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‘Theology ES brary
PREEACE.
Tus little work is primarily intended as an assistance to those students who are reading the subject of Grace for their examination in the Theological School at Oxford; but it is thought that it may be useful also for Candidates for Holy Orders, and others who are desirous of mastering the opinions of the Church on this important subject. In preparing the work, I have to acknowledge my obligations to Dr. Bright's *Anti-Pelagian Treatises," the introduction to which book furnished me with one or two valuable hints; but in the main I have derived my information from an independent study of S. Augustine's works. I have derived very much assistance in doing so from the excellent arrangement and invaluable Index of the Benedictine Edition of that Father. My reading, if it has done nothing else, has at least convinced me that no adequate knowledge
vill PREFACE.
of S. Augustine’s opinions can be obtained except by a study of the writer’s actual works at first hand: and it is hoped that this little book may lead others to gain for themselves, by such study, a much more complete and clear view than can be got by only reading through the quotations of the Father which are here made. Any other works which I have consulted will be found referred to in the foot-notes. The quotations from S. Augustine and Prosper are from the Benedictine edition. The references are made to the same edition. The chapters are added in brackets for the convenience of reference.
INTRODUCTION,
THE Second Council of Orange has one peculiar feature, that it passed no original canons of its own. The object with which the Council met, as the Preface states, was to examine and ratify certain Articles or Cafitula, sent by Felix IV., bishop of Rome. This object it literally fulfilled, adding probably nothing whatever, except the Preface or Preamble just alluded to, and a concluding paragraph explaining why it was that certain of the illustrious laity had been invited to sign, as wellas the thirteen bishops. This was also an unusual step, though not without precedent in the history of Church Councils.
These Articles, with the exception of Art X., were borrowed almost verbatim from two writers, viz., Prosper probably a layman of Aquitaine, and Gennadius, a presbyter of Marseilles.
For an account of the former of these, and the part he played as an opponent of Pelagian opinions, the reader should by all means consult the Introduction to Dr. Bright's * Anti-Pelagian Treatises." *
Of Gennadius nothing is known, except what we may, gather from the two works he has left us. The first, De
ZU Dpexlvss- 1x1. 2
INTRODUCTION.
Scriptoribus ecclesiasticis, is merely an imitation and continuation of the similar work of S. Jerome, the second, Liber de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, written probably 492-94, is that from which the quotations in these Articles are made. It is a kind of summary of the writer’s own faith and opinions on matters of doctrine and various religious questions. On essentials of Christian faith, the writer is in form very dogmatic, and for the most part rigidly orthodox; but on other subjects he showed himself to be a man of independent views. Thus he candidly confessed that he did not believe that the present world would be hereafter literally destroyed by fire, but only renovated.* On the subject of the Holy Communion, he recommended in most cases a weekly, but spoke doubtfully of the value
.|of a daily, reception.2 On the doctrine of grace, with
which we are chiefly concerned, we find the same outspoken candour. While he strongly insisted on the necessity of preventing grace (See Articles I.—VIIL.), he condemns in the most unqualified terms the doctrine of a predestined Reprobation (see last paragraph but one of the acts of the Council); and in so doing he tacitly condemns S. Augustine himsel£3 Partly on this account, and partly on account of his depreciation of S. Augustine and Prosper, and his approbation of Faustus in the De Viris Lilustribus, he is sometimes charged with being a semi-Pelagian. But such a charge would seem to be amply refuted by his own language in Arts. I.-VIII., and some have in consequence regarded his accounts of these people as spurious. It is possible that Gennadius,
* See Lib. de Eccles. Dogm., Ixx. ? [bid. liii. 3 See notes on this passage below pp. 46, 47. ^ See Article on Gennadius, in Smith's Dict. of Eccles. Biogr.
INTRODUCTION.
without belonging definitely to the semi-Pelagian party, may have partially come under the influence of the semi- Pelagian Cassian, who was himself a monk of Marseilles.
The Liber de Eccles. Dogm. of Gennadius was, as he himself says in the account of himself at the close of his other work, sent by himself to Pope Gelasius, and hence passed into the hands of Felix, his successor, who transmitted it to the Council. If it were clear that Gennadius was a semi-Pelagian, the acts of the Council would represent a curious phenomenon, viz., a combination in one set of Articles of the statements of two writers of different and more or less directly antagonistic schools on the same subject, without the church either then or since having discovered any discrepancy between the two.
The quotations made from Gennadius only in the acts of the Council comprise Articles I.-VIIL, and the paragraphs which follow Article XXV. The rest, with the exception of Article X., are all quoted from Prosper's Liber Sententiarum. But this work was a collection of extracts taken almost entirely (sometimes 1t is true, with slight alterations) from S. Augustine, and there are only three of them quoted in the acts, viz, Articles IX., XIL, and XIV., which were not so derived. And the two last even of these appear to be adaptations of S. Augustine's language." Three of the Articles quoted from Prosper, viz, XIIL, XIX., and XXI., had been already quoted by Gennadius, and if we can trust our MSS., they would seem to have been taken verbally from that source, for the text will be found to agree with Gennadius rather than Prosper.?
t See notes on Arts. XIL, XIV. ? See notes on Arts. XIIL, XIX., XXI.
INTRODUCTION.
Thus the Articles of this Council fall mainly under three distinct heads—
(1) Arts. L-VIII. A condemnation of semi-Pelagian opinions taken consecutively from Gennadius.
(2) IX., and XL-XXV,. Selections from Prosper’s Sentences (quoted for the most part from S. Augustine) refuting various points in Pelagian doctrines, and arranged not on any doctrinal principle, but in the order in which they occurred in Prosper, but not consecutive.
(3) A general summary of the Catholic doctrine as opposed to Pelagian and semi-Pelagian views, taken consecutively from Gennadius.
The order in the second of these divisions is purely accidental. Prosper himself makes the quotations in the order in which they occurred in the books of S. Augustine he quotes. To attempt therefore to discover any doctrinal method in their arrangement must be a useless waste of labour.
Before studying in detail the language of these Articles it is important that the reader should thoroughly understand the main points at issue in the Pelagian controversy. He will then be able to see readily and clearly the bearing of smaller questions on those which may be considered fundamental. In order to do this he should first endeavour to acquaint himself with the doctrines of either party considered as a whole, and then compare their respective views in detail, and so get to understand the several points on which they differed from each other. We here give a short summary of the views of either party, which the reader should fill up from his own reading.
Following what we may call the historical order, we may divide the subject into four main divisions according
INTRODUCTION.
as the questions affected: (1) the nature of man; (2) sin; (3) grace; (4) good works.
On these four heads the views of Pelagius* may be described as follows—
(1) Human nature, consisting of a mortal body? and an immortal soul,is acknowledged in both its parts to be the creation of God, made for the highest purposes, and potentially at least good. Man thus constituted had the alternative of good and evil offered to him, with the
free power of choosing either. "This last is called in|
theological language Zjerum arbitrium. Adam as a fact chose the evil and so sinned.
(2) Sins must be regarded either as wrong actions done, or good actions omitted. They have in no sense an essential existence, and cannot therefore inherently belong to human nature, so as to affect it as a disease.3 Adam's sin cannot therefore have produced any real effect on human nature. Men are still in a similar position to Adam, and endowed with a nature precisely similar both in body and soul. They have the same free choice between good and evil, and if they sin, they are merely following the bad example set them by Adam.4
(3) In order to attain to holiness, and obtain everlasting life, man needs God's help and grace in many ways.
(a) It is by God's goodness and power alone that man receives forgiveness for past sins.5
(2) He has a nature endowed with an inherent power
* Some of these opinions were disclaimed by Pelagius (see De Gest. Pel. passim), but, in spite of his quibbles, they may be considered a fair representation of the views held at least by his party.
5 De Nat. et Grat: (xxxiv.) § 39.
INTRODUCTION.
of doing good (zzseparabilzs possibilitas nature)*: but this nature thus endowed is itself the gift of God, because He made it.
(c) He has had from various times revelations from God, especially those known as the law given on Sinai, and the gospel given by Christ. These teach man what he ought to do.?
(2) The fact that he has the choice of obeying the law thus revealed is part of God's constitution. This freechoice is therefore also a gift of God.3
(4) Man may, and indeed must, obtain holiness, by using all these gifts of God, and by them doing good works. Such works are the condition and ground of obtaining acceptance with God, who, being just and holy, rewards us if we do good works pleasing to Him, and punishes us if we do the contrary. Good works therefore merit God's grace (so understood) and in the end eternal life. Those most insisted on are the entire renunciation of riches.5
'There were two other doctrines closely connected and generally held with these—
(5) That as human nature was in itself sinless, it was absurd to baptize infants who had committed no actual sin, and were therefore saved if they died.
(6) That it was quite possible, by the help of God's revelation without and his own natural power within, for man to live a perfectly sinless life, and several have actually done so.7 It should be observed that, according
5 Aug. contr. d. Ep. Pel. I. (xxii.) § 40. 7 De Nat. et Grat. (vii.) $ 8; (xxxvi.) $ 42, &c.
INTRODUCTION.
to Pelagius’ view, a very large number of small sins, such especially as arise from ignorance or forgetfulness, were regarded as inevitable, and therefore, not being subject to his free-choice, as in reality no sins at all.*
Following the same method of arrangement, we may describe the corresponding tenets of S. Augustine almost in his own words as follows—
(1) Both parts of human nature, Ze., body and soul, were made by God out of nothing. Both were originally immortal. Adam therefore, had he not sinned, would have continued to have lived on for ever. Man was endowed not merely with a bare Z/berum arbitrium, but with a goodwill (dona voluntas), z.e., a definite love of good implied in the very idea of rectitude?; but even in this condition of integrity he needed God's grace to keep him from sin.3
(2) Sin, though not in itself having an essential existence, was able to and did affect the nature of man both in body and soul, which are substances, much as hunger or disease, which are equally without essential existence, weaken or impair the body. Man's whole nature was thus by Adam's transgression “changed for the worse."5 The bona voluntas was entirely lost, and his choice was no longer properly free, but inclined to evil.ó This change affected the nature not only of Adam himself, but of all those who are descended from him, and so derive from him not only their body, but also probably
* De Nat. et Grat. (xii.) $ 13.
? Aug. De Civ. Dei, XIV. xi. 1.
3 See notes on Art. XIX. 4 De Nat. et Grat. (xx.) § 22. 5 See notes on Arts. I., II. $ See notes on Art. XIII.
INTRODUCTION.
their soul,* just in the same way as bodily diseases are sometimes inherited.
(3) The kinds of Divine grace acknowledged by Pelagius are inadequate to produce a condition of justitéa or holiness in man.
(z) Forgiveness alone is not enough. It can only have a remedial effect on the past. It cannot supply strength for the future.?
(2) Nature is not enough, especially now that man has lost his original natural power. He wants, therefore, a supernatural power to restore nature, and enable him to combat with sin.3
(c) Revelations from God, in whatever form, have of themselves no power to give man the inward moral and spiritual strength he needs. They are but preparatory to. grace. The only moving power they can have is terror ; but if they compel men to do right from fear of punishment, the motive is wrong, and the outwardly right actions are sins in the sight of God who sees the heart.* The law shows man what is right and what is wrong, but does not give him the power of obedience. Practically it frequently aggravates the evil. The rebellious spirit in man often sins all the more grievously because he cannot bear the restraint the law imposes upon him, just as the river dashes with greater violence over the barriers placed across it.5
(2) Man's choice is no longer free. If itis free in any
See notes on Art. I.
De Nat. et Grat. (xxvi.) § 29.
De Spir. et Lit. (xxvii.) $ 47. De Nat. et Grat. (iii.) $3. De Spir. et Lit. (viii.) $$ 13, 14.
INTRODUCTION.
sense, it is only free to do evil, not to do good. In either case it does not of itself constitute a moving power.
(4) Man therefore, in order to reach the desired state, and obtain eternal life, needs the special grace of God at all times, and no single good action can be done without the special help of God.? Good works are therefore the works of God working with us and in us,3 and as such only can merit a reward.* It is the grace of God which first moves a man to seek for more grace from Him, and gives him the first beginnings of faith. By the grace of God he is reborn in Baptism.® By the grace of God through the Holy Spirit is infused charity, by which he loves God and does what pleases Him.7 By the grace of God he perseveres unto the end, until he reaches perfection.?
(5) On the first of the two remaining doctrines S. Augustine urges most emphatically and repeatedly that infants being born in sin require the Regeneration of Baptism, and cannot otherwise be saved.9 He even argues that they are not only condemned, but justly condemned, on the grounds that sin as such deserves God's condemnation.'^ In one passage, however, he considers that God may grant them a far milder condemnation than wilful and deliberate sinners.'*
(6) On the last point S. Augustine wavered consider-
* See notes on Art. XIII. ? De Gest Pel. (xiv.) 88 30, 31. 3 See note on Arts. IX., XX. 4 See notes on Art. XVIII.
5 See note on Art. V. © De Gest. Pel. (xii.) $ 28.
7 De Spir. et Lit. (iii.) § 5, &c. ? See notes on Art. X.
™ De Pecc. Mer. I. (xvi. $ 21. (Quoted by Dr. Bright, Anti-Pel.
Treat. xiv., Note 4.)
INTRODUCTION.
ably. At first, on theological grounds, he was ready sometimes to admit the possibility of being without sin by the special power and grace of God * ; but he usually modified this by asserting that no man had actually lived here without sin, and relegating the sinless state to man's condition hereafter. He is inclined, however, in one passage to make a single exception in the case of the Virgin Mary.3 In his treatise, De Dono Perseverantie,* he even goes so far as to speak of the doctrine of human sinlessness as one of the three cardinal errors of the Pelagians; but perhaps he intended to refer only to sinlessness deemed possible without Divine grace.
Later on the main subject of the controversy changed, or rather the controversy was more or less restricted to a single topic, viz, the necessity of preventing grace, which was denied by the more moderate semi-Pelagian party. The quotations from Gennadius (Articles I.- VIII.) are entirely concerned with this subject. They reiterate in a variety of ways the doctrine that man cannot himself initiate the moral and spiritual work which results in Regeneration, but that it depends upon God. The remaining Articles treat of this and also the other parts of the wider subject as, especially, the need of co-operating grace, by which alone man can persevere.
If we except the short passage bearing upon Predestination, the Articles of the Council can certainly claim to represent the views of S. Augustine. As we have seen, the larger number of them (XI. & XV.-XXV.) are actually though indirectly quoted almost verbally from his writings.
* De Spir. et Lit. (i.-v.), §§ 1-7, &c. ? De Nat. et Grat (Ix.), $ 7o, &c. 3 [bid. xxxvi., $ 42. ^ De Don. Pers. (ii.) $ 4.
INTRODUCTION.
The first eight are so like S. Augustine’s teaching that there is hardly a phrase for which we cannot find an equivalent in his works. They show that Gennadius, their author, was a man who had carefully studied and caught the spirit of the champion for Divine grace. Similarly, Articles IX., X., XIL, XIV., exactly represent, though in somewhat different language, S. Augustine's teaching on the same topics.
It has sometimes been maintained, as by Milman,? that we have also a distinct departure from, or at least a modification of, the Augustinian theology in the insertion, as it is implied, by the Western Church of outward means of grace, such as Baptism, which narrowed the sphere of God's action to the limits of the outward and visible Church, so that while it expressly condemned semi-Pelagianism it really introduced semi-Pelagian ideas. Whether this can or cannot be fairly considered a human limitation of Divine power need not be discussed here; but it is only fair to recognise the fact that the limitation itself was repeatedly recognised by S. Augustine, who spoke sometimes in the most uncompromising manner of those who were without the reach of outward means of grace.^ Atthe same time it must be confessed that by the adoption of Gennadius's alteration of S. Augustine's language in Art. XIII., and of Gennadius's own language on the connection of preventing grace with Baptism in Art. V. and in the concluding paragraph, the Council did undoubtedly give a distinct prominence to Baptism as the outward means of electing grace.
The Augustinian character of the Articles as a whole
* Hist. of Lat. Christ., Bk. ii. ch. ii. 2 See, e.g., De Nat. et. Grat. (iv.) 8 45; (ix.) § 10.
can only be understood and appreciated by comparing the language of the Articles with that of the great father himself. And the student is recommended to make a careful study of the quotations given in full in the notes for this purpose from S. Augustine’s works.
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
CONCILIUM ARAUSICANUM SECUNDUM.
CONSTITUTIO EPISCOPORUM IN CIVITATE ARAUSICANA, DE GRATIA ET LIBERO ARBITRIO.
In dedicatione basilicze a Liberio patricio constructz celebratum, quinto nonas Julias, Decio Juniore, viro clarissimo, consule; id est, anno Christi DX XIX. Felicis IV. Papze anno tertio.
PRZEFATIO.
* The reference is undoubtedly mainly to S. Augustine, whose language actually is incorporated for the most part in Arts. XI.-X X V, What follows must be understood as meaning that the tenour of the language was derived from Holy Scripture. At same time these Articles actually contain many scriptural quotations. Prosper is also probably referred to. "The statement is evidently taken from
THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
WHAT WAS DECIDED BY THE BISHOPS IN THE TOWN OF ORANGE CONCERNING GRACE AND FREE-WILL.
Held at the dedication of the Church built by Liberius the patrician, on the third day of July, in the consulship of the most illustrious Decius Junior, z.¢., in the year of Christ 529, in the third year of Pope Felix IV.
PREFACE.
When, by the mercy and at the call of God, we had assembled to the dedication of the church which the most illustrious prefect and patrician, our son Liberius, built out of devout piety in the town of Orange, and a spiritual discussion had arisen among us concerning the things which belong to the rule of the Church, it came to our hearing that there were some who were inclined in their simplicity to hold too careless opinions, and not in accordance with the rule of the Catholic faith, concerning grace and free-will Wherefore it seemed to us right and reasonable, with the advice and sanction of the Apostolic See, that we should publish for all to hold, and subscribe our signatures to, a few articles sent to us by the Apostolic See which were collected, on this subject especially, from
the first sentences of the concluding paragraphs from Gennadius (see p. 44). The Council do not seem to have been acquainted with the Liber de Eccles. Dogm., and very probably thought that the extracts from that work sent them by Felix were really collected by him from some earlier fathers.
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
* Si quis per offensam przvaricationis Adze non totum, id est secundum corpus et animam, in deterius dicit hominem commutatum, sed anime libertate illesa durante corpus tantummodo corruptioni credit obnoxium ; Pelagi errore deceptus adversatur Scripture dicenti: 3 Anima que peccaverit ipsa morietur ; et: ^ Nescitis
* From Gennadius, Lib. de Eccles. Dogm. $ 38. The question of original sin was very closely connected with certain psychological questions concerning the origin of the human soul. The two common views on this subject held in early Christian times are known respectively as the czeatiazzs? and the £raduciamzst. According to the first of these, the soul of each man is separately created by God. According to the second, it is derived like the body from his parents. In addition to these were views having more or less of a pantheistic character; such as that of Origen, that all souls had an existence from eternity; or that again of the Manichzeans, that souls belonged to the great Divine hierarchy. An intermediate opinion between this and creatzanism was held by a certain Vincentius Victor, who had been a Donatist, and had only lately been converted to the Church, when S. Augustine wrote the treatise De Anima et ejus Origine. Victor maintained that souls were made by God out of Himself, and could only be the subject of original sin from their contact with sinful flesh. S. Augustine argues against this view on the grounds that it is inconsistent with God's justice for Him to condemn innocent souls to a state of union with sinful nature, and so make them liable to its punishment. For the same reason he was inclined to reject the czeafiazzs£ view, and
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
the volumes of the Holy Scriptures by the early Fathers to teach those who hold heterodox opinions. Having read these, let him who has not hitherto believed what he ought concerning grace and freewill without delay turn his mind to what accords with the Catholic faith.
ARTICEES.
I. That not the body only, but the soul also was injured by the sin of Adam. ;
If any one denies that the whole of human nature, Ze, in body and soul, was changed for the worse by the offence of Adam's transgressions, but believes that while the liberty of the soul remained uninjured, the body only became liable to corruption, he is deceived by the error of Pelagius, and contradicts the Scripture which says, “ the
adopt the Zraduciamzst. He expresses himself, however, with great caution: Qd sz ergo sic etzam anima et spiritus hominzs et a Deo datur, quamdiu datur; et tamen ex propagine sui generis? Quod ego nec defendo, mec refello; t.e., ** Is it not possible that the soul and spirit of man, though always the gift of God, are yet given by the propagation of their own kind. An opinion which I neither defend nor refute?” De An. et Orig. I. (xvi.) § 26. See also De Orig. An. (Ep. clxvi.) (iv.) § 10, &c. On the other hand, Gennadius himself adopted definitely the creatianist view. See Lib. de Eccles. Dogm. xiv.
* On the opinion that original sin involved the loss of true liberty, see below on Art. XIII.
3The argument is curious. The word zefAes&—of which anima is a translation—is used in this connection, as frequently in the Old Testament, as equivalent to **person ;" as in Gen. xii. 5: ** The souls that they had gotten in Haran.” It is never used of the highest part of man’s nature, which is 7zac, and is even used of a “ dead person" in Numb. vi. 6.
^'The last two quotations are made to prove the general depravity of the human race, which was practically denied by those who, like Victor, limited the effects of inherited sin to the body.
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
* Om. Gennad. by homeeotel.
1 Om. et,Gennad.
* etianz, Gennad.
* Om. mors, Gennad.
* invocatione humana, some
MSS. & Gennad.
II. Quod peccatum Adz non ipsi solum nocuit, sed ad posteros quoque transiit.
5 Si quis soli Adz preevaricationem suam, non et * ejus propagini asserit nocuisse, aut certe mortem tantum corporis, quze poena peccati est, non autem et peccatum, quod mors est animze, per unum hominem in omne genus humanum transiisse testatur; injustitiam Deo dabit, contradicens Apostolo dicenti: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per deccatum. mors, et ita in omnes homines * mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt.
6 Si quis * ad invocationem humanam gratiam Dei dicit posse conferri, non autem ipsam gratiam facere ut invocetur a nobis, contradicit Isaize prophete, vel Apostolo idem dicanti : Zuventus sum a non quaerentibus me ; palam apparui his qui me non interrogabant.
5 From Gennadius, ibid. $ 39. This Article is closely connected with the last. To limit inherited sin to the body is virtually to deny its existence. It is to make it inherited punishment, and involves injustice on the part of God, who, according to this view, punishes men for sins which belong not to themselves, but to Adam. Gennadius probably derived it from S. Aug. c.d. Ep. Pel. IV. (iv.) § 6: Sed Pelagiamz quomodo dicunt solam: mortem ad mos tramsisse per Adam? Sit enim propterea morimur, quia dle mortuus est; dile autem mortuus est, quia peccavit ; penam dicunt transire sine culpa,
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
soul which has sinned itself shall die," and ** Do ye not know that to whom ye show yourselves slaves to obey, his slaves ye are to whom ye obey?” and, * By whom any one is overcome, his slave he is also made?”
II. That the sin of Adam did not hurt himself only, but passed on to his descendants also,
If any one asserts that Adam’s transgressions hurt himself alone, and not also his progeny, or declares that at any rate only bodily death, which is the punishment of sin, and not sin also, which is the death of the soul, by one man passed on all the human race, he will be ascribing injustice to God, and contradicting the Apostle who says, * By one man szz entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, because all have sinned."
III. That the grace of God is not given at man's call, but itself makes man call for it.
If any one says that the grace of God can be conferred at man's call, and not rather that grace itself makes us call for it, he contradicts the prophet Isaiah, or the Apostle who quotes his words, * I was found of those who were not seeking me; I appeared openly to those who were not asking for me."
e£ tnnocentes parvulos injusto judicio fumiri trahendo mortem sine meritis mortis.
$ From Gennadius, ibid. § 40. That the grace of God must precede prayer is frequently insisted upon by S. Augustine. Gennadius may have had in his mind, S. Aug. Enarr. in Psalm cxiv. $ 5, in which, commenting on the words J@sericors Dominus et justus, et Deus noster miseretur, he says, Ques enim eunt invocavit, nist quem ipse prior vocavit. See below on Article VI.
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
* nobis, Gennad.
* So Gennad., but Hard. reads generationem.
V. Quod initium fidei non ex nobis, sed ex gratia Dei sit.
7 From Gennadius, ibid. $ 41. Wemay compare with this Article S. Aug. cont. d. Ep. Pel. IV. (iv.) § 12, in which he shows that the passage, 52 volueritis et audteritis me (Is. i. vv. 19, 20), does not imply that will precedes grace, which would be inconsistent with the words, Preparatur voluntas a Domino (Prov. viii. 35), and destroy the whole character of grace. S. Augustine, however, does not generally speak of preventing grace as the work of the Holy Spirit, whose special work, according to his teaching, is to infuse the motive of Christian love in the regenerate.
8 From Gennadius, ibid. § 42. Cf. Aug. De Praed. Sanct. (ii.) 88 3, 4 : Sed nunc eis respondendum esse video, qui diuina testimonia, que de hac ve. adhibuimus, ad hoc dicunt valere, ut noverimus ex nobis quidem mos habere ipsam fidem, sed incrementum ejus ex Deo,
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
IV. That God to cleanse us from sin does not wait for, but prepares our will.
If any one contends that God to cleanse us from sin waits for our will, and does not rather allow that our very wish to be cieansed is put into us by the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit, he resists the Spirit Himself, who says by Solomon, ** The will is prepared by the Lord," and the Apostle who teaches the wholesome doctrine, “It is God who worketh in you both to will and to perform for His good will."
V. 'That the beginning of faith is not of ourselves, but-of the grace of God.
If any one says that just as the increase, so also the beginning of faith, and the very feeling of belief by which we believe on Him who justifies the *impious" man, and come to the Regeneration of sacred Baptism, is not by the gift of grace (Ze, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit correcting our will from infidelity to faith, from impiety to piety), but is implanted in us by nature, he is proved an adversary to the doctrines of the Apostle ; for the blessed Paul says, ‘“‘ We trust that He who began a
tanquam fides non ab ipso donetur nobis, sed ab ipso tantum augeatur in nobis, co merito quo cepit a nobis. He then proceeds to argue from Rom. xi. 35 ; Phil. i. 29; 1 Cor. vii. 25 ; and from the conversion of S. Paul, that the beginning of faith must come from God. Seealso Cont. d. Ep. Pel. II. (x.) $ 23, where he proves the same from Ps. Ixxvi. (Ixxvii.) 10, 11: Mumguid obliviscetur misereri Deus? aut continebit im tra sua misericordias suas? Et dixi: nunc cmpi; hec mutatio dextere Excelsi. He argues from this passage that the beginning of faith referred to in zz7:c cepi must follow the mercy of God alluded to in ver. io.
9 This, derived from Rom. iv. 5, became the technical word in theological language for an unregenerate man.
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
* Christi Jesu, Gennad.
Some MSS.
read orantibus.
70 From Gennadius, ibid. $ 43. This Article sums up and expands the last three. It may be divided into four heads. Preventing grace is not in any case preceded (1) by faith (eredemzibus); (2) by will (volentibus, desiderantibus) ; (3) by human effort (conantibus— studentibus) ; (4) by prayer (petentibus—pulsantibus). To these we may add obedience and humility, which is closely connected with, if not implied in, 3 and 4. Of these the first has been already treated of in Art. V. It is constantly insisted on by S. Augustine as, ¢.g.,in De Praed. Sanct. (vii.) § 12, where he shows that faith is not a work in the ordinary sense, but the work of God. The second is the subject of Art. IV. Itis quoted by Prosper as being the opinion of Cassian (See Anti-Pelag. Treat. Introd. pp. lx. lxi), in Cont. Coll. (iv.) $8 11, 125; (xix.) § 55 and passim. Cf. also Aug. De Spir. et Lit.
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good work in you will perfect it even unto the day of our Lord Jesus Christ;” and also, * To you it was given in behalf of Christ, not only to believe in Him, but also to suffer for Him;” and again, ** By grace ye were saved by faith, and that not out of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." For those who say that the faith by which we believe in God is by nature, define all those who do not belong to the Church of Christ as in a certain sense “ faithful.”
VI. That without the grace of God mercy is not bestowed upon us when we believe and seek for it; rather it is grace itself which causes us to believe and seek for it.
If any one says that without the grace of God mercy is bestowed upon us by God when we believe, wish, long forit, strive, toil, watch, desire it, seek, ask for it, or when we knock, and does not rather acknowledge that it is by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit within us that we believe, wish, or have the power of
(xxxiv.) § 60 : Profecto et ipsum velle credere Deus operatur in homine. The third is a condemnation of the Pelagian doctrine in its extreme form. The fourth is a repetition in sense, though not in form, of the error condemned in Art. III. Cassian and others who held Pelagian or semi-Pelagian views were constantly appealing to our Lord's words, ** Ask, and it shall be given unto you, seek, and ye shall find, knock, and it shall be opened unto you" (Matt. vii. 7), in favour of their view that prayer and effort must precede grace. Prosper quotes and refutes this argument of Cassian in Cont. Coll. (ii.) § 6. Cf. also S. Aug. De Don. Pers. (xxii.) $ 64: Attendant ergo quomodo falluntur qui putant esse a nobis, nom dari nobis, ut petamus, quaramus, pulsemus, and so on.
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
X From Gennadius, ibid. § 44. This Article describes the work of the Spirit on the mind and heart. The first produces thought, consent, and belief; the second, pleasure and delight in believing. For the first cf. Aug. De Don. Pers. (xiii.) § 33: Cogitantes credimus, cogitantes loquimur, cogitantes agimus quicquid agimus: quod autem attinet ad pietatis viam et verum Det cultum. non sumus idonei cogitare aliquid tanquam. ex mobismet ipsis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. On the other hand, in De Spir. et Lit. (xxxiv.) § 60, S. Augustine speaks of consent to the call of God as an act of the will Consentire autem vocationi Det vel ab ea dissentire
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
doing all these things as we ought, and puts the help of grace as a supplement to human humility or obedience, instead of acknowledging that obedience and humility are the gift of grace itself, he resists the Apostle who says, “What hast thou which thou hast not received?” and, * By the grace of God I am what I am.”
VII. That by the powers of nature without grace we are not able to think or choose any good thing pertaining to our salvation.
If any one affirms that we can fitly think or choose any good thing pertaining to the salvation of eternal life, or agree to the saving, z.¢, the evangelical, preaching by the strength of nature without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all pleasure in agreeing and believing the truth, he is deceived by an heretical Spirit, not understanding the words of God, who says in the gospel, * Without me ye can do nothing;” and those again of the Apostle, ** Not that we are fitted to think anything of ourselves as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God."
proprie voluntatis est. In his early works S. Augustine clearly recognized in the act of choice two distinct elements, the human will and the work of the Spirit guiding it and assisting it in its choice, but not overruling it. Latterly, however, he seems to have underrated the first, and made Divine grace practically an overruling power. The action of the Spirit on the heart of man, inflaming it to love, is one of the leading themes of the De Spiritu et Litera. This is most beautifully expressed in (iii.) § 5, where he speaks of the soul as inflamed by the Spirit with a passionate longing to partake of the true Light. Cf. also (x.) § 16; (xxix.) § 51.
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* per misericordiam, Gennad.
* ille, Gennad.
* ministerium, Gennad.
| VIII. Quod per liberum arbitrium ad gratiam baptismi pervenire nullus possit.
72 $i quis alios * misericordia, alios vero per liberum
hominis nati sunt constat esse vitiatum, ad gratiam baptismi posse venire contendit; a recta fide probatur ‘alienus. *Is enim non omnium liberum arbitrium per | peccatum primi hominis asserit infirmatum; aut certe ita lesum putat, ut tamen quidam valeant sine revelatione |Dei * mysterium salutis seternce per semetipsos posse |conquirere. Quodquam sit contrarium ipse Dominus probat, qui non aliquos, sed neminem ad se posse venire testatur nisi quem Pater attraxerit, sicut et Petro dicit: | Beatus es Simon Barjona, qui caro et sanguis non. reveavit tibt, sed Pater meus qui in celis est; et apostolus; Nemo potest dieere Dominum Fesum misi im Spiritu | Sancto.
IX. De adjutorio Dei, per quod bona operamur.
7 From Gennadius, ibid. $ 45. The doctrine here condemned was a speculation of Cassian. It was especially attacked by Prosper in his Contra Collatorem. See especially (iii.) 8 9: a szmz quos gratia Det salvet, alit quos lex et natura. (vii.) 8 18: Aoc posse quosdam per liberum arbitrum sine adjutorto Dei, and passim. See below, p. 49, note 38.
73 This article is taken from Prosper’s Liber Sententiarum, xxii. It is remarkable as being one of those quotations (chiefly confined to the first 35), which Prosper makes, not from S. Augustine’s works,
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
VIII. That by free choice no one can come to the grace of Baptism.
If any one while allowing that some receive that benefit by God’s mercy, contends that others however can come to the grace of baptism by their free choice (which in all who were born after the transgression of the first man is known to have been-impaired) is proved not to belong to the true faith. For he asserts that the free choice of all men was not weakened by the sin of the first man; or at least, thinks that it was only so far injured as to admit of the possibility of some being able to seek for themselves the mystery of eternal salvation without the revelation of God. How false this opinion is is proved by the Lord Himself, who testifies not that some, but that zo one can come to Him unless the Father draw him; just as he says also to Peter, “ Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona, because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but My Father which is in heaven,” and the Apostle, * No man can say the Lord Jesus, except by the Holy Spirit.”
IX. Of the help of God, by which we do good works.
It is of God’s gift when we think rightly, and keep our |
but from his own. This particular quotation is taken from Prosper's work on Psalm cxviii. (cxix.) v. 59; but it is in the strictest accordance with the teaching of S. Augustine. Cf. especially De Nat. et Grat., (xxvii.) § 30, where the doctrine that all good works come from God is based on Phil. ii. 12, 13, Deus zz homine et velle et operari operatur; and Serm. xiii, (ii) 3: SZ ergo Deus est qui operatur im nobis, quare dictum est, '* Vestram ipsorum salutem operamini.” — Quia sic im nobis operatur, ut et nos operemur.
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
* Some MSS. read sanatis.
* voveret, Prosp. Aug.
* acciperet, Prcsp. Aug.
X. De adjutorio Dei ab omnibus semper implorando. :
75 Nemo quidquam Domino recte * voverit, nisi ab ipso * acceperit quod voveret, sicut legitur: Que de manu tua accepimus damus tibe.
™ This is the only article not derived almost verbally from some other source. But the doctrine that perseverance is necessary as well as Regeneration, and is only attainable by Divine grace, is laid great stress on by S. Augustine, and made the subject of a special treatise, called De Dono Perseverantie. In the beginning of this work, (ii) $ 4—(v.) § 9, he grounds the duty of prayer for perseverance on St. Cyprian’s interpretation of the several clauses in the Lord’s Prayer. In (vi.) § 10, he explains that by perseverance he means Zerseverantia usque in finem. In (vii) § 15, he escapes the difficulty of reconciling prayer for perseverance with his view of Predestination by the remark, Prorsus in hac re non oferosas disputationes exspectet ecclesia, sed attendat quotidianas orationes suas.
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
steps from falsehood and unrighteousness; for as often as we do good, God works in us and with us that we may work.
X. Of the help of God, how it is always to be implored by all.
The help of God is always to be implored even by those who are reborn and sanctified (healed), that they may be able to arrive at a good end, or endure in good works.
XI. Of the obligation of vows.
No one can properly vow anything to God, without having received what he would vow from Him, as it is read, “‘We give Thee what we have received from Thy hand.”
5 As far as voveret from Prosper, Lib. Sent. liv. He adapts it from S. Aug. De Civ. Dei, XVII. iv. 7; but neither he nor S. Augustine have the quotation from 1 Chron. xxix. 14, at the end. The doctrine here condemned is virtually that known in later times as that of works of supererogation, from which an a /orziore argument was drawn by the Pelagians in favour of human merit. The special works referred to in this argument were vows of chastity. See De Gest. Pel. (ch. xiii.) $ 29. The article condemns the doctrine, not by denying works of supererogation, but by showing that even these are conditional upon Divine grace. Compare the rather different view taken in our Article XIV.
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
30 XII. Quales nos diligat Deus. Tales nos amat Deus quales futuri sumus ipsius dono, non quales sumus nostro *7 merito. XIII. De reparatione liberi arbitrii. * Some MSS.
read libertatis.
'$ Arbitrium * voluntatis, in primo homine infirmatum, nisi per gratiam '9 baptismi non potest reparari; quod amissum, nisi a quo potuit dari, non potest reddi, unde
16 From Prosper, Lib. Sent. lvi. It is not an actual quotation from S. Augustine, but may have been suggested by the following passage in the De Trinitate, IV. (i) 8 2: Ac primum nobis persuadendum fuit quantum nos diligeret Deus, ne disputatione non auderemus erigi in eum. — Quales autem dilexerit, ostendi opportebat, ne tanquam de meritis mostris superbientes magis ab eo resiliremus, et in nostra fortitudine magis deficeremus. See also De Cat. Rud. (iv.) § 7, where he argues the same from passages like Rom. v. 63; 1 John ii. 16; and adds, Mulla est major ad amorem invitato, quam prevenire amando.
77 The idea of human merit was not denied altogether by S. Augustine, but it was limited to works done after and by the grace of God. Grace itself could not be merited byman. See Art. XVIII.note. There isno question here of the nature of Predestination, whether it depends on Prescience or Absolute Purpose: the language of the Article is quite consistent with either view.
15 From Gennad. Lib. de Eccles. Dogm. § 47, who adapted it from Prosper, Lib. Sent. clii. Except for the omission of the words proprio vitio after amzssum, he has quoted it exactly from Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XIV. xi. 1. The passage runs thus: Arbitrium igitur voluntatis tunc est vere liberum, cum witüis peccatisgue mom seruit. Tale datum est a Deo: quod amissum proprio vitio nist a quo, &c., as in text. S. Augustine did not | mean that the natural power or faculty of choice itself was lost, but that by inherited depravity it had become enslaved to sin, and therefore its freedom was lost, until it was restored by God who gave it. In Cont. d. Ep. I. (iii.) § 6, he distinctly maintains that
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
XII. On what ground God loves us.
God loves us for what we shall be by His gift, not for what we are by our own merit.
XIII. Of the restoration of free choice.
The choice of the will, weakened in the first man, cannot be restored but by the grace of baptism; for being lost, it cannot be given back except by Him who
in a certain sense not merely arbitrium voluntatis, but hberum arbitrium, remained even after the fall, because the freedom was only hampered in one direction. It was free to commit sin, but not free to do good; Que potestas (.e., the power of becoming sons of God), nulla esse potest ex libero arbitrio, quia nec liberum in bono erdt, quod liberator non liberaverit; sed in malo liberum. habet arbitrium, &c. In De Civ. Dei, XIV. xi. 7, he speaks of the will of Adam before the fall asa bona voluntas. Fectt dtaque Deus hominem rectum: ac per hoc voluntatis bone. Non enim rectus esset, bonam mom habens voluntatem. Somewhat similarly in Op. Imperf. VI. xxv. (vol x. p. 1346 in Benedictine edition), he divides avdztrium liberum into two parts: (1) a love of doing good; (2) a love of happiness. The first was lost at the fall, the second is immovably fixed in human nature, and can never be lost; but in order to work for good it must be assisted by Divine grace. Hoc est liberum arbitrium nostris mentibus immobiliter fixum, non quo bene agere volumus, nam dd humana iniquitate potutmus amittere, et gratia diuina possumus recipere: sed liberum. arbttrium. quo beati esse volumus, et misert nolumus, nec andserd possunt amittere nec beati. . . . Hoc arbitrium liberum adjuvatur per Dei gratiam, ut quod naturaliter volumus, Aoc est beate vivere, bene vivendo habere possimus.
19 The insertion of the special reference to baptism as the remedy for original sin is characteristic of the Council, and important when we consider how seldom it made any alterations in the extracts from Patristic writers. The doctrine, however, was definitely taught by | S. Augustine, and is implied of course in the whole of his argument as to the fate of unbaptized children. See above Introd. p. 9.
* So Prosper. Some MSS. have anticipent—misericordiz.
* mutantur fideles, Prosper. Aug.
* Om. Prosper.
CANONS OF T'HE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
XIV. Quod ut liberemur a miseria, misericordia Dei preevenimur.
2° Nullus miser de quacumque miseria liberatur, nisi qui Dei misericordia preevenitur, sicut dicit Psalmista: Cz/o * anticipet nos misericordia * tua, Domine; et illud : Deus meus, misericordia ejus praventet qme.
XV. Quod per gratiam Dei in melius mutetur fidelis.
^ Taken from Prosper, Lib. Sent. ccxi. (ccxii.), with the addition of the two quotations. Prosper adapted it probably from such passages of S. Augustine as Op. Imperf. I. xc. : Jz paradiso enim diabolus seductor beate voluntatis fuit, quam seducendo miseram fecit: nunc autem, sicut fateris, seductor est misere voluntatis. Ab hac ergo qmserid. . . . non eam. liberat nisi ille ad quem quotidie tota clamat Ecclesia, Ne nos inferas in tentationem, &c. Compare also Enarr. in Ps. Ixxvii. (Ixxix.) 8 11: Ad hoc vult intelligt anticipare mos misericordias Dei, ut nostra paupertas, id est infirmitas, eo miserante adjuvetur ad ejus precepta facienda, ne ad judicium. ejus damnandi veniamus.
^: Taken with slight alterations from Prosper, Lib. Sent. ccxxv. (ccxxvil.) Prosper has adapted it from the following passage of
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could give it. Wherefore the truth Himself says: “ If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.”
XIV. That to be freed from misery we are prevented by the mercy of God.
No miserable man is freed from any misery whatever, except he also is prevented by the mercy of God, as the Psalmist says, *Let Thy mercy speedily go before us, O Lord;” and again, “ As for my God, His mercy will prevent me.”
XV. That through the grace of God a faithful man-is changed for the better.
Adam was changed from that which God formed him, but for the worse through his iniquity; a faithful man is changed from that which sin has wrought, but for the better through the grace of God. ‘The former therefore was the change of the first transgressor; the latter is * the change of the right hand of the Most High.”
S. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. Ixviü. Serm. i. $2: 4d eo quod formavit Deus, mutatus est Adam, sed in gejus inzquatatzs sue: ab eo quod operata. est iniquitas, mutantur fideles, sed in melius per gratiam. Det. Ut mutaremur in pejus, nostra iniquitas fudit, ut mutaremur im melius, non nostra justititia, sed gratia Dei praestat. The substitution by Prosper of the words mutatio est dextere Excelsi from Ps. Ixxvi. 11 (Ixxvii. 10), for gratia Dez in the last clause, is in accordance with S. Augustine's interpretation of the psalm in Cont. d. Ep. Pel. II. (x.) 8 23. E? dixt, nunc ec pi, hec mutatio dextere excelsi. Cum ergo dixisset nunc cepi; non att, hac mutatio arbitrii met, sed dextere excelst.. On the various translations and interpretations of this difficult verse see Delitzsch on the Psalms zz Joco. See also note on Art. V. above.
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* 1nsonuit, Prosp. Aug.
+ Om.Prosp.Aug. * See note. ascendit, Aug.
t captivam duxit, Prosp Aug.
* habet, some MSS., Aug. and Prosp.
t auferetur, some MSS., Aug. and Prosp.
XVII. De fortitudine Christiana.
22 Slightly altered from Prosper, Sent. cclix. (cclxi.), which is almost an exact quotation from Augustine, De Spir. et Lit. (xxix.) § 50. The omission of the words Porro autem st non gratis mortuus est before ascendens, &c., spoils the sense, and is probably accidental, being due to homeoteleuton. To refute the view of Pelagius, that grace consisted mainly of an outward revelation or law, was the chief object of this treatise of S. Augustine. He bases his arguments on 2 Cor. iii. 6, where he interprets /ztera of an external revelation of law distinguished in principle from the internal infusion of grace by the Spirit.
*3 From Prosper, Lib. Sent. ccxcv. (cexcvii.) It is a quotation from S. Augustine, Op. Imperf. I. lxxxiü. It is an answer to the argument of Julian from the Pelagian side, that the fortitude or power of enduring pain shown by heathens and Christians alike proves that no man can be either compelled into
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
XVI. That we should not boast of what we have, because it is of God.
Let no one boast of that which he seems to have, as though he had not received it, or think that he has therefore received it, because a letter from without has either appeared for him to read, or sounded for him to hear. For, as the Apostle says, “If righteousness is by the law, then Christ died in vain." *' Ascending up on high, he made captivity captive, He gave gifts to men." From that source he has it, whoever has ought; and whoever denies that he has it from that source, either has it not truly, or that which he seems to have is taken away from him.
XVII. Of Christian courage.
The courage of heathens is due to worldly desire; but the courage of Christians to the love of God, which is spread abroad in our hearts, not through the choice of the
The whole subject is fully discussed in Augustine, De Patientia, see especially (chs. xvi, xvii) $8 13, 14, where he argues from such passages as I Cor. xiii. 4, 7, Caritas magnanima est, omnia tolerat, that the motive of Christian courage is love. The motive of heathen courage is cupzditas, by which he seems to understand mere natural selfishness. The special example given is that of criminals who are willing to endure the most painful tortures to avoid death, which would follow if they confessed their crimes.
24 The reference in mundana cupiditas is to 1 S. John ii. 15, 16.
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* Some MSS.
read a.
* After gratiam some MSS. add Dei.
1 posset, Gennad. * potest, Prosp. Aug.
+ recuperare Prosp. Aug.
* quam, Prosp.
XVIII. Nullis meritis gratiam preeveniri.
. XIX. Neminem nisi Deo miserante salvar.
?6 Natura humana, etiamsi in illa integritate, in qua est condita, permaneret, nullo modo seipsam, Creatore suo non adjuvante, servaret: * unde cum sine Dei gratia salutem non 1 possit custodire quam accepit, quomodo sine Dei gratia * poterit 1 reparare * quod perdidit?
From debetur merces to the end is from Prosper, Sent. cexcvii. (ccxcix.) Prosper adapted it from Aug. Op. Imperf. I. cxxxiii. Debetur, inquam, bona merces operibus hominum bonis; sed non debetur gratia, que ipsos homines bonos operatur ex malis.
The insertion of the first. clause from the title of the sentence in Prosper, *zzul£zs meritis preveniri gratiam, is, as it happens, unfortunate, becauseitcauses an ambiguity. Thenegative should not becarried on to the second clause. The meaning of S. Augustine is that a reward is owed for good works, because they are the works of God (see second quotation below), but no good works can merit grace. The proper order is grace, good works, reward, and this order cannot be reversed. The first clause rightly understood is exactly Augustinian. In the context of the passage just quoted, a few lines further down, he adds, Zs7272 gratiam vere gratiam, i.e., gratuztam mullisque meritis precedentibus debitam, commendabat Apostolus. In the next chapter he explains in what sense good works can, and in what they cannot, be said to have a meritorious value. Lege Lxechielem prophetam unde quod satis visum est supra commemoravi:
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will which is in us, but by the Holy Spirit which has been given us.
XVIII. That grace in not prevented by any merits.
A reward is not owed for any merits preventing grace on the ground of good works done, but grace which is not owed precedes to enable them to be done.
XIX. That no man is saved except by the mercy of God. ;
Human nature, even though it remained in that integrity in which it was made, could in no way preserve itself without the help of its Creator. Since then without the grace of God it cannot keep the salvation which it has received, how without the grace of God will it have the power of restoring what it has lost?
ista etam. verba veperies, d.e, Deum facere ut pracebta ejus homines faciant, quorum miseretur, non fropter merita eorum, que mala ibi
2° From Gennadius, § 47, who quotes it from Prosper, Sent. cccviii. (ccex.) with the single alteration of zecugerare quam into reparare quod. Prosper had already quoted it from S. Augustine, Ep. clxxxvi. 37. The necessity of grace, even in the unfallen state of Adam, is more fully discussed in the Enchir. d. Fid. (civ.) § 28: Qwza etsi peccatum in solo libero arbitrio erat constitutum, non tamen. justitie retinende sufficiebat liberum arbitrium, nist participatione tmmutabilis boni divinum. adjutorium. preberetur. He goes on to compare the state of the body, which may kill itself by starvation by a mere act of choice, but cannot keep itself alive without food. Comp. De Nat. et Grat. xlviii, $ 56.
* Om. Prosp. Aug. 1 facit, Prosp.
* Om.et Gennad. Prosp. Aug.
* Some MSS. read ex, with Prosp. Aug.
* et his, Aug.
| ex natura.
* implere, Aug.
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XX. Nihil boni hominem posse sine Deo.
27 Multa Deus facit in homine bona que non facit homo, nulla vero facit homo * bona que non Deus 1 prestat ut faciat homo.
XXI. De natura et gratia.
77 From Prosper, Sent. cccxii. (cccxiv.), who quotes it from Aug. Cont. d. Ep. Pel. II. (ix.) § 21. S. Augustine had been explaining Prov. xvi 1. ominis est preparare cor, et a Domino responsio lingue. The ‘preparation of the heart,’ he argued, must be understood of man using God's help, ‘the answer of the tongue’ of the work of God alone in man in answer to prayer. deo guippe scriptum est, hominis est preparare cor, et a Domino responsio lingue: quia homo | preparat cor, non tamen sine adjutorio Dei, qui sic tangit cor, ut homo preparet cor. In responsione autem lingue, id est, in eo quod preparato cord lingua divina respondet, nihil operis habet homo, sed totum est a Domino Deo. Ibid. (ix.) 88 19, 20. Rather differently
he speaks, in De Grat. and Lib. (xvii.) § 33, of the work of God
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
XX. How man can do no good thing without God.
God does many good things in man which man does not do; but man does no good things which God does not give him the power of doing.
XXI. Of nature and grace.
Just as the Apostle says most truly to those who, wishing to be justified in the law, have fallen from grace, “ If justice is in the law, then Christ died in vain;" so to those who think that nature is the grace which is commended and received by faith in Christ, it is most truly said, * If justice is by nature, then Christ died in vain." For in the first case there was law and it did not justify, in the second there was nature as well, and it did not justify. Therefore Christ did not die in vain, in order that both the law might be fulfilled by Him, who said, * [ came not to destroy the law, but to fulfil " ; and nature, destroyed through Adam, might be restored by Him who said that He * came to seek and to save what was lost."
38 From Gennadius, Ibid. $ 48, who quotes from Prosper, Lib. Sent. cccxv. (cccxvii.), and he again from S. Augustine, De Grat. | et Lib. (xiii.) $ 25. The differences are merely verbal. That grace cannot be defined as nature, which has no justifying power, as the Pelagians held, is refuted constantly by S. Augustine. See, e.r.,
De Nat. et Grat. (xxxiv.) $ 39; and above, Introd. p. 8, note 3.
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
* ita, Prosper.
+ Some MSS.add quod volunt from Prosp. Aug.
XXII. De his que hominum propria sunt.
XXIII. De voluntate Dei et hominis.
29 From Prosper, Lib. Sent. cccxxiii. (ccexxv.), who quotes from S. Aug. Tract. in Johan. v. r. The last clause in S. Augustine runs thus: wt ne deficiamus im via, venire ad ejus requiem satietatemque possimus, This is his comment on S. John viii. 44.
3° From Prosper, Lib. Sent. cccxxxviii. (cccxl.), who adopts it from S. Aug. Tract. in Johan xix. $ 19. S. Augustine, commenting on the words in S. John v. 30, ‘‘I seek not my own will, but the will of Him who sent me,” writes: Mon meam, mom propriam ; non meam . . . que resistat Deo, Faciunt enim homines voluntatem suam, non Det, quando faciunt quod volunt, non quod jubet Deus: quando autem ita faciunt quod volunt, ut tamen sequantur voluntatem Det, non faciunt voluntatem suam, quamvis quod volunt faciant. Volensfac tuam quod juberis ; atque ita et hoc facies quod vis, et non voluntatem facies sed. jubentis. What S. Augustine wishes to emphasize is that
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
XXII. Ofthe things which properly belong to men.
No man has anything of his own but falsehood and sin; but if any man has any truth and justice, he has it from that fountain which we ought to thirst for in this desert, that being refreshed by it as with drops of water we may not faint by the way.
XXIII. Of the will of God and man.
Men do their own will, not that of God, when they do that which is displeasing to God; but when they do (that which they will) in such a way as to serve the Divine will, although they act willingly, it is really the wil of Him by whom their will is prepared and ordered.
the test of the action is the motive. If the first and leading motive of a man's action is the carrying out of his own will, it is wrong, rather on the ground that he is doing his own will, than that the action is from other grounds displeasing to God. The first motive should be to do God's will. But this does not necessarily imply that it is contrary to man's own will. On the contrary, it is his positive duty so to yield himself to God's will as to make it his own. The whole passage implies a real effort on the human side. This is not so distinctly brought out in the article itself, though it is perhaps more in accordance with the usual language of S. Augustine. The paradox in the clause qzazdo—wvoluntati is much like our translation of cud servire regnare est (inthe old Gelasian prayer) * whose service is perfect freedom."
CANONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF ORANGE.
* Non, Aug.
* So Prosp. Aug.; butthe MSS.read uicumque (see note).
* dilexit; Prosp. 1 diffudit, Prosp.
XXIV. De palmitibus vitis.
XXV. De dilectione qua diligimus Deum.