SYSTEMATIC

THEOLOGY

CHARLES HODGE, D.D.

GRAND RAPIDS, MICH.

Primary Idea of Faith is Trust. — More limited Sense of the Word Definitions of Faith founded on its Subjective Nature, --

First, a Degree of Conviction less than Knowledge, but stronger than Opinion 46

Second, a Conviction determined by the Will 49

Definition founded on the Objects of Faith. — Conviction of the Truth of Things not seen 53

Definitions founded on the Kind of Evidence on which the Conviction rests, --

First, a Conviction founded on Feeling 52

Second, a Conviction founded on Testimony 60 § 3. Different Kinds of Faith 67 § 4. Relation of Faith and Knowledge 75 § 5. Relation of Faith and Feeling 88 § 6. Relation of Faith and Love 93 § 7. Object of Saving Faith 95 § 8. Effects of Faith 104

Assurance 106

Certainty of Salvation 110 CHAPTER XVII. JUSTIFICATION. § 1. Symbolical Statement of the Doctrine 114 § 2. Justification a forensic Act 118

Proof of the Doctrine 120

Calvin's Doctrine 133 § 3. Works not the Ground of Justification 134

Romish Doctrine. — Remonstrant Doctrine. — Protestant Doctrine 137 § 4. The Righteousness of Christ the Ground of Justification 141 § 5. Imputation of Righteousness 144 § 6. Proof of the Doctrine of Imputation 150 § 7. Consequences of the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness 161 § 8. Relation of Faith to Justification 165

Romish Doctrine. — Remonstrant Doctrine. — Protestant Doctrine 170 § 9. Objections to the Protestant Doctrine of Justification 171 § 10. Departures from the Protestant Doctrine 179

Rationalistic Theories. — Philosophical Theories. — Speculative Theologians 199 CHAPTER XVIII. SANCTIFICATION. § 1. Its Nature 213

Nature of Good Works. — Romish Doctrine. — Works of Supererogation. — Precepts and Counsels 235 § 5. Necessity of Good Works 238

Theism the Foundation of the Moral Law. — Christian Liberty in Matters of Indifference. — Scriptural Use of the Word "Law." — Different Kinds of Laws. — Perfection of the Law. — The Decalogue. — Rules of Interpretation 272 § 2. Division of the Contents of the Decalogue 272 § 3. The Preface to the Ten Commandments 275 § 4. The First Commandment 277 § 5. Invocation of Saints 281

Worship of Images forbidden. — Doctrine and Usage of the Romish Church 296

Import of the Command. — Oaths. — Romish Doctrine. — Vows. — Monastic Vows 319 § 8. The Fourth Commandment 321

Its Design. — Origin and Perpetual Obligation of the Sabbath 323

How it is to be sanctified 336

Sunday Laws 340 § 9. The Fifth Commandment.-- Its Design 348

Filial Relation. — Parental Duties. — The Obedience due to Civil Magistrates 356

Obedience to the Church 360 § 10. The Sixth Commandment. — Its Design 362

Capital Punishment 363

Celibacy. — Marriage a Divine Institution 376

As a Civil Institution 377

Monogamy 389

Converted Polygamists 387

Divorce 391

Doctrine of the Church of Rome. — In what Sense Marriage is a Sacrament 398

Laws of Protestant Countries 401

The Social Evil 406

Foundation of the Right of Property. — Community of Goods. --Communism and Socialism. — International Society — Violations of the Eighth Commandment 434 § 13. The Ninth Commandment 437

Importance of Truth. — Detraction.-- Falsehood. — Mental Reservation. — Pious Frauds. — False Miracles 452 § 14. The Tenth Commandment 463 CHAPTER XX. THE MEANS OF GRACE. § 1. The Word of God 466

Office of the Word as a Means of Grace. — Lutheran Doctrine 479 § 2. The Sacraments 485

