## Reformed Dogmatics
Vol. 3. Sin and Salvation in Christ
## Herman Bavinck
MONERGISM EDITOR’S NOTE.
CHAPTER VI. On the World in its Fallen State.
7. § 41. The Person of the Mediator.
8. § 42. The Work of the Mediator.
CHAPTER VIII. On the Benefits of the Covenant.
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## CHAPTER VI. On the World
## in its Fallen State.
. When God on the seventh day had finished his work which He had
made, He rested on the seventh day from all his work which He had
made, Genesis 2:2, Exodus 20:11, 31:17. Thus Scripture indicates the transition
from the work of creation to that of preservation. That this resting of God
does not have its cause in weariness, nor does it consist in an idle looking
on, is each time clearly and distinctly expressed by Holy Scripture, Jes.
40:28, John 5:17. Creating is for God no work and preserving no rest. The
resting of God only makes known that He made an end to the bringing forth
of nova genera, Pred. 1:9, 10; that the work of creation in the proper and
narrower sense, as productio rerum e nihilo, had been completed; and that
He in this finished work delighted himself with divine good pleasure, Genesis 1:31, Exodus 31:17, Psalms 104:31, cf. August., de civ. XI 8. XII 17. de Gen. ad lit.
IV 8 sq. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 15. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 73. Calvin on
Genesis 2:2. Zanchius, Op. III 537 etc. Creating now passes over into
preserving. Both are in Scripture so essentially distinguished, that they can
be placed over against each other as labor and rest. And yet they are also so
intimately related and connected, that preserving itself can be called a
creating, Psalms 104:30, 148:5, Jes. 45:7, Amos 4:13. Preservation is, after all,
itself also a divine work, no less great and glorious than creation. God is no
Deus otiosus, He always works, John 5:17, and the world has no stability
in itself. From the moment of its origin onward it exists only in and through
and unto God, Nehemiah 9:6, Psalms 104:30, Hd. 17:28, Romans 11:36, Colossians 1:15,
Hebr. 1:3, Op. 4:11. Although distinct from his essence, it is in its existence
never independent; independence would be non-being. The whole world
with all that is in it and happens in it, stands under God’s government;
summer and winter, day and night, fruitful and unfruitful years, light and
darkness, everything is his work and is formed by Him, Genesis 8:22, 9:14,
5:24, Matthew 5:45 etc. Scripture knows no independent creature; it would be a
contradiction in itself. God cares for all creatures, for animals, Genesis 1:30,
and in particular also for human beings. He sees them all, Job 34:21, Psalms 33:13, 14, Spr. 15:3, forms the heart of them all and pays heed to all their
works, Psalms 33:15, Spr. 5:21; they are all the work of his hands, Job 34:19,
the poor and the rich, Spr. 22:2. He determines the dwelling of all, Deuteronomy 32:8, Hd. 17:26, inclines the heart of all, Spr. 21:1, governs the steps of all,
Spr. 5:21, 16:9, 19:21, Jeremiah 10:23 etc. does with the host of heaven and the
inhabitants of the earth according to his good pleasure, Daniel 4:35. They are
in his hands as clay in the hand of the potter, as a saw in the hand of him
who draws it, Jes. 29:16, 45:9, Jeremiah 18:5, Romans 9:20, 21. Very particularly
his providential government extends yet over his people. The whole history
of the patriarchs, of Israel, of the church, and of every believer is proof
thereof. What human beings have intended for them for evil, God intends
for them for good, Genesis 50:20; every instrument prepared against them shall
not succeed, Jes. 54:17; even the hairs of their head are all numbered, Matthew 10:30; all things work together for their good, Romans 8:28. Thus all that is
created stands in the power and under the government of God; both, chance
and fate, are unknown to Scripture, Exodus 21:13, Spr. 16:33. It is God who
works all things according to the counsel of his will, Ef. 1:11, and makes all
things serviceable to the revelation of his virtues, to the honor of his name,
Spr. 16:4, Romans 11:36. All this Scripture comprehends in a beautiful manner
in this, that it time and again speaks of God as of a King, who rules all
God is a King, the King of kings and the Lord of lords; a King who in
Christ is a father for his subjects, and a Father who at the same time is king
over his children. All that is found among creatures, in the animal and
human and angelic world, in family and society and state, of care for, of
love toward, of protection of the one by the other, is a weak shadowingforth of God’s providential ordering over all the works of his hands. His
absolute power and his perfect love are the proper object of the faith in
providence in Holy Scripture.
