## Reformed Dogmatics

Vol. 2. God and Creation

## Herman Bavinck

MONERGISM EDITOR’S NOTE.

2. § 21. The Knowability of God. (Cognitio Dei Insita.)

3. § 22. The Knowability of God. (Cognitio Dei Acquisita.)

5. § 24. Classification of the Names of God.

6. § 25. The Proper Names of God.

7. § 26. The Essential Names of God.

8. § 27. The Personal Names of God.

CHAPTER V. On the World in its Original State.

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## MONERGISM EDITOR’S NOTE.

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May these books bless you to the glory of God.

S.D.G.

Monergism.

. Mystery is the element of life of dogmatics. To be sure, Scripture by

μυστηριον does not understand an abstract-supernatural truth in the

Roman sense; but it is just as far removed from the thought that the believer

would understand and comprehend the revealed mysteries in a scientific

sense, cf. deel I 532. Rather, the knowledge which God has revealed of

himself in nature and Scripture far surpasses the representation and the

concept of man. Insofar, it is all mystery with which dogmatics deals. For it

has not to do with finite creatures, but from the beginning to the end it

raises itself above all creature to the Eternal and the Infinite himself.

Already immediately when it makes a beginning, it stands before the

Incomprehensible. From Him it takes its beginning, for out of Him are all

things. But also in the further loci, when it descends to the creatures, it

considers these no otherwise than in their relation to God, as they are out of

and through and unto Him. Thus then the knowledge of God is the only

dogma, the exclusive content of the whole dogmatics. All doctrines that are

treated in it, about the world, about man, about Christ etc., are but the

explication of the one, central dogma of the cognitio Dei. From Him

everything is considered. Under Him everything is subsumed. To Him

everything is led back. It is always God and God alone, whose glory in

creation and re-creation, in nature and grace, in world and church it has

to ponder and to describe. It is his knowledge alone, which it must display

and spread out for view. Thereby dogmatics does not become a dry,

scholastic science, without fruit for life. The more it ponders Him, whose

knowledge is its only content, the more it will pass over into admiration and

adoration. If only it never forgets, to think and to speak about the things

instead of about the words; if only it remains a Theologie der Thatsachen

and does not degenerate into a Theologie der Rhetorik, it is, as scientific

description of the knowledge of God, also in the highest degree fruitful for

life. The knowledge of God in Christ is, after all, life itself, Psalms 89:16; Jes.

11:9; Jeremiah 31:34; John 17:3. Therefore Augustine desired to know nothing

else and nothing more than God and himself: Deum et animam scire cupio.

Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino. Therefore Calvin began his Institutie with the

knowledge of God and of ourselves. And therefore the Catechism of

Geneva gave, to the first question: quis humanae vitae praecipuus est finis?

the answer: ut Deum, a quo conditi sunt homines, ipsi noverint, cf. also den

Catech. van Westminster.

But as soon as we undertake to speak about God, the question arises how

we shall be able to do that. We are human beings and He is the Lord our

God. There seems to exist between Him and us no kinship and no

communion, such that we could name Him in truth. Between Him and us

there is a distance as between the infinite and the finite, between eternity

and time, between being and becoming, between the all and the not.

However little we know of God, even the weakest notion implies that He is

a being infinitely far exalted above every creature. And Scripture confirms

that not only; it sets that majesty and exaltation of the Lord of lords before

us first in the full light. Already the first chapter of Genesis depicts His

incomprehensible exaltation; He speaks and it is there. And although

Scripture then subsequently describes God to us in His condescending love,

and says that He dwells with him who is of a contrite and humble spirit,

nevertheless He is the High and the Exalted One, who dwells in eternity,

Jes. 57:15. God is great and we do not comprehend it, Job 26:14, 36:26,

37:5. He is incomparable, Jes. 40:18, 25, 46:5, dwelling in the darkness,

1 Kon. 8:12; Jes. 45:15, in an inaccessible light, 1 Timothy 6:16. No one has

seen Him or can see Him, Exodus 33:20; John 1:18, 6:46; 1 Timothy 6:16. The

hidden ground, the depth of God, ‎‏‏ֵחֶקר‎, and the boundary, the extremity, the

essence of the Almighty, ‎‏‏ַּתְכִלית‎, is not to be reached, Job 11:7; Eccl. Sir.

all that is creaturely, above need, Job 22:2, 3; Hd. 17:25; change, Jak. 1:17;

infinitely far exalted. He is not to be described and to be named with no

name. He is without name, His name is wonderful, Genesis 32:29; Richt.

2. Even outside the domain of special revelation this majesty of God has

been acknowledged. Among the Brahmins God is the Unknowable, without

names and attributes, known only by him who does not know, Hoekstra,

Wijsg. Godsd. II 2. Hartmann, Religionsphilos. I 278 f. The Koran

describes Allah many times in a very anthropomorphic way, but among the

followers of Mohammed there arose many who interpreted this description

spiritually and even denied all attributes to God, Dozy, Het Islamisme bl.

131 v. Houtsma, De strijd over het dogma in den Islam tot op El-Ash’ari

1875 bl. 120 v. Saussaye, Lehrb. der Rel. II 385. Greek philosophy too has

many times clearly acknowledged and expressed this unknowability of

God. According to the well-known story the philosopher Simonides

repeatedly requested a longer postponement for the answer to the question

of the tyrant Hiero, who God was, Cic. de nat. deor. I 22. According to

Diogenes Protagoras began his book on the gods thus: περι μεν θεων ο ὐ κ

Preller, Hist. phil. gr. 183. Cic. de nat. deor. I 63. Carneades of Cyrene

subjected belief in the gods not only to a sharp critique, but also contested

the possibility of forming a conception of God. Plato rejected every

anthropomorphic and anthropopathic representation of the Deity and

Philos. der Gr. II 4 928 f. And in a similar sense he says in the Republic

VI 19, that the Deity or the idea of the good is elevated not only above all

that exists, but also above being itself, ἐ πεκεινα πασες ο ὐ σιας. Philo

connected this Platonic philosophy with the doctrine of the O. Test. and

found the same thought expressed in the name Ihvh. Not only is God free

from every imperfection that is present in finite, changeable, dependent

creatures; no, God also far surpasses all perfection of creatures. He is better

than virtue, knowledge, beauty, purer than unity, more blessed than

blessedness. He is properly without attributes, ἀ ποιος, and without names,

and therefore also cannot be comprehended and described. According to his

essence God is unknowable. We can know that He is, but not what He is.

Only being can in the proper sense be ascribed to Him; the name Ihvh is the

only one that indicates his essence, Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. V3 353 f. Dähne,

Gesch. Darstellung der jüdisch-alex. Religionsphilos. 1834 I 114 f. Schürer,

Neutest. Zeitgesch. 1874 S. 655 f. Plotinus went the farthest. Plato still

ascribed many attributes to God. Philo supplemented his negative theology

with a positive one, in which he describes God as a personal, almighty,

perfect being. But with Plotinus there is nothing to be said of God except

only negatively. God is absolutely one, elevated above all multiplicity and

therefore also not to be defined by thought, the good, not even by being, for

all these determinations still include a multiplicity. God as pure unity is

indeed the cause of thought, being, the good, but He is himself distinct from

them and stands transcendent above them. He is unbounded, infinite,

without form, and so much distinguished from every creature that even

activity, life, thought, consciousness, being, cannot be ascribed to Him. He

is inaccessible to our thought and to our language. We cannot say what He

is, but only what He is not. Even the designations of το ἑ ν and το ἀ γαθον,

of which Plotinus generally makes use, are no description of God’s essence,

but only of his relation to the creatures, and indicate nothing other than his

absolute causality, Zeller, ib. 476-496. Still greater did the distance between

God and his creature become in Gnosticism. It made an absolute separation

between the highest God and the world. In nature, in Israel, in Christianity

there was no essential revelation of God but only of the aeons. There

was therefore no theologia naturalis, neither insita nor acquisita, and

likewise no theologia revelata. The highest God was absolutely unknowable

and unapproachable for the creature; He was βυθος ἀ γνωστος, ἀ ρρητος,

eternal σιγη, Iren., adv. haer. I 11. 24.

3. But this doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God and of the

unknowability of his essence has also been the point of departure and the

fundamental idea of Christian theology. God is not exhausted in his

revelation, neither in creation nor in re-creation. He cannot communicate

himself fully to creatures, because then these themselves would have to be

God. Therefore there is no adequate knowledge of God. There is no name

that makes his essence known to us. There is no concept that fully

comprehends Him. There is no description that completely determines Him.

What lies behind the revelation is utterly unknowable. We can approach it

neither with our thought or imagination, nor with our language. Already the

epistle of Barnabas c. 5 asks: if the Son of God had not come in the flesh,

how then would men have seen Him and remained preserved? Justin Martyr

calls God inexpressible, immovable, nameless, Apol. I 61; also words such

as Father, God, Lord are not proper names ἀ λλ’ ἐ κ των ε ὐ ποιϊων και των

ἐ ργων προσρησεις, Apol. II 6. God cannot appear, not go, not be seen, etc.;

if there is mention of this in the O. Test., this refers to the Son, who is his

envoy, Dial. 127. Also in Irenaeus, adv. haer. IV 20, there occurs the in his

time very common but nevertheless incorrect and partly gnostic antithesis

between the Father, who is hidden, invisible, unknowable, and the Son, who

has revealed Him. In Clemens Alex. God is pure μονας, Strom. V 11. If we

think away all that is creaturely, we do not reach what God is, but what He

is not. Form, movement, place, number, property, name, etc. cannot be

ascribed to Him. If we nevertheless call Him one, good, Father, Creator,

Lord, etc., then we do not thereby express his proper essence but only

indicate his power, Strom. V 12. He is even exalted above the one, ὑ περ

α ὐ την την μοναδα, Paedag. I 8. In one word, God is, as Athanasius, c. gent.

speak Orig., de princ. I [6] 1, 5. sq. c. Cels. VI 65. Eusebius, Praep. Evang.

V 1. Theophilus, ad Autol. I 3. Tatianus. c. Gr. 5. Minucius Felix. Octav. c.

18. Novatianus, de trin. 2. Cyprianus, de idol. vanit. 5. Lactantius, Instit.

div. I 6. Cf. Münscher- v. Coelln, Dogmengesch. I 132 f. Hagenbach,

Dogm. § 37. Schwane, Dogmengesch. I2 72 f. We also encounter the same

conception in Augustine and Joh. Damascenus. Augustine, in the

description of God, proceeds from the concept of being. He is the one who

is, as his name Ihvh also makes known; this is his proper name, his nomen

in se; all other names are ad nos, Serm. 6 n. 4. Serm. 7 n. 7. Therefore, if we

want to say what He is, we say only what He, in distinction from all finite

substances, is not. He is ineffabilis. Facilius dicemus quid non sit quam

quid sit. He is not earth, sea, heaven, angel, etc., nothing of all that the

creature is; hoc solum potui dicere quid non sit, Enarr. in Ps. 85 n. 12. de

doctr. chr. I 6, de ord. II 47. He is thus thought, ut aliquid quo nihil melius

sit atque sublimius illa cogitatio conetur attingere, de doctr. chr. I 7. But He

cannot be thought as He is. For He is exalted above all that is bodily,

changeable, become, tract. 23 in Ev. Joh. n. 9. Quis est autem, qui sic

cogitat Deum, quemadmodum ille est? quaest. in Jos. VI 29. He is

incomprehensible and must be so, si enim comprehendis, non est Deus,

Serm. 117 n. 5. And if we then finally want to say what we think of Him,

then we struggle with language. Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur, et

verius est quam cogitatur, de trin. VII 4, de doctr. chr. I 6. If we nevertheless

express something concerning Him, then that is not adequate, but it serves

only to make us say something and to make us think of a being that

surpasses everything, de doctr. chr. I 6. Sicut Deus a nullo intellectu valet

proprie cogitari, ita nulla definitione potest proprie definiri aut determinari,

de cogn. verae vitae 7. Deus scitur melius nesciendo, de ord. II 44.

Likewise Damascenus says that God το θειον, ἀ ρρητον και ἀ καταληπτον is,

de fide orth. I c. 1. We speak of God in our way and know what God has

revealed of himself; but what God’s essence is and how He is in all, we do

not know, ib. c. 2. That God is, is clear; but τι ἐ στιν κατ’ ο ὐ σιαν και φυσιν,

ἀ καταληπτον τουτο παντελως και ἀ γνωστον. That God is unbegotten,

unchangeable, without beginning, etc., says only what He is not. To say

what He is, is impossible. He is nothing of all that is, not because He is not,

but because He is ὑ περ παντα τα ὀ ντα και ὑ περ α ὐ το το ε ἰ ναι. What we say

positively of God does not indicate his nature, but the relations of his

4. This unknowability of God’s essence was taught even more strongly by

Pseudo-Dionysius, to whom Damascenus already appeals, and by Scotus

Erigena. According to the Areopagite there is no concept, no expression, no

word, which utters God’s essence, de div. nom. c. 1 § 1. With unusual,

figurative names God is therefore designated. He is ὑ περουσιος ἀ οριστια,

suprasubstantialis infinitas, ἡ ὑ περ ν ῶ ν ἑ νοτης, supra mentem unitas, το

μηδεν των ὀ ντων ο ὐ σα, ib. We can neither utter nor think that one,

unknown, above being, above the good, above every name and word and

understanding, above all the finite exalted essence, ib. c. 1 § 5. Only

because He is the cause and the principle of everything, can we, like

Scripture, name Him according to his workings, ib. c. 1 § 4. He is thus on

the one hand ἀ νωνυμος and on the other hand πολυωνυμος, ib. 1 § 6. But

also the positive names, which we ascribe to God on the ground of his

works, do not make us know Him in his essence, for they belong to Him in

a wholly different and infinitely more perfect manner than to the creatures,

de myst. theol. c. 1 § 2. Therefore negative theology is more excellent than

positive, for it makes us know God as exalted above every creature. Yet it,

too, provides us with no knowledge of God’s essence. For in the end God

surpasses both every negation and every affirmation, every θεσις and every

ἀ φαιρεσις, de myst. theol. c. 5. In entirely the same spirit Erigena reasons.

God is exalted above all that is creaturely, also above being and knowing,

de div. nat. I 7 sq. II 23. We know only that He is, not what He is, ib. I 13, II

28, V 26. What we predicate of Him, He is only in an improper manner, and

thus He again is it not, I 36. The affirmative theology is improper,

metaphorical I 14 sq. 37. It is surpassed by the negative. Verius enim

negatur Deus quid eorum, quod de eo praedicatur, quam affirmatur esse, [8]

I 76, II 30, III 20. Melius nesciendo scitur, cujus ignorantia vera est

sapientia I 66. Therefore his predicates are best supplemented by super or

plusquam. He is superessentialis, plusquam veritas, plusquam sapientia etc.

I 14. Yes, so greatly does He surpass everything that is creature, that He can

not unjustly be designated with the name of the nothing, nihilum, III 19. Cf.

Stöckl, Philos. des M. A. I 45 f. Baur, Die christl. Lehre von der Dreiein.

und Menschw. Gottes II 274 f. Doedes, Inl. tot de leer van God 133 v.

5. Although Scholasticism now expressed itself more cautiously on

various points and, in particular, assigned a higher value to positive

theology than Pseudo-Dionysius and Erigena; yet it too entirely agreed with

the doctrine that the being of God an sich was unknowable for man. Anselm

says that the names of God’s being only indicate it per similitudinem,

Monol. c. 63, that the relative properties of his being cannot be predicated,

and the absolute only in a quidditative, not in a qualitative sense, Monol. c.

15-17. According to Albertus Magnus, God is exalted above all being and

thinking. He cannot be attained by human thought, attingitur sed non

capitur per comprehensionem. No name expresses his being. He is

incomprehensible and unnameable, cf. Stöckl, Philos. des M. A. II 370.

Thomas distinguishes a threefold knowledge of God, visio Dei per

essentiam, cognitio per fidem and cognitio per rationem naturalem. The first

far surpasses man’s natural knowledge and can be obtained only by

supernatural grace. It is reserved for heaven, is granted here on earth only a

single time, and yet also never makes a comprehending of God possible, S.

Theol. I qu. 12 art. 1-11. Here on earth the knowledge of God is mediate.

We cannot know God as He is in Himself, but only secundum quod omnium

prima et eminentissima causa is. From the workings we can ascend to the

cause, ib. art. 12. And likewise it is the case with the knowledge that we

obtain of God from his special revelation through faith. We know Him

thereby better, in quantum plures et excellentiores effectus ejus nobis

demonstrantur, ib. art. 13. But it gives no knowledge of God per essentiam.

There is no knowledge of God’s being, of his quidditas, per speciem

propriam; but we know only habitudinem ipsius ad creaturas, ib. art. 12.

There is no name that expresses his being adaequate. His essentia stands

high supra id, quod de Deo intelligimus et voce significamus, ib. qu. 13 art.

1. The positive names may indicate God’s being, yet they do so in a very

imperfect manner, just as the creatures from which they are derived

represent Him imperfectly. God is knowable only, secundum quod

repraesentatur in perfectionibus creaturarum, ib. art. 2. But with the further

development of scholasticism this truth of the incomprehensibility of God

was pushed into the background. The doctrine of God was unfolded more

and more broadly. Existence, names, being, persons, properties were

developed so finely and precisely that no place remained for the

incomprehensibility of God. It became an ordinary property alongside the

others, treated just as prolixly and dialectically. Duns Scotus asserted

against Thomas that there was indeed a quidditative, albeit also imperfect,

knowledge of God, Sent. I dist. 3 qu. 2. Against that nominalism already

raised objection and became more or less skeptical. Durandus said that

there was no cognitio abstractiva of the divine being. And Occam declared:

nec divina essentia, nec divina quidditas nec aliquid intrinsecum Deus, nec

aliquid, quod est realiter Deus, potest hic cognosci a nobis, ita quod nihil

aliud a Deo occurrat in ratione objecti, Stöckl, Philos. des M. A. II 1009.

Mysticism sought to obtain yet another knowledge of God than along the

path of dialectic. And toward the end of the Middle Ages Nic. Cusanus

argued in his writing de docta ignorantia, that no truth could be obtained by

reason, but only by faith, which was mystically conceived as a new organ in

man. After the Reformation Roman theology returned to scholasticism and

also adopted the doctrine of the unknowability of God’s being in the sense

of Thomas, e.g. Sylvius, Comm. in Thomam, ed. 4 Antv. 1693 I p. 96 sq.

Billuart, Cursus theol. I 1747 p. 228 sq. Petavius, Theol. dogm. I c. 5 VIII c.

6. Theol. Wirceb. ed. Paris. 1880 III 73 sq. Jansen, Praelect. Theol. II 78 sq.

C. Pesch, Praelect. dogm. 1895 II p. 46 sq. etc. At the Lateran council under

Innocentius III this doctrine was even ecclesiastically established and

pronounced by Rome: Deus ineffabilis est. [10]

6. Reformation theology has brought no change in this. Luther, in his

work de servo arbitrio, made the distinction between Deus absconditus and

revelatus, between Deus ipse and verbum Dei. And later he came more and

more to hold only to the latter, i.e. to God as He has revealed Himself in

Christ; quod supra nos, nihil ad nos. But yet the full being of God did not,

for him, come to expression in that. And there remained in God a dark,

hidden background, viz. Deus ut est in sua natura et majestate, Deus

absolutus. And this, according to Luther, was plane incognoscibilis,

incomprehensibilis, inaccessibilis, Köstlin, Luthers Theol. I 47. 76 f. 314 f.

Later Lutheran theologians did not speak of such a sharp distinction

between God’s being and His revelation, but all nevertheless teach that no

adaequate name and no proper definition of God can be given, Gerhard,

Loci theol. II c. 5. cf. Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. § 17. Bretschneider,

Dogm. I4 443. The Reformed thought in agreement with this. Their deep

aversion to all creature-idolatry led them everywhere sharply to distinguish

between what is God’s and what is of the creature. More than any other

theology they took seriously the proposition that finitum non est capax

infiniti. Zwingli said: quid Deus sit, tam ex nobis ipsis (these words may

not be omitted, as Hoekstra does, Wijsg. Godsd. II 14) ignoramus, quam

ignorat scarabeus, quid sit homo, Opera III 157. Calvin considered it a vain

speculation to investigate quid sit Deus; for us it is enough to know, qualis

sit et quid ejus naturae conveniat, Inst. I 2, 2. I 5,-9. Comm. in Romans 1:19.

Later theologians expressed the unknowability of the divine being still

much more strongly. Because the finite cannot grasp the infinite, all names

of God serve, not to make His being known to us, but to indicate, in some

measure according to our capacity, that of God which we need to know. The

propositions: Deus definiri nequit, Deo nomen non est, finitum non est

capax infiniti, recur with all theologians. They all teach unanimously that

God infinitely far surpasses our concept, our representation, our language.

Thus, e.g., Polanus says, the attributes which are ascribed to God in Holy

Scripture do not explain His nature and being. Much more they make

known to us quis et quomodo non sit, quam quis et quomodo sit.

Quidquid de Deo dicitur, non est Deus, quia est ineffabilis. Nulla attributa

divina essentiam naturamque Dei sufficienter explicant, quia illa est

infinita. Infinitum autem per id quod finitum est digne satis pleneque

explicari non potest, Synt Theol. II c. 6 p. 137, cf. also Zanchius, de natura

Dei seu de attributis, Op. II col. 9-10. Hyperius, Methodus theol. 1574 p.

Maresius, Syst. theol. p. 48. Alsted, Theol. schol. did. p. 56 sq. Moor,

Comm. in Marckii Comp. I 505 sq.

7. But also in Reformation theology the significance of this

incomprehensibility of God was perceived less and less as time went on. It

was indeed still taught, but stood entirely by itself and exercised no

influence. The schema in which the doctrine of God was treated soon stood

almost unalterably fixed. Much worse was it with other directions.

Socinianism did not enter at all into the question of the knowability of God.

It did not take the least interest in the knowledge of God’s essence. To know

God stood approximately equal to knowing that He is absolute Lord, Fock,

Der Socin. S. 414-416. Crell wrote a work de Deo ejusque attributis, and in

it indeed proved God’s existence with all kinds of arguments, but refrained

from all questions concerning God’s essence, knowability, etc. Conr.

Vorstius wrote a Tractatus de Deo s. de natura et attributis Dei 1610, which

fell into the same Socinian errors, cf. Acta Syn. Dord. sess. 149 sq. The

Remonstrants also felt no need to enter into metaphysical questions; they

rather warned against idle speculation and urged simplicity. That which was

strictly necessary to know was only the will of God. The cultus Dei is much

more necessary than the cognitio Dei, Episc., Instit. theol. Lib. 4 sect. 2 cap.

1. Limborch, Theol. Chr. Lib. II c. 1. Rationalism thought itself certain of

God’s existence and attached little value to the knowledge of his essence. It

is as if the majesty and the greatness of God is no longer perceived at all.

Leaving aside all so-called metaphysical questions, one hastens to the will

of God, in order to know and to do it. Not in knowing God, but in doing his

will lies eternal life. Bretschneider calls the question entirely

superfluous, whether God can be defined, Dogm. I4 443. Syst. Entw. 341.

But when this truth of the unknowability of the divine being had been

almost entirely forgotten by theology, it was brought back to remembrance

by philosophy. Rationalism supposed that, with its proofs for God’s

existence and with its doctrine of God’s attributes, it stood on firm,

scientific ground. But Kant, although with his doctrine of God, virtue, and

immortality still wholly caught up in rationalism and moralism,

nevertheless brought about a great change in the foundation on which this

doctrine rested. Just as sensibility brings with it a priori the forms of space

and time, and the understanding the categories, so reason also contains a

priori, synthetic Grundsätze und Regeln, especially this Grundsatz, that it

ascends from the conditioned to the unconditioned, Kr. d. r. Vern. ed.

Kirchmann S. 300. Thereby it forms three transcendent ideas, soul, world,

God, S. 308-318. But these three ideas cannot be demonstrated objectively,

but can only be derived subjectively from the nature of reason, S. 319. We

cannot perceive the object of those ideas; we therefore also cannot obtain

any scientific knowledge of them, S. 321, 322. Scientifically judged, they

are paralogisms, antinomies, ideals, S. 322. Our knowledge does not reach

further than the domain of experience, S. 469, 475, 508. These ideas

therefore do not increase our knowledge, but only regulate it; they bring

unity into our concepts and cause us to consider everything as if there were

God, the soul, the world, S. 512, 530, 537, 541. Science can neither prove

nor deny the reality of those ideas, S. 532. Psychology, cosmology

(teleology), and theology are therefore not science, S. 547. The critique of

pure reason ends with a negative result. Now practical Vernunft does indeed

cause us to assume the reality of those ideas, Kr. der prakt. Vern. ed.

Kirchmann S. 149 f. And indeed Kant ascribes to God understanding and

will and other attributes, S. 150, 157, but nevertheless the being of God

remains hidden. Practical reason does indeed know that those three ideas

have objective reality, but nothing more. It does not increase the content of

our scientific knowledge. Speculative reason can do nothing with those

ideas except regulate and purify our knowledge, and makes use of the idea

of God in order to counteract and ward off anthropomorphism as a source

of superstition and fanaticism, S. 162 f. If understanding and will are

ascribed to God, then that is only a knowledge of God in praktischer

Beziehung, but in no respect a speculative knowledge, S. 165. Whoever

abstracts from the anthropomorphistic element of it retains nothing but the

word, S. 166. The idea of God does not belong in metaphysics, which does

not exist, but in morality, S. 166 f. Fichte at first stood wholly on the same

standpoint as Kant. In his Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung,

Königsberg 1792, he lets faith in God rest on the postulates of reason, also

ascribes to God definite attributes such as holiness, blessedness,

omnipotence, righteousness, omniscience, eternity, S. 3 f. 104. But with that

we still have no definite concept of God, and do not know his being as it is

an sich; that would also not promote but harm pure morality, S. 105.

Religion always represents God in human fashion, in time and space, and

even bodily, and does no harm by that, provided only that it does not come

into conflict with morality and provided that this sensible representation is

not held to be objectively valid, S. 124 f. Everything must be understood as

Herablassung zu unserm subjectiven Bedürfniss, S. 127. Nur eine solche

Offenbarung also kann göttlichen Ursprungs seyn, die einen

anthropomorphisirten Gott, nicht als objectiv sondern blos für subjectiv

gültig giebt, S. 129. And Schleiermacher too, although in many respects

deviating from Kant and Fichte and attaching himself more closely to

Spinoza, nevertheless agreed with them in the doctrine of the unknowability

of God. The idea of the unity of being and thinking, of the real and the

ideal, i.e. the idea of God, is the presupposition of all our knowing,

Dialektik herausg. von Jonas 1839 S. 397, the ground of our thinking, S. 60,

163; but is not to be grasped in thought and remains hinter dem Vorhang, S.

78, 79. As soon as we want to bring the Absolute nearer to us, it is made

finite in our thinking, S. 69 and we speak in image. S. 78. It is in one word

unattainable for knowing, S. 87. In his Glaubenslehre Schleiermacher

presented the same thoughts, be it also in a more religious and less

elaborated form. God is the Woher of our Daseyn; and as such an absolute

causality He is no object of our knowing but only content of the feeling of

8. Since then the doctrine of the unknowability of God has penetrated

more and more into the consciousness of the modern age. Hegel indeed

stood on another standpoint. Acknowledging that the religious

representation was inadequate and suitable only for the people, he

nevertheless considered philosophy capable of stripping this representation

of its sensuous form, and thus of elevating it to an adequate concept.

Reason, in his opinion, gradually raised itself through various stages to the

absolute being, then sees the truth face to face, and knows as its essence

reason, thinking, the concept itself. Philosophy, pure science, or more

specifically logic, is the description of God in his essence, an sich. It

comprehends the Absolute in its fitting, adequate form, as thinking, in the

form of the concept, Werke III, S. 33 f. In his spirit many, such as Strauss,

Philos. des Unbew. II9 155 f. 175 f. Religionsphilos. 608 f., Scholten, Initia

p. 109 sq. L. H. K. II 199, 200, attempted, by purification and deepening of

the concepts, to come ever nearer to the transcendent reality. But with

others Hegel’s philosophy led to a wholly different outcome; they asserted

that in the idea of God the representation could never be overcome, and

therefore came to atheism. Feuerbach said that the personal God was

nothing other than the essence of man himself, and theology nothing but

anthropology. All that is predicated of God is derived from man, not only

personality but all attributes and names. Religion is a deification of man

himself. Man cannot rise above his own essence and therefore God is and

remains always a sensuous, human being, not only in Christ. dogmatics but

also in philosophy, Wesen des Christ. 1841. And many spoke likewise and,

together with the anthropomorphic representation, threw away the whole

idea of God, e.g. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff16 S. 392 f. Id. Der Gottesbegriff

und dessen Bedeutung in der Gegenwart2 1874. Haeckel, Nat.

Schöpfungsgesch.5 S. 30 f. Strauss, Der alte u. d. neue Glaube2 S. 122. 144

f. Friedrich Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral S. 179. But this atheism

went too far for others. Taking note of the limitation of human cognitive

capacity, which always remains moving within the finite, these thought that

man must confine himself to what is given under observation

(positivism), refrain from every statement about existence and nature of the

supersensuous (abstentionism), and thus in this respect must only confess

his absolute ignorance (agnosticism). In France the task of science was

limited to the establishing and explaining of phenomena by Auguste Comte,

who therefore also excluded theology from the circle of the sciences, cf.

deel I 151v. In England it was especially Herbert Spencer who, with all

kinds of arguments, contested the knowability of God, First Principles, 5th

ed. 1887 p. 68-97. And in Germany, after being satiated with Hegel’s

panlogism, one returned to the critical philosophy of Kant. Thus

agnosticism in the last half of this century has become almost universally

dominant. All metaphysics is distrusted; one has an aversion to speculation;

only what is positive and belongs to the domain of the sciences exactes

stands firm. Theology has come so much under the fear of this agnosticism

that it scarcely dares any longer to speak of knowledge of God; it tries as

much as possible to exclude all metaphysics and to confine itself to the

religious; it is ashamed of its own name and has allowed itself to be

rechristened into a science of religion. For, although agnosticism is in fact

death for theology, this has nevertheless still been maintained by many

under another form. Kant regained by practical reason what he had lost by

theoretical reason. Spencer leaves room for a religious veneration of the

Unknowable. Already before him Sir William Hamilton, in his writing On

the philosophy of the unconditioned, Edinb. Rev. Oct. 1829, and Dr. Henry

Longueville Mansel in his work The limits of religious thought examined in

eight lectures, preached before the university of Oxford 1858, had asserted

that our thinking, because always bound to space, time, distinction,

opposition, etc., can never penetrate to the absolute, even though on

religious grounds the representation of God as a personal being must be

maintained, cf. Dorner, Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. VI 1861 S. 320 f. 347 f. To

a similar dualism the Neo-Kantians in Germany also came. Thinking may at

its best bring us to the concept of the Absolute, yet in religion we do not

have enough with that. Here we have need of a God who is like us, whom

we represent as a person, and who, as a Father, cares for his children.

Such a religious representation is indeed always subject to criticism from

the side of science; it is not the highest and the true, but there is no more to

be attained, Lipsius, Dogm. § 229 f. 243 f. Ritschl, Metaph. u. Rel. 8 f.

Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 211 f. Rauwenhoff, Wijsb. v. d. godsd. 611 v. Hoekstra,

Wijsg. godsd. II 11 v. And likewise others have sought in humanity, moral

idealism, ideal-formation, spiritism, theosophy, buddhism, etc. a

compensation for what science in Christian theology had taken from them,

9. The grounds on which this agnosticism can rely are of very great

weight. In the first place it can avail itself of the argument that was from

ancient times advanced by the sophists and sceptics against the possibility

of all knowledge, namely, that all human knowledge is subjective and

relative. Nothing in the world stands by itself independently; object and

subject are dependent on one another. Things and their properties exist only

then and so, as they stand in relation to someone’s perception; something

first becomes something through the relation to the senses of the subject.

We therefore can never say what a thing is in its essence, independently of

our perception; we can only pronounce that something at a given moment

thus appears to us; ἀ νθρωπος μετρον παντων. This argument is indeed of

great significance; but it proves too much; if it were valid, it would make

impossible not only the knowledge of God but all knowledge of man and

world; moreover this idealism has already been discussed in part I 145-151

and can therefore here further remain out of consideration. But agnosticism

has various grounds that are advanced specifically against the knowability

of God. Philosophy and theology were indeed, as appeared above, at all

times convinced of the inadequacy of our knowledge of God. Negative

predicates say only what God is not, and positive ones belong to Him in an

entirely different way than they are found in creatures. The limitation, the

finitude, the anthropomorphism of our knowledge of God was

acknowledged by all. But in more recent times the unreachability of the

knowledge of God has been argued in still other and more drastic fashion.

Subjectively, namely, attention has been drawn to the limited nature of the

human faculty of knowledge; and objectively to the inner contradiction

from which every concept of God suffers. The first was done by Kant, the

second by Fichte. Kant investigated the human faculty of knowledge and

came to the conclusion that the forms of intuition and the categories of the

understanding were brought along by the subject itself, had validity in the

world of phenomena, but also made all true knowledge of the noumena

impossible for us. The transcendent ideas of God, world, soul are indeed

rules for our acting, and a moral human being cannot act otherwise than as

if an objective reality corresponds to those three ideas; but to prove this is

not possible. Fichte added to that still the objection that the concepts of

absolute and personality can never be united with one another. Spinoza

already said that all determination was a negation, Epist. 50, that a thing

therefore, in proportion as it became more determined and concrete, was

also all the more finite and limited. Thereby it nevertheless ceases to be that

which other things are: if something is white, it can no longer be red or

black. God therefore cannot be something determinate alongside and in

distinction from the creatures, but He is the substance of all creatures, the

one, infinite being, so that all that is, is in Him, Eth. I prop. 14. 15. This

philosophical premise was applied by Fichte to the concept of personality;

personality and self-consciousness were things that we had found in

ourselves and that cannot be thought without limitation and finitude. If we

transfer them to God, we make Him into a finite, limited, human being. The

moral world-order is therefore also the one essentially necessary thing in

religion; more we do not need; a special, personal existence of God is

unnecessary for religion, and it is also unprovable, indeed impossible and in

conflict with itself; whoever desires such a God is still caught in

eudaemonism, Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche

Weltregierung 1798, Werke V 184 f. cf. Kuno Fischer, Gesch. der neuern

Philos. V2 628 f. This reasoning has then been disseminated in wide circles,

and returns at every moment, cf. Schelling in his first period, Werke I 1 S.

200, Hegel, Werke V 18, Schleiermacher, Reden über die Religion3 S. 167

f. Schopenhauer, Parerga und Paral. I5 123 f. Hartmann, Philos. des Unbew.

II9 175 f. Id. Religionsphil. II 145-163, Id. Lotzes Philos. 1888 S. 168 f.

Strauss, Christl. Gl. I 502 f. Biedermann, Dogm. II2 457-472, 537-547 etc.

In the essence of the matter this opposition between absolute and

personal is no other than that which in Christian theology was always felt

and was expressed in the negative and positive, the apophatic and the

cataphatic theology. However much the proofs against the knowability of

God are each time presented in another form, in fact they are always the

same and always come down to this. Man is bound to sensible perception

and always derives the material of his thought from the visible world; he

does not intuit the spiritual and cannot raise himself to the world of the

invisible things, because he always remains bound to space and time. Also

his thinking is material and finite and limited; just as the eagle remains

enclosed within the atmosphere (Hamilton) and the fish within the pond

(Lange), so our thinking always moves within the circle of the finite. More

still, thinking is of such a nature that it of itself presupposes a separation

between subject and object, which, standing over against one another and

limiting one another, can neither of them be absolute. To think is to

condition, therefore Hamilton said; and Mansel expressed the same thus:

distinction is necessarily limitation; knowledge of the absolute is therefore a

contradiction, for it indicates that one has knowledge concerning something

that is absolute, thus stands in no relation, and precisely as known by a

subject nevertheless again does stand in relation. If now the nature of

thinking is so constituted, and if we then nevertheless still want to think and

know God, then we always do one of two things: either we draw the

absolute down within the circle of the finite and we make God into a

personal, limited, human being; or we attempt in our thinking to raise

ourselves above all bounds of space and time, strip our thought concerning

God of all conformity to the finite creature, but then also retain nothing in

our thinking except an empty, abstract, contentless concept, which has not

the least value for religion. Yes, even that concept escapes us; under our

thinking the absolute becomes nothing. Absoluteness and personality,

infinity and causality, immutability and communicability, absolute

exaltation above and conformity to the creature seem in the concept of God

to be irreconcilable. We find ourselves in an insoluble antinomy. It is as if

only the choice is left to us between a coarse realism and a tenuous

idealism, between a God who is nothing but a man on a grand scale, or a

cold abstraction that causes the religion of the heart to freeze and die.

10. To a considerable extent this doctrine of the unknowability of God can

be assented to and wholeheartedly affirmed. Scripture and church both

emphatically maintain the unsearchable majesty and the sovereign

exaltedness of God. There is no knowledge of God as He is in Himself. We

are human beings and He is the Lord our God. There is no name that fully

expresses his being; no definition that circumscribes Him. He is infinitely

far exalted above our imagination, above our thought, above our language.

He cannot be compared with any creature; all nations are esteemed by Him

as less than nothing and vanity. Deo nomen non est. Deus definiri nequit.

He can be apprehendi, not comprehendi. There is some γνωσις but no

καταληψις of God. Thus it is said throughout the whole of Scripture and

throughout the entire Christian theology. And when a superficial rationalism

deemed an adaequate knowledge of God possible, Christian theology has

always most strongly contested this. According to Socrates, Hist. Eccl. IV 7,

Eunomius, a follower of Arius, would have taught that he knew God just as

well as himself. God’s essence consisted according to him solely in the

ἀ γεννησια, and in that he had a clear, distinct, adaequate concept of the

divine essence; God was no more and man no less known than was

expressed in this praedicaat. Later Spinoza said that he had as clear a

concept of God as of a triangle, although he did not thereby wish to assert

Deum omnino cognoscere, Epist. 60. And in this century Hegel taught that

the absolute in the philosophy of concepts came to complete selfconsciousness and thus was known completely and adaequately by the

philosopher; the consciousness of God in us is nothing but the

consciousness of God of Himself. God is, insofar as He is known by us, i.e.

insofar as He knows Himself in us. This rationalism has been opposed and

rejected in the Christian church with all force, Basilius, Hexaem. hom. 1.

Gregor. Naz. Orat. 28 etc. cf. Schwane, D. G. II 27 f. Indeed, a deep

religious interest is involved here. Augustine once expressed it in this way:

de Deo loquimur, quid mirum si non comprehendis? Si enim comprehendis,

non est Deus. Sit pia confessio ignorantiae magis, quam temeraria professio

scientiae. Attingere aliquantum mente Deum, magna beatitudo est;

comprehendere autem, omnino impossibile, Serm. 38 in Ev. Joan. Therefore

God is precisely the sole object of all our love, because He is the

Infinite and Incomprehensible. Although, however, Scripture and church

thus as it were accept the praemisses of agnosticism and are even more

deeply than Kant or Spencer penetrated by the limitation of man and the

incomparable greatness of God, yet they draw from this another conclusion,

a conclusion that was expressed by Hilarius de trin. II 7 as follows: perfecta

scientia est, sic Deum scire, ut licet non ignorabilem, tamen inenarrabilem

scias. The knowledge that we have of God is a wholly peculiar one. It can

be called positive, insofar as by it we acknowledge a being that is infinite

and essentially distinct from all finite creatures. On the other side it is

negative, because we cannot ascribe a single praedicaat to God as we think

it in creatures. And it is therefore an analogical one, because it is the

knowledge of a being that in itself is unknowable, nevertheless can make

something of Himself known in creatures.

Herein indeed lies something of an antinomy; or rather, agnosticism

suffers from a confusion of concepts and therefore sees here an

irreconcilable contradiction, but Christian theology beholds here an

adorable mystery. It is completely incomprehensible to us, that and how

God in the creature, eternity in time, immeasurability in space, infinity in

the finite, immutability in change, being in becoming, the all as it were in

the nothing can reveal itself and make itself known in some measure. This

mystery is not to be understood, it can only be acknowledged with

thanksgiving. But mystery is something other than contradiction.

Pantheistic philosophy has made it into that. If it identifies the absolute with

the indeterminate and calls every determination a limitation and negation,

then it makes itself guilty of a confusion of concepts. There is a world-wide

difference between infinite and endless, between almighty and the sum of

all power, between absolute being and the sum of all being, between

eternity and the totality of all moments of time etc., and so also between the

absolute and the indeterminate, unbounded, boundless. Pantheism first

inserts its own concept of God into these words and can then easily accuse

theism of being in conflict with it. That God is the Infinite and nevertheless

can reveal himself in finite creatures and has also actually revealed

himself, is indeed the recognition of an incomprehensible mystery, namely

of the wonder of creation, but by no means the admission of a palpable

absurdity. Finite being cannot detract from the infinity of God, if only it has

its absolute subsistence in the being of God. And so also our knowledge is

no limitation of God, because it is grounded in Him himself, is sustainable

only through Him, and has Him himself precisely as Infinite for its object

and content. Moreover, if the absolute excludes all limitation and every

determination is a negation, then it is not only impermissible to speak of

God as personality, but then it is equally wrong still to call Him the

absolute, the one, the good, the being, the substance etc. Pantheism labors

under the delusion that it is finished with the concept of God when it has

removed personality and self-consciousness from it as contradictory

elements. And the theistic philosophers from the first half of this century,

such as J. H. Fichte, Carus, Steffens, Weisse, Ulrici e. a. have, in reaction,

all too much clung to this concept of personality, and thought that in the

concept of absolute personality they possessed an adequate description of

the essence of God. Certainly many good remarks have been made over

against pantheism as proof that personality is not in conflict with the

absolute essence of God. If absolute is not conceived as boundless, as

endlessly extended on all sides, then it is not to be seen how personality

would be in conflict with it. Then there is only enclosed in it, that the selfconsciousness of God is as rich and deep, as infinite, as his being.

Personality may then also in us human beings awaken over against a not-I,

in God it is the eternal synthesis of himself with himself, the infinite selfknowledge and self-determination and therefore not dependent on a not-I, J.

H. Fichte, Die Idee der Persönlichkeit u. der indiv. Fortdauer, 1855 S. 52 f.

J. W. Hanne, Die Idee der absol. Persönl. 2e Aufl. 1865. Weisse, Philos.

Dogm. I 552 f. Lotze, Mikrok. III3 549-580. Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 39.

Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 213-223. Kaftan, das Wesen der Chr. Religion

378 f. Lipsius, Dogm. § 229. Martensen, Dogm. 75. Thomasius, Christi

Person u. Werk I3 11 f. Lange, Dogm. I 167 II 53. Bruch, Lehre v. d. göttl.

Eigensch. 122 f. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. II 53 f. Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 391.

Bovon, Dogm. Chrét. I 229 s. Doedes, Inl. tot de Leer van God 74 v.

But yet it is true, what the older Fichte said, that personality is a concept

borrowed from ourselves and therefore, transferred to God, always contains

something imperfect. The concept of personality, used of God, is inadequate

and in principle nothing better than all other anthropomorphisms, in which

we speak of God. The Christian church and theology has also never used

this word for the essence of God and has, with the three modi subsistendi in

that essence, spoken of persons only hesitantly and for lack of something

better. But at the same time it is thereby clear that pantheism has still gained

nothing when it points to the incongruity of this concept. The opposition

between absoluteness and personality is essentially the same as that

between negative and positive theology. Even if the word personality is

wrong, thereby in fact nothing has yet been decided. The same question

therefore returns again and again. If every determination is a negation, then

God also may not be called the one, the being, the absolute. Then all

thinking and speaking about God is forbidden. If we, who are human

beings, may not speak of God in an analogous, human way, then nothing

else remains for us than to be silent. For in a divine way to think and speak

about God, we cannot. But then all religion also falls. If God cannot be

known, He also cannot be felt and enjoyed in feeling. Feeling is as finite as

the understanding, and finitizes and humanizes God in the same way. There

is then no possibility that God reveals himself objectively in his creatures or

that we subjectively perceive Him through any organ. All religion is then

sacrilege, and all theology is then blasphemy of God.

11. The question concerning the knowability of God is thereby reduced to

this other one, whether God has willed and been able to reveal himself in

the world of creatures. For it is perfectly true, what Kant says, that our

knowledge does not extend further than our experience, Kr. der r. Vern. ed.

Kirchmann 508. If God has not revealed himself, then there is also no

knowledge of Him. But if He has revealed himself, then there is something,

however little it may be, that falls under our observation and thus can lead

to knowledge. Then, however, it speaks for itself, that the denial of the [23]

knowability of God entirely coincides with the denial that God has revealed

himself in the works of his hands. Agnosticism falls back into the error of

the old gnosticism. God is ὁ Βυθος ἀ ρρητος, eternal σιγη; there is no

communion and no kinship between Him and his creatures. The whole

world is in an absolute sense ἀ θεος; there is no trace of God to be noticed in

the world; the world is the product of a lower God, of a demiurge, of a

chance; man is not created after God’s image but is simply a product of

nature without God in the world; no religio, no theologia is possible, neither

from creation nor from re-creation. God and world are absolutely separated.

Yes, worse still, agnosticism cannot escape the consequence that God

cannot reveal himself. It shuts Him up in himself, it makes Him into an

unknown, invisible power, which has no consciousness and no will, which

cannot communicate itself in any way, which is eternal σιγη. And the world,

as likewise in Manichaeism, is elevated to a power alongside and over

against God, which cannot in any way take Him up into itself, and is

completely unfit to radiate anything of his glory. Agnosticism thus ends in

fact in atheism, of which it is only the nineteenth-century form and name.

Yet agnosticism usually does not go so far, and still maintains the existence

of The Unknowable. But then it also immediately suffers from an inner

inconsistency, which is untenable: Augustine already observed, that the

proposition that we know nothing of God already presupposes a great

degree of knowledge concerning God, and that there was thus a pugna

verborum. For if we call God ineffabilis, then at that same moment we say

something and much of Him, so that He again is not ineffabilis, de doctr.

chr. I 6. Non enim parvae notitiae pars est.... si antequam scire possimus

quid sit Deus, possumus jam scire quid non sit, de trin. VIII 2. Not-knowing

is itself a positive, an all-embracing knowing, it is non parva inchoatio

cognitionis Dei, Ep. ad Consent. It says already so much, namely, that He is

nothing of all that which is creature. And so it is also with the agnostics.

Spencer e.g. says, that we are driven by our thinking to assume the

existence of an absolute being as ground of the universe, although on

account of our finitude and limitation we can form no concept of it. But if

we are so finite and limited, how do we then come to form the thought

of such an absolute being and to assume its existence. And if we really must

assume the existence of such an absolute being, why would any knowledge

of that being be wholly impossible? No single agnostic therefore confines

himself to the non liquet. Spencer e.g. says at every moment, that we do not

know the absolute, and yet he has an idea of it, proves its existence and also

ascribes all sorts of properties to it. He says, that it is not a negative but a

positive concept, that it is the cause of everything, that it is a power, most

analogous to our will, that it is infinite, eternal, omnipresent etc. This truly

is no longer agnosticism but a very definite knowledge and a fairly welldefined concept of God. Agnosticism, in itself untenable and afraid of

atheism, in the end serves to justify a pantheistic concept of God. Cf. on and

against agnosticism: Flint, Antitheistic theories 3 ed. 1885 p. 14. James Orr,

The christ. view of God and the world 1893 p. 96. A. B. Bruce, Apologetics,

Edinb. Clark 1892 p. 146. John Caird, An introduction to the philos. of

religion, Glasgow 1880 p. 8-38. G. J. Lucas, Agnosticism and religion,

being an examination of Spencers religion of the unknowable preceded by a

history of agnosticism. Baltimore, Murphy and Co. 1895. Art. Sekularismus

in Herzog2.

. Just as formerly with religion I 209 v., so it also appeared now with

the knowledge of God, that it cannot have its origin except in

revelation. If God is not revealed in his creatures, then of itself no

knowledge of Him is possible. But if He displays his virtues in the world of

creatures, then the knowability of God can no longer be contested.

Naturally, thereby the nature and the measure of that knowledge are

not determined. All who teach the knowability of God readily agree that

that knowledge is wholly of its own kind and of very limited extent. For,

although God is revealed to some extent in his creatures, there remains in

Him an infinite fullness of power and life behind, which does not come to

light. His knowledge and power do not coincide with the world and do not

pour themselves out into it in full. He cannot even reveal himself

completely to and in creatures, for the finite does not contain the infinite; no

one knows the Father except the Son, Matthew 11:27 cf. Deuteronomy 29:29. Moreover,

that which God reveals of himself in and through creatures is already so

rich and so deep that it can never be fully known by any human being. We

## § 21. The Knowability of God. (Cognitio Dei Insita.)

do not understand the world of created things in so many respects and stand

every moment on all sides before riddles and mysteries; how then should

we understand the revelation of God in all its richness and depth? But

thereby the knowability of God is nevertheless not nullified. The

incomprehensibility of God nullifies this knowability so little that it rather

presupposes and confirms it; the richness of the divine being, surpassing all

knowledge, precisely constitutes a necessary and important element of our

knowledge of God. It remains established that God is knowable for us in

that same way and in that same measure as He reveals himself to us in

creatures.

That there is now a revelation of God in the world can really hardly be

denied. In the first place, Holy Scripture leaves us not a moment in doubt

on that point. It does not set up an altar for the unknown God, but proclaims

that God who made the world, Hd. 17:23, whose power and divinity can be

perceived from the creatures by the human νους, Romans 1:19, who above all

created man after his image and likeness, Genesis 1:26, as his offspring, which

lives and moves in Him, Hd. 17:28, has spoken to him through prophets and

apostles, above all through his Son himself, Hebr. 1:1, and now continually

reveals himself to and in him through Word and Spirit, Matthew 16:17, John 14:23 etc. According to Holy Scripture the whole world is a creation and

thus also a revelation of God; there is in an absolute sense nothing atheistic.

And this testimony of Scripture is confirmed from all sides. There is no

atheistic world, there are no atheistic peoples, there are also no atheistic

human beings. The world cannot be conceived as ἀ θεος, because then

it could not be the work of God but would have to be the creation of an

ἀ ντιθεος. And now dualism, which has repeatedly appeared in religion and

philosophy, has indeed discerned in matter a daemonic principle, but in the

world has nevertheless always acknowledged a connection of idea and

matter, a struggle of light and darkness. There is no one who can in an

absolute sense and consistently deny the knowability of God, and thus His

revelation in the world, wholly and entirely. Agnosticism itself is proof of

that, just as scepticism cannot maintain itself except with the help of what it

combats. And precisely therefore, because the world is not to be conceived

as ἀ θεος, therefore there are also no atheistic and religionless peoples.

Indeed this has been asserted by Socinus, Tract. Theol. c. 2, de auctor.

Script. c. 2, Locke, Essay on human understanding I ch. 4 § 8, and by many

in this century, e. g. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff16 380 f., Darwin, Afst. des

menschen 1884 I 127. But this opinion has been sufficiently refuted and is

now almost generally abandoned, Moor, Comm. I 57. M. Vitringa, Comm. I

16. Flint, Antitheïstic theories, 3 ed. p. 250-289, 519-532. Peschel,

Völkerkunde S 260. Zöckler, Das Kreuz Christi 1875 S. 417 f. The wellknown saying of Cicero, that there is no people so barbarous that it believes

not in the gods, has been confirmed from century to century. This fact is of

great significance. That which all men agree upon by virtue of their nature

cannot be false, Cic. de nat. deor. I 17. Opinionum enim commenta delet

dies, naturae judicia confirmat, ib. II 2. And so finally there are also no

atheistic human beings. There is not so much difference about the existence

as about the essence of God. Indeed there is a practical atheism, a life

without God in the world, Psalms 14:1, 53:2, Ef. 2:12. But conscious theoretical

atheism in an absolute sense is rare, if it ever occurs. The word atheism,

however, has often been used in a relative sense, not as a denial of the

Godhead überhaupt, but of a particular Godhead. The Greeks accused

Socrates of atheism, Xenophon, Memor. I 1. Cicero counted Protagoras,

Prodicus among the atheists, because they denied the popular gods, de nat.

deor. I 42. The Christians were therefore many times accused of atheism by

the Heathens, Suicerus s. v. ἀ θεος. And the Christians in their turn used that

name for those who denied the God of revelation, ib. The Romans have

sometimes reckoned Luther, Melanchton, Calvijn among the atheists,

Buddeus, de Atheismo 1747 p. 116 sq. In more recent times J. G. Fichte

was openly accused of atheism, because he held the moral world-order

itself to be God. And even now the name of atheist is sometimes given to

those who know no other power than matter, such as Feuerbach, Strauss,

Büchner, Haeckel, Czolbe, Dühring, cf. A. Drews, Die deutsche

Spekulation seit Kant II 235 f. And indeed, if the materialists recognize

nothing other than matter and change of matter, then they are atheists and

want themselves to be regarded as such. But this almost never occurs.

Taken in an absolute sense, as denial of an absolute power, atheism is

almost unthinkable. All finally again recognize a power that is venerated as

God. Strauss asks for his universe a piety, as the believer for his God, Der

alte u. d. neue Gl2. 141 f. Atheism and materialism repeatedly turns into

pantheism, Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff16 3, 70, 71 f., Haeckel, Nat.

Schöpfungsgesch. 20, 32, 64 Id. Der Monismus als Band zw. Rel. u. Wiss.

1893. That comes about because man cannot withdraw from the recognition

of a highest power. At the same moment that he denies the true God, he

invents for himself a false God. Religion sits too deep in man’s nature for

that, and the revelation of God speaks too loudly. Even if in some times

religious indifferentism and scepticism takes hold deeply and far around

itself, as e. g. in the age of Pericles, of emperor Augustus, of the

Renaissance, and also in this century, then religion nevertheless always

comes up again. Rather does man seize upon the coarsest superstition than

that he can in the long run endure the naked, cold unbelief. But we can go

even further. Not only does atheism in an absolute sense almost never

occur, but even in that sense it is rare that it would deny a personal God

who lays claim to our veneration. Naturalism, hylozoism, pantheism are

without doubt directions that repeatedly present themselves. But they are

directions, not so much in the religious as in the philosophical domain.

They have never arisen of themselves, spontaneously, but owe their origin

to criticism of the religious representations in others. They are not dogmatic

but critical; and they therefore always serve only for a time and in a limited

circle. A people, a society, a church, a congregation of such naturalists

and pantheists is unthinkable and untenable; the pantheists themselves

acknowledge this, the religious representation is necessary for the lesser

man, but only the philosopher raises himself to the pure concept. From that

it follows that belief in a personal God is natural and normal; it arises

everywhere of itself and in all men. But atheism, even as denial of a

personal God, is an exception. It is philosophy, not religion. There is truth

in the sharp word of Schopenhauer: ein unpersönlicher Gott ist gar kein

Gott, sondern bloss ein missbrauchtes Wort, ein Unbegriff, eine contradictio

in adjecto, ein Shiboleth für Philosophieprofessoren, welche, nachdem sie

die Sache haben aufgeben mussen, mit dem Worte durchzuschleichen

bemüht sind, Par. u. Parel. I5 123. cf. Welt als Wille u. Vorst. II6 398, 406,

739. Therefore a certain will is also necessary, in order not to believe in a

God, in a personal God. Deum non esse non credit, nisi cui Deum non esse

expedit. There are no atheists who are firmly and certainly convinced of

their unbelief, even unto martyrdom. Because it is abnormal and unnatural,

does not rest on immediate consciousnesses but on mediate proofs and

fallible reasonings, therefore it is never certain of its case. The proofs for

the existence of a personal God may be weak, they are always still stronger

than those for the denial. To prove that there is no God is even impossible;

for that one would have to be omniscient and omnipresent, i.e. oneself

would have to be God, cf. Voetius, de atheismo, Disp. I 114-225. G. J.

Vossius, de origine et progressu idol. I c. 3. Leydecker, Fax Veritatis III

controv. 3. Turretinus, Theol. El. III qu. 2. Maresius, Syst. Theol. 1673 p.

44. Buddeus, Theses theol. de atheismo et superst., ed. Lulofs L. B. 1747.

Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 198, 242. Flint, Antith. theories3, lecture I, Hoekstra,

Des Christens godsvrucht bl. 6. Doedes, Inl. tot de leer v. God. 57v.

2. This naturalness, universality, and necessity of religion and knowledge

of God has already early led to the thought that it was implanted in man by

nature and inborn. The fact is there, after all, that all human beings from

earliest youth onward have consciousness not only of a physical but also of

a psychical, spiritual, invisible world. True and false, good and evil,

right and wrong, beautiful and ugly are indeed no measurable and

calculable magnitudes and cannot be perceived with the five senses, but

they are a reality which for our consciousness stands much more firmly

than that of matter and of force. Materialism may reckon only with gravity

and heat and electricity; but faith and hope and love are still wholly other

forces, which have governed humanity and have preserved it from sinking

away into bestiality. Augustine has rightly said that the truth of spiritual

things is actually much more certain and firmer than that of the visible.

Nihil absurdius dici potest, quam ea esse quae oculis videmus, ea vero non

esse quae intelligentia cernimus, cum dubitare dementis sit intelligentiam

incomparabiliter oculis anteferri, de immort. an. c. 10 n. 17. de civ. XIX c.

18. The truths of mathematics, of logic, the first principles of ethics, law,

religion stand indubitably firm for all. They bear a character of naturalness,

universality, and necessity, which can be denied by no one. They seem, as

ideae innatae, to be enclosed in man’s nature, to be given with his birth.

The doctrine of innate concepts is already rooted in Greek philosophy.

There it constituted a great problem for thought, how learning is

nevertheless possible. For one of two things seemed to be the case: either

we already know something and then we can no longer learn it, or we do

not know it, but how is it then to be explained that we strive to learn it,

Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. I4 996, II4 823, III 189. Plato solved this problem by

his doctrine of recollection; the soul, before its connection with the body,

had beheld the ideas in all their beauty and had preserved the images of

them deep in its memory. He proved this especially by mathematics, which

we can build up entirely out of our mind without help of sensible

perception, but otherwise thought that all learning presupposed the

praeexistence of the soul, Zeller, ib. II4 639, 643 f. 823 f. Aristotle did

indeed regard sensible perception as the way to knowledge, but nevertheless

judged that reason potentially brought with it some highest, general

principles, which stand firm by themselves, lie at the basis of all proofs, and

are acknowledged by all, ib. III 188 f. The Stoics spoke of κοιναι ἐ ννοιαι,

φυσικαι ἐ ννοιαι, ἐ μφυτοι προληψεις, i.e. such concepts as, by virtue of the

nature of our thinking, are derived by all from perception, ib. IV3 74 f.

389 f. With all these philosophers there is as yet no question of innate ideas

in the strict sense. Plato does not limit recollection to a few innate concepts

but extends it to all knowledge; and Aristotle and others do indeed speak of

general principles but expressly teach that these are not given as ideas with

birth but are found specifically by means of perception and thinking, yet in

such a way that every normal human being must then also find them. In the

proper sense the doctrine of innate concepts first occurs with Cicero. He

speaks of notiones impressae, cogitationes insitae, innatae and assumes a

knowing of all kinds of truths prior to all experience and investigation.

There are according to him semina innata virtutum, Tusc. III 1, 2, notitiae

parvae rerum maximarum, which nature planted sine doctrina in our soul,

de fin. V 21, 59, an innate knowledge of God, Deos esse natura opinamur,

Tusc. I 16, 36. Nat. D. I 1, 2 etc. Zeller, IV3 659 f.

3. In more recent philosophy the doctrine of the ideae innatae was

advanced by Descartes, who was also the first to use this term and thus

began to employ idea in a sense unusual up to that time. With Descartes this

doctrine was connected with his dualism between soul and body. The

cognitio intellectualis cannot be derived from sensible perception; this gives

only the occasio, whereby our mind per innatam facultatem forms the

representations and concepts, Renati Descartes, Notae p. 185. The cognitio

proceeds from a principle of its own, i.e. from ideae innatae. Among those

ideae innatae that of God is the chief, which, as it were, is a nota artificis,

operi suo impressa. Medit. tertia p. 24. But he conceives the innate

character of those ideas in such a way that the soul by nature possesses the

power, the facultas, the dispositio, to bring them forth out of itself. The

ideas are therefore not actual but potential in our mind, Object. et Respons.

p. 102, Notae p. 184, 185. Also according to Leibniz the necessary and

universal truths do not come to us from without, but they proceed from

ourselves, such as e.g. those of substance, duration, change, cause, the

mathematical truths and especially also the idea of God. Together these

truths form the natural light of reason. But the innate character of those

truths is explained by Leibniz more extensively and more clearly than

by Descartes. The latter said only that those ideas were potential in our

mind. Leibniz, however, says that they are innately present virtualiter,

comme des inclinations, des dispositions, des habitudes ou des virtualités

naturelles et non pas comme des actions. The human mind does not merely

have the receptivity to know them, for then all knowledge could be called

innate, but it is the source of those truths, it can bring them forth out of

itself, les tirer lui-même de son fond. The ideas thus lie, as it were,

preformed in the human soul. And this is possible, because there is a

representing and thinking without consciousness. They come to

consciousness when sensible perception gives occasion for it. This also

brings the ideas virtually present in us actually into our mind, cf. Spruijt,

Proeve van de leer der aangeb. begrippen 144, Stöckl, Gesch. d. n. Phil. I

426, Malebranche thought he could explain learning and knowing in man in

no other way than by the supposition that we see the ideas in God and that

God therefore, as the universal and infinite being, is immediately present in

our understanding. In his footsteps the ontologism of Gioberti, Gratry,

Ubaghs e. a. taught that we immediately behold God in our mind as the

absolute being and that therefore an intuitive knowledge of God is present

in man, Stöckl, Gesch. d. neuern Philos. II 568 f. 620 f. By Kant this

doctrine of innate concepts was importantly modified. In connection with

the terminology of Wolff he spoke of knowledge apriori and aposteriori,

and now taught no innate concepts but indeed innate forms, namely forms

of intuition, i.e. space and time, forms of the understanding, i.e. categories,

and forms of reason, i.e. the ideas God, virtue and immortality. The

idealism of Fichte and Hegel drove this doctrine to such a point that they

constructed not only the knowledge of the necessary and universal truths,

but all knowledge, and even all being, the whole material world, out of

thinking. The grounds on which this doctrine of the ideae innatae chiefly

rests are these: Learning, the ability to learn, presupposes that what is

learned is already present in some way in our mind. Reasoning and proof

are built on principia that must be established per se and apriori. Experience

gives only δοξα, contingent truths; universal and necessary truths can

proceed only from the human mind itself. That there are such universal

and necessary truths is proved by the consensus gentium. And above all the

opposition between soul and body is of such a nature that representations

and concepts cannot have their origin in sensible perception; they must

either be explained from the human mind or from the Spirit of God, in

whom man beholds all ideas. On the other hand the doctrine of innate

concepts was opposed by the Socinians, who rejected natural religion, Fock,

Der Socin. 307 f., cf. also Episcopius, Inst. theol. I c. 3, Locke, Essay

concerning human understanding I ch. 2-4, Hobbes, de cive c. 14 n. 19 etc.

They appealed to the following considerations: The doctrine of the ideae

innatae is completely superfluous, because the origin of those ideas can also

be well explained in another way. History teaches that no single

representation and no single concept is the same among all men and

peoples. Even innate moral principles do not exist; concerning good and

evil the greatest possible difference prevails; and the concept of God is so

little innate that there even exist atheistic men and peoples. Children, idiots,

the insane therefore also know nothing of such innate concepts. All

knowledge in man stems from sensible perception; nihil est in intellectu

quod non prius fuerit in sensu. This refutation of the ideae innatae made

much headway in England and France in the previous century. The

materialism of this century joined it. The doctrine of innate concepts has

generally been abandoned and replaced by the theory of the inheritance of

characteristics, Darwin, Afst. v. d. mensch, hoofdst. 3, 4. Spencer, bij Spruyt

Proeve 342. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff16 S. 344 f.

4. It is important to know what attitude Christian theology has adopted

toward this doctrine of the ideae innatae. Prof. Spruyt finds it strange that

the scholastics, with rare unanimity, declared themselves against that

doctrine, and suspects that for that there must have been a theological

reason, which, however, he cannot indicate, Proeve bl. 60. This is indeed

the case and will become clear in what follows. Although Christian

theology generally assumed that there were truths known not by revelation

but by nature, and obtained not by deliberate investigation and reflection

but, as it were, involuntarily [33], it nevertheless decisively rejected the

doctrine of innate concepts. To be sure, the proponents of the ideae innatae

in later times, such as Thomassinus, Theol. dogm. I c. 4, Staudenmaier, Chr.

Dogm. II 57 f. Kuhn, Gotteslehre 2de Aufl. 542 f., Klee, Dogm. II 1-4 and

the ontologists such as Malebranche, Gioberti, Ubaghs etc., appealed to

some church fathers, but wrongly. Justin Martyr, Apol. II 6 does indeed

speak of the idea of God as a πραγματος δυσεξηγητου ἐ μφυτος τ ῃ φυσει

των ἀ νθρωπων δοξα, but does not further say how he means this ἐ μφυτος.

Irenaeus, adv. haer. II 1 sq. does indeed argue against the Gnostics that the

world was created by God and reveals Him and makes Him known, but

does not mention a cognitio innata. Clement of Alexandria also says that the

Father and Creator of all things is known by all by nature and without

instruction, ἐ μφυτως και ἀ διδακτως, but he himself explains repeatedly that

that knowledge is obtained from the contemplation of God’s works, Strom.

V 13. 14. Tertullianus lays very strong emphasis on natural knowledge of

God. All men, in spite of their idolatry, in danger and distress call upon the

one God. And they have not learned this from Moses or the Prophets, but

their own soul taught them therein. Animae enim a primordio conscientia

Dei dos est. This is the same among all peoples, adv. Marc. 10. The soul is

by nature Christian, Apol. 17. By that Tertullianus means nothing else than

that some truths, such as that of the existence and unity of God, are known

not first by special revelation but by nature: quaedam enim et natura nota

sunt, ut immortalitas animae penes plures, ut Deus noster penes omnes, de

resurr. 3. With more right one appeals to Augustine, who in many respects

stood under Plato’s influence and also acknowledges this himself, de beata

vita 4. Indeed he attaches much more value to thinking than to sensory

perception. The senses perceive only changeable things, but reason,

although distinct in each human being, sees and knows general, necessary,

unchangeable truths. And that is only to be explained by the fact that the

reason of each human being sees those general truths in the one general

reason, the one unchangeable truth, which God himself is. And thus

Augustine then repeatedly explains that we, just as we see sensible objects

by the light of the sun, so contemplate intelligible truths in the light of

God, de civ. VIII 7, de trin. XII 15. He is nearer to us than the creatures and

easier to find than these, de Gen. ad litt. V 16. He is the veritas super omnia

praesidens, Conf. X 41. He even says, Deus et Dominus rerum omnium

humanis mentibus, nulla natura interposita, praesidet, de musica VI 1. From

this it is clearly evident that Augustine considers it much better and easier to

ascend to God by thinking into the eternal truths than by contemplation of

external nature. But it may nevertheless not be inferred from this that the

soul of man here on earth would already contemplate God directly and

immediately and then in this way would come to the knowledge of the

eternal truths. For elsewhere he clearly says that the visio Dei is reserved

for heaven, de trin. II 17, that here on earth the cognitio vespertina has been

allotted to us, de Gen. ad litt. IV 32, that the eternal truths which man

recognizes are to be distinguished from God as truth itself, de lib. arb. II 13,

Solil. I 5, that man gradually ascends from the contemplation of nature,

from the knowledge of reason and its laws to God, Conf. VII 10. de lib. arb.