Their Nature. — Usage of the Word. — Theological Definition. — Lutheran Doctrine. — Romish Doctrine. — Remonstrant Doctrine 490 § 3. Number of the Sacraments 492 § 4. Efficacy of the Sacraments 49S

Zwinglian and Remonstrant Doctrine. — Reformed Doctrine. — Lutheran Doctrine. — Romish Doctrine. — The "Ex Opere Operato" Doctrine 509 § 5. The Necessity of the Sacraments 516 § 6. The Validity of the Sacraments 523 § 7. Baptism 526

Its Mode. — Use of the Word 526 § 8. The Formula of Baptism 539 § 9. The Subjects of Baptism. — Qualifications for Adult Baptism 541 § 10. Infant Baptism 548

Visible Church is a Divine Institution. — It does not consist exclusively of the Regenerate. — The Commonwealth of Israel was the Church. — The Church under the Christian Dispensation Identical with that of the Old. — The Terms of Admission into the Church the Same under both Dispensations. — Infants were Members of the Church under the Old Testament Economy. — They are still Members of the Church. — They need and are capable of receiving the Benefits of Redemption 55S § 11. Whose Children are entitled to Baptism? 558

Usage of the Church of Rome. — Theories adopted by many Protestants. — President Edwards's Doctrine. — The Half-Way Covenant 567

Puritan Doctrine. — Usage of the Reformed Churches 573 § 12. Efficacy of Baptism 579

Doctrine of the Reformed Churches. — Baptismal Regeneration 591 § 13. Lutheran Doctrine of Baptism 604 § 14. Doctrine of the Church of Rome 605 § 15. The Lord's Supper 511

Of Perpetual Obligation 511

Elements to be Used. — Sacramental Actions. — Its Design. — Qualifications for the Lord's Supper 629 § 16. Doctrine of the Reformed Churches 626

Zwinglian View. — Calvin's Doctrine. — The Form of Statement in which the Zwinglians and Calvinists Agree 631

The Sense in which Christ is Present in the Sacrament 637

Manducation 643

What is Received in the Lord's Supper 645

The Efficacy of the Lord's Supper 647 § 17. Modern Views on this Sacrament 650 § 18. The Lutheran Doctrine 661 § 19. Doctrine of the Church of Rome 677

Transubstantiation. — Withholding the Cup from the Laity 685

The Lord's Supper as a Sacrifice 685 § 20. Prayer 692

The Object of Prayer 700

Requisites for Acceptable Prayer 701

Different Kinds of Prayer 705

Public Prayer 707

Power of Prayer 708 PART IV. ESCHATOLOGY. CHAPTER I. STATE OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH. § 1. Protestant Doctrine 718

The Old Testament Doctrine on the Future State 716

Intermediate State 724 § 2. Sleep of the Soul 730 § 3. Patristic Doctrine of the Intermediate State 733 § 4. Doctrine of the Church of Rome 743

Purgatory 749 CHAPTER II. RESURRECTION. § 1. Scriptural Doctrine 771 § 2. History of the Doctrine 781 CHAPTER III. SECOND ADVENT. § 1. Preliminary Remarks 790 § 2. The Church Doctrine 792 § 3. Personal Advent of Christ 792 § 4. Calling of the Gentiles 800 § 5. Conversion of the Jews 805

Are the Jews to be Restored to their Own Land? 807 § 6. Antichrist 812

The Papacy the Antichrist of St. Paul.-- The Antichrist of Daniel 823

The Antichrist of the Apocalypse 825

Roman Catholic Doctrine of Antichrist 831 CHAPTER IV. CONCOMITANTS OF THE SECOND ADVENT. § 1. The General Resurrection 837 § 2. The Final Judgment 844 § 3. The End of the World 851 § 4. The Kingdom of Heaven 855 § 5. Theory of the Premillennial Advent 861

Did the Apostles expect the Second Advent in their Day? 867 § 6. Future Punishment 868

Duration of Future Punishment.-- Objections to the Scriptural Doctrine 878

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

CHAPTER XV.