To this testimony of Scripture is added that of all peoples. The doctrine of
the providence of God is an articulus mixtus, in part known to all men from
God’s revelation in nature. It is an article of faith in every religion, even in
the most degenerate; whoever denies it undermines religion; without it there
is no longer any place for prayer and sacrifice, for faith and hope, for trust
and love. Why serve God, asks Cicero, Nat. D. I 2, if He does not concern
Himself with us at all? Therefore all religions agree with the word of
κρατυνει. And philosophy too has many times acknowledged and defended
this providence of God, e.g. Socrates in Xenophon, Mem. I 4 IV 3. Plato in
Timaeus, Leges X 901, Rep. X 613 A. Aristotle in Eth. Nic. X 9. the Stoa in
Cicero, Nat. D. II. Seneca, de providentia and de beneficiis, Cicero, Nat. D.
I 2 III 26, Plutachus, de fato, Plotinus, περι ε ἱ μαρμενης and περι προνοιας,
cf. also Philo’s writing περι προνοιας, Wendland, Philo’s Schrift über die
Vorsehung, Berlin 1892. Yet for that reason the doctrine of providence in
pagan religion and philosophy was not the same as it is in Christianity.
Among the Heathen the belief in providence was more theory than practice,
more philosophical contemplation than religious dogma; it did not reach
into distress and into death; it always swayed back and forth between
chance and fate. Because God, for example, in Plato was not a creator but
only a former of the world, his power found its limit in finite matter, Zeiler,
Philos. d. Gr. II4 928. Although Aristotle expresses his belief in God’s
providence more than once, this nevertheless for him entirely coincides
with the operation of natural causes; the deity as νοησις νοησεως stands in
solitary self-contemplation outside the world, without will, without action,
and the creature has from it no help or love to expect, ib. III 368 f. 790 f.
With the Stoa the προνοια was identical with the ε ἱ μαρμενη and the φυσις,
ib. IV 143; and according to Epicurus providence was in conflict with the
blessedness of the Gods, ib. 428. And indeed some, such as Plutarchus and
Plotinus, exerted themselves to escape both chance and fate; but in fact fate
always rose again behind and above the deity, and chance from below again
pressed into the lower creatures and the smaller events; magna Dii curant,
parva negligunt, Cicero, Nat. D. II 167. Cf. Pfanner, Syst. theol. gent. c. 8.
Creutzer, Philosophorum veterum loci de provid. divina ac de fato 1806.
Schneider, Christl. Klänge aus den gr. u. röm. Klassikern, 1865 S. 231 f.
2. Of that nature, however, the Christian faith in God’s providence is not.
On the contrary, it is a source of comfort and hope, of confidence and
courage, of humility and resignation, Ps. 23, 33:10v., 44:5v., 127:1, 2,
146:2v. etc. The faith in providence in Scripture rests absolutely not only on
God’s revelation in nature but much more on his covenant and promises; it
has as its foundation not only God’s righteousness but above all also his
compassion and grace; it presupposes the knowledge of sin, much deeper
than among the Heathen, but also the experience of God’s forgiving love; it
is no cosmological speculation but a glorious confession of faith. And
therefore it looks, through all pain and suffering, again joyfully into the
future; even if the riddles are not solved, faith in God’s fatherly hand
always lifts itself up again out of the depth and even causes one to glory in
tribulations. In connection with this it is noteworthy that Scripture does not
know the abstract word providence. People have indeed wished to give this
word a Scriptural character by appeal to Genesis 22:8, 1 Samuel 16:1, Ezech.
20:6, Hebr. 11:40; a few times the word also occurs of human foresight, Hd.
13:14, Romans 12:17, 13:14, 1 Timothy 5:8. But all that does not take away that
Scripture, when treating of God’s providence, uses wholly other words.
It does not sum up the activity of God, expressed by this word, in an
abstract concept and does not hold a theological treatise about it. But it
depicts it itself in the richest and most vivid manner and lets us see it in
history; Scripture as a whole is the book of the providence of God. And
thus, depicting that providence, it speaks of creating, Psalms 104:30, 148:5,
making alive, Job 33:4, Nehemiah 9:6, renewing, Psalms 104:30, seeing, beholding,
observing, Job 28:24, Psalms 33:13, 15, preserving, guarding, keeping, Num.
working, John 5:17, bearing, Hebr. 1:3, caring, 1 Petr. 5:7. The word
providence is borrowed from philosophy. According to Laertius Plato was
the first who used the word προνοια in this sense, cf. Zeller, Philos. der Gr.