II c. 3-13 Cf. Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorzeit, I2 756 f. Schwane, D. G. II2 54-

67, Gangauf, Aug. Lehre v. Gott dem Dreieinigen 1883 S. 137 f. Spruyt,

Proeve 43-57. Mysticism, however, had in Augustine a powerful support,

and it taught that man originally, besides an oculus carnis and an oculus

rationis, had also received an oculus contemplationis, which, restored by

grace, would already here at moments and in glory perfectly contemplate

God, Bonaventura, Brevil. II c. 12. By Bonaventura the proposition is

therefore also contested that omnis cognitio sit a sensu; the soul knows God

and itself without the help of the senses, Sent. II dist. 39 art. 1 qu. 2. Yet

mysticism in Bonaventura, though on this point deviating from Thomas,

remains within the bounds. Quamvis Deus sit praesens, tamen propter

caecitatem et caliginem intellectus nostri, in qua sumus, ipsum cognoscimus

ut absentem, Sent. II dist. 10 art. 1 qu. 1. The contemplation of God is not

given to every human being, but is only a gift of grace, which can raise a

Paul thereto, Sent. II dist. 23 art. 2 qu. 3. And even as regards the

knowledge of the prima principia, this is indeed called innate in

Bonaventura, but he explains in addition, quia lumen illud sufficit ad illa

cognoscenda post receptionem specierum sine aliqua persuasione

superaddita propter sui evidentiam.... Naturale enim habeo lumen, quod

sufficit ad cognoscendum quod parentes sunt honorandi, et quod proximi

non sunt laedendi, non tamen habeo naturaliter mihi impressam speciem

patris vel speciem proximi, Sent. II dist. 39 art. 1 qu. 2. Although

Bonaventura thus also assumes that there are truths which we do not obtain

through sensory perception but through inward contemplation and through

communion with God, yet even in him there is no question of innate ideas

in the proper sense, cf. the Freiburg edition of the Breviloquium, 1881 p. 79

sq. 148 sq. Schwane, D. G. III 111 f. Sanseverino, Philos. Christ. Neap. III

art. 41. The whole scholasticism unanimously rejected the doctrine of innate

concepts. In distinction from that, it taught that the essence of things is the

proper object of intellectual knowledge. All knowledge begins with sensory

perception. But when this sees the things, then the understanding has the

aptitude to abstract the general from them, and indeed first of all the socalled innate concepts. These are thus not brought along ready-made by the

intellectus but, in accordance with its nature, abstracted from the perception

of sensible things. That also holds for the idea of God. God is not the

substance of things but their causa, and therefore He can, from His works,

by perception and thinking, be known to some extent in His existence and

in His virtues. Innate knowledge exists only insofar as a natural habitus has

been implanted in our understanding, to ascend from the finite to the

infinite, from the particular to the general, cf. deel I 158 v., and further

Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 2 art. 1, c. Gent. I c. 10, 11. Theol. Wirceb. III 5 sq.

C. Pesch, Theol. dogm. II 10-13, Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorzeit I2 67 f. 587

f., Beilagen, 3tes Heft S. 3-47, Denzinger, Vier Bücher v. d. relig. Erk. II 28

f. The ontologism of Gioberti and Ubaghs was condemned at Rome 18

5. Among the Lutherans the good and true element that lay enclosed in the

doctrine of innate concepts could not come into its own. The theologia

naturalis, as well insita as acquisita, found little favor with them, cf. already

vol. I 222. By the combating of the scholastic doctrine, naturalia adhuc esse

integra, Luther allowed himself to be led into an opposite extreme. The

image of God was wholly lost. Ratio sine Spiritu Sancto est simpliciter sine

cognitione Dei. Homo in rebus divinis nihil habet quam tenebras. Properly

speaking, for man there has remained only the aptitudo passiva, i.e. the

possibility of being saved. For the rest, his understanding, will, inclination

are limited only to the civilia; in the spiritual he is wholly blind and dead.

Luther does indeed acknowledge that God still reveals himself in his works,

creation is a Larve Gottes; but man no longer knows Him from it. Luther

even sometimes goes so far that he calls sin essentia hominis, and that man

is nihil quam peccatum; expressions which one certainly must not unfairly

press and force, but which nevertheless are of significance for his view of

the cognitio Dei insita and acquisita, Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 244 f. 287 f.

367 f. The same negative standpoint is taken by the Lutheran symbols, ed.

Müller5 522, 585, 589, 594; and some theologians such as Flacius and

Chemniz went so far that they rejected the whole cognitio Dei naturalis,

Zöckler, Theol. Natur. 1860 S. 64. But soon one nevertheless returned from

this one-sidedness. Luther himself often spoke differently, and saw and

praised in nature a work of God, Zöckler, ib. 60 f. Melanchton taught a

cognitio Dei both insita and acquisita; there are traces of God in all his

works, but these would be insufficient, nisi etiam insita esset menti

quaedam notitia seu προληψις de Deo, Corpus Ref. XIII 137 sq. And this

example is followed by the later theologians. Gerhard, Loci Theol.

Prooemium § 17, Loc. II c. 4, Quenstedt, Theol. did. polem. I 250 sq.,

Hollaz, Exam. Theol. p. 187 sq., Calovius, Isag. ad S. Theol. c. 4, Buddeus,

de atheismo 1767 p. 225 sq. etc. discuss the theologia naturalis and defend

it expressly against the Socinians. Later it was even treated separately by

some, such as Jaeger et al. The cognitio Dei insita was now variously

defined by the Lutheran theologians, as a facultas or dispositio or habitus or

perfectio or lumen congenitum et habitui analogum. But on this all were

agreed, that it did not consist in a species impressa, which would already be

present in man prior to all use of reason, Hollaz 189, Quenstedt 253,

Calovius 77. Therefore Descartes’ doctrine of the ideae innatae was

rejected, Hollaz 195, and likewise the mystical doctrine of the inner light

and of contemplation, ib. 198-220. And over against that the theologia

insita was then conceived as a natural aptitude and inclination implanted in

the intellectus humanus, to come sine discursu et mentis ratiocinatione to

knowledge of God and to give to this an undoubted, firm and certain

testimony, Hollaz 188-190, Quenstedt 253. Ante sensualem perceptionem

nihil est in intellectu, quoad idealem rerum repraesentationem, est tamen

aliquid in intellectu, quoad notitiam habitualem, Hollaz, Ex. theol. 193.

Quenstedt, Theol. did. pol. I 260.

The Reformed, from the beginning, adopted a friendlier attitude toward

the theologia naturalis. Calvin distinguished between a general and a special

grace and explained from the former all the good that has still remained

even in sinful man, cf. my address on De Algem. Genade bl. 27 v. He also

definitely assumed that a sensus divinitatis had been implanted in the

human spirit, and indeed naturali instinctu. God has implanted in all

numinis sui intelligentiam, cujus memoriam assidue renovans, novas

subinde guttas instillat, Inst. I 3, 1. He also calls this semen religionis, and

explains from it the universality of religion, ib. The conviction that there is

a God is naturaliter ingenita; it can never be eradicated, I 3, 3. But yet

scarcely one in a hundred is found, qui conceptum in suo corde foveat,

nullus autem in quo maturescat, I, 4, 1. And to that semen religionis there

now comes the revelation of God in his works, so that aperire oculos

nequeant quin aspicere eum cogantur, I 5, 1. There is no little piece of the

world, nulla mundi particula, in which not at least some sparks of his glory

are seen to shine forth, I 5, 1. First of all man himself as a microcosm is an

officina innumeris Dei operibus nobilis, I 5, 3, 4, but then further the whole

of nature, which can piously even be called God, 1 5, 5. Cf. II, 2, 18 and

comm. on Ps. 8; 19; Hd. 17:27, 28. Romans 1:19. Hebr. 11:3. And thus all

Reformed symbols and theologians speak. Ursinus, Tract. Theol. 1584 says

that God reveals himself to man cum notitiis de se menti hominum

impressis, tum creaturis omnibus tanquam speculis et documentis suae

divinitatis propositis p. 35, and among the notitiae nobiscum nascentes he

also counts the sensus that there is a God, as the universality of religion

proves, p. 39. Zanchius, Op. III 636 sq. rejects both Plato and Aristotle and

teaches with the Stoa and Cicero, that the κοιναι ἐ ννοιαι nobiscum

nasci, non autem usu comparari; children immediately know that three is

more than two, that there is a distinction of good and evil, etc. Polanus,

Synt. Theol. p. 325 understands by the recta ratio the vera notitia voluntatis

et operum Dei, ut et ordinis judiciique divini, a Deo menti humanae

inscripta; whose author is the Logos, whose form and norm are the principia

naturalia, and which is increased by the contemplation of God’s works; cf.

further P. Martyr, Loci Comm. p. 2 sq. Maresius, Syst. theol. p. 41. H.

Alting, Theol. elenctica 1654 p. 2 sq. Leydecker, Fax Verit. Loc. 3 contr. 1.

Alsted, Theol. polem. 1620 p. 185-187. Turretinus, Theol. El. I qu. 3 n. 2.

Moor, Comm. I 41 etc. And yet, notwithstanding that the theologia insita

was so powerfully advocated, Cartesius’ doctrine of the ideae innatae was

decisively rejected by Voetius, Disp. V 477-525. He accuses Cartesius

especially of three things, that he uses the word idea in an unusual sense

and thus falsifies it; that he does not clearly say what is to be understood

under that idea Dei innata, whether it belongs to the theologia insita or

acquisita, whether it is a facultas or actus, an ens reale or ens intentionale,

etc.; and that he deprives the knowledge that comes to us through the senses

of its value and certainty. In what sense the theologia insita is then to be

understood is clearly defined by Voetius. It is a facultas seu vis seu aptitudo

facultatum rationalium, seu lumen naturale in eo, quod intellectus veritatem

principiorum potest sine ullo labore, praevio studio aut ratiocinatione

comprehendere, et positis ponendis (cognitione scil. terminorum) de facto

sic comprehendit, ex naturali quadam necessitate et insito sibi pondere in

hunc veritatis sensum atque assensum dilatus et inclinans; in the same way

as the will by a natural disposition pursues the good and the eye of itself

beholds the light and the visible, Disp. I 141 cf. V 516, 525. The wellknown saying: nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu is then

also recognized as truth insofar as the world around us, on the one side or

the other, as direct object or as product or as part or as antithesis, etc., is

necessarily required in order to bring us to conscious knowledge, ib. V 525.

6. From all the above-mentioned, the reason becomes clear to us, [39]

why Christian theology so unanimously rejected the doctrine of the ideae

innatae. It was the fear of rationalism and mysticism that guided it in this. If

man already at his birth brought with him in his mind a perfectly clear and

distinct knowledge, whether of all the ideas (Plato), or of God (Cartesius),

or of being (Gioberti), then he thereby became independent of the world; he

could produce perfectly pure knowledge out of his own mind and was

sufficient unto himself; he could even dispense with the revelation which

God had given in his word; better and more clearly than in nature and

Scripture he found perfect knowledge in his own mind. Yes, more still, by

the doctrine of the ideae innatae an unquenchable chasm was dug between

spirit and matter, between soul and body. The visible world was then not a

creation and revelation of God, no embodiment of divine thoughts; from it

the eternal truths, intellectual knowledge could not be derived; man found

these only, through self-reflection and recollection, when he separated

himself from the world and withdrew into his own soul-life. And indeed the

danger is hereby indicated, which always threatens from the side of the

ideae innatae. The dualism of Plato has in Neoplatonism and thereby again

in the Christian, specifically the Roman church led to a mysticism which

indeed at first on the lower steps of meditation made use of the revelation of

God in nature and Scripture but then, having risen higher to contemplation,

could indeed dispense with all those external aids and had in the inward

word, the spiritual light, the vision and communion of God in the inmost

existence of the soul perfectly enough. And the dualism that in more recent

philosophy arose again through Cartesius and the doctrine of the idea Dei

innata connected therewith has with Leibniz and Wolff first, thereafter with

Kant, Fichte and Hegel led to a rationalism that constructed the whole

world of being out of the immanent thought of the human mind. Now it is

clear as day that Scripture will know nothing of such an α ὐ ταρκεια of man

and of such a contempt for body and world. It teaches that man in soul and

body is bearer of the image of God and that through his body he is akin and

connected to the whole visible world. But this bond is no slave-chain; on

the contrary, the world in which man is placed leads him not away

from God but up to God; it is a creation of God, a mirror of his virtues, a

manifestation of his thoughts. There is, according to the beautiful word of

Calvin, nulla mundi particula, in qua non scintillae saltem aliquae gloriae

ipsius emicare cernantur, Inst. I 5, 1. And because Christian theology

understood that, therefore it unanimously rejected the doctrine of innate

concepts. And then there were added the objections, drawn from

psychology and history, which against this doctrine were advanced, among

others, by Locke. Empiricism defended, over against mysticism and

rationalism, a precious truth. For, if these directions asserted that the

essence, the idea of things could not come to us from sensible perception

but could arise only in God (Malebranche), in the soul through ἀ ναμνησις

(Plato) or through thinking out of man’s own mind (Cartesius-Hegel), then

they too thereby had a good intention. God is indeed the sun of spirits. In

his light we see the light. The Logos enlightens every man, coming into the

world. But yet it is true that we here on earth do not see face to face, that we

walk in faith, and see through a mirror in a dark reason. Only through

contemplation of God’s revelation in nature and Scripture do we come to

knowledge of God, Romans 1:19, 1 Corinthians 13:22, 2 Corinthians 3:18. There is here on

earth no direct, immediate knowledge of God and of his thoughts to be

obtained, but only a mediate, per speculum and in speculo. The feeling of

the mystics, rationalists and ontologists is therefore not theistic but

pantheistic; it confuses the lumen rationis with the lumen Dei, the general

truths in us with the ideas in the consciousness of God, our logos with the

Λογος του θεου. And over against that Christian theology set the doctrine

of Holy Scripture, that all our knowledge of God, since his essence in itself

is unknowable for us, is obtained through mediate revelation and bears an

analogical character. In fact, then, no single man comes to the knowledge of

the prima principia and to the thought of God apart from the world. The

little child, that is born unconscious, gradually receives all kinds of

representations and ideas from the environment in which it is brought up.

With the first man this may by the nature of the case have been otherwise;

all who are born after him have come to conscious and clear knowledge,

both of visible and invisible things, not each on his own occasion and by his

own reflection, but through their parents and through their circle of life.

Therefore there is no knowledge of the invisible, except under the symbol

of the visible. Whoever lacks a sense also receives no representation of the

phenomena corresponding thereto. A blind man does not know what light is

and therefore also does not understand that God is a light, otherwise than

only negatively and by contrast. Therefore there is also in law and custom,

in religion and art so much difference among men and peoples possible.

This would be inexplicable if the ideas in the proper sense were innate and

had been implanted immediately by God himself in our mind. Now,

however, we see that all men indeed have the capacity of speech but

nevertheless speak very different languages; that all indeed have an idea of

God but clothe it in all kinds of representations; that there are men who in

their heart say that there is no God; that the distinction of good and evil is

everywhere known but the content of both is determined very divergently;

that concerning right and wrong, concerning beautiful and ugly the opinions

differ very far from one another. In one word, there is not a single religious

or ethical truth that ubique, semper et ab omnibus has been acknowledged;

there has never existed a theologia naturalis in an actual sense, any more

than a natural law and a natural morality.

7. Therewith, however, only the one side of the truth has been shown.

There is still a reverse side, which is of no less importance. For it cannot be

denied, that just as objectively the light of the sun, so also subjectively the

eye is necessary in order to see. That human beings in fact learn, and

acquire knowledge from their environment, is certain; but it presupposes

that they bring with them a capacity, an aptitude and inclination to learn.

Language is taught to us by the people among whom we are born, but it

presupposes in every human being a disposition and an inclination to speak.

Thus it is in every domain, in religion, art, morality, law, science etc. The

semina scientiarum lie by nature in the human being. All science proceeds

from general principia, which stand firm by themselves and of themselves.

All knowledge rests in faith. All proof presupposes in the end an ἀ ρχη

ἀ ποδειξεως. There are logical, mathematical, philosophical, ethical and thus

also religious and theological principia, which indeed are very general

and abstract, but which nevertheless are accepted by all human beings and

in all centuries and which bear a character of naturalness and necessity. The

laws of thought are the same for all; the doctrine of numbers is everywhere

the same; the distinction of good and evil is known to all; there is no people

without religion and knowledge of God. This is not otherwise to be

explained than by the assumption of principia per se nota, κοιναι ἐ ννοιαι,

veritates aeternae, which have been imprinted by nature upon the human

spirit. With religion one must, whether one will or not, always again go

back to a semen religionis, a sensus divinitatis, an instinctus divinus, a

cognitio insita. Scripture itself goes before us in this. It binds the human

being as strongly as possible to the objective revelation in nature and grace,

but it acknowledges at the same time, that the human being is God’s image

and offspring, that he possesses in the νους a capacity to see God in his

works and that he bears the work of the law written in his heart, Genesis 1:26,

Hd. 17:27, Romans 1:19, 2:15. Yet everything depends on understanding well

this originality of the κοιναι ἐ ννοιαι. They have been designated in various

ways and one has spoken of ἐ μφυτος, ingenitus, insculptus, insitus, inborn,

in-created, implanted etc. And no one uses those words in a literal sense; as

soon as these expressions are thought through, almost all hasten to declare

that they do not mean that these ideae innatae are at once brought along

with birth fix und fertig and are present in consciousness as species

impressae. In that sense there are then also no inborn concepts. God does

not let the human being come into the world adult in any respect but lets

him be born as a helpless and needy child. And that child would perish, if it

were not fed and cared for by its environment. Yet in the child the future

man already lies hidden. And thus it is in the intellectual, ethical and

religious domain. Cognitio Dei insita does not mean that the human being

immediately, by God himself, is equipped with a sufficient knowledge and

no longer has any need of revelation. It does not indicate that he is capable,

on his own, of deriving any conscious, clear and true knowledge of God

from his own spirit. But it indicates that the human being possesses both the

potentia (aptitudo, vis, facultas) and the inclinatio (habitus, dispositio), in

order in the normal course of development and in the midst of the

environment in which God granted him life, of himself and without

compulsion, without scientific reasoning and proof, ἐ μφυτως και

αδιδακτως, to come to some firm, certain, indubitable knowledge of God.

The words ἐ μφυτος, ingenitus, inborn etc. thus do not intend to express that

which a human being is born with, but they only wish to make known that

the knowledge of God is born from the human being himself by a natural

way, without scientific reasoning. They are not to be understood as opposita

of the doctrine that the human being is born as tabula rasa, without a

definite, material content in his consciousness; but they are opposed to the

opinion that the human being was first brought externally, by a particular

revelation, by scientific proof, as it were artificially and by compulsion, to

knowledge of God. Thus those expressions have always been meant in

Christian theology. They therefore alternated with ἀ διδακτως, φυσει, vi

insita, sine praevio studio, sine discursu operoso etc. Dei cognitio nobis

innata dicitur esse, in quantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere

possumus Deum esse, Thomas in Kleutgen, Phil. der Vorzeit I 348.

Therefore Locke’s remark is also incorrect, that, if under ideae innatae only

the capacity of knowledge were understood, then all knowledge could be

called inborn. For the cognitio Dei is therefore called insita or innata,

because every human being with normal development must come to it. Just

as a human being, opening the eyes, of himself beholds the sun and by its

light the objects, so must the human being by virtue of his nature, as soon as

he hears that there is a God, that there is a distinction of good and evil, etc.,

give his assent to that. He cannot do without that. He accepts those truths of

himself, without compulsion or proof, because they stand firm by

themselves. Therefore the knowledge of God is called inborn, and the

expression of an inborn potentia or facultas was unsatisfactory. There is

expressed on the one hand, over against the doctrine of the ideae innatae,

that the knowledge of God is not brought along by the human being clear

and ready but comes about mediately, through the operation of revelation in

his consciousness, and on the other hand there is indicated over against

empiricism, that that revelation of God speaks so loudly and powerfully and

finds so deep an echo in everyone’s mind, that it can be called as it were

natural and in-created to the human being. And hereby theology has not

only done full justice to Scripture, but also to psychology and history.

Revelation is there from God in all his works, not only outside but

especially also in the human being. Of nature, from which God is known,

the human being himself constitutes the principal part. And from that whole

nature, both outside and in him, the human being receives impressions and

sensations, which in his consciousness, prior to all reasoning and proof,

cultivate the awareness of a Supreme Being. It is God himself, who leaves

himself without witness to no human being. Cf. I 16. 157v. 212v., and

further still Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit I2 587-792. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I

195. Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 197. Mc Cosh, The intuition of the mind,

inductively investigated, 1860. John Caird, An introduction to the philos. of

religion 1880 p. 39. 160. Lotze, Mikrok. III 580 f.

. Although there may be no antithesis between the cognitio Dei insita

and acquisita, there is nevertheless undoubtedly a distinction between

the two. Often this distinction is conceived in such a way that the first

denotes the knowledge of God which is innate to man and accrues to him

from his own being, and the second that which, for the increase and

extension of the first, comes to man in part from without, from the

contemplation of the world. But the difference between the two is not

thereby indicated clearly and precisely. For, in the proper sense, there is no

knowledge innate, neither of God nor of the world. All knowledge comes

from without into man’s consciousness. What is innate is only the capacity

for knowledge; but this capacity comes to operation and act only through

the influence of the world in and around us. The seed of religion does

indeed lie in man, but it germinates only in the field of the whole of human

life. Just as the eye is brought along by man at his birth but sees the objects

only in the light of the sun, so the believer beholds God only in all the

works of his hands. Furthermore, it has become clear to us in the previous §

## § 22. The Knowability of God. (Cognitio Dei Acquisita.)

that Christian theology has never understood by the innate and implanted

character of the knowledge of God that man at birth brought along any

conscious knowledge of God; but it thereby only indicated that the

knowledge of God does not need to be imparted to man by coercion or

violence, and also not by logical reasoning or compelling proofs, but that it

is by nature, spontaneous, of itself proper to man. A man, developing

normally, comes without coercion or effort, of himself to some knowledge

of God. Therefore the cognitio Dei insita is also not in antithesis with the

acquisita, for in a broader sense the first too can be called acquisita. For the

revelation of God precedes the cognitio Dei, both insita and acquisita. He

does not leave himself without witness. He works with his eternal power

and divinity upon man from all sides, not only from without but also from

within; in nature and the world of men, in heart and conscience, in

prosperity and adversity, God as it were comes to meet man. And man,

created after God’s image, received the capacity to take up the impressions

thereof and thereby to come to some awareness and to some knowledge of

the Eternal Being. The cognitio insita, as soon as it is cognitio and thus not

only potentia but actus, has never arisen otherwise than under the influence

of the revelation of God in and outside man and is therefore in so far always

acquisita. For these reasons the distinction between the cognitio Dei insita

and acquisita was formerly usually indicated differently. It consisted in

these two things. First, in this, that the cognitio Dei innata was obtained of

itself, spontaneously, without effort or coercion, whereas the cognitio Dei

acquisita was acquired by reasoning and argument, by reflection and proof

along the viae causalitatis, eminentiae and negationis; the former was

noetica, the latter dianoetica. And second, from that there also flowed this

difference, that the first consisted only in principles and was general and

necessary, but the second was more elaborated and developed, yielded more

concrete propositions and was therefore also subject to all manner of doubt

and contestation. That there is a God stood and stands nearly for all as

certain. But the proofs for the existence of God have been found by

thought and are therefore alternately despised and highly esteemed, Moor,

Comm. I 41. 44. And thereby the distinction is precisely indicated. It does

not lie in this, that the innate knowledge of God would arise from man and

the acquired from the world. The moral proof too is derived from the moral

consciousness which is within man. In both it is the same and the whole

revelation of God, from which the cognitio Dei penetrates into our

consciousness. But in the cognitio Dei insita that revelation works upon the

consciousness of man and cultivates there impressions and awarenesses. In

the cognitio Dei acquisita that revelation of God is thought through by man;

his understanding sets to work, his reflection awakens, and with clear, lucid

consciousness he seeks by reasoning and proof to ascend from the creatures

to God. For man has, in no domain of knowledge, enough with impressions

and awarenesses. He is not satisfied with consciousness alone. It is not

sufficient for him that he knows. He also wants to know that he knows; he

seeks to explain the how and why of his knowing. And hence it is that

ordinary, everyday, empirical knowing always seeks to pass over into

proper, scientific knowing; that faith raises itself to theology, and the

cognitio Dei insita completes itself in the cognitio Dei acquisita.

2. The division into cognitio Dei insita and acquisita is usually applied

only to the theologia naturalis. And this is then distinguished from and often

set in opposition to the theologia revelata. Already earlier this view has

been contested at length, I 219-244. There is no separate theologia naturalis,

which, apart from all revelation, could be obtained by man from the

thinking contemplation of the world. That knowledge of God which is

summarized in the theologia naturalis is no product of human reason. It

presupposes, in the first place, that God himself reveals himself in the

works of his hands; it is not man who seeks God, but God who seeks man

also through his works in nature. Further, it is not man who, with the natural

light of reason, understands and knows this revelation of God; all religions

of the Heathen are positive; but on man’s side a sanctified understanding

and an opened eye are needed, in order to take note of God, the true and

living God, in his creatures. And even this is not enough. Even the

believer, even the Christian, would not understand God’s revelation in

nature and would not be able to reproduce it purely, if God himself had not

described in his Word how and what he reveals of himself in the whole

world. The cognitio Dei naturalis is included in Scripture itself and is

therein unfolded at length. Therefore it is also an altogether wrong method

that the Christian, in the treatment of the theologia naturalis, as it were

divests himself of the special revelation in Scripture and of the illumination

of the H. Spirit, discusses it without any Christian Voraussetzung, and

thereafter proceeds to the theologia revelata. The Christian, also as

dogmatician, from the beginning stands with both feet on the foundation of

the special revelation; not only first in the locus de Christo but also in the

locus de Deo is he a believer in Christ. But standing thus, he looks around

him, and armed with the spectacles of the H. Scripture he sees in the whole

world a revelation of that same God whom he knows and confesses in

Christ as his Father in the heavens. Then, however, under the cognitio Dei

insita and acquisita is not to be understood that knowledge which we obtain

from creation apart from the special revelation. From our earliest youth

onward God’s special revelation in Christ has worked upon us all; we are

born in the covenant of grace and thus as Christians; all manner of Christian

influences have formed the knowledge of God which is now our portion, to

a much greater extent than the working that has proceeded from God’s

revelation in nature upon our heart; and in the light of that special revelation

we have all also learned to contemplate nature and the world around us. We

all owe the knowledge of God from nature to God’s special revelation in his

Word. Nature would let us hear voices just as confused as the Heathen, if

we had not listened to God’s speech in the works of grace and thereby now

understood his voice also in the works of nature. But now that revelation of

God in nature is also of high value. It is the same God who in nature and in

grace, in creation and re-creation, in the Logos and in Christ, in the Spirit of

God and in the Spirit of Christ speaks to us. Nature and grace are no

antithesis; we have one God, from whom and through whom and unto

whom they both are. [48]

3. This applies to both the cognitio Dei insita and acquisita; both we owe

to Holy Scripture. It is true that it makes no effort to prove the existence of

God. It proceeds from that existence and presupposes that man knows and

acknowledges God. It does not consider man to have sunk so deeply that, in

order to believe, he beforehand has need of a proof. For he is still bearer of

the image of God, God’s offspring, and endowed with a νους, in order to

observe in the creation God’s eternal power and divinity. The denial of

God’s existence is in the eyes of Scripture a sign of folly, of deep moral

decay, Psalms 14:2. Such people are exception, not rule. As a rule Scripture

reckons with such as acknowledge the existence of God unforcedly and by

virtue of the prompting of their nature. It does not appeal to the reasoning

intellect, but to the rational and moral consciousness. It does not analyze

and demonstrate, but shows God in all the works of his hands. But it does

do that, then. Heaven and earth together with all creatures, foliage and

grass, rain and drought, fruitful and unfruitful years, food and drink, health

and sickness, riches and poverty, and all things speak of God to the pious.

There is no part, no little piece of the world, in which his power and

divinity is not beheld. To heaven and earth, birds and ants, flowers and lilies

man is referred, in order to behold and acknowledge God. Scripture does

not reason in the abstract and does not make God into the conclusion of a

syllogism, now leaving it to us whether we shall find that proof compelling.

But it speaks with authority, it proceeds theologically and religiously from

God, it shows his virtues in his works and it demands that we shall

acknowledge God. An ox knows its owner, and a donkey the manger of its

lord, but Israel has no knowledge, my people does not understand, Jes. 1:3.

It is certain for it that God reveals himself in the creatures and that He

leaves himself without witness to no one, Hd. 14:17, Romans 1:19. And thus,

appealing to the whole creation as a testimony and revelation of God, it

contains in germ everything that was later worked out broadly in the proofs

and was unfolded dialectically. There is truth in the remark of C. J. Nitzsch,

Syst. der Chr. Lehre, 6te Aufl. S. 142, that Holy Scripture gives us a

beginning and analogy of the aitiological proof in Romans 1:20, of the

teleological in Ps. 8; 19; Hd. 14:17, of the moral in Romans 2:14 and of

the ontological in Hand. 17:24, Romans 1:19, 32. But speaking thus, not in

dialectical demonstration but in the language of testimony, not appealing to

the reasoning intellect but making an appeal to heart and conscience, to the

whole rational and moral consciousness of man, Scripture has never been

without power and influence. In this too it is a powerful word, sharp as a

two-edged sharp sword, penetrating to the division of soul and spirit, a

judge of the thoughts and deliberations of the heart. Even without logical

demonstration and philosophical proof Scripture in this its testimony is

powerful, because it is the word of God and finds support in the rational and

moral nature of every man. It is God himself who leaves himself without

witness to no one. And it is man himself who, because he was created after

God’s image, in spite of himself must give heed and assent to this

testimony. In this light the so-called proofs for God’s existence must also be

considered. That will preserve us both from overestimation and from

contempt of the proofs.

4. Already among the ancient sages, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato,

Aristotle, Plutarch, Seneca, Cicero, we encounter the proofs that are

adduced for the existence of God. From the beauty, the harmony, the

motion, the purposiveness of the world, from reason and the innate

consciousness, from the importance of religion for state and society, from

the agreement of the peoples, one concludes to the existence of a selfconscious, rational, Divine being, Zeller, Philos. der Gr. I4 885 f. II4 771 f.

III3 357 f. IV3 133 f. Christian theology adopted all these proofs and

treated them with preference; Augustine added yet one from the general

concepts, de lib. arb. II c. 3-15. Münscher—v. Coelln, D. G. I 125-129. It

did not disdain the support that was offered to it by pagan science, and, with

rejection of dualistic Gnosticism and Manichaeism, saw in nature a work of

God. This standpoint of Christian theology is the more noteworthy, because

Christianity was in part hostile over against the cosmos and laid all

emphasis on the salvation of man. But nature was and remained for

Christian theology, in spite of all asceticism, that penetrated into the

church, a creation of that same God who in Christ had revealed himself as

Re-Creator and Saviour. Indeed, the value and force of the proofs were very

soon overestimated. To be sure, some church fathers express that the

Heathens never came to a pure religio naturalis and that the way of these

proofs is very difficult for the sinner, Athanasius, c. Gent. c. 35 sq. But

gradually the proofs lose their religious character; they are detached from

all moral conditions; the cognitio Dei acquisita comes to stand separately

alongside the insita; and Christian theology received more and more the

conviction that the truths of the religio naturalis were provable in the same

sense as those of mathesis or logika. They were actually not articuli fidei

but praeambula ad articulos, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 2 art. 2. c. Gent. I 10-

13. The ontological argument of Anselm, in his Proslogium, although taken

over by some such as Halesius, Bonaventura, Itiner. c. 5, was indeed

rejected by most, because we can ascend to God only through the creatures,

Thomas, c. Gent. I 10-12. But otherwise great value was attached to the

proofs and much care expended; in the theologia naturalis one stood on

rational, scientific ground before and outside faith, Schwane, D. G. III 107

f. And on that same rationalistic standpoint Rome and Roman theology still

stand to the present day, Petavius, Theol. I cap. 2. Sylvius, Comm. in totam

pr. p. S. Thomae, ed. 4a 1693 I p. 22-26. Theol. Wirceb. 1880 III 1-20.

Perrone, Prael. Theol. II 3-41. Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorz. I2 673 f. II2 668

f. Schwetz, Theol. fund. I § 4-8. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 1-20. Hettinger,

Apol. des Christ. I7 103 f. Jansen, Prael. I 39-51 etc. The Vatican declared

that God can be known with certainty from the creation by the natural light

of reason, cf. deel I 221.

The Reformation did indeed adopt this theologia naturalis with its proofs,

but did not let them precede [faith]; rather, it incorporated them into the

doctrine of faith. Calvin proceeded from the semen religionis and then

indeed saw in every particula mundi, in the starry heaven, in the human

body, in the soul, in the preservation of all things, etc., irrefutable signa and

testimonia of God’s majesty, Inst. I 5, 1-10, but then immediately again

acknowledges that the semen religionis, although implanted in all in an

ineradicable way, can nevertheless be stifled and can bring forth no good

fruit; man no longer has an eye to behold God, for that he has need of faith,

I 4, 1. 5, 11-15. This same place is occupied by the theol. naturalis in

Ursinus, Tract. theol. 1584 p. 37-44, Martyr, Loci p. 2 sq., Musculus, Loci

p. 2-5, Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 4, cf. Schweizer, Gl. der ev. ref. K. I 156 f.

But soon protest. theol. set out upon the rationalistic path. While the theol.

nat. was at first a description, on the basis of Scripture, of what the

Christian could know about God from creation, it soon became an

exposition of what the unbelieving, rational man could come to know from

nature by his own thinking. The theologia naturalis became theologia

rationalis. Cartesius found in the innate idea an incontrovertible proof for

the existence of God. Voetius still perceived the difference between this

rationalistic argumentation and the Reformed doctrine of the theol. nat.,

Disp. V 455-525. But this awareness, in Alsted, Theol. nat. 1623, Mastricht,

Theol. II c. 2, Marck, Merch I 1, 14, Turretinus, Theol. El. III qu. 1 e. a.,

was lost more and more. Rationalism made its entry everywhere. The

theologia naturalis became the proper, scientific, demonstrable theology,

over against which the theologia revelata came to stand increasingly in the

shadow and finally disappeared entirely. The proofs were divided into

classes and elaborated at length; one distinguished metaphysical proofs

from motion, causality, contingency of the world; physical from harmony,

order, purpose of the universe and of particular creatures, such as sun,

moon, stars, fire, light, earth, water, animal, plant, man, body, soul, ear, eye,

hand, instinct, etc.; historical from the consensus gentium, the societas, arts,

sciences, revelation, prophecy, miracle; moral from conscience, freedom,

morality, judgment, reward and punishment, etc., and finally also

mathematical proofs, Buddeus, de atheismo et superst., ed. Lulofs, 1767 p.

224-318, and further litt. in M. Vitringa I p. 11 sq. Walch, Bibl. theol. sel. I

676-744, Doedes, Inl. tot de Leer v. God 200-217.

This self-satisfaction of theologia naturalis lasted until Kant. He subjected

the proofs to a strict criticism, argued that theoretical reason here had to end

with a non liquet [52], Kr. d. r. V. ed. Kirchmann S. 470 f., but built the

existence of God on the postulate of practical reason, cf. deel I 447 f. Since

then the proofs have fallen into discredit with many philosophers and

theologians. Jacobi even considered it impossible to prove God’s existence,

because God would then depend as a conclusion on the grounds of proof,

Von den göttl. Dingen, Werke III 368. 567 f. As unnecessary for the believer

and as useless for the unbeliever the proofs were rejected or despised by

Reinhard, Dogm. § 30. Schleiermacher II § 33. Twesten II 19 f. Hofmann,

Schriftbew. I2 62. Beck, Vorles. über die Glaubenslehre I, 63 f. Frank, Syst.

d. chr. Wahrh. I2 102-109. Philippi, K. Gl. II 1-17. Bovon, Dogm. Chrét. I

216. Böhl, Dogm. 16 f. Rauwenhoff, Wijsb. v. d. godsd. 499 v. etc. Others

did not go so far, but at least assigned to the moral proof in the sense of

Kant an important place, as Köstlin, Die Beweise für das Dasein Gottes,

Stud. u. Kr. 1875 S. 601-655, 1876 S. 7-80. cf. also Herzog2 5, 308. Ritschl,

Theol. u. Met. 8 f. Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 200 f. Kaftan, Wahrh. d. chr. Rel.

490 f. The proofs acquired a much greater significance in the philosophy of

Hegel; he let them count as God’s self-proof in the human spirit and

therefore attached great value especially to the ontological proof, Ueber die

Beweise vom Dasein Gottes, Werke XII 291 f. Biedermann regards them as

proofs not for the existence of a personal God but indeed of an

einheitlichen, absoluten Grund der Welt, Dogm. § 645 f., cf. also Hartmann,

Religionsphil. II 114 f. Paulsen, Einl. in die Philos. 239 f. etc. Herbert

Spencer considers the essence of the Absolute unknowable but its existence

nevertheless provable, First Principles 5th ed. p. 1-123, especially p. 87-97,

cf. Spruyt, Gids April 1886, Molenaar, Bijbl. v. d. Herv. 21 Mei 1885.

Furthermore, from various sides the attempt has been made to present the

old proofs in a new form and to maintain them, either as proofs or as

grounds for faith in a personal God, Dorner, Gl. I 199 f. Kahnis, Luth.

Dogm. I2 118 f. Lange, Dogm. I 207 f. Ulrici, Gott. u. die Natur 2e Aufl.

431 f. Weisse, Philos. Dogm. I 301 f. Lotze, Mikrok. III3 553 f. Pfleiderer,

Grundriss 1886 S. 65. Barry, Die natürl. Theol. 1882. Kennedy,

Gottesglaube u. mod. Weltanschauung 1893. Zöckler, Theol. naturalis 1860.

Fricke, Ist Gott persönlich, Leipzig Wigand [53] 1896. Hodge, Syst. Theol.

I 202. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 222. Bruce, Apologetics 1892 p. 149-163.

Caird, Introd. to the philos. of religion 1880. Flint, Theism, Edinb. 1877.

James Orr, Chr. view of God and the world 1893 p. 104-137. Land, Godg.

Bijdr. 1856 bl. 353 v. Doedes, Inl. tot de Leer v. God 236 v. Leer v. God 50

v. Bruining, The existence of God 1892. Maronier, What we know of God.

1889. Graswinckel, Faith and Freedom 1890 bl. 144-185 etc.

5. The ontological proof occurs in threefold form. The conclusion from

the general ideas and forms in the human mind, i.e. from reason, which

stands above our individual reason and above the whole world, to absolute

reason, the sum-total of all those ideas and forms, the absolutely true and

good and beautiful, i.e. to God (Plato, Augustine, Boethius, Anselm in his

Monologium). Or it proceeds from the necessary thinking of the highest,

absolute idea, i.e. of God, and concludes from that to the existence of that

idea, because otherwise it would not be the absolute, the highest idea, since

an idea which at the same time does exist is greater and higher than one

which does not actually exist (Anselm in his Proslogium). Or it sees in the

innate character of the idea of God a fact that cannot be explained otherwise

than by the existence of God, who has implanted this idea in man

(Descartes). The forms differ, but the proof is one, insofar as it concludes

from thinking to being. Now this does not apply with respect to creatures,

as everyone acknowledges. For these exist contingently; they can, without

any logical contradiction, be thought as non-existing. Thinking and being

belong to an entirely different category and are wholly different things.

From the thinking of something, e. g. a winged horse, it by no means

follows that that something actually exists. Being is not a product of

thinking. No one has meant this, then, by the ontological proof. But the

question is whether precisely with the idea of God one may not conclude

from thinking to being. To that the answer is, in the first place: yes, but

under one condition, namely if God exists. If God exists, then He exists

necessarily, and essentia and existentia are one in Him. But this condition

was precisely what had to be proved; it had to be shown that God exists,

Schelling, Werke II 3 S. 156 f. In the second place it must be answered that

from our thinking, even from our necessary thinking, of the idea of

God one nevertheless cannot conclude to the existence of God, because the

being of God after all is not, or can be, a product of our thinking of the idea

of God. The world of ideas and forms, including also the idea of God, is not

to be identified with God; it is something in us. With those ideas the

existence of God is therefore not yet given of itself. At most one can

conclude from the presence of those ideas in us to the existence of God, but

then this is properly not an ontological but a cosmological proof. But the

being itself of the idea of God in us, however necessary this may also be,

never includes and cannot as such already include the existence of God. The

ontological proof is therefore no proof in the strict sense. It only contains:

1o that the world of ideas and forms, and thus also the highest idea, is not

thought by us arbitrarily, but necessarily, and 2o that that world of ideas and

forms, and specifically also the idea of God, as soon as we think it, is by us

also thought as really existing and must be thought as such. The necessary

thinking of the idea of God also entails the necessary thinking of that idea

as really existing. But it does not take us further. We remain moving within

the circle of thinking. It does not carry us across the chasm from thinking to

being. It would do that only then, when from those ideas not as ideas but

from the being of those ideas in us one might be allowed to conclude to a

being that created and maintained those ideas in us and itself had to be the

highest idea; but then it would, as has been said, be no ontological but a

cosmological proof, cf. Runze, Der ontol. Gottesbeweis, krit. Darst. seiner

Gesch. seit Ans. bis auf die Gegenwart, Halle 1882. Körber, das ontol.

Argument, Bamberg 1884.

6. The cosmological proof also appears in various forms. The inference

from motion to a primum movens, quod a nullo movetur (Aristotle), from

the changeable to the unchangeable (Damascenus), from the relative to the

absolutely perfect (Boethius, Anselmus), from the series causarum, which

cannot be infinite, to a prima causa efficiens (Thomas), from the contingent

existence of the world to an ens necessarium (id.), from what does not exist

of itself to what exists through itself (Richard Vict.), from the existence

of the relative to that of the absolute (Spinoza, Hegel, Hartmann, Scholten)

etc. But in all these forms the cosmological proof nevertheless always

comes down to the same thing, namely, to the inference from an effect to a

cause. In itself this is also a perfectly lawful inference, in spite of the

criticism of Hume and Kant; if we are no longer permitted to apply the law

of causality, all science is impossible. But the cosmological proof proceeds

from various presuppositions which are not established in themselves and

for all. It presupposes, not only that the particular things in the world but

that also the entire universe is contingent, finite, relative, imperfect; that a

series causarum in infinitum is unthinkable; that the law of causality also

applies to the world as a whole. Only when all these presuppositions were

correct would the cosmological proof have force. It rightly concludes that,

like all things, so also the world as a whole, as composed of those things,

must have a cause. But it does not carry us further; it says nothing about the

character and nature of that cause. Whoever infers from the world to a cause

which itself again needs a cause has done enough to the logical force of this

proof. That that cause is infinite, absolute, perfect does not follow directly

from the cosmological proof, but flows from other considerations. Thus

indeed a series causarum infinita is unthinkable and impossible; there is no

one who accepts it; all acknowledge an absolute ground, a first being,

whether this bears the name of God or of the absolute, of substance or

force, of matter or will etc. If this presupposition is now correct, as it is in

fact acknowledged by all, then the cosmological proof brings us one step

further, namely, to a cause of the world which exists of itself and is

therefore infinite, eternal, absolute. But whether that cause is now also

transcendent or only immanent, whether it is personal or impersonal,

conscious or unconscious, is hereby absolutely not decided. Many, however,

have tried to derive something more from the cosmological proof, whether

directly or indirectly. Directly they tried to do this in such a way that they,

because an effect cannot contain more than lies in the cause, from the

personal, the conscious, the free, the ideas that were in the world, inferred

to a personal, conscious, free being, which at the same time was the

highest idea, the absolute reason. This reasoning, however, runs aground on

the fact that the relation of cause and effect is then arbitrarily conceived as

an emanation and, applied to God, would also demand that He would be

material, bodily, indeed even impure and unholy. Others have therefore

taken a by-path and reasoned that an infinite, absolute cause, a being that

exists from, in and through itself, cannot exist otherwise than as spirit,

person, e.g. Dorner, Gl. I 243 f. Kahnis, Luth. Dogm. I2 122. Doederlein,

Zeits. f. Philos. u. philos. Kritik 1886 S. 52 f. But against this the objection

holds that by the cosmological proof we know nothing of the inner nature of

such a first cause, that we have no right to begin to apply the law of

causality again to such a first cause and therefore can determine nothing

concerning it. And thus it remains that the cosmological proof leads us at

most, namely, with the acknowledgment that an infinite series of causes is

impossible, to a first, self-existing, absolute world-cause, Strauss, Der alte

u. d. neue Gl. 1872 S. 214 f. Pesch, Die grossen Welträthsel II2 288 f.

7. The teleological proof proceeds from the order and beauty, the harmony

and the purpose, which in the world, whether in its entirety, or in particular

creatures, starry heaven, elements, earth, man, animal, plant, hand, eye etc.,

are to be observed, and concludes from that to an intelligent cause.

Although the teleological proof never fails to make an impression and was

also mentioned by Kant with respect, yet especially in the present time

many objections have been raised against it. First, from the materialistic

side it is asserted that there is no purpose in things and that the teleological

explanation of nature must make way for the mechanical, e.g. Haeckel, Nat.

Schöpf. 1874 S. 16 f. Lange, Gesch. des Mater. 1882 S. 570 f. Büchner,

Kraft u. Stoff, 16de Aufl. S. 214 f. Second, pantheism objects that the

presence of order and purpose in the world gives absolutely no right to

assume a conscious, intelligent cause, because the unconscious, just as in

every human being, so also in the world-whole, works much more wisely

and more surely than conscious reflection and deliberate calculation,

Hartmann, Philos. des Unbew. 9de Aufl. 1882 passim. And finally Kant still

raised the objection that this proof at most led to a world-former but

not to a world-creator, Kr. d. reinen Vern. ed. Kirchmann S. 500. Now

against these objections quite a number of other considerations weigh up.

Scripture everywhere acknowledges a purpose in creation, Gen. 1, Spr. 8,

Ps. 8, 1 Corinthians 3:21-23, Romans 8:28 etc. The teleological view of the world has

been embraced by almost all philosophers, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato,

Aristotle etc. and repeatedly presses itself upon every human being, in spite

of the misuse that has repeatedly been made of it especially in the previous

century. Purposes are to be observed, both in particular phenomena,

climate, seasons, temperature of the water, fertilization of plants, blood

circulation, organisms, hand, eye etc., and in the world-whole. All atoms

obey one law; everything rests on thought, which can be understood by

man; the universe is no more to be explained from a chance than the Iliad

from a throw of letters. And even the fact that we often cannot demonstrate

a purpose proves that we, where we observe it, do so rightly. Moreover, the

teleological view of the world does not exclude the mechanical in physical

nature; only this latter goes beyond its power and competence when it

wants to explain all phenomena in the world, also the conscious and

spiritual, from matter and metabolism, Ulrici, Gott u. die Natur 1866, Id.

Gott u. d. Mensch 1874. P. Janet, Les causes finales 1882. Ebrard, Apolog.

§ 74 f. Pesch, Die grossen Welträthsel I2 241 f. 310 f. 788 f. Kennedy,

Gottesgl. und mod. Weltanschauung 1893. Doedes, de Leer van God bl. 118

v. etc. If now the presence of order and purpose stood firm for all and in this

time did not itself have such powerful and prolix demonstration needful,

then indeed the teleological proof would give us the right to conclude from

the beauty and harmony of the world to a conscious being, for an

unconscious purpose does not exist. Hartmann has indeed tried to argue the

contrary, but his proofs for the purposive operation of the unconscious are

therefore not valid, because it is one thing whether a man does something

with consciousness and with an intentional purpose, and another thing

whether in an unconscious action a purpose can be observed. Instinct works

unconsciously, but nevertheless in the unconscious action of instinct a

purpose is to be discerned that points back to a being which with

consciousness has produced such an instinct. If there is a purpose in

the world, it must also have been thought beforehand. Even if it should be

true that we also with the teleological proof do not get further than to a

world-former, then that proof would nevertheless be of no small

significance. Yes, even if this proof did not specifically lead to one

intelligent being, but left open the possibility for the existence of many

Divine beings, who together had produced the world, then still the

teleological proof would not be devoid of all value. The intelligence would

then nevertheless be required in the first cause or causes by the arrangement

of the world, and this proof would have delivered what it could deliver.

Only one would then, having by this way come to one or more worldformers, stand before the difficulty how a being that did not produce matter

could nevertheless give to that matter form and shape, or also, how more

than one being could be prima causa of the world. Logically these

objections may still have some value, practically they no longer have any

significance for our consciousness. Everything here depends on the

presence of a purpose in the world; if that stands firm, thereby the

consciousness of the highest being is given, Pesch, Die grossen Welträthsel

8. The moral proof finally pays attention to the moral phenomena that

occur in man and humanity, conscience, responsibility, remorse, reward and

punishment, virtue and happiness, fear of death and judgment, triumph of

the good, etc., and concludes from them to a moral being, who created and

maintains that entire moral world-order. Some in this connection direct

attention more to the conscience, which speaks in every human being, to the

moral law, to which everyone feels bound, and conclude from that to a

highest, sovereign lawgiver. Others pay attention especially to the

disharmony of virtue and happiness, of sin and punishment, and postulate

from that a being, who in the hereafter will bring about just harmony. Or

one also takes the whole moral world-order into view in its inner

connection and in its supremacy above the order of nature and concludes

from that to a being, who created that moral order and placed it above the

order of nature. Always, however, this argument is based on the ethical

phenomena in the human world and thereby arrives at God as the highest

moral being. Also against this proof exceptions have been raised. In the

first place materialism adduces against it, that the moral, just like conscious

life, is not an independent order but has gradually arisen through evolution,

appears here thus and elsewhere so, and in the end rests on accidental

change of matter, Darwin, Afst. v. d. mensch, hfdst. 4. Hellwald,

Kulturgesch. I3 26 f. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff 462 f. 478 f. And in the second

place Fichte taught, that the moral world-order rests and subsists in itself

and has no more need of a God above and outside it; and the advocates of

autonomous and independent morality have followed him in that, C.

Coignet, La morale indép. Paris 1869. Again, against this materialistic and

autonomous conception all kinds of weighty objections can be raised. It is

even being recognized more and more generally, that materialism has not

explained the moral phenomena of freedom, responsibility, remorse, etc.,

Du Bois Reymond, Die sieben Welträtsel 1882 S. 84. Carneri, Sittl. u.

Darw. 1877. Weygoldt, Darwin. Relig. Sittl. 1878 etc. And also the morale

indépendante has been contested with strong arguments, Caro, La morale

indép. Paris 1876. Cramer, Christ. en Hum. bl. 159 v. But this is

nevertheless certain, that the premises of this proof themselves first need so

much strong support, that it hardly comes to the conclusion. Nevertheless

this proof, especially through the influence of Kant, has found with many so

much sympathy, that the other proofs have thereby almost entirely been

neglected, cf. above bl. 52 and further the litt. on the moral world-order,

Zeller, Vortr. u. Abh. III 1884 S. 189 f. Carrière, De zedelijke wereldorde

1880. Hartmann, Das sittl. Bewustsein 1886 S. 570 f. Christ, Die sittl.

Weltordnung 1894, Traub, Die sittl. Weltordnung 1892, Pierson, Gids Nov.

1895 bl. 248. Yet this proof cannot be called stronger than the others. It

even bears a much more personal character than the previous arguments.

Even if in the world around us often little of a moral world-order is to be

perceived, in his conscience each person feels, in spite of himself, bound to

a moral order, just as strongly as in his understanding to the laws of

thinking. This moral order, which each person discovers in his own inner

life, does not coincide immediately with the idea of God, also does not

compel to the recognition of the existence of God, even allows for whoever

wants to escape from it all kinds of exceptions, but nevertheless remains a

powerful testimony, that always again leads to the recognition of a holy

and righteous being.

9. It is regrettable that these arguments for the existence of God in

theology have received the name of proofs. Yet not for the reason

mentioned by Jacobi. Although proving is the deriving of a proposition

from another, the proving of God’s existence is therefore not yet a

contradictio in adjecto. Dependence in a proof is something quite different

from dependence in reality. The causa cognoscendi is absolutely not the

same as the causa essendi. Although the existence of God in a syllogism can

be the conclusion, just as in general one can infer from the work to the

workmaster, that existence in reality is nevertheless beginning and ground

of the being of all things; indeed, as such it is precisely posited in the

conclusion. But the name of proofs is for the above-mentioned arguments

therefore less well chosen, because it has transferred them into a category

where they do not belong, namely into that of logical, mathematical, exact,

compelling demonstrations, and thus has deprived them of their ethical and

religious character. It now has the appearance as if faith in the existence of

God would rest on those proofs and would stand or fall with them. And that

would yet be ein elender Glaube, der sich Gott erst beweisen müsste, ehe er

zu ihm betete, Kahnis, Luth. Dogm. I 128. But rather the opposite is the

case. The existence of no single thing is for us first established on the

ground of proofs. Of the existence of ourselves, of the external world, of the

laws of thought and morals, etc., we are convinced firmly and certainly

before all reasoning and demonstration by the impressions which all these

things irresistibly make upon our consciousness. We accept that existence of

itself, spontaneously, without compulsion or violence. And so it is also with

the existence of God. The so-called proofs may bring about more clarity

and lucidity, but the certainty concerning the existence of God is not in the

least strengthened by them. This is determined only by faith, i.e. by the

spontaneity with which our consciousness bears witness to the existence of

God, which from all sides presses itself upon us. The proofs are therefore

also not grounds, but rather products of faith. Faith namely tries to give

itself an account of the religious impressions and emotions which every

human being receives and carries about in his soul. Faith also works upon

the understanding and this gradually seeks to bring order into that chaos of

impressions and apprehensions; it rubrics and classifies them and reduces

them to a few kinds. Impressions come to us from the world of ideas (ontol.

proof), from that of finite, contingent, changeable things (kosmol. proof),

from that of beauty and harmony (teleol. proof), from that of the moral

order (moral proof). But although they can thus be classified, it must

nevertheless never be thought that these four proofs are the only and

isolated testimonies which God causes to go forth to us. No, all things speak

to the pious person of God, the whole world is a mirror of His virtues, there

is nulla mundi particula, in which His eternal power and divinity is not

beheld. From within and from without us God’s testimony comes to us. He

does not leave Himself without witness, in nature nor history, in heart nor

conscience, in life nor lot. And therefore that testimony of God is so

powerful that it is scarcely denied by anyone. All human beings and peoples

have heard something of the voice of the Lord. The consensus gentium, by

many still reckoned a fifth proof, is a confirmation of this that God does not

leave Himself without witness; it is the answer of humanity to the call of

God. These testimonies which go forth from God and which throughout the

whole world are directed to the human being, are ordered and ranked in the

proofs. They receive through the syllogistic form in which they are clothed

no greater force. But as proofs weak, they are strong as testimonies. They

are no arguments that compel the understanding of the unbeliever, but signa

and testimonia, which never fail to make an impression on everyone’s mind.

Analyzed, isolated, detached from one another and placed next to each

other, they can be contested at every point of the reasoning and they stop

the believing, which happens spontaneously and of itself. But conceived as

testimony and preached as revelation of that God, of whose existence every

human being by nature, before reasoning and study, is assured in the

deepest of his soul, they are of no small value. For even if it is the case that,

thus preached, they meet objections and scruples, thereby they are

nevertheless not nullified. Just as no one believes in God’s love because

everything discovers His love but despite everything that awakens doubt, so

also everyone is convinced beforehand of the existence of God; through the

proofs he does not come to his faith and through the objections he

suffers no shipwreck in his faith. In every domain it is so that in reflection

the difficulties first arise, but no one therefore casts away the moral law, the

law of thought, religion, art, science as folly, because his thinking does not

know how to explain the phenomena which it acknowledges and does not

know how to defend against all objections. But nonetheless reflection,

although no certainty concerning existence, does bring clarity and lucidity.

The so-called proofs for the existence of God give the believer an account

of his own religious and ethical consciousness; they place weapons in his

hand with which the opponent, who in any case is not better armed, can be

repelled; they are for the Christian a sign that it is one and the same God

who reveals Himself in nature and grace and that therefore creation and recreation, physis and ethos, do not stand manichaean and dualistic next to

each other; the virtues of God, which there shine in the world, are the same

which also glitter in the kingdom of heaven. And together the testimonies,

which from God in the world go forth to us and are comprehended in the

so-called proofs, are nothing other than revelation of the Name of the Lord,

by which He designates Himself to the ear of His creatures, and by which

He gives us the right to address Him. In connection with one another they

make us know Him as the Divine being, which by us must necessarily and

necessarily as existing be thought, which is the only, first, absolute cause of

all creatures, which with consciousness and purposively governs all things,

and which above all in the conscientie reveals Himself as the Holy One to

each and every one who believes.

. All that becomes knowable to us of God in his revelation is

designated in Holy Scripture by the Name of God. The original

meaning of the word ‎‏‏ֵׁשם‎ is probably that of sign, distinguishing mark, σημα,

signum, just as the gr. ὀ νομα and the lat. nomen are derived from the stem

gno and thus denote that by which something is known, distinguishing

mark. A name is a sign of him who bears it, a designation according to

one or another property in which he reveals himself and becomes knowable.

There is a connection between the name and its bearer, and that connection

is not arbitrary but grounded in the bearer himself. Even among us, and still

now, when names have mostly become sounds without meaning, that

connection is still felt. A name is something personal and wholly something

other than a number or a specimen of its kind. It always makes a more or

less unpleasant impression when our name is written or used incorrectly. On

the name hangs our honor, our worth, our person and individuality. But

much stronger was that connection in earlier times, when names still had a

transparent meaning and were a revelation of the person or the thing that

received it. So it is also in Scripture. Adam had to give the animals names

according to their nature, Genesis 2:19, 20. Of many names in Scripture the

meaning is indicated and at the same time the reason why they are given, e.

g. Eve, Genesis 3:20, Cain, 4:1, Seth, 4:25, Noah, 5:29, Babel, 11:9, Ishmael,

16:11, Esau and Jacob, 25:25, Moses, Exodus 2:10, Jesus, Matthew 1:21 etc. More

than once a name is changed or a byname added, when a person appears in

another quality, Abraham, Genesis 17:5, Sarah, 17:15, Israel, 32:28, Joshua,

Numbers 13:16, Jedidjah, 2 Samuel 12:25, Mara, Ruth 1:20, Peter, Mark 3:16, etc.

After his ascension Christ has received a name above every name, Philippians 2:9,

Hebr. 1:4, and to the believers in the new Jerusalem a new name is given,

Op. 2:17, 3:12, 22:4. The same holds for the name of God. There is an

intimate connection between God and his name. This connection too is

according to Scripture not accidental or arbitrary but established by God

himself. Human beings do not name him: he gives himself a name. In the

foreground therefore stands the name as revelation from God’s side, in an

active and objective sense, as nomen editum. Then the name of God is

identical with the virtues or perfections which he reveals outwardly, with

his glory, Psalms 8:2, 72:19, his honor, Leviticus 18:21, Psalms 86:11, 102:16, his

redeeming power, Exodus 15:3. Jes. 47:4, his service, Jes. 56:6, Jeremiah 23:27, his

holiness, 1 Chronicles 18:10, Psalms 105:3, 3:21 etc. The name is God himself, as he

reveals himself in one relation or another. That name as revelation of God is

therefore great, Ezech. 36:23, holy, Ezech. 36:20, fearful, Psalms 111:9, a

high refuge, Psalms 20:2, a strong tower, Spr. 18:10. With proper names,

specifically with the name Ihvh, God has made himself known to Israel.

Through the Malak, in whose inward part his name is, Exodus 23:20, he has

revealed himself to Israel. And through him he has laid his name upon the

children of Israel, Numbers 6:27, established the remembrance of his name

among them, Exodus 20:24, set his name among them and caused it to dwell,

Deuteronomy 11:14, 12:5, especially in the temple that is built for his name, 2 Samuel 7:13. In that temple now his name dwells, 2 Chronicles 20:9, 33:4. By that name

he delivers, Psalms 54:3 and for the sake of that name he cannot forsake Israel,

not blaspheme, profane, or use that name in vain. Exodus 20:7, Leviticus 18:21,

24:11. On the contrary, that name must be invoked, recounted, magnified,

known, confessed, feared, exalted, awaited, sought, hallowed, Genesis 4:26,

Jes. 26:8, Matthew 6:9, John 12:28 etc. In the N. Test. there is but one name by

which God grants salvation; it is the name of Jesus Christ, Hd. 4:12. But in

that one name he has also revealed himself fully; in it is included all that

God is and will be for his own; in that name he communicates himself, with

all his benefits, to his people, Matthew 28:19, Luke 24:47, John 20:31, Hd. 2:38, 1

Cor. 6:11, Jak. 5:14. And still richer revelation the believers have to await in

the new Jerusalem, Op. 3:12, when his name will be on everyone’s

forehead, Op. 22:4. The name of God in Holy Scripture is the designation,

not of God as he exists in himself, but of God in his revelation, in his

manifold relations to the creatures. This name, however, is not arbitrary, but

God reveals himself thus and in that manner, because he is who he is. On

his name therefore hangs his honor, his renown, all his virtues, his whole

revelation, his own divine being. But that name therefore grants to him to

whom it is revealed special privileges and at the same time imposes on him

peculiar obligations. The name of God includes that he, revealing himself

therein, is now also named accordingly by creatures. The nomen editum

passes over into the nomen inditum. The ε ἰ ναι and καλεισθαι are in [65]

Holy Scripture two sides of the same thing. God is what he is called, and he

is called what he is. What he reveals of himself is expressed and represented

in definite names. He grants to his creatures the privilege, on the basis of

and in accordance with his revelation, to name and address him. The one

name of God, as the comprehending whole of his entire revelation both in

nature and grace, for us falls apart into many, many names. Only in that

way do we obtain an overview of the richness of his revelation and the deep

significance of his name. We name him and may name him according to all

that of his being becomes manifest in creation and re-creation. But all those

names, as designations of God, impose on us the obligation to hallow and

glorify them. It is the one name, the full revelation, and insofar the very

being of God himself, with which we have to do in all those names. God

places himself by his name in a definite relation to us; to that we ought in

our relation to him to correspond, Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 513 f. Oehler,

Theol. des A. T. § 56. art. Name in Herzog2. Smend, Lehrb. S. 281 f.

2. The names by which God is named and addressed by us are therefore

not arbitrary; they have not been devised by us according to our own

pleasure. It is God himself, who in nature and grace consciously and freely

reveals himself, who grants us the right, on the ground of this revelation, to

name Him, indeed who in his Word has made known to us his own names

on the ground of his revelation. All these names now without distinction

bear this character, that they are derived from the revelation. There is not a

single name that designates God’s essence an sich. The nomen editum is the

foundation of all nomina indita. And because the revelation of God in

nature and Scripture is specifically directed to human beings, therefore it is

a human language in which God speaks of himself to us; therefore they are

human words of which He makes use; therefore they are human forms

under which He appears. In Scripture, therefore, there do not occur here and

there a few anthropomorphisms; the whole of Scripture is

anthropomorphistic. From the first to the last page it testifies of a coming of

God to and a seeking of man. The whole revelation of God concentrates

itself in the Logos, who has become σαρξ, and is as it were one

humanization, one incarnation of God. If God spoke to us in a divine

manner, no creature would understand Him, but this is his grace, which

already began with the creation, that He bends down to his creatures and

speaks to them and appears to them in a human manner. Therefore all the

names by which God names himself and allows himself to be named by us

are derived from earthly and human relations. Thus in Scripture He is called

El, the Strong One, Elschaddai the Mighty One, Jahveh, the Being One,

further Father, Son, Spirit, good, merciful, gracious, righteous, holy etc., all

concepts that first apply to creatures and then are transferred to God in an

eminent sense. Even the so-called incommunicable attributes, such as

immutability, independence, simplicity, eternity, omnipresence, are

presented in Scripture in forms and expressions borrowed from the finite

and therefore also in a negative sense; eternity cannot be presented except

as a negation of time. Scripture does not even make a single attempt to

describe these perfections of God positively, according to their own

essence, abstracted from their relation to the finite. But the

anthropomorphism goes in Scripture much further. Everything that is proper

to human beings and even to creatures is also ascribed to God, in particular

partes hominis, membra corporis, sensus, affectus, actiones, subjecta and

adjuncta humana. God has a soul, Leviticus 26:11, Matthew 12:28, and a Spirit, Genesis 1:2 etc. Of a body of God there is never any mention, although God in

Christ also assumed a true body, John 1:14, Colossians 2:17, and the church is

called Christ’s body, Ef. 1:22. But all bodily organs are nevertheless

attributed to God. There is spoken of his face, Exodus 33:20, 23, Jes. 63:9, Psalms 16:11, Matthew 18:10, Op. 22:4, of his eyes, Psalms 11:4, Hebr. 4:13, of his eyelids,

Psalms 11:4, of his eyeball, Deuteronomy 32:10, Psalms 17:8, Zach. 2:8, of his ears, Psalms 55:2, of his nose, Deuteronomy 33:10, of his mouth, Deuteronomy 8:3, of his lips, Job 11:5,

of his tongue, Jes. 30:27, of his neck, Jeremiah 18:17, of his arm, Exodus 15:16, of

his hand, Numbers 11:23, of his right hand, Exodus 15:12, of his finger, Exodus 8:19,

of his heart, Genesis 6:6, of his inward parts, Jes. 63:15, Jeremiah 31:20, Luke 1:78,

of his bosom, Psalms 74:4, of his lap, John 1:28, of his foot, Jes. 66:1.

Further, there is no human emotion or it is also present in God, such as

joyfulness, Jes. 62:5, rejoicing, Jes. 65:19, sorrow, Psalms 78:40, Jes. 63:10,

grief, Psalms 95:10, Jeremiah 7:18, 19, fear, Deuteronomy 32:27, love with all its

modifications such as mercy, compassion, grace, long-suffering etc., further

zeal and jealousy, Deuteronomy 32:21, repentance, Genesis 6:6, hatred, Deuteronomy 16:22,

wrath, Psalms 2:5, vengeance, Deuteronomy 32:35. Further, all human actions are also

transferred to God, such as taking knowledge, Genesis 18:21, investigating, Ps.

remembering, Genesis 8:1, Exodus 2:24, speaking, Genesis 2:16, calling, Romans 4:17,

commanding, Jes. 5:6, scolding, (= rebuking, reproving) Psalms 18:16, 104:7,

answering, Psalms 3:5, testifying, Malachi 2:14; resting, Genesis 2:2, working, John 5:17; seeing, Genesis 1:10, hearing, Exodus 2:24, smelling, Genesis 8:21, tasting, Ps.

walking, Leviticus 26:12, descending, Genesis 11:5, meeting, Exodus 3:18, visiting,

Genesis 21:1, passing by, Exodus 12:13, leaving, Richt. 6:13; writing, Exodus 34:1,

sealing, John 6:27, engraving, Jes. 49:16; striking, Jes. 11:4, chastising,

Deuteronomy 8:5, punishing, Job 5:17, binding up, Psalms 147:3, healing, Psalms 103:3,

making whole, Deuteronomy 32:39, killing and making alive, Deuteronomy 32:39; wiping

away, Jes. 25:8, blotting out, 2 Kon. 21:13, washing, Psalms 51:4, cleansing, Psalms 51:4, anointing, Psalms 2:6, adorning, Ezech. 16:11, clothing, Psalms 132:16,

crowning, Psalms 8:6, girding, Psalms 18:33; destroying, Genesis 6:7, laying waste,

Leviticus 26:31, killing, Genesis 38:7, plaguing, Genesis 12:17, judging, Psalms 58:12,

condemning, Job 10:2 etc. Further, God is also very often designated with

names that make known a certain profession, office, relation, relationship

among human beings. He is a bridegroom, Jes. 61:10, a man, Jes. 54:5, a

father, Deuteronomy 32:6, a judge, king, lawgiver, Jes. 33:22, a warrior, Exodus 15:3, a

hero, Psalms 78:65, Zef. 3:17, an artist and builder, Hebr. 11:10, a husbandman,

John 15:1, a shepherd, Psalms 23:1, a physician, Exodus 15:26 etc.; while then in

these capacities there is again mention of his seat, throne, footstool, rod,

scepter, weapons, bow, arrow, sword, shield, chariot, banner, book, seal,

treasure, inheritance etc. Yes, even, in order to express what God is for his

own, all kinds of images are borrowed from animate and inanimate

creation. He is compared to a lion, Jes. 31:4, an eagle, Deuteronomy 32:11, a lamb,

Jes. 53:7, a hen, Matthew 23:37, to the sun, Psalms 84:12, the morning star, Op.

22:16, to a light, Psalms 27:1, a candle, Op. 21:23, a fire, Hebr. 12:29, a spring

or fountain, Psalms 36:10, a vein of water, Jeremiah 2:13, to food, bread, drink,

water, ointment, Jes. 55:1, John 4:10, 6:35, 55, to a rock, Deuteronomy 32:4, a

hiding place, Psalms 119:114, tower, Spr. 18:10, an upper chamber, Psalms 9:10, a

shadow, Psalms 91:1, 121:5, a shield, Psalms 84:12, a way, John 14:6, a temple, Op.

21:22 etc., Polanus, Synt. Theol. II c. 35, Alsted, Theol. schol. 104 sq.

Glassius, Philol. Sacra 1691 p. 1116-1181.

3. The whole creation, the entire nature with all its kingdoms, the world of

men above all, are in Holy Scripture made serviceable to the description of

the knowledge of God. No limit is set to anthropomorphism. All creatures,

living and lifeless, animate and inanimate, organic and inorganic, offer

names, in order to bring the greatness of God in some measure to our

consciousness. Although ἀ νωνυμος in himself, God is nevertheless

πολυωνυμος in his revelation. Omnia possunt dici de Deo, et nihil digne

dicitur de Deo. Nihil latius hac inopia. Quaeris congruum nomen, non

invenis; quaeris quoquo modo dicere, omnia invenis, August., tract. 13 in

Ev. Joh. n. 5. And for elucidation, why God can be named in so many ways,

Augustine made use of a striking image. Our body has manifold needs, for

light and air, food and drink, dwelling and clothes etc., and all these things

are different and lie alongside one another in the creatures. Our spirit also

has many and manifold needs, but what provides for them is not manifold

but is always the one and the same Divine being. In terra aliud est fons,

aliud lumen. Sitiens quaeris fontem, et ut pervenias ad fontem, quaeris

lucem, et si dies non est, accendis lucernam, ut ad fontem pervenias. Fons

ille ipse est lux: sitienti fons est, caeco lux est; aperiantur oculi ut videant

lucem, aperiantur fauces cordis ut bibant fontem; quod bibis hoc vides, hoc

audis. Totum sit tibi Deus, quia horum quae diligis totum tibi est. Si

visibilia attendis, nec panis est Deus, nec aqua est Deus, nec lux ista est

Deus, nec vestis est Deus, nec domus est Deus. Omnia enim haec

visibilia sunt et singula sunt; quod est panis non hoc est aqua, et quod est

vestis, non hoc est domus, et quod sunt ista, non hoc est Deus, visibilia

enim sunt. Deus tibi totum est; si esuris, panis tibi est; si sitis, aqua tibi est;

si in tenebris es, lumen tibi est, quia incorruptibilis manet; si nudus es,

immortalitatis vestis tibi est, cum corruptibile hoc induerit incorruptionem

et mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem, tract. 13 in Ev. Joh. Likewise

Pseudodionysius says that God is ἀ νωνυμος and at the same time

πολυωνυμος, He is at the same time παντα τα ὀ ντα και ο ὐ δεν των ὀ ντων,

de div. nom. c. I. § 6. 7. With Thomas we read, quod Deus in se praehabet

omnes perfectiones creaturarum, quasi simpliciter et universaliter perfectus,

S. Theol. I qu. 13 art. 2. And more beautifully still with Bonaventure: ut

laudibus Deum possimus extollere, atque ad Dei cognitionem

promoveamur, necessaria nobis sunt translationes ad divina. Ratio vel finis

translationis duplex est. Una in qua est laus Dei, alia manuductio intellectus

nostri. Propter laudem Dei necessaria est translatio. Et quoniam Deus

multum est laudabilis, ne propter inopiam vocabulorum contingeret cessari

a laude, sacra Scriptura docuit nomina creaturarum ad Deum transferri; et

hoc in numero indefinito, ut sicut omnis creatura laudat Deum, sic Deus

laudatur ex omni nomine creaturae, et qui non poterit uno nomine laudari,

tamquam superexcellens omne nomen, laudaretur ex omni nomine. Alia

ratio est manuductio intellectus nostri. Quia cum per creaturas ad

cognoscendum creatorem venimus, ut plurimum, fere omnes creaturae

habent proprietates nobiles, quae sunt ratio intelligendi Deum, ut leo

fortitudinem, agnus mansuetudinem, petra soliditatem, serpens prudentiam

et consimilia; ideo oportuit plura nomina transferri ad Deum, Sent. I dist. 34

art. 1 qu. 4. And Calvin agreed with that, when he said: nulla est mundi

particula, in qua non scintillae saltem aliquae gloriae ipsius emicare

cernantur. God is immanent in all that is created. The pure in heart sees God

everywhere. Everything is full of God. Fateor pie hoc posse dici, modo a

pio animo proficiscatur, naturam esse Deum, Inst. I 5, 1. 5. But there is

ascent in the creatures. The place and the rank which the creatures occupy is

determined by their affinity to God. All creatures name a name of God. But

among all creatures man stands at the top. He alone bears the high name of

image, son, child of God. He alone is called God’s offspring. And

therefore the most and the most exalted names of God are derived from

man. Never, however, may man be detached from nature. And never may

any creature or any part of the world be placed alongside or over against

God. There is nothing outside and without God. To be sure, there has

repeatedly been sinned against here. The dualism of Plato, Neoplatonism,

Gnosticism, Manichaeism restricted God’s revelation and set a matter

hostile over against Him. And in all kinds of forms this exercised influence

and worked on in theology. When in more recent times under the influence

of Kant and Jacobi the revelation of God is limited to the religious and

ethical; when Scripture is acknowledged only in its religious-moral content;

when the seat of religion is sought only in heart or conscience, in feeling or

will, there is in all this the same dualistic principle speaking. Nature, with

its elements and forces, man in his social and political life, art and science

come to stand outside the revelation of God and become neutral, i.e. Godless terrains. Naturally, then, the O. Test. and a very great part of the N.

Test. can no longer be appreciated; that nature and world have nothing more

to say to the believer; that the revelation, that the Word of God loses all

influence on public life; that religion, pushed back into a hidden refuge of

heart and inner chamber, forfeits every claim to respect; that dogmatics,

specifically also the locus de Deo, shrinks from day to day, and that

theology no longer knows how to maintain its place. Theology no longer

knows how to speak of God, because it does not speak from and through

Him. It has no more names with which it can name God. God becomes the

great Unknown and the world first becomes ἀ θεος, then ἀ ντιθεος.

4. The names by which God in his revelation calls himself, however, bring

with them for thought a peculiar difficulty. For, earlier it appeared to us that

God is incomprehensible and exalted far above all that is finite; here,

however, in his names, he descends to all that is finite and becomes like the

creatures. There presents itself here an antinomy, which seems insoluble.

Ἀ νωνυμος on the one hand, God is yet πολυωνυμος on the other hand. After

first all anthropomorphism has been banished, it is here nevertheless

brought in again. With what right then can these names be used of God? On

what ground are they ascribed to Him, who stands infinitely high above all

creature and cannot be comprehended by the finite? That ground can lie

only in this, that the whole creation, although as creature infinitely far

removed from God, is nevertheless a creature, a work of God and akin to

Him. The world is no antithesis alongside and over against God, no

independent power, no second God, but wholly and entirely God’s work in

its being and its thus being: it is from the beginning designed to reveal God.

The whole people of Israel is in all its laws and institutions, offices and

ministries, character and customs etc. arranged to proclaim God’s virtues,

and the human nature of Christ has been made capable by the H. Spirit, to

declare the Father and to make his name known to men. The apostolic band

with its diversity of upbringing, preparation, gift and calling is destined, to

tell the μεγαλεια του θεου. And therefore God can and may be named by us

in a creaturely way. The right of anthropomorphism rests on this, that God

himself has descended in and to his creatures and has revealed his name in

and through creatures. Anthropomorphism thus by no means resides only,

as was already remarked, in a single word such as personality. Of God there

is no other way of speaking than in an anthropomorphic way. For Him

himself we do not see. We can see Him only in his works and, according to

the revelation in those works, name Him. More still, we cannot see God, at

least here on earth, face to face. If God then nevertheless wills that we shall

know Him, then He must descend to us, accommodate himself to our

limited, finite, human consciousness, speak to us in human language.

Whoever therefore contests the right of the anthropomorphisms, in principle

thereby denies the possibility that God reveals himself in his creatures, must

from there proceed to the denial of creation and in the end retains nothing

but an eternal dualism between God and world, between the infinite and the

finite. If indeed our naming of God with anthropomorphic names includes a

finiting of God, then this holds much more of the revelation in creation.

God as the Infinite is then powerless, to bring forth another being outside

his own essence; the world is in no respect a revelation, it is solely and

only a concealment of God; man is solely and only opposed to God and not

akin to Him; and God is eternal βυθος, nameless σιγη, both for himself and

for man. Naturally then too no knowledge of God is any longer possible. If

anthropomorphic, creaturely names fall short of God’s essence, then He

cannot and may not be named by us with any name, then we must be

absolutely silent; every name, with which we would wish to designate Him,

is then a dishonouring of God, an assault on his majesty, a blasphemy, cf.

above p. 22. One has sought to evade this consequence, which however lies

close at hand, by making a distinction between representation and concept.

Plato already began with that. Neoplatonism and gnosticism continued this.

And Hegel has come forward with it again. But thereby one nevertheless

does not get a step further. Even the highest speculation and the most

profound philosophy must nevertheless think and speak about God; even if

they now cast away all representations and retain only pure, abstract

concepts, they do not thereby rise above human, creaturely thinking and

speaking and do not approach the Infinite himself. Even the most abstract

names, such as being, substance, the absolute, the one, spirit, reason, are

and remain anthropomorphisms. For man there is only a choice between

these two: absolute silence or human thinking and speaking about God,

between agnosticism, i.e. theoretical atheism, or anthropomorphism.

Philosophy has therefore also always again returned to anthropomorphism,

otherwise it would naturally also have ended with a negative critique. Plato,

Philo, Plotinus, Pseudodionysius, Damascenus, Erigena have in the end

nevertheless again ascribed all sorts of names to God. Cataphatic theology

built up what apophatic had broken down. The substance of Spinoza

received many attributes and modes. With Hegel God nevertheless again

became life, spirit, thinking, reason, subject. Rauwenhoff lets the

imagination appear, where the understanding must end, Wijsb. v. d. godsd.

611 v. By many philosophers therefore the right of anthropomorphism is

defended, Kant, Kr. der Urtheilskraft ed. Kirchmann S. 346 f. Jacobi, Werke

III 276 f. Paulsen, Einl. in die Philos. 1892 S. 262 f. Hartmann, Philos.

d. Unbew. II9 414 etc. And thus naturally also Christian theology has

always judged. God therein walks the way of men, ‎‏‏ֶּדֶרְך ְּבֵני ָאָדם‎, as the Jews

expressed it. Incomprehensibilia sunt Dei opera et actiones, neque nos

assequi aliquid de iis possemus, nisi Sacra Scriptura iis uteretur loquendi de

Deo formulis, quae rebus humanis propinqua sunt. Itaque Spiritui Sancto,

Scripturarum auctori, placet, propter captus nostri imbecillitatem nostro

more balbutire et blandius humiliusque quam majestati tantae convenit,

nobiscum per signa et verba agere, Flacius bij Glassius p. 116, cf. Luther bij

Oehler S. 169. Gerhard, Loci Theol. II c. 8 sect. 1. Ursinus, Tract. theol. 49,

Polanus, Synt. p. 192 sq. Martyr, Loci p. 2, Alsted, Theol. schol. 148,

Bretschneider, Dogm. I 477, Id. Syst. Entw. 365 f. Hengstenberg, Auth. d.

Pent. II 445 f. Philippi II 27 f. Twesten II 16. Lange, II 32 f. Kahnis, Dogm.

I 337. Beck, Vorles. II 3 f. Dr. Graue, on reaching an understanding

concerning the analogical character of the knowledge of God, Jahrb. f. prot.

Theol. Oct. 1888 S. 481-503.

5. The right of these names may thus be established, but what is their

value? What and what kind of knowledge do they provide us concerning the

Divine being? There can be no question of it, that this knowledge is an

adaequate one. It is in every respect finite and limited, but for that reason it

is nevertheless not impure and untrue. Adaequate knowledge we have very

little; everywhere and in every domain we finally run up against a mystery;

the inner being of things, the Ding an sich, escapes our observation. We

perceive phaenomena and from that conclude to the being, we come to

know properties and thereby climb up to the substance, but this itself lies

behind the appearance and is unknown to us. Natural science assumes

atoms as the last constituents of reality but has not the least empirical

knowledge of them. A definition can be given only of the very simplest

things; as soon as they are of a somewhat higher order, they cannot be fully

described in any concept. That already holds for the visible world; but still

more it is applicable in the world of the invisible things. Man is namely a

bodily, sensuous being. All his knowledge begins with and arises out of

sensuous perception. Our thinking is bound to the senses, as our soul to the

body. The spiritual things we never perceive directly but only through

the medium of material things. We see everything ἐ ν α ἰ νιγματι. Not only

God, but also the soul and the whole spiritual world comes to our

knowledge only through the sensuous world. Hence it is that we designate

all the spiritual with names, which in the first place apply in the visible

world. The soul of man we name after bodily phenomena. Its activities,

such as knowing, thinking, understanding, comprehending, judging,

deciding, feeling etc. we bring to consciousness in ourselves and others by

means of words, which originally indicate a bodily action. All our speaking

of invisible things is thus metaphora, image, likeness, poetry. Τα γαρ

και ἀ σωματων ο ὐ δεν, Greg. Naz., Orat. 45. But for that reason we

nevertheless do not speak untruthfully and incorrectly. On the contrary,

genuine poetry is truth, for it rests on the likeness, the correspondence, the

affinity of the different groups of phenomena. The whole of language is

built on that, all figures proceed from that. If speaking in images were

untrue, all our thinking, and all our knowing would be appearance, and

speaking itself would be impossible. This same also holds in religion and

theology. Adaequate knowledge of God does not exist. We cannot name

Him, as He exists in himself. All his names are borrowed from the

creatures. But for that reason they are not untrue, a fruit of human

imagination. Just as there exists likeness and thus comparison is possible

between the different parts of the world, so there is also affinity between

God and his creatures, which gives us the right to speak of Him in a

creaturely way. More still, temporally, in reality, the natural does indeed

precede the spiritual; but logically and ideally the spiritual is first and

thereafter the natural. The natural would not be able to lead us to the

spiritual, if it had not itself proceeded from it. Plato saw in the cosmos a

realization of the ideas. And Scripture teaches, that all things have been

made through the Logos and have not come into being out of things that

appear before the eyes, John 1:3, Hebr. 11:3. It is God himself, who has

made the whole creation, also the material, serviceable to the revelation of

his virtues. He could do that, because He is the almighty creator and has

absolute dominion also over matter. Even if it is then also the case, that we

call God with names borrowed from the creatures, in those creatures

they have first been placed by God himself. We do indeed use the names

with which we designate God first of the creatures, because we know these

earlier than God. But materially they apply first to God and thereafter to the

creatures. All virtues are first in Him, then in the creatures. He possesses

them per essentiam, these have them only per participationem. Just as the

temple is made according to the τυπος, shown to Moses on the mountain,

Hebr. 8:5, so every creature is first eternally thought and thereafter created

in time. All πατρια i.e. not every lineage but all fatherhood in heaven and on

earth is named from the Πατηρ who created all things, Ef. 3:15, cf. Matthew 23:9, Damascenus, de fide orthod. I 9. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 3 art. 2, qu.

13 art. 3 and 6. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 22 art. 1 qu. 3. Zanchius, Op. II

col. 11-14 etc. All heavenly things are in Scripture painted for us in earthly

paints and colors. God himself comes to us through the whole creation and

has dwelt among us in the human nature of Christ. This human nature was

certainly no adaequate organ of his Godhead; it was even a concealment of

his glory. And yet the fullness of the Godhead has dwelt bodily in Him;

whoever saw Him, beheld the Father. Both thus can be very well united, a

knowledge, which is inadaequate, finite, limited and yet at the same time

true, pure, sufficient. God reveals himself in his works, and according to

that revelation He is named by us. He permits us to name Him in our weak,

human language, because He himself in the creatures has displayed his

virtues before us. We are thus actually not the ones who give God a name;

how could we do and may we do that? It is God himself, who through

nature and Scripture lays his glorious names upon our lips. According to an

old distinction the names of God are no product of the ratio ratiocinans, the

subjective reason of man, but of the ratio ratiocinata, the objective reason in

revelation. God’s self-consciousness is the archetype, and our knowledge of

God, drawn from his Word, is the ectype.

6. By this the character is indicated which the knowledge of God always

bears in creatures. Two extremes are thereby avoided. On the one side stand

those who deem an essential, quidditative, adequate knowledge of God

possible, whether through mystical contemplation (Plotinus, Malebranche,

the ontologists and the Roman Catholics as teaching the visio Dei per

essentiam in the state of glory), or through logical thinking (Eunomius,

Scotus, Spinoza, Hegel). Against all these the word remains true: no one has

ever seen God; only the Son, who was in the bosom of the Father, has

declared Him to us. Moses saw God’s glory only when it had passed by.

The prophets beheld God only in vision. Both in the creation outside us and

in our own life of the soul, the created always remains standing in between

God and our consciousness; ideae innatae do not exist. We see in a mirror

and walk by faith. An absolute, an adequate knowledge of God is therefore

impossible. The conversion of representation into concept, of the language

of imagination into that of thought, of kataphatic into apophatic theology, of

the Semitic-concrete into the Japhetic-abstract, always ends in the loss of all

knowledge of God. But on the other hand, by the name of ectypal theology

the feeling is also rejected of those who indeed deem the creaturely names

for the designation of the being of God unavoidable, but in them see

nothing but symbols, products of the poetic imagination. In a certain sense

even Damascenus belongs here, de fide orthod. I 12 and Pseudodionysius,

de div. nom. c. 1, cf. also Mozes Maimon., More Neb. I c. 58, Cusanus, de

docta ignor. I c. 24. They asserted namely, that all those names made God

known to us only as cause of all things, so that e.g. the name of wisdom

ascribed to God contained nothing more than that He was the cause of all

wisdom. But Thomas already rightly remarked against that, that God could

then just as well be called gold, silver, sun, moon, body, etc., since He is

nevertheless the cause of all those creatures; and furthermore we all mean

something else and more when we call God good, than when we call Him

the cause of the good. The virtues of God are not all to be seen in all

creatures and in all in the same way, S. Theol. I qu. 13 art. 2. Zanchius, Op.

II col. 11-13. Yet later that feeling was especially renewed again by

Schleiermacher. God is only absolute causality; his attributes are subjective

designations; the character of theology is not to be called ectypal or

analogical but symbolic, Schleiermacher, Reden über die Relig. S. 46, [77]

Bretschneider, Dogm. I4 477, Paulsen, Einl. in die Philos. 263. The

religious representations are then products of the poetic imagination,

aesthetically to be valued ideals (Rauwenhoff, Pierson, F. A. Lange etc.) In

some modern circles in recent times the tendency is to be perceived, to

continue to use the biblical and ecclesiastical names as symbols of higher,

spiritual truths. This conception of the character of theology, however, is

not tenable. Symbolic can indeed be called that theological science which

occupies itself with the explanation of the sacred symbols occurring in

Scripture and in the church, as e.g. Vitringa gives to that the name of

theologia symbolica 1726, cf. d’Outrein, Proefstukken van heilige

Sinnebeelden 1700. A symbol is always a sensible object or a sensible

action for the designation of a spiritual truth. But theology as such does not

have to do with such symbols, but with spiritual realities. When

consciousness, will, holiness etc. is ascribed to God, no one understands

this in a symbolic sense. Not a single religious person sees in such

representations products of his imagination, as everyone gladly

acknowledges this in works of art. The religious person, on the contrary,

holds those religious representations to be objectively true, and his religion

languishes and dies away as soon as he begins to doubt that. If they then are

products of the imagination, their objective truth is not to be maintained.

Aesthetically they may then still be valued, religiously and ethically they

have lost their value; religion can no more be converted into art than into

philosophy. Attempts to maintain them then still as symbols always end in

disappointment; he who, like Hegel, makes a distinction between

representation and concept, no longer lets himself be satisfied with the

representation; he always tries to come to the pure concept and then later in

vain reaches back to the religious representations as symbols. The symbolic

character of theology makes the names of God into a reflex of one’s own

life of feeling, deprives them of all truth, and seeks their ground only in the

ever-changing ratio ratiocinans. Man is then the measure of religion; as man

is, so is his God. For these reasons theology is not to be called symbolic,

but ectypal or analogical. Herein is enclosed: 1o. that all our knowledge of

God is from and through God, is grounded on his revelation, i.e. on the

ratio ratiocinata; 2o. that God, in order to communicate his knowledge to

creatures, must descend to those creatures and accommodate himself to

their capacity; 3o. that the possibility of this συγκαταβασις cannot be

denied, since it is given of itself with the creation, i.e. with the existence of

a finite being; 4o. that our knowledge of God therefore nevertheless is

always only analogical, i.e. formed according to analogy of what of God is

to be perceived in his creatures; has as its object not God himself in his

unknowable being but God in his revelation, in his relation to us, in τα περι

την φυσιν, Damasc., de fide orthod. I 4, in his habitudo ad creaturas,

Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 12 art. 12; and thus is only a finite image, weak

likeness and creaturely imprint of that perfect knowledge which God

possesses of himself; and 5o. that our knowledge of God nevertheless is yet

true and pure and reliable, because it has the self-consciousness of God as

archetype and his self-revelation in the cosmos as foundation, Thomas, S.

Theol. I qu. 13 art. 5 c. Gent. I c. 32-34. Zanchius, Op. II col. 23. 24.

Junius, de theologia, Op. 1607 I 1378 sq. ed. Kuyper p. 51 sq. Gomarus,

Disp. theol. I. Owen, Θεολογουμενα 1661 p. 10 sq. Calovius, Isag. ad theol.

. Holy Scripture calls God by many names, but never proceeds from

an abstract concept of God. Never does it elevate the one attribute of

God at the expense of the other. Indeed, now the one, then again the other

attribute comes more to the foreground, but between all attributes there is

complete harmony. It is the intention of Scripture to bring all virtues of God

equally to their honour. Just as the person of Christ does not represent a

particular one-sided character or temperament and yet is a person full of life

and reality, so also God in his revelation is always unfolding all his virtues

in harmonious coherence. Nowhere is there any mention of the essence of

God in abstracto. The Hebr. word ‎‏‏ּתּוִׁשָּיה‎ a rad. ‎‏‏ָיָׁשה‎; existence, being, arab. III

to help, to set up, denotes that which endures, is lasting, provides

advantage, in concreto especially true wisdom and happiness, Job 5:12,

28:29, Mich. 6:9, but in none of these places stands for the essence of God,

cf. Delitzsch on Job 5:12. Nor can the N. T. words θεοτης Colossians 2:9, θειοτης

Romans 1:29, μορφη θεου Philippians 2:6, θεια φυσις 2 Petr. 1:4 cf. Galatians 4:8 prove

## § 24. Classification of the Names of God.

that there the essence or the nature of God is spoken of in distinction from

his attributes, as Polanus wishes, Synt. theol. p. 135. God’s essence

becomes knowable to us in his revelation, i.e. in his names. The names of

God are designations of his ἀ ρεται, 1 Petr. 2:9. This manner of speaking

connects itself with Jes. 42:8, 12. 43:21. 63:5, where the Hebr. ‎‏‏ְּתִּהָלה‎ praise,

honour, in the LXX has been translated by ἀ ρετη, cf. Habakkuk 3:3. Zach. 6:13.

The congregation has the calling to proclaim God’s virtues, i.e. to give him

honour for the δοξα, which is displayed in all his works. Of a description of

God’s essence, apart from the attributes, there is never any mention in Holy

Scripture. In the first period, something of that sort was also not attempted

in Christian theology. Under the nomina Dei everything was comprehended

that one had to say of God. The names of God were indication not only of

the nomina propria but also of the attributes so called later and even of the

persons in the Divine essence, Clemens Alex. Strom. V 12. Augustinus, de

doctr. chr. I 5. Pseudodion., de div. nom. c. 1 sq. Damascenus, de fide orth. I

c. 12. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 13. Catech. Rom. I c. 2 qu. 11. 13. Kleutgen,

Theol. der Vorzeit I2 S. 211 f. Gerhard, Loci Theol. loc. 2. Hyperius, Meth.

Theol. p. 89 sq. c. 3. Polanus, Synt. Theol. Lib. 2 c. 6. Zanchius, Op. II col.

9. 10. Walaeus, Op. I p. 152 sq. Alsted, Theol. did. schol. p. 61. The

attributes were then also immediately included in the idea of God; thus e.g.

with Irenaeus, adv. haer. I c. 14. II c. 13., 35 etc. Augustinus does indeed

speak of God’s essentia, but he understands by that the fullness of the being

of God and immediately includes all attributes, simplicity, eternity,

goodness, wisdom etc. in it. In the confessions, God is also spoken of more

than once in that way, without distinction of essence and attributes, and

without classification of the attributes, Conc. Lateran. bij Denzinger,

Enchir. symb. n. 355, Conc. Vatic. de fide c. 1. Conf. August. art. 1. Conf.

Gall. art. 1. Scot. art. 1. Belg. art. 1. Conf. Westm. cap. 2. And even

later still various theologians do not enter into these distinctions and treat

the attributes, without speaking beforehand about the nature of God, e.g.

Thomas. S. Theol. I qu. 3 sq. Ursinus, Tract. theol. p. 46-70.

2. But soon a distinction nevertheless arose. To that end one was led by

the question what the attribute was which at once distinguished God from

all creatures, what the principal concept was and from which, therefore, one

had to proceed in the doctrine of God. Now the Platonic philosophy had

already sought that principal concept in being, and Philo had connected this

with the name Ihvh, the only name which indicated not an operation or

power but the essence of God himself, and therefore often called God ὁ ὠ ν

or το ὀ ν, Zeller, Philos. V3 356. This circumscription of the essence of God

was adopted in Christian theology. Irenaeus describes God repeatedly as

absolutely simple, adv. haer. II c. 13. 28 IV 11 and even calls Him

inexcogitabilis et insubstantivus, I c. 14, but over against Gnosticism

nevertheless lays the emphasis especially on this, that God is the creator of

all things and that He has revealed himself in his works, Harnack D. G. I

485 f. On the other hand, with Origenes, de princ. I 1 sq. c. Cels. VI 64. VII

42-51, Athanasius, de decr. nic. syn. c. 11, Damascenus, de fide orth. I c. 2.

4. 9. etc. cf. Harnack D. G. II 119 f. Schwane, Dogm. I 132 II 35,

Kattenbusch, Vergl. Confessionskunde I 310 f., God is the one, the being,

indeed the one exalted above all being, ὁ ὠ ν, ὁ ὠ ν καθ’ ἑ αυτον, το ὀ ν,

who is being itself, who has being from and through himself. And in the

footsteps of Philo all this was derived from or fastened to the name of Ihvh

in the O. Test. In the West these determinations were adopted. Augustine

repeatedly circumscribes God as summum esse, summum bonum, verum,

pulchrum etc. God is a substantia, for what is no substance does not exist,

Enarr. in Ps. 67. But, because the word substantia is often used in contrast

with accidentia, which are in the substance and have it as bearer, Augustine,

of God, prefers to use the word essentia, quam Graeci ο ὐ σιαν vocant and

for which the word natura is also sometimes used, de trin. V 2 VII 5 sq. de

civ. XII, 2. de doctr. chr. I 6. With God, after all there is no distinction

between substance and accidents; his being is no bearer of the attributes, but

these are identical with being itself. God is the highest, best, most beautiful,

most perfect being, quo esse aut cogitari melius nihil possit, de lib. arb. II 6.

de doctr. chr. I 7. He is Deus, supra quem nihil, extra quem nihil, sine quo

nihil est; summa vita, summa veritas, summa beatitudo, summa sapientia,

summa essentia, de civ. XII 2. Solil. I 1. And Augustine too appeals for this

circumscription of God to the name Ihvh, de trin. V 2. VII 5. de doctr. chr. I

32. We then later find this same circumscription repeatedly again, with

Hilarius, de trin. I c. 1 sq. Pseudodion., de div. nom. cap. 1. § 6, who

however in cap. 4 § 1 proceeds from the idea of the good and in c. 5 § 1

says that this extends still further than that of being, Anselmus, Monol. c.

28. Prosl. c. 17 sq. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 8. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 2 art.

3 and qu. 3. S. c. Gent. I c. 16 sq. Bonaventura, Brevil. I cap. 2. Sent. I dist.

8. etc. Petavius, Theol. lib. 1 c. 6. Perrone, Prael. theol. II 81-90. C. Pesch,

Prael. II 46-70. Jansen II p. 26-46. Although this now did indeed become

the usual opinion, there were nevertheless some who chose another point of

departure. They sought the principal concept with the idea of God not in

absolute being, in the esse a se (aseitas), but in infinity; and they therefore

preferred to circumscribe the essence of God as an ens infinitum. Thus did

Duns Scotus, who asserted that being could be ascribed univoce, in the

same sense, to God and to the creature, but that the distinguishing mark

between God and the creature lay in this, that God was an ens infinitum and

the creatures were finite, Sent. I dist. 3 qu. 1. and dist. 8 qu. 3. Further, there

were still some Thomists who thought that the proper essence of God lay in

the intellectual nature and they therefore circumscribed God as ens

intelligens, as e.g. with Gotti, cf. Perrone, Prael. theol. II p. 82. Kleutgen,

Theol. der Vorzeit I2 229.

3. The Reformation brought no change in this conception. People aligned

themselves with one or another description. The Reformed, at least in the

first period, for the most part adopted the description of Augustine and

Thomas. They proceeded from the concept of aseitas or of independentia

and often defined God as an ens independens, Zwingli, Op. III 155 sq. IV

81 sq. Hyperius, Meth. Theol. p. 87. Martyr, Loci Comm. p. 39b.

Polanus Synt. Theol. lib. II c. 5. Zanchius, Op. II col. 49 sq. Ursinus, Tract.

theol. 1584 p. 46 sq. Alongside this there also occur the descriptions of God

as spiritus increatus, spiritus simplicissimus, spiritus a se ipso existens,

sometimes further supplemented with the trinitarian formula unus essentia,

trinus personis, Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. S. 35 f. Schweizer, Gl. der ev.

ref. K. I 244 f. The Lutherans used the definition essentia spiritualis infinita,

ens spirituale a se subsistens, spiritus independens, Schmid, Dogm. der ev.

luth. K6. S. 73-77. Hase, Hutt. red. § 54. By contrast, Socinianism adopted

another standpoint. Disregarding all metaphysical questions, it laid

emphasis only on the will of God. The knowledge of God consists only in

knowing his will. Religion loses all mysticism and is absorbed into cultus.

God comes to stand ever farther away from world and humanity. In

Remonstrantism, rationalism and English deism this is continued, cf. above

bl. 15. 16. Against this cold, moralistic concept of God there again came a

reaction from the side of philosophy. Spinoza reverted to the idea of being,

conceived God as substantia unica, infinita, necessario existens, ens

absolute infinitum, absolute causa prima et immanens, Eth. I prop. 7 sq. and

again spoke of a love of God, amor Dei intellectualis, which bestowed the

highest blessedness, Eth. V prop. 15 sq. To be sure, rationalism and deism

also remained dominant after Spinoza, but around the middle of the 18th

century people became more and more weary of this. The great spirits,

Goethe, Lessing, Herder felt themselves attracted to Spinoza, and soon his

pantheism made its entry into philosophy. Kant already undermined the

foundations of rationalism, although he nevertheless still called himself a

deist, Drews, Die deutsche Spekul. I 104. Fichte undertook the struggle

against the concepts God and immortality as products of eudaemonism. In

his exaggerated moralism God was for him identical with the pure I, with

the moral world-order; God was no being, no substance but absolutes Thun,

Thätigkeit; thus in his Wissenschaftslehre 1794, Ueber den Grund unseres

Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung 1798, Appellation an das

Publikum 1799. Later he partially retreated from this and aligned himself

more closely with Spinoza, Anweisung zum seligen Leben oder

Religionslehre 1806. Schleiermacher displayed an even stronger

resemblance to Spinoza. God and world are correlata, Dialektik S. 162. God

is the Woher unseres empfänglichen und selbsthätigen Daseins, Glaub. I5 S.

20. Schelling distinguished himself from both in that he took account not

only of the spiritual, religion, morality but also of objective nature. It was

his aim to raise natural science out of the deplorable condition in which it

found itself. And thus he then comprehends both, nature and spirit together;

nature is visible spirit, spirit invisible nature; in both he sees a continuous,

organic revelation of the Absolute, which is exalted above all oppositions,

one, simple, eternal, without praedikaten, unity of the infinite and the finite,

of God and world, ἑ ν και παν, Drews, Die deutsche Spekul. I S. 201 f.

Finally Hegel transformed this system into a logical idealism. Nature and

history are a logically necessary self-unfolding of the idea. Everything is

rational, everything is embodied thought. Reason is thus the absolute

substance, it is God himself. For God is nothing other than the one, living

world-idea developing itself to self-consciousness. God is thus in Hegel

indeed reason, thinking, spirit, subject, but not in the sense that He would

have a life of his own before and outside the world. Ohne Welt ist Gott

nicht Gott, the world is an essential moment in the life of God, Drews, Die

deutsche Spekul. I 229 f.

4. Nor did opposition to this pantheism fail to appear. A whole series of

theistic philosophers arose, in order to demonstrate the untenability of

pantheism and to maintain the right of theism. They sought their strength in

the idea of absolute personality, connected this with the idea of becoming,

and thus introduced into God a theogonic process, whether in a Unitarian

(Jacobi, Herbart, Drobisch, Rothe, Lotze, Ulrici, Carrière etc.), or in a

Trinitarian sense (Baader, Schelling, J. H. Fichte, Weisse, Dorner etc.). But

this theistic speculation too has had its time. Separation of theology and

philosophy, of religion and metaphysics has become the watchword. On the

one hand science withdraws more and more from the terrain of religion and

of theology; it becomes exact, positive. On the other hand religion too seeks

more and more to detach itself from science and to banish all metaphysics

and philosophy. For the locus de Deo this has as a consequence that the

essence of the Godhead is sought exclusively in the ethically good. The

Groningen theology placed the fatherhood and the love in God in the

foreground, Hofstede de Groot, De Gron. Godg. 1855 bl. 177 v. Scholten

did indeed proceed from God’s absolute sovereignty, L. H. K. II4, but the

ethical moderns rose up in opposition to his speculative intellectualism and

monistic determinism, and conceived God as Father, Hoekstra, Des

Christens godsvrucht 1866 bl. 103 v. Bronnen en grondslagen 1864 bl. 265

v., as the moral ideal, the power of the good, holy power, Hooykaas, God in

de geschiedenis 1870. Hooykaas, H. Herderschee, Oort, Van Hamel, Godsd.

volg. de beginselen der eth. rigting onder de modernen 1876. In Germany,

in the same way, the neo-Kantianism of Ritschl has come forward against

the speculative Vermittelungstheologie. Ritschl denies that religion is a

legal relationship. According to Duns Scotus, the socin. and the armin. God

is the unlimited ruler, who nevertheless treats human beings with fairness,

although they have no rights over against Him. Arbitrariness, dominium

absolutum is the essence of God and the law of the world; God can do the

one just as well as the other. The relationship between God and man is

private-law in character, and finds its image in the slaveholder who treats

his slave fairly, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 223-229. According to the orthodox

Protestants God’s relationship to the world is determined by justice. Man

has a right to eternal life if he keeps God’s law and otherwise deserves

punishment. This theory is public-law in character; it is derived from the O.

Test., especially from Pharisaism and was taken over by Paul and thus

entered into the christ. church, ib. III2 229-245. Cf. also his studies on God,

Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1865 and 1868, now reissued in Gesammelte Aufsätze,

Neue Folge 1896. But both representations are wrong. Law and religion

stand over against each other. No dualism may be introduced into God

between justice and grace. The whole abstract, Areopagitic concept of God

must be given up, which places God negatively above the world and

assumes no communion between God and man, ib. S. 253. Religion is a

moral relationship, and Christianity is the vollendet geistige and absolut

sittliche Religion, ib. III2 S. 8 f. The relationship of God and man finds

its image not in the relation of a master to his servant or of the government

to its subjects but in that of a father to his child. The family is its model,

III2 90. God must therefore be conceived as love; alongside it no other

concept of equal value comes into consideration, ib. S. 255. From that one

must proceed at once. The Christian dogmatician should not begin,

according to synthetic method, with all kinds of metaphysical abstractions

about God as the Absolute, Theol. u. Methaph. 12 f. Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 2-

8. 32, nor also with a so-called theologia naturalis which does not exist, III2

S. 200 f. Theol. u. Met. S. 8 f., nor also with the concept of personality or

with the attribute of holiness, III2 255, but at once and entirely with love.

From that everything, creation, providence, reconciliation, justification etc.

must be derived, ib. 255. Theol. u. Met. 20. Cf. Kaftan, Das Wesen der chr.

Relig. S. 383. Herrmann, Die Religion im Verhältniss zum Welterkennen

und zur Sittlichkeit S. 121 f. Gottschick, Die Kirchlichkeit der s. g. kirchl.

Theol. S. 152 f. And thus every direction is recognizable by its concept of

God. In turn God is defined as the being, the absolute being, substance; or

as the Sovereign, the Lord, the Supreme Being; or as infinite Spirit,

absolute causality, absolute personality; or as the Father, love, goodness etc.

It is so difficult to proceed from the harmony of all God’s virtues and to

maintain these to the end. Every human being is limited and lays the

emphasis on one attribute at the expense of the others; Jansenius saw in

God especially truth, François de Sales love, Vincentius goodness, Saint

Cyran omnipotence, Quack, Port-Royal, reprint from the Gids of 1872 bl.

49. And yet it is the calling of theology, after the example of Holy Scripture,

to honor all virtues of God equally.

5. But because theology in this way defined the essence of God and made

one attribute into the chief concept, it ran the risk of making a distinction

between the essence of God and the attributes that were later added

alongside it. In doing so, of course, it could not take the path of polytheism,

which made so many divine persons out of the different attributes, as these

were revealed in creatures. Plato too gave to the ideas, as archetypes of

real things, an existence of their own, independent, alongside God.

Gnosticism defined God as the unknowable and unnameable, but made the

Platonic ideas into aeons, which emanated from God and in a descending

series removed themselves from God. They were called ἐ ννοια, νους,

λογος, ζωη, σοφια etc. and were the personified attributes of God,

emanating from God, presented as divine beings, Iren. adv. haer. I 11. 24.

Philo, under Plato’s influence, often represented the divine powers,

especially goodness, power, and the logos, as hypostases, Zeller, Philos. der

Gr. V3 S. 358 f. Jewish theology assumed various hypostases, such as

metatron, memra, schechina, ruach, bath kol, Weber, System der altsyn. pal.

Theol. S. 172; and in the kabbalah the ten sefiroth or attributes of God were

often described as emanations from the Divine essence, Franck, La Kabbale

ou la philos. religieuse des Hébreux, Paris Hachette 1873. Ueberweg,

Gesch. der Philos. II § 27. Herzog2 7, 375 f. Dr. Th. Bloch, Gesch. der

Entw. der Kabbala u. der jüd. Rel. Philos. Trier Mayer 1894. Later too this

gnostic and kabbalistic philosophy has still often exercised great influence.

In Arianism something of this gnosticism still continued to have an effect,

insofar as it assumed a gradation among the Divine persons. Monotheism,

no longer supported and maintained by the doctrine of the Trinity, easily

passes over into polytheism. We hear it daily, that state, science, art,

fortune, chance, fate, etc. are by many regarded and venerated as

independent powers alongside and in the place of God.

Although Christian theology did not go so far, it nevertheless soon made a

distinction between God’s essence and attributes. The church fathers had

already long spoken of the essence of God in distinction from the three

persons, but gradually the word essence was also set over against his

attributes. Especially through the struggle against Eunomius this distinction

arose. Eunomius in his liber apologeticus repeatedly expressed that the

names were an indication of the essence of the thing, τας προσηγοριας ε ἰ ναι

των ο ὐ σιων σημαντικας, ib. c. 18. Bibl. patr. gr. dogm. ed. Thilo II p. 598.

Over against this Basilius and Gregorius Nyss. asserted that there was not a

single name that expressed God’s essence, but that there nevertheless were

And Greg. Nyss. spoke of ο ὐ σια of God as το ἱ ποκειμενον and of ποιοτητες

or ἰ διωματων διαφοραι in relation to that essence, Diekamp, Die

Gotteslehre des h. Gregor. van Nyssa, Münster 1896 I 190 f. As soon as this

distinction arose, the question necessarily had to be asked, what belonged to

the essence and what to the attributes. Therewith the good path was

abandoned. If the church fathers in the description of God proceeded from

the name Ihvh and described Him as being, then with that they did not have

in view the essence of God in distinction from his attributes, but the whole

essence of God as it reveals itself in his attributes. The being that was

ascribed to God was thus no abstractum, but a living, infinitely full,

concrete being, a summum esse, which at once and in one was identical

with summa vita, summa veritas, summa sapientia, summus amor etc., as

Augustine repeatedly said, a πελαγος ο ὐ σιας ἀ πειρον και ἀ οριστον, mare

substantiae infinitum et interminatum, Greg. Naz. Or. 38. Damasc., de fide

orth. I 9. The description of God as essentia indicated that He was the

comprehending whole of all reality, and absolutely not that He was the

abstract being, in the philosophical sense of that word. Baur, Gesch. der

Lehre von der Dreiein. II 644 f., and Ritschl in his studies on God, Jahrb. f.

d. Theol. 1865 S. 275-318. 1868 S. 67-133 and S. 251-302 have not kept

this difference sufficiently in view. Also in Basilius and Gregorius Nyss. the

distinction of essence and attributes still served chiefly, in order over

against Eunomius to maintain the incomprehensibility of God’s essence.

6. But when the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God later came to

stand in the background, the distinction between essence and attributes

acquired another significance. As in creatures between their substance and

their attributes, so one also made in God a distinction between his essence

and his perfections. This, however, led to all kinds of difficulties. In the first

place one came into conflict with one’s own point of departure. It was the

unanimous doctrine of the whole Christian church and theology, that God’s

essence an sich was unknowable, that no name and no definition could be

given of it and that God could be known only from his revelation, by his

own light. Therewith theology from the beginning adopted a positive

standpoint and cut off all philosophical speculation at the root. Now,

however, it imperceptibly brought philosophy in again. The essence of God

was distinguished from his attributes. Of that essence, therefore, something

could and had to be said apart from the attributes. The incomprehensibility

of God was in fact denied. But there was more. This distinction between

God’s essence and attributes entailed that that essence could not be defined

except in very abstract terms, as ens spirituale, ens infinitum, ens

absolutum, without further praedikaten. That might now be a philosophical

definition, but that was no longer the Christian, the biblical concept of God.

God never confronted us thus in Scripture. The theological and the

philosophical concept of God resembled each other remarkably. The first

chapters of Christian dogmatics gave a schema of concepts that was all too

much borrowed from Plato and Aristotle and that was then later

supplemented by Christian ideas. Especially when in this century theology

took over the idea of the Absolute from philosophy, the mixing of both

clearly emerged. It is the merit of Ritschl that he saw that. He was

completely right when he demanded that dogmatics should at once proceed

from the Christian concept of God. Only he too again was guilty of onesidedness, when on that ground he demanded that God might be conceived

only as love. In Scripture, which in its entirety and not merely for a part,

e.g. the gospels, the words of Jesus, the sermon on the mount, is the

principium of dogmatics, God confronts us in a fullness of attributes. And it

is the demand of dogmatics to proceed equally not from one but from all

virtues of God. Only then does there come harmony in our knowledge of

God and thus also in our whole doctrine and in our whole life. Further, the

incorrectness of that distinction between essence and attributes came out in

this, that it, once adopted, was nevertheless at once revoked again. By the

doctrine of the simplicitas Dei, Christian theology was after all safeguarded

against the error of assuming an essential difference between the two. It

said in general that there was no distinction. Every attribute is God’s

essence. God is what he has. In creatures there is a distinction between what

they are and what they have; a human being is still a human being, even if

he has lost the image of God and has become a sinner. But in God all

attributes are his essence itself. God is wholly light, wholly understanding,

wholly wisdom, wholly logos, wholly spirit etc. Iren. adv. haer. II 28 IV 11.

In God is the esse quod sapere, quod bonum esse, quod potentem esse. Una

eademque res dicitur sive dicatur aeternus Deus sive immortalis sive bonus

sive justus enz., August., de trin. VI 7. Damascenus, I 9. Thomas, S. Theol.

I qu. 2 art. 3. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 42. 51-53. Schmid, Dogm. der

ev. luth. K. S. 81. God is everything together at the same time and wholly.

Deus habet nullas proprietates sed mera est essentia. Proprietates Dei sunt

realiter ipsamet Dei essentia nec ab essentia Dei nec inter se re ipsa

differunt. All this was well and beautifully said. Only, why make a

distinction that was at once again annulled and presently once again in the

doctrine of the simplicitas Dei was shown in its incorrectness? Worse was

that others, proceeding from the distinction between essence and attributes

acknowledged by all, now also sought an objective and real distinction, and

thus more or less made the attributes independent over against the essence.

Thus Gilbert Porretanus made a distinction between the essence, the nature

of God, the divinitas and God, Deus; the divinitas was the forma, by which

God is God, but not itself God, Divinitate Deus est sed divinitas non est

Deus, Petavius, de Deo I cap. 8, art. Herzog2 5, 168. Duns Scotus did

indeed deny that there was a distinctio realis between essence and

attributes, but nevertheless said that the attributes were distinguished

formaliter from God’s essence and from one another, with appeal to

Damascenus and Augustinus, Sent. I dist. 8 qu. 4 n. 17 sq. Socinianism

spoke of accidentia in God and considered a different conception and

description of the attributes necessary for the subject, Fock, Der Socin. S.

427. Many have gone still further and have even assumed an objective

distinction in God, at the expense of the simplicity and the immutability of

God, Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 38. Martensen, Chr. Dogm. § 85. Vilmar, Dogm.

I 190 f. Dorner, Chr. Glaub. I 181 f. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk I3

34 f. Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 371-374. Oosterzee, Chr. Dogm. § 47.

Proceeding further on this line, Doedes first treated those determinations

which are of themselves given with the idea God, such as unity,

communicability, incomparability, incomprehensibility, self-subsistence

etc., and subsequently the attributes which now in addition accrue to

that divine essence, and are only five in number, omnipotence, wisdom,

goodness, love, holiness. The Roman Catholic theologian C. Pesch likewise

speaks of attributa, substantiae divinae superaddita, Praelect. theol. II 72.

The disadvantage of the separation comes out most strongly in F. A. B.

Nitzsch, who first treats the essence of God with the aseitas, holiness, unity

etc., Ev. Dogm. S. 351-367, then the works of creation S. 367-396 and only

thereafter the attributes according to the division of Schleiermacher, S. 396-

For these reasons the distinction between essence and attributes is not to

be approved. Of course it is not thereby denied that God is a being, a

substance, nor is the use of the word essence disapproved; in the doctrine of

the Trinity it is even indispensable. But the rejection of the distinction

means that the essence of God is in no respect knowable apart from the

attributes, and that no division may be given which makes some attributes

appear as given with the essence and others as added thereto. Therefore

Christian theology has at all times rightly taught that the attributes are

identical with the essence of God. Each attribute is the Divine essence

itself. Therefore it is impossible, with one attribute or one name, to describe

the whole essence of God, as has often been attempted, e.g. with the idea of

absolute personality or of love. Love is in no greater or lesser degree an

attribute of God and a description of his essence than any other virtue or

perfection. It stands on an equal line with all attributes, as Nitzsch, Ev.

Dogm. S. 351 f. also rightly remarks. Whether God has still more virtues

than those which He reveals to us in creation and dominion can remain an

open question. Spinoza said that a substance, in proportion as it had more

reality, also possessed more attributes, Eth. I prop. 9, and that God as the

infinite substance therefore also had infinitely many attributes, ib. prop. 11,

although only two, thought and extension, are known to us. And Reinhard,

Dogm. S. 100 found it very probable that Gott eine Menge von

Eigenschaften besitzen könne, wovon wir gar keinen Begriff haben, weil

die unendliche Vollkommenheit in so eingeschränkten Geschöpfen, wie wir

sind, unmöglich alle Aehnlichkeiten mit sich hat vereinigen können, cf. also

L. Meijer, Treatises on the divine attributes, Gron. 1783 I 186 v. But

however this may be, the calling of dogmatics is to show the harmonious

unity of all the virtues which God has displayed in his works.

7. If, accordingly, no distinction can be made between essence and

attributes, because every attribute is the essence of God itself, then it still

does not follow from that that the distinction also among the attributes

mutually is only nominal and subjective, without any ground in reality.

Many, however, have judged thus. Aëtius and Eunomius reasoned as

follows: God is simple and without any composition; what is in Him or is

predicated of Him cannot differ from his essence; goodness, wisdom,

power, etc., especially the ἀ γεννησια, are distinguished from the essence

neither realiter nor in our thought; whoever therefore names one attribute,

e.g. the agennesia, thereby expresses the whole divine essence; the Son

therefore also cannot be God like the Father; see Eunomius, Liber

apologeticus, Bibl. patr. gr. dogm. ed. Thilo II 581-615. In the Middle Ages

many arrived at the same thought. The perfections of God are distinguished

from the essence and from one another neither virtualiter nor formaliter

(Duns Scotus), but only in name. The concept of the one is contained in that

of the other, involvitur unum in altero. Whoever calls God good, calls Him

therein at the same time just, powerful, etc., Stöckl., Phil. des M. A. II 968.

Also in the Arabic and Jewish philosophy this subjective conception of

Gesch. der Attributenlehre in der jüd. Rel. Philos. des M. A. von Saadja bis

Maimuni 1877. Spinoza understood by attribute id quod intellectus de

substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens, Eth. I def. 4.

According as the emphasis is laid on the first or second part of this

definition, the judgment diverges whether Spinoza regarded the attributes as

subjective conceptions of the understanding or as objective, real properties

of the substance, Falckenberg, Gesch. d. neuern Philos. S. 90. The

pantheism, which through him found entrance into philosophy, has no place

any longer for the attributes of God. God has no being distinct from the

world, no proper life any more. His attributes are identical with the laws of

the world, Strauss, Gl. I 613. Schleiermacher therefore also defined

them wholly subjectively, as etwas Besonderes in der Art, das

schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl auf Gott zu beziehen; their origin lies

in the religieuse Dichtung, they are without speculative content, they

express neither God’s essence, which is unknowable, nor his relations to the

world, because God then would have to stand in manifold relations to the

world; they are simply subjective conceptions, without objective ground.

And he therefore also treated the doctrine of the attributes not separately but

throughout the whole dogmatics, Chr. Gl. § 50.

Against this conception of the names of God it is now, on the ground of

God’s revelation, to be maintained that very certainly every attribute is

identical with the Divine essence, but that for that reason the attributes are

nevertheless still distinct. Basil and Gregory of Nyssa taught thus in their

writings against Eunomius. They said on the one hand that the attributes did

not differ really, τω πραγματι, since God was simple and exalted above all

composition, but on the other hand that they were nevertheless not

distinguished only in name, λογ ῳ. Avoiding these two extremes, they

judged that the names of God differed κατ’ ἐ πινοιαν, that we in our

understanding had different ἐ ννοιαι, ἐ πινοιαι, ἐ πενθυμησεις of the one and

the same Divine essence, and that with the different attributes, such as

goodness, wisdom, etc., we thus did not merely use different names, but in

doing so really also thought something different. The concepts, therefore,

which we place in the names of God, are mutually distinct. The names of

God therefore ought not to be mixed or confused with one another; each

could be considered by itself. Thus God was very certainly identical with

the attributes divinitas, bonitas, sapientia, paternitas, filietas etc., but for

that reason these are not equal among themselves in conception. The one

attribute is therefore not so involved in the other that we cannot think the

one without the other; but each attribute expresses something particular,

Petavius, I c. 7-10. Schwane, Dogmengesch. II2 S. 19-31. Augustine

expresses himself still more strongly, that every attribute is God’s essence

and in so far is identical with every other attribute. Quidquid enim

secundum qualitates, nl. of God, dici videtur. secundum substantiam vel

essentiam est intelligendum, de trin. XV 5. Deo autem hoc est esse, quod

est fortem esse aut justum esse aut sapientem esse etc., de trin. VI, 4, cf.

above p. 89. Also the attributes are not mutually different, quae justitia

ipsa bonitas et quae bonitas ipsa beatitudo, de trin. XV 8. Eadem magnitudo

ejus est, quae sapientia, non enim mole magnus est sed virtute; et eadem

bonitas quae sapientia et magnitudo et eadem veritas quae illa omnia; et non

est ibi aliud beatum esse et aliud magnum aut sapientem aut verum, aut

bonum esse aut omnino ipsum esse, de trin. VI 6. Yes, he says expressly

that these praedicamenta or qualitates, used of God, are properly affectiones

of our mind; quidquid horum de Deo dicis, neque aliud et aliud intelligitur

et nihil digne dicitur, quia haec animarum sunt, quas illa lux perfundit

quodam modo et pro suis qualitatibus afficit, quomodo cum oritur

corporibus lux ista visibilis. Si auferatur, unus est corporibus omnibus color,

qui potius dicendus est nullus color. Cum autem illata illustraverit corpora,

quamvis ipsa unius modi sit, pro diversis tamen corporum qualitatibus

diverso eos nitore adspergit. Ergo animarum sunt istae affectiones, quae

bene sunt affectae ab illa luce quae non afficitur et formatae ab illa quae

non formatur, Serm. 341 n. 8. But however strongly Augustine speaks here,

he nevertheless fully maintains that all these praedicamenta are rightly and

truly used of God. God is all that He has and that is ascribed to Him in the

names. With this simplicitas Dei Augustine is not concerned to take

anything away from God, but on the contrary always to conceive Him in the

fullness of his being. Therefore he also speaks of the simplex multiplicitas

or multiplex simplicitas in God, de trin. VI 4 and he calls God’s wisdom

simpliciter multiplex et uniformiter multiformis, de civ. XII 18. In later time

the distinction of the ratio ratiocinans and the ratio ratiocinata was used, in

order to bring the difficulty that presented itself with the doctrine of the

attributes to some solution. The distinction of the attributes might on the

one hand detract nothing from the unity, the simplicity, the immutability of

God’s essence, and yet on the other hand could also not be conceived as a

subjective, arbitrary, and untrue invention of man. And therefore it was

rightly said that this distinction was grounded in God’s revelation itself. For

it is not we who thus name God. We do not invent those names. On the

contrary, if it depended on us, we would be silent about Him, try to forget

Him, and deny all his names. We have no desire for the knowledge of

his ways. We repeatedly set ourselves in opposition to all his names, to his

independence, his sovereignty, his righteousness, his love, and we rebel

against all his perfections. But it is God himself who reveals all his virtues

and lays his names upon our lips. He gives himself his names and maintains

them in spite of our resistance. It is of little use whether we deny his

righteousness; He shows it to us every day in history. And so it is with all

virtues. In spite of us He brings them to revelation. The final goal of all his

ways is that his name may shine in all his works and be written upon

everyone’s forehead, Op. 22:4. Therefore we cannot name Him otherwise

than with the many names that his revelation itself puts into our hand. With

the simplicity of God this distinction of the attributes is also not in

contradiction. For the simplicitas does not designate God as an abstract

concept, as the absolute, the being, the idea, etc., but precisely makes

known that He is an absolute fullness of being. And therefore God cannot

reveal himself to finite creatures otherwise than under many names. The

Divine essence is so infinitely rich that no creature can survey it all at once.

Just as a child cannot imagine the value of a large coin but then first gets

some notion of it when it is broken down into a number of smaller coins, so

also we can form no idea of the infinite fullness of God’s essence unless it

repeatedly reveals itself to us in another relation and under another point of

view, Augustine, tract. 13 in Ev. Joan. Martyr, Loci p. 39. Moor, Comm. I

582 etc. God remains eternally and immutably one and the same, but the

relation differs in which He stands to his creatures and these stand to Him.

The light remains the same, even though it breaks into different colors,

(Augustine). The fire does not change, whether it warms, illuminates, or

burns, (Moses Maimonides). And grain remains grain, even though we call

it according to the different relations now fruit, then seed, then food,

(Basil). God is named differently, on account of the varii effectus, which He

brings about in the creatures through his always one and the same essence.

In this connection it must be remembered that God can appear in such

different attributes and be called with such different names, because there is

affinity between Him and his creatures. If this did not exist, all names

would be untrue. But now there is in the creatures analogy of what is

present in God himself. The names do not merely designate God as cause of

things, but they give, however weak and defective, yet some conception of

the Divine essence. Thus, indicating God with all these names, we speak

indeed imperfectly, finitely, limitedly, humanly, but yet not falsely and

untruly. For although knowing and willing, righteousness and grace in God

are one and always the same full entire essence, yet God, as it were, spreads

out that one rich essence in these many virtues, as if next to and alongside

one another, before our eyes. Even if it is always the same essence that

meets us in those names, in each name a comprehension is granted to us of

what that essence truly is in infinite fullness. In God, according to the

essence, holiness and mercy may be the same, yet our conception of both,

formed from God’s own revelation, is nevertheless different. There is no

name that can express God’s essence adaequaat; thus many names serve to

give us an impression of his greatness that surpasses all. Cf. besides those

mentioned, Damascenus, de fide orth. I c. 10. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 3. art.

3 qu. 13 art. 4. c. Gent. I c. 5. Sent. I dist. 2. qu. 1 art. 2. Petavius, de Deo I

cap. 7-13. C. Pesch, Praelect. dogm. II 71-76. Zanchius, Op. II 49 sq.

Polanus, Synt. theol. lib. 2. c. 7. Voetius, Disp. I 233 sq. Heppe, Dogm. der

ev. ref. K. 51-53. Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. § 18.

8. As has already been said above, in the earliest period everything that

could be thought and spoken of God was summarized under his names. But

the richness of the material made ordering necessary. There came at once

some delimitation, because the term names gradually came into use for the

nomina propria, God, Lord, etc. Next, the doctrine of the Trinity was soon

treated separately, whether before or after the so-called attributes, and in an

entirely proper terminology. Further, the distinction between essence and

attributes brought with it that the former was separated from the latter, and

thus the doctrine of the attributes came to stand alone. The division which

now lay most to hand for these attributes and which is also the oldest and

first, was that into negative and positive names. As soon as one, after all,

began to reflect on the way in which one had arrived at those names,

one saw that they had been obtained from the creatures either via negationis

or via eminentiae and causalitatis. We find this division or at least this

twofold respectively threefold way, to come to know God, already in Philo

and Plotinus, Zeller, Philos. der Gr. S. 355 f. 483. cf. also Herzog2 10, 521.

With the church fathers God was both unknowable and knowable,

unknowable according to his essence, knowable according to his revelation;

on the one hand only what He is not could be said of God, but on the other

hand something positive could nevertheless be predicated of Him in an

imperfect and inadequate way. Pseudodionysius, de myst. theol. I 2,

Damascenus, de fide orth. I 2. 4, Erigena, de div. nat. I 78 worked out this

thought expressly into a division, into a twofold theology, the apo- and the

kataphatic. The former indicates the three ways in so many words, when he

says that we come to knowledge of God ἐ ν τ ῃ παντων ἀ φαιρεσει και

came to speak of three viae, by which one came to knowledge of God, via

negationis, eminentiae and causalitatis, especially since Durandus de S.

Porciano. These three viae were acknowledged in dogmatics down to the

most recent time. Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Reformed have all adopted

them and sometimes treated them at length. But they have also been sharply

criticized more than once. Spinoza rejected the via eminentiae with the

remark that a triangle, if it could speak, would say Deum eminenter

triangularem esse, Epist. 60, cf. Xenophanes in Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. I 490.

Kant thought that the way of causality could only be trodden within the

circle of the phaenomena. Schleiermacher disapproved of the via negationis

and eminentiae and retained only the via causalitatis, Chr. Gl. § 50. 51. cf.

further Twesten II 30 f. Strauss, Gl. I 536 f. Bruch, Lehre v. d. göttl.

Eigensch. 83 f. Dorner I 188 f. Vilmar I 190. Doedes, L. v. God 208. Frank,

Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. I2 228. Lange, Dogm. II 42 f. Hodge, I 339.

Wichelhaus, Die Lehre der H. Schrift vom Worte Gottes u. s. w. 1892 S.

332 f. etc. Now it is certainly true that the names of God existed long before

these three viae were devised, that these were born only later from

reflection on the names, that the via eminentiae and causalitatis are actually

one and thus together as via positionis can be set over against the via

negationis; but it is nevertheless just as certain that there is no

knowledge of God except from the creatures, that all names of God are

borrowed from the creatures, and that all those names either deny

something in God or posit something in God in a perfect way of that which

is in creatures. Only, in doing so, it may never be forgotten that the ratio

cognoscendi is not identical with the ratio essendi. In reality it is not the

creature but God who is the first. He is archetype, the creature is ectype. In

Him everything is original, absolute; in the creatures everything is derived,

relative. God is therefore properly not named after what is in creatures, but

creatures are named after what exists in God, cf. above p. 74 v. Keeping this

in view, one can nevertheless say that Holy Scripture also treads these two

ways. And everyone who wishes to think and speak about God does so

according to the negative or positive relation in which God stands to the

world, F. A. B. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. S. 400. To this it is certainly also to be

ascribed that the division of the names of God into negative and positive

arose so quickly, found such general acceptance, and in fact underlies all

other divisions that arose later. This division is already to be found in Philo,

Plotinus and the church fathers, and is then employed by Damascenus, de

fide orthod. I c. 4. 9. 12. Anselmus, Monol. c. 15. Prosl. c. 5. 6. Thomas, S.

Theol. I qu. 13 art. 2. Petavius, Theol. dogm. I c. 5. Perrone, Prael. theol. II

p. 91 etc. Among the Roman Catholics this division is the most usual,

although also some Reformed and Lutherans have adopted it. In that

division other distinctions are then also made. Augustinus, serm. 38 de

tempore already made the remark that some names of God were used

proprie, others metaphorice and still others relative. Accordingly the

nomina negativa were again divided into purely negative and relative, and

the nomina positiva into propria and metaphorica, Thomas I qu. 13 art. 2

and 3. Alongside this division into negative and positive attributes another

arose. Plato already taught that God is good through himself, but the

creatures only through μετοχη. In Christian theology this thought,

especially with Augustine, has borne ripe fruits. Over against pantheism it

was maintained that God’s essence is incommunicable and that the soul was

no pars Dei, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 90 art. 1. Zanchius, Op. II col. 53 sq.

But it was at the same time taught that all creatures were akin to God

and that in particular man was his image and likeness. There was analogy

between Creator and creatura. This led to the division of attributa

communicabilia and incommunicabilia. These two names were first already

in use in the doctrine of the Trinity, for the essence of God, the deitas, was

communicabilis, namely communicated by the Father in generation to the

Son, but the persons and the personal properties, e.g. the paternitas, were

incommunicabiles, Pseudodion., de div. nom. cap. 2 § 5. Bonaventura,

Brevil. I c. 4. Id. Sent. I dist. 27 p. 1 art. 1 qu. 3 etc. From there these two

names were also taken over into the doctrine of the attributes in order to

maintain both God’s transcendence and God’s immanence, Anselmus,

Monol. c. 15. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 13 art. 9. 10. This division now found

acceptance especially among the Reformed theologians, without doubt also

because it offered a suitable opportunity to combat the ubiquity doctrine of

the Lutherans, Sohnius, Op. I 97. Zanchius, Op. II col. 50-51. Polanus,

Synt. Theol. lib. II c. 7 and 14. Mastricht, II 5, 12 etc., and now still in

Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 337 and Gravemeyer, Geref. Geloofsleer, 3e stuk bl.

62 etc. Yet all concede that the communicable attributes in an absolute

sense, as they are in God, are just as incommunicable as the others, cf.

Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. S. 52 f. The Lutherans mostly gave preference

to another division, namely that into attributa quiescentia and operativa, or

immanentia and extra se exserentia, which was also employed in defense of

the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum, Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth.

K. S. 78. Under the first group (negative, incommunicable, metaphysical,

quiescent) there were then usually treated the attributes of unity, simplicity,

independence, immutability, eternity, omnipresence. The second group

(positive, communicable, operative, personal) was mostly again divided

into attributes of understanding, will and power. The division into attributes

of being, of understanding and of will in Bretschneider I 480, Thomasius I

14 f. Vilmar I 195, Oosterzee § 47, cf. Frank I 232 f. Philippi II 23, to which

Hase, Lehrb. S. 271 still adds that of feeling, deviates only little from the

above-mentioned divisions. By contrast, the division of Schleiermacher

proceeds from another standpoint. The attributes with him are only

subjective conceptions and grounded only in the ratio ratiocinans. And thus

he divides them according to the relation of God to world, sin and

redemption, into such as are present in the feeling of dependence, as the

antithesis of sin has not yet arisen in it (eternal, omnipresent, almighty,

omniscient), as that antithesis is indeed felt (holy, righteous), and as it is

overcome (love and wisdom). In agreement with this many divide the

attributes according to the relation of God to the world, and then

specifically to the world in general (infinite, eternal, omnipresent), to the

ethical world (holy, righteous; grace, mercy) and to the ethical-physical

world (wisdom, blessedness), Wegscheider § 60. Böhme, Lehre v. d. göttl.

Eig. 1826. Bruch, Lehre v. d. göttl. Eig. S. 110 f. Lange, Dogm. II 61 f.

Grétillat, Exposé de theol. syst. III 220. Hoekstra, Wijsg. godsd. II 92-99

etc.

9. All the above-mentioned divisions apparently differ widely from one

another and make use of entirely different names. But in substance they

correspond very closely with each other. Whether one speaks of negative

and positive, incommunicable and communicable, quiescent and operative,

absolute and relative, of properties of the substance and of the subject, in

relation to the world and to man, in fact one nevertheless always gives the

same order in which the attributes are treated. Against all divisions,

therefore, essentially the same objections hold. They all give the appearance

that the being of God is divided into two halves, that first the absoluteness,

then the personality is treated, that first the being an sich, then in its relation

to the creatures is discussed, that the first group of names is obtained apart

from the creation and the second group of names from the creatures, and

that thus no unity and harmony of all God’s virtues comes about, Frank,

Syst. d. chr. Wahrheit I 228 f. Now, however, it is the incontrovertible

teaching of Scripture, that God in his hidden being is unknowable and

unnameable and that all names of God presuppose the revelation, i.e. the

creation. Of the being and life of God outside of and without the creation

we know nothing, for the simple reason that we ourselves are creatures and

thus are always bound to the creation. Clearly that was formerly seen

and expressed with respect to the relative, metaphorical and positive names

of God. The relative names such as Lord, Creator, Sustainer, Saviour etc.,

accrue to God only after and through the creation; no one can be called lord,

unless he has servants; men, the servants of God, have come to be in time,

and thus God has become our Lord in time, August., de trin. V 16, cf. de

ord. II 7. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 13 art. 7. Anselmus, Monol. 15.

Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 30. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 30 art. 1. Zanchius,

Op. II 24-26. Polanus, Synt. Theol. p. 192. Of the metaphorical names, to

which the anthropomorphisms also belong, it is clear that they presuppose

the creation. And the positive names of good, holy, wise etc., therefore have

for our consciousness some content, because we perceive ectypes of them

in the creatures, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 12 art. 12. But all these names,

though relative, metaphorical and positive, on the other hand nevertheless

do indeed make known something in God, which in Him exists absolutely,

proprie and thus again also negatively, in another sense than in the

creatures. Augustine attempted to show that, although God becomes Lord in

time, his being nevertheless is immutable and all change falls only in the

creature. That which God begins to be called temporally, which previously

was not said, is manifestly said relatively; yet not according to an accident

of God, as though something had happened to him, but plainly according to

an accident of that to which God begins to be said relatively, de trin. V 16.

The reverse holds of the second group of names, whether these are called

negative, incommunicable, quiescent, absolute or otherwise. For although

they deny to God something that is in creatures, they are nevertheless all in

a certain sense again also positive, communicable, transeunt, relative. If

they were not that, if they were completely incommunicable, they would

also be absolutely unknowable and unnameable. That we can think and

name them proves that they have been revealed in one way or another by

God in his works. The negative names therefore also have a positive

content; even if it is the case that we learn to know the eternity of God only

from and in time, his omnipresence from and in space, his infinity and

immutability only from and amid all the finite and mutable creatures; yet

they do give us some, and even important, knowledge of God. Even if

we cannot positively comprehend eternity, it nevertheless says so much, to

know that God is exalted above all time. And therefore it is incorrect to

divide the attributes of God in such a way that on the one side there comes

to stand a group that is negative, incommunicable, quiescent, absolute etc.,

and on the other side one that is positive, communicable, operative, relative

etc. For all attributes are both at the same time. All attributes are absolute

and all are nevertheless first known from the relation of God to his

creatures. And again, we can name God only according to what of Him is

manifest in his creatures, but we nevertheless name Him who is the source

of all good and the cause of all creatures. More still, precisely because the

attributes are identical with the being of God and mutually in God, no

division is to be found that would be grounded objectively in the attributes

themselves, Doedes, Leer v. God 217. What can be obtained is only a

certain order in the treatment of the many names of God. Among these,

those names at once set themselves apart which later were more specifically

indicated as names and which as names of address and designation in a

broader sense may be called nomina propria. Next, there are names that

make known the divine being in all its relations to the creatures and that

formerly were mostly called attributes, virtues, perfections etc. The word

attributes is for this the least preferable, because it always again makes one

think of a being to which the attributes have been added; the name virtues,

on the other hand, finds support in Scripture itself, 1 Petr. 2:9. This second

group can bear the name of nomina essentialia, because they all make

known to us the being of God, not an sich, but as it descends to us in the

revelation and communicates itself to us. Finally there is still a third group

of names, which all have reference to the self-distinctions in the being of

God and which therefore can be called nomina personalia. The most

difficult thing now is to bring order into the treatment of the names that

belong to the second group. Yet that order is precisely indicated in the

relation in which God stands to his creatures. The whole world is a

revelation of God. There is no part of the universe in which not something

of his virtues is revealed. But there is distinction among the creatures. Not

all proclaim all his virtues, and not all with the same clarity. There is

rank order and ascent; all creatures display vestigia Dei, but only man is

image and likeness of God. He not only shares being with the lower

creatures, and life and spirit with the higher; but in this communion with the

material and spiritual world he is also in a wholly special way akin to God

himself, created as prophet, priest and king in knowledge, holiness and

righteousness. Thus God, the source of all being and the archetype of man,

is then himself also all that which creatures share. In Him all that is indeed

in an original, divine way; in every virtue of God both his absolute

exaltation above and his kinship to the creature is to be noticed; every

attribute is in a certain respect incommunicable and in another again

communicable. But nevertheless there is from the creature, especially from

man, analogy in the divine being. Thus there are then first names by which

God reveals himself to us as the One Who Is in the strictest sense: aseitas,

immutabilitas, infinitas (aeternitas and immensitas). Second, there are

names that make known to us God as the Living One, as Spirit: spiritualitas,

invisibilitas, simplicitas. Third, there are names that describe the divine

being as perfectly self-conscious, as Light: scientia, sapientia, veracitas.

Fourth, there are names that point us to the ethical nature of that being and

designate God as the Holy One: bonitas, justitia, sanctitas. And finally, fifth,

there are names in which God appears for us as the absolute power, as Lord,

King, Sovereign: voluntas, libertas, omnipotentia. This division is on the

one hand connected with the knowledge of God, which in the so-called

proofs for his existence is summarized; and on the other hand points

forward to the vestigia and the imago Dei, which have been impressed in

the creatures. No knowledge of God except through revelation, and thus

always analogical and ectypal; but through that revelation then nevertheless

true and pure knowledge of the incomprehensible and adorable being of

God!

. Among the names of God, in the first place those names clearly set

themselves apart by which He, as a proper personal being in [103]

distinction from all creatures, is indicated, named, addressed. All languages

possess such names for the Divine being. Although God in himself has no

name, we have need to designate Him and for that have no other means than

a name. Nisi enim nomen scieris, rerum cognitio perit, Isidorus in Moor I

504. The Greek word θεος, formerly derived from τιθεναι, θεειν, θεασθαι,

Suicerus, s.v., M. Vitringa I 134, is nowadays by some philologists brought

into connection with Ζευς, Διος, Jupiter, Deus, Diana, Juno, Dio, Dieu; then

it is identical with the Sanskrit name dêva, bright heaven and derived from

the stem div, to shine, to glitter. The interchange of the designation heaven

and God occurs in many languages; the oldest Greek god was called

Uranus, certainly identical with the Sanskrit name Varuna; Taengri among

the Tartars and Turks, Thian among the Chinese denotes both heaven and

God; and also in Scripture the name God is replaced by that of heaven, e.g.

in the expression kingdom of the heavens or of God. Another Greek name is

## § 25. The Proper Names of God.

δαιμων, from the verb δαιω, and designates God as distributor and disposer

of fate; on the other hand κυριος, from κυρος, is the mighty one, the lord,

the owner, the ruler. Our word God is of uncertain origin. It has been

brought into connection with the word good; with the Zend khodâ, a se

datus, per se ipsum existens; with the Sanskrit gudha or gutha, κευδω,

which would designate God as the hidden one, or with a stem, κοδω,

κοσμος, which would mean to order, to arrange, or with the Aryan çuddhas,

pure, good etc., but all these derivations are uncertain. The name Asura

among the Indians, and Ahura among the Persians designates God as the

living one. Cf. Kluge, Etymol. Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, s. v.

Gott. Cremer, Wört. der neut. Gr. s.v. Herzog2 5, 290. Hoekstra, Wijsg.

2. Scripture speaks many times of the name of God in a very broad sense.

The Jews therefore counted no fewer than seventy of them, Eisenmenger,

Entdecktes Judenthum I 455; and in Christian theology, under the names of

God his perfections also were at first included. But gradually a distinction

arose; already Hieronymus limited the names of God to a dozen, viz. El,

Elohim, Elohe, Tzebaoth, Eljon, Escher ehje, Adonai, Iah, Ihvh, Schaddai,

and in this he was followed by many, Alsted, Theol. schol. 71 sq.

Moor, I 511. The simplest name by which God is designated in Holy

Scripture is ‎‏‏ֵאל‎. Concerning the derivation there is disagreement. Lagarde

connects the word with the root ‎‏‏אלי‎ and the preposition ‎‏‏אל‎ and thinks that

the word designates God as the one who is the goal and the object of human

desire. But this derivation is as improbable as that which connects the word

with ‎‏‏ֵאָלה‎, the sacred tree. According to by far the most, the word is derived

from the stem ‎‏‏אּול‎, either in the sense of being in front, the first, being lord

(Nöldeke), or in that of being strong, mighty (Gesenius), litt. bij M. Vitringa

I 132. Moor I 515 sq. Schultz, Altt. Theol. 508. Smend, Altt. Theol. 26. The

name ‎‏ה‏ֱאלֹוַּ‎ plur. ‎‏‏אלהים‎ is derived from the same stem ‎‏‏אול‎ or from ‎‏‏אלה‎, to be

frightened, and thus makes God known either as the strong one or as object

of fright and fear. The singularis is little in use and poetic, e.g. Psalms 18:32,

Job 3:4; on the other hand, the pluralis is the usual name for God. This

pluralis is not to be explained as a pluralis majestatis, since this is nowhere

in Scripture customary of God; neither can an indication of the Trinity be

seen in it, as since Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 2 was done by many, Zanchius,

Op. I 25. Voetius, Disp. V 27. M. Vitringa I 209 sq., for Elohim almost

always has the adjectivum and the verbum in singulari with it, Augustinus,

de trin. II 11. Bellarminus, de Christo, c. 6. Calvijn, Inst. I 13, 9. Gomarus,

Theses Theol., disp. 5. Moor I 796. The modern critics mostly see in it a

remnant of the earlier polytheism, but this explanation runs up not only

against the same objection as the earlier trinitarian one, but also, as later

investigations show, outside Israel it has been customary as a name for one

single God, Noordtzij, Oost. Lichtstralen over West. Schriftbeschouwing

1897 bl. 41 v. Therefore this pluralis is better to be understood as a pluralis

of abstraction (Ewald), or as a pluralis of quantity, which like ‎‏‏מים‎ and ‎‏‏ׁשמים‎

indicates an unbounded magnitude (Oehler), or as an intensive pluralis,

which makes known a fullness of power (Delitzsch). In a few instances

Elohim is construed with an adjectivum or verbum in plurali, Genesis 20:13,

pluralis is also to be noted in the pron. personale, Genesis 1:26, 3:22,

54:5, ‎‏‏בראים‎ Pred. 12:1, Psalms 149:2, and in ‎‏‏ֲאֹדָני‎. All these plural forms

designate God as the fullness of life and of power. Durch Elohim wird das

göttliche Wesen in seinem Urverhältniss und in seinem stetigen

Grundverhältniss zur Welt bezeichnet. Es ist eine Verhältnissbestimmung,

nicht eine unmittelbare innere Wesensbestimmung, und zwar ist es

Bestimmung des absoluten Hoheitsbegriffs in Bezug auf die ganze Welt,

Beck, Gl. II 22, cf. litt. bij M. Vitringa I 133, Moor I 518, Oehler, Theol. §

36, Schultz, Altt. Th. 516. The name ‎‏‏ֶעְליֹון‎, LXX ὑ ψιστος, points to God as

the Most High, exalted above everything; it occurs in the mouth of

Melchizedek, Genesis 14:18, of Balaam, Numbers 24:16, of the king of Babylon,

Jes. 14:14, cf. also Mark 5:7, Luke 1:32, 35, Hd. 16:17 and further especially

in poetry. ‎‏‏ֲאֹדָני‎, alternating with ‎‏‏האדון‎, which in turn is strengthened to ‎‏אדון

‏אדונים‎ or ‎‏‏אדון כל הארץ‎, makes God known as the Lord, to whom everything is

subject and over against whom man stands as a servant, Genesis 18:27. In

earlier time God in this same sense was also called ‎‏‏ַּבַעל‎, Hosea 2:18, but later

this name acquired an idolatrous character and therefore fell out of use,

Robertson, Israels oude godsdienst bl. 200 v. All these names are not yet

nomina propria in the narrower sense; they are also sometimes used of the

idols, of men, Genesis 33:10, Exodus 7:1, 4:16, and of the authorities, Exodus 12:12,

82:1, but they are nevertheless the usual names by which God is named and

addressed. They are also general Semitic names, which make God known in

his exaltedness above all creature. The Semites gladly call God Lord, King;

they feel themselves deeply dependent on him and bow themselves humbly,

as servants, before him, yet in those names they do not express a

philosophical view about the being of God but place his relation to the

creatures, specifically to men, in the foreground.

3. This high, exalted God, however, also descends from his transcendence

to the creature. He reveals himself not only in general through creation to

all peoples, but has also made himself known to Israel in a particular sense.

The first name with which God now appears in the special revelation

is that of ‎‏‏ַׁשַּדי‎ or ‎‏‏ֵאל ַׁשַּדי‎. As such God reveals himself to Abraham, when he

appoints him to be a father of many nations and seals his covenant with

circumcision, Genesis 17:1. In the time of the patriarchs this name accordingly

but further also in Job, in some psalms and a couple of times with the

prophets. In the N. Test. it is rendered by παντοκρατωρ, 2 Corinthians 6:18, Op. 4:8

etc. The origin of the name is still obscure. Nöldeke derived it from ‎‏‏ַׁשד‎,

lord, and punctuated it as ‎‏‏ֵׁשַדי‎, but in view of Genesis 43:14, 49:25, Ezech. 10:5

the name is nevertheless undoubtedly an adjective. Formerly it was derived

from ‎‏‏ׁש‎ for ‎‏‏אׁשר‎ and ‎‏‏ַדי‎, ἱ κανος, and then translated as qui est sufficiens, allsufficient; or from ‎‏‏ׁשדד‎ in the sense of being strong, destroying; or also from

‎‏‏ׁשדה‎ or ‎‏‏אׁשד‎ to pour out, so that God is thereby designated as the one who

communicates everything abundantly. Everywhere, however, with this

name the idea of power and of invincible strength stands in the foreground,

and Jes. 13:6 brings, even if only in a pun, this name into connection with

‎‏‏ׁשדד‎, to destroy, cf. Joel 1:15. Therefore this name makes known to us God

as the one who possesses all power and thus can break all resistance and

can make everything serviceable to his will. While Elohim is the God of

creation and of nature, Elschaddai is the God who makes all the forces of

that nature subordinate to and places them in the service of grace, cf.

marginal note on Genesis 17:1, Zanchius, Op. II 43. M. Vitringa I 132. Moor I

522 sq. Oehler, Theol. § 37. Delitzsch on Genesis 17:1 etc. In this name the

θειοτης and αιδιος δυναμις of God is no longer an object of terror and fear,

but a source of salvation and of consolation. God gives himself to his

people and, with his invincible power, stands surety for the fulfilment of his

promises, for the maintenance of his covenant. Therefore from now on he is

also each time called the God of Abraham, Genesis 24:12, Isaac, Genesis 28:13,

Jacob, Exodus 3:6, the God of the fathers, Exodus 3:13, 15, the God of the

Hebrews, Exodus 3:18, the God of Israel, Genesis 33:20, and with Isaiah often the

Holy One of Israel. God is the Exalted One, Creator of heaven and earth,

the Almighty, but who at the same time also stands in a special, favorable

relationship to his people. [107]

As the God of grace, however, He appears especially under the name ‎‏‏יהוה‎.

The Jews called this name the name par excellence, the essential name, the

proper name, the glorious name, the name of the four letters,

τετραγραμματον etc., and from Leviticus 24:16 and Exodus 3:15, where one read

‎‏‏ְלֹעָלם‎, in order to conceal, inferred that it was forbidden to pronounce it. It is

unknown when this opinion arose among the Jews. But it is certain that the

LXX already regularly read Adonai and therefore rendered the name by

κυριος; other translations followed this example and translated the name by

Dominus, The Lord, der Herr, Heere, Syn. Dordr. sess. 12 etc.; French has

l’Éternel. Thereby the original, correct pronunciation has also been lost.

The church fathers called the name ἀ πορρητον, ἀ λεκτον, ἀ φραστον,

probably not because they held the pronunciation of this name to be

unlawful, but because the Jews so judged and the pronunciation had in fact

been lost, Moor I 534, Buddeus, Inst. theol. dogm. I 188. In Greek the four

letters were written as ΠΙΠΙ, or also, according to Diodorus Siculus and

Origen, rendered by Ιαω or Ιαη, according to Hieronymus by Jaho,

according to Philo Byblius by Ιευω, according to Clemens Alex. by Ιαου.

Theodoret relates that the Jews pronounced Αϊα and the Samaritans Ιαβε.

All this points back to an old pronunciation Iahveh, Schultz, Altt. Theol.4

523. With appeal to the tradition among the Jews, by some the name was

pronounced as Jeve, e.g. by Joachim of Floris in his Evangelium aeternum.

Indeed this punctuation is to be found in Samuel b. Meir, and was later still

defended by Hottinger, Reland e. a., Delitzsch, Neuer Comm. über die

Genesis 1887 S. 546 f. The pronunciation Jehovah is of recent date: it found

entrance especially through the Franciscan Petrus Galatinus, who, however,

was opposed by many, e.g. by Genebrardus, Petavius, de Deo VIII c. 9,

Herzog2 4, 173. Later men such as Drusius, Amama, Scaliger, Vriemoet e.

a. also asserted that the pronunciation Jehovah could not be the true one, but

had borrowed the vowels from Adonai, Voetius, Disp. V 55, cf. litt. in M.

Vitringa I 130. In fact this punctuation is burdened by very serious

objections. First, Ihvh in the Hebr. Bible is a keri perpetuum and has now

the vowels of Adonai, then those of Elohim; further, the form Jehovah is

un-Hebrew and inexplicable; and finally this punctuation dates from a

time when the Jews had long considered the pronunciation of the name

forbidden. If this vocalization is now incorrect, the question arises how then

the name is to be explained. The assertion that it is of Egyptian origin

(Voltaire, Schiller, Wegscheider, Heeren, Brugsch) is contradicted by Exodus 5:2 and finds scarcely any defense any longer. Also the opinion of

Hartmann, Bohlen, Colenso, Dozy, Land, that it is Canaanite or Phoenician

and was adopted by the Israelites after their entry into Canaan, has proved

untenable and has been conclusively refuted, Kuenen, G. v. I. I 397-401.

Valeton, De Isr. Godsnamen, Theol. Stud. VII 1889 bl. 173-221, especially

bl. 176 v. The Israelite origin of the name may thus be regarded as

established. Then, however, there is also no doubt possible that it comes

from the stem =‎‏‏הוה‎= or ‎‏‏היה‎, and, since the pronunciation of Jaho, advocated

by von Hartmann, Religionsphilos. I 370 f., cannot be taken into

consideration, Kuenen, Volksgodsd. en Wereldgodsd. 261 v., there remains

only a difference as to whether it is a 3 pers. impf. of qal or of hiphil. The

latter explanation has been defended by Gesenius, Schrader, Lagarde,

Schultz, Land, Kuenen, G. v. I. I 275, actually only on the ground that so

exalted a concept of God as would be expressed in the qal form is not yet

conceivable in the time of Moses. The name Jahveh would then not mean,

He who is, but He who causes to be, who gives life, Creator. But Smend,

Altt. Rel. Gesch. 21 says from his standpoint rightly that this name too is

still far too high for that time; and he also calls this explanation improbable

for the reason that the hiphil of the verb ‎‏‏הוה‎ never occurs. Thus only the

derivation remains which is given of the name in Ex. 3. Yet even then there

is still difference over the meaning of the name. The church fathers thought

with this name especially of the aseitas; God was the being one, the eternal,

unchangeable being over against the ο ὐ κ Ὀ ν of the idols and the μη ὀ ν of

the creatures. Others, such as W. R. Smith, Smend t. a. p. 21, appeal to Exodus 3:12, and take the name as He who will be with you. Both interpretations

are unacceptable; the latter, because the addition with you, ‎‏‏ִעָּמך‎, then could

not be lacking, and the former, because it sounds too philosophical and also

finds no support in Ex. 3. For in verses 13-15 the meaning of the name is

clearly indicated. In full it reads ‎‏‏ֶאְהֶיה ֲאֶׁשר ֶאְהֶיה‎; and thereby the Lord

says that He who now calls Moses and wants to save his people is the same

as He who appeared to their fathers. He is who He is, yesterday and today

the same forever. This meaning is set in still clearer light in verse 15: Ihvh,

the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob sends Moses,

and that is his name eternally. God does not call himself here the being one

without more and gives no explanation of his aseitas, but He says expressly

what and how He is. How and what then will He be? That is not to be said

in one word, that is not to be described by one single epithet, but He will be

who He will be. In that everything is enclosed; general and indefinite this

addition is, but therefore also so rich and deep in meaning. He will be who

He has been for the patriarchs, who He now is, who He will remain; He will

be everything for his people. It is no new and no strange God who comes to

them through Moses, but it is the God of the fathers, the unchangeable one,

the steadfast one, the faithful one, the always remaining like himself, who

does not forsake or abandon his people, but always seeks it out again and

saves it, unchangeable in his grace, in his love, in his help, who will be

what He is, because He is always himself; ‎‏‏אני הוא‎ therefore He calls himself

Naturally the aseitas does lie here as a foundation, but it nevertheless does

not come to the foreground and is not directly expressed in the name. From

this explanation it also appears whether and to what extent the name Ihvh

was already known before the time of Moses. Exodus 6:3 does not say that the

name as a name was then communicated to Moses, but that the Lord with or

with respect to his name was not known to the fathers. The name is

therefore also already found repeatedly before Ex. 6, occurs in many proper

names, such as Jochebed, Achija, Abija, 1 Chron. 2:24, 25, and for that

reason too could not be an entirely new name, because Moses, in order to

find a hearing with his people, precisely had to appear not with a foreign

name but in the name of the God of the fathers, Exodus 3:12. The intention of

Exodus 6:3 therefore can be no other than that the sense and meaning of this

name was first then made known by the Lord himself to Moses. And this is

indeed also so. Only in Ex. 3 does the Lord himself give an explanation of

this name; here He says how He wants this name to be understood.

The name already existed earlier, was also then already used several times

by the Lord himself, Genesis 15:7, 28:13, and used as a form of address, Gen.

name given. It is in the abstract quite possible that the name Ihvh originally,

according to its derivation, meant something entirely different from what is

said in Ex. 3. Ex. 3 gives no etymology, no word-, but a thing-explanation.

Just as God in his special revelation to Israel took over all kinds of religious

usages, circumcision, sabbath, sacrifice, priesthood etc., and bestowed on

them a special meaning, so He has also done with this name. Apart from

origin and original meaning, the Lord says in Ex. 6 how and in what sense

He is Iahveh, the I will be who I will be. The name Ihvh is from now on the

description and the guarantee of this, that God is and remains the God of his

people, unchangeable in his grace and faithfulness. And that could also only

now, in Moses’ time, come to light. There had to elapse precisely a long

time, in order to prove that God was faithful and unchangeable; someone’s

faithfulness can only in the long run and especially in times of misery be

tested. So it was with Israel. Centuries had elapsed after the time of the

patriarchs; Israel was oppressed and sat down in misery. And now God

says: I am who I am, Iahveh, the unchangeably faithful, the God of the

fathers, the God also now still of you and unto eternity. Now God lays in an

old name an entirely new meaning, which also only now can be understood

by the people. And therefore Ihvh is Israel’s God from the land of Egypt,

4. The name Ihvh is in the Old Testament the highest revelation of God.

No new names are added. Ihvh is God’s proper name, Exodus 15:3, Psalms 83:19,

Hosea 12:6, Jes. 42:8; is therefore never used of anyone other than Israel’s

God and also never occurs in statu constructo, in plurali, or with suffixa.

Indeed this name is repeatedly altered in form or strengthened by one or

another addition. By shortening there arose the form ‎‏ְ‏ַיֲה‎, ‎‏‏ָיהּו‎, ‎‏‏ָיה‎, which is

used especially in compounds, and from that there arose again the

independent nomen ‎‏‏ָיּה‎. This shortened name is regularly used in the [111]

exclamation ‎‏ ‏ַהְללּו־ָיּה‎, but furthermore also occurs repeatedly independently,

connection with ‎‏‏יהוה‎, Jes. 26:4. Very common also is the combination

Adonai Ihvh, e.g. Ezech. 23:12. A special strengthening the name Ihvh also

receives through the addition Zebaoth, ‎‏‏יהוה צבאות‎, Psalms 69:7, 84:2, Hagg. 2:7-

9, once ‎‏‏יהוה הצבאות‎, Amos 9:5, properly shortened from ‎‏‏יהוה אלהי צבאות‎, 1

Sam. 1:3, 4:4, Jes. 1:24, or ‎‏‏יהוה אלהים צבאוח‎, Psalms 80:5, 84:9. Because

Zebaoth was connected with Ihvh, which allows no status constructus, and

sometimes with Elohim in statu absoluto, Origenes, Hieronymus e. a.

inferred from that that Zebaoth was an apposition; and they were still

further strengthened in this by the fact that the word in the LXX, especially

in 1 Sam. and Jes., and also in Romans 9:29, Jak. 5:4 has remained

untranslated, Moor I 512 sq. But this opinion lacks all foundation.

Elsewhere Zebaoth is rendered by παντοκρατωρ or κυριος των δυναμεων,

and the name Ihvh, who Zebaoth, i.e. armies, hosts is, yields no sense. It is

difficult, however, to say what must be understood by those Zebaoth. Some

have thereby thought of the war-armies of Israel and think that the name

Lord of hosts designates God as God of war. But most of the passages cited

only a trio of passages, 1 Samuel 4:4, 17:45, 2 Samuel 6:2 provide an appearance of

proof; and 2 Kon. 19:31 is much more in conflict with it. Further, the

pluralis Zebaoth is indeed in use for the multitudes of the people of Israel,

war-army of Israel is always designated with the singularis zaba, Richt. 8:6,

that the name Lord of hosts with the prophets no longer has this meaning of

God of war; but they then leave unexplained how and whereby this

expression has thus changed in meaning. Others, with the word hosts, think

of the stars with appeal to texts such as Deuteronomy 4:19, Psalms 33:6, Jeremiah 19:13,

33:22, Jes. 34:4, 40:26, Nehemiah 9:6; Smend extends this still further and

understands by it the powers and elements of the cosmos, on the basis of

passages such as Genesis 2:1, Psalms 103:21, Jes. 34:2. And indeed Scripture

speaks repeatedly of the stars as the host of heaven, Deuteronomy 4:19, and of all

creatures as the host of heaven and earth, Genesis 2:1, but in the first place

then never the pluralis but only the singularis is customary; further, the stars

are indeed called the host of heaven but never called the host of God; and

finally, indeed all creatures, but never so abstract a concept as powers and

elements of the cosmos, are designated with the name of host. The

implausibility of these newer explanations causes the old interpretation,

which with the hosts thought of the angels, to rise in value. And this

interpretation finds abundant support in Scripture. The name Lord of hosts

is repeatedly brought into connection with the angels, 1 Samuel 4:4, 2 Samuel 6:2, Jes.

37:16, Hosea 12:5, 6, Psalms 80:2, 5 v., 89:6-9, and the angels are time and again

represented as a host that surrounds the throne of God, Genesis 28:12, 13,

6:2. Even if it is the case that zaba usually stands of the host of the angels in

singulari, this can nevertheless be no objection, because Scripture

repeatedly makes mention of many hosts of angels, Genesis 32:2, Deuteronomy 33:2,

Psalms 68:18, 148:2. And with this the meaning of the name agrees. This bears

absolutely no warlike or bellicose character; even from 1 Samuel 4:4, 17:45, 2

Sam. 6:2 this is not to be inferred. But in this name there is everywhere

expressed the glory of God as King, Deuteronomy 33:2, 1 Kon. 22:19, Psalms 24:10,

Jes. 6:2, 24:23, Zach. 14:16, Zach. 1:14. The angels belong with the δοξα of

God or of Christ, they heighten and spread it, Matthew 25:31, Mark 8:38, 2 Thessalonians 1:7, Op. 7:11. Iahveh Zebaoth is throughout the whole of Scripture the

solemn royal name of God, full of majesty and glory. Elohim designates

God as Creator and Sustainer of all things; El Schaddai makes Him known

as the Strong One, who makes nature subservient to grace; Iahveh describes

Him as the one who in his grace keeps faith forever; Iahveh Zebaoth depicts

Him as the King full of glory, who, surrounded by his ordered hosts, in his

temple receives honor and homage from all his creatures. Cf. on Ihvh

Zebaoth, Delitzsch, Luth. Zeits. 1869 and 1874 and on Psalms 24:10, Schrader,

Jahrb. f. prot. Theol. 1875 S. 316-320, Oehler, Theol. § 195 f. Schultz,

Theol. 529 f. Smend, Altt. Rel. 185 f. König, Die Hauptprobl. der altisr. Rel.

S. 49 f., Kuenen, G. v. I. II 46. Stade, Gesch. Isr. I 437. Valeton, t. a. p. bl.

208 v. art. Zebaoth in Herzog2 en Riehm, Handwörterbuch. Borchert, Der

Gottesname Jahve Zebaoth, Stud. u. Kr. 1896 S. 619-642.

5. In the N. Test. all these names have been retained. El and Elohim are

rendered by θεος, Eljon is translated by ὑ ψιστος θεος, Mark 5:7, Luke 1:32,

Also the designation of God as God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob or as God

of Israel passes over into the N. Test., Matthew 15:31, 22:32, Mark 12:26, Luk.

part these appositions are replaced by the genitives μου, σου, ἡ μων, ὑ μων,

for in Christ God has become the God and Father of his people, and of each

of his children, Hebr. 8:10, Op. 7:12, 19:5, 21:3. The name Jahveh is in the

17, 2:8, 21:6, 22:13. Otherwise it is, in the footsteps of the LXX, which

already read Adonai, translated by κυριος, from κυρος, power. Κυριος

makes God known as the Mighty One, the Lord, the Owner, the Ruler, who

by right possesses power and authority, in distinction from δεσποτης, the

lord, who in fact exercises power, and is in the N. T. used now of God, then

of Christ. Also the combinations of Ihvh Elohim, Ihvh Elohim Zebaoth are

found again in the N. T., as κυριος ὁ θεος, Luke 1:16, Hd. 7:37, 1 Petr. 3:15,

21:22; while in Romans 9:29, Jak. 5:4 Zebaoth has remained untranslated. One

new name seems to be added in the N. Test., it is the name of Πατηρ. Yet

this name is also already used of God in the O. Test. several times, Deut.

Israel is also called his son several times, Exodus 4:22, Deuteronomy 14:1, 32:19, Jes.

1:2, Jeremiah 31:20, Hosea 1:10, 11:1. The name here expresses the special,

theocratic relationship in which God stands to his people Israel; He

has formed that people in a wondrous way out of Abraham. In the more

general sense of Origin and Creator of all things the Father-name is used in

the N. Test. in 1 Corinthians 8:6, Ef. 3:15, Hebr. 12:9, Jak. 1:18, cf. Luke 3:38, Hd.

17:18. But otherwise the name expresses the ethical relationship in which

God now through Christ stands to all his children. The relationship which in

the O. T. existed between God and Israel is type and example of this; it has

now been deepened and expanded, ethicized and individualized. The name

of Father now becomes the ordinary name of God in the N. Test. The

designation Jahveh is insufficiently rendered by κυριος; it is, as it were,

supplemented by the Father-name. This is the highest revelation of God.

God is not merely the Creator, the Almighty, the Faithful One, the King and

Lord; He is also the Father of his people. The theocratic kingdom under

Israel passes over into a kingdom of the Father, who is in the heavens. The

subjects are at the same time children; the citizens members of the

household. Both, right and love, state and household come in the New-

Testament relationship of God to his people to complete fulfillment. Here is

the perfect Kingship, for here is a King who is at the same time Father, who

does not subject his subjects by force but who himself creates and preserves

his subjects. They are as children born from Him, they bear his image, they

are his family. This relationship has in the N. Test. become possible through

Christ, who is the own, only-begotten and beloved Son of the Father. And

the believers become partakers of this sonship and also become conscious

of it through the H. Spirit, John 3:5, 8, Romans 8:15 v. In the name Father, Son

and Spirit God has revealed himself most richly. The fullness which from

the beginning lay enclosed in Elohim has gradually unfolded itself and in

the trinitarian name of God has unfolded itself most gloriously and most

completely. Lit. on the names of God, Hieronymus, de decem nominibus.

Pseudodion., de div. nom. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 13. Petavius, de Deo VIII

c. 8, 9. Gerhard, Loci theol. II c. 1-3. Bretschneider, Syst. Entw. 345 f.

Zanchius, Op. II 26-50. Voetius, Disp. V 48 sq. Buxtorf, de nominibus Dei,

Dissert. philol. theol., diss. 5. Hottinger, de nominibus Dei orient., Diss.

phil. theol. 1660. Moor I 505-552. M. Vitringa I 127-135, and further of the

more recent, besides the already above-mentioned, Hofmann,

Schriftbew. I 76-89. Beck, Chr. Gl. II 14 f. Grau, Gottes Volk und sein

Gesetz 1895.

## A. God as the Being.

. Among some, the locus de trinitate precedes that concerning the

virtues of God. Damascenus, de fide orthod. I 6 sq., Lombardus, Sent.

I dist. 2 sq., Bonaventura, Brevil. I c. 2 sq., Martyr, Loci Comm. p. 36 sq.

etc.; and Frank has even serious objection to the reversed order, Syst. der

chr. Wahrh. I 151 f. If, by treating the virtues of God before the doctrine of

the Trinity, it were intended gradually to ascend from theologia naturalis to

theologia revelata and from the natural to the Christian concept of God, it

would without doubt deserve disapproval. But this is by no means the case.

In the doctrine of the perfections of God the divine nature is treated, as it

has been revealed to us in Scripture, is confessed by the Christian faith, and,

as will presently appear in the locus de trinitate, exists in a threefold

manner. In order, in that locus, to understand that Father, Son, and Spirit

## § 26. The Essential Names of God.

partake of the same divine nature, it is necessary to know what that divine

nature contains in itself and wherein it is distinguished from all created

nature. Scripture also goes before us in this. The being of God is there

taught to us earlier and more clearly than his trinitarian existence; the

Trinity first comes to clear revelation in the N. Test.; the names Ihvh,

Elohim precede those of Father, Son, and Spirit. The first thing that

Scripture makes known to us of God is that He has a proper being and life,

distinct from all creatures, self-subsistent and independent. He has a proper

essence, a proper φυσις, natura, substantia, essentia, not in distinction from

his virtues, but confronting us and becoming knowable in all virtues and

perfections. He bears proper names, which belong to no creature. [116]

Among these the name Ihvh stands at the head, Exodus 3:14. By this name He

is designated as the one who is and will be what He was, who eternally, in

relation to his people, remains like himself. He exists of himself. He existed

before all things, and these exist only through Him, Psalms 90:2, 1 Corinthians 8:6,

Openb. 4:11. He is ‎‏‏ָאדֹון‎ κυριος, δεσποτης in the absolute sense, Lord of the

whole earth, Exodus 23:17, Deuteronomy 10:17, Joshua 3:13. He is from nothing,

everything is dependent on Him, Romans 11:36. He kills and makes alive,

creates the light and the darkness, peace and evil, Deuteronomy 32:39, Jes. 45:5-7,

54:16. He does with the host of heaven and with the inhabitants of the earth

according to his will, Daniel 4:35, so that men are in his hand as clay in the

hand of the potter, Jes. 64:8, Jeremiah 18:1 v., Romans 9:21. His counsel, his good

pleasure is the ultimate ground of all that is and happens, Psalms 33:11, Spr.

does everything for his own sake, for his name’s sake, for his glory’s sake,

needs nothing, is all-sufficient, Job 22:2, 3, Psalms 50:19 v., Hd. 17:25, and has

life in himself, John 5:26. And thus He is the first and the last, the alpha and

the omega, who is and who was and who is to come, Jes. 41:4, 44:6, 48:12,

Openb. 1:8 etc.; absolutely independent, not only in his existence, but as a

consequence thereof also in all his virtues and perfections, in all his decrees

and deeds. Independent He is in his understanding, Romans 11:34, 35, in his

will, Daniel 4:35, Romans 9:19, Ef. 1:5, Op. 4:11, in his counsel, Psalms 33:11, Jes.

46:10, in his love, Hosea 14:5, in his power, Psalms 115:3 etc. And thus allsufficient in himself, and receiving nothing from outside himself, He is, on

the contrary, the only source of all being and life, of all light and love, the

abundant fountain of all goods, Psalms 36:10, Hd. 17:25. This independence of

God is acknowledged more or less by all men. The Heathen indeed draw the

divine down into the creaturely and teach a theogony, but behind and above

their gods they nevertheless often again assume a power to which

everything is subjected in the absolute sense. Many speak of nature, chance,

fate, or fortune as a power that is exalted above everything; and

philosophers preferably designate God by the name of the Absolute.

In Christian theology this virtue of God bore the name of α ὐ υταρκεια,

aseitas, omnisufficientia, independentia, magnitudo. In the East one spoke

of θεος ἀ ναρχος, ἀ ναιτιος, ἀ γεννητος and one preferably called God

α ὐ τοαρετη, α ὐ ταγαθος etc., cf. Suicerus, Thes. Eccl. s. v. God is all that He

is through himself. He is ipsa per se bonitas, sanctitas, sapientia, vita, lux,

veritas etc. As was already said earlier, the church fathers, in imitation of

Philo, in the description of God mostly proceeded from the name Ihvh. That

was his essential name par excellence. God was the Being. In this name: I

will be who I will be, everything is enclosed. All other virtues of God were

derived from it. God is summum esse, summum bonum, summum verum,

summum pulchrum. He is the perfect, the highest best being, quo esse aut

cogitari melius nihil possit. He has the whole being in himself, He is an

infinite and unbounded sea of being. Si bonum, si magnum, si beatum, si

sapientem vel quidquid tale de Deo dixeris, in hoc verbo instauratur quod

est Est. Nempe hoc est ei esse, quod haec omnia esse. Si et centum talia

addas, non recessisti ab esse; si ea dixeris, nihil addixisti; si non dixeris

nihil minuisti, Bernardus, de consid. I c. 6. Scholasticism joined in with

this, Anselmus, Monol. 6. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 8. Thomas, S. Theol. I

qu. 2 art. 3 and qu. 3 and qu. 13 art. 11. S. c. Gent. I c. 16 sq. and also

treated this virtue under the name of the infinitas or spiritualis magnitudo

Dei, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 7. S. c. Gent. I c. 43, or under that of the

aseitas Dei, by which it was indicated that God as summa substantia per se

ipsam aut ex se ipsa est quidquid est, Anselmus, Monol. 6. Later Roman

Catholic theologians likewise mostly proceed from this aseitas or

independentia, Petavius, de Deo I c. 6. Theol. Wirceb. III p. 38 sq. Perrone,

Prael. theol. II p. 88-90. Jansen, Prael. theol. dogm. II 26 sq. The

Reformation brought no change in this. Luther too, on the basis of the name

Ihvh, describes God as the absolutely being; He is pure being. But Luther

nevertheless does not linger long over abstract, metaphysical descriptions

and soon passes from the Deus absconditus to the Deus revelatus in

Christus, Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 302 f. Melanchton in his Loci describes

God as essentia spiritualis. The Lutherans have mostly adopted this

description but then often added to it the further determination infinita, a se

subsistens or independens, Schmid, Dogm. der ev. Luth. K. § 17. Among

the Reformed this perfection of God comes still more strongly to the

foreground, although the name aseitas is later mostly exchanged for that of

independentia. Aseitas expresses only the independence of God in his

existence, but independentia has a broader sense and includes that God is

independent in everything, in his being, in his virtues, in his decrees, in his

works. While earlier writers therefore mostly proceed from the name Ihvh,

Hyperius, Meth. Theol. p. 87, 135. Sohnius, Op. II 48. III 261. Polanus,

Synt. Theol. p. 135 etc., later the independentia mostly occurs as the first of

the incommunicable attributes, Mastricht, Theol. II c. 3, Heidegger, Corpus

Theol. III § 30. Maresius, Syst. theol. loc. 2 § 17. Marck, Merg der Godg.

IV § 20. L. Meyer, Verhand. over de Godd. eigensch. 1783 I bl. 39-110 etc.

If now God in Scripture ascribes this aseitas to himself, then by it He makes

himself known as absolute being, as the being in the absolute sense. By this

perfection He is at once essentially and absolutely distinguished from all

creature. For all the creature is not a se but ab alio, and thus is and has

nothing of itself; it is absolutely dependent in its origin and thus also in its

whole further existence and development. But God, according to this name,

is only of himself, a se, not in the sense as if He had caused himself, but as

being from eternity to eternity who He is, being not becoming, absolute

being, the fullness of being, and thus also eternally and absolutely

independent in his existence, in his virtues, in all his works, the first and the

last, the only cause and final end of all things. In this aseitas of God all

other virtues are enclosed; they are given with it and are its rich, manysided unfolding. And yet, while with this virtue the immeasurable

distinction between Creator and creature at once comes to light clearly and

plainly, there is nevertheless also of this perfection of God a weak likeness

in all the creature. Pantheism cannot acknowledge this, but theism

confesses that the creature, though absolutely dependent, nevertheless has a

proper, distinct being. And in this being perseverance in its existence is

implanted, the conatus in suo esse perseverandi, the Selbsterhaltungstrieb,

the urge to self-preservation. All creature, insofar as it is, fears death;

and even the smallest atom offers resistance to every attempt at destruction.

It is a shadow of the independent, immutable being of our God.

2. From God’s aseity his immutability flows of itself. Yet this seems to

find little support in Scripture. For there God always stands in the most

living intercourse with the world. In the beginning he created heaven and

earth and thus passed from not-creating to creating. And from that

beginning he lives, as it were, the life of the world and especially of his

people Israel along with it; he comes and he goes, he reveals and conceals

himself, he turns his face away and turns it toward in grace. He repents,

his intention, Exodus 32:10-14, Jonah 3:10. He becomes angry, Numbers 11:1, 10,

Psalms 106:40, Zach. 10:3, and lays aside his anger, Deuteronomy 13:17, 2 Chronicles 12:12,

toward the ungodly, Spr. 11:20, 12:22; with the pure he keeps himself pure

but with the perverse he shows himself a wrestler, Psalms 18:26, 27. In the

fullness of time he even becomes man in Christ and comes to dwell through

the H. Spirit in the congregation; he rejects Israel and accepts the Gentiles.

And in the life of the children of God there remains a continual alternation

of feeling of guilt and consciousness of forgiveness, of experiences of

God’s wrath and of his love, of his abandonment and of his nearness. But at

the same time that same Scripture testifies that God under all that is the

same and remains the same. Everything changes but he remains standing,

he remains who he is, Psalms 102:26-28. He is Ihvh, the being and ever

remaining like himself; the first and with the last still the same God, Jes.

41:4, 43:10, 46:4, 48:12. He is who he is, Deuteronomy 32:39, cf. John 8:58, Hebr.

1:17, 6:16, Hebr. 1:11, 12. And immutable in his existence and being, he is

so also in his thought and will, in all his intentions and decisions. He is not

a man that he should lie or repent. What he says, he does, Numbers 15:29, 1

Sam. 15:29. His charismata and calling are ἀ μεταμελητα, Romans 11:29. He

does not cast off his people, Rom. [120] 11:1. He completes what he began,

Psalms 138:8, Philippians 1:6. In one word, he, Ihvh, does not change, Malachi 3:6; with

him ο ὐ κ ἐ νι παραλλαγη ἢ τροπης ἀ ποσκιασμα, Jak. 1:17. Upon this, in

Christian theology, the doctrine of the immutabilitas Dei was built.

Mythological theogony could not raise itself to this height, but philosophy

named and described God many times as the only, eternal, immutable,

unmoved, self-like ruler of all things, Philolaus et al., in Zeller, Phil. d. Gr.

I4 425, 488 f. II 928. Aristotle concluded from the motion of the world to a

primum movens, an α ἰ διος ο ὐ σια ἀ κινητος, which was one and eternal,

necessary, immutable, free of all composition, without any possibility, ὑ λη,

δυναμις, but only ἐ νεργεια, pure ε ἰ δος, mere being, absolute form, το τι ην

ἀ κλινης, παγιος, βεβαιος, ἀ μεταβλητος, ἑ στως, Dähne, Gesch. Darst. der

jüd.-alex. Rel. Philos. I 118. And with this Christian theology agreed. God

is according to Irenaeus, semper idem, sibi aequalis et similis, adv. haer. IV

c. 11, cf. Orig. c. Cels. I 21. IV 14. With Augustine the immutability of God

flowed directly from the fact that he was the highest, perfect being. To

every rational creature it is naturaliter et veraciter insitum, esse omnino

incommutabilem et incorruptibilem Deum, de Gen. ad litt. VII 11. Through

the senses this concept of an eternal and immutable being is not to be

obtained, for every creature, also man himself, is mutable; but within

himself he sees and finds that immutable, which is better and greater than

all that changes, de lib. arb. II 6, de doctr. chr. I 9. If God were not

immutable, he would not be God, Conf. VII 4. His name is being and this

name is a nomen incommutabilitatis. All that changes ceases to be what it

was. But true being belongs only to him who does not change. What truly

is, that remains. Quod est, manet. But what changes fuit aliquid et aliquid

erit; non tamen est, quia mutabile est, de trin. V 2. God, however, who is,

cannot change, since every change would be a diminution of being. And as

immutable as God is in his being, so is he also in his knowing, willing, and

deciding. Dei essentia, qua est, nihil mutabile habet, nec in aeternitate, nec

in veritate, nec in voluntate, de trin. IV prooem. As he is, so he knows and

wills, in an immutable manner. Essentia tua scit et vult

incommutabiliter et scientia tua est et vult incommutabiliter et tua voluntas

est et scit incommutabiliter, Conf. XIII, 16. Creation, revelation,

incarnation, affections, etc. brought about no change in God. In God there

has never come a novum consilium, de ord. II 17. There has always been in

God a single, immutable will. Una eademque sempiterna et immutabili

voluntate res quas condidit, et ut prius non essent egit, quamdiu non

fuerunt, et ut posterius essent, quando esse coeperunt, de civ. XII, 17. Only

there is change in the creature from non-being to being, from good to evil,

etc. The same thought we then later find again time and again, with Joh.

Damascenus, de fide orthod. I c. 8. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu 9. Lombardus,

Sent. I dist. 8, 3. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 8 art. 2 qu 1-2. Petavius, de Deo

III c. 1-2. and thus also with Luth. and Reformed theologians, Gerhard,

Loc. II cap. 8 sect. 5. Zanchius, Op. II col. 77-83. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c.

13, cf. Conf. Gall. art. 1. Conf. Belg. 1 enz.

But this immutability of God found much opposition, both from the

deistic and from the pantheistic side. With Epicurus the gods are wholly like

excellent men, who change of place, activity, thought, etc., Zeller IV 430 f.,

and with the Stoa the Deity, just as formerly with Heraclitus, was taken up

as the immanent cause of the world in its unceasing change, ib. IV 133 f. Of

the same nature was the opposition to the immutability of God in Christian

theology. On the one side stands Pelagianism, Socinianism,

Remonstrantism, rationalism, which especially opposes the immutability of

God’s knowing and willing, and makes the will of God dependent on and

thus lets it change according to the conduct of man. In particular Vorstius in

his work de Deo et ejus attributis opposed the immutability of God. He

distinguished between the essentia of God, which is simple and immutable,

and the voluntas Dei, which as libera also does not will everything eternally

and not always the same, Dorner, Gesammelte Schriften 278. But much

more serious still is the opposition to the immutability of God, from the

pantheistic side. Common to this opposition is that the idea of becoming is

transferred to God and thus the boundary between Creator and creature is

wholly erased. The idea of God as substantia, as it occurs with Spinoza,

proved to be an abstract concept without content. In order to bring life

into that concept, philosophy often replaced being with becoming. Naturally

there is in that still a great difference, according as one conceives this

process, through which God himself becomes, unitarily or trinitarily and

lets it be accomplished immanently in the being of God or transeunt in the

world. To this belongs in the first place Gnosticism, but then further the

theosophy of the kabbala, of Böhme, Baader, Schelling, Rothe, Hamberger,

etc., working on in the doctrine of the kenosis, and finally the pantheistic

philosophy of Fichte, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer, Hartmann etc.

However differently worked out, the fundamental thought is one. God is not

but becomes. An sich, in the first moment, He is βυθος ἀ γνωστος, an

abstract purely potential being, nature without more, contentless thinking, a

dark urge, a blind alogical will, in one word, a being that is nothing but can

become everything. But out of that potential being God brings himself in

the form of a process gradually to actuality. He is his own Creator. He

produces himself. He gradually comes, whether then in himself or in the

world, to personality, to self-consciousness, to spirit. God is causa sui.

Under the influence of this philosophical idea of absolute becoming, the

immutability of God has also in more recent theology been repeatedly

denied or limited, and God has with preference been called causa sui, selfactualising power, Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 16-38. Martensen, Chr. Dogm.

1856 S. 86. 116, cf. Chr. Ethik. I 90 f. Luthardt says, Gott ist seine eigene

That, Apol. Vortr. über die Grundwahrh. des Chr. 1870 I 45, cf. Müller, Die

chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde II5 171 f. Others speak of a Selbstsetzung Gottes,

Dorner, Chr. Gl. I 244. 245. Frank, Syst. der chr. Wahrh. I2 116 f. In his

treatise Ueber die richtige Fassung des dogm. Begriffs der

Unveränderlichkeit Gottes, Ges. Schriften 1883 S. 188-377, Dorner

attempts to avoid deism and pantheism (acosmism) both and to unite the

immutability and the Lebendigkeit of God with one another. He thinks to

attain this goal by placing the immutability of God in the ethical, S. 340 f.

Ethically God is immutable and always like himself, He remains holy love,

S. 352. But otherwise Dorner thinks that through the creation, the

incarnation and satisfaction etc. indeed change has come in God, S. 309.

311 f. 358 f. 364, that He stands in Wechselverhältniss to man, S. 319.

362, that He knows reality only from the world, S. 320, that there is also for

Him a past, present and future, S. 322, that He is wrathful, justifies, and has

a disposition corresponding to man, S. 324 etc. And thus essentially also

Weisse, Philos. Dogm. I 573. F. A. B. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 365 e. a. Many

also in the doctrine of God do not express themselves about this important

attribute, but let it first be noticed at the creation or at the incarnation or at

the kenosis etc., that they assume change in God, as e.g. Ebrard, Hofmann,

Thomasius e. a.

Nevertheless, the doctrine of the immutability of God is of the highest

importance for religion. The distinction between Creator and creature lies in

the antithesis of being and becoming. All that is creature is becoming. It is

changeable, strives continually, seeks rest and satisfaction and finds that

rest only in Him, who is pure being without becoming. Therefore God is so

He does not change in his essence, nor in his knowing or willing, He

remains who He is eternally. Every change is foreign to God. There is in

Him no change of time, for He is eternal; nor of place for He is

omnipresent; nor also of essence for He is pure being. Christian theology

also expressed this latter many times by the term purus actus. Aristotle had

thus conceived the essence of God, as πρωτον ε ἰ δος without any δυναμις, as

absolute ἐ νεργεια. Scholasticism therefore came to speak of God as actus

purissimus et simplicissimus, in order to indicate that He is the perfect,

absolute being without any potentia to non-being or to other-being. Thus

Boethius says, de cons. philos. lib. III, that God does not change in essence

(forma), quia purus actus est, cf. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 3. Therefore the

expression causa sui was also avoided of God. The idea of absolute

becoming was first clearly expressed by Heraclitus and thereafter

repeatedly returned in philosophy. Plotinus in particular makes use of this

concept, not only in application to matter, but also to that which he holds

for absolute being. He teaches concerning God, that He has produced his

own being, that He was active before He was, Thilo, Kurze pragm.

Gesch. d. Philos. I 352 f. Now Christian theology did indeed speak of God

that He was an ens a se, and thus of his aseitas. And Lactantius, Synesius

and Hieronymus also employed the expression causa sui; the latter wrote:

Deus qui semper est nec habet aliunde principium et ipse sui origo est

suaeque causa substantiae, non potest intelligi aliunde habere quod subsistit,

Comm. ad Eph. cap. 3:15. But this expression was nevertheless always

understood thus, that God indeed existed of himself but not that He had

become and been produced of himself, Klee, Kath. Dogm. II 43. When later

Cartesius accorded precedence to the will of God above the understanding

and made the essentia of all things depend on that will, indeed even made

God’s existence a product of his will, so that he said, Deus se revera

conservat, God is causa sui and a se, not in a negative but in a positive

sense, God is causa efficiens sui ipsius, He has being a reali potentiae

immensitate, Resp. ad primas objectiones p. 57, 58; then indeed some

followers adopted this expression, such as e.g. Burmannus, Synopsis theol.

I c. 15 § 2, but the Reformed theologians wanted the expression causa sui,

existentia a se to be understood in no other than a purely negative sense,

Ryssenius, De oude rechtsinnige waerheyt enz. Middelb. z.j. bl. 24.

Mastricht Theol. theor. pract. II c. 3 § 22. Moor, I 590 sq. A causa sui in a

positive sense is not possible, because then one and the same thing would at

the same moment be said to exist, insofar as it produces itself, and not to

exist, insofar as it is produced. Now it is understandable that monistic

philosophy has taken refuge in this idea of absolute becoming, in order to

give at least an appearance of explanation of reality. But Herbart has rightly

subjected this idea to a sharp critique, and his adherents Thilo, Die

Wissenschaftlichkeit der mod. Theol. S. 25 and Flügel, Die spekul. Theol.

in der Gegenwart 1888 S. 201. f., Die Probleme der Philos. und ihre

Lösungen 1888 S. 10 f. have not without reason expressed their

astonishment over the fact that this idea has made such progress in

speculative theology. For there is, in theology, with application to the

Divine essence, nothing to be done with it. Not only does Scripture testify

that there is in God no change nor shadow of turning, but thinking

leads to the same conclusion. With becoming one must ask after a cause, for

there is no becoming without cause. But being, in an absolute sense, no

longer permits the question after a cause. Absolute being is, because it is.

The idea of God brings immutability of itself along. No increase or decrease

is conceivable in Him. He cannot change for the better or for the worse. For

He is the absolute, perfect, true being. Becoming is proper to the creature

and is a form of change in space and time. But God is who He is, eternally,

above space and time, far exalted above all the creature. He rests in himself

and is therefore the goal and the point of rest of all creatures, the rock of

salvation, whose work is perfect. Whoever ascribes change to God, of

essence, knowledge or will, does injury to all his virtues, the independence,

the simplicity, the eternity, the omniscience, the omnipotence. He robs God

of his Divine nature and religion of its firm ground and sure comfort. Yet

this immutability is no monotonous unity, no rigid immovable being.

Scripture itself goes before us, to describe God to us in the most manifold

relations to all his creatures. Immutable in himself, He nevertheless as it

were lives along the life of his creatures and takes part in their alternations.

Scripture speaks of God in a human way and cannot do otherwise. But

however humanly it may speak, it at the same time forbids us to posit any

change in God himself. There is change around Him and outside Him, there

is change in the relation to Him, but there is no change in God himself. And

herein consists precisely the incomprehensible greatness of God and at the

same time the glory of the Christian confession, that God, immutable in

himself, can nevertheless call changeable creatures into being; that He,

eternal in himself, can nevertheless enter into time; that He, immeasurable

in himself, can nevertheless penetrate every point of space with his essence;

that He who is absolute being, can nevertheless also grant to the becoming

creature a place of its own. In the eternity of God no moment of time, in his

immeasurability no point of space, in his being no element of becoming is

to be discovered. But conversely it is God who posits the creature, it is

eternity that posits time, it is immeasurability that posits space, it is being

that posits becoming, it is immutability that posits change [126]. A

transition between the two does not exist; there is a deep chasm between the

being of God and the being of all creature. It is Divine greatness, that He

can descend to the creature; that He, transcendent, can nevertheless dwell

immanently in all that is created; that He, preserving himself, can give

himself and, absolutely maintaining his immutability, can nevertheless enter

into an infinite number of relations to his creatures. With various examples

one attempted to elucidate this. The sun remains the same, whether it

scorches or warms, causes pain or refreshes (Augustine). A coin does not

change, although it is now called a prize and then a pledge (id.). A pillar

remains standing, whether someone now sees it at his right hand, then at his

left hand (Thomas). An artist does not change, when he gives form to his

conception in word or tone, in voice or color, and a scholar does not, when

he sets down his thoughts in a book. All these comparisons limp, but they

nevertheless give some idea how something, remaining the same in essence,

can change in relation. With God this now holds so much the more, because

He, the immutable, is himself the sole cause of all that changes. He does not

place himself in relation to any creature, as if this would in any way exist

without Him, but He himself places all things in those relations to himself,

which He eternally and immutably wills and precisely thus, in that manner

and in that moment of time, in which they actually take place. Every prius

and posterius does not fall in God, but in rebus prius non existentibus et

posterius existentibus, Aug. de civ. XII 17. It is immutable being itself, that

places changing becoming with an entirely own order and law outside itself

and brings it, as it were for itself, onto the stage.

3. The immutability of God is called eternity with respect to time and

omnipresence with respect to space. Both were indeed sometimes brought

together under the name infinitas Dei. The concept of infinity, however, is

in itself unclear. In the first place it can be taken negatively in the sense of

endless. Something is then called infinite because it in fact has no end but

nevertheless can have one. Often in philosophy God has been called infinite

in this sense. Neoplatonism conceived God in this sense as without

boundary and form, without any determinateness, ο ὐ πεπερασμενος, [127]

ὁ ρος ο ἰ κ ἐ χων, ἀ πειρος etc., an overflowing fullness, from which the world

has emanated, Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. V 485 f. 497. In the same sense the

kabbalah spoke of God as ‎‏‏ֵאין טֹוף‎, the infinite, without boundary and form,

but who in the ten sefiroth created a transition from the infinite to the finite,

Frank, La Kabbale 179. Later the philosophy of Spinoza gave currency to

this concept of the infinity of God. The substance, God, in Spinoza is not a

being proper, distinct from the world; it is that which in creatures

constitutes reality, and therefore of itself infinite, ens absolute infinitum,

Eth. I prop. 8. All determination is therefore negation, a deprivation, a lack

of existence, Epist. 50 and 41, God, however, is free from all limitation and

delimitation, He is substantia non determinata. Extension is one of his

attributes. With Hegel the concept of infinity again received another

meaning, because he conceived the substance of Spinoza not as an eternal

immutable being but as an absolute becoming. God was therefore called

infinite, because He could become everything, approximately in the same

way as the ἀ πειρον of Anaximander, which itself is indeterminate but can

bring forth all kinds of things. The error of this conception consists in this,

that the most universal, which the understanding obtains by abstraction

from finite being, is identified with the infinite. For it was precisely the

striving of the philosophy of identity, to let the particular proceed from the

universal, the determinate from the indeterminate, the finite from the

endless by a process. God is an sich infinitus potentiâ, He becomes finitus,

personal, conscious, determinate in the creatures as his revelation. But this

conception is untenable. Infinite is not a negative but a positive concept; it

does not indicate that God has no being proper, distinct from the creatures,

but that He is limited by nothing finite and creaturely. Now of course in

different ways such a creaturely limitation can be denied of God. If one

means that God non tempore finiri potest, then infinitas coincides with

aeternitas. If one wishes to make known that God non loco finiri potest,

then infinitas is the same as omnipraesentia. And thus the infinitas Dei is

also often defined, Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 10. 11. Zanchius, Op. II 90.

But infinitas can also be understood in this sense, that God is infinite in his

virtues, that every virtue is present in Him in an absolute way; then

infinitas is as much as perfectio, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 7. But even then

the infinity of God must be well understood. The infinity of God is no

infinitas magnitudinis, as one sometimes speaks of the infinite or endless

size of the world, for God is not a body and has no extension. It is also no

infinitas multitudinis, as mathematics speaks of infinitely small and

infinitely great, for God is one and simple. But it is an infinitas essentiae.

God is infinite according to his essence, absolutely perfect, infinite in an

intensive, qualitative, positive sense. But thus the infinity of God entirely

coincides with perfection, and it does not need to be discussed separately.

Infinity in the sense of not being determined by time is the eternity of

God. In Scripture there is nowhere any mention of a beginning or an end of

God’s existence. Although He is often very vividly represented as entering

into time, He is nevertheless exalted above it. He is the First and the Last,

and remaining despite all change, Psalms 102:27, 28. He is God from eternity to

eternity, Psalms 90:2, 93:2. There is no searching out of the number of his

years, Job 36:26. A thousand years are for Him as little as for us the day of

yesterday, Psalms 90:4, 2 Petr. 3:8. He is the eternal God, Jes. 40:28, Romans 16:26, dwelling in eternity, Jes. 57:15, living for ever, Deuteronomy 32:40, Op.

10:6, 15:7, who swears by his life, Numbers 14:21, 28, the θεος ζων και μενων,

1 Petr. 1:23, incorruptible, Romans 1:23, immortal, 1 Timothy 6:16, who is and

was and shall be, Exodus 3:14, Op. 1:4, 8. Most certainly Scripture here too

speaks of God in a human way, and of eternity in the forms of time, but it

nevertheless at the same time clearly indicates that God is exalted above

time and is not to be measured or determined by this standard. The deism of

earlier and later times, however, understands by eternity a time endlessly

extended forward and backward; the difference between time and eternity

lies only in quantity, not in quality; it is gradual, not essential. The

distinction does not lie in this, that in eternity there is no succession of

moments, but that it is without beginning and end. Past, present, and future

are there not only for man, but are there also for and in God. Thus the

Socinians taught, Socinus, Prael. theol. c. 8. Crell, De Deo et ejus attributis

c. 18. Catech. Racov. qu. 60, cf. Fock, Der Socinianismus S. 427 f.;

likewise Reinhard, Dogm. S. 106. Wegscheider, Instit. theol. § 63. Dorner,

Glaub. I 132. Ges. Schriften 322 etc. From the other side, eternity and time

are likewise mingled by pantheism. God and world here relate as natura

naturans and natura naturata, Spinoza, Eth. I prop. 29. Eternity is not

essentially distinguished from time, but is the substance, the immanent

cause of time, and this is the mode, the accidens of eternity, just as the surge

of waves is the form of appearance of the ocean; God himself is dragged

down into the stream of time and only in time comes to his full reality,

Spinoza, Cog. Metaph. I c. 4. II c. 1. Hegel, Encycl. der philos. Wiss. § 257

f. Hartmann, Philos. des Unbew. I9 S. 281 f. 298 f. Biedermann, Dogm. II

518 f. Strauss expressed it clearly in his Glaub. I 562: Ewigkeit und Zeit

verhalten sich wie die Substanz und ihre Accidentien. And Schleiermacher

cautiously defined the eternity of God as seine mit allem Zeitlichen auch

die Zeit selbst bedingende schlechthin zeitlose Ursächlichkeit Gottes. Now

Christian theology, with respect to this perfection of God as well, has to

avoid both deism and pantheism. Naturally the distinction between eternity

and time also lies in the fact that the latter has a beginning and end or at

least can have them and the former does not. But the whole difference is

nevertheless not exhausted in that. There are three notae of the concept of

eternity, namely that it excludes principium, finem and also successionem.

God is ἀ γεννητος, ἀ φθαρτος but also immutabilis, Petavius, de Deo III c. 3

§ 6. There is between eternity and time a distinction not only in quantity

and degree, but also in quality and essence. For indeed, already Aristotle

observed that time was indeed not one but nevertheless stood in the closest

connection with motion, with becoming, i.e. with the transition from

potentia to actus, although he thought that a motion in the world without

beginning was conceivable. Augustine expressed this in another way thus,

that there is time only where the present becomes past, and the future

becomes present. Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si

quaerenti explicare velim, nescio; fidenter tamen dico, scire me. Quod si

nihil praeteriret, non esset praeteritum tempus, et si nihil adveniret,

non esset futurum tempus, et si nihil esset, non esset praesens tempus, Conf.

XI 14. Time is not a substance alongside others, no real quid, but a mode of

existence of things. If there were no creatures, there would be no time. Time

began a creatura, much more than creatura coepit a tempore, Aug., de Gen.

ad litt. V 5, de civ. XI, 6. On the other hand, time is also not merely a

subjective form of perception, as Kant thought, Kr. d. r. V. 81 f. Indeed,

truth also lies here, and Augustine reasoned that there is indeed, in order to

measure and calculate time, need of a thinking spirit, which holds fast the

past by memory, stands in the present, and expects the future, and which

insofar measures the times in itself, Conf. XI, 23-28. Thereby, however,

Augustine did not deny that there would be no measurable and divisible

motion of things if there were no thinking spirit that counted and measured

it. But a distinction must be made between external and internal time,

tempus extrinsecum and intrinsecum. By external time we understand the

standard by which we measure motion. This is in a certain sense accidental

and arbitrary. We derive it from the motion of the heavenly bodies, which is

constant and known to all men, Genesis 1:14 v. This time will once cease, Op.

10:6, 21:23 v. But something else is the case with internal time. This is that

mode of existence of things by which they have a past, present, and future

and thus parts, which, by whatever standard, can be measured or counted.

Now what can be measured or counted is subject to measure and number

and thereby bounded; for there is always still a measure and number greater

than what is measured or counted. The essence of time therefore does not

lie in this, that it is a parte ante and a parte post finite or endless, but in this

that it contains succession of moments, that there is an earlier, a now, and a

later in it. But from that it follows that time, tempus intrinsecum, is the

mode of existence of all that is created, and is essentially proper to all finite

being. Whoever says time, says motion, change, measurability, countability,

boundedness, finitude, creature. Time is the duration of creaturely being;

tempus est mensura motus in re mobili. But therefore no time can fall in

God. He is who He is from eternity to eternity. There is in Him no change

nor shadow of turning. He is not a becoming but an eternal being. He

has no beginning and no end, but also no earlier and later. He cannot be

measured nor counted in his duration. A thousand years are for Him as one

day. He is the eternal ἐ γω ε ἰ μι, John 8:58. The eternity of God is therefore

rather to be thought of as an eternal present, without past or future. Omne

praesens est apud Deum. Hodiernus tuus (dies est) aeternitas. Aeternitas

ipsa Dei substantia est, quae nihil habet mutabile, Aug. Conf. XI 10-13. de

vera relig. c. 49. Boethius defined the eternity of God by this, that He

interminabilis vitae plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit ac possidet, de

cons. philos. V, and Thomas as interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta

possessio, S. Theol. I qu. 10 art. 1. And thus all theologians speak, Tertull.

adv. Marc. I 8. Greg. Nyss. adv. Eunomium I. Greg. Naz. orat. 38, 11.

Dionysius, de div. nom. c. 5 § 4. Anselmus, Monol. c. 18-24. Prosl. c. 18.

Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 8, 2. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 10. Petavius, de Deo

III c. 3-6. Gerhard, Loci II c. 8. Zanchius, Op. II 73-77. Alting, Theol.

problem. loc. 3 probl. 20 etc. Yet the eternity of God may therefore not be

thought of as an eternally standing still, immovable moment of time. But it

is one with God’s essence, and thus a fullness of being. God is not only

eternal, but He himself is sua aeternitas, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu 10 art. 2. It

has its analogy not in the contentless being of man, for whom through

idleness or boredom, through pain or anxiety the minutes stretch into hours

and the days do not go but creep, but rather in the rich, full life of that man,

for whom through labor and enjoyment time as it were does not exist, and

the hours and days fly by. Therefore there is truth in the assertion that in

hell there is no eternity, but only time, Thomas, S. Theol. I. qu. 10 art. 3 ad

3, and that a creature the more loses the imperfect in time and approaches

eternity, as it is akin to God and is his image, ib art. 4 and 5. Therefore the

eternity of God also does not stand abstract and transcendent above time,

but is present and immanent in every moment of time. There is an essential

distinction between eternity and time, but there is nevertheless also analogy

and kinship, so that the former can dwell and work in the latter. Time was

created with the things, it has no origin in itself; an eternal time, a time

without beginning, is inconceivable. God, the eternal, is the only absolute

cause of time. But that time also has no subsistence in itself, it is a

continual becoming and must rest in an unchangeable being. It is God who

with his eternal power bears time in its entirety and in every moment. God

permeates time and every moment of time with his eternity. In every second

the pulsebeat of eternity beats. God therefore stands in relation to time. He

enters with his eternity into time. Time is also objective for Him. He knows

in his eternal consciousness the whole of time and the succession of all its

moments. He himself thereby does not become temporal, not subjected to

time, measure, number; He remains eternal and dwells in eternity. But He

uses time, in order therein to bring his eternal thoughts and virtues to

revelation; He makes time subservient to eternity and thus proves himself to

be the βασιλευς των α ἰ ωνων, Rex seculorum, 1 Timothy 1:17.

4. Infinity, as not being limited by space, is the omnipresence of God.

This too is described in Holy Scripture in a very vivid manner. God is the

Creator, and all that exists is and remains his in an absolute sense. He is the

Lord, the Possessor of heaven and earth, Genesis 14:19, 22, Deuteronomy 10:14, and is

exalted above all creature, also above place and space. Heaven and earth do

not contain Him, much less an earthly temple, 1 Kon. 8:27, 2 Chron. 2:6,

Jes. 66:1, Hd. 7:48. Yet He is also not shut out by space. He fills heaven and

earth; no one can hide himself from his face; He is a God from afar and

κιυουμεθα και ἐ σμεν, Hd. 17:28. Indeed, He is present in different places of

creation in different degree and manner. The whole of Scripture proceeds

from the thought that heaven, which nevertheless is also created, since its

existence is in a special sense God’s dwelling and throne, Deuteronomy 26:15, 2

John 14:2, Ef. 1:20, Hebr. 1:3, Op. 4:1 v. etc. But from there He descends,

Genesis 11:5, 7, 18:21, Esther 3:8, walks in the garden, Genesis 3:8, appears

repeatedly and in definite places, Gen. 12, 15, 18, 19, etc., comes down

especially to his people on Mount Sinai, Exodus 19:9, 11, 18, 20, Deuteronomy 33:2,

Richt. 5:4. While He lets the Gentiles walk in their ways, Hd. 14:16,

He dwells in a special manner among his people Israel, Exodus 19:6, 25:8,

etc., Matthew 5:34, Op. 21:10, in the tabernacle and in the temple on Zion, which

Jes. 8:18, Matthew 23:21, above the ark between cherubim, 1 Samuel 4:4, 2 Sam.

prophets repeatedly warn against a fleshly trust in this dwelling of God in

the midst of Israel, Jes. 48:1, 2, Jeremiah 3:16, 7:4, 14, 27:16. For the Lord is far

from the ungodly, Psalms 11:5, 37:10 v., 50:16 v., 145:20, but his face beholds

the upright, Psalms 11:7. He dwells with him who is of a broken and humble

spirit, Jes. 57:15, Psalms 51:19. When Israel forsakes Him, then He returns to

them in Christ, in whom the fullness of the Godhead dwells bodily, Colossians 2:9. Through Him and through the Spirit whom He sends, He dwells in the

Ef. 2:21, 3:17, until He shall one day dwell with his people and shall be all

in all, 1 Corinthians 15:28, Op. 21:3. In polytheism, gnosticism and manichaeism

this omnipresence of God could not be acknowledged. But also in the

Christian church there were many who indeed wanted to know of an

omnipraesentia of God’s power but not of his essence. The

anthropomorphites could not think of God without a definite form and

place. In order to preserve God from mixture with material substance and

the impurity of the world, some church fathers, over against the Stoa, went

so far as to assert that God πορρω κατ’ ο ἰ σιαν, ἐ γγυτατω δε δυναμει was,

Clemens Alex. Strom. II c. 2, that He dwelt in heaven, like the human spirit

in the head, Lactantius, de opif. Dei c. 16. Inst. div. VIII 3. But by this they

nevertheless did not deny the essential presence of God in every place. Only

later was this decisively denied and contested by Augustinus Steuchus,

bishop of Eugubium † 1550 in his commentary on Ps. 138 and further by

Crell, de Deo ejusque attributis c. 27, who assumed indeed an

omnipraesentia operativa but not essentialis and restricted this latter to

heaven. Remonstrantism expressed itself cautiously, called the question of

less importance and preferably refrained from decision just as with the

eternity of God, Episcopius, Inst. theol. IV, 2, 13. Limborch, Theol. Christ.

II, 6. Coccejus too was accused that under the omnipresence of God he

understood only the efficacissima Dei voluntas omnia sustentans ac

gubernans, but defended himself against that in a couple of letters to Anslar

and Alting, Opera VIII p. 137 sq. epist. 169, 170, 176. The Cartesians said

that God was omnipresent not by extension of his essence but by a simple

act of his thinking or by a powerful act of his will, which were one with his

essence, and denied that an ubi could be ascribed to God, Burmannus,

Synopsis I, 26, 6. Wittichius, Theol. pacifica c. 14. Rationalism went still

further, which restricted God’s essential presence to heaven and deistically

separated Him from the world, Reinhard, Vorles. S. 106, 120. Wegscheider,

Instit. § 63. Deism came to this restriction of the omnipresence of God out

of fear of the pantheistic mixing of God and world and of the defilement of

the Divine essence with the moral and material impurity of created things.

Indeed that fear is also not imaginary. The Stoa already taught that the

Godhead as fire, aether, air, breath penetrates all things, also the bad and the

ugly, Zeller IV 138. Spinoza spoke of the substantia as corporea, Eth. I

prop. 15, called God a res extensa, ib. II prop. 2 and taught a presence of

God that coincides with the being of the world, Cog. metaph. II c. 3. With

Hegel, Werke XI 268 God’s omnipresence is identical with his absolute

substantiality. On this line also lies the definition of the omnipresence of

God by Schleiermacher as die mit allem Räumlichen auch den Raum

bedingende schlechthin raumlose Ursächlichkeit Gottes, Gl. § 53. Likewise

Biedermann says, Chr. Dogm. § 702, that the pure In-sich-sein Gottes is

pure antithesis of all space and place and insofar transcendent, but that God

as ground of the world is immanent to it and that this Grundsein is his being

itself, cf. also Scholten, Initia p. 124.

Christian theology has here too once again avoided deism and

pantheism. For Scripture taught clearly that God is exalted above space and

place and therefore cannot be determined or enclosed, 1 Kon. 8:27, 2

Chron. 2:6, Jeremiah 23:24. Even where Scripture speaks in human fashion and,

in order to give us a conception of the being of God, as it were enlarges

space infinitely, Jes. 66:1, Psalms 139:7, Amos 9:2, Hd. 17:24, the thought

nevertheless lies at the foundation of this, that God stands outside all

bounds of space. There is then also, just as between eternity and time, so

between the immensitas Dei and space an essential distinction. Space or

place was defined by Aristotle as the immovable boundary of something

surrounding or enclosing, το του περιεχονυος περας ἀ κινητον, Phys. IV c.

5. This definition, however, proceeds from an overly external concept of

space. For very certainly space is the distance of a particular object to other

fixed points. But even if we were to think only one single simple object,

space and place would nevertheless belong to it on account of the relation to

imaginary points, which we could assume in thought. Space and place is

therefore a property of all finite being and is, with the finite as such, given

of itself. A finite being exists of itself in space. Its limitedness brings with it

the concept of a ubi. It is always somewhere and not at the same time in

another place. Abstracted from all measurable distance to other points

(locus extrinsecus), a locus intrinsecus is proper to all creatures. Spiritual

beings too are not excepted from this. In another dispensation the distances

can be wholly different than we know them here on earth, just as now steam

and electricity have already brought about a great change in this for our

perception. But limited, local being remains proper to all creatures. Space is

therefore not a form of perception, as Kant asserted, but a mode of

existence of all that is created. And still much less correct is it, that space

would be a form of external, time a form of internal perception, and thus the

representation of space would apply only to the bodily and that of time only

to the spiritual world. Both, time and space, are inner modes of existence of

all finite being. But from that it follows, that just as time, so also space

cannot apply to God, the Infinite. He is transcendent, exalted above all

space. Already Philo and Plotinus spoke in this sense, Zeller, V 354,

483, and Christian theology likewise said that God παντα χωρων, μονος δε

ἀ χωρητος was, Hermas, Pastor mand. 1. Iren., adv. haer. II 1. IV 19.

Clemens Alex. Strom. VII c. 7. Orig., c. Cels. VII 34. Athanasius, de decr.

Nic. Syn. c. 11. Greg. Naz. Orat. 34. Damascenus, de fide orthod. I 9.

Augustine formerly thought in his Manichaean period that God, like a fine

ether, was spread through the whole world and through endless space, Conf.

VII 1. But later he saw it differently. God is exalted above all space and

place. He is not somewhere and yet He fills heaven and earth; He is not

spread through space like the light and the air, but He is at all places with

His whole being, ubique totus and nusquam locorum, Conf. VI 3. de civ.

VII 30. He is enclosed by no space or place; and therefore it would be better

to say that all things are in Him than that He is in the things. But yet this too

is again not to be understood as if He were the space in which the things

were located, for He is no locus. Just as the soul tota in toto corpore et in

qualibet parte is, just as the one and the same truth is known everywhere, so

by way of comparison God is in all things and all things in God, Enarr. in

Ps. 74. And these thoughts of Augustine later return with all theologians,

Anselmus, Monol. c. 20-23. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 36 en 37. Thomas, S.

Theol. I qu. 8. S. c. Gent. III, 68. Sent. I dist. 37. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist.

37. And Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians have added nothing

essentially new to it. Petavius, de Deo III c. 7-10. Gerhard, Loci I c. 8 sect.

8. Polanus, Synt. II c. 12. Zanchius, Op. II col. 90-138 enz. Indeed, of God

too no space and place can be predicated. Space is a form of existence of

finite being; the immensitas is a property of God alone and proper to no

single creature, not even to the human nature of Christ. It contains, first of

all, that God is outside all space and place, and infinitely exalted above it.

Deus sibi ipsi locus, α ὐ τος ἑ αυτου τοπος, Tert. adv. Prax. c. 5. Theophilus,

ad Autol. II, 10. Damasc. de fide orthod. I 13. He is in Himself, in se ipso

ubique totus. In this sense God can just as well be said to be nowhere as

somewhere (Philo, Plotinus). For a ubi, a locus does not apply to Him. The

omnipresence of God expresses not only and even not in the first

place this being of God in Himself, but indicates especially a certain

relation of God to space, which has been created with the world. Here too

we can speak of God only on the ground of creation. Scripture even speaks

of a going, coming, walking, descending of God. It speaks in human

fashion and we too do not get beyond that. Difficile invenitur ubi sit,

difficilius ubi non sit, August. de quant. an. c. 34. Therefore it is not useless,

cf. e.g. Lipsius Dogm. § 306. Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsd. II 121-128, to

remind ourselves with every attribute that we thus speak humanly of God.

Precisely the awareness that God is measured by no time or space, even if

this is purely negative, preserves us from robbing God of His exaltation

above all creature. In the negation there nevertheless lies again a strong

position. The relation of God to space cannot consist in this, that He is in

space and is enclosed by it, as Uranos and Kronos were powers above Zeus.

For God is no creature. Si in aliquo loco esset, non esset Deus, August.

Enarr. in Ps. 74. Not only is He no body, which extends itself through space

and is circumscriptive in space, but He is also no finite, created spirit,

which is always bound to a ubi and thus is definitive in space. Nor can the

relation be of such a nature that space is within Him and is enclosed by Him

as the greater, infinite space, as some formerly did call God τοπος των

ὁ λων, and Weisse, Philos. Dogm. I § 492 f. speaks of infinite space as

immanent to God. For space is by nature a form of existence of the finite

creature and does not apply to God, the Infinite. But God is in space in such

a way that He, as the Infinite existing in Himself, nevertheless repletively

fills and upholds every point of space by His immensitas. Indeed pantheism

is to be avoided here, which makes God’s being into the substance of things

and thereby also makes the divine being spatial. But equally deism is to be

resisted, which lets God be omnipresent per potentiam but not per

essentiam et naturam. There is essential distinction, but no separation

between God and the creature. For every part of being and every point of

space, in order to exist, needs nothing less than His immensitas. The deistic

representation as if God dwells in a particular place and from there now

governs all things by His omnipotence, is in conflict with the being of

God. It actually denies all His virtues, His simplicity, His immutability, His

independence; it makes God into a man and creation independent. Not like

a king in his realm or a captain on his ship is God present in His creation.

His activity is no actio in distans. But He is, as Gregory the Great expressed

it, present in all things, per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam; enter,

praesenter Deus hic et ubique potenter, His omnipresence is ἀ διαστασια,

adessentia. He is in hell just as well as in heaven; in the godless as well as

in the pious; in the places of uncleanness and of darkness just as well as in

the halls of light. For He is not defiled by that uncleanness, because His

essentia, although omnipresent, is nevertheless another than that of the

creatures. Therefore Anselm said that it was actually better to say that God

was cum tempore et loco than in tempore et loco, Monol. c. 22. Yet this

does not take away that God in another sense is again present in the

creatures in different ways. There is a distinction between His physical and

His ethical immanence. People too can in a natural sense be right next to

one another and yet in sympathy and direction of spirit differ from one

another by a world’s breadth, Matthew 24:40, 41. The soul is present in the

whole body and in all parts, but in each of them in its own way, in the head

differently than in the heart, and in the hand differently than in the foot.

Haec autem facit atque agit unus verus Deus; sed sicut idem Deus, ubique

totus, nullis inclusus locis, nullis vinculis alligatus, in nullas partes sectilis,

ex nulla parte mutabilis, implens coelum et terram praesente potentia, non

indigente natura. Sic itaque administrat omnia quae creavit, ut etiam ipsa

proprios exercere et agere motus sinat. Quamvis enim nihil esse possit sine

ipso, non tamen sunt ulla quod ipse, Aug. de civ. VII, 30. God’s immanence

is no unconscious emanation, but a conscious praesentie of His being in all

creatures. And therefore that presence of God differs according to the nature

of those creatures. Certainly every being, even the smallest and least, arises

and exists only by divine power. There is nothing less than the being of God

needed, to grant the smallest creature arising and subsistence. God dwells in

all creatures but not in all aequaliter, August. Epist. 187 c. 5 n. 16.

Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 37 pars 1 art. 3 qu. 1-2. All things are indeed in eo

but not cum eo, Lomb. Sent. I dist. 37. God dwells in heaven differently

than on earth, in the animals differently than in human beings, in the

inanimate creatures differently than in the animate, in the godless

differently than in the pious, in Christ differently than in the church. The

creatures are different, according as God dwells in them in a different way.

Nature and being of the creatures is determined by their relation to God.

Therefore they all reveal God, but in different measure and according to

different sides. With the pure You keep Yourself pure, but with the perverse

You show Yourself a wrestler, Psalms 18:27. In all creatures God is present per

essentiam, but in no one except only in Christ does the fullness of the

Godhead dwell bodily. In Christ He dwells in an entirely unique way, per

unionem. In other creatures He dwells according to the measure of their

being, in these per naturam, in others per justitiam, in others per gratiam, in

others per gloriam. There is endless diversity, so that they all together

would reveal the glory of God. It helps little, whether we deny this

omnipresence of God. He makes us feel it in heart and conscience. He is not

far from each one of us. What separates us from Him is only sin. It removes

us not locally, but spiritually from God, Jes. 59:2. To forsake God, to flee

from Him, as Cain did, does not consist in local separation but in spiritual

unlikeness. Non loco quisque longe est a Deo, sed dissimilitudine, Aug.

Enarr. in Ps. 94. And conversely, to go to Him, to seek His face, does not

consist in a pilgrimage but in humiliation and repentance. And whoever

seeks Him, finds Him, not far away, but in His immediate nearness. For in

Him we live, move, and are. Propinquare illi, est similem illi fieri; recedere

ab illo, dissimilem illi fieri, Aug. Enarr. in Ps. 34. Noli ergo cogitare Deum

in locis; ille tecum est talis, qualis fueris. Quid est talis, qualis fueris?

Bonus, si bonus fueris; et malus tibi videtur, si malus fueris; sed opitulator,

si bonus fueris; ultor, si malus fueris. Ibi habes judicem in secreto tuo.

Volens facere aliquid mali, de publico recipis te in domum tuam, ubi nemo

inimicorum videat; de locis domus tuae promtis et in faciem constitutis,

removis te in cubiculum; times et in cubiculo aliunde conscium, secedis in

cor tuum, ibi meditaris: ille in corde tuo interior est. Quocumque ergo

fugeris, ibi est. Te ipsum quo fugies? Nonne quocumque fugeris, te

sequeris? Quando autem et te ipso interior est, non est quo fugias a Deo

irato nisi ad Deum placatum. Prorsus non est quo fugias. Vis fugere ab

ipso? Fuge ad ipsum, Aug. Enarr. in Ps. 74.

## B. God as Spirit.

5. This being, however, is not to be conceived in God as an abstract being

without content, but as a rich, full, Divine life. Holy Scripture, in order to

indicate the fullness of the life of God, makes use not only of adjectives but

also of substantives and calls God truth, righteousness, life, light, love,

theology treated this doctrine under the name of the simplicitas Dei. With

Irenaeus, adv. haer. I 12. II 13. 28. IV 4, God is called totus cogitatus, totus

sensus, totus oculus, totus auditus, totus fons omnium bonorum, cf.

Clemens, Strom. V 12. Orig. de princ. I 1, 6. Athanasius, de decr. Nic. syn.

c. 22. c. Ar. II 38. The three Cappadocians, over against Eunomius, had

especially to maintain the right of the different Divine names. But

Augustine returned again and again to the simplicitas Dei. God is pure

essentia, without accidens, de trin. V 4. Compared with Him all created

being is a non-being, de trin. VII, 5 Enarr. in Ps. 134. Conf. VII, 11. XI, 4.

In creatures there is a difference between being, living, knowing, willing;

there is a difference of degree among them; there are creatures that only are,

others that also live, still others that also think. But in God all that is one, de

civ. VIII, 6, de trin. XV, 5. God is all that He has, de civ. X, 10. He is his

own wisdom, his own life. Being and life are one in Him, cf. above 88 v. 92

v. and Gangauf, Des h. Aug. specul. Lehre von Gott dem Dreieinigen 1883

S. 147-157. And furthermore we find them with Damascenus, de fide orth. I

9, who adduces different proofs for this doctrine, with Anselmus, Monol. c.

15, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 8 n. 4-9, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 3, who in art.

3 expresses it briefly thus, Deus est Deitas, Id. S. c. Gent. I c. 16 sq.

Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 8 art. 3 and further with all Roman

Catholic, Luth. and Ref. theologians, Petavius, de Deo Lib. II c. 1-8. Theol.

Wirceb. III p. 64. Perrone, Prael. theol. II 92 sq. Jansen, Prael. theol. dogm.

II 60 sq. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit I 183 f. Philos. der Vorzeit II 742 f.

Gerhard, Loci theol. Loc. 2 cap. 8 sect. 3. Baier, Comp. theol. posit. I c. 1 §

9. Buddeus, Inst. theol. II c. 1 § 17. Hyperius, Meth. theol. p. 88, 89.

Zanchius, Op. II 63-73. Polanus, Synt. theol. lib. 2 c. 8. Trigland,

Antapologia cap. 4. Voetius, Disp. I 226-246. H. Alting, Theol. Elenct. p.

119 sq. Moor I p. 604-618. L. Meijer, treatise on the Div. attributes IV 517-

552 etc. On the other hand, this simplicity of God was opposed from

various sides. Eunomius did indeed teach the absolute simplicity of God,

but concluded from it that all names of God were only sounds and that the

essence of God coincided with the ἀ γεννησια. This one property made all

others superfluous and useless, Schwane, D. G. II2 21. The

anthropomorphites of earlier and later times opposed the simplicity of God,

because they ascribe a body to God. The Arabic sages taught the simplicity

of God, but thereby opposed the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, because

the three persons were denominationes additae super substantiam, Stöckl

Gesch. der Philos. des M. A. II 89. Duns Scotus came into contradiction

with the simplicity of God, which he otherwise expressly teaches, Sent. I

dist. 8 qu. 1-2, insofar as he assumed that the attributes were formaliter

distinct from one another and from God’s essence, ib. qu. 4. Nominalism

went still much further and assumed a real distinction of the attributes. In

the century of the Reformation this track was followed by the Socinians.

These came to it, in the interest of the independence of man, to limit the

Divine essence and thus knew no way with the simplicity of God. Socinus

doubted whether simplicity could be ascribed to God according to

Scripture. The catechism of Rakow omits it entirely. Schlichting, Volkelius

and others denied that the attributes were one with God’s essence, and

asserted that a fullness of attributes was not in conflict with his unity,

Hoornbeek, Socin. conf. I p. 368-369. Vorstius agreed with this and said,

especially on the ground of the doctrine of the Trinity, that in God a

distinction must be made between materia and forma, essence and

attributes, genus and differentiae. Scripture therefore also says that God

swears by his soul, Jeremiah 51:14, that the Spirit is in Him, 1 Corinthians 2:11.

There is a distinction between knowing and willing, between the subject

that lives and the life by which he lives, cf. Trigland, Kerk. Gesch. IV 576,

585 v. Schweizer in de Theol. Jahrb. 1856 S. 435 f. 1857 S. 153 f. Dorner,

Gesammelte Schriften 1883 S. 278 f. The Remonstrants were of the same

opinion. In their Apol. Conf. cap. 2 they said that of the simplicitas Dei not

a jot stood in Scripture, that it was purely metaphysical doctrine and

absolutely not necessary to believe. As an objection it was especially urged

that with the simplicity of God the freedom of his will and the change of his

disposition could not be reconciled. Episcopius still included the simplicitas

Dei among the attributa, and thought that the relationes, the volitiones and

decreta libera could indeed be united with it, Instit. Theol. Lib. 4 sect. 2 cap.

7, but Limborch no longer mentioned this property. With rationalism it

receded entirely into the background, or even remained undiscussed,

Wegscheider, Inst. Theol. § 61. Reinhard Dogm. § 33. Bretschneider,

Handb. der Dogm. I4 486. The latter says that Scripture does not know

these subtleties of philosophy. Pantheism too could not recognize or

appreciate the doctrine of the simplicity of God. It identified God and world

and, by the mouth of Spinoza, even ascribed to God the property of

extension. Thus the simplicitas Dei has almost entirely disappeared from

more recent theology; its significance is not seen; sometimes it is strongly

opposed. Schleiermacher did not place the simplicity of God on one line

with the other attributes and held it only for das ungetrennte und

untrennbare Ineinandersein aller göttlichen Eigenschaften und Thätigkeiten,

Chr. Gl. § 56. With Lange, Kahnis, Philippi, Ebrard, Lipsius, Biedermann,

F. A. B. Nitzsch, Oosterzee and others this property is no longer mentioned.

By Vilmar, Dogm. I 208 f. Dorner, Glaub. I 221 f. Id. Gesammelte Schriften

S. 305. Frank, Syst. de chr. Wahrh. I2 124. Ritschl, Theol. u. Metaph. S. 12

f. Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 S. 2 f. Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1865 S. 275 f. 1868

S. 67 f. S. 251 f. Doedes Ned. Geloofsbel. bl. 9 it is strongly opposed,

especially on these two grounds, that it is a metaphysical abstraction and

conflicts with the doctrine of the Trinity, cf. against that Schweizer, Chr. Gl.

I 256-259. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 338. Kuyper, Ex ungue leonem 1882.

Yet this simplicitas Dei is of the greatest significance for the knowledge

of God. Not only is it taught in Scripture where God is called light, life,

love, etc., but it also flows from the idea of God itself and is necessarily

given with the other attributes. Simple here is the opposite of composite. If

God is composite of parts, like a body, or also of genus and differentia,

substantia and accidentia, materia and forma, potentia and actus, essentia

and existentia, then his perfection, his unity, his independence, his

immutability cannot be maintained. For then He is not the highest love,

because something other than in Him is the subject that loves and

something other the love by which He loves, and so with respect to all the

other attributes. God then is not the one, quo melius nihil cogitari potest.

But God is of himself and has nothing above himself; He is therefore

completely one with wisdom, with grace, with love, etc.; He is absolutely

perfect, something higher than God cannot be thought, August. de trin. V 10

VI 1. Hugo a St. Victor, de trin. I 12. With creatures all that is different.

Here there is a distinction between existence, essence, life, knowing,

willing, acting, etc., omne quod compositum est creatum est, no creature

can be absolutely simplex, for every creature is finite. But God is the

infinite, and all that is in Him is infinite. All his attributes are divine and

therefore infinite, one with his essence. Therefore He is and can also alone

be sufficient, supremely blessed and supremely glorious in himself,

Petavius, de Deo lib. II 2. From this it already appears that this simplicity of

God is absolutely no metaphysical abstraction. It is essentially distinct from

the philosophical idea of το ὀ ν, το ἑ ν, το μοναχον, το ἁ πλουν or of the

substance, of the absolute, etc., with which Xenophanes, Plato, Philo,

Plotinus and later Spinoza and Hegel designate God. It is not found by

abstraction, by going out above all oppositions and distinctions in creatures,

and by defining the idea of God as the being elevated above all oppositions.

But rather one has arrived at this attribute by positing all perfections of

creatures in God in a perfect, divine way. The definition of God as

simplicissima essentia indicates that He is the perfect, infinitely-full being,

that He is an infinite and unbounded πελαγος ο ὐ σιας. And far from

promoting pantheism, as Baur, chr. Lehre van d. Dreiein. Gottes II

635 thinks, this doctrine of the simplicissima essentia Dei stands directly

opposite to it. For in pantheism God has no own existence and life outside

of and without the world. With Hegel, for example, the absolute, pure

being, thinking, the idea exists not before, but only logically and potentially

earlier than the world. All the determinations of the absolute being are

without content, being is nothing but abstract, logical forms of thought,

Drews, Die deutsche Spekulation I 249. But the definition of God as

simplicissima essentia in Christian theology maintains precisely that God

has an own, infinite, supremely blessed life in himself, even if it is also the

case that we can only designate that essence of God with names borrowed

from creatures. The substance, the highest being, the absolute, etc., with

which pantheistic philosophy by preference names the divine essence, is

obtained by abstraction; one proceeded to think away everything from

things until one retained nothing but the last, most general concept, namely

pure being, naked existence. This being is indeed an abstractum, a concept,

to which no reality corresponds and that may not be further determined.

Every further determination would make it finite, make it into something

particular and thus destroy the generality. Omnis determinatio est negatio.

But the being that in theology is ascribed to God is an own, particular

being, distinct from the world. It designates God, not as a being of which

we can think absolutely nothing except that it is, but as a being in which

everything is essence, as the absolute fullness of being. This simple essence

therefore does not exclude the many names, as Eunomius asserted, but

requires them. God is so rich that we cannot obtain any conception of his

richness except with many names. Each name names the same full, divine

essence, but each time from another side, according to which it reveals

itself to us in his works. God is therefore simplex in his multiplicitas and

multiplex in his simplicitas (Augustinus). Every determination, every name,

with which we designate God, is therefore not a negation, but an

enrichment of the knowledge of his essence. Divinum esse est

determinatum in se et ab omnibus aliis divisum per hoc quod sibi nulla

additio fieri potest, Thomas, Sent. I dist. 8 qu. 4 art. 1 ad 1. Kleutgen,

Theol. der Vorzeit I2 204 f. Understood thus, this simplicity of God is also

not in conflict with the Trinity. For simple, simplex here does not stand

opposite to two- or threefold, duplex, triplex, but opposite to

composite, compositus. And now the divine essence is not composed of

three persons, nor is each person composed of the essence and the

proprietas personalis; but the one same simple essence exists in the three

persons, each person or personal property is distinguished from the essence

not re but only ratione, each personal property is indeed a relatio realis but

nevertheless adds not aliquid reale to the essentia. The personal properties

non componunt sed solum distinguunt, Petavius, lib. 2. cap. 3-4. Zanchius,

6. The simplicity of God includes his spiritual nature, for everything

bodily is composite. Scripture does indeed always speak of God in a human

way, and ascribes to Him all kinds of bodily organs and activities, but even

in this it nevertheless observes a certain limit. Of the internal organs of the

human body only heart and bowels are ascribed to Him. Organs of

nourishment, digestion, and reproduction are never transferred to Him.

There is indeed in God mention of seeing and hearing, and also of smelling,

but not of tasting and touching. A body is nowhere attributed to Him.

Although the O. T. also nowhere says in so many words that God is spirit,

yet this conception underlies the whole description of God. God is Jahveh,

who descends to his people and reveals himself in a human way, but from

the beginning He is also Elohim, who is far exalted above all that is

creaturely. He exists of himself, Exodus 3:13, Jes. 41:4, 44:6, is eternal, Deuteronomy 33:20, 23, incapable of being imaged, Exodus 20:4, Deuteronomy 5:8, because without

likeness, ‎‏‏ְּתמּוָנה‎, Deuteronomy 4:12, 15. God and human beings stand over against

one another as spirit and flesh, Jes. 31:3. Although He reveals himself many

times in appearance, dream, vision and in so far makes himself visible, Gen.

Jes. 6:1, it is nevertheless by his Spirit, and thus in a spiritual way, that He

is present in creation and creates and sustains all things, Psalms 139:7, Genesis 2:7,

Job 33:4, Psalms 33:6, 104:30 [146] etc., Oehler, Theol. des A. T. § 46. Schultz,

Altt. Theol. 496-504. More clearly the spiritual being of God comes to light

in the N. Test. Not only is it evident from this, that God is eternal, Rom.

also expresses it directly, when He calls God πνευμα and therefore demands

a spiritual and true worship of God, John 4:24. And indeed this statement is

not repeated literally by the apostles, but nevertheless they have the same

conception of the being of God, when they call Him invisible, John 1:18, cf.

which does not conflict with the promise of the beholding of God in the

22:4. This spiritual being of God has been misunderstood and denied in

paganism, Romans 1:23. Even philosophy has not been able to detach itself

from the sensible representations of God. Materialism holds the material

atoms to be the ultimate ground of being. Deism finite-izes God and makes

Him in essence like human beings; with Epicurus the gods are a company

of reasoning philosophers, with a fine etheric body, and distinguished by

sex, Zeller, IV3 433. But pantheism too encroaches upon this spiritual being

of God. According to Heraclitus and the Stoa the first cause is to be thought

of as material and bodily; God is at the same time the original power, which

in the course of time brings forth everything out of itself and thus also takes

it back again into itself, Zeller IV3 133-146. All these directions also

worked in the Christian church and down to the present day. With the

realistic-eschatological representations, which in the second half of the

second century prevailed in a wide circle, the thought of a certain

corporeality of God was not far away. Of Tertullian it is not entirely certain

whether he ascribed to God a material body. For he does indeed say, quis

enim negabit, deum corpus esse, etsi deus spiritus est? spiritus enim corpus

sui generis in sua effigie, adv. Prax. 7, but he seems to take corpus in the

sense of substance, when he says: omne quod est, corpus est sui generis,

nihil est incorporale nisi quod non est, de carne 11, and elsewhere speaks

just as realistically of the soul, de an. 6. Yet the identification of

corpus and substantia is remarkable; it proves that Tertullian could think of

no substance except as corpus. And elsewhere he then also says that God is

no more free from affects than the human being, even though they are also

present in Him in a perfect way. He even goes so far that he wants to take

the hands and eyes ascribed to God in Scripture not spiritually but literally,

though in a perfect way, adv. Marc. II 16. Tertullian can therefore be called

the father of biblical realism. The danger of the spiritualism of the

Alexandrian school, obtained by allegorical exegesis, drove many in the

direction of anthropomorphism. Melito, bishop of Sardis, according to

Origen ascribed a body to God, although it cannot be determined to what

extent this report is correct, Herzog2 9, 539. In the fourth century such an

anthropomorphism was taught by Audius and his followers, and by many

Egyptian monks, who were especially opposed in the writing attributed to

Cyril contra anthropomorphitas. Later this man-shaped representation of

God was renewed by Socinianism. Here God is only a Lord, who has power

over us. Of his simple, infinite, independent, spiritual being no mention is

made, Socinus, Christ. relig. instit. Catech. Racov. qu. 53. Crell asserted

that the word spirit of God, angel and soul was used not aequivoce and

analogice but univoce, de Deo et attrib. lib. 1 c. 15. And Vorstius said in the

sense of Tertullian, vere corpus Deo attribui, si per corpus vera et solida

substantia intelligatur, Dorner, Ges. Schriften 279. Furthermore, theosophy

also teaches that God indeed in a certain sense has a body and that therefore

the human being also was created bodily after God’s image. In the kabbalah

the ten sefiroth, that is, the attributes or modes, in which God reveals

himself, together bear the name of Adam Kadmon, the first heavenly man,

because the human form is the highest and most perfect revelation of God

and God is thus represented in Scripture, Franck, La Kabbale 1843 p. 179.

From that there developed among the Christian theosophists, in connection

with the doctrine of the Trinity, the representation that God, who is not a

resting being, but an eternally becoming life, not only inwardly raises

himself from darkness to light, from nature to spirit, but also outwardly

surrounds himself with a certain nature, corporeality, glory, heaven, and in

that gives form to himself for himself and glorifies himself. Thus we

find it with Böhme, cf. Joh. Claassen, Jakob Böhme, Sein Leben und seine

theos. Werke, 3 Bde Stuttgart 1885 I S. XXXII, 157 II 61. Oetinger, Die

Theologie aus der Idee des Lebens usw. 1852 S. 109 f. Baader, cf. Joh.

Claassen, Franz v. Baaders Leben und theos. Werke usw. 2 Bde Stuttgart

1887 II 110-112. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psychol. S. 48 f. Auberlen, Die Philos.

Oetingers 1847 S. 147. Hamberger, Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. VIII 1863 S.

448 etc. Finally, even in pantheism the spiritual nature of God does not

come into its own. Spinoza ascribed to substance the property of extensio,

Eth. II prop. 1, 2. And in the philosophy of Hegel, Schleiermacher,

Hartmann e. a. the world is an essential moment in the infinite. Ohne Welt

ist Gott nicht Gott, Hegel, Werke XI 122. God and world are correlata, they

express the same being, first as unity then as totality, Schleiermacher,

Dialektik S. 162. To be sure, this pantheism, and even with a certain

predilection, continues to speak of God as Spirit. But what is to be

understood by that is difficult to comprehend. Hegel uses the name spirit

especially for the last and highest Stufe, which the idea through nature in

the human being, specifically in philosophy, reaches. Das Logische wird zur

Natur und die Natur zum Geiste, Werke VII, 2 S. 468. Hegel still seeks the

essence of spirit in ideality, in the einfache Insichseyn, in the ikness, ib. S.

14 f. 18 f., but God nevertheless becomes spirit only after a long process

through and in the human being. Others have begun to use that word spirit

for the last immanent cause of things, without thereby thinking of a proper,

distinct existence and of a personal, conscious life. Hartmann designates the

unconscious as pure, unconscious, impersonal, absolute spirit, and therefore

calls his philosophy spiritualistic monism and panpneumatism, Philos. des

Unbew. II9 457. Philos. Fragen der Gegenwart 1885 S. 61.

Against all these tendencies the Christian church and theology have

always held fast to the spiritualitas Dei, Iren. adv. haer. II c. 13. Orig. de

princ. I 1, 6. c. Cels. VII 33 sq. VIII 49. Augustine, de trin. XV 5. de civ.

VIII 5. Conf. VI 3 etc. John of Damascus, de fide orthod. I c. 11. II c. 3 etc.

The spiritualitas Dei is often not treated separately, but is brought up under

the simplicitas Dei, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 8, 4 sq. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu.

3. art. 1-2. S. c. Gent. I c. [149] 20. Petavius, de Deo II c. 1. The spiritual

being is likewise maintained and defended by Roman Catholic, Luth., and

Reformed theologians, Theol. Wirceb. III 27-34. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. II

68. Gerhard, Loci theol. II c. 8 sect. 1. Forbesius a Corse, Instruct. histor.

theol. lib. 1 c. 36. Mastricht, Theol. theor. pract. II c. 6. Under this

spiritualitas Dei it was now understood that God was a proper substance,

distinct from the being of the world, and that this substance was immaterial,

imperceptible to bodily senses, without composition or extension. Of the

nature of such an immaterial substance man can form only some faint

notion from the analogy of the spiritual being that he finds in himself. But

the being of his own soul is unknown to man in a positive sense; he

observes in himself all kinds of psychic phenomena and from these

concludes to a spiritual substance as their bearer, but this being of the soul

itself escapes his observation. And even then the spiritualitas Dei is of a

wholly different and unique kind. The designation spirit for God, angel, and

soul is not to be understood univoce and synonymously, but analogice. This

is already evident from the fact that the spirit in angels and men is

composite, indeed not out of material parts but nevertheless out of

substantia and accidentia, out of potentia and actus, and is thus subject to

change. In God, however, this composition is no more present than that out

of bodily parts; He is pure being. But furthermore it also comes clearly to

light in this, that God as πνευμα is not only the Πατηρ των πνευματων,

Hebr. 12:9, but equally the Creator and Father of all visible things. These

too have come to be out of things that do not appear before the eyes, Hebr.

11:3, and have their origin in God as πνευμα. God as spiritual being is the

author not only of all that among creatures is called πνευμα and ψυχη, but

also of all that is called σωμα and σαρξ. And thus the spiritualitas makes

known that perfection of God by which He is to be conceived both

negatively, in analogy with the spirit of the angels and the soul of man, as

immaterial and invisible, and also positively as the hidden, simple, absolute

ground of all creaturely, somatic and pneumatic, being. This was also

perceived earlier, and hence some proposed to call even the spirits of the

angels and the souls of men still bodies, while God then alone was

spirit in an entirely unique sense, cf. Augustine, Epist. 28, or also, to apply

to God neither the predicate of corporeality nor that of incorporeality,

because He is exalted above both, Petavius, de Deo II c. 1 § 14-16. But this

deserves no recommendation, because it promotes misunderstanding and

also forgets that, although all knowledge of God is analogical, that analogy

nevertheless comes out more clearly in the one group of creatures than in

the other, and speaks more strongly in the world of invisible things than in

that of visible. Equally incorrect is it on the other side, with Cartesius to

place the essence of spirit in cogitatio, de meth. c. 4, and with Cartesian

theologians to define the essence of God as res cogitans, Wittichius, Theol.

c. 15 § 218, or as perfectissima et purissima intellectio, Burmannus,

Synopsis I 17, 4. For thereby the spiritual nature of God is at once identified

with personality, as indeed also happened with Reinhard, Dogm. 111,

Wegscheider, Inst. theol. § 64, and others. Pantheism therefore knew no

way with this spiritual nature of God, and made it into a sound without

meaning, into a word without reality. It is therefore of importance to

maintain the spiritualitas Dei as an indication of his substantia incorporea.

Personality, self-consciousness and self-determination, is thereby not yet

given of itself; indeed naturally in God, because He is a simple being; but

not in the concept considered in itself. Animal consciousness and the

unconscious representations in man prove sufficiently that spiritualitas and

personalitas are not identical concepts. That which is expressed in the

personalitas comes up later in the doctrine of the scientia and voluntas Dei.

Here, with the spiritualitas, it is a matter of maintaining the spiritual being

of God. And this is of such great importance, that upon it rests the whole

manner in which we must serve God. Worship in spirit and truth rests on the

spirituality of God. Only thereby is all image-worship in principle and for

ever cut off.

7. From this spiritualitas Dei there follows directly his invisibilitas.

Scripture teaches this explicitly, above p. 145 f. And in the Christian church

there was therefore little difference of opinion about whether God could be

beheld with bodily eyes. Both for this dispensation and for that in glory this

was generally denied; only a few, the Audians, the Socinians,

Vorstius, and also some Lutherans, such as Quenstedt, Theol. I 554 sq. 566,

Hollaz, Ex. theol. 458, Hulsemann, Majus, Jaeger e. a., accepted it and also

appealed to the Reformed Alsted, Theol. schol. 849, Bucanus, Instit. theol.

1648 p. 443; but Gerhard, Loc. XXXI § 144 left it undecided; and Baier,

Comp. I c. 6, Buddeus, Inst. theol. II c. 3 § 4 restricted it to the cognitio

intellectualis. Moreover, it was taught by all that God as spirit was invisible

to bodily senses, Iren. adv. haer. II 6. IV 20. Orig. c. Cels. VII 33 sq.

Augustinus, de civ. XXII 29. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 12 art. 3 ad 3. Martyr,

Loci, p. 8, 9. Zanchius, Op. I 225 etc. If there can be talk of a seeing of

God, this is possible only with eyes of the soul or of the spirit. In that

connection, however, the question could arise whether a beholding of God

is possible, directly, without the medium of creatures, face to face? Can

God, as scholasticism said, be seen, ut est in se per essentiam, in substantia

vel essentia sua? Now it was generally taught that such a beholding of God

per essentiam in any case was possible only in the status gloriae. Here on

earth such a seeing of God was attainable for no one. At most this was, by a

special grace and only for a moment, permitted to Moses, Ex. 34, Isaiah, c.

6, Paul, 2 Cor. 12, August. Epist. 112, de Gen. ad litt. XII 27. Basil.

Hexaem. hom. 1. Hilarius, de trin. V. But by far the most judged also with

respect to the beholding of God that had fallen to the lot of patriarchs,

prophets, and apostles, that it had always taken place mediately, through a

cloud, in some sign or other, under some form or other, Petavius, de Deo

VII c. 12. In discussion, therefore, in fact only the question was whether in

the status gloriae there is a visio Dei per essentiam. Now the church fathers

do indeed speak many times of a seeing of God that is laid up for believers

in heaven, e.g. Iren. adv. haer. IV 20. Clem. Alex. Strom. V c. 1. Greg. Naz.

Orat. 34. August, de civ. XXII 29, de Gen. ad lit. XII 26, but they do not

mention a seeing of God per essentiam. They only say with Scripture that

the blessed will see God, not through a mirror, but face to face. And they

add that God is invisible, but that he can make himself visible and can

reveal himself to man, Iren. ib. In potestate nostra non est eum videre,

sed in potestate illius est apparere, Ambrosius, in Petavius, VII c. 7. Others

therefore also denied that God per essentiam would be beheld in the

hereafter, such as Chrysostom, Gregorius Nyss., Cyrillus Hier.,

Theodoretus, Hieronymus, Isidorus e. a. The Roman theologians are

embarrassed by the statements of these patres. Vasquez acknowledged

outright: hos patres, si sincere loqui volumus, vix possumus in bonum

sensum interpretari. But others try to weaken these statements and to

explain them in the sense that they deal with the bodily beholding of God or

with the beholding of God in this life or with the absolute knowledge of

God, which is also in heaven unattainable and remains so, Thomas, S.

Theol. I qu. 12 art. 1 ad 1. Sent. IV dist. 49 qu. 1 art. 1 ad 1. Petavius, de

Deo VII c. 5. Theol. Wirceb. III p. 82-86. Gradually, however, under the

influence of the neoplatonic mysticism that acted upon Pseudodionysius,

another conception of the visio Dei arose. It was now conceived as a

beholding of God in his being, ut in se est. God no longer descended to

man, but man was raised up to God by a supernatural gift and thus deified.

Greg. Magnus, Moral. l. 18 c. 28 already said that God will be seen not only

in his glory but also in his nature, for ipsa ei natura sua claritas, ipsa claritas

natura est. Prosper, de vita contempl. 1 c. 4 spoke of the blessed as sui

creatoris substantiam mundis cordibus contemplantes. Bernardus, serm. 4 in

festum omnium sanctorum, says that God will be seen in all his creatures,

but that the trinitas will also be seen in semetipsa. And the council at

Florence declared that souls in coelum mox recipi et intueri clare ipsum

Deum trinum et unum sicuti est, pro meritorum tamen diversitate alium alio

perfectius, cf. Denzinger, Enchir. symb. et defin. n. 403, 456, 588, 870, 875.

Scholasticism found here ample material for all kinds of speculation and

also made ample use of it. In connection with the doctrine of the dona

superaddita it was taught that man with his natural gifts was not capable of

this beholding of God, but that a divinum auxilium was necessary for it,

which supplemented, elevated, and completed the natural gifts. That

supernatural help was usually designated by the name of lumen gloriae. But

there arose great difference about the nature of this lumen, whether it was

objective or subjective, whether it was the Word or the Spirit, a gift of

the H. Spirit or this himself, although it was also mostly assumed that it was

aliquid creatum, intellectui datum in ratione habitus. Moreover, it became

the general doctrine that God in his being was the object of the beholding,

and that the blessed therefore saw in God everything that cannot be

separated from his being, thus both the attributes and the persons. But the

Thomists asserted that the being could not be beheld without the persons

and the one attribute not without the other, while the nominalists and

Scotists maintained the opposite. Further, according to everyone’s opinion,

God himself and all that was formaliter in him, i.e. belonged to his being,

was the object of the beholding; but there was again difference whether to

that also belonged that which was eminenter in him, i.e. what is called into

existence by God in accordance with his decrees. Usually this was

maintained in order thereby to justify the invocation of the angels and of the

blessed, who in God saw everything that would happen and thus knew the

needs of believers on earth. Even though it was now also added that the

visio Dei was no comprehensio and differed in the blessed according to the

measure of their merits, yet this doctrine ended in the deification of man.

The creature, on the ground of a supernatural gift, raises itself upward by its

own merits and becomes like God, Lombardus, Sent. 4 dist. 49. Thomas S.

Theol. I qu. 12, I 2 qu. 3, especially art. 12. qu. 4 art. 2. S. c. Gent. III c. 38-

63. Sent. IV dist. 49 qu. 1, 2. Bonaventura, Brevil. VII c. 7. Hugo Vict. de

Sacr. lib. 2 pars 18 c. 16. Petavius, De Deo VII c. 1-14. Becanus, Theol.

Schol. I c. 9. Theol. Wirceb. III p. 67-90. Perrone, Prael. theol. III p. 266-

276. Jansen, Prael. theol. dogm. III p. 913-935. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. III p.

23-44. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorz. II S. 122-134. Scheeben, Dogm. I 562 f.

The Reformation adopted a different position over against this visio Dei.

The Lutherans tended to assume a visio Dei per essentiam, and not only

mentalis but even also corporalis. God’s power was so great that He could

grant to the blessed an illumination, whereby they can also see Him with

the eyes of the body in his essence, above p. 151. Also some Reformed

theologians did not consider such a visio Dei per essentiam impossible,

Bullinger on John 1:18. Polanus, Synt. Theol. p. 9, 518. Synopsis pur.

theol. LII 11-24. Forbesius a Corse, de visione beatifica, Op. Amst. 1703 I

282-289. etc. But most, holding to the glory prepared for believers which

surpasses all knowledge, set aside the spinosae quaestiones of scholasticism

or also rejected the visio Dei per essentiam entirely, Calvin, Inst. III 25, 11.

Pareus on 1 Cor. 13 12. Rivetus on Psalms 16:11, Op. II 68. Danaeus on 1 Timothy 6:16. Gomarus on John 1:18. Op. p. 249-252. Maccovius redivivus, Theol.

pol. 162. Hoornbeek, Instit. theol. XVI 20 Turretinus, Theol. El. XX qu. 8.

Heidegger, Corpus theol. III 37, XXVIII 138. Moor, VI 720. M. Vitringa IV

18-25, especially Voetius, Disp. II 1193-1217 etc.; cf. also Episcopius, Inst.

theol. IV sect. 2 c. 4, Limborch, Theol. Chr. VI 13, 6. This modesty is

certainly in accordance with Scripture, which indeed speaks of a beholding

of God by the blessed, but declares nothing further about it and elsewhere

expressly calls God invisible. The beholding that awaits believers is called

by Paul a knowing as we are known. If God, as all assume, cannot be

known perfectly, in his essence, but is incomprehensible, He also cannot be

seen in his essence. Visio per essentiam and comprehensio are, after all,

completely the same. Moreover, God is infinite and man remains finite, also

in the status gloriae. God therefore can always be seen by man only in a

finite, human manner. The objectum may thus be infinitum, the

repraesentatio in human consciousness is and remains finita. But then the

seeing of God is also not per essentiam. Then from God’s side there is

always a συγκαταβασις necessary, a revelation, whereby He from his side

descends to us and makes himself known to us; Matthew 11:27 also remains in

force in glory. The beholding of God in his essence would entail that man

would be deified and the boundary between Creator and creature would be

erased. That indeed lies on the line of the Neoplatonic mysticism, which

was taken up by Rome, but not on that of the Reformation, and at least not

of the Reformed church and theology. For with Rome man is raised by the

donum supernaturale above his own nature; he thereby in fact becomes

another being, a homo divinus and supernaturalis, Bellarminus, de justif. V

12; but however high and glorious the Reformed also thought of the

status gloriae, there too man nevertheless remained man, indeed elevated

supra gradum suum naturalem, but not supra speciem suam et objectum illi

analogum, Turret., Th. El. XX qu. 8, 12. The blessedness of man is certainly

situated in the visio Dei beatifica, but nevertheless always in such a visio as

for which the finite and limited human nature is capable. A θεωσις, as Rome

teaches it, fits into the system of the Pseudodionysian hierarchy but finds no

support in Scripture, cf. later the locus on the image of God, and also

Stuckert, Vom Schauen Gottes, Zeits. f. Th. u. K. von Gottschick VI 6 S.

## C. God as Light.

8. The whole of Scripture proceeds from the assumption that consciousness

and knowledge belong to God. He is pure φως without any σκοτια, 1 John 1:5, dwelling in an inaccessible light, 1 Timothy 6:16, and source of all light in

In this designation of light is included that God is perfectly conscious of

himself, that He surveys himself in his whole being and that nothing in that

being is hidden from his consciousness. Also the trinitarian life of God is a

further, God has consciousness and knowledge of all that exists outside his

being. Nowhere in Scripture is it even indicated that anything would be

unknown to Him. Indeed the manner in which He takes knowledge is

sometimes described very humanly, Genesis 3:9 v., 11:5, 18:21 etc., but He

nevertheless knows everything. The thought that something would be

unknown to Him is rejected as absurd; would He who plants the ear not

hear, and He who forms the eye not see, Psalms 94:9. Repeatedly there is

Spr. 8:12 v., Psalms 147:5, Romans 11:33, 16:27, Ef. 3:10 etc. And this knowledge

of God has every creature as its object. It extends to everything, and is thus

omniscience in the strict sense. His eyes run through the whole earth, 2

Chron. 16:9; everything is known to Him and lies naked spread out before

his eye, Hebr. 4:13. The smallest and least, Matthew 6:8, 32, 10:30, the

8:39, Luke 16:15, Hd. 1:24, Romans 8:27, thoughts and deliberations, Ps.

his origin and being and in all his ways, Ps. 139, night and darkness, Psalms 139:11, 12, hell and destruction, Spr. 15:11, the evil and sinful, Psalms 69:6, Jer.

future, Jes. 41:22 v., 42:9, 43:9-12, 44:7, 46:10, specifically also the end of

life, Psalms 31:16, 39:6, 139:6, 16, Job 14:5, Hd. 17:26 etc., it is all known to

God. He knows everything, 1 John 3:20. And He knows all that not

aposteriori, by observation, but apriori, from eternity, 1 Corinthians 2:7, Romans 8:29,

Ef. 1:4, 5, 2 Timothy 1:9. His knowledge is not susceptible of increase, Jes.

40:13 v., Romans 11:34, is certain and determinate, Psalms 139:1-3, Hebr. 4:13, so

that all God’s revelations are true, John 8:26, 17:17, Titus 1:2, all the works of

God make his wisdom known to us, Psalms 104:24, 136:5, Ef. 3:10, Romans 11:33, and dispose us to worship and admiration, Psalms 139:17 v., Jes. 40:28,

Job 11:7 v., Romans 11:33, 1 Corinthians 2:11. The knowledge of God both of himself

and of the world is taught in Scripture so decisively and clearly, that it was

at all times acknowledged within the Christian church. But pantheism has

come into opposition to that. It ascribed to God no being of his own,

distinct from the world, and therefore could also assume in God no

consciousness of his own. Spinoza did indeed still speak of the cogitatio as

an attributum Dei and called God a res cogitans, Eth. II prop. 1. But from

that cogitatio he distinguished the intellectus as certus modus cogitandi, and

this does not fall in the natura naturans but only in the natura naturata, Eth. I

prop. 31, and all these modi cogitandi together constitute God’s eternal and

infinite intellect, Eth. V prop. 40 schol. This pantheism led through Fichte,

Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer to the Philosophie des Unbewussten of

Eduard von Hartmann. In the first part of his work he indicates at length the

significance which belongs to the unconscious everywhere in the world, and

then says that that unconscious being is one in all things II9 155 f. And this

Unconscious, although preferably not called God II [157] 201, nevertheless

with Hartmann fills the place of God. Now this Unconscious is sometimes

conceived by Hartmann in such a way that it is not blind and alogical, like

the will in Schopenhauer, but rather clear-sighted, clairvoyant, just like

instinct in animal and human being, and possesses an omniscient, all-wise,

überbewusste Intelligenz, II 176 f. But he denies that consciousness belongs

to the Unconscious. For consciousness consists in a splitting of subject and

object, is thus always a limitation and presupposes individualization, indeed

even the body, II 177 f. As soon as consciousness is taken absolutely, it

loses its form and of itself becomes unconscious, II 179. If the absolute still

had a consciousness of its own outside the individual consciousnesses, it

would at once devour these. Monism is incompatible with a conscious

Divine being. Such a being would not be immanent in but separated from

the world. It is indeed the cause of all consciousness but is not itself

conscious, II 178 f. And self-consciousness in particular cannot be ascribed

to the absolute, for this presupposes a distinction of subject and object, a

reflection upon itself, which cannot occur in the absolute, II 187 f.

Pantheism thus denies to God both knowledge of the world,

Weltbewusstsein, innerweltliches Selbstbewusstsein, and knowledge of

himself, self-consciousness, ausserweltliches or innergöttliches

Selbstbewusstsein. Even where He comes to consciousness in the individual

consciousnesses, He knows only the world but not himself, Hartmann II.

176. Now to Hartmann almost everything that he says about the power and

significance of the unconscious in creatures can be conceded. The

unconscious indeed plays a great role in animal and human life. But it is

remarkable that Hartmann does not even pose the question whether that

extensive power of the unconscious does not precisely presuppose and

require the intelligence of God. For very certainly there is many a time an

unconscious and yet purposive action. But the unconscious in animal and

human being then does not itself act with a purpose; rather, the conscious

spirit of the human being sees in that action a purpose, toward which it is

directed precisely by a higher consciousness standing above it, Thomas, S.

c. Gent. I 44, 5. From of old, therefore, the observation of the purposive in

the world has led to the recognition of a Divine being. Anaxagoras therefore

already assumed a νους, which possessed an infinite knowing, in order to

order everything in the best way. Socrates defines the Deity thus, that it sees

and hears everything and is present everywhere. With Plato God is the

world-former, who creates everything according to the ideas. Aristotle

reasons that the Deity is the primum movens, the absolute being, actus

purus, and absolutely incorporeal. It is therefore thinking, νους, and has as

its content itself. God cannot derive the content of his thought from without;

He can only think the best, and that is Himself. God thus thinks himself, He

is the thinking of the thinking; the thinking and its object is in Him one,

God is νοησις νοησεως, Metaph. XII 9. And even the Stoa concluded

teleologically from the purpose in the world to an intelligent cause. Zeno

already reasoned thus: Nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse

sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt. Non igitur caret sensu

mundus, Cic. N. D. II, 8, 22. cf. III, 9, 22: quod ratione utitur melius est

quam id quod ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius. Ratione igitur

mundus utitur. So also Thomas, S. c. Gent. I c. 28 and 44. Whoever

recognizes no purpose in the world also has no need of a self-conscious

God and has enough with materialism. But whoever, with von Hartmann,

defends the teleological worldview, must assume in God a consciousness,

and does not explain the conscious by the unconscious. For in the effect

there cannot be more present than lies in the cause. Would He who plants

the ear not hear, and He who forms the eye not behold? A perfection in the

creature points back to a perfection in God. If the rational being in value

surpasses all others, if thinking, the human being, otherwise weak as a reed,

nevertheless elevates above all creatures, God cannot be thought of as

unconscious. Religion resists that, which always and everywhere

presupposes a personal, self-conscious God, but philosophy too registers

protest against that. Pantheism may be able to appeal to Spinoza and Hegel;

theism has all the philosophers of antiquity on its side and also finds in

more recent philosophy still support with Cartesius, Leibniz, Kant,

Schelling (2nd period), J. H. Fichte, Herbart, Lotze, Ulrici, Carrière etc.

That now the Divine self-consciousness differs specifically from that of the

human being and has in this only a weak analogy, certainly stands beyond

all doubt. In so far there would be no objection to calling God überbewusst.

But precisely therefore one cannot conclude from the limitation of human

self-consciousness to Divine knowledge. In spite of all reasonings from the

pantheistic side about limitation, individuality, and the sensory basis as

necessarily proper to self-consciousness, it is not to be seen why God’s selfknowledge would be a limitation of his being. With us self-consciousness is

finite and limited, because we ourselves are finite and because it never

covers our being. Our being is much richer than our self-consciousness. But

God is the eternal, pure being. And his self-knowledge has nothing less than

that full, eternal, Divine being itself as its content. Being and knowing are

one in God. He knows himself through his own being. He also does not

come to consciousness gradually, and is not now more than less conscious

of himself. For in Him there is no becoming, no process, no development.

He is pure being, mere light without darkness, Augustinus, de trin. XV 14.

From this self-consciousness of God his Weltbewusstsein is to be

distinguished. Earlier theology therefore divided the knowledge of God into

scientia naturalis (necessaria, simplicis intelligentiae) and scientia libera

(contingens, visionis). The two are not identical, as pantheism teaches, for if

the absolute is to be conceived as only logically and potentially prior to the

world, it is wholly insufficient for the explanation of the world. God does

not need the world, in order to come to personality, to self-consciousness.

He has neither, according to Hegel, a logical, nor, according to Schelling, a

historical cursus to run through, in order to attain his full actuality (von

Baader). But yet the self-consciousness and the Weltbewusstsein in God

cannot stand so separated alongside one another, as it was sometimes

represented in the earlier dogmatics. Rather, there exists between the two an

organic connection. God has, out of the infinite fullness of ideas, which are

present in his absolute self-consciousness, not arbitrarily selected some, in

order to realize them outside himself. He has therein let himself be guided

by the goal, to bring to revelation in the world himself, all his virtues and

perfections. The cognitio libera thus comprises precisely those ideas which

in their realization are suited to unfold, in a creaturely manner, the being of

God. The cognitio naturalis is of course unfit to be communicated to

creatures. As God knows himself, he can never be known by creatures,

neither as regards the content and the extent, nor also as regards the

manner. But the cognitio libera comprises all that which is susceptible of

realization and suited to bring the virtues of God to revelation in and for

creatures. It stands to the cognitio naturalis as the ectype to the archetype.

Yet also with this cognitio libera it must be kept in view that it is in God

something wholly different than in the creatures. Even if this cognitio libera

is communicable, it is nevertheless distinguished not only in extent but also

in nature and essence to a great degree in God and in the rational creature.

In the first place, Holy Scripture teaches very clearly that this scientia Dei

comprises all that is; nothing is withdrawn from his omniscience, nothing

hidden from his all-seeing eye. Past, present, and future; the least and the

most hidden; everything is naked and revealed before Him with whom we

have to do. At all times this was also acknowledged in Christian theology.

The only one who spoke otherwise was Hieronymus. This one called it in

his commentary on Habakkuk 1:13 absurd, to bring down the Divine majesty so

far, ut sciat per momenta singula quot nascantur culices, quot ue moriantur;

quae cimicum et pulicum et muscarum sit in terra multitudo, quanti pisces

in aqua natent, et qui de minoribus majorum praedae cedere debeant. But

this limitation of God’s omniscience finds no support in Scripture and has

been unanimously rejected by Christian theology. And furthermore God

knows everything not by observation from the things, but he knows

everything out of and from himself. Our knowledge is posterior; it

presupposes being and is derived from it. With God it is the reverse; he

knows everything before it is. Scripture also expresses this clearly, when it

says that God knows everything before it happens, Jes. 46:10, Amos 3:7,

Daniel 2:22, Psalms 139:6, Matthew 6:8 etc. God is after all the Creator of all things;

he has thought them before they existed. Iste mundus nobis notus non esse

posset, nisi esset; Deo autem, nisi notus non esset, esse non posset, August.

de civ. XI 10, de Gen. ad lit. V 18. He exists of himself and can also in his

consciousness and knowledge not depend on or be determined by anything

that is outside him. From his aseitas there flows of itself the absolute

independence of his knowing. He knows everything not from the things

after their existence, for then these, as with Schopenhauer and Hartmann,

would have proceeded out of the unconscious being, cf. August. de civ. XI,

10 [161] Conf. XIII 16. Gen. ad. litt. V 15, but he knows everything in and

through and out of himself. And therefore his knowledge is also one,

simple, unchangeable, eternal; he knows everything at once,

simultaneously, from eternity; and everything stands eternally present

before his eye, Iren., adv. haer. I 12. August., de trin. XI 10. XII 18. XV 7,

13, 14. Lombardus, Sent. I. dist. 35, 36. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 14. S. c. Gent.

I c. 44 sq. Zanchius, Op. II 195 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 18 etc.

Therefore, of praescientia there can, in the proper sense, be no question

with God. With Him there is no differentia temporis, Tertull., adv. Marc. III

5. He calls the things that are not as though they were, and sees what is not

as though it already existed. Quid est enim praescientia, nisi scientia

futurorum? quid autem futurum est Deo, qui omnia supergreditur tempora?

Si enim scientia Dei res ipsas habet, non sunt ei futurae sed praesentes; ac

per hoc non jam praescientia sed tantum scientia dici potest, August., ad

Simpl. II 2. Omne quod nobis fuit et erit, in ejus prospectu praesto est,

Gregorius Magnus, Mor. l. 20 c. 23. Quidquid tempora volvunt, praesens

semper habet, Marius Victor, in Petavius, de Deo IV 4. The distinction of

God’s omniscience into praescientia, scientia visionis (of the present) and

reminiscentia is wholly and entirely a human representation, Philippi,

Kirchl. Gl. II 67. Yet Scripture represents it many times in such a way, as

though God’s omniscience temporally precedes the being of things. And

without this auxiliary representation we also cannot speak of God’s

omniscience. But from that there arose in theology the question, how this

omniscience of God was to be reconciled with man’s freedom. If God

nevertheless foreknows everything, then everything stands fixed from

eternity and there remains no place any longer for free and contingent acts.

Cicero therefore already came to denial of God’s omniscience, because he

could not bring it into agreement with the free will, de fato c. 14. de div. II

5-7. Marcion denied to God, together with omnipotence and goodness, also

omniscience, because He had let the first man fall into sin, Tertull. adv.

Marc. II 5. Later this same was taught by the Socinians. God knows

everything but everything according to its nature. He knows the possibly

future, the contingent, thus not with absolute certainty, for then it would

cease to be contingent, but He knows it as possible and contingent, i.e. He

knows the future, insofar as it depends on men, not certainly and

infallibly in advance. For otherwise freedom of will was lost, God became

author of sin and Himself subjected to necessity, Fock, der Socin. 437-446.

But such a limitation of God’s omniscience was too much in conflict with

Holy Scripture for it to be able to find acceptance otherwise than with a

few. Christian theology usually seeks the solution in another direction. Two

ways offered themselves for that. On the one hand Origen made a

distinction between the praescientia and the praedestinatio. God indeed

foreknows the things, but this praescientia is not the cause and the ground

of their happening; rather God only foreknows them certainly, because they

will happen in time through the free decision of men; ὀ υ γαρ ἐ πει εγνωσται

On the other side stands Augustine, who also wants to maintain both, the

praescientia and freedom of will. Religiosus animus utrumque eligit,

utrumque confitetur, et fide pietatis utrumque confirmat, de civ. V 9, 10.

But he sees that, if God foreknows something certainly, it must also

necessarily happen; otherwise the whole praescientia again collapsed.

Praescientia, si non certa praenoscit, utique nulla est, de lib. arb. III 4.

Therefore he says that the will of man, with his whole nature, with all his

decisions, is included in the praescientia and is not destroyed by it, but

rather is posited and maintained. Cum enim sit praescius voluntatis nostrae,

cujus est praescius ipsa erit. Voluntas ergo erit, quia voluntatis est praescius,

de lib. arb. III 3. Voluntates nostrae tantum valent, quantum Deus eas valere

voluit atque praescivit; et ideo quidquid valent, certissime valent; et quod

facturae sunt, ipsae omnino facturae sunt; quia valituras atque facturas ille

praescivit, cujus praescientia falli non potest, de civ. V 9. Scholasticism,

although making all kinds of distinctions, in principle aligned itself with

Augustine, Anselmus, de concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis

necnon gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 38.

Bonaventura, ib. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 14. Hugo Vict., de Sacram. I 9 etc.

But the Jesuits brought change, cf. deel I 91 v. In connection with

semipelagianism, between the scientia necessaria and the scientia libera

they inserted still the so-called scientia media, in order by means of this to

reconcile God’s omniscience with man’s freedom. By this they understood

a knowledge of God, logically preceding the decrees, of the

conditionally future. The object of this knowledge is not the merely

possible, which will never become actuality, nor also that which, as a

consequence of a decree of God, will certainly happen, but that possible

which under one or another condition can become actuality. God namely in

his government of the world lets much depend on conditions, and now

knows in advance what He will do, in case the conditions are fulfilled or in

case they are not fulfilled by man. God is thus ready in all cases, He

foresees and knows all possibilities, and with a view to all those

possibilities has taken his measures and made his decisions. He knew in

advance what He would do, if Adam fell and also if he remained standing;

if David went to Keilah or did not go there; if Tyre and Sidon repented or

did not repent etc. The knowledge of the futura conditionata thus precedes

the decree of the futura absoluta; man decides wholly freely and

independently at every moment but can nevertheless never surprise God by

one decision or another or nullify his plans, for on all possibilities God’s

praescientia has been reckoned. This doctrine of the scientia media was

supported with many passages of Scripture, which ascribe to God the

knowledge of what in a given case would happen, when one condition or

another was or was not fulfilled, such as Genesis 11:6, Exodus 3:19, 34:16, Deut.

Cor. 2:8. It was indeed opposed by the Thomists and Augustinians, e.g.

Bannez, the Salmanticenses, Billuart, Summa S. Thomae 1747 I 464 sq.,

but by the Molinists and Congruists Suarez, Bellarminus, Lessius etc. also

zealously defended. Fear of Calvinism and Jansenism benefited the doctrine

of the scientia media in the Roman church, and gradually it found entrance

in a more strict or moderate sense with almost all Roman theologians, cf.

deel I 93, Karl Werner, Der h. Thomas v. Aq. III 389-442. Id. Gesch. der

kath. Theol. 98 f. G. Schneemann, Die Entstehung der thomistischmolinistischen Controverse, Ergänzungshefte zu den Stimmen aus Maria

Laach, no 9. 13. 14. Schwane, D. G. der neuern Zeit S. [164] 37-59.

Petavius, de Deo IV c. 6. 7 etc. The line of Augustine was thereby

abandoned and that of Origen taken up again. Thus the Greek theology had

done from the beginning, Damasc., de fide orth. II c. 30. Roman theology

followed. Also the Lutherans, Gerhard, Loc. II c. 8 sect. 13, Quenstedt,

Theol. I 316, Buddeus, Instit. 217, Reinhard, Dogm. 116 etc., and the

Remonstrants, Episc., Inst. IV sect. 2 c. 19, Limborch, Theol. Chr. II c. 8. §

29 were not disinclined to the scientia media. In more recent times many

teach, approximately in the same way, that God also actually obtains

knowledge from the world as medium scientiae. He indeed knows the

contingent-future as possible in advance, but first learns from the world that

it does or does not become actual. For all cases, however, He knows sein

dem Thun der Creatur, wie es auch ausfalle, angemessenes Thun; He did

indeed establish the schema of the world-plan but leaves the Ausfüllung to

the creature, Dorner, Gl. I 319-323. Rothe, Ethik § 42. Martensen, Dogm. §

116. Kahnis, Dogm. I 343. Grétillat, Theol. syst. III 237 s. Sécretan, La

civilisation et la croyance 1887 p. 260 s. etc. On the other hand, following

in the footsteps of Augustine, such a nuda praescientia and scientia media

were rejected by the Reformed, Voetius, Disp. I 254-258. Twissus, de

scientia media, Op. III p. 1 sq. Turretinus, Theol. El. III qu. 13. Moor, I 659

Now with the scientia media the question does not concern this, whether

things among themselves do not many times stand in a conditional

connection to one another, which is known to God and is willed by Him

Himself. If only this were meant by the scientia media, it could be accepted

without objection, as Gomarus, Disp. theol. X 30 sq. and Walaeus, Loci

Comm. Op. I 174-176, cf. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. r. K. 64, adopted and

acknowledged it in that sense. But the doctrine of the scientia media aims at

something else; it wants to bring the Pelagian conception of the freedom of

the will into agreement with omniscience. The will of creatures namely is

by virtue of its nature indifferent. It can do the one as well as the other. It is

determined neither by its nature nor by the manifold circumstances in which

it is placed. These can exercise influence on the will, but in the end the will

remains free and chooses as it pleases. This freedom of the will is of course

not to be reconciled with a decree of God; it essentially consists in [165]

independentia a decreto Dei. God has not determined that will, but has left

it free; He could not determine it without destroying it. God must, over

against the will of rational creatures, adopt a waiting attitude. He looks on

to see what it will do. But now He is omniscient. He thus knows all

possibilities, all contingently-future things, and also knows the absolutely

future things beforehand. Accordingly He has taken His decrees. If a man in

certain circumstances will accept grace, He has elected him to life; if he

will not believe, He has rejected him. Now it is clear that such a doctrine in

principle deviates from that of Augustine and Thomas. For with these the

foreknowledge precedes the things and nothing can come into being except

through the will of God. Non fit aliquid nisi omnipotens fieri velit, Aug.

Enchir. 95. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 14 art. 9 ad 3. Not the world but the

decrees are the medium from which God knows all things, Thomas, I qu. 14

art. 8. Bonaventura, Sent. II dist. 37 art. 1. qu. 1. And the contingent and

free can therefore be known in its connection and order certainly and

infallibly. It is true that scholasticism on this point sometimes expressed

itself somewhat differently than Augustine. Anselm e.g. said that the

praescientia brought with it no necessitas interna and antecedens but only a

necessitas externa and consequens. Cur Deus homo 16. And Thomas judged

that God indeed knows the futura contingentia eternally and certainly

secundum statum, quo actu sunt, secundum suam praesentialitatem, but that

they in their causae proximae were nevertheless contingent and

undetermined, S. Th. I qu. 14 art. 13. But that does not take away that with

a view to the causa prima they are perfectly certain and thus cannot be

called contingent; and elsewhere Thomas nevertheless also says again,

omne quod est, ex eo futurum fuit antequam esset, quia in causa sua erat ut

fieret, cf. Billuart I 440 sq. But in the doctrine of the scientia media the

contingent and free things also become contingent and free over against

God, and indeed not only over against his praedestinatio but also over

against his praescientia. For, just as with Origen, the things here are not

because God knows them, but God knows them beforehand because they

will be. The order is thus not: scientia necessaria, scientia visionis,

decretum creandi etc., but scientia necessaria, scientia media, decretum

creandi etc., scientia visionis, Jansen, Prael. II 110 sq. God does not know

the free acts of men from his own being, from his decrees, but from

the will of the creatures, Schwane, D. G. IV 52. God thus becomes

dependent on the world, receives knowledge from the world which He

could not have or obtain from himself, and thus in his scientia ceases to be

one, simple, independent, i.e. God. The creature conversely becomes for a

great part wholly independent of God; it did indeed at one time receive the

esse and the posse from God, but it now has the velle wholly in its own

hand. It decides wholly sovereignly and brings something to reality or not,

without a decree of God preceding it. Something can thus come to existence

without God’s will; the creature is creator, autonomous, sovereign; and the

whole history of the world is withdrawn from God’s government and placed

in the hands of man. This one decides and then God comes with his plan

corresponding to that decision. If such a decision now occurred once, e.g.

with Adam, then that was still conceivable; but such decisions of more or

less serious nature occur thousands of times in every human life; what then

is to be thought of a God who always waits upon all those decisions and has

all possible plans ready for all possibilities; what even remains of the

schema of the world-plan, whose Ausfüllung is left to man; and what is a

government worth in which the King is the slave of his subjects? And that is

the case here with God in the scientia media. God looks on and man

decides. It is not God who makes a distinction among men; these

distinguish themselves. Grace is distributed according to merits,

predestination depends on the good works; what Scripture everywhere

combats and Augustine rejected in Pelagius, is by Jesuitism stamped as

orthodox, Roman doctrine, Billuart, I 479. For indeed the proponents of the

scientia media appeal to many places of Holy Scripture, but wholly without

right. For Scripture very certainly acknowledges that things are set by God

in all kinds of connection to one another and that this connection is often

also of a conditional nature, so that the one cannot happen unless something

else is previously fulfilled. Without faith there is no salvation, without labor

no food, etc. But all the texts which the Jesuits cited for the scientia media

do not prove what had to be proved. They do speak of condition and [167]

fulfillment, of obedience and promise, of supposition and consequence, of

what will happen in the one or in the other case. But none of them say that

God, even if it is that He speaks to men in a human way and acts and

negotiates with them in a human way, would not in each particular case

have known and determined what certainly had to happen. Between the

merely possible, which exists only as an idea in God and will never become

actual, and the certainly actual, which is established by God’s decree, there

is no longer any domain that can be governed by the will of man.

Something always belongs either to the one or to the other. If it is only

possible and never becomes actual, it is the object of the scientia necessaria;

and if it indeed becomes actual once, it is the content of the scientia libera.

There lies nothing more between, there is no scientia media. But moreover,

the scientia media also does not attain what it wants to attain. It wants to

reconcile the freedom of the will in the sense of indifferentia with the

praescientia. Now it says that this, conceived as scientia media, does not

make the human actions necessary but leaves them wholly free. And that is

also so, but then it also ceases to be praescientia. If God indeed certainly

knows beforehand what a man in a given case will do, then He can only

foresee this if the motives determine the will in one direction and this thus

does not consist in indifference. Conversely, if this consists in indifferentia,

then no knowledge, no calculation beforehand is possible, then there is only

scientia post factum. God’s praescientia and the will as arbitrariness exclude

one another. Si enim scit, said therefore Cicero already, certe illud eveniet;

sin certe eveniet, nulla fortuna est. Therefore the solution of the problem

must with Augustine be sought in another direction. The freedom of the will

does not consist, as will later appear, in indifferentia, in arbitrariness or

chance, but in lubentia rationalis. And this is so little in conflict with the

praescientia Dei that it is rather posited and maintained by it. The will with

its nature, its antecedents and motives, its decisions and consequences is

included in the ordo causarum, qui certus est Deo ejusque praescientia

continetur, Aug. de civ. V 9. In the knowledge of God the things among

themselves lie precisely in that same connection in which they occur in

reality. It is not the praescientia and not the praedestinatio that now and then

falls in from above and compels, but every decision and action is motivated

by what precedes it. And thus, in that connection, it is included in the

scientia Dei. The contingent and free is, in accordance with its own nature

known and willed by God, inserted into the ordo causarum, which in world

history is gradually made manifest to us.

9. The knowledge of God, considered from another point of view, bears

the name of wisdom. The distinction between the two is generally known.

Almost all languages have different words for these two concepts as well.

Everyone knows that erudition, science, knowledge, and wisdom are far

from being the same and absolutely do not always go together. A simple

man often excels in wisdom above a scholar. Both rest on distinct faculties

in man. We obtain knowledge through study, wisdom through insight. The

former comes about discursively, the latter intuitively. Knowledge is

theoretical; wisdom is practical, teleological, it places knowledge in the

service of an end. Knowledge proceeds apart from the will, wisdom is

indeed a matter of the intellect but is made serviceable to the will.

Knowledge therefore often proceeds entirely apart from life, but wisdom is

most closely connected with life, it is ethical in nature, it is "the art of living

well," the quality, the act of him who makes a right use of his greater skill,

and chooses the best means to the best ends. The etymology already points

to this distinction. Wise (wijs) comes from wijzen, to show, and is the

quality of him who indicates the direction; sapiens, from sapere, cf. σαφης,

to taste, indicates that someone through his own experience has obtained a

correct independent judgment; σοφος probably also hangs together with

σαφης and then has the same basic meaning. Also among the Eastern

peoples we encounter this distinction, but with an important modification.

Just as in the West knowledge stands in the foreground; so in the East

wisdom. The Eastern peoples live much more out of contemplation than out

of abstract thinking; they do not work with concepts but with the images of

the things themselves; they live subjectively closer to their heart and stand

objectively nearer to the immediate reality of life. Not in the head, but in

the heart, in the root of the personality, subject and object meet one another,

and repel one another in the hardest way or attract one another in the

tenderest way. It is as if the substances of things overflow into one another

through sympathy of life. We encounter that Eastern character intensely and

deeply also in Israel. Here too, in its time, the chokma had to arise, ‎‏‏חכמה‎

from ‎‏‏חכם‎ to be firm, dense, solid, subst. soundness, Tüchtigkeit. But here it

came into the service of revelation. Genuine, true wisdom is no fruit of

man’s intellect but is rooted in the fear of the Lord and consists in that

moral Tüchtigkeit, which is directed according to the Lord’s law and reveals

itself in a moral life, Deuteronomy 4:6-8, Psalms 19:8, 111:10, Job 28:28, Spr. 1:7, 9:10.

And when later insight penetrated more deeply into the revelation of God in

nature and in law, it obtained an independent place, it developed a literature

of its own and rendered its thoughts in a form of its own, in the form of

proverbs, ‎‏‏ְמָׁשלֹות‎. Alongside understanding and knowledge, wisdom is now

also ascribed to God in Scripture. He has, speaking through the word,

40:8, 48:13. In the first period, in creation especially God’s power and

exaltedness are noticed. But gradually the Israelite spirit, nourished and

guided by the fear of the Lord, penetrates more deeply into nature and law,

and admires in them his adorable wisdom. Both, the world and the

revelation of God under Israel, are derived from that wisdom, Job 9:4,

and in Spr. 8:22 ff., Job 28:23 ff., that wisdom, through and with which God

has brought forth all things, is presented personally. The N. Test. carries this

line further and not only ascribes wisdom to God in various places, Romans 16:27, 1 Timothy 1:17, Judas 25, Op. 5:12, 7:12, but also says that the world

has been created through the word of God, John 1:2, Hebr. 11:3, and sees

God’s wisdom especially revealed in the folly of the cross, 1 Corinthians 1:18, in

Christ, 1 Corinthians 1:24, in the church, Ef. 3:10, in the whole guidance of God

with Israel and the Gentiles, Romans 11:33. Cf. Hooykaas, Wisdom among

Hebrews 1862, J. F. Bruch, Die Weisheitslehre der Hebräer 1851. Burger

art. Weisheit in Herzog2. Oehler, Die Grundzüge der altt. Weisheit 1854. Id.

Theol. des A. T. § 235 f. Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 548 f. Delitzsch, Comm.

über das Salom. Spruchbuch, Einl. Cremer, Wörterbuch s. v. σοφος. König,

Der Offenbarungsbegriff des A. T. 1882 I 194 f. Smend, Lehrb. der

altt. Rel. S. 508 f. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 168, 169. Frank, Syst. der chr.

This doctrine of Scripture concerning the Divine word and the Divine

wisdom was in particular brought by Philo into connection with the ἰ δεαι.

Thereby the foundation was laid for the doctrine of the Logos, which is

discussed further in the locus de trinitate. But the doctrine of ideas of Plato

later once again had a powerful influence on Christian theology, and now

through neo-Platonism. Thus it came to Augustine, who assigned it a place

in theology. But naturally he had to modify it on important points for that

purpose. In the first place, the ideas are not a world of their own, κοσμος

νοητος, alongside and outside God, but they are in God and constitute the

content of his thinking. Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse nisi in

mente creatoris, 83 qu. qu. 46. Gen. ad litt. IV 6, 24, 29. V 13. They are

God’s thoughts about all that is created, both before and after the creation

and thus eternal and unchangeable, for there can be nothing in God except

what is eternal and unchangeable, ib. en de trin. IV 1. de civ. XI 5. In Deo

enim novum exstitisse consilium, ne dicam impium, ineptissimum est

dicere, de ord. II 17. Yet those ideas in God’s intellect are not one with his

self-knowledge nor also with the Logos or the Son, as earlier patres had

sometimes said. Augustine maintains the essential distinction between God

and world and avoids pantheism. Aliter ergo in illo sunt, quae per illum

facta sunt; aliter autem in illo sunt ea, quae ipse est, de Gen. ad litt. II 6. On

the other hand, Augustine cannot think otherwise than that God has created

all things according to ideas. In that his wisdom is manifested. Sic ergo

sapientia Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, secundum artem continet omnia,

antequam fabricet omnia, tract. 1 in Ev. Joan. Omnia ratione sunt condita,

83 qu. qu. 46 n. 2. Non enim quidquam fecit ignorans. Nota ergo fecit, non

facta cognovit, de Gen. ad litt. V 8. de trin. XV 13. de civ. XI 10. Creation

is a realization of God’s thoughts. Therefore there also exists between the

ideas and the creatures a close connection. The ideas are the examples and

forms of things, principales formae, rationes rerum, stabiles atque

incommutabiles, 83 qu. qu. 46 n. 2; and therefore not only of the species but

of all individual things. Cum omnia ratione sint condita, singula igitur

proprisis sunt creata rationibus, ib. en de civ. XI 10. de Gen. ad litt. III 12,

14. V 14, 15. But yet this view is not always maintained. Sometimes the

ideas in Augustine also appear again as types and examples, which

gradually realize themselves and are first perfectly realized in the new

heaven and the new earth, de Gen. ad litt. V 11. Nor is the connection clear,

in which according to Augustine the ideas and the creatures stand. The ideas

are in God not only as examples, but they are also active forces, immanent

principia in the things. He therefore preferred the translation of ἰ δεαι by

rationes above that of Cicero by formae or species, 83 quaest. qu. 46. de

Gen. ad litt. I 18, II 16, IX 18. The ideas are, as it were, laid down in the

things themselves. Ideas and creatures do not stand dualistically as

παραδειγματα and ὁ μοιωματα, as true and untrue, as unchangeable and

changeable alongside and over against one another, but the ideas are the

soul and the principle of things; the movement belongs to the creatures ex

illis insitis rationibus, de Gen. ad litt IV 33. And furthermore the causality

of the ideas is nevertheless always again mediated by the will of God; this

is the proper and final cause of the being of things, de civ. XXI, 8, cf.

Gangauf, Metaph. Psych. des h. Aug. S. 77 f. Ritter, Gesch. der chr. Philos.

II 310 f. Dr. E. Melzer, Des Aug. Lehre vom Kausalitätsverhältniss Gottes

zur Welt 1892 S. 5 f. Besides in Augustine, we also find this doctrine of

ideas in Clemens Alex. Strom. IV c. 25, V c. 3. Tertull. de an. 18. Eusebius,

Praep. evang. l. 14 c. 44. Orig. op John 1:1. Dionysius, de div. nom. c. 5. and

later in Anselmus, Monol. c. 8 sq. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 35. Thomas, S.

Theol. I qu. 15. qu. 44 art. 3. S. c. G. 54. Sent. I dist. 36. Bonaventura, Sent.

I dist. 35. Petavius, Theol. dogm. IV c. 9-11. Scheeben, Kath. Dogm. I 657

f. Simar, Lehrb. der Dogm. 3e Aufl. Freiburg 1893 S. 147 f., and also in

Reformed theologians such as Polanus, Synt. theol. p. 267. 268. Zanchius,

Op. II col. 201. Voetius, Disp. I 258 sq. Twissus, de scientia media 1639 p.

312 sq. Later this doctrine of ideas has almost entirely disappeared from

dogmatics. The word idea has also changed in meaning in more recent

philosophy. Formerly one understood by idea the example of things in the

creative spirit of God, while concept was the imprint of things in the

knowing spirit. But in the new philosophy idea has become the

designation for those concepts which are obtained not from sensible

perception but by pure thinking (Cartesius), of which there is no experience

and thus no scientific certainty (Kant), which can be recognized only

immediately in feeling or reason (Jacobi). Yet usage still often recalls, at

least in our and in the German language, the old meaning. The word still

always, especially in the field of art, includes the thought of an objective

example, παραδειγμα, and therefore of an ideal perfection. One then speaks

of the idea of God, freedom, art, science, the true, the good, the beautiful,

etc. Applied to God, the idea expresses that God has made all things with

wisdom, that wisdom is the firstling of his way, ἀ ρχη της κτισεως is, Spr.

8:22, Colossians 1:15, Op. 3:14. God is no less than an artist. Just as this one

realizes his idea in the work of art, so God creates all things according to

the thoughts which he has formed. The world is a work of art of God. He is

artist and builder of the whole universe. God does not work unconsciously,

but in all his works is guided by wisdom, by his ideas. But there is also a

difference between God and an earthly artist. God’s thoughts are absolutely

original, taken from his own being, eternal, unchangeable; indeed, they are

one with his Divine being. The ideas in God are the essentia Dei itself,

insofar as this is the example of created things and can be expressed and

imitated in finite creatures. Every creature is a revelation of God and

participates in the Divine being. The nature of this participation does not

consist in this, that the creatures are modifications of God’s being, or that

the creatures have received that being of God realiter into themselves. But

every creature has its own being, because in its existence it is an ectype of

the Divine being. Because of the multiplicity and the richness of God’s

ideas, realized in the created, the wisdom of God is to be called

πολυποικιλος, Ef. 3:10. But nevertheless the wisdom of God is one and his

idea of the world is one, gradually unfolding in the course of the centuries

and leading the real onward to the intended goal. By reason of this

archetypal character of the ideas in God there is also no proper idea of sin

as such. Sin, after all, is not a proper being, but a diminution of being, a

deformation; it is indeed object and content of God’s knowledge, it is

indeed made serviceable by the wisdom of God to his glory; but it is in

itself no idea of his wisdom, no ray of his light, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 15 art.

3. Yet that wisdom does come to expression in the creation, the ordering,

the guidance and government of all things. It is and remains the ‎‏‏ ָאמֹון‎,

opifex, Spr. 8:30, ἡ των παντων τεχνιτις, Wijsh. 7:21, which creates,

governs, and leads all things onward to their destination, i.e. to the

glorification of God’s name.

10. Among the virtues of God’s intellect there finally belongs also the

truthfulness of God. The Hebr. word ‎‏‏אמת‎, ‎‏‏אמונה‎, adi. ‎‏‏אמן‎ comes from the

verb. ‎‏‏אמן‎ to make firm, build, support, intr. to be firm, hi. to hold fast to,

trust in, be certain of something, and denotes, subj. the holding fast to

something, faith, πιστις, and obj. the firmness, reliability, truth of the person

or the thing on which one relies. The Hebr. words are in the LXX now

and thus in Dutch by true, truthful, faithful; the concept ἀ ληθεια had in

ordinary Greek and thus also in LXX and N. T. too definite a meaning for it

to be able sufficiently to render the Hebr. words, it therefore had to be

supplemented by the words πιστος etc. Already the name Ihvh expresses

that He remains who He is. He is truth and without injustice, ‎‏‏ָעֶול‎,

There lies here both in it, both that He is the true, essential God over against

the idols, which are ‎‏‏ֲהָבִלים‎, Deuteronomy 32:21 etc., and that He as such at all times

keeps and makes true His words and promises, so that He is perfectly

reliable. For He is not a man, that He should lie or have regret, Numbers 23:19,

1 Samuel 15:29. All that proceeds from Him bears the stamp of truth.

Repeatedly there is mention of His beneficence, ‎‏‏ֶחֶסד‎, and faithfulness, Gen.

‎‏‏ֶחֶסד‎, and truth, Genesis 24:27, Exodus 34:6, Psalms 57:4, 61:8, 89:15 etc. His words,

ordinances, paths, works, commandments, laws, are all pure truth, 2 Sam.

and faithfulness reveals itself on earth so richly and gloriously, that it

reaches unto the clouds, Psalms 36:6, Exodus 34:6. He confirms His word

repeatedly by swearing by Himself, Genesis 22:16 etc., Hebr. 6:13. Therefore

He is many times called a rock, which by His unchangeable firmness offers

support to His favorites, Deuteronomy 32:4, 15, 18, 30, 37 and in many proper

truth and of faithfulness He keeps the covenant, Deuteronomy 4:31, 7:9, Psalms 40:11,

Hosea 12:1 etc. and He is a perfectly reliable refuge for all His people, Ps.

is called in the N. T. the ἀ ληθινος θεος; i.e. only that God is the true,

essential God, who has revealed Himself in Christ, John 17:3, 1 John 5:20.

And all that He reveals is pure truth. He is a θεος ἀ ληθης in contrast with

all men, John 3:33, Romans 3:4. His word is the truth, His gospel is truth,

Christ is the truth, John 14:6, 17:17, Ef. 1:13. Yes, He is now still, who He

always was. The N. Test. is fulfillment and confirmation of His promises in

the days of the O. V. He has thought of His covenant and oath, Luke 1:68-

73. He is faithful, πιστος, in that He is and remains the God of the covenant

All His promises are in Christ yes and amen, 2 Corinthians 1:18, 20. Christ is ὁ

μαρτυς ὁ πιστος, Openb. 1:5, 3:14, 19:11. And therefore He is and can be

the unchangeable object of our πιστις, cf. Wendt, Der Gebrauch der Wörter

ἀ ληθεια, ἀ ληθης und ἀ ληθινος im N. T., Stud. u. Krit. 1883 S. 511-547.

Cremer, Wörterbuch 1895 S. 109-126.

Scripture thus uses the word truth in different senses. And philosophy also

usually distinguishes a threefold concept of truth, namely veritas in essendo

(in rebus), in significando (in verbis), in cognoscendo (in intellectu), or

veritas metaphysica, ethica and logica, Liberatore, Inst. philos. ed. 8,

Romae 1855 I 70 sq. Schmid, Der Begriff des Wahren in Gutberlet’s Philos.

in Marck I 676. Metaphysical, ontological truth consists in this, that

some object, a person or thing, is all that which belongs to its essence. Thus

gold, which not only looks like gold, but essentially is, is genuine, true,

veritable gold. Truth in this sense stands over against falsity, spuriousness,

vanity, non-being. It is a property of all being as being; it is one with the

substance. Augustine in particular often spoke of truth in this meaning. All

being is as such true and beautiful and good. There is indeed rich diversity

in the measure of being; there is a difference of degree among creatures.

But all things have nevertheless received being from God pro suo modo and

participate in the divine being, cf. e.g. de civ. XI 23, de nat. boni c. Manich.

c. 19. But from this being of creatures Augustine ascends to God. In

Scripture God is called the true one over against the idols, which are vanity.

And thus in Augustine God is the true, only, simple, unchangeable, eternal

being. Compared with his being, the being of creatures is to be regarded as

a non-being. God is summum esse, summa veritas, summum bonum. He is

pure essentia. He does not have, but he is the truth. O veritas quae vere es,

Conf. X 41. VII 10. XII 25. But further, God is also the truth in the second

above-mentioned, i.e. in the ethical sense. By veritas ethica is to be

understood the agreement between someone’s essence and his revelation, in

word or in deed. He who says otherwise than he thinks is untruthful, a liar.

Truth in this sense stands over against lie. Now in God there is perfect

agreement between his being and his revelation, Numbers 23:19, 1 Samuel 15:29,

Titus 1:2, Hebr. 6:18. It is impossible that God should lie or deny himself.

And finally God is also the truth in the logical sense. This consists in

agreement of thinking with reality, conformitas or adaequatio intellectus et

rei. Our concepts are true when they are a pure imprint of reality. In this

sense truth stands over against error. God is now also for that reason the

truth, because he knows all things as they really are. His knowing is correct,

unchangeable, adequate. Yes, in his knowing he is truth itself, just as in his

being he is ontological truth. The knowledge of God is living, absolute,

adequate truth. It is not obtained from investigation and reflection upon

things, but is essential in God and precedes things [176]. It is one with the

essence of God and is thus substantial truth. Therefore also his word, his

law, his gospel are pure truth. They are all as they must be. Now these three

meanings of the concept of truth are indeed distinct, but they are

nevertheless also again one. This unity consists in this, that truth always in

all three meanings is agreement of thinking and being, of ideal and real

being. God is the truth in the metaphysical sense, for he is the unity of

thinking and being. He is perfectly self-conscious. He is God in the true

sense, fully corresponding to the idea of God, which is in himself. He is the

truth in the ethical sense, for he reveals himself, speaks, acts, appears as he

truly is and thinks. And he is the truth in the logical sense, for he thinks

things as they are, or rather, things are as he thinks them. He is the truth in

the full, absolute sense. And therefore he is the prima veritas, the original

truth, the source of all truth, the truth in all truth; the ground of truth, of the

true being of all things, of their knowability and thinkability; the ideal and

the archetype of all truth, of all ethical being, of all rules and laws

according to which the essence and the revelation of all things must be

judged and normed; the source and the origin of all knowledge of the truth

in every domain, the light in which we alone can see the light, the sun of

spirits. Te invoco Deus veritas, in quo et a quo et per quem vera sunt, quae

vera sunt omnia, Aug. Solil. I 1. Cf. further Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 16 and

17. I, 2 qu. 3 art. 7. S. c. Gent. I c. 59-62. III c. 51. Bonaventura, Sent. I

dist. 8 art. 1. Scheeben, Kath. Dogm. I 578 f. 663 f. Gerhard, Loci Theol. II

c. 8 sect. 16. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 27. Zanchius, Op. II col. 226-242. L.

Meyer, Treatises on the Div. attributes IV pp. 1-88.

## D. God as the Holy One.

11. Among the ethical virtues the first place belongs to the goodness of

God. This is also known from nature. With Plato the idea of the good was

one with the Deity. But the word good has different senses. The original and

first meaning of good seems to indicate not an inner quality but a

relation to something else. With Socrates the good was identical with the

useful, with what was good, serviceable, useful for another, Xen., Memor.

IV 6, 8 v.; an absolute good therefore does not exist, there is only a relative

good; utility and harm are the standard of good and evil. Greek ethics

remained at this standpoint; the question concerning the highest good

coincides with that concerning happiness; good is that which all desire,

Plato, Symp. 204 E. v. Arist. Nic. Eth. I 2. Hence the common definition:

bonum est id quod omnia appetunt, e. g. in Dionys., de div. nom. c. 4.

Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 5 art. 1. qu. 16 art. 1 en 3. S. c. Gent. I c. 38. 40.

Sent. I dist. 8 art. 3. Utilitarian morality adheres to this meaning of the word

good, and bases its doctrine on it, cf. Paulsen, System der Ethik 1889 S. 171

f. Wundt, Ethik 1886 S. 18 f. And Fr. Nietzsche has built his whole

revolution of morality on it; good originally meant as much as noble,

strong, powerful, beautiful, and bad was the designation of the simple,

common man, Zur Genealogie der Moral S. 6. Now the word good indeed

often has this meaning, when we speak of a good house, a good friend, etc.,

and thereby indicate that a person or thing possesses certain properties and

is good for something. Good then has no content of its own, but receives it

from the end for which someone or something must serve, and therefore

varies in meaning among the different peoples. The Greek thinks of beauty

in it, καλοκαγαθια, the Roman of noble birth and wealth, the Germanic of

what is fitting and tüchtig; and in connection with that the meaning of

ἀ ρετη, virtus, virtue, also differs. This good in a general sense contains

under itself the useful, the pleasant, the aesthetic and the ethical good,

bonum utile, bonum delectabile and bonum honestum, Thomas, S. Theol. I

qu. 5 art. 6, I 2 qu. 99 art. 5 etc. In all these meanings good is still a relative

concept and denotes id quod omnia appetunt. But yet the word does not fit

in this meaning. We also speak of a bonum in se. The meaning of good as

bonum morale or honestum forms the transition to that. The moral good is

good in itself, abstracted from all advantageous or disadvantageous

consequences; it has absolute value. According to Scripture God is the sum

of all perfections. All virtues are present in Him in an absolute sense.

Scripture calls Him only a few times good in an absolute sense,

5:48. But whatever virtue it ascribes to God, it always proceeds from the

presupposition that this belongs to Him in an absolute sense. Knowledge,

wisdom, power, love, righteousness, etc. belong to Him in an entirely

unique, i.e. divine, way. This His goodness is therefore one with His

absolute perfection. In Him idea and reality are one. He is pure ε ἰ δος, actus

purissimus. He needs to become nothing, but is what He is eternally. He has

no end outside himself, but is self-sufficient, ἐ ξαρκης, παναρκης,

α ὐ ταρκης, Psalms 50:9 v., Jes. 40:28 v., Habakkuk 2:20. He receives nothing but only

gives. Everything has Him, He has need of nothing or no one. He always

intends himself, because He cannot rest in something less than himself.

Because He himself is the absolutely-good, the perfect, He can and may

love something else only in and for himself. He can and may not be

satisfied with less than absolute perfection. Where He loves others, He

loves in them himself, his own virtues, works, gifts. On the goodness of

God, in the sense of perfection, cf. August., de nat. boni c. Manich. 1, de

trin. VIII 3. Pseudodion., de div. nom. c. 13. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 4-6, c.

Gent. I 28. Petavius, de Deo VI c. 1 sq. Gerhard, Loc. II c. 8 sect. 10. 17.

Zanchius, Op. II 138 sq. 326 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 9 etc. Therefore

He is also absolutely blessed in himself, as the sum of all good, of all

perfection. Aristotle already said that God was therefore the blessed one,

because He was the unity of thinking and thought and above all desiring,

striving, willing, completely exalted, Zeller III3 367 f. And at all times

those who placed the primacy in the intellect have attached themselves to

Aristotle and sought blessedness in thinking, knowing, contemplation, cf.

Thomas S. Theol. I 2 qu. 3 art. 4. There was truth in this, insofar as absolute

blessedness is a state of rest, is not compatible with any striving toward an

end and also presupposes consciousness. Blessedness belongs only to

rational beings. The unconscious in von Hartmann, just like the will in

Schopenhauer, is absolute unblessedness, which itself needs redemption,

Hartmann, Philos. des Unbew. II9 434. Religionsphilosophie II 152 f.

Drews therefore also says that the property of perfection cannot be ascribed

to God; a perfect God would be a totes Abstraktum and would not be

able to explain the world; a God who had everything, who was perfectly

blessed and sufficient to himself, has no need of change, no world, Die

deutsche Spekulation seit Kant, II 593 f. But precisely this doctrine of the

absolute unblessedness of God makes one cautious about ascribing the

primacy to the will in God and man, as Duns Scotus and many after him

did. Much more correct therefore is the standpoint of Bonaventura, who

placed blessedness in both, in intellect and will, Sent. IV dist. 49 pars 1 art.

1 qu. 4, 5. Just as the blessedness of man will encompass soul and body and

all his faculties, so in God it consists not only in his perfect knowledge but

likewise in his perfect power, goodness, holiness, etc. Beatitudo status est

omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus, Boethius, de cons. philos. 4. On

the blessedness of God, August. de civ. Dei XII 1. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu.

26, Gerhard, Loc. II c. 8 sect. 19. Zanchius, II 155 sq. Polanus, II c. 17. But

what is good in itself is good also for others. And God as the perfect and

blessed one is the highest good for his creatures, bonum summum quod

omnia appetunt; fons bonorum omnium; bonum omnis boni; bonum unum

necessarium et sufficiens, finis bonorum omnium, Psalms 4:7, 8, 73:25, 26. He

alone is the bonum quo sit fruendum, but creatures are bona, quibus sit

utendum, August. de doctr. chr. I c. 3 sq. de trin. X 10. Lombardus, Sent. I

dist. 1. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 1. Augustine in particular has often

presented God thus as summum bonum, de trin. VIII 3, Enarr. in Ps. 26, de

doctr. chr. I 7, cf. Anselmus, Prosl. c. 23-25. In Him is everything and in

Him alone is what all creatures seek and need. He is the summum bonum

for all creatures, though for these in different measure, according as they

share more or less in his goodness, can enjoy Him more or less. He is the

one toward whom all creatures consciously or unconsciously, willingly or

unwillingly strive, the object of all desire. And the creature finds no rest

except in God alone, August. Conf. I 1. Thus the highest good was at all

times placed in God by Christian theology, and it did not occur to thought to

seek that highest good in any moral act or virtue of the creature, in duty

(Kant), in the kingdom of God (Ritschl), in love (Drummond) or in any

other creature. But further, as summum bonum God is also the abundant

fountain of all goods, Ned. Gel. art. 1. Deus, cum perfecte bonus sit,

perpetuo beneficus est, Athenagoras, Leg. pro christ. n. 26. There is no good

in any creature except from and through Him. He is the causa efficiens,

exemplaris et finalis of all good, however distinct this may be in the

creatures. All natural, moral and spiritual good has its origin in Him. Holy

Scripture is a hymn of praise to the goodness of the Lord. From it creation

is derived, and all life and blessing for man and for beast, Ps. 8, 19, 36:6-8,

65:12, 147:9, Matthew 5:45, Hd. 14:17, Jak. 1:17. It extends over all his works,

Psalms 145:9 and endures forever, Ps. 136. Time and again the whole creation

is called upon to praise God’s goodness, 1 Chronicles 16:34, 2 Chronicles 5:13, Psalms 34:9,

Dionysius, de div. nom. c. 4, who depicts the goodness of God in an exalted

way and compares it to the sun, which illuminates everything, Thomas, S.

Theol. I qu. 6, especially art. 4. c. Gent. I c. 40, 41. Petavius, de Deo VI c.

3. Gerhard, Loc. II c. 8 sect. 10. Polanus, Synt. Theol. II c. 20. Zanchius,

Op. II col. 326-342 etc. This goodness of God appears in different forms,

according to the objects to which it is directed. Closely related to it is

lovingkindness, ‎‏‏ֶחֶסד‎ a. v. ‎‏‏חסד‎, stringere, to bind, χρηστοτης, related to

πραυτης, 2 Corinthians 10:1. Sometimes it is used in a general sense, 1 Chronicles 16:34,

but mostly it denotes God’s special favor toward his people, the affection

with which He is bound to his favorites, to Joseph, Genesis 39:21, Israel, Numbers 5:8. It is connected with God’s covenant, Nehemiah 1:5, is the principle of

comfort, Psalms 119:76, endures eternally, Jes. 54:8, 10 and is better than life,

Psalms 63:4. In all its richness it has been revealed in Christ, Romans 2:4, 2 Corinthians 10:1, Ef. 2:7, Colossians 3:12, Titus 3:4 and now shows itself to believers, leading

them to repentance, Romans 2:4, 11:22, Galatians 5:22, cf. Delitzsch on Psalms 4:4.

Cremer s. v. ἐ λεος. The goodness of God is called, when it is shown to the

wretched, mercy, ‎‏‏ָרֲחִמים‎, σπλαγχνα, viscera, misericordia, N. T. ἐ λεος,

ο ἰ κτιρμος. Of this mercy of God Scripture makes mention at every moment,

145:8 etc., in contrast with men, 2 Samuel 24:14, Spr. 12:10, Daniel 9:9, 18. It is

end, Lamentations 3:22, tender as of a father, Psalms 103:13, is shown to thousands, Ex.

Jeremiah 12:15, 30:18, 31:20, Hosea 2:22, Mich. 7:19 etc. In the N. T. God, the

Father of mercies, 2 Corinthians 1:3, has revealed his mercy in Christ, Luke 1:50 v.,

who is a merciful high priest, Matthew 18:27, 20:34 etc. Hebr. 2:17 and He

further shows the riches of his mercy, Ef. 2:4 in the salvation of believers,

Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 21 art. 3. Zanchius, Op. II 370 sq. Polanus, Synt.

theol. II c. 23. Gerhard, Loc. II c. 8 sect. 11. The sparing goodness of God

toward those deserving punishment is called longsuffering, ‎‏ַ‏רּו‎ or ‎‏‏ֹאֶרך ַאַּפִים‎,

μακροθυμια, ἀ νοχη, χρηστοτης. More than once this virtue of God is also

spoken of in Scripture, Exodus 34:6, Numbers 14:18, Nehemiah 9:17, Psalms 86:15, 103:8,

145:8, Jonah 4:2, Joel 2:13, Nahum 1:3. It has shown itself in the whole time

before Christ, Romans 3:25, and is also now still, after the example of Christ,

3:20, Polanus, Synt. Theol. II c. 24. Much richer is the goodness of God

where it is shown to such as have deserved nothing good but all evil; then it

bears the name of grace, ‎‏‏ֵחן‎, ‎‏‏ְתִחָּנה‎ a. v. ‎‏‏ָחַנן‎ to bow, incline, χαρις, v. χαριζομαι

This word also denotes the favor which is found by one man with another

Used of God, however, it never has the creatures in general nor the Gentiles

either, but only his people as its object. It is shown to Noah, Genesis 6:8,

meek and wretched, Spr. 3:34, Daniel 4:27, and then especially to Israel as a

people. His election and guidance, his deliverance and redemption and all

the benefits which it received in distinction from other peoples, are due only

psalmody and prophecy, the ground tone is always: not unto us, O Lord, but

unto thy name give glory, Psalms 115:1. He does everything for his name’s

therefore that grace is also time and again praised and glorified, Exodus 34:6, 2

Zach. 12:10. In the N. Test. that grace appears to be still richer and deeper

in content. Χαρις means in an objective sense beauty, pleasantness, grace,

Luke 4:22, Colossians 4:6, Ef. 4:29, and subjectively favor, affection on the side of

the giver and thanks, veneration on the side of the receiver. In God it

denotes his voluntary, unowed, undeserved affection, which is shown to

guilty sinners and in place of the sentence of death grants them the

δικαιοσυνη and the ζωη. As such it is a virtue and attribute of God, Romans 5:15, 1 Petr. 5:10, which shows itself in the sending of Christ, who is full of

grace, John 1:14 v., 1 Petr. 1:13 and further in the bestowal of all kinds of

spiritual and bodily benefits, which are all gifts of grace and are themselves

exclude all merits on man’s side altogether, John 1:17, Romans 4:4, 16, 6:14,

23, 11:5 v., Ef. 2:8, Galatians 5:3, 4, Schultz, Altt. Theol. 425 f. Cremer s. v. The

doctrine of grace was first developed in the Christian church by Augustine,

but in doing so one usually did not think of grace as a virtue of God, but of

the benefits which were bestowed by God out of grace in Christ upon the

church. Among the attributes of God grace is usually not treated. Yet this

concept of grace, namely as virtus Dei, is not lacking; Thomas says e. g.

quandoque tamen gratia Dei dicitur ipsa aeterna dilectio, secundum quod

dicitur etiam gratia praedestinationis, in quantum Deus gratuito et non ex

meritis aliquos praedestinavit sive elegit, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 110 art. 1., cf.

Schwetz, Theol. dogm. cath. I 1851 p. 193. Gerhard, Loc. II c. 8 sect. 11 qu.

4. Musculus, Loci Communes 1567 p. 317 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 21.

Zanchius Op. II 342-358, but immediately grace is nevertheless taken in a

broader sense, as it must first later in dogmatics, in the locus de

salute, come up for discussion. Cf. also Lange, art. Gnade in Herzog2,

Dogm. II § 18. Further, the goodness of God appears as love, when it gives

not only certain benefits, but itself. In the O. Test. this love as an attribute of

God is not yet spoken of so often, but nevertheless it is absolutely not

virtues and attributes, such as right and righteousness, Psalms 11:7, 33:5, 37:28,

45:8, but also persons are its object, Psalms 78:68, 146:8, Spr. 3:12, Deuteronomy 4:37,

love of God comes to light in the N. T., now that God has given himself in

the Son of his love. The Hebr. ‎‏‏ַאֲהָבה‎ is not rendered by ἐ ρως, which is the

usual name for sensual love, nor by φιλια, the word for love between blood

relatives, but by ἀ γαπη, which is foreign to ordinary Greek and also does

not occur in Philo and Josephus but is precisely suited to denote the full,

pure, divine love, just like the Latin caritas (dilectio) in distinction from

amor. The relation of Father and Son is depicted as a life of love, John 3:35,

has shown his love in his surrender, John 15:13, that love also reveals itself

toward men, not only the world or the church in general, John 3:16, Romans 17:23, Romans 9:13, Galatians 2:20. Yes, God does not love, but He is love, 1 John 4:8, and his love is foundation, source, example of ours, 1 John 4:10. Now

one can indeed speak of God’s love in general toward the creatures and

toward men, φιλοκτισια, amor complacentiae and φιλανθρωπια, amor

benevolentiae, but Scripture nevertheless mostly uses the word goodness

for that, and as a rule speaks of God’s love, just like of his grace, only in

relation to the people or the church which He has chosen, ἐ λεκτοφιλια,

amor amicitiae, Oehler, Theol. des Alt. Test. § 81. Schultz, Altt. Theol. 545

f. Smend, Altt. Religionsgesch. 197 f. Cremer, s. v. This love is now indeed

not in the sense the essence of God, that it constitutes the center and the

heart in it and the other attributes are its modes, Schleiermacher, Chr.

Gl. § 167. Schoeberlein, Princip u. System der Dogm. 1881 S. 129. Dorner,

Glaub. I 437. Oosterzee, Dogm. § 50, for all attributes are his essence in an

equal sense; in God there is no higher and lower, no less and more, Lange,

Dogm. II 203. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, I3 S. 105. Doedes,

Leer van God 231. But nevertheless love is most certainly identical with the

divine essence. It is independent, eternal, unchangeable as God himself. It

has in Him its origin and also returns through the creatures to Him again.

Pseudodionysius therefore spoke of divine love tamquam sempiternus

circulus, propter bonum, ex bono, in bono, et ad bonum indeclinabili

conversione circumiens, in eodem et secundum idem et procedens semper

et manens et remeans, de div. nom. c. 4 § 14. Cf. Augustinus, de trin. VIII

6-12. IX 6. X 1. Conf. IV 12. Solil. I 2. de vera relig. c. 46. Lombardus,

Sent. III dist. 32, 1. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 20. S. c. Gent. I c. 91.

Scheeben, Dogm. I 692 f. Gerhard, Loci theol. loc. II c. 8 sect. 11 qu. 2.

Zanchius, Op. II 359 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 22.

12. Closely related to goodness is the holiness of God. Formerly it was

defined as ab omni scelere libera et omnino perfecta et omni ex parte

immaculata puritas, Pseudodion., de div. nom. c. 12 § 2, cf. further

Suicerus, s. v. ἁ γιος. Often it is not treated separately alongside the bonitas,

perfectio and pulchritudo Dei; neither Lombardus nor Thomas bring it up.

Among the Protestant theologians the definition of the holiness of God was

essentially the same; it consisted in moralis perfectio, puritas, Polanus,

Synt. theol. II c. 28. Synopsis, VI 40. Mastricht, Theor. pract. theol. II c. 19.

L. Meyer, Treatise on the Divine attributes III 115 ff. and was now

connected more with righteousness, then with goodness, and also

sometimes with the truthfulness and wisdom of God, Heppe, Dogm. der ev.

ref. K. S. 73, cf. Bretschneider, Syst. Entw. 382 f. Hase, Hutt. Rediv. § 63.

The investigation of the biblical concept holy, however, has gradually

caused another view to arise. All now acknowledge that the concept of

holiness in O. and N. T. expresses a relation of God to the world. But there

is disagreement about what kind and character that relation is. Menken

thought in that connection, with an eye to texts such as Hosea 11:9, Jes.

57:15, Ezech. 20:9 ff., of God’s condescending goodness and grace,

Versuch einer Anleitung zum eigenen Unterricht in den Wahrh. der h. S. 3te

Aufl. 1833 cap. 1 § 9. Baudissin, however, held that in the holiness of God

rather his absolute exaltation and power above all creatures was expressed,

Stud. zur semit. Religionsgesch., 2tes Heft, Leipzig 1878 S. 3-142, and in

this opinion was supported by Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. II2 89 f., and also by

Prof. H. P. Smith, Presb. and Ref. Rev. Jan. 1890 p. 42 etc. with appeal to

the connection of glorious, exalted with holy in passages such as Jes. 63:15,

64:11, Jeremiah 17:12, Ezech. 20:40 etc. Related to that is the view of Schultz,

who in the holiness of God thinks of God’s consuming majesty, of his

unapproachability and inviolability, of the infinite distance that separates

him from every creature, and for that refers to Exodus 15:11, 1 Samuel 2:2, 6:20,

Jes. 6:3, 8:14, 10:17, Altt. Theol.4 554 f., cf. also Kuenen, G. v. Isr. I 47 ff.

Hofmann, Schriftbeweis I2 83, in the main also Smend, Altt.

Religionsgesch. 333 f. Because there was thus the greatest difference over

which attribute of God was nevertheless indicated by holiness, others have

thought that this concept indicates no inner, essential quality at all, but only

a relation, and thus is purely and only a Verhältnissbegriff. First holiness

was understood in this way by Diestel, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1859 S. 3-62, and

since then it is accepted by many as the correct one, especially by Otto

Schmoller, Die Bedeutung von ‎‏‏קדׁש‎ im A. T., in Festgruss an Rudolf von

Todt zum Dr. jubiläum, von seinen Freunden u. Schülern, Stuttgart 1893 S.

39-43, cf. also Delitzsch art. Heiligkeit in Herzog2. Cremer, Wörterbuch s.

v. Issel, Der Begriff der Heiligkeit im N. T. Leiden, 1887. R. Schröter, Der

Begriff der Heiligkeit im A. u. N. T. Leipzig, Fock 1892. Hoekstra, Wijsg.

Godsd. II 260-280.

The stem ‎‏‏קדׁש‎, related to ‎‏‏הדׁש‎, is mostly derived from the root ‎‏‏קד‎ with the

meaning of cutting, separating, and thus expresses: being cut off, being set

apart. The verb occurs in ni. pi. hi. hithp., the adj. is ‎‏‏ָקדֹוׁש‎ and the subst. ‎‏‏ֹקֶדׁש‎;

the oppositum is ‎‏‏ֹחל‎, κοινος of ‎‏‏ִחֵּלל‎, κοινον facere, Leviticus 10:10, 1 Samuel 21:5,

6, Ezech. 48:14, 15. It is related to but yet also clearly distinguished

from ‎‏‏ָטהֹור‎, clean, which has as oppositum ‎‏‏ָטֵמא‎, Leviticus 10:10. The word holy is

now in the first place used of all kinds of persons and things, which are set

apart from common use and are placed in a special relation to God and his

service. Thus there is mention of holy land, Exodus 3:5, holy assembly, Exodus 12:16, holy sabbath, Exodus 16:23, holy people, Exodus 19:6, holy place, Exodus 29:31, holy anointing, Exodus 30:25, holy robe, Leviticus 16:4, holy jubilee year,

Leviticus 25:12, holy house, Leviticus 27:14, holy field, Leviticus 27:21, holy tithe, Leviticus 27:30, holy water, Numbers 5:17, holy vessels, Numbers 16:37, holy cow, Numbers 18:17, holy camp, Deuteronomy 23:14, holy gold, Joshua 6:19, holy bread, 1 Samuel 21:4, holy ark, 2 Chron. 35:3, holy seed, Ezra 9:2, holy city, Nehemiah 11:1, holy

covenant, Daniel 11:28, holy word, Psalms 105:42, of the temple as sanctuary,

Exodus 15:17 with its holy and holy of holies, and also of the angels or the

children of Israel as the holy ones, Deuteronomy 33:2, 3, Job 5:1, 15:15, Psalms 16:3,

12:1, Zach. 14:5. In all these cases the concept holy does not yet express an

inward, moral quality, but only indicates that the persons or objects thus

designated are consecrated to the Lord and stand in a special relation to his

service, and thus are set apart from the common sphere. In this peculiar

relation to God, however, the persons and things that are called holy do not

stand of themselves. There is rather by nature a distance and estrangement,

a distinction and opposition between God and his creature. In itself the

whole world is ‎‏‏ֹחל‎, profane, not standing in communion with God and not

suited to his service. Nor can the persons and things sanctify themselves

and place themselves in that special relation to God which is expressed by

the word holy. Sanctification proceeds only from God. He is the one who

sanctifies Israel, priesthood, temple, altar, special places, persons and

objects, transfers them into his service and communion, and separates them

from the unholy. I am the Lord, who sanctify you, Exodus 31:13, Leviticus 20:8,

persons or things by the Lord now takes place in a twofold way: negatively

by choosing a people, person, place, day, object and setting it apart from all

others, and positively by consecrating these persons or things

according to definite rules and causing them to live. God sanctifies the

sabbath, not only by setting it apart from the other days of the week but also

by resting on it and blessing it, Genesis 2:2, 3, Exodus 20:11, Deuteronomy 5:12. He has

sanctified the whole people of Israel, by choosing it out of all peoples of the

earth, by taking it up into his covenant and making his laws known to it, Exodus 19:4-6. The holiness of God is the principle of the whole legislation, of the

moral and of the ceremonial commandments, of the whole revelation of

salvation to Israel, for this intends nothing other than that Israel be holy, Exodus 19:4-6, Leviticus 11:44, 45, 19:2, 20:26. Israel is holy, because God takes it as

his possession, comes to the people, dwells among them and is to them a

God, Exodus 19:4-6, 29:43-46. And within this circle he now again sanctifies in

particular the firstborn, by appropriating them to himself, Exodus 13:2, the

people, in that they wash themselves and thus prepare themselves to meet

God, Exodus 19:10, 14, the mountain, by marking it off, Exodus 19:23, the

priesthood by anointing, offering, sprinkling of blood and special clothing,

Exodus 28:3, 41, 29:1 v. 21, the tabernacle and the altar by anointing, Exodus 29:37, 40:9 v. Leviticus 8:10, 11, Numbers 7:1, the anointing oil, by having it

prepared in a special way, Exodus 30:22 v., the Nazirites, by causing them to

live according to definite rules, Numbers 6:2 v. etc. And what is thus holy

shares in a life of its own, bears a character of its own, is distinguished from

common life and the common law; it may e.g. not be touched, Exodus 19:23,

24, not be eaten, Exodus 29:33, not be used, Exodus 30:32 v., it sanctifies that

which comes into contact with it, Exodus 30:29, Leviticus 10:2 v., Numbers 1:51, 53,

3:10, 38, Jes. 8:14. Now the positive act by which something becomes holy

is not always expressed; sometimes the sanctification seems to consist in

nothing other than separation, Leviticus 25:10, 27:14, Joz. 7:13, 20:7, Rich.

nevertheless something more than only to separate; it is, by means of

washing, anointing, offering, sprinkling of blood etc., to strip something of

that character which it has in common with all things, and to impress upon

it another, proper stamp, which it must bear and display everywhere. Now

the ceremonies that were necessary for sanctification clearly indicate that

the uncleanness and sinfulness of the creature also come into consideration

here, which precisely in that way had to be removed. Washing, offering,

sprinkling of blood, anointing served for de-sinning and dedication, Leviticus 8:15, 16:16, Job 1:5 etc. Holy and clean are therefore synonyms, Exodus 30:35,

Leviticus 16:19. But for that reason the concept holy does not amount to that

moral purity. Indeed this is not excluded, but it is not the only nor even the

first meaning. Holy in the O. T., especially in the law, is much broader in

sense. The whole distinction and opposition of outward and inward purity

etc. has been transferred from a later standpoint to that of the Mosaic

legislation. But holy is that which is chosen and set apart by Ihvh, which by

special ceremonies has been stripped of the common character and has

received a character of its own, and now in this new condition lives

according to the laws set for it. Israel is a holy people, because it has been

chosen and set apart by God, has been taken up into a covenant and now

has to live according to all his laws, also the ceremonial etc. Holy is that

which in everything corresponds to the special laws which God has given

for it; holiness is perfection, not in a moral sense only, but in that whole

sense in which the peculiar legislation of Israel conceives it, in a religious,

ethical, ceremonial, inward and outward sense.

This concept of holiness, however, only then becomes fully clear when we

investigate in what sense it is applied to God. Cremer has rightly pointed

out that holiness does not in the first place indicate a relation from below to

above, but from above to below, and that it belongs in the first place to God

and thereafter, in a derived sense, also to creatures. Creatures are not holy in

themselves. Nor can they sanctify themselves. All sanctification and all

holiness proceeds from God. Ihvh is holy, and therefore He wills a holy

people, a holy priesthood, a holy dwelling, etc., Exodus 19:6, 29:43, Leviticus 11:44,

6:20, Psalms 22:4, 99:5, 9, Jes. 5:16, 6:3 etc. Isaiah often uses the name of the

Ezech. 39:7, Habakkuk 1:12, 3:3. And further there is also mention of God’s holy

holy arm, Jes. 52:10, holy majesty, 2 Chronicles 20:21. Now Ihvh is called so in

the first place because He has placed Himself in a special relation to Israel;

holy is also with God in the first place a Verhältnissbegriff. Jahveh’s

holiness reveals itself in this, that he has adopted Israel as his people, gave

himself to Israel and went to dwell among them, Exodus 29:43-46, Leviticus 11:44,

45, 20:26, Psalms 114:1, 2. But this relation is no abstraction, but is rich in

content. God Himself has regulated this relation in the laws which He gave

to Israel. The whole legislation of Israel has its principle in the holiness of

Ihvh and its goal in the sanctification of the people. What the sanctification

of Ihvh entails becomes manifest in the whole law; and the people is holy

when it corresponds to that. As the Holy One He is the one who gave

himself to Israel and dwells among Israel, but now also further holds to his

word, remains faithful to his covenant, Psalms 89:35 v. and time and again

rescues and delivers Israel. God is the Holy One of Israel, who belongs to

Israel and who is such as his law makes Him known. From his holiness

145:21, the hearing of prayer, Psalms 3:5, 20:7, 28:2, comfort, Jes. 5:16, Habakkuk 1:12, trust, Psalms 22:4, 5, 33:21, Jes. 10:20. His holiness does not permit that

He destroy Israel. As the Holy One He is the Creator, Redeemer and King

of Israel, Jes. 43:14, 15, 49:7, 54:5, 62:12. And thus He is thanked and

praised by his people, which has been redeemed, as the Holy One, Psalms 30:5,

71:22, 97:12, 1 Chron. 16:10, 35. But at the same time this holiness of God

is also principle of punishment and chastisement. If Israel breaks his

covenant, profanes his name, transgresses his laws, then it is precisely the

holiness of God that urges Him to punishment; his holiness demands that

Israel be holy and sanctify Him, Leviticus 11:44, 45, 19:2, 20:7, 26, 21:8. In case

of disobedience, He chastises Israel, 1 Kon. 9:3-7, 2 Chron. 7:16-20. The

same holiness which is principle of deliverance and object of praise is for

the transgressors principle of destruction and object of fear. Holy is then

synonymous with zealous, Joz. 24:19, great and fearful, Exodus 15:11, Psalms 99:3,

111:9, with glorious and exalted, Jes. 6:3, 57:15. No one is like Him as the

Holy One, Exodus 15:11, 1 Samuel 2:2, Jes. 40:25. To sanctify Him is to fear

Him, Jes. 8:13, 29:23. When men profane his name and his covenant, then

He sanctifies Himself through justice and righteousness, Jes. 5:16, Ezech.

28:22. But even then He does not forget his people. His holiness remains

49:7, 52:10 etc. Jeremiah 51:5, Hosea 11:8, 9, and will finally reveal itself in this,

that He will make the Gentiles know that He is the Lord, Jeremiah 50:29, Ezech.

36:23, 39:7 and delivers and cleanses Israel from all iniquities, Ezech.

36:25 v., 39:7. This latter now leads directly onward to holiness in the New-

Testament sense. Already the choice of the Greek word is of significance.

Σεμνος from σεβομαι, denotes what is venerable, Philippians 4:8, 1 Timothy 3:8, 11,

Titus 2:2; ἱ ερος expresses only a relation to the Deity, 1 Corinthians 9:31, 2 Timothy 3:15, Hebr. 8:2, 9:8 etc.; ἁ γνος has the meaning of pure, chaste, 2 Corinthians 11:2,

Titus 2:5 etc. These words are never used of God. God in the N. T. is only

called ὁ σιος, Op. 15:4, 16:5, cf. Hebr. 7:26 and especially ἁ γιος, Luke 1:49,

holiness of God is not yet clearly determined alongside and in distinction

from all other perfections of God. There it still denotes the whole relation in

which the Lord stands to Israel and Israel to the Lord. Therefore Ihvh can

be called the Holy One of Israel, who has given himself wholly and entirely

to Israel and maintains and preserves it as his possession by all manner of

ways. Therefore also on the side of the people the sanctification is not only

religious and ethical but also ceremonial, civil, political in nature. Just as

holiness in God is not yet delimited alongside other virtues, so it is also on

the side of Israel comprehending the whole people in all respects. But when

in the N. T. ὁ ἁ γιος του θεου appears, Mark 1:24, Luke 4:34, Hd. 3:14, 4:27,

who forms with the world the deepest antithesis, John 15:18 and sanctifies

and consecrates himself to God in an absolute sense, John 17:19, then the

holiness of God ceases to be principle of punishment and chastisement, and

it becomes in the Holy Spirit, who in the O. T. is so called only a few times,

Psalms 51:13, Jes. 63:10, but now regularly bears that name, the principle of the

sanctification of the church. This is now the ἐ θνος ἁ γιον, 1 Petr. 2:5, 9, Ef.

2:19, 5:27, consisting of ἐ κλεκτοι, ἁ γιοι, ἀ μωμοι, Ef. 1:1, 4, Colossians 1:2,

22, 3:12, 1 Corinthians 7:24, wholly and entirely freed from sin and cleansed and

eternally with soul and body consecrated to God. The holiness which Ihvh

causes himself to be given to Israel and wholly and entirely claims Israel for

his service, finally reveals itself in the highest degree in this, that God gives

himself in Christ to the church and delivers and cleanses it from all

iniquities.

13. To the holiness of God belongs also his glory. Scripture uses for this

the words ‎‏‏ָּכבֹוד‎ and δοξα; ‎‏‏ָּכבֹוד‎ from the verb ‎‏‏כבד‎, to be heavy, weighty, is the

appearance of him who is weighty, eminent; alongside this there is also in

use ‎‏‏הֹוד‎, which denotes the glorious appearance of him whose name is

widely spread, and ‎‏‏ָהָדר‎, which denotes that appearance in its radiance and

beauty, Delitzsch on Psalms 8:6. The Greek word for this in LXX and N. T. is

δοξα, the recognition that someone enjoys or to which he has a claim,

subjectively therefore the recognition that is due to someone or is in fact

bestowed, the fame or honor in which he shares, syn. with τιμη and

ε ὐ λογια, Op. 5:12, opp. ἀ τιμια, 2 Corinthians 6:8; and objectively the appearance,

form, the aspect, the splendor, radiance, glory of a person or thing, which

presents itself, or the person or thing itself in their glorious appearance, and

then related to ε ἰ δος, ε ἰ κων, μορφη, Jes. 53:2, 1 Corinthians 11:7. The ‎‏‏ָּכבֹוד יהוה‎,

δοξα του θεου therefore makes known the radiance and glory that is

inseparable from all the virtues of God and from his entire self-revelation in

nature and above all in grace, the glorious form in which He everywhere

appears over against creatures. This glory and majesty with which God is

clothed and which marks all his doing, 1 Chron. 16:27, Psalms 29:4, 96:6,

104:1, 111:4, 113:4 etc., reveals itself in the whole creation, Ps. 8, Jes. 6:3,

but is nevertheless especially seen on the terrain of grace. It appears to

Deuteronomy 5:24. It filled the tabernacle and the temple, Exodus 40:34, 1 Kon. 8:11

and communicated itself to the whole people, Exodus 29:43, Ezech. 16:14 etc.

Above all it is beheld in Christ, the Only-begotten, John 1:14 and through

Him in the church, Romans 15:7, 2 Corinthians 3:18, which expects the blessed hope

and appearing of the glory of the great God and of its Savior Jesus Christ,

Titus 2:13. More than once it is brought into connection with the glory

of God. Exodus 29:43, Jes. 6:3 and therefore also described as a fire, Exodus 24:17,

Leviticus 9:24 and as a cloud, 1 Kon. 8:10, 11, Jes. 6:4. Without doubt Scripture,

with that cloud and that fire, thinks of sensibly perceptible, creaturely forms

under which God’s presence made itself known, cf. deel I 249. It is,

however, something else with the light with which the glory of God is often

compared and under which it is repeatedly represented. Light is in Scripture

the image of truth, holiness, and blessedness, Psalms 43:3, Jes. 10:17, Psalms 97:11.

This comparison is so simple and natural that truly the supposition is not

needed for it that Ihvh originally was a sun-god, Kuenen, G. v. I. I 48 v. 240

v. 249. 267, just as little as the designation rock needs to point to an earlier

period of stone-worship, Kuenen, I 392-395. The light of the sun and the

fire of heaven provide the Israelite the material for the description of the

virtues of Iahveh, but he is clearly conscious in doing so of speaking in

image. Just as the thunder is his voice, Psalms 104:7, Amos 1:2, Jes. 30:30, so the

light of nature is his garment, Psalms 104:2. What light is in nature, source of

knowledge, of purity, of joy, that God is in the spiritual. He is the light of

the pious, Psalms 27:1, his countenance, his word spreads light, Psalms 44:4, 89:16,

119:105, in his light alone they see the light, Psalms 36:10. He himself is pure

light, without darkness and father of all that is light, 1 John 1:5, 1 Timothy 6:16,

Jak. 1:17, and is according to the promise, Jes. 9:1, 60:1, 19, 20, Mich. 7:8,

in Christ appeared as the light, Matthew 4:16, Luke 2:32, John 1:4, 3:19, 8:12, 1

John 2:20, so that now his church is light in Him, Matthew 5:14, Ef. 5:8, 1 Thessalonians 5:5, and goes to meet the full light, Op. 21:23 v. 22:5, Colossians 1:12. The Jews

later thought with this ‎‏‏ָּכבֹוד יהוה‎ of a created, visible radiance, of a Lichtleib,

by which He made his presence known in the creation and even conceived

it in the schechina as a personal subject, Weber, System der altsyn. pal.

Theol. 1880 S. 160, 179-184. From Jewish theology this opinion passed

over into theosophy. Böhme describes the glory of God as a Leib des

Geistes, as a Reich der Herrlichkeit Gottes, das ewige Himmelreich, worin

die Kraft Gottes wesentlich ist, tingiert vom Glanz und Kraft des

Feuers und des Lichts, as an uncreated heaven, a paradise, Joh. Claassen,

Jakob Böhme, sein Leben und seine theos. Werke I 157, II 61, and so also

Baader, Joh. Claassen, Fr. v. Baaders Leben u. theos. Werke II 90 f.

Oetinger, Die Theol. aus der Idee des Lebens, herausgeg. von J. Hamberger

1852 S. 113 f. 117 f. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych2. S. 49 f. Keerl, Der Mensch

das Ebenbild Gottes II 17 f. 113. Id. Die Lehre des N. T. von der

Herrlichkeit Gottes, Basel 1863. Among the Lutheran theologians there was

earlier already dispute about whether God in a proper (Dannhauer,

Chemniz) or indeed in an improper (Musaeus e. a.) sense was called light,

M. Vitringa, Doctr. chr. relig. I 139. In the Eastern church even the council

of Constantinople in 1431 attached its approval to the doctrine of an

uncreated, divine light that was distinct from the essence of God, Kurtz,

Lehrb. der Kirchengesch. § 69, 2. Yet this opinion cannot be approved.

Scripture clearly teaches the spirituality and the invisibility of God. The

assumption of a glory of God as a place, ‎‏‏מקום‎, form, ‎‏‏תמונה‎, ε ἰ δος, μορφη, as

a ‎‏‏פנים‎, of a body, a realm, a heaven, which, even if it were uncreated, would

nevertheless be distinct from his essence, is in conflict with the abovementioned attributes and likewise with the simplicity of God. Also when

Scripture speaks of God’s countenance, glory, and majesty, it speaks in

image. But just as all perfections, so also this one comes out in his

creatures. It is communicable. There is in the created a weak radiance of the

inexpressible glory and majesty that God possesses. Just as the creatures

lead us to speak of God’s eternity and omnipresence, of his righteousness

and grace, so they make us know something of the glory of God. Yet here

too the analogy is not identity. Already in language this comes out. With the

creatures we speak of beautiful, fair, fine; but Scripture has for the beauty of

God a proper name, that of glory. Therefore it also deserves no

recommendation to speak, with the church fathers, scholastics, and Roman

Catholic theologians, of the pulchritudo Dei. Augustine already spoke in

that sense. He proceeded from the fundamental proposition: Omne quod est,

in quantum est, verum, bonum, pulchrum est. Now there is in being and

thus also in the true, good, and beautiful distinction, ordering of rank,

ascent. In proportion as something has more being, it also has more

truth, goodness, and beauty. Everything is beautiful in its kind. Singula

opera Dei.... inveniuntur habere laudabiles mensuras et numeros et ordines

in suo quaeque genere constituta, de Gen. c. Manich. I 21. Inest enim

omnibus quoddam naturae sui generis decus, de Gen. ad litt. III 14. All

creatures therefore contribute to the beauty of the whole. But all beauty of

the creatures is perishable and changeable; they are not beautiful through

themselves, but through participation in a higher, absolute beauty. Question

all creatures: Respondent tibi omnia: ecce, vide, pulchra sumus. Pulchritudo

eorum, confessio eorum, Serm. 241. That highest beauty, to which all

creatures point, is God. He is summum esse, summum verum, summum

bonum and also the highest unchangeable beauty. Ista pulchra mutabilia

quis fecit, nisi incommutabilis pulcher? ib. God is the highest beauty,

because in his being there is absolute unity and measure and order. Nothing

is lacking to Him, and there is nothing superfluous in Him, de ord. I 26. II

51. de beata vita 34. c. Acad. II 9. Ritter, Gesch. der christl. Philos. II 289 f.

Also in this conception of Augustine the influence of neoplatonism is not to

be denied, which likewise regarded the Godhead as the highest beauty and

the cause of all that is beautiful, Zeller V2 483 f. But thus this thought of

Augustine nevertheless found entrance with Dionysius, de div. nom. c. 4 §

7. Bonaventura, Breviloquium Pars I c. 6. Petavius, Theol. dogm. VI c. 8.

Scheeben, Kath. Dogm. I 589 f. etc. In contrast, the Prot. theologians

preferred to speak of the majestas and gloria Dei, Gerhard, Loci theol. I c. 8

sect. 18. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 31. Mastricht, Theor. pract. theol. II c.

22. Synopsis pur. theol. VI 43. In the glory of God his greatness and

exaltedness comes out, as it is so many times depicted in the psalms and

prophets, Ps. 104, Jes. 40, Hab. 3. It is called greatness and exaltedness,

insofar as it awakens in the creature reverent admiration and worship. It is

called glory, insofar as it prompts to thanks and praise and honor. It is called

majesty, insofar as it stands in connection with his absolute dignitas and

demands subjection from every creature.

14. To God as the Holy One there finally also belongs the virtue of

righteousness. The words ‎‏‏ַצִּדיק‎, ‎‏‏ֶצֶדק‎, ‎‏‏ְצָדָקה‎ denote the state of someone

who conforms to a law. The first meaning seems to be a forensic one; ‎‏‏ַצִּדיק‎ is

he who in a lawsuit is in the right before the judge and therefore must be

acquitted, ‎‏‏ִהְצִּדיק‎ oppos. ‎‏ַ‏ִהְרִׁשי‎ Deuteronomy 25:1. It is also the word for him who is

in the right in a dispute or war of words, Job 11:2, 33:12, 32, Isaiah 41:26; and

the substantive can therefore also denote the correctness or truth of an

assertion or utterance, Psalms 52:5, Proverbs 16:13, Isaiah 45:23. Subsequently it then

in general means that someone is in the right, even if no lawsuit and no

court is involved; that he has the right on his side, is righteous and good and

conforms to the law, Genesis 30:33, 38:26, 1 Samuel 24:18, Psalms 15:2. From here

it is also transferred to the religious sphere and applied to God. In the

Pentateuch God is still only twice called ‎‏‏ַצִּדיק‎, Exodus 9:27, Deuteronomy 32:4. God’s

righteousness first comes to expression in history, in his government of the

world and in his guidance of Israel, and is therefore also developed most by

the psalmists and prophets. It reveals itself over the whole world, even in

the beasts of the field, Psalms 36:7. God is a Judge of the whole earth, Genesis 18:25. It consists in this, that God recompenses each according to his work,

treats the righteous and the wicked differently, Genesis 18:25. But now it is

remarkable that the one side of this righteousness, viz. that according to

which God punishes the wicked, the justitia vindicativa, comes much less to

the foreground in Scripture than that other, according to which He confirms

the righteous. Diestel in his article, Die Idee der Gerechtigheit vorzüglich

im A. T., Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. V 1860, 2tes Heft, S. 173-253 has rightly

drawn attention to this and has found agreement with many, especially with

Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. II2 102-119. The matter itself, which later in

dogmatics was expressed as justitia vindicativa, is not absent. On the

contrary, God by no means holds the guilty innocent, Exodus 20:7, Nahum 1:3. He

does not spare, Ezekiel 7:4, 9, 27, 8:18, 9:10. He accepts no person and no

gift, Deuteronomy 10:17, and judges impartially, Job 13:6-12, 22:2-4, 34:10-12,

35:6, 7. He is righteous and all his judgments are right, Psalms 119:137, 129:4;

also the punishing of the wicked is more than once connected with his

2:5, 2 Thessalonians 1:5-10. But yet it is true that the punishing of the wicked is

mostly derived from the wrath of God and that righteousness in Scripture

especially appears as a principle of salvation for the people of God. The

wrath of God is in the Hebrew indicated by many words, ‎‏‏ַאף‎, ‎‏‏ָהרֹון‎, ‎‏‏ַּכַעס‎, ‎‏‏ַזַעם‎,

‎‏‏ֹרֶגז‎, ‎‏‏ֶקֶצף‎, mostly translated by wrath, wrathfulness, ‎‏‏ֵחָמה‎ mostly rendered by

fury, ‎‏‏ֶעְבָרם‎ mostly translated by indignation, LXX and N. T. by θυμος, the

inward, and ὀ ργη, the outwardly manifesting wrath, connected together,

Romans 2:8. This wrath, whose root-words partly are connected with the

concept of burning, partly express a violent, not-to-be-restrained movement

of the mind, is often compared to a fire, Leviticus 10:6, Deuteronomy 32:22, Psalms 21:10, a

17:4, and is therefore called hot, burning, Psalms 58:10, Deuteronomy 13:17, 2 Chron.

aroused and kindled by Israel’s theocratic sins against the covenant of God,

such as perjury, Joshua 9:20, profanation of the service of God, Leviticus 10:6,

Numbers 1:53, 16:46, 18:5, idolatry, Deuteronomy 9:19, the sin of Manasseh, 2 Kings 23:26, David, 1 Chron. 27:24, and especially by the sins of which the

people made themselves guilty and by which it has deserved all kinds of

Ezekiel 5:13 f., 7:3, 13:13 etc. Zechariah 7:12 f. This wrath is dreadful, Psalms 76:8,

and works terror, Psalms 2:5, 90:7, pain, Job 21:17, Psalms 102:11, punishment, Psalms 1:2, with that wrath hatred, vengeance, and zeal are related. Hatred has

almost always the sinful deeds, Deuteronomy 16:22, Psalms 45:8, Proverbs 6:16, Jeremiah 44:4,

Hosea 9:15, Amos 5:12, Zechariah 8:17, Revelation 2:6, and only a few times the sinful

persons, Psalms 5:6, Malachi 1:3, Romans 9:13, as object. The vengeance ‎‏‏ְנָקָמה‎,

ἐ κδικησις, which is ascribed to God, Nahum 1:2, 1 Thessalonians 4:6 and is expressly

reserved to Him, Deuteronomy 32:35, Romans 12:19, Hebrews 10:30, now also sometimes

reveals itself in judgment and judicial sentence, Numbers 31:2, 3, Judges 5:2,

first reveal itself in all its power in the future, in the day of vengeance,

Nahum 1:2 is aroused by the fact that Israel, the bride of Ihvh, violates his

rights as bridegroom and husband by whoring after other gods, Deuteronomy 32:16,

21, 2 Kings 14:22, Psalms 78:58, Ezekiel 8:3, 5 and reveals itself in this, that Ihvh

now on his part also provokes Israel to jealousy by choosing another

Alongside all these virtues, the righteousness of God is now for the most

part taken in bonam partem and described according to that side according

to which it puts the righteous in the right and elevates them to honor and

salvation. In that especially consists the ‎‏‏ְצָדָקה‎ of Ihvh, that He recognizes the

righteousness of the righteous, brings it to light and makes it triumph. He is

righteous because He decrees salvation for the pious, confirms them, Ps.

alive, 119:40, acquits, 34:23, does justice, 35:23 etc., while the wicked do

not come to his righteousness, 69:28, 29. The righteousness of Ihvh

therefore forms no antithesis with his lovingkindness, as wrath does, Psalms 69:25v., but is related to it and synonymous, Psalms 22:32, 33:5, 35:28, 40:11,

manifestation of the righteousness of God is at the same time manifestation

of his grace, Psalms 97:11, 12, 112:4, 116:5, 119:15-19. Even the forgiveness of

sins is due to that righteousness of God, Psalms 51:16, 103:17, 1 John 1:9. The

manifestations of that righteousness, ‎‏‏ִצְדקֹות‎, are therefore saving benefits,

deeds of rescue and deliverance, Judges 5:11, 1 Samuel 12:7, Psalms 103:6, Isaiah 45:24, 25, Micah 6:5. Especially with Isaiah this soteriological character of

the righteousness of God comes strikingly to expression. Israel is indeed a

sinful people and is therefore also severely punished, 43:26, 48:1, 53:11,

57:12, 59:4, 64:5, but nevertheless Israel is in the right over against the

Gentiles; it has, in spite of all its transgressions, a righteous cause, it

nevertheless in the end has the right on its side. When it then also has

been chastised enough, God’s righteousness will awaken and recognize

Israel in this its right and deliver it from all its misery, 40:1v., 54:5, 7v.,

57:15v., 61:1v. etc. And so it is with all the pious. Personally they are

sinners, they stand guilty of all kinds of unrighteousness and they are a poor

and miserable people. But they stand for a righteous cause, they trust in the

Lord, and they count on it that God will do them justice, will plead their

cause and will crown them with his salvation, Psalms 17:1v. 18:21, 22, 34:16,

103:6, 140:13. And also in the N. Test. God’s δικαιοσυνη consists

specifically in this, that in Christ it offers a means of atonement, by which

He both himself appears δικαιος and also can δικαιουν τον ἐ κ πιστεως, and

further grants to his own forgiveness, 1 John 1:9 and decrees salvation, John 17:25, 2 Timothy 4:8. Still more, finally even wrath and zeal, hatred and

vengeance are made serviceable to the rescue and deliverance of his people.

His wrath is accomplished after a little time, Psalms 30:6, 78:38, 85:4, 103:9,

Hosea 14:5, Micah 5:18, and his zeal against Israel comes to an end, Ezekiel 16:42, 36:6v. Zechariah 8:2v. Then his wrath and zeal and vengeance will turn

against the enemies of his people in the great day of wrath and vengeance,

thereby serve for Israel as blessing and for deliverance, 2 Kings 19:31, Isaiah 9:6, 37:32, Joel 2:18, Zechariah 1:14, 8:2. And likewise the N. T. says that,

although God’s wrath already now rests on the wicked, John 3:36, Ephesians 2:3,

1 Thessalonians 2:16, yet that wrath in all its dreadfulness will first be revealed in

in Scripture, cf. besides Diestel and Ritschl t. a. p., Ortloph in a treatise on

the righteousness of God, Zeits. f. luth. Theol. u. Kirche 1860. Kautzsch,

Ueber die Derivata des Stammes ‎‏‏צדק‎ im altt. Sprachgebrauch, Tübingen

1881. Koenig, De vi vocis ‎‏‏צדקה‎ in libris prophetarum, Paris 1894. Cremer,

s. v. Köstlin, in Herzog2 5, 311 and Stud. u. Krit. 1892, 3tes Heft S. 423-

425. Oehler, Theol. des A. T. § 47. Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 S. 540 f.

Fricke, Der paulin. Grundbegriff der δικαιοσυνη θεου, erörtert auf Grund

von Romans 3:21-26. Leipzig Böhme 1888. H. Beck, Die δικ. θεου bei Paulus,

Neue Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1895, 2tes Heft S. 249-261, and further

literature later in the locus de justificatione. On the wrath of God:

Lactantius, de ira Dei. Tertull. de ira Dei. Bartholomäi, Vom Zorne Gottes,

Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1861 v. 256-277. Weber, Vom Zorne Gottes 1862.

Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. II2 S. 119-156. Diestel, t. a. p. S. 193 f. Lange art.

in Herzog1, Kübel in Herzog2. Oehler § 48. Schultz, S. 560 f. Smend S. 99

In dogmatics the concept usually acquired a broader sense. Sometimes it

was taken so broadly that it also included the perfection or holiness of God;

righteousness was then virtue itself and the sum of all virtues; in God

consisting in perfect agreement with himself, justitia divina. But usually, in

imitation of Aristotle, it was nevertheless conceived in a narrower sense. He

defined it in his ethics as ἀ ρετη, δι’ ἡ ν τα α ὑ των ἑ καστοι ἐ χουσιν; it is only

possible in a society of beings who can possess a greater or smaller quantity

of goods; among the gods it does not exist, because there is no measure for

their possession, and among irrational creatures neither, because among

them there is no question of property. The justitia therefore presupposes,

first of all, that there are rights, which have been bestowed by the lawgiver,

justitia dominica, legislativa, dispositiva; next, that those rights are

mutually respected by treaties, contracts, justitia commutativa; and finally

that those rights which exist are maintained, justitia distributiva, and indeed

by reward, justitia remunerativa, or by punishment, justitia vindicativa; in

all those parts righteousness was constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum

cuique tribuendi. All this was transferred to God; and thus the concept of

righteousness in dogmatics acquired a much broader sense than in

Scripture. Now there is no overriding objection to this, provided only that

the difference in usage is kept in view, for the matters themselves, which in

dogmatics are treated under the justitia Dei, all occur clearly in Holy

Scripture. Indeed, there is even an advantage connected with it, because it

offers opportunity to maintain the righteousness of God in its whole

extent against its opponents. The Gnostics in general and especially

Marcion made a sharp antithesis between law and gospel, works and faith,

flesh and spirit, and thus also between the God of wrath, of vengeance, of

righteousness, who revealed himself in the O. T., and the God of love and of

grace, who in the N. T. in Christ had made himself known, Harnack, D. G. I

228 f.; and later, essentially in the same sense, righteousness, specifically

punitive righteousness, as in conflict with his love, was denied of God by

many. Now, with the justitia Dei many difficulties present themselves; with

God there is, after all, no right conceivable that stands above him and to

which he has to adhere, for his will is the highest law; creatures have no

rights over against him, for they have received everything from him and

have repaid him nothing; they can lay no claim to reward, for even when

they have done everything they were obliged to do, they are unprofitable

servants; and also nothing in his nature seems to compel him to punish; why

should he, who is the Almighty, not be able to forgive without satisfaction

or punishment? In order, however, not to stray too far from the biblical

concept of righteousness, it is preferable to bring all these questions up not

here but presently under the will and the freedom of God. Righteousness in

Holy Scripture is not an attribute of the dominium absolutum of God but

rests on a moral foundation. Even though it is the case that a creature of

course cannot have any rights over against God, Romans 11:35, 1 Corinthians 4:7 and

even though there is no question of a justitia commutativa, Thomas, S.

Theol. I qu. 21 art. 1, it is nevertheless God himself who, as it were, gives

rights to his creatures. Every creature has received in creation its own

nature; there are laws and ordinances for all created things; there are rights

which lie enclosed in the existence and in the nature of all that is. Above all,

such rights have been given to rational creatures, and among these again for

all the domains in which they move, for intellect and heart, soul and body,

art and science, family and society, religion and morality. And when those

rights have been forfeited and sinned away by man, then God establishes

with Noah a foedus naturae and with Abraham a foedus gratiae, in which he

again out of grace grants to his creatures all kinds of rights and binds

himself by oath to the maintenance of those rights. Thus, by God’s grace, a

whole legal order has been established, both in nature and grace, with all

kinds of institutions, ordinances, and laws, which he himself maintains and

causes to prevail. These institutions and rights, however, are not derived in

Scripture from God’s righteousness,—would any righteousness also oblige

him to that?—but from his holiness and grace. And certainly this is more

correct than that they are designated with the name of justitia legislativa.

Yet this is not wrong, provided only that it is not thought thereby that God

by virtue of some righteousness or other gave and had to give all those

rights to his creatures. This, however, is precisely what is involved, that

God is the Highest Lawgiver, and that the whole legal order in every

domain is rooted in him. All right, whatever it may be, has its ultimate and

deepest ground, not in a contrat social nor in an independent natural law,

nor in history, but only in the will of God, and in that will, not conceived as

dominium absolutum, but as a will of goodness and grace. God’s grace is

the source of all right. But further, God also maintains that legal order in

every domain of life; he, who is righteousness itself and the source of all

right, is also the judex, the vindex justitiae. His justitia legislativa includes

the justitia judicialis. Right is no right when it is not maintained, if need be

with coercion and punishment. To be sure, this is not given of itself with the

legal order. Without sin the legal order would nevertheless have existed; but

it would have been obeyed without coercion by every creature voluntarily

and out of love. It is sin which necessitates right, in accordance with its

nature, to have itself respected with force and coercion. Not right in itself

but indeed the character of coercion, which it now must bear, has become

necessary through sin. But so little is this character of coercion accidental or

arbitrary, that now no right is conceivable without that character and our

own conscience itself bears witness to it. The moral order is so little in

conflict with the legal order, that it rather bears, demands, and supports it.

Right is an important part of morality. Righteousness is precisely the way in

which the grace and love of God are maintained and raised to triumph.

Those who with Marcion assume an antithesis between righteousness and

grace, fail to recognize the connection between moral and legal order, [202]

and do not understand the majesty and the glory of right. The justitia Dei

must therefore by virtue of its nature be a justitia judicialis and thus on the

one hand a justitia remunerativa and on the other hand a justitia vindicativa.

Not as though the creature could ever of itself lay claim to any reward or

could in itself receive forgiveness without punishment; but God is obligated

by his covenant, by the right once instituted by him, by his name and honor,

to bring his people to salvation and to punish the ungodly. Thus alone can

right come to dominion and triumph. There is truth in the fiat justitia, pereat

mundus; but Scripture nevertheless more beautifully places this thought in

the foreground, that right must be done, in order that the world may be

saved. Cf. Irenaeus, adv. haer. III 25 IV 39 sq. Tertullianus, adv. Marc.

passim. Orig. de princ. II 5, 3. Pseudodion. de div. nom. 8 § 7. Anselmus,

Prosl. c. 9 sq. Lombardus, Sent. IV 46 en de comm. van Thomas en

Bonaventura, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 21. Gerhard, Loc. II c. 8 Sect. 12.

Quenstedt I 292. Hollaz 268. Zanchius, Op. II 394 sq. Polanus, Synt. II c.

26. Voetius, Disp. I 339-402. Owen, on div. justice, Works 1862 X 481-624.

Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. V. Moor I 674 sq. 996 sq. Meijer, De Godd. eigensch.

## E. God as Sovereign.

15. Along with all the virtues discussed, there finally come also those which

are proper to God as Sovereign. God is the Creator, and thus the Owner,

Possessor, Lord of all; nothing exists or possesses anything outside of Him;

He alone has absolute authority; His will always decides and over

everything. Of that sovereign will, ‎‏‏ֵחֶפץ‎, ‎‏‏ְצבּו ָרצֹון‎, Daniel 4:35, 6:18, θελημα,

βουλημα, there is therefore also continual mention in Holy Scripture. That

will is the final cause of all things, of their being and their being-such. From

it everything is derived, creation and preservation, Op. 4:11, government,

Spr. 21:1, Daniel 4:35, Ef. 1:11, the suffering of Christ, Luke 22:42, election

and reprobation, Romans 9:15 v., regeneration, Jak. 1:18, sanctification, Philippians 2:13, the suffering of believers, 1 Petr. 3:17, our life and lot, Jak. 4:15, Hd.

18:21, Romans 15:32, even the smallest and most insignificant things, Matthew 10:29 etc. And correspondingly, in Christian theology and binds

himself under oath to the maintenance of those rights. Thus, by God’s

grace, an entire legal order has been established, both in nature and in

grace, with all kinds of institutions, ordinances, and laws, which He

Himself maintains and causes to rule. These institutions and rights,

however, are not derived in Scripture from God’s righteousness,—which

righteousness would also obligate Him thereto?—but from his holiness and

grace. And certainly this is more correct than that they are designated with

the name of justitia legislativa. Yet this is not wrong, provided only that it is

not thought thereby that God, by virtue of some or other righteousness,

gave and had to give all those rights to his creatures. This, however,

precisely consists in the fact that God is the Highest Lawgiver, and that the

whole legal order in every domain is rooted in Him. All right, whatever it

may be, has its final and deepest ground, not in a contrat social nor in an

autonomous natural law, nor in history, but only in the will of God, and in

that will, not conceived as dominium absolutum, but as a will of goodness

and grace. God’s grace is the source of all right. But further, God also

maintains that legal order on every terrain of life; He, who is righteousness

itself and the source of all right, is also the judex, the vindex justitiae. His

justitia legislativa includes the justitia judicialis. Right is no right when it is

not maintained, if need be with coercion and punishment. Indeed, this is not

given of itself along with the legal order. Without sin the legal order would

nevertheless have existed; but it would have been obeyed without coercion

by every creature voluntarily and out of love. It is sin which compels right,

in accordance with its nature, to have itself respected with force and

coercion. Not right in itself, but rather the character of coercion which it

now must bear, has become necessary through sin. But so little is this

character of coercion accidental or arbitrary, that now no right is

conceivable without that character and our own conscience itself bears

witness to it. The moral order is so little in conflict with the legal order, that

it rather bears, demands, and supports it. Right is an important part of

morality. Righteousness is precisely the way in which the grace and love of

God are maintained and raised to triumph. They who, with Marcion, assume

an antithesis between righteousness and grace, fail to recognize the

connection between moral and legal order, these over to the kabbalah

and neoplatonism. Here Plotinus had already taught that God, causa sui,

product was of his will and power and that thus the will was the ultimate

being and preceded the intellect. And likewise now Schelling made the will

into the ultimate principle both of the existence of the infinite and of finite

being. Already in his philosophical investigations on the essence of human

freedom of the year 1809 he adopted this standpoint. Es gibt, said he, in der

letzten und höchsten Instanz gar kein anderes Seyn als Wollen. Wollen ist

Urseyn und auf dieses allein passen alle Prädicate desselben:

Grundlosigkeit, Ewigkeit, Unabhängigkeit von der Zeit, Selbstbejahung.

Die ganze Philosophie strebt nur dahin, diesen höchsten Ausdruck zu

finden, Werke I 7 S. 350. In God and in creatures a distinction must be

made between the essence, insofar as it exists, and the essence, insofar as it

is only ground of existence, ib. 357. God has the ground of his existence in

himself, i.e. in a nature distinct from God himself, ib. 358. This nature is, as

it were, that Sehnsucht, die das ewige Eine empfindet, sich selbst zu

gebären; it is will, aber Wille in dem kein Verstand ist, und darum auch

nicht selbständiger und vollkommener Wille, indem der Verstand der Wille

in dem Willen ist. Dennoch ist sie ein Willen des Verstandes, nämlich

Sehnsucht und Begierde desselben; nicht ein bewusster, sondern ein

ahnender Wille, dessen Ahndung der Verstand ist, ib. 359. But thus it is now

also with all things. They are something other than God and yet cannot be

outside God. This contradiction is only to be solved thus, dass die Dinge

ihren Grund in dem haben, was in Gott selbst nicht Er selbst ist, d. h. in

dem, was Grund seiner Existenz ist, ib. 359. Things have their ground in

this dark nature, in this unconscious will of God. Indeed, in the world rule,

order, and form are now to be observed, just as in God also out of the dark

nature the light of spirit and of personality has arisen. Aber immer liegt

noch im Grande das Regellose, als könnte es einmal wieder durchbrechen,

und nirgends scheint es, als wären Ordnung und Form das Ursprüngliche,

sondern als wäre ein anfänglich Regelloses zur Ordnung gebracht worden,

ib. 359. The whole world-process is derived by Schelling from the

antithesis of nature and spirit, of darkness and light, of the real and the ideal

principle, which together from all eternity are present in God himself [205]

. By this standpoint Schelling has gone beyond the rationalism of Hegel and

has become of the greatest significance for later philosophy. The thoughts

which he had already expressed in his investigation on human freedom, he

did indeed further elaborate in his later writings, Stuttgarter

Privatvorlesungen of 1812, Werke I 7 S. 417 f., Denkmal der Schrift von

den göttlichen Dingen des Herrn F. H. Jacobi of 1812, Werke I 8 S. 19 f.

and especially in his Philosophie der Offenbarung, Werke II 3ter u. 4ter

Band, in a more detailed and theistic sense. But he remained faithful to his

primacy of the will and in this was followed by Schopenhauer and von

Hartmann. Now it is true that the will in these philosophers is no will in the

proper sense, but nothing but an unconscious desiring, a blind impulse, a

dark nature. But in part this was acknowledged by themselves. Schelling

says expressly that the will without intellect is no independent and perfect

will, indem der Verstand der Wille in dem Willen ist, Werke I 7, 359.

Schopenhauer did indeed reckon consciousness to the appearance of the

will and considered it bound to individuality and brains, Die Welt als Wille

u. Vorst. II6 370, but nevertheless interposed between the will and the world

of appearance the ideas, which were the eternal forms and exemplars of

things, ib. I 154. And von Hartmann speaks of the Unconscious again as

subject and as überbewusst, Philos. des Unbew. II9 186. The existence of

things is determined by the will, but the essence by the intellect, Schelling,

Werke, II 3 S. 57-62. Hartmann, Philos. des Unbew. I 100 f. II 435 f. 446 f.

Yet even apart from this acknowledgment, their philosophy is of great

significance for theism. It has demonstrated the untenability of rationalistic

and idealistic pantheism. God is not to be conceived without will, freedom,

and power. Indeed, it has been objected against this that all willing was a

desiring and striving and thus a proof of imperfection, of dissatisfaction, of

unrest, which cannot occur in God. And mysticism has therefore sung: Wir

beten, es geschehe, mein Herr und Gott, dein Wille; Und siehe, Er hat nicht

Wille, Er ist eine ewige Stille (Angelus Silesius). But this objection rests on

an incorrect conception of the will. Certainly, willing is often a striving

after something that is not possessed; but when the will has now obtained

that desired thing and rests and enjoys in it, then that resting and

enjoying is also an act and activity of the will, indeed the highest and most

powerful activity, cf. later the doctrine of the will. Such a will now, which

rests and enjoys in what has been obtained, also exists in creatures and is

nothing but love, which embraces its object and is blessed in it. If such a

resting and enjoying is not reckoned to the will, it is either unattainable for

the creature, i.e. then no blessedness is possible for the creature; or if that

blessedness will nevertheless once be bestowed on the creature, it cannot

exist otherwise than in destruction of the will, in stupefaction of

consciousness and in complete suppression of personality. In pantheistic

mysticism, therefore, blessedness is conceived as a sinking, a merging, a

being swallowed up of the soul in God, i.e. in a nirvana. But Scripture and

Christian theology do not teach thus. Blessedness does not kill the will but

brings it to its highest activity; for love is the richest, most powerful energy

of the will. Thus now there is also a will in God. His willing is not a striving

after a good that He would lack and without which He cannot be blessed.

For He is the All-sufficient and the All-blessed in himself. He is himself the

highest good, for his creatures and also for himself. He can rest in nothing

else than in himself; because He is God, He cannot be blessed except

through and in himself. His love is self-love and therefore absolute, Divine

love. And that absolute self-love is nothing other than a willing of himself,

the highest, absolute, Divine energy of his will. The object of God’s will is

therefore God himself. Not in that sense, as if He were product of his will,

as if He had caused himself and were causa sui, cf. above p. 124, for that

would again introduce becoming and striving and thus the imperfect into

God. But rather thus, that God eternally wills himself with a voluntas

complacentiae, that He eternally loves himself with Divine love and is

perfectly blessed in himself. His will is sapientissima ejus propensio in se

ipsum tanquam summum bonum; it is also no faculty or power in God, but

subject, action and object of that will is one with God’s essence; θελημα

θελητικον, θελησις and θελημα θελητον] coincide with his essence,

Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 45. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 19 art. 1. c. Gent. I 72 sq.

Zanchius, Op. II 246. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 19 etc. [207]

Scripture, however, also speaks of a will of God in relation to the created.

Just as the knowledge of God is twofold, scientia necessaria and libera, so

also the will of God is to be distinguished as propensio in se ipsum and as

propensio in creaturas. But just as the scientia libera does not make God

dependent on the creatures but is known to Him from His own being, so

also the will of God, which is directed to the creatures, is not to be set

dualistically alongside the will which has His own being as its object.

Scripture teaches expressly that God wills alia a se and repeatedly speaks of

His will in relation to the creatures, but it adds, as in one breath, that God

does not will those creatures out of need, but only for His own sake, for His

name’s sake, Spr. 16:4. Creation, therefore, is not to be conceived as an

object that stands outside and over against Him, which He lacks and after

which He strives in order to possess it, or by which He hopes to obtain

something which He does not have. For from Him and through Him and

also to Him are all things. He does not find His end in the creatures, but

these find their end in Him. Quae extra se vult, ea etiam quodam modo sunt

in Deo, in quo sunt omnia, Zanchius, II 246. He does not will the creatures

for something that they are or that is in them, but He wills them for His own

sake. He remains His own end. He never directs Himself to the creatures as

such but through these to Himself. Going forth from Himself, He returns to

Himself again. It is one propensio in se ipsum tanquam summum finem et

in creaturas propter se ut media; His love for Himself takes that for the

creatures up into itself and through these returns again to Himself.

Therefore His willing, also in relation to the creatures, is never a striving

after any good still to be obtained, and thus also no sign of imperfection and

unblessedness; but His willing is always, also in and through the creatures,

absolute self-enjoyment, perfect blessedness, Divine rest. Rest and labor are

one in God; His self-sufficiency is at the same time absolute actuositas,

16. Although, however, God by one and the same simple act wills himself

and the creatures, nevertheless the will of God must by us be distinguished

with a view to the different objects. In pantheism this distinction is

impossible, because the world there is the very essence of God

himself. But Scripture ascribes to the creatures a being which, though not

independent, is nevertheless proper, distinguished from God’s essence; and

therefore the creatures cannot in the same sense and in the same way be the

object of his will, as he himself is that with his essence. The will of God,

whereby God wills himself, is propensio in se tanquam finem; the will,

which has the creatures as object, is propensio in creaturas tanquam media.

The former is necessaria just as the scientia simplicis intelligentiae; God

cannot do otherwise than love himself; he delights in himself eternally and

with divine necessity. This will of God is therefore elevated above all

arbitrariness, but yet not unfree and compelled; freedom and necessity here

coincide. Quite otherwise, however, is it with the will of God, which has the

creatures as object. Scripture speaks of this will as absolutely as possible.

God does all that pleases him, Psalms 115:3, Proverbs 21:1, Daniel 4:35. He is

accountable to no one and justifies none of his deeds, Job 33:13. Men are in

his hand as clay in the hand of the potter, Job 10:9, 33:6, Isaiah 29:16, 30:14,

64:8, Jeremiah 8:1v., nations are as a drop, a speck of dust, regarded as nothing,

Isaiah 40:15v. It is just as foolish for a man to exalt himself against God, as

for an axe to boast against him who hews with it, or for a saw to vaunt

against him who draws it, Isaiah 10:15! There is no right of man with God; no

one can ask him: What doest thou? Shall the clay also say to its former:

What makest thou, Job 9:2v., 11:10, Isaiah 45:9? So let man then be silent and

lay the hand upon the mouth, Job 39:37. And the N. T. teaches no

otherwise. God can do with his own what he will, Matthew 20:15. Being and

thus-being depends solely on God’s will, Revelation 4:11. This is the ultimate

ground of all. Mercy and hardening have therein their cause, Romans 9:15-18.

In the church the H. Spirit distributes gifts, as he will, 1 Corinthians 12:11. And a

man has nothing to object against God’s free dispositions, Matthew 20:13v.,

Romans 9:20, 21. On these grounds, in Christian theology, as the scientia

visionis, so also the voluntas Dei, which had the creatures as object, was

always called libera. Augustine said that the will of God was the last and

deepest ground of all things, de civ. XXI 8. de trin. III 7. 19; a deeper [209]

ground there is not. To the question why God created the world, there is but

one answer: quia voluit; whoever then still asks further for a cause for that

will, majus aliud quaerit, quam est voluntas Dei; nihil autem majus inveniri

potest, de gen. c. Man. I 2. de civ. V 9; and thus spoke with him the whole

Christian church and theology, e.g. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 19 art. 5. Calvin,

Inst. III 23, 2. All taught, indeed not that God could act plus and melius than

he did, for he always acts in a divine, perfect manner; but that he

nevertheless could have made the things plura and majora and meliora than

he has made them, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 44. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 25

art. 5 and 6. Zanchius, Op. II 184-187. Voetius, Disp. I 426. 564. V 151.

Burmannus, Synopsis I 41, § 41. The moral law was by some indeed called

eternal and natural, and regarded as expression of God’s essence; but there

was therein nevertheless again a distinction made between the essential and

the accidental, and from many commandments in special circumstances

dispensation could be granted, Voetius, Disp. I 347 sq. Moor II 614 sq. The

incarnation and satisfaction was according to many not absolutely

necessary; God could also, if he had willed, have forgiven without

satisfaction and need not necessarily punish sin, Athan. c. Ar. III. Gregorius

Naz. Or. 9. Damasc. de fide orth. III 18. Aug., de trin. XIII 10. Lombardus,

Sent. III dist. 20. Thomas, S. Th. III qu. 1 art. 2. Petavius, de incarn. II c.

13. Calvin, Inst. II 12, 1. Comm. on John 15:13. Zanchius, VIII 144-146.

Martyr, Loci, cl. 2 c. 17. Pareus on Rom. 5. Twissus, Vindic. gr. 1652 I 153

sq. e. a. such as Vossius, Roell, Vogelsang, B. S. Cremer, cf. M. Vitringa I

170. Schultens, Waersch. on the catech. of Comrie, pp. 198-222. Still more

strongly this wisdom of God came out in election and reprobation, for

which no single ground is to be given and which rests only in the sovereign

good pleasure of God. Of a right of any creature over against God there can

be no question; a justitia commutativa there is not, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 21

art. 1. Polanus, Synt. II c. 26. Voetius, Disp. II 358. Since a creature can

have no merits with God, there is also no justitia remunerativa in the proper

sense, Thomas, I qu. 21 art. 1. Ned. Geloofsbel. art. 24. Conf. Westm. c. 16.

Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. X 288. Some even maintained that God, although he

never makes use of this right, could punish the innocent temporally or

eternally, Perkins, Works I 772. Twissus, Vind. I 165. 179. 324 sq.

Amyraldus, Synt. thesium I 237. Thus many theologians, proceeding from

the absolute freedom of God, came onto the line of medieval nominalism. It

was Duns Scotus who consistently applied the Pelagian concept of freedom

of the will as absolute indifference to God. In Sent. I dist. 8 qu. 5 he argues

against Aristotle and Avicenna, that besides God nothing is necessary. The

world in its whole and in its parts is contingent, it is unnecessary for God.

To the question why God has now willed this and has willed the one rather

than the other, Scotus answers: indisciplinati est quaerere omnium causas et

demonstrationem.... Principii enim demonstrationis non est demonstratio;

immediatum autem principium est voluntatem velle hoc ita quod non est

aliqua causa media inter ista; sicut immediatum est, calorem esse

calefactivum, licet hoc sit naturalitas, ibi autem libertas, et ideo hujus, quare

voluntas voluit hoc, nulla est causa, nisi quia voluntas est voluntas. Sicut

hujus, quare calor est calefactivus, nulla est causa, nisi quia calor est calor,

quia nulla est prior causa, Sent. I dist. 8 qu. 5 n. 24. One must stop at this

word: Voluntas Dei vult hoc; there is no cause prior ratione voluntatis, ib.

To this principle Scotus remains faithful in all that is and happens in time. If

the whole world is accidental, then this its character can only be preserved

thereby, that God, the first cause, causes it accidentally. Now God causes

the world through intellect and will. The accidental, however, cannot lie in

God’s intellect, insofar as it precedes the will, for this intellect intelligit

mere naturaliter et necessitate naturali. It must therefore lie in the will, Sent.

I dist. 39 qu. 5 n. 14. This divine will nihil aliud respicit necessario pro

objecto ab essentia sua; ad quodlibet igitur aliud contingenter se habet, ita

quod posset esse oppositi, ib. n. 22. Now Scotus indeed acknowledges that

the knowledge of God precedes the will and that the ideas in God, although

distinguished from his essentia, are before his decree, Sent. I dist. 35 qu.

unic. n. 7 sq. But it is nevertheless the will which out of all those possible

ideas chooses and determines which will attain reality. The will is the cause

of all actuality. And only as a consequence of this volitional decision does

the intellect also know what will become actual, ib. dist. 39 qu. 5 n. 23 sq.

God has thus created the world with absolute freedom, even if it is the

case that he has taken the decision thereto from eternity, ib. II dist. 1 qu. 2

n. 5. Naturally human freedom of the will was therefore by Scotus also

conceived as absolutely as possible; the will is free ad oppositos actus and

ad opposita objecta, ib. I dist. 39 qu. 5 n. 15 sq.; it is determined by nothing,

it can just as well choose a lower as a higher good, it is itself alone the

complete cause of its actions; non autem bonitas aliqua objecti causat

necessario assensum voluntatis sed voluntas libere assentit cuilibet bono et

ita libere assentit majori bono sicut minori, ib. I dist. 1 qu. 4 n. 16. Nihil

aliud a voluntate est causa totalis volitionis in voluntate, II dist. 25 qu. 1 n.

22. The will even precedes the intellect, for although the intellect offers to

the will the object of its striving, the will nevertheless directs the intellect to

the object; and blessedness lies formally not in the intellect but in the will,

IV dist. 49 qu. 4. Further, Scotus indeed acknowledges that love to God,

prescribed in the first table of the law, is necessary and natural, but the

commandments of the second table are positive and could also have been

otherwise, III dist. 37 qu. unica. In relation to the incarnation Scotus teaches

that the Logos, if he willed, could also assume another nature than the

human, e.g. that of a stone, III dist. 2 qu. 1 n. 5 sq. The incarnation would

probably also have taken place apart from sin and was also in the state of

sin not absolutely necessary; God could also have redeemed in another way,

III dist. 7 qu. 3 n. 3. III dist. 20 qu. unica. The merits of Christ were not

sufficient in themselves, but were as such accepted by God, III dist. 19 qu.

unica. Considered in itself, reckoned according to God’s potentia absoluta,

God could also have granted salvation to the sinner apart from the merits of

Christ, and the sinner could also have satisfied for himself, if only God had

willed to reckon his works as sufficient, IV dist. 15 qu. 1 n. 4 sq. cf. also IV

dist. 1 qu. 6 n. 4 sq. Transubstantiation is possible, quia una substantia

potest totaliter incipere et alia totaliter desinere, IV dist. II qu. 1 n. 4. God

can even cause a person or thing during a tempus intermedium to cease in

its existence, without thereby identity being lost, IV dist. 43 qu. 1 n. 4. Yet

Scotus did not go so far as some Mohammedan theologians, who let

all things from moment to moment be created by the will of God without

mutual connection, without laws of nature, without substances and

qualities, Ritter, Gesch. der christl. Philos. III 732 f. He acknowledges ideas

in God, which precede the will; deems love to God necessary and natural;

believes in a natural knowledge of God, in a world order and natural law,

and also says that incarnation and satisfaction according to the potentia Dei

ordinata were necessary. But nevertheless Scotus elevates freedom and

omnipotence so much, that at least the means, which must lead to the end,

become wholly arbitrary, Ritter, Gesch. d. christl. Philos. IV 388 f. Stöckl,

Gesch. der Philos. des M. A. II 832 f. Baur, Dreiein. u. Menschw. Gottes II

642 f. Ritschl, Jahrb. f. d. Th. 1865 S. 298 f. Dorner, in Herzog2 3, 735 f.

By others this principle of the freedom and omnipotence of God was

developed still further. Entirely in the spirit of Scotus, Occam, e.g., asserted

that God according to his potentia absoluta can grant salvation without

regeneration and can damn the regenerate; that he can forgive without

satisfaction and can regard works of sinful man as sufficient; that the Father

could have become man in place of the Son, and that the Son could also

have assumed the nature of a stone or a donkey; that God can grant

dispensation from all commandments of the moral law etc., Stöckl, Philos.

des M. A. II 1018 f. This nominalistic standpoint was later adopted in the

first place by the Jesuits but then further by the Socinians, Fock, Der Socin.

416 f., the Remonstrants, Apol. Conf. c. 24. Episc., Instit. theol. V sect. 5 c.

3, by Cartesius, Resp. sextae, Amst. 1654 p. 160 sq., by Cartesian

theologians, such as Burmannus, Synopsis I c. 20 § 6. c. 21 § 19 sq., and in

this century among others still by Charles Sécrétan, Philosophie de la

liberté 1849 I 305 S. On this standpoint the will in God is wholly detached

from his essence and from all his virtues; it consists in nothing other than

formal arbitrariness. Creation, incarnation, satisfaction, good and evil, true

and untrue, reward and punishment, everything could just as well have been

otherwise than it in fact is. There is nothing natural any more, everything is

positive. But precisely this nominalism caused Christian theology to be on

its guard. Even if it also said with Augustine that the will of God was the

ultimate ground of all things, it nevertheless guarded itself against stripping

this will of all nature and letting it dissolve into pure arbitrariness.

First of all it took, in the doctrine of God, its point of departure not in the

voluntas but in the essentia Dei. The scientia simplicis intelligentiae

logically preceded the scientia visionis, just as the voluntas necessaria

preceded the voluntas libera. Self-knowledge and self-love in God was

absolutely necessary; and the knowledge and the will, which have the

creatures as object, are not dualistically separated from that, but stand with

it in the closest connection. The scientia visionis is bound to the scientia

simplicis intelligentiae and the voluntas libera to the voluntas necessaria.

According to consistent nominalism not only the existence but also the

essence of things is exclusively determined and fixed by the formal will in

God; properly speaking there is thus in God no scientia simplicis

intelligentiae, in which all possibilities are comprised, there is only in him a

scientia visionis, which follows upon the will. But according to Christian

theology all possibilities lay enclosed in the scientia simplicis intelligentiae,

and from that the scientia visionis draws and the will brings them to reality.

The existence of things thus does indeed depend on the will of God, but the

essence on his intellect. Leibniz built further on this and said that God was

indeed free to create or not to create the world, man, the animals, the plants,

but if he created them he had to create them according to the idea which his

consciousness had formed of them without and before the will. Given the

will of God to create, the world must be precisely as it is. It is therefore the

best possible and hangs together in all parts so intimately, that qui unum

bene novit, omnia novit, Theod. I 7. 52 II 169 s. Pichler, Die Theol. des

Leibniz I 239 s. cf. also Schelling, Werke II 3 S. 57-62. Hartmann, Philos.

des Unb. I9 100 f. II 435 f. 446 f. Weisse, Philos. Dogm. I § 460 f. Further,

Scripture taught everywhere that God created and sustained the world by

the word, by the Logos. It thus rested on thoughts of God. God did not act

arbitrarily and contingently but with the highest wisdom. Even if therefore

by us the reasons for his acting could not be traced, they were nevertheless

present for him. And for those reasons Christian theology then also sought.

Creation had its cause in his goodness or love; for the permission of sin all

kinds of reasons were given; incarnation and satisfaction were perhaps not

absolutely necessary but this way of redemption was nevertheless the

most suitable and excellent, Petavius, de incarn. II c. 5 sq.; and even if

many did not dare to limit the potestas absoluta, all nevertheless

acknowledged that he made no use of this absolute right and thus in the

potestas ordinata again wholly agreed with one another. And finally on

concrete points nominalism was decisively rejected; the moral law can have

no other content than it has, Thomas, S. Theol. I 2 qu. 100 art. 8. Becanus,

de lege naturae III c. 3 qu. 4. Suarez, de lege I c. 15. Voetius, Disp. I 364-

402. Maresius, Syst. theol. VII 4. Turretinus, Theol. El. III qu. 18 and XI

qu. 2. Heidegger, Corp. Theol. III 89, 90; the punishment of sin is

necessary, Can. Dordr. II 1. Voetius, Disp. I 358 sq. II 240 sq. Moor I 683

sq. 996-1034, and likewise the incarnation and satisfaction, Iren. adv. haer.

III 20. Anselmus, Cur Deus homo. Heid. Cat. q. 11. 40. Lord’s Supper form

of the Ned. Ger. Kerken. Trigland, Antapol. c. 4. Voetius, Disp. II 238 sq.

Turretinus, de satisf. Christi II § 16 sq. Owen, de justitia divina. Ex. v. h.

Ontw. v. Tol. V etc.; and the power of God was so defined, that it excluded

the doing of contradictory things, see presently at n. 18.

In this way nominalism in Christian theology has, if not been overcome,

then at least been pushed back and limited. If the voluntas libera was

defined as propensio in creaturas propter se ut media, then in that there was

already enclosed a principled resistance to the will of God as absolute

arbitrariness, for the character of the means is determined by the nature of

the final end. Hence it is also the case that theology, although placing the

will of God in the foreground and continually returning to it, has

nevertheless always again sought motives for that will. Realism strove to

understand the world as one harmonious whole, in which nothing was

arbitrary and everything had its place, even sin, and which as a whole was

serviceable to the glorification of God’s name. If the nature of a science

consists in the rerum cognoscere causas, theology too cannot withdraw

itself from such an investigation. Only, for every practitioner of science,

and especially for the theologian, humility and modesty are a first duty. He

may not be wise above what one ought to be wise. All science is bound to

its object; it may not, for the sake of any preconceived theory falsify

or deny the phenomena which it observes. Thus theology too is most strictly

bound to the facts and testimonies which God makes known to it in nature

and Scripture. It must let these stand, unweakened and unmutilated. If it

cannot explain them, it has to confess its ignorance. The will of God, which

expresses itself in those facts, is for it the end of all reasoning. It finally

rests in his sovereignty. In that sense the word of Augustine remains true:

voluntas Dei cujusque creaturae natura est. It allows itself to be seduced

neither by pantheism, which makes the world necessary, for there is a

distinction between God and world, between his voluntas necessaria and

voluntas libera; nor also by deism, which makes the world into a product of

chance, for that whole world is a revelation of God’s wisdom. And it

maintains against both, that the world is an act of God’s free, sovereign will

and that God for this will has had his wise and good reasons. For us

something is good solely and only because God wills it; God himself can

never will anything, except because it is in itself or for something else good,

Voetius, Disp. I 387. We almost never see why God has willed the one and

not the other, and we must therefore represent it thus, that He could have

willed the one just as well as the other. But in God there actually falls no

choice, which after all always presupposes uncertainty, wavering,

deliberation. He knows eternally, firmly, unchangeably what He wills. In his

will there falls no arbitrariness, no chance, no uncertainty, but only eternal

determinateness and unchangeableness. The contingent is proper to the

creature, and, said with reverence, it is not even possible for God, to take

this character away from the creature. In God alone are existentia and

essentia one; every creature as such, by virtue of its own nature, includes

the possibility that it did not exist. But God has with eternal and

unchangeable will willed all creatures as contingent. Therefore it is not

possible for us and is even also not permitted, to climb higher than to the

will of God. For every attempt thereto results in this, to seek for the creature

a ground in God’s being, thus to make it necessary and eternal and divine,

and to strip it of its creaturely, i.e. contingent character. In so far the will of

God, which has the created as object, is called free. But this freedom does

not exclude the other virtues of God, his wisdom, goodness, righteousness

etc. For, that is also among creatures not the true freedom of will,

which needs a long time of doubt, deliberation and decision; but that is the

highest freedom, which at once, uno intuitu, determines both the end and

the means and knows of no hesitation. And such a freedom is also in God; a

freedom which is not to be thought of as bound by the other virtues of God

or as independent of them in nominalistic fashion, but such a freedom,

which therefore in an absolute sense is free because it is the freedom of a

wise, righteous, holy, merciful and almighty God. When Augustine,

Thomas, Calvin etc. therefore said that there was no causa for the will of

God, then by that they meant that the will of God, as one with his being, has

no causa behind or above itself, on which that will would be dependent. But

by that they by no means wished to say that that will was without ratio, that

it in the sense of Schopenhauer was a blind, alogical will. On the contrary,

the will of God is one with his being, with his wisdom, goodness and all his

virtues, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 19 art. 5. And therefore heart and head of man

can rest in that will, for it is the will, not of a blind fate, of an incalculable

chance, of a dark power of nature, but the will of an almighty God and of a

gracious Father. His sovereignty is a sovereignty of unbounded power, but

also a sovereignty of wisdom and grace. He is King and Father at the same

time. Cf. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorz. I 452-585. Scheeben I 681 f. Dorner I

410 f. Id. Gesammelte Schriften 341 f. Müller, Lehre v. d. Sünde II5 180 f.

Ebrard, Dogm. § 71 f. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. I2 283 f. Hodge, I 402.

17. Creation, however, presents still more and still other difficulties for

the doctrine of the will of God. Just as God and world are distinct and

therefore the will of God for us falls apart into propensio in se and in

creaturas, so there is also in the world among the creatures again all manner

of distinction. And that distinction rests on a different relation in which

God, with his being, his knowing and willing, places himself toward the

creatures. God does not will everything in the same way, in the same sense,

with the same energy of his being; for then no diversity among the creatures

would be possible, then everything would be a uniform sameness. But while

He wills all creatures propter se ut media, He wills these more than

those, according to the measure as they are more direct and suitable media

to his glorification. God is a Father for all his creatures, but He is so in a

special sense for his children. His affection for all that He created stands

below that for the church, and for this below that for Christ, the Son of his

good pleasure. A providentia generalis, specialis and specialissima is

distinguished. And so also we make in the will of God, which is directed to

the creatures, again as much distinction as there are creatures. For as rich as

that whole world is, so rich is the voluntas Dei libera. This therefore is not

to be conceived as an indifferent potency, as a blind force, but as rich, full,

living, divine ενεργεια, artery of all that rich life which creation gives us to

behold. But now there is in that world one thing that causes special

difficulty for the doctrine of the will of God, and that is evil, both as malum

culpae and as malum poenae, in an ethical and in a physical sense. However

much evil may stand under God’s government, it nevertheless cannot in the

same sense and in the same way be object of his will as the good. With a

view to those wholly different and directly opposed objects we must in the

will of God itself again make distinction. Scripture leads us in this. There is

a great difference between the will of God, which prescribes to us what we

have to do, Matthew 7:21, 12:50, John 4:34, 7:17, Romans 12:2, and the will of

God, which says what He does and will do, Psalms 115:3, Daniel 4:17, 25, 32, 35,

Romans 9:18, 19, Ef. 1:5, 9, 11, Op. 4:11. The petition that God’s will may be

done, Matthew 6:10, has a wholly different sense than the childlike resigned: Thy

will be done, Matthew 26:42, Hd. 21:14. And so we see in history time and again

that will of God appear in a twofold sense. God commands Abraham to

offer his son and yet does not let it happen, Gen. 22. He wills that Pharaoh

let Israel go and yet hardens his heart, that he thus does not do it, Exodus 4:21.

He has it announced to Hezekiah that he will die and yet adds fifteen years

to his life, Jes. 38:1, 5. He forbids condemning the innocent and yet Jesus

has been delivered up according to the determinate counsel and

foreknowledge of God, Hd. 2:23, 3:18, 4:28. God does not will sin, He is

far from godlessness, He forbids and punishes it severely, and yet it exists

mercy on whom He will, and hardens whom He will, Romans 9:18. Already

soon in theology the distinction arose between this twofold will of God.

Tertullian already speaks of a hidden, higher and a lower or lesser will, de

exhort. 2 sq. Augustine points out that God many times accomplishes his

good will through the evil will of men, Enchir. c. 101. Later this twofold

will received the name of voluntas ε ὐ δοκιας, beneplaciti, arcana, decernens,

decretiva and voluntas ε ὐ αρεστιας, signi, revelata, praecipiens. The name

voluntas signi is derived from the fact that this will significat quid Deo

gratum sit et nostri sit officii and is known by us from the five signa:

praeceptio, prohibitio, consilium, permissio, operatio. Worked out at length

by scholasticism, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 45. Hugo Victorinus, de Sacram.

Lib. 1 Pars 4. Id. Summa Sent. tract. 1 cap. 13. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 19

art. 11, 12 etc., it was generally adopted by Roman theology, Petavius, de

Deo lib. V c. 4, 6, Theol. Wirceb. III 160. Perrone, II 199. C. Pesch, Prael.

dogm. II 156 etc. But with special predilection it was nevertheless treated in

Reformed theology, Calv. Inst. I c. 18 § 3, 4. Musculus, Loci Comm. p. 978

sq. Martyr, Loci Comm. p. 63 b. sq. Ursinus, Tract. theol. p. 237 sq.

Zanchius, Op. II 251 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 19 etc. cf. Schweizer, Gl.

der ev. ref. K. I 359-368. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 68 f. Alongside this

there came still other distinctions of the will of God, especially that in

voluntas antecedens and consequens, which already occurs in Tertullianus,

adv. Marc. II 11, Chrysostomus, Ep. ad. Ephesians 1:5 and Damascenus, de fide

orth. II c. 29, and that in voluntas absoluta and conditionata, efficax and

inefficax, which is already found in Augustine, Enchir. c. 102 sq. de civ.

XXII c. 1 and 2. These distinctions too can be well understood, in this sense

namely that God antecedenter and conditionate wills many things, e.g. the

salvation of all men, which He nevertheless consequenter and absolute does

not will and therefore does not let happen. Zanchius t. a. p. therefore also

says that all these distinctions come down to the same thing; and Hyperius,

Meth. theol. p. 155-159 judges likewise. Walaeus, Op. I 180. Voetius, Disp.

V 88. etc. But although Luther in his book de servo arbitrio had made

a very sharp distinction between the Deus absconditus and revelatus, the

Lutherans rejected this distinction in voluntas beneplaciti and signi, at least

in a Calvinistic sense, Gerhard, loc. 2 c. 8 sect. 15. Baier, Comp. theol. pos.

I c. 1 § 22. Buddeus, Instit. theol. dogm. II c. 1 § 29. The Arminians

followed that example, Episcopius, Instit. theol. IV sect. 2 c. 21. Limborch,

Theol. Christ. II c. 9 § 9. And the Roman theologians did indeed retain the

distinction in name, but explained it in such a way that the will of God was

always voluntas beneplaciti, divided into voluntas antecedens and

consequens and that the voluntas signi was nothing but a partial revelation

of that will, Theol. Wirceb. III 160. C. Pesch, Prael. II 156. Kleutgen,

Theol. d. Vorz. I 564 f. Thus it has happened that on the one hand the

Romanists etc. have in fact retained only the distinction in voluntas

antecedens and consequens (absoluta and conditionata), and the Reformed

only that in voluntas beneplaciti and signi (decernens and praecipiens,

arcana and revelata) with rejection of that of the voluntas antecedens and

consequens, Maccovius, Collegia theol. disp. 1-8. Nic. Gurtler, Instit. theol.

and 27 sq. Turretinus, Theol. El. III qu. 15, 16. The difference comes down

to this, that the Romanists, Lutherans, Remonstrants etc. proceed from the

voluntas signi; this is the proper will, consisting in this, that God does not

will sin but only wills to permit it, that He wills the salvation of all, offers

grace to all etc.; and when man has then decided, God accommodates

himself to that, determines what He wills, the salvation of him who

believes, the perdition of him who does not believe. The voluntas

consequens follows upon the decision of man, and is not the proper,

essential will of God but the action of God on the occasion of the conduct

of man. In contrast, the Reformed proceeded from the voluntas beneplaciti

and held this to be the proper, essential will of God; that will always goes

on, always reaches its goal and is eternal and unchangeable; the voluntas

signi, on the other hand, is the prescription of God, in law and gospel,

which applies as rule for our conduct.

Now it is the continuous doctrine of Scripture, both in O. and N. Test.,

that the will of God is eternal, unchangeable, independent, efficacious. Not

now and then is this expressed, e.g. Psalms 33:11, [220] 115:3, Daniel 7:25, Isaiah 46:10, Matthew 11:26, Romans 9:18, Ephesians 1:4, Revelation 4:11 etc., but the whole of

Scripture testifies to it; all the virtues of God require this; the whole history

of church and world furnishes proof for it. And accordingly Christian

theology taught, especially since Augustine, that the will of God is simple,

eternal, unchangeable, because it is one with his essence, Aug. Conf. XII

15. The voluntas antecedens is properly no will in God, magis potest dici

velleitas quam absoluta voluntas, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 19 art. 6. The

voluntas signi is called voluntas in God only in a metaphorical sense, sicut

cum aliquis praecipit aliquid, signum est quod velit illud fieri, ib. art. 11.

The proper will in God is the voluntas beneplaciti, and this is one with

God’s essence, is unchangeable and is always accomplished, ib. art. 6 and 7.

c. Gent. I 72 sq. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 45-48 and the comm. Thomas,

Bonaventura e.a. Pelagianism has wrongly abandoned this line, and

elevated a powerless desire, an unfulfilled wish in God to will. Thereby it

has done injustice to the whole being, to all the virtues of God. For if the

velleitas is the proper and essential will of God, then He is deprived of his

omnipotence, wisdom, goodness, unchangeableness, independence etc.; the

whole government of the world is then withdrawn from his providence; an

irreconcilable dualism is created between God’s intention and the result of

world history; the outcome is then for God an eternal disappointment; the

world-plan has failed, and Satan celebrates triumph at the end. Now

Pelagianism does indeed assert that it acts thus in the interest of God’s

holiness, and that it maintains this better than Paul and Augustine, than

Thomas and Calvin, because in their system God becomes the author of sin.

But this is no more than appearance; sin remains from the standpoint of

Pelagius just as inexplicable as from that of Augustine; indeed, holiness

comes into its own much better here. For it is more in accordance with

Scripture and the whole Christian faith to assume that God, for wise

reasons, though unknown to us, has in a certain sense willed sin, than that

He, willing it in no respect, nevertheless tolerates and permits it. This latter,

after all, does precisely detract from his holiness and omnipotence, cf. later

in the doctrine of sin. In addition, Scripture, though theologically placing

the voluntas beneplaciti in the foreground, nevertheless at the same

time maintains in the voluntas signi how and in what way He does not will

sin. In the signa of prohibition, admonition, warning, chastisement,

punishment etc. He descends to us, and says what He requires of us.

Because man is a rational, moral being, God does not deal with him as with

a stick and a block, but speaks and acts with him in accordance with his

nature. Just as a father forbids a child the use of a sharp knife, and yet

himself handles it without harm, so God forbids to his rational creatures the

sin, which He himself nevertheless can use and in fact uses to the

glorification of his name. The voluntas beneplaciti and the voluntas signi

therefore also do not conflict with each other, as the common objection

runs. For in the first place the voluntas signi is properly not the will of God,

but only his command and prescription, which holds as a rule for our

conduct. In the voluntas signi He does not say what He will do; it is no law

for his acting; it does not prescribe what God must do; but in it He says

what we have to do; it is a rule for our conduct, Deuteronomy 29:29. It is therefore

called voluntas Dei only in a metaphorical sense. Indeed it is objected

against this that the voluntas signi is nevertheless so called because it is a

signum voluntatis in Deo, and thus must correspond with his voluntas

beneplaciti. Secondly, it should therefore be remarked that this is indeed so;

the voluntas signi is an indication of what God wills that we shall do. The

voluntas beneplaciti and the voluntas signi do not stand directly opposite

each other, so that God according to the former does will sin and according

to the latter does not will sin, according to the former does not will the

salvation of all and according to the latter does, etc. For even according to

the voluntas beneplaciti God takes no pleasure in sin, it is no object of his

good pleasure, He does not torment out of lust for tormenting. And

conversely He wills just as little according to the voluntas signi as

according to the voluntas beneplaciti that all men, head for head, be saved;

that cannot, with a view to history, be taught in earnest by anyone; in fact it

is by everyone in 1 Timothy 2:4 restricted to a greater or smaller circle. Both

stand so little over against each other that the voluntas signi is precisely the

way in which the voluntas beneplaciti is accomplished. In the way of

admonitions and warnings, prohibitions and threatenings, conditions and

demands God carries out his counsel. And the voluntas beneplaciti

maintains only that man, transgressing God’s command, does not

become independent of God for a single moment, but in that same moment

serves the counsel of God and becomes, even if unwillingly, an instrument

of his glory. Not the voluntas signi alone, but also the voluntas beneplaciti

is holy and wise and good, and will precisely in the way of the law and of

righteousness at the end be revealed as such. Therefore, finally, the

distinction of both also ought to be maintained. It is the problem of right

and fact, of idea and history, of the moral and the actual, of what ought to

happen and of what indeed happens, that here confronts us. Whoever denies

the voluntas signi does injustice to the holiness of God, to the majesty of the

moral law, to the seriousness of sin. Whoever, on the other hand, denies the

voluntas beneplaciti comes into conflict with the omnipotence, the wisdom,

the independence, the sovereignty of God. On both standpoints one runs the

danger either with a superficial optimism to close the eyes to reality, and to

call all the actual rational, or with a one-sided pessimism to curse existence

and to despair of world and lot. Theism, however, seeks no solution in

striking out one of both terms of the problem, but acknowledges and

maintains them both; it sees the lines of the rational and the actual at every

moment in history intersect and cross each other; it traces both back to the

sovereignty of God and has of this the lofty thought that it also through the

irrational and sinful will bring his holy and wise counsel to execution to the

glory of the Lord’s name. Herein indeed his divine sovereignty shines forth

brilliantly, that He in men’s folly glorifies his wisdom, in their weakness his

power, in their sin his righteousness and grace.

18. The sovereignty of God finally reveals itself in his omnipotence,

which, however, after what has already been said, requires less extensive

treatment. In Scripture never and nowhere is a limit set to the power of

God. Already in the names El, Elohim, El Schaddai, Adonai the idea of

power comes to the foreground. Further, He is called ‎‏‏ֵאל ָּגדֹול ְונֹוָרא‎, before

whose face no one can stand, Deuteronomy 7:21v., ‎‏‏ָאִביר ִיׂשָרֵאל‎, Jes. 1:24, ‎‏ָהֵאל ַהָּגדּול

Lord, the Owner, the Ruler, who possesses authority and supremacy; the

King, who reigns in eternity over all things, Exodus 15:18, 29:10, 93-99, 2 Kings 29:15, Jeremiah 10:7, 10 etc., but above all is King over Israel and as such rules

it, protects it, and leads it to salvation, Numbers 23:21, Deuteronomy 33:5, Richt. 8:23,

likewise in the N. T. the μεγας βασιλευς, Matthew 5:33, 1 Timothy 1:17, the

1 Timothy 6:15; who both possess the ἐ ξουσια, ἀ ρχη, potestas, the right, the

authority and the competence, Matthew 28:18, Romans 9:21 and the δυναμις,

κρατος, potentia, the fitness and the power to act, Matthew 6:13, Romans 1:20. But

further the omnipotence of God appears from all his works. The creation,

the preservation, the redemption of Israel from Egypt, nature with its

ordinances, the history of Israel with its miracles proclaim loudly and

clearly the omnipotence of God. Psalmists and prophets return to these

great deeds time and again and apply them to humiliation for the proud and

to comfort for the believer. He is strong in power, Jes. 40:26, creates earth

and wind, light and darkness, the good and the evil, Amos 3:6, 4:13, 5:8, Jes.

45:5-7, 54:16. He makes mute and speaking, dead and living, saves and

absolute power over all things, so that nothing can resist Him, Ps. 8, 18, 19,

too wondrous for Him, all things are possible for Him, Genesis 18:14, Zach.

8:6, Jeremiah 32:27, Matthew 19:26, Luke 1:37, 18:27; He can raise up children for

Abraham from stones, Matthew 3:9. He does all his good pleasure, Psalms 115:3, Jes.

And above all his δυναμις comes forth in the works of redemption, in the

raising of Christ, Romans 1:4. Ef. 1:20, in the working and

strengthening of faith, Romans 16:15, Ef. 1:19, in the distribution of grace

above asking and thinking, Ef. 2:20, 2 Corinthians 9:8, 2 Petr. 1:3, in the

resurrection on the last day, John 5:25v. etc. And this power of God is finally

also the source of all power and authority, of all force and strength in the

creatures. From Him is the dominion of man, Genesis 1:26, Ps. 8, the authority

of government, Spr. 8:15, Romans 13:1-16, the strength of his people, Deuteronomy 8:17, 18, Psalms 68:36, Jes. 40:26 v. the strength of the horse, Job 39:22, the

violence of the thunder, Psalms 29:4, 68:34 etc. In one word, his is the strength.

Psalms 62:12, and to Him belong the power and the strength, Psalms 96:7, Op. 4:11,

In complete agreement with their doctrine of the will and the freedom of

God, cf. above p. 210f., the nominalists now described the omnipotence of

God in such a way that God by it can do everything that He wills, not only,

but also can will everything. Distinguishing between the potentia absoluta

and ordinata, they judged that God according to the former could also sin,

err, suffer, die, become a stone or an animal, could change bread into the

body of Christ, could do contradictory things, could undo what had

happened, could make false what was true and true what was false, etc.

According to his potentia absoluta God is thus sheer arbitrariness, pure

potency without any content, which is nothing and can become everything,

cf. Chamier, Panstr. Cath. II l. 2 c. 3 § 5. Voetius, Disp. I 411, 427. In

principle this is the standpoint of all who uphold the primacy of the will,

and therefore this opinion has later repeatedly returned and it occurs not

only in Christianity but also among other religions, especially with Islam.

On the other side stand those who say that God can only what He wills and

that He, what He does not will, also cannot. The possible coincides with the

actual. What becomes no actuality is also not possible. God has fully

exhausted his power in the world. This was already the opinion of Plato and

Plotinus, Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. II 928 V 496 f., and further of some church

fathers, Petavius, de Deo V c. 6, but in the Middle Ages was especially

taught by Abaelard, Deus non potest facere aliquid praeter ea quae facit,

Introd. theol. III c. 5. And thus later the Cartesian theologians judged,

foed. I 2 c. 3 § 7 sq. Wittichius, Theol. pacif. § 199 sq. further Spinoza,

Cogit. metaph. II c. 9. Eth. I prop. 16, 17. Schleiermacher, Gl. § 54. Strauss,

Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godg. II 112 f. etc. Scripture condemns both the one and

the other standpoint. It says on the one side expressly that God cannot do

many things; He cannot lie, have regret, change, be tempted, Numbers 23:19, 1

2 Timothy 2:13; for his will is after all one with his being, and the potentia

absoluta, which detaches the power of God from his other virtues, is

nothing but a vain and unlawful abstraction. On the other hand Scripture

declares just as decisively that the possible extends much further than the

And to this Christian theology held fast. Augustine says on the one hand

that God’s will and power are not distinguished from his being. Homo aliud

est quod est, aliud quod potest.... Deus autem cui non est aliud substantia ut

sit, et alia potestas ut possit, sed consubstantiale illi est quidquid ejus est et

quidquid est, quia Deus est, non alio modo est et alio modo potest; sed esse

et posse simul habet, quia velle et facere simul habet, tract. 20 in Ev. Joan.

n. 4. Conf. XI 10, XII 15. Indeed God’s omnipotence consists in this, that

He can what He wills, certe non ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quoniam

quidquid vult potest, de civ. XXI 7. But God cannot will everything, He

cannot deny himself. Quia non vult non potest, quia et velle non potest. Non

enim potest justitia velle facere quod injustum est, aut sapientia velle quod

stultum est, aut veritas velle quod falsum est. Unde admonemur Deum

omnipotentem non hoc solum, quod ait apostolus: negare se ipsum non

potest, sed multa non posse.... Deus omnipotens non potest mori, non potest

mutari, non potest falli, non potest fieri, non potest vinci, Serm. 214. But

then further Augustine argues that this is no lack of power, but precisely

true, absolute omnipotence. It would precisely be impotence, if He could

err, sin, etc. Serm. 213, 214, de civ. V 10. Augustine especially clarifies that

in relation to the proposition, which is often brought against the

omnipotence of God, that God cannot undo what has been done. This

statement can after all have a twofold sense. First, one can mean by it that

God nullifies the fact that has happened; but this is no sense, for a fact that

has happened is no longer and cannot and need not be nullified. But second,

one can mean by it that God would undo the fact that has happened in

human consciousness, so that this now comes to think that it has not

happened. But this too has no sense, for God who is the truth would then

have to make what is true untrue. Other theologians have spoken in a

similar sense about God’s omnipotence and have only repeated what

Augustine had said. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 42-44. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu.

25. S. c. Gent. II c. 6-10. Bonaventura, Breviloquium I c. 7. Petavius, de

Deo V c. 7. Gerhard, II c. 8 sect. 9. Buddeus, Instit. theol. dogm. II c. 1 §

30. Musculus, Loci Comm. p. 952 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 29.

Zanchius, Op. II 159 sq. Voetius, Disp. I 403 sq. V 113 sq. Alsted, Theol.

schol. did. p. 93-96. Mastricht, Theor. pract. theol. II c. 20. Chamier, Panstr.

Cath. II l. 2 c. 1-3. Leydecker, Fax Veritatis p. 163 sq. 233 sq. etc.

Specifically, by the Reformed theologians the distinction in potentia Dei

absoluta and ordinata was only acknowledged up to a certain point. The

nominalists had misused this, in order to assert that God according to the

first could do everything, also what was in conflict with his nature, and

thereby they also especially argued the doctrine of transubstantiation.

Against that Calvin rose up and he rejected such a commentum potentiae

Comm. in Jes. 23:9, Luke 1:18. The Roman Catholics therefore accused

Calvin that he limited and thus denied the omnipotence of God,

Bellarminus, de gratia et lib. arb. III c. 15. But Calvin did not therefore

deny that God could do more than He in fact did, but he only contested such

a potentia absoluta, which would not be bound to his being and virtues and

thus could also do all kinds of contradictory things. Thus conceived, in the

sense of Augustine and Thomas, the said distinction was also generally

accepted by the Reformed theologians, Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 29. Alsted,

Theol. schol. did. p. 96. Heidegger, Corpus theol. III 109. Synopsis pur.

theol. VI 36. Mastricht, II 20, 13. And thus understood, this distinction is

also to be approved. The pantheism does indeed say that God and

world are correlata, and that God has no own being and life, no own

consciousness and will in distinction from the world. But it thus mixes

everything together in a hopeless way, and also brings about a boundless

confusion in thinking. God and world, eternity and time, infinity and

finitude, being and becoming, the possible and the actual, the necessary and

the contingent, etc., are not words of the same content and the same

meaning. The world is of such a nature that our thinking cannot take from it

the character of contingency. The thought of its non-existence includes not

the least logical contradiction. There can be motives why God has called the

world into being; the cosmos can in its whole and in each of its parts be

embodiment of divine thoughts; but it is impossible to explain the origin of

the world logically, without the will of an almighty God. And therefore

alongside the actual there remains a domain for the possible. God is not

absorbed in the world, eternity does not pour itself out empty into time,

infinity is not identical with the sum of all the finite, omniscience does not

coincide with the content of thought of rational creatures. And thus the

omnipotence of God is still infinitely exalted above the unbounded power

which comes to manifestation in the world. Cf. Weisse, Philos. Dogm. §

499 f. Dorner I 441 f. Ebrard § 179 f. Philippi II3 59 f. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm.

S. 503-506. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrheit I2 249 f. Grétillat III 256 s. Hodge

. Higher still than in the essential names does God’s revelation rise in

the nomina personalia, which make known to us the distinctions that

exist in the unity of his being. This revelation already begins in the O. Test.

To be sure, it does not yet occur there in full, as the church fathers and later

theologians have often taught with disregard of the historical character of

revelation; but it is just as incorrect that it would not yet be found there at

all, as after the Socinians and the Remonstrants, was taught by

Semler, Herder, Doederlein, Bretschneider, Dogm. I4 565 f. Hofmann,

Schriftbeweis I2 90 f., and others, cf. Walch, Bibl. theol. sel. II 687. The O.

T. makes the trinitarian existence of God known only indistinctly; it is the

charter of the becoming doctrine of the Trinity, Petavius, de trin. II c. 7.

Lange, Dogm. II 124 f. 148 f. But it nevertheless contains, not only in a few

texts standing by themselves but especially in the organism of its revelation,

moments that are of the highest significance for the doctrine of the Trinity.

First of all, the name Elohim comes into consideration. That this in its

plural form is no proof for the Trinity was already remarked earlier, p. 104.

## § 27. The Personal Names of God.

But it is nevertheless remarkable that this name, among the advocates of

monotheism, has never met with objection on account of its form. This is to

be explained only from the fact that it contains no reminiscence of

polytheism, but designates the Godhead in its fullness and richness of life.

The God of revelation is no abstract unity, but the living, true God, who in

the infinite fullness of his life includes the highest diversity. Already

immediately at the creation that comes out. Elohim creates by speaking and

by sending out his Spirit. The word that God speaks is no sound, but a

power, so great that by it he creates and sustains the world; he speaks and it

by God, proceeding from him and thus distinguished from him, is later

hypostatized as wisdom in Job 28:23-27, Spr. 8:22 v. cf. Spr. 3:19, Jeremiah 10:12, 51:15. That wisdom is from eternity possessed by God, prepared,

appointed, searched out, as his nursling and craftswoman, through whom he

created and sustains all things. But not only through the word and wisdom,

also through the Spirit of God does the work of creation and of preservation

Jes. 40:7, 13, 59:19. While the word is the mediator through which God

calls all things into being, it is his Spirit through which he is immanent in

all that is created, and makes it all living and adorns it. Thus, already

according to the doctrine of the O. T., it comes out in creation that all things

owe their origin and continuance to a threefold causa. Elohim and cosmos

do not stand dualistically alongside one another, but the world, created by

God, has his Word as objective, his Spirit as subjective principle. The world

is first thought by God and therefore comes into being through his almighty

speaking, and when it has received reality, it does not stand outside and

over against him but continues to rest in his Spirit. Still more clearly in the

O. T. this threefold cause comes out on the terrain of special revelation, in

the work of re-creation. Then it is no longer Elohim alone, but Jahveh, who

reveals himself, who makes himself known as the God of the covenant and

of the oath, of revelation and of history. But also as such he does not reveal

himself directly and immediately, Exodus 33:20. It is again through his Word

that he makes himself known and saves and preserves his people, Psalms 107:20. And bearer of that word of saving revelation is the Malak Ihvh, the

Messenger of the Covenant. Not always, where the expression Angel of

God or Angel of the Lord occurs in the O. T., is one to think of the angelus

increatus, as Hengstenberg thought. In 2 Samuel 24:16v., 1 Kon. 19:5-7, 2

Kon. 19:35, Daniel 3:25, 28, 6:23, 10:13, we have to think of an ordinary

23, 27:23, Jud. 9, Op. 12:7. About other places there can be doubt, such as

places named in part I 250, the subject that speaks and acts in the angel of

the Lord rises far above a created angel. The church fathers before

Augustine unanimously saw in this Angel of the Lord a theophany of the

Logos, cf. the quotations in Trip, Die Theophanien in den

Geschichtsbüchern des A. T. Leiden 1858 S. 20-41. Often, however, this

view was connected with the opinion that the Father is actually invisible,

unapproachable, ineffable, but that the Son can reveal himself and is the

principle of all revelation; thus with Justin Martyr, Theophilus, Irenaeus,

Tertullian. But this separation and opposition between the Father and the

Son was rightly contested by the later church fathers, Athanasius, the three

Cappadocians, etc. The Son was true God and thus just as invisible as the

Father. Thus the view of Augustine was prepared, who also always thought

the theophanies of God in the O. T. to be mediated by created angels, de

trin. III 11, de civ. XVI c. 29. The scholastic and Roman theologians usually

adopted this exegesis of Augustine, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 51 art. 2

and 3 ad 5. I 2 qu. 98 art. 3. Sent. II dist. 8 qu. 1 art. 6. Petavius, de trin.

VIII c. 2. Scheeben, Kath. Dogm. I 784 f. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 245 etc.

Luther and Calvin thought now of a created, then of the uncreated angel,

Trip, 49-58; but the later Protest. interpreters understood those places

mostly of the Logos, especially also in opposition to the Socinians,

Remonstrants and Rationalists, who saw in them nothing but angelophanies.

While Hofmann, Baumgarten, Delitzsch align themselves with the latter

view, the old view has again been defended by Stier, Hengstenberg, Keil,

Kurtz, Ebrard etc., also Philippi, Kirchl. Glaub. II3 191-196. The difference

between these two interpretations is not so great as it seems. The advocates

of the old-church view must, after all, acknowledge that the Logos assumed

a human form; and Augustine and his must concede that in that created

angel the Logos revealed himself in an altogether special way, Rivetus in

Trip 65. And in addition comes the fact that the places where the angel of

the Lord is spoken of cannot all be understood in the same sense. So much

then also stands firm, that in the Malak Ihvh, who preeminently bears that

name, God and then specifically the Logos was present in an altogether

unique way. That appears clearly from the fact that he, though distinguished

from Jehovah, is nevertheless also one with him in name, in power, in

redemption and blessing, in worship and honor, part I 250. Trip, t. a. p. 100

f. This exegesis is moreover recommended by the whole O. and N. T.

with this. And just as Jahveh now in re-creation reveals himself objectively

through his word, in the Malak Ihvh; so he does this subjectively in and

through his Spirit. The Spirit of God is the principle of all life and salvation,

of all gifts and powers within the terrain of revelation; of courage, Richt.

policy, Numbers 11:17, 25, 1 Samuel 16:13, of understanding and wisdom, Job 32:8, Jes. 11:2, of holiness and renewal, Psalms 51:13, Jes. 63:10, cf. Genesis 6:3,

29, 24:2, 3, Mich. 3:8 etc. In a special measure he will rest upon the

Messiah, Jes. 11:2, 42:1, 61:1, but thereafter also be poured out over all

give all a new heart and a new spirit, Ezech. 36:26, 27. On the H. Spirit in

the O. T.: Kleinert, zur altt. Lehre vom Geiste Gottes, Jahrb. f. d. Th. 1867

S. 3-60. Oehler, Theol. des A. T.2 178 f. 214 f. Smend, Altt. Religionsgesch.

459 f. Warfield, The Spirit of God in the Old Test., Presb. and Ref. Rev.

Oct. 1895 p. 665-687. This threefold divine principle, which underlies

creation and re-creation, and bears the whole economy of O. T. revelation,

is now a few times also mentioned together. The threefold repetitions in

Daniel 9:19, Zach. 1:3, Jes. 6:3, 33:22 do not come into consideration for this;

only the high-priestly prayer of blessing, Numbers 6:24-26, in the threefold

character of its blessing points back to a threefold revelation of God and is

thus the O. T. example of the apostolic blessing, 2 Corinthians 13:13. The plural

forms in Genesis 1:26, 27, 3:22, Jes. 6:8 etc. lack sufficient force, because they

are to be explained in the same way as the pluralis Elohim, cf. above p. 104.

Of more significance are places such as Genesis 19:24, Psalms 45:8, 110:1, Hosea 1:7, because they point to a self-distinction in the divine being. And most

clearly a threefold self-distinction in the divine being is indicated in Psalms 33:6, Jes. 61:1, 63:9-12, Hagg. 2:5, 6. Many formerly also saw in the three

men who appeared to Abraham, Gen. 18, a revelation of the Trinity, e.g.

Witsius, Oec. foed. IV 3 § 3-8. Others thought that one of the three was the

Logos and the other two were ordinary angels, e.g. Calvin, Kantt.

Statenvert., Moor I 807. Much more plausible, however, is the exegesis of

Augustine, de civ. XVI 29, according to whom the three men were three

created angels, in whom Jahveh, however, revealed himself and was present

in a special way. Literature on the Trinity in the O. T. in M. Vitringa I 213

2. These thoughts of the O. T. have been fruitful in many directions. In the

first place they were taken over and further elaborated in the apocryphal

literature. In the Proverbs of Jesus Sirach wisdom occupies a broad

place. She is from God and before all things created by Him, and she

remains with Him unto eternity. She is spread out over all God’s works, but

nevertheless has her resting-place especially in Zion and is to be found in

the law, c. 1:1-40 and cap. 24, cf. also Baruch, c. 3:9-4:4. But the book of

Wisdom goes further, 6:22-9. Here wisdom is so hypostatized that her

Divine attributes and works are ascribed to her. She is clearly distinguished

from God, for she is the breath of his power, an effluence of his glory, a

radiance of his light, 7:25, 26. But she is also most intimately connected

with God, lives together with Him, is initiated into his knowledge and

selects those ideas which will be carried out, 8:3, 4. She is the παρεδρος on

his throne, knows all his works and was present at the creation of the world,

9:4, 9. Yes, she is herself the one who creates and governs and renews all

18:15, 16 and with his Spirit, 1:4-7, 9:17, 12:1. Already in this book of

Wisdom the influence of Greek philosophy is noticeable, especially 7:22v.,

but much stronger is this the case with Philo. The relation of God to the

world had already been investigated by Plato. From the distinction and

opposition of δοξα and ἐ πιστημη Plato inferred that, just as the former must

have a sensible object in reality, so the latter must have as its object an

eternal and unchangeable being, i.e. an idea. These ideas, although actually

nothing other than general concepts, were by Plato elevated to metaphysical

principia, to proper substances, to a kind of intermediate beings, according

to which the δημιουργος formed the cosmos and which therefore are the

παραδειγματα and the α ἰ τιαι of things. Although Aristotle subjected this

doctrine of ideas to a sharp criticism, yet the thought that an intelligent,

spiritual principle lay at the basis of all things has no longer been lost from

Greek philosophy. The Stoa in particular laid emphasis on the fact that a

Divine reason was the ground of all phenomena. For that it employed the

name λογος σπερματικος, because all being and life germinates from that

logos as from a seed, and it also sometimes spoke in the plural of λογοι

σπερματικοι, in order thereby, alongside the unity, also to indicate the

diversity of the all-creating natural force, Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. IV3 159,

160, cf. 140 note. Even the later so very significant distinction of

λογος ενδιαθετος and προφορικος is borrowed from the Stoa, ib. 67 note.

This Greek doctrine of the idea, the νους and the λογος had now already

before Philo been brought into connection with the doctrine of the O. T.

concerning the word and wisdom, Zeller, ib. V 266. But nevertheless it was

especially Philo who fused all these different elements, Platonic doctrine of

ideas, Stoic doctrine of the logos, O. T. wisdom-doctrine etc. into one

system. In doing so he proceeds from the dualism of God and world. God is

αποιος, indescribable; we can only say that He is, not what He is. Therefore

He also cannot stand in immediate contact with matter. Before God created

the sensible world, He made a plan and in his thinking formed the κοσμος

νοητος, the ideas, as παραδειγματα and δυναμεις of all things. These ideas

are now represented by Philo as the powers by which God can work in the

world, and now more than less figuratively, now more than less personally

described as servants, governors, envoys, mediators, as λογοι and powers,

as bonds and pillars, which by Moses were called angels and by the Greeks

daemonen, as thoughts which are found in the Divine thinking and are

uncreated and infinite as God himself. These ideas are now also many in

number, but they find their unity in the logos, the idea that is all ideas, the

power that is all powers, the book that contains all thoughts within itself,

the κοσμος νοητος itself. And in the same way as the Divine ideas, so also

this logos is described, now once more as an attribute of God and one with

his wisdom and then more as a being, distinguished from God. He stands,

as it were, between God and world and has part in both; he is not uncreated

as God and yet also not created as the finite things; he is substitute, envoy,

interpreter, governor, angel, instrument, image, shadow of God, indeed his

firstborn son, his oldest son in distinction from the world which is his

youngest son; Philo even calls him God, but δευτερος θεος. Zeller brings

clearly to light that the logos in Philo, like the Divine ideas, bears and must

bear this double character. He is an intermediate and therefore a double

being, an attribute of God and yet a person, neither identical with God nor

also a creature like the world, an idea in the thinking of God and a power in

the world, hovering back and forth between an impersonal attribute [234]

and a personal subsistence, but for that very reason deemed suitable as

mediator between God and the world, cf. Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. V3 370-386,

and litt. on Philo there 338, in addition also Max Heinze, Die Lehre v.

Logos in der gr. Philos. 1872. Schürer, Neut. Zeitgesch. 653 f. Meijer-

Weiss, Ev. Joh. 6e Aufl. S. 52 f. Jean Réville, La doctrine du Logos, Paris

1881. Kuenen, Volksgodsd. en wereldgodsd. 163 v. Weiszäcker, Das apost.

Zeitalter der chr. Kirche 1890 S. 549 f. Hatch, Griechentum and

Christentum 1892 S. 129 f. Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 S. 552 f. Kaftan, Das

Verhältniss des evang. Glaubens zur Logoslehre (Gottschick, Zeits. f. Th. u.

K. VII 1897 1es Heft S. 1-27) Anathon Aall, Geschichte der Logosidee in

der griech. Philosophie. Leipzig Reisland 1896. Theol. Stud. v. Dr.

Danbanton, XI 1893 2e aflev. In Jewish theology this doctrine of

intermediate beings has been developed still further. As completely

transcendent God cannot enter into immediate connection with the

creatures. For that He has need of all kinds of intermediate beings. If He

wishes to do nothing other than guide the powers present in nature and

humanity, then He makes use of angels. But if He wishes to work creatively

or re-creatively in the world, hypostases appear which, although being

creatures, nevertheless bear Divine attributes, because they are

representatives of God. Such hypostases are Metraton, the μεταθρονος of

God; Memra, the word of God; Schechina, the presence of God’s glory;

Bath Kol, the voice of God, which gives revelations and proclaims oracles;

Ruach hakkodesch, the spirit that proceeds from God and communicates

higher knowledge, Eisenmenger, Entdecktes Judenthum, I 265 f. II 393 f.

etc. Weber, System der altsyn. paläst. Theol. 172-189. Herzog2 2, 230 f.,

3. Although the Proverbs of Jesus Sirach still fairly closely connect with

the canonical literature, in the book of Wisdom, in Philo, and in Jewish

theology an influence of philosophy is to be perceived, which causes the

thoughts of the O. T. to stray farther and farther away. In the first place

there is a difference in principle. The doctrine of intermediate beings in

Philo and the later Jewish theology was born out of the Platonic antithesis

of God and world, of which in the O. Test. books not a trace is yet to be

observed. The word and the wisdom are in the O. T. not mediating

intermediate beings between God and world, but they stand wholly and

entirely on the side of God, belong to Him, and are the principia of the

created world. In Philo, however, the intermediate beings take an

impossible place: are neither God nor creature, neither person nor attribute,

neither substance nor power, but partake of both; they erase the boundary

line, which in the O. T. always separates the creature from the Creator and

prepare the philosophy of Gnosticism and the Kabbalah. In the second place

there is a no less great difference in the character, which the doctrine of the

word and the wisdom in Scripture and that the doctrine of the intermediate

beings in Philo bears. In Philo the logos in its first meaning is equal to

reason, thinking, the thought in God and thus as such immanent in God,

nothing but an attribute. Only in its second meaning does that logos become

word, which proceeds from God and occupies a mediating place between

God and world. In the O. Test., however, the word is not first reason and

thought of God, much less an ideal world-image, a κοσμος νοητος, but the

spoken word, by which He creates and sustains all things. And also the

wisdom in Job and Proverbs is presented not as an attribute of God, but

personally as possessed and ordained by God from eternity and, at the

creation of all things, consulted and searched out. Third, the intermediate

beings in Philo and the Jewish theologians have no soteriological

significance. Indeed they serve for illumination and for communication of

knowledge, but of a connection between those intermediate beings and the

Messiah there is no mention. They even push the doctrine of the Messiah as

revelation of the truth and as acquirer of salvation into the background. And

now it is indeed true, that also in the O. T. the connection between word and

wisdom, servant of God and Messiah, Malak Ihvh and Davidide, is not yet

clearly effected. The lines still run alongside one another. But they

nevertheless approach each other. Elohim and Jahveh is the same God. He,

who as Elohim by Word and Spirit creates and sustains the world, is also He

who as Jahveh by his Malak has led Israel, by the servant of Jahveh will

save his people and by the Messiah from David’s house will reign over

them eternally and will renew and sanctify them all by his Spirit. And these

lines, which in the O. T. more and more approach one another run out

upon Him, who is the Logos, the prophet, priest and king, in whom God

comes to his people and dwells among them eternally. For Philo an

incarnation of the logos would have been an absurd thought. In the N. Test.

this is precisely the highest revelation of God. Finally it can still be added

here, that the doctrine of intermediate beings in Philo etc. is not worked out

and has no boundary. Philo does indeed bring some unity into the Divine

ideas by summarizing them in the logos, but the same that he says of this

one, he also repeatedly says of all Divine ideas. In Jewish theology the

number of intermediate beings increases more and more. It is an emanation,

as with the aeons in Gnosticism. The dualism avenges itself to the very end.

The intermediate beings bring no communion between God and world into

being, because they in fact are neither of the two. The world nevertheless

always again remains outside and over against God. The significance of the

Spirit of God is not seen. In the O. T. this doctrine of the Spirit occupies a

great place. In the apocryphal literature, in Philo and in Jewish theology it is

almost wholly neglected. The Spirit is at most only still a Spirit of

prediction, bestowed on a few, Zeller, V 384, Weber, 184 f., but no longer

the Spirit of the O. Test., who concludes and completes creation and recreation. For all these reasons there is a principial distinction between the

development, which the trinitarian thoughts of the O. T. have found in the

apocryphal literature, in Philo and the Jews, and that which has been given

to them in the N. Test. The N. Test. may have some words in common with

Philo etc. and also speak of Christ as λογος, εικων, απαυγασμα, υ ἱ ος, θεος

etc.; the agreement does not go further. The N. T. is written in Greek, in the

κοινη διαλεκτος, in the language that existed and was spoken everywhere. It

created no new language. The thoughts of God have assumed the σαρξ of

human language. But into those words God has placed a new content. There

is agreement in form, the content differs. Philo and John have no more than

the name of Logos in common. More and more this is seen and

acknowledged, Harnack, Dogmengesch. I2 85, 99. Trip, Die Theophanien

des A. T. 126-129. Dorner, Entw. der Lehre v. d. Person Christi I2 30 f.

Godet, Comm. sur l’Evang. de Saint Jean I2 p. 212-221. Meijer-Weiss,

Komm. über das Ev. des Joh. 6e Aufl. S. 50 f. Weiss, Bibl. Theol. des

N. T. 3te Aufl. S. 624. Orr, Christian View of God and the world 510-512.

Cremer, Wörterbuch der neut. Gräcität s. v. λογος. Cf. also Max Müller,

Theosophie oder Psychol. Religion, Leipzig Engelmann 1895, 12te

Vorlesung.

4. The N. Test. contains the pure development of the trinitarian thoughts

of the O. T. But now these come to stand in a much clearer light, not

through abstract reasonings about the essence of God, but through the selfrevelation of God in appearance, word, and deed. Just as strongly as in the

O., the unity of God is expressed in the N. Test. There is only one being that

can be called God, θεος, Elohim, John 17:3, 1 Corinthians 8:4, but this one, true

God reveals himself in the economy of the N. T., specifically in the facts of

incarnation and outpouring, as Father, Son, and Spirit. In those facts no

absolutely new principia emerge. They are the same ones that were also

active in creation and in the economy of the O. T. The Father, who bears

this name mostly in relation to the Son and to his children, is the same one

who can also be called Father as Creator of all things, Matthew 7:11, Luke 3:38,

John 4:21, Hd. 17:28, 1 Corinthians 8:6, Hebr. 12:9; all things are from him, 1 Corinthians 8:6. The Son, who is thus named especially in his wholly unique relation to

God, is the same one who as Logos with the Father created all things, John 1:3, 1 Corinthians 8:6, Colossians 1:15-17, Hebr. 1:3. And the Holy Spirit, who has

received his name especially with a view to his work in the church, is the

same one who with Father and Spirit in creation adorns and completes all

the general doctrine of the N. T. writers that these three, Father, Son, and

Spirit, are no others than those who also in the economy of the O. T. have

revealed themselves to the fathers in word and deed, in prophecy and

miracle. The Oldtest. name Jahveh, inadequately rendered by κυριος,

unfolds its content fully in the N. T. name πατηρ, above bl. 113. In the

incarnate Son of God the fulfillment is seen of all O. T. prophecy and

shadow, of prophet and king, of priest and offering, of servant of God and

Davidide, of Malak Ihvh and wisdom. And in the outpouring of the H.

Spirit there has come to pass what the O. T. had promised, Hand.

2:16v. But the N. T., although connecting itself with the O. T., does not stop

there; it goes far above it. Much more clearly than in the O. T. it now comes

to light that the God of the Covenant is and must be a triune God, that a

threefold principle appears in the work of salvation. Not a few texts, but the

whole N. Test. is trinitarian in this sense. All salvation and blessing and

blessedness has its threefold cause in God, Father, Son, and Spirit. We see

these three immediately appear at the birth of Jesus, Matthew 1:18v., Luke 1:35

instruction is wholly trinitarian. He declares the Father to us and describes

him as Spirit, who has life from himself, John 4:24, 5:26, and in a wholly

unique sense is his Father, Matthew 11:27, John 2:16, 5:17. He distinguishes

himself from the Father, but is nevertheless his only-begotten, own, beloved

Son, Matthew 11:27, 21:37-39, John 3:16 etc., one with him in life, glory, power,

John 1:14, 5:26, 10:30. And he speaks of the H. Spirit, who himself leads

and equips him, Mark 1:12, Luke 4:1, 14, John 3:34, as of another Paraclete,

whom he will send from the Father, John 15:26 and who will convict, teach,

lead into the truth, comfort, and remain forever, John 14:16. And before he

departs, Jesus draws all this together in το ὀ νομα του πατρος και του υ ἱ ου

και του ἁ γιου πνευματος, i.e. in the one Divine name, το ὀ νομα in sing., in

which nevertheless three distinct subjects, ὁ πατηρ, ὁ υ ἱ ος and το πνευμα,

all intentionally named with the article, reveal themselves. This instruction

is continued and expanded by the apostles; all know and extol a threefold,

Divine cause of salvation. The good pleasure, the foreknowledge, the

election, the power, the love, the kingdom is the Father’s, Matthew 6:13, 11:26,

John 3:16, Romans 8:29, Ef. 1:9, 1 Petr. 1:2 etc. The mediatorship, the

reconciliation, the salvation, the grace, the wisdom, the righteousness is the

And the regeneration, renewal, sanctification, communion is the H. Spirit’s,

John 5:6 etc. And just as Jesus finally sums up his instruction in the name of

the Father, of the Son, and of the H. Spirit, so also the apostles repeatedly

place these three alongside one another and on one line, 1 Corinthians 8:6,

Trinity in the N. T. Baur, Dreiein. u. Menschw. Gottes I 80 f. Hahn, Theol.

Sartorius, Christi Person u. Werk I3 44 f. Beck, Chr. Gl. II 40 f. etc. Also

Biedermann, Chr. Dogm. II 37 acknowledges that the trinitarian doctrine of

God is rooted in Scripture, cf. Strauss I 409-425. Lipsius, Dogm. § 241,

242. F. A. B. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 426. The text 1 John 5:7 has not been

mentioned above because of its doubtful authenticity. It is lacking in all

Greek codices, except in a couple from the 16th century; in all Latin

codices before the 8th century; in almost all translations. Further, it is never

cited by the Greek fathers, not even in the Arian struggle, and likewise not

by the Lat. fathers, Hilar. Ambros. Hieron. August, etc. If it is cited or

presupposed in Tert., then it existed ± 190. If in Cyprian, then it was known

± 220. If it occurred in the Afra, according to an H. S. from the 5th and one

from the 7th century, then one can still ascend somewhat higher. The Afra

arose ± 160 in Africa and came ± 250 to Italy. Certainly the text occurs in

Vigilius, end of the 5th century. In the 16th century it was included in the

Compl. edition, Erasmus 3rd ed., Stephanus, Beza, textus receptus. In the

context it is not required. Explanation of the omission and disappearance is

very difficult. The authenticity, however, is still defended by some, e.g. W.

Koelling, Die Echtheit von 1 John 5:7. Breslau 1893.

5. Holy Scripture, however, does not stop with these data; it offers still

more and also makes us acquainted with something of the relations in

which these three distinct subjects, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, stand to

one another. For that, the name Father first of all comes into consideration.

This name, in the most general sense, denotes God as Creator of all his

works, in particular of man, Numbers 16:22, Matthew 7:11, Luke 3:28, John 4:21,

Hd. 17:28, 1 Corinthians 8:6, Ef. 3:15, Hebr. 12:9. In the O. Test. this name

acquires a theocratic significance; God is the Father of Israel, because He

created and preserved it by his wondrous power, Deuteronomy 32:6, Jes. 63:16,

significance passes over into the ethical, in which God is the Father of

his children, Matthew 6:4, 8, 9, Romans 8:15 etc. But in an altogether unique,

metaphysical sense God is Father of the Son. Jesus always makes an

essential distinction between the relation in which He himself and in which

others, the Jews, the disciples, stand to the Father, Mt, 11:25-27, Luke 22:29, John 2:16, 5:17, 20:17 etc. He called God his own Father, πατερα

ἰ διον, John 5:18. And Scripture clearly indicates that the name Father does

not in the first place apply to God in relation to Israel and the believers, but

on the contrary originally to the relation of the Father to the Son, John 14:6-

13, 17:26. God is, in the proper, original sense, Father of the Son, He loves

the Son, John 5:19v., 10:17, 17:24, 26, and this love passes from the Father

through the Son over to others, John 16:27, 17:26. This relation of the Father

to the Son did not come to be in time but it is from eternity, John 1:14, 8:38,

17:5, 24. And therefore God is by the apostles repeatedly in a special sense

called the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Romans 15:6, 1 Corinthians 15:24, 2 Corinthians 1:3, Galatians 1:1, Ef. 1:3 etc. The fatherhood of the Son is his special, personal

property. He alone is from himself, the first in the order of existence, John 5:26, and therefore also the Father both in creation and re-creation, from

whom all things are, 1 Corinthians 8:6. Thus in Old as in New Testament it is the

Father who occupies the first place. His is the counsel, Hd. 4:28, Ef. 1:11,

the good pleasure, Matthew 11:26, Ef. 1:9, the initiative in creation and

redemption, Psalms 33:6, John 3:16, the ἐ ξουσια and the δυναμις, Matthew 6:13,

Romans 3:26, 2 Timothy 4:8, the goodness, the wisdom, the immortality, the

inaccessible light, Matthew 19:17, Romans 16:27, 1 Timothy 6:16. Therefore he also

repeatedly bears the name of God in a special sense. He is Elohim, Jahveh

Cor. 8:6, 1 Timothy 2:5, who is named as God and Father alongside the Lord

Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, 1 Corinthians 12:6, 2 Corinthians 13:13, 1 Thess.f 1:3,

Op. 1:6. Indeed Christ calls Him not only his Father but also his God, Mt.

Christ of God, Luke 9:20, 1 Corinthians 3:23, Op. 12:10. Yet from this it has

wrongly been inferred by the Arians of earlier and later time, that

only the Father is God, and that Son and Spirit, though related to God,

nevertheless stand outside the divine essence. For, in the first place,

Scripture, as will appear more fully presently, ascribes to Son and Spirit

divine names, attributes, works, and honor just as well as to the Father. And,

further, it deserves notice that Scripture nowhere says that the Father alone

is the true God, but indeed that the Father is the only true God, something

which is fully acknowledged in the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity.

Next, all those passages make no contrast between the Father on the one

hand and the Son and the Spirit on the other, but between the Father, as the

only God, and the gods of the heathen. Then from the statements that the

Father is the only true God, only wise, only good, only immortal, it by no

means follows that the Son and the Spirit are not also of the same divine

essence and partake of that same unity, wisdom, goodness, and immortality,

any more than from 1 Corinthians 8:6 it follows that only Christ and not God is our

Lord, through whom all things are and we through Him. And finally the

Father can therefore be called only wise, only good, etc., because He

possesses everything from himself, is πηγη θεοτητος, whereas Son and

Spirit possess the same essence and the same attributes by communication.

The name of God, ascribed to the Father in particular, indicates that He is

the first in the divine economy; it is, as it were, an official name, indication

of his rank and place, just as among men, who all partake of the same

nature, there is nevertheless also distinction of station and of honor, August,

de trin. I c. 6. VI c. 9. Petavius, de trin. II c. 4. III c 1. 2. Mastricht, Theol.

theor. pract. II c. 25.

6. Further, light is also shed for us on the immanent relations of God by

the names which the Son bears in Scripture. These names are very many in

number, refer mostly to his historical appearance, and therefore come up

later in the locus de Christo. But there are also among them those which

belong to Him prior to and abstracted from his incarnation. First of all, the

name Logos comes into consideration. Various reasons have been given

why Christ bears this name. The word has been translated by ratio, sermo,

verbum, and then again understood as verbum interius or exterius,

Petavius, de trin. VI c. 1. The point of departure for the designation,

however, undoubtedly lies in the continuous doctrine of Scripture, that God

reveals himself in creation and re-creation through the word. Through the

word God creates, sustains, and governs all things, and through the word He

also renews and re-creates the world. The gospel is therefore also called the

word of God, λογος του θεου. John calls Christ the Logos, because He is

the one in and through whom God reveals himself, both in creation and in

re-creation, John 1:3, 14. In the Old Testament, however, the word through

which God reveals himself first appears at the creation. The hypostasis and

the eternal existence of that word is not expressed. In Proverbs 8 wisdom is

indeed presented as personal and eternal, but also brought into close

connection with the creation; with a view to this it is prepared, appointed,

searched out by God, vs. 22, 23. The Arians inferred from the ‎‏‏ָקָנִני‎ of vs. 22,

LXX εκτισε με, Syr. Trg. ‎‏‏ְּבָראִני‎, cf. Sirach 1:4, 9, 24:8, that the Son was not

eternally generated but was created before all things. And the church fathers

maintained over against that that ‎‏‏ָקָנִני‎ had to be rendered by ἐ κτησατο, Aq.

Symm., or possedit, Hieron., or that this word did not refer to the essence of

the Son but to his office and dignity in creation and re-creation. Without

doubt the latter is the case. There is here no question of an eternal

generation, but it is only said that God prepared wisdom, ‎‏‏ָקָנִני‎, and appointed

it, ‎‏‏ִנַּסְכִּתי‎, that it was born, ‎‏‏ִחַּלְלִּתי‎, before and with a view to the creation,

Petavius, de trin. II c. 1. But the N. Testament goes far above this. John says

not only that He, in and through whom God reveals himself, is a person, but

he declares expressly that this Logos was in the beginning, ἐ ν ἀ ρχ ῃ ἠ ν ὁ

Λογος. He did not become Logos, He was not first prepared and appointed

to it at the creation; He was as person and by nature Logos, Logos from

eternity. And further, He himself was θεος, He stood in communion with

object of his eternal love and self-communication, 5:26, 17:24. Therefore

He could also reveal the Father perfectly, because He partook of his Divine

nature, his Divine life, his Divine love, etc., from eternity and was by nature

Logos. God communicated himself to Him, therefore He can communicate

God to us. The Logos is the absolute revelation of God, for God has

communicated himself with all his fullness to Him eternally.

Another name is that of Son of God. In the O. Test. this name usually has

theocratic significance. Israel is so called, because it has been chosen,

63:8, Jeremiah 31:9, 20, Hosea 11:1, Malachi 1:6, 2:10. In the N. Test. the church

takes its place, which consists of υ ἱ οι θεου by adoption or τεκνα θεου by

birth. Specifically, the title Son of God is also very often an official name,

for the judges Psalms 82:6, for the angels, Job 38:7, and especially also for the

king, 2 Samuel 7:11-14, Psalms 89:27, 28. In Psalms 2:7 Jahveh says to the King

anointed over Zion: ‎‏ָ‏ֲאִני ַהּיֹום ְיִלְדִּתי‎, ‎‏‏ְּבִני ַאָּתה‎, LXX γεγεννηκα σε, Vulg. genui

te; on the day when the Lord anointed Him and appointed Him as king, He

generated Him as Son and gave Him the right to world dominion. With

respect to David this refers back to the decree of God in 2 Sam. 7, and with

respect to the Messiah prefigured by David it is in Hebr. 1:5, 5:5 explained

of eternity, cf. vs. 2, 3, in which Christ as the Son has been generated by the

Father, i.e. in which He has been brought forth as the radiance of God’s

glory and the expressed image of his substance. And that He was this has

now, according to Hd. 13:33, Romans 1:3, been powerfully proved in the

resurrection. In Micah 5:1 a related thought is expressed. The Ruler over

Israel, who will once come forth out of the small Bethlehem, already exists

from of old. His goings forth as Ruler, from God, are already from the days

of eternity. He was Ruler from eternity, He has shown this in the history of

Israel and thus He will once appear visibly out of Bethlehem. The

designation Son of God, applied to the Messiah, undoubtedly proceeds from

the theocratic significance of this expression in the O. Testament. It is not

probable that the demoniacs, Matthew 8:29, cf. 4:3, the Jews, Matthew 27:40, the

High Priest, Matthew 26:63, or even the disciples at least in the first period, John 1:50, 11:27, Matthew 16:16, have understood the full content of this designation.

But in Christ this name nevertheless receives a much deeper significance.

To be sure, He is now and then called, as mediator and king, God’s Son in

the theocratic sense, Luke 1:35, although even then the adoptionist

conception, that he according to his Divine nature is Son by generation and

according to his human nature by adoption, as was asserted by the

Socinians, Remonstr. Conf. art. 3. Apol. Conf. art. 3. Limborch, Theol.

Christ. II 17, 10. B. S. Cremer, cf. Archief v. Kerk. Gesch. v. Ned. VIII 419-

428, Calv. Inst. II 14. 6. Moor, I 755 sq. etc., finds no support in Scripture.

But Christ was not first adopted as Son of God as a king under Israel in

time. He is not called God’s Son on account of his supernatural birth, as the

Socinians taught and Hofmann, Schriftbeweis I 116 f. still tries to argue.

Nor does He bear that name in an ethical sense, as many think, Weiss, Bibl.

Theol. § 17. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. II2 97. Scholten, L. H. K. II 206 e. a.

Nor did He first become it through his mediatorship and his resurrection,

for which one appeals to John 10:34-36, Hand. 13:32, 33, Romans 1:4. But He

is Son of God in the metaphysical sense, by nature and from eternity. He is

highly exalted above angels and prophets, Matthew 13:32, 21:27, 22:2, and

stands in an entirely unique relation to God, Matthew 11:27. He is the beloved

Son, in whom the Father has his good pleasure, Matthew 3:17, 17:5, Mark 1:11,

the own Son, Romans 8:32, the eternal Son, John 17:5, 24, Hebr. 1:5, 5:5, to

whom the Father gave ζωην ἐ χειν ἐ ν ἑ αυτ ῳ , John 5:26, who is like the

Father in knowledge, Matthew 11:27, in honor, John 5:23, in power in creation

and re-creation, John 1:3, 5:21, 27, in activity, John 10:30, in dominion, Mt.

this his Sonship has been condemned to death, John 10:33, Matthew 26:63 v.

In the third place, the name Image of God is also discussed here. The

human being can indeed be so called by analogy, but Christ is so in the

absolute sense. He was, before his incarnation, as Logos, as Son, Romans 1:3,

4, 8:3, Galatians 4:4, εν μορφη θεου, Philippians 2:6, rich, 2 Corinthians 8:9, clothed with

glory, John 17:5, and has now returned into that through his resurrection and

ascension. Thus He was and is still ε ἰ κων του θεου του ἀ ορατου, Colossians 1:15,

Hebr. 1:3, i.e. not the radiance itself, ἀ παυγασμος, but the image effected or

arisen through radiance, reflection, ἀ παυγασμα, of God’s glory and

the expression, the imprint of the self-subsistence, of the being of the

Father. As such He is πρωτοτοκος πασης κτισεως, Colossians 1:15, Op. 1:14, the

firstborn in comparison with all creature and thus existing before all

creature and not, like the creatures, made or created, πρωτοκτιστος,

πρωτοπλαστος, but begotten, πρωτοτοκος, in whom all things were created,

ἐ κτισθη; and He is at the same time ἀ ρχη, πρωτοτοκος ἐ κ των νεκρων, ἐ ν

after whose image the believers are renewed, 2 Corinthians 3:18, Philippians 3:21. The

expression πρωτοτοκος does not include Christ among the creatures but

precisely excludes Him from them. He stood, as only- and firstborn, as Son

and Logos, as adequate image of God, to the Father from eternity in an

entirely unique relation. And indeed Christ is now presented as Mediator as

dependent on the Father and standing under the Father, so that He is one

sent, a servant, a fulfiller of the work of the Father, obedient unto death and

once handing over his kingdom to the Father, but never is his unity of

essence thereby impaired. In John 14:28 Jesus says that his going to the

Father is for the disciples a cause of joy, ὁ τι ὁ πατηρ μειζων μου ἐ στιν.

Thereby He does not express that the Father is greater in power, which is

expressly contradicted by John 10:28-30; but He thinks of the relation in

which He now, in his humiliation, stands to the Father. Now this one is

greater. But this lesser greatness of Jesus will precisely cease when He goes

to the Father, and therefore his disciples can rejoice over his going; He is

precisely in essence and nature equal to the Father, although now in office

and station less than the Father. He is no creature, but was and is and

remains God, above all to be praised unto eternity, John 1:1, 20:28, Rom.

Thess. 1:12, Titus 2:13, 2 Petr. 1:1. The attempt, already formerly employed

by the Socinians and now by Ritschl, Schultz, Kaftan, Pfleiderer et al., to

construe the name θεος, used of Christ, not as a name of essence but as a

name of office, requires later, in the doctrine concerning Christ, broader

discussion. For the present let it only be remarked that this designation in

the case of Christ is untrue if He is not really also partaker of the

Divine nature, Lipsius, Theol. Jahresbericht X 378.

7. Finally, Holy Scripture also gives us some insight into the immanent

relations of God through the name of the Holy Spirit. In advance it deserves

remark, that the doctrine of the H. Spirit is the same through all the

Scriptures of Old and New Covenant. Although revealed much more clearly

in the N. Test., it is in principle also present in the O. T. The N. T. is

conscious of giving no other doctrine of the Spirit than that which was

found in the O. T.; it was the same H. Spirit, who formerly spoke through

Petr. 1:11, 2 Petr. 1:21, testified in Noah’s days, 1 Petr. 3:19, was resisted by

Israel, Hd. 7:51, worked faith, 2 Corinthians 4:13, who would descend upon the

Messiah and dwell in the church, Matthew 12:18, Luke 4:18, 19, Hd. 2:16.

Although now the Divine being is Spirit, John 4:24, and is holy, Jes. 6:3, yet

the Holy Spirit in Scripture is a designation of a particular person in the

Divine being, distinct from Father and Son. He bears this name on account

of his particular modus subsistendi. Spirit properly means wind, breath. The

H. Spirit is the breath of the Almighty, Job 33:4, the Spirit of his mouth, Psalms 33:6, who is compared by Jesus with the wind, John 3:8 and is breathed

upon his disciples, John 20:22, cf. 2 Thessalonians 2:18. The Spirit is God as the

immanent principle of life in all that is created. And he is called holy,

because he himself stands in a particular relation to God and places all

things in a particular relation to God. He is not the spirit of a man, of a

creature, but the Spirit of God, the Holy Spirit, Psalms 51:13, Jes. 63:10, 11. As

the breath from our mouth, so the Spirit proceeds from God and keeps

every creature alive. Therefore he is called the Spirit of God, the Spirit of

the Lord, the Spirit of the Father, Genesis 1:2, Jes. 11:2, Matthew 10:20, and also

the Spirit of Christ, the Spirit of the Son, Romans 8:2, 9, 1 Corinthians 2:6, 2 Cor.

God and of the Lamb, Op. 1:4, 3:1, 4:5, 5:6. This procession of the Spirit is

indicated in Scripture by different names. Most often it is expressed thus,

that the Spirit is given by God or by Christ, Numbers 11:29, Nehemiah 9:20,

Jes. 42:1, Ezech. 36:27, John 3:34, 1 John 3:24, 4:13, sent or sent forth, Ps.

God, Matthew 3:16, placed in the midst of Israel, Jes. 63:11, Hagg. 2:6, laid upon

someone, Matthew 12:18, breathed upon someone, John 20:22 etc. But it is also

said that the Spirit proceeds, ἐ κπορευεται παρα του πατρος, John 15:26.

This took place specifically on the day of Pentecost. Therefore the

personality of the H. Spirit also now first clearly comes forward. In the O.

Test. there is indeed a distinction between God and his Spirit. But the nature

of that distinction remains obscure. Ο ἰ πω γαρ ἠ ν πνευμα, ὁ τι Ιησους

ο ὐ δεπω ἐ δοξασθη, John 7:39. But now he is spoken of as of a person. He is

John 2:1, ἀ λλος παρακλητος, John 14:16, who speaks of himself in the first

person, Hd. 13:2, to whom all kinds of personal faculties and activities are

ascribed, such as searching, 1 Corinthians 2:10, 11, judging, Hd. 15:28, hearing,

12:11, teaching, John 14:26, praying, Romans 8:27, testifying, John 15:26, etc.

and who is coordinated with Father and Son and is placed on one line, Matthew 28:19, 1 Corinthians 12:4-6, 2 Corinthians 13:13, Op. 1:4. This now cannot be, unless he is

also true God. As his personality, so also the deity of the H. Spirit first

clearly comes to light in the N. T. It appears first of all from this, that in

spite of the distinction which exists between God and his Spirit, it is

nevertheless completely the same, whether God or his Spirit says

something, dwells in us, is despised by us, Jes. 6:9 and Hd. 28:25, Jeremiah 31:31

10, 1 Corinthians 3:16 and 6:19, Ef. 3:22. This then only comes fully into its own,

when with the personal distinction the unity of essence goes together.

Further, all kinds of Divine attributes are ascribed just as well to God’s

Spirit as to God himself: e.g. eternity, Hebr. 9:14, omnipresence, Psalms 139:7,

presupposes that the Spirit is one in essence with God himself. The same is

the case with the Divine works of creation, Genesis 1:2, Psalms 33:6, Job 33:4, Psalms 104:30, and of re-creation. Yes, in this his deity especially comes

out clearly. He is the one who has qualified Christ for his office by his

apostles for their particular task, Matthew 10:20, Luke 12:12, 21:15, 24:49, John 14:16 v., 15:26, 16:13 v., etc. who distributes to believers all kinds of gifts

and powers, 1 Corinthians 12:4-11, and who above all causes the fullness of Christ

to dwell in the church. The H. Spirit stands to Christ in the same relation as

Christ to the Father. As the Son has nothing and does nothing and speaks

nothing of himself but receives everything from the Father, John 5:26,

16:15, so the H. Spirit takes everything from Christ, John 16:13, 14. As the

Son testifies of the Father and glorifies the Father, John 1:18, 17:4, 6, so in

his turn the H. Spirit the Son, 15:26, 16:14. As no one comes to the Father

except through the Son, Matthew 11:27, John 14:6, so no one can say Jesus to be

the Lord except through the H. Spirit, 1 Corinthians 12:3. There is no fellowship

with God except through the Spirit. But that Spirit then also bestows all the

benefits which Christ has acquired, regeneration, John 3:3, the conviction of

sin, John 16:8-11, adoption, Romans 8:15, renewal, Titus 3:5, the love of God,

Romans 5:5, all kinds of spiritual fruits, Galatians 5:22, the sealing, Romans 8:23, 2

Cor. 1:22, 5:5, Ef. 1:13, 4:30, the resurrection, Romans 8:10. Yes, through the

Spirit we have with no one less than with the Son and the Father himself

direct, immediate fellowship. The H. Spirit is God himself in us, John 14:23

21. Who can grant us all that, who can cause God himself to dwell in our

hearts, except one who is himself God? Therefore Divine honor is also due

to him. He stands alongside Father and Son as cause of all salvation, Matthew 28:19, 1 Corinthians 12:4-6, 2 Corinthians 13:13, Op. 1:4. In his name we are baptized,

Matthew 28:19. From him is all life and power. He is the author of our prayers,

Zach. 12:10, Romans 8:15, 16. And over against that the church is warned not

to grieve him, Jes. 63:10, Ef. 4:30; indeed the blasphemy against the [249]

H. Spirit is unforgivable, Matthew 12:31, 32. Older literature on the H. Spirit is

given by Walch, Bibl. theol. sel. I 75 sq. 241, among which especially

Owen, Discourse on the Holy Spirit 1674, holl. 1746, deserves attention,

and by Dr. Kuyper, Het werk van den H. Geest, 1888 in the preface; newer

literature especially with M. Beversluis, de H. Geest en zijne werkingen

volgens de Schriften des N. V. 1896 bl. VII, among which especially come

into consideration J. Gloël, Der H. Geist in der Heilsverkündigung des

Paulus 1888. H. Gunkel, Die Wirkungen des H. Geistes u.s.w. Gött. 1888.

Further still Synopsis der dogm. moraltheol. Lehre von der Wirksamkeit des

H. Geistes zunächst nach dem h. Thomas von Aquin, von Dr. i.e. Pruner,

Lycealprogramm für das Jahr 1891 Eichstätt. W. Koelling, Preumatologie

oder die Lehre von der Person des H. Geistes, Gütersloh 1894. Dr. G.

Smeaton, The doctrine of the Holy Spirit 1882.

8. In all these moments of revelation, Holy Scripture of course does not

yet offer us a fully developed dogma of the Trinity. But it nevertheless

teaches that the one name of God unfolds itself fully only in that of Father,

Son, and Spirit. It states clearly and distinctly that all God’s works

outwardly, both in creation and re-creation, have a threefold divine causa. It

leaves no doubt that this threefold causa consists of three distinct subjects,

who stand in personal relation to one another. And it thereby contains all the

data from which theology has constructed the dogma of the Trinity.

Philosophy had nothing essential to add to it; even the doctrine of the Logos

is New Testament. Only everything awaited the time when the ratio

christiana would have developed sufficiently to conceive the holy mystery

that lay here. Among the apostolic fathers there is as yet no mention of this.

They repeat Holy Scripture, without yet understanding the deep sense and

the mutual connection of the truths, and they employ expressions that in a

later time would no longer be defensible. Yet they are also of the highest

importance for the dogma of the Trinity, insofar as they combat both the

Ebionite and the Docetic direction and, in stronger or weaker terms, express

the lofty nature of the Christ, exalted above the angels. The dogma of the

Trinity, as is already evident at the beginning, was not born from a [250]

philosophical reasoning about the being of God, but from reflection on the

facts of revelation, on the person and the work of Christ. In the dogma of

the Trinity, from the beginning it was a matter of the deity of Christ, of the

absolute character of Christianity, of the truth of God’s revelation, of the

true reconciliation of sins, of the absolute certainty of salvation. Among the

apost. fathers, now, Christ occupies an entirely unique place; predicates are

ascribed to Him that belong to no creature. He is called Son, proper, only,

only-begotten Son of God, Clemens, 1 Cor. 36. Ignat., Rom. 1. Eph. 20.

Smyrn. 1. Diogn. 9. 10. Barn. 7. 12., radiance of God’s majesty, scepter of

His majesty, Clemens, 1 Cor. 16. 36. Lord of the earth, to whom all is

subjected, Creator of all things, Judge of the living and the dead, Barn. 7.

incomprehensible Logos, who as a God, ὡ ς θεος, has been sent to earth,

Diogn. 7. and may be called θεος, Clemens, 2 Cor. 1. Ign., Rom. 3. Smyrn.

1. 10. Eph. 1. 18. 19. And Father (God), Son (Christ), and Spirit are

mentioned together, Clemens, 1 Cor. 46. Ign. Eph. 9. Magn. 13. Of the Holy

Spirit there is little mention among the apost. fathers, but He is nevertheless

distinguished from Father and Son and placed alongside them; only with

respect to the Pastor of Hermas, Sim. V 5. 6. there is disagreement as to

whether he identifies the Holy Spirit with the Son or distinguishes Him

from that, Baur, Dreiein. u. Menschw. I 134 and against that Dorner,

Entwicklungsgesch. I 191-205. When in the second century the gnosis

appears, Christian thinking also awakens. The deity of Christ acquires

dogmatic importance and is therefore also expressed much more clearly.

Justin Martyr gives Christ repeatedly the name of God, even of ὁ θεος, c.

Tryph. 34. 56. 58. 113. 126 etc. and ascribes to Him all kinds of exalted

predicates. He is the firstborn of creation, the beginning of another race,

equipped not with a single charisma but with all the powers of the Spirit, in

possession not of a σπερμα of the logos, but of the whole logos, λογικου το

ὁ λον, mighty to deify the human race and therefore Himself God, c. Tr. 87.

138. Apol. II 10. 12. He further clearly teaches the pre-existence of Christ,

not as power only but as person, c. Tr. 128. Because the Father is hidden,

inexpressible, exalted above time and space, c. Tr. [251] 127. Apol. II 6., all

revelations under the O. T. and also in the heathen world are revelations of

the Logos, c. Tr. 127. Apol. I 46. 61. 63. Apol. II 10. 13. He even existed at

the creation; the word Genesis 1:26 is spoken to Him, c. Tr. 62. But the

immanent relation between Father and Son is not yet clear in Justin. It

seems that the Logos, who is indeed another than the Father ἀ ριθμ ῳ ἀ λλ’

ο ὐ γνωμ ῃ , was first generated by the Father before and for the sake of

creation, and indeed did not arise by division, but was nevertheless brought

forth δοναμει και βουλ ῃ of the Father, just as one light is kindled from

another and just as the word goes forth from our mouth, Apol. II 6. c. Tr. 61.

100. 128. Therefore he is called πρωτογονος, πρωτοτοκος του θεου, Apol. I

46. 58. The generation is called προβαλλειν, but mostly γενναν, c. Tr. 62.

76. 129. Apol. I 23. 2. 6, and the Logos is insofar called a γεννημα or

ἐ ργασια, c. Tr. 62. 114. 129. Justin seeks to maintain the unity of God by

the fact that the Son is indeed another than the Father ἀ ριθμ ῳ ἀ λλ’ ού

γνωμη, c. Tr. 56 and is subordinate to the Father. The Son is ἡ πρωτη

δυναμις μετα τον πατερα, Apol. I 32; He takes the second place, δευτερα

χωρα, Apol. I 13; He has received everything from the Father, c. Tr. 86, is

God and Lord, because the Father has willed it, c. Tr. 127, and is ὑ πο τ ῳ

πατρι και κυρι ῳ τεταγμενος, c. Tr. 126. Justin thus still has a deficient

conception on various points. The hidden being of the Father in contrast

with the Son, the generation of the Son by the will of the Father and for the

sake of creation, the subordination of the Son to the Father were later

rejected by the church. Some have therefore called Justin an Arian, but

wrongly. For, first, this question did not yet exist in Justin’s time; and,

further, there are in him various elements that run directly counter to the

view of Arius; he teaches decisively and clearly the deity of the Son, he

says that the Son is not created but generated and elucidates this with the

later very common images of word and light; he clearly perceives the

importance of the deity of Christ for the whole work of salvation, for the

truth of Christianity. Therefore he also repeatedly names the Father, the

Son, and the Spirit together as the object of our worship, Apol. I 6. 13. 60.

61. 65. 67; and although it is the case that he assigns to the Son the δευτερα

χωρα and to the Spirit the τριτη ταξις, Justin expresses clearly in these

places the personality of the Holy Spirit and His distinctness from the Son.

To be sure, one has appealed against this to Apol. I 33, but this passage

teaches nothing other than that Justin understood by το πνευμα in Luke 1:35

not the person of the H. S. but the Logos, an exegesis that also occurs with

others. Further, it is also established that Justin does not count the Spirit

among the angels or in general among the creatures. But about the divine

nature of the Holy Spirit and about His ontological relation to Father and

Son we find in Justin as good as nothing. The religious importance of the

doctrine of the Holy Spirit was not yet felt. The Spirit is still understood

only as Spirit of prophecy, who inspired the prophets and apostles and

qualified Christ. But of a continual necessary working of the Holy Spirit in

the church Justin has no awareness. The objective revelation of God in the

Logos seems sufficient; the subjective illumination is not seen through in its

necessity, cf. Semisch, II 305-333. Schwane, Dogmengesch. I2 79 f. Finally,

in Justin Martyr it emerges very clearly what kind the influence of Greek

philosophy in Christian theology has been. That such an influence has been

exercised, and not least in Justin, is denied by no one. But that influence is

precisely most noticeable in those elements of Justin’s doctrine which were

later banished by the church, namely, in his distinction between the λογος

ἐ νδιαθετος and προφορικος, in his conception of the Son as δευτερος θεος,

in his doctrine of the hidden God, in his placing of the Son outside the

divine being. All other elements, the Logos-nature of Christ, the praeexistence, the generation, the creation of all things through the Logos, the

sonship, the deity of Christ, have been derived by Justin with consciousness

from Scripture and argued from Scripture, cf. Semisch, Justin der Martyrer

II 295 f. The defects that adhere to the doctrine of the Trinity in Justin are

not avoided by the following apologists, Theophilus, Tatian, Athenagoras.

Tatian, Or. c. Gr. 5, does say that, insofar as all things have their ground in

God, they all exist ideally, as Logos, in Him, but this Logos is brought forth

by the will of God and is ἐ ργον πρωτοτοκον του πατρος; κατα μερισμον,

ο ὐ κατα ἀ ποκοπην. With Theophilus the Logos does indeed exist

before the creation as λογος ἐ νδιαθετος, because He is θεου νους και

φρονησις, but He is nevertheless generated by the Father as λογος

προφορικος for the sake of creation, ad Autol. II 10. 22. Athenagoras, Leg.

pro Chr. c. 10, likewise teaches that the Logos did indeed exist eternally,

because God is the eternal νους, but He is nevertheless the first γεννημα of

the Father, because He went forth from God as the idea and the energy of

things. Just as Theophilus was the first to speak of a τριας in God, ad Autol.

II 26, so Athenagoras also connects God the Father, God the Son, and the

Holy Spirit, who was active in the prophets and is an effluence of God, goes

forth from God and returns into Him, like the ray from the sun, and calls

them the object of Christian veneration, ib. c. 10. 12. But with the

distinction of the three persons their unity is not sufficiently maintained.

The Father is the one, unbegotten, eternal, invisible God, and Son and Spirit

are one with Him not in essence, but in spirit and power, ib. c. 24.

The next development of the doctrine of the Trinity, consisting chiefly in

the banishment of the philosophical elements, is due to three men, each of

whom contributed his own share to the construction of Christian dogma.

Irenaeus is the powerful opponent of the gnostic concept of God and of the

conception of the Logos as world-idea. Now and then he too shows that he

has not wholly overcome the old representation; he still calls the Father the

invisible, hidden God in contrast with the Son, adv. haer. IV 20, 10. But

nevertheless he combats as sharply as possible the conception of God as

βυθος and the emanation of the aeons, and maintains the scriptural

distinction of Creator and creature. The Logos is, as it were, stripped of his

twofold nature and transferred wholly to the side of God. The Logos is not a

creature, but a hypostatic word, III 8, praeëxistent, II 6. IV 12, true God, IV

10. 14 etc. Also the distinction of λογος ἐ νδιαθετος and προφορικος is to be

rejected II 17. 18. For apart from the fact that this distinction detracts from

the personality of the Logos and connects his generation with the creation,

the Logos must not be represented as the understanding and the reason of

God. For God is simple, wholly spirit, wholly understanding, wholly

thought, wholly logos, II 16. 48, so that both the Son and the Father are true

God. The unity of Father, Son, and Spirit is very clearly expressed by

Irenaeus, their divine nature is expressly maintained, they are repeatedly

named together, IV 6. 20, 33. The generation of the Son did not take place

in time, the Son had no beginning, He existed eternally with God II 18. III

22. IV 37. But Irenaeus falls short in indicating how, within the unity, the

threeness nevertheless exists and how Father, Son, and Spirit, although

partaking of one divine nature, are nevertheless distinct. Here he is

supplemented and corrected by Tertullian. To be sure, in the overcoming of

gnostic dualism he stands behind Irenaeus. He distinguishes between Father

and Son as between a Deus invisibilis et invisus and a Deus visibilis et

visus, adv. Prax. 14. 15. In all manner of ways and with all manner of

arguments he demonstrates that distinction, with the name Logos, with the

incarnation, with the theophanies, etc. Indeed, with Tertullian the Logos

first attains full sonship and independent personality through the three

moments of the speaking of God, the generation, and the incarnation, adv.

Pr. 6. 7, so that there was a time in which the Son was not, adv. Hermog. 3.

But even if, against patripassianism, he goes too far in the distinction of the

persons, on the other side he therefore strives all the more to hold fast the

unity in the threeness and the threeness in the unity. The three persons are

unius substantiae, unius status, unius potestatis, unus Deus. They are

distinct as regards the ordo and the oeconomia, Oeconomiae sacramentum

unitatem in trinitatem disponit. They are three non statu, sed gradu, and yet

the one God, ex quo et gradus isti et formae et species in nomine Patris,

Filii et Spiritus Sancti deputantur. Just as a ray of the sun is also sun, so

there are different species, formae, effigies, moduli in the one and

undivided substantia. The three persons are therefore unum, not unus. The

Son is another than the Father and the Spirit is again another, but the name

God and Lord is common to them. They are unus Deus, they are not to be

separated. As trunk and branch, spring and stream, sun and ray cannot be

separated, so neither can the Father and the Son. The trinitas therefore does

not abolish the monarchia. The Son is indeed another than the Father but

not divisus, separatus. There is distinctio, distributio, no diversitas and

divisio. It is a unitas ex semetipsa derivans trinitatem, adv. Prax. 2 sq. Thus

Tertullian kneads the stiff Latin language, in order to maintain equally both

the unitas and the trinitas in God; both formally and materially he has

been of the greatest significance for the dogma of the Trinity. In spite of the

fact that he does not always rise above subordinatianism and distinguishes

too little the ontological, cosmological, and soteriological in the doctrine of

the Trinity, he has provided the concepts and the words which the dogma of

the Trinity needed in order to express its true meaning. He replaced the

Logos-speculation with the filiatio and thereby definitively detached the

ontological Trinity from cosmological speculation. And he was the first who

attempted to derive the Trinity of the persons not from the person of the

Father, but from the being of God. While, however, Tertullian does not yet

free the ontological Trinity from the cosmological and soteriological

process, it is Origen who conceives it wholly and entirely as an eternal

process in the being of God himself. The generation is an α ἰ ωνιος γεννησις,

de princ. I 2, 4. The light cannot be without shining; so the Father cannot be

without the Son, ib. I 2. 2. 4. 7. 10. There was no time in which the Son was

not, ib. I 2. 2. 4. c. Cels. VIII 12. The Father is not Father before the Son but

per filium, de princ. I 2. 10. There is no separation, ἀ χωριστος ἐ στι του

υ ἱ ου ὁ πατηρ, c. Cels. IV 14. 16. All divine attributes are common to Father

and Son; the Son is one with the Father; not alongside but in God do we

venerate the Son, c. Cels. VIII 12. 13. The Son has the same wisdom, truth,

reason as the Father, He is α ὐ τοσοφια, α ὐ τοαληθεια, α ὐ τολογος, c. Cels. V

41. But now, in order to maintain the distinction within this unity and

equality, Origen calls subordinatianism to his aid and goes back behind

Tertullian in deriving the Trinity not from the being of God but from the

person of the Father. And thus Origen came to represent the Father as ὀ

than the Son, as the one entire Godhead, exalted above all being, invisible,

incomprehensible; and the Son as θεος without article, as ἑ τερος του

πατρος κατ’ ο ὐ σιαν, so much less than the Father as the world is less than

the Son, cf. Dorner, Entw. I 652 f. Compare, concerning the doctrine of the

Trinity before Nicaea, besides the dogmengesch. v. Münscher, Harnack,

Schwane, Thomasius, also Dr. C. P. Caspari, Der Glaube an die Trinität

Gottes in der Kirche der 3 ersten Jahrh. nachtgewiesen, Leipzig Faber

1894. Scheeben I 796 f. Petavius, de trinitate, appendix 1. Forbesius a

Corse, Instit. hist. theol. 1645 Lib I c. 1-5. G. Bull, Defensio fidei Nicaenae,

9. The church, however, did not follow Origen. It rejected his

subordinatianism and at Nicaea pronounced the true, full Godhead of the

Son. This confession bore entirely a religious character. It maintained the

soteriological principle of Christianity. But from now on the significance of

the doctrine of the Trinity changed. Nicaea pronounced the distinction in

God, and taught that Father, Son (and Spirit) were God; it now further came

down to maintaining the unity in this distinction. Before Nicaea one had

difficulty in getting from the unity of God to a threeness; now it is the

reverse. From now on the trinitarian dogma acquires a proper, independent

value, a theological significance. Athanasius with the three Cappadocians

and Augustine are the ones who in this way elaborate and complete the

dogma. Athanasius understood better than anyone in his time that with the

Godhead of Christ and the Trinity Christianity stood or fell. To the defense

of this truth he devoted his whole life and all his powers. He fought for no

philosophical problem but for the Christian religion itself, for the revelation

of God, the doctrine of the apostles, the faith of the church. The Trinity is

the heart of Christianity. Thereby it is in principle distinguished from

Judaism, which denies the distinction in God, and from Heathendom, which

denies the unity of God, Athan. ad Serap. I 28. With Athanasius,

accordingly, the philosophical mixing of ontology and cosmology is wholly

banished. He rejects the gnostic dualism between God and the world, which

was taken over by Arius, and every kind of intermediate beings, c. Ar. II 26.

The Trinity, he says, has mixed nothing foreign with itself, it does not

consist of the Creator and something that has become, but it is wholly and

perfectly divine, ibid. Therefore the Trinity is also an eternal one. There is

in God nothing accidental; He becomes nothing, He is everything eternally.

Just as the Trinity always was, so it is and remains, and in it the Father, the

Son and the Spirit, ad Serap. III 7. c. Ar. I 18. The Father was always

Father; it belongs, otherwise than with us, to his nature to be Father, de

decr. nic. syn. 12. Just as the sun is not to be conceived without light

and the spring not without water, so the Father is not to be conceived

without Son; God is not ἀ γονος; He always speaks, c. Ar. II 2. ad Serap. II

2. Whoever denies the Trinity makes God into a lifeless principle or comes

to the doctrine of the eternity of the world, c. Ar. I 14. And therefore eternal

also is the generation and the existence of the Son. There was neither for the

Father nor for the Son a time that He was not, c. Ar. I in its entirety. This

Son cannot be a creature and is not brought forth by the will of God but is

generated out of his being, c. Ar. I 25. And the same is said, although less

often and at less length, of the H. Spirit, ad Serap. I 20, 21 etc. These three

persons are truly distinct; they are not three parts of one whole, not three

names for one thing. The Father is only Father and the Son is only Son and

the Spirit is only Spirit, c. Ar. III 4. IV 1. ad Serap. IV 4, 6, 7. But at the

same time he maintains the unity in such a way that they are all three

ὁ μοουσιοι and one ὑ ποστασις (with Athanasius still as much as ο ὐ σια) and

have the same properties, c. Ar. III 3, 4, de decr. nic. syn. 19-25; that the

Father is the ἀ ρχη and the πηγη θεοτητος, c. Ar. IV 1.; that the three persons

exist in one another, ad Serap. I 14 III 6, c. Ar. III 6, and are one in their

operation, ad Serap. I 28. Cf. Fr. Lauchert, Die Lehre des h. Athan. d. Gr.

Leipzig 1895 S. 10-65. Schwane, Dogmengesch. II2 83-108. This doctrine

of the Trinity of Athanasius we also find in the main, only further elucidated

by names, images, comparisons, with Basil in his Libri V against

Eunomius, in his writing de Spiritu Sancto and in many of his letters and

homilies, with Gregory Nyss. in his Libri XII c. Eunomium and in his oratio

catechetica, and with Gregory Naz. in his 5 Orationes theologicae. John

Damasc. summarizes the result and aligns himself especially with Greg.