REGENERATION

§ 1. Usage of the Word.

The subjective change wrought in the soul by the grace of God, is variously designated in Scripture. It is called a new birth, a resurrection, a new life, a new creature, a renewing of the mind, a dying to sin and living to righteousness, a translation from darkness to light, etc. In theological language, it is called regeneration, renovation, conversion. These terms are often used interchangeably. They are also used sometimes for the whole process of spiritual renovation or restoration of the image of God, and sometimes for a particular stage of that process. Thus Calvin gives the term its widest scope: "Uno verbo poenitentiam interpretor regenerationem, cujus non alius est scopus nisi ut imago Dei, quae per Adae transgressionem foedata et tantum non obliterata fuerat, in nobis reformetur. . . . Atque haec quidem instauratio non uno momento, vel die, vel anno impletur, sed per continuos, imo etiam lentos interdum profectus abolet Deus in electis suis carnis corruptelas." [1]

With the theologians of the seventeenth century conversion and regeneration were synonymous terms. In the acts of the Synod of Dort, we find such expressions as "Status conversionis aut regenerationis," and "effecta ad conversionem sive regenerationem praevia." John Owen, in his work on the Holy Spirit, follows the same usage. The fifth chapter of the third book of that work is entitled "The nature of regeneration," and one of the heads under this is, "Conversion not wrought by moral suasion only." "If the Holy Spirit," he says, "acts no otherwise on men in regeneration or conversion," then so and so follows. Turrettin, as we have seen, distinguishes between what he calls "conversio habitualis" and "conversio actualis." "Conversio habitualia seu passiva, fit per habituum supernaturalium infusionem a Spiritu Sancto. Actualis vero seu activa per bonorum istorum exercitium. . . . Per illam homo renovatur et convertitur a Deo. Per istam homo a Deo renovatus et convertus convertit se ad Deum, et actus agit. Illa melius regeneratio dicitur, quia se habet ad modum novae nativitatis, qua homo reformatur ad imaginem Creatoris sui. Ista vero conversio, quia includit hominis ipsius operationem." This is clear and accurate. As these two things are distinct they should be designated by different terms. Great confusion arises from this ambiguity of terms. The questions whether man is active or passive in regeneration and whether regeneration is effected by the mediate or immediate influence of the Spirit must be answered in one way if regeneration includes conversion, and in another if it be taken in its restricted sense. In the Bible, the distinction is generally preserved; metanoia, repentance, change of mind, turning to God, i.e., conversion, is what man is called upon to do; anagennesis, regeneration, is the act of God. God regenerates; the soul is regenerated. In the Romish Church justification is making subjectively just, i.e., free from sin and inwardly holy. So is regeneration. So is sanctification. These terms, therefore, in the theology of that church are constantly interchanged.

Even by the Lutherans, in the "Apology for the Augsburg Confession," regeneration is made to include justification. That is, it is made to include the whole process by which the sinner is transferred from a state of sin and condemnation into a state of salvation. In the "Form of Concord" it is said, "Vocabulum regenerationis interdum in eo sensu accipitur, ut simul et remissionem peccatorum (quae duntaxat propter Christam contingit) et subsequentem renovationem complectatur, quam Spiritus Sanctus in illis, qui per fidem justificati sunt, operatur, quandoque etiam solam remissionem peceatorum, et adoptionem in filios Dei significat. Et in hoc posteriore usu saepe multumque id vocabulam in Apologia Confessionis ponitur. Verbi gratia, cum dicitur: Justificatio est regeneratio. . . . Quin etiam vivificationis vocabulum interdum ita accipitur, ut remissionem peccatorum notet. Cum enim homo per fidem (quam quidem solus Spiritus Sanctus operatur) justificatur, id ipsum revera est quaedam regeneratio, quia ex filio irae fit filius Dei, et hoc modo e morte in vitam transfertur. . . . Deinde etiam regeneratio saepe pro sanctificatione et renovatione (quae fidei justificationem sequitur) usurpatur. In qua significatione D. Lutherus hac voce, tum in libro de ecelesia et conciliis, tum alibi etiam, multum usus est." [3]

As this lax use of terms was unavoidably attended with great confusion, the "Form of Concord" itself, and the later Lutheran theologians were more precise. They made especially a sharp distinction between justification and anything signifying a subjective change in the sinner.

In the early Church regeneration often expressed, not any inward moral change, but an external change of state or relation. Among the Jews when a heathen became a proselyte to their religion, he was said to be born again. The change of his status from without to within the theocracy, was called regeneration. This usage in a measure passed over to the Christian Church. When a man became a member of the Church he was said to be born anew; and baptism, which was the rite of initiation, was called regeneration. This use of the word has not yet entirely passed away. A distinction is still sometimes made between regeneration and spiritual renovation. The one is external, the other internal. Some of the advocates of baptismal regeneration make this distinction, and interpret the language of the formulas of the Church of England in accordance with it. The regeneration effected in baptism, in their view, is not any spiritual change in the state of the soul, but simply a birth into the visible Church.

Institutio, lib. III. cap. iii. 9, edit. Berlin, 1834, vol. i. p. 389.

Locus xv. quaes. iv. 13, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. ii. p. 460.

§ 2. Nature of Regeneration.

By a consent almost universal the word regeneration is now used to designate, not the whole work of sanctification, nor the first stages of that work comprehended in conversion, much less justification or any mere external change of state, but the instantaneous change from spiritual death to spiritual life. Regeneration, therefore, is a spiritual resurrection; the beginning of a new life. Sometimes the word expresses the act of God. God regenerates. Sometimes it designates the subjective effect of his act. The sinner is regenerated. He becomes a new creature. He is born again. And this is his regeneration. These two applications of the word are so allied as not to produce confusion. The nature of regeneration is not explained in the Bible further than the account therein given of its author, God, in the exercise of the exceeding greatness of his power; its subject, the whole soul; and its effects, spiritual life, and all consequent holy acts and states. Its metaphysical nature is left a mystery. It is not the province of either philosophy or theology to solve that mystery. It is, however, the duty of the theologian to examine the various theories concerning the nature of this saving change, and to reject all such as are inconsistent with the Word of God.

Not a change in the Substance of the Soul.

Regeneration does not consist in any change in the substance of the soul. The only advocate of the opposite doctrine among Protestant theologians was Flacius Illyricus, so called from the place of his birth. He was one of the most prominent Lutheran theologians in what is called the second Reformation in Germany. He did great service in the cause of truth in resisting the synergism of Melancthon, and the concessions which that eminent but yielding reformer was disposed to make to the papists. He contributed some of the most important works of the age in which he lived to the vindication of the Protestant faith. His "Catalogus Testiam Veritatis," designed to prove that the doctrine of the Reformation had had their witnesses in all ages; his "Clavis Scripturae Sacrae;" and especially the great historical work, "The Magdeburg Centuries" (in thirteen volumes, folio), of which he was the originator and principal author, attest his learning, talents, and untiring industry. His fervent and uncompromising spirit involved him in many difficulties and sorrows. He died worn out by suffering and labour, says his biographer; one of those men of faith of whom the world was not worthy. Always extreme in his opinions, he held that original sin was a corruption of the substance of the soul, and regeneration such a change of that substance as to restore its normal purity. All his friends who had sided with him in his controversy with the Synergists and the supporters of the Leipzig Interim, forsook him now, and he stood alone. In the "Form of Concord," adopted to settle all the controversies of the period, these peculiar views of Flacius were condemned as a virtual revival of the Manichaean heresy. It was urged that if the substance of the soul be sinful, God, by whom each individual soul is created, must be the author of sin; and that Christ who, in assuming our nature, became consubstantial with us, must be a partaker of sin. No Christian Church has assumed the responsibility of the doctrine of Flacius, or held that regeneration involves a change of the essence of the soul.

Regeneration does not consist in an Act of the Soul.

Regeneration does not consist in any act or acts of the soul. The word here, of course, is to be understood not as including conversion, much less the whole work of sanctification, but in its restricted sense for the commencement of spiritual life. The opposite view, which makes regeneration, even in its narrowest sense, an act of the soul, has been held by very different classes of theologians. It is, of course, involved in the Pelagian doctrine which denies moral character to everything except acts of the will. If "all sin is sinning," and "all love loving," then every moral change in man must be a change from one form of voluntary activity to another. As the later Remonstrants held the principle in question they made regeneration to consist in the sinner's own act in turning unto God. The influence exerted on him was one which he could yield to or resist. If he yielded, it was a voluntary decision, and in that decision his regeneration, or the beginning of his religious life, consisted.

Dr. Emmons's View.

Dr. Emmons, holding that all sin and holiness consist in acts, which acts, whether sinful or holy, are immediately created by God, makes regeneration to consist in God's giving rise to the commencement of a series of holy acts. In his discourse on Regeneration, the first proposition which he undertakes to establish is, "that the Spirit of God, in regeneration, produces nothing but love." This is maintained in opposition to those who say that the Spirit produces a new nature, principle, disposition, or taste. "Those in the state of nature," he says, "stand in no need of having any new power, or faculty, or principle of action produced in them, in order to their becoming holy. They are just as capable of loving as of hating God. . . . This is true of all sinners, who are as much moral agents, and the proper subjects of moral government, before as after regeneration. Whenever, therefore, the divine Spirit renews, regenerates, or sanctifies them, He has no occasion of producing anything in their minds besides love." "The love which the Spirit of God produces in regeneration is the love of benevolence, and not the love of complacence." "Though there is no natural or necessary connection between the first exercise of love and all future exercises of grace yet there is a constituted connection, which renders future exercises of grace as certain, as if they flowed from a new nature, or holy principle, as many suppose." His first inference from the doctrine of his sermon is, "If the Spirit of God produces nothing but love in regeneration, then there is no ground for the distinction which is often made between regeneration, conversion, and sanctification. They are, in nature and kind, precisely the same frdits of the Spirit. In regeneration, He produces holy exercises; in conversion, He produces holy exercises; and in sanctification, He produces holy exercises." Secondly, "If the Spirit of God in regeneration produces nothing but love, then men are no more passive in regeneration than in conversion or sanctification. Those who hold that the divine Spirit in regeneration produces something prior to love as the foundation of it, that is, a new nature, or new principle of holiness, maintain that men are passive in regeneration, but active in conversion and sanctification. . . . But if what has been said in this discourse be true, there is no new nature, or principle of action, produced in regeneration, but only love, which is activity itself." [8]

Professor Finney's Doctrine.

Professor Finney, in his "Lectures on Systematic Theology, teaches: (1.) That satisfaction, happiness, blessedness, is the only absolute good; that virtue is only relatively good, i.e., good as tending to produce happiness. (2.) That all virtue lies in the intention to promote the happiness of being, that is, of universal being. There is no virtue in emotion, feeling, or any state of the sensibility, for these are involuntary. Love to God even is not complacency in his excellence, but "willing him good." (3.) All sin is selfishness, or the choice of our own happiness in preference to the good of universal being. (4.) Every moral agent is always "as sinful or holy as with their knowledge they can be." (5.) "As the moral law is the law of nature, it is absurd to suppose that entire obedience to it should not be the unalterable condition of salvation." (6.) Regeneration is an "instantaneous" change "from entire sinfulness to entire holiness." It is a simple change of purpose.

The system of Professor Finney is a remarkable product of relentless logic. It is valuable as a warning. It shows to what extremes the human mind may be carried when abandoned to its own guidance. He begins with certain axioms, or, as he calls them, truths of the reason, and from these he draws conclusions which are indeed logical deductions, but which shock the moral sense, and prove nothing but that his premises are false. His fundamental principle is that ability limits obligation. Free will is defined to be "the power of choosing, or refusing to choose, in compliance with moral obligation in every instance." "Consciousness of the affirmation of ability to comply with any requisition, is a necessary condition of the affirmation of obligation to comply with that requisition." "To talk of inability to obey moral law, is to talk sheer nonsense." [13]

But it is acknowledged that man's ability is confined to acts of the will, therefore moral character can be predicated only of such acts. The acts of the will are either choices or volitions. "By choice is intended the selection or choice of an end. By volition is intended the executive efforts of the will to secure the end intended." We are responsible, therefore, only for our choices in the selection of an ultimate end. "It is generally agreed that moral obligation respects strictly only the ultimate intention or choice of an end for its own sake." "I have said that moral obligation respects the ultimate intention only. I am now prepared to say, still further, that this is a first truth of reason." "Right can be predicated only of good-will, and wrong only of selfishness. . . . It is right for him [for a man] to intend the highest good of being as an end. If he honestly does this, he cannot, doing this, mistake his duty, for in doing this he really performs the whole of duty." "Moral character belongs solely to the ultimate intention of the mind, or to choice, as distinguished from volition." [18]

The end to be chosen is "the highest good of being." "Good may be natural or moral. Natural good is synonymous with valuable. Moral good is synonymous with virtue." Moral good is only a relative good. It does meet a demand of our being, and therefore produces satisfaction. This satisfaction is the ultimate good of being." "I come now to state the point upon which issue is taken, to wit: That enjoyment, blessedness, or mental satisfaction, is the only ultimate good." "Of what value is the true, the right, the just, etc., aside from the pleasure as mental satisfaction resulting from them to sentient existences." [22]

It follows from these principles that men perform their whole duty, and are perfect, if they intend the happiness of being in general. There is no morality in emotions, sentiments, or feelings. These are involuntary states of the sensibility, and are in themselves neither good nor bad. "If any outward action or state of the feeling exists, in opposition to the intention or choice of the mind, it cannot by any possibility have moral character. Whatever is beyond the control of a moral agent, he cannot be responsible for." "Love may, and often does exist, as every one knows, in the form of a mere feeling or emotion. . . . This emotion or feeling, as we are all aware, is purely an involuntary state of mind. Because it is a phenomenon of the sensibility, and of course a passive state of mind, it has in itself no moral character." Gratitude, "as a mere feeling or phenomenon of the sensibility, . . . has no moral character." The same is said of benevolence, compassion, mercy, conscientiousness, etc. The doctrine is, "No state of the sensibility, . . . has any moral character in itself." The love which has moral excellence, and which is the fulfilling of the law, is not a feeling of complacency, but "good-will," willing the good or happiness of its object. Should a man, therefore, under the impulse of a benevolent feeling, or a sense of duty, perform a right act, he would sin as really as if, under the impulse of malice or cupidity, he should perform a bad act. The illustration is, that to pay a debt from a sense of justice, is as wicked as to steal a horse from acquisitiveness. A man "may be prevented [from committing commercial injustice] by a constitutional or phrenological conscientiousness or sense of justice. But this is only a feeling of the sensibility, and if restrained only by this, he is just as absolutely selfish as if he had stolen a horse in obedience to acquisitiveness." "If the selfish man were to preach the gospel, it would be only because upon the whole it was most pleasing or gratifying to himself, and not at all for the sake of the good of being as an end. If he should become a pirate, it would be exactly for the same reason. . . . Whichever course he takes, he takes it for precisely the same reason; and with the same degree of light it must involve the same degree of guilt." To feed the poor from a feeling of benevolence, and to murder a parent from a feeling of malice, involve the same degree of guilt! Such a sacrifice to logic was never made by any man before. But still more wonderful, if possible, is the declaration that a man may "feel deeply malicious and revengeful feelings toward God. But sin does not consist in these feelings, nor necessarily imply them." [29]