II4 929. The apocryphal books already use it, Sap. 14:3, 17:2, 3 Mark 4:21,
διακυβερναν, 3 Mark 6:2, διοικειν, Sap. 8:1 etc. And the church fathers
adopted it and gave it citizenship in Christian theology, cf. Suicerus. s. v. In
doing so, however, the word underwent a not unimportant change.
Originally providence after all means the foreseeing, providentia, or the
foreknowing, προνοια, of what will happen in the future. Providentia est,
per quam futurum aliquid videtur, Cic. Inv. II 53. Understood thus, the word
was absolutely not suitable to encompass everything which the Christian
faith confesses in the doctrine of God’s providence. As foreknowledge of
the future, the providence of God would then belong only to the scientia
Dei and be fully dealt with in the locus on the virtues of God. The Christian
faith, however, understands by the providence of God not a nuda
praescientia, but confesses that all things are by God not only foreknown
but also predetermined and ordained. Therefore providence was soon
reckoned not merely to the understanding but also to the will of God, and
προσφορον διεξαγωγην λαμβανει, de fide orthod. II 29. Taken in this sense,
the providence of God would belong at home in the doctrine of the decrees
of God and be dealt with there entirely. But again the Christian faith
confesses more than is indicated by the word in this sense. The decrees
of God are, after all, carried out; and the creatures, which as a consequence
thereof receive their existence, do not exist for a moment of themselves, but
they are from moment to moment borne only by God’s almighty hand. The
arising and the existence of all creatures have their origin, not in a
foreknowledge nor also in a decree but specifically in an almighty act of
God. And providence is thus, according to the doctrine of Scripture and the
confession of the church, that act of God by which He maintains and
governs all things from moment to moment, not only Fürsehung but also
Vorsehung. These different meanings in which the word providence was
understood were, however, the cause that the place and the content of this
doctrine in Christian dogmatics continually changed and were subjected to
all kinds of alterations. Now it is reckoned to the virtues, then to the decrees
(opera Dei ad intra), then to the opera ad extra, cf. deel II 374v.
fide orth. II 29, and treats it indeed after creation but yet in close connection
with the praescientia and praedestinatio, II 30. Lombardus discusses it in
the chapter on the praedestinatio, but before creation, Sent. I dist. 35. A very
clear exposition is given by Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 22 art. 1; he defines it
first in general as ratio ordinis rerum in finem and regards it as principalis
pars prudentiae, whose task it is precisely, ordinare alia in finem; but then
he says further that ad providentiae curam duo pertinent, scilicet ratio
ordinis, quae dicitur providentia et dispositio, et executio ordinis, quae
dicitur gubernatio, cf. also Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 35 and Hugo Vict. S.
Sent. tr. 1 c. 12. Following these and other examples, the doctrine of
providence in Roman theology was treated either with the praedestinatio
with the will of God, Petavius, de Deo VIII c. 1-5. Becanus, Theol. schol. I
c. 13. Theol. Wirceb. Paris 1880 III 175. Perrone, Prael. Theol. II 1838 p.
233. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 158; or only as conservatio or gubernatio
separately after creation, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 103-105, c. Gent. III 65
and commentatores on Sent. II dist. 37. Theol. Wirceb. III 497; or entirely
in the broadest sense after the locus de creatione, Schwetz, Theol. dogm. I
405. Jansen, Prael. theol. II [7] 329. Simar, Dogm.3 252. Scheeben, Dogm.
II 12. And likewise in the theology of the Reformation providence was now
taken as a consilium, according to which God governs all things, Conf.
Helv. post. art. 6. Ursinus, Explic. qu. 27. Zanchius, Op. II 425. Maresius,
Syst. Theol. IV § 19. Alsted, Theol. schol. 174, then again as a work of God
outwardly, Calvin, Inst. I 16, 3. 4. Polanus, Synt. Theol. VI 1. Junius,
Theses Theol. XVII 1. 2. Synopsis pur. theol. XI 3. Heidegger, Corpus
Theol. VII 3 etc. The difference naturally concerns more the name than the
matter, as Alsted, Theol. schol. 175 and Baier, Comp. theol. I 5, 2, rightly
remark. If God really maintains and governs the world, then He must know
it beforehand (providentia), also will and be able to care for it (prudentia)
and in time also in fact maintain and govern everything in such a way that
the end proposed by Him is attained. Thus taken in a broad sense,
providence comprises 1o an actus internus, which then further was indeed
again distinguished into προνωσις, προθεσις and διοικησις, cf. Gerhard,
Loc. VI c. 2, and 2o an actus externus, which was defined as executio
ordinis, as conservatio, concursus, gubernatio. The actus internus of this
providentia, however, has earlier already been fully treated in the doctrine
of the virtues and of the decrees of God; here, after the doctrine of creation,
providence can therefore come into consideration only as actus externus, as
an act of God outwardly. Although now providence in this sense can never
be detached from the actus internus, the προγωσις, προθεσις and διοικησις,
nor even be thought without it, it is nevertheless distinguished from it, as
the executio ordinis from the ordo itself. The word providence has thereby
undergone an entire alteration. And the question can arise whether the word
is still suitable for indicating the matter. When formerly providence was still
treated in the doctrine of the virtues or of the decrees of God, it retained its
original meaning; but since it is more and more conceived as conservatio
and gubernatio and comes up after creation, that original meaning has
almost entirely been lost. Providence in this latter, narrower sense is no
proper providentia any more, no ratio ordinis rerum in finem, for this
precedes it and is presupposed by it; it itself is executio ordinis. This latter
was therefore in dogmatics further defined by conservatio or by
gubernatio or by both together, Lactantius, de ira Dei c. 10. Thomas, S.
Theol. I qu. 103. 104. Bonaventura, Brevil. ed. Frib. 1881 p. 93. Ned.
Geloofsbel. art. 13. Heid. Cat. X. Zanchius, Op. II 425. Synopsis pur. theol.
XI 3 etc. Between these two there was later still, in order to ward off
pantheism and deism, inserted the concursus or cooperatio, which in
substance indeed was always treated with the doctrine of providence, e.g.
with Aug. de trin. III 4. de civ. V 8-11. Theodoretus, de provid. or. X.
Boëthius, de cons. IV and V. Damasc., de fide II 29. Thomas, S. Th. I qu.
Zwingli, de provid. c. 3. Op. IV 86. Calvin, Inst. I 16. 2. Contre la secte des
libertins, C. R. 35 p. 186, de aet. Dei praed., C. R. 36 p. 347-366. Zanchius,
Op. II 449. Martyr, Loci C. p. 56. 59. Wollebius, Theol. c. 30. Synopsis pur.
theol. XI 13. Gerhard Loc. VI c. 9 etc., but which later also formally
obtained a place of its own between conservatio and gubernatio, Mastricht,
Theol. III 10, 10. 29. Turret., Theol. El. VI qu. 4. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. VI
270. IX 210. Brakel, Red. Godsd. XI 6. Marck, Godg. X 9. Quenstedt,
Theol. I 531. Hollaz, Ex. theol. 421. Buddeus, Inst. 409. From this it
appears that the word providence was not considered sufficient for
indicating the executio ordinis and was further specified by maintenance
and government. These too are undoubtedly conceived more correctly, more
vivid in representation and more in accordance with the usage of Holy
Scripture. Especially when the word providence is taken abstractly and put
in the place of God himself, as Plutarch already began with this, cf. Cremer
s. v. προνοια, and the rationalism of the previous century followed this, it is
open to objection. Yet the word, which obtained citizenship in the language
of theology and of religion, may be retained, provided that the matter which
is indicated by it is understood in the Scriptural sense.
3. The Christian doctrine of providence as an almighty act of God,
whereby He preserves and governs all things, is to be distinguished not only
from pagan fate and chance but for that reason also from the pantheism and
deism which repeatedly revive in the Christian centuries. For, there are but
three alternatives for the sum of existence, chance, fate or Deity. With
chance there would be variety without uniformity, with fate uniformity
without variety, but variety in uniformity is the demonstration of primal
design and the seal of the creative mind. In the world as it exists, there is
infinite variety and amazing uniformity, James Douglas in U. B. Smith,
System of Christian Theol. New-York, Armstrong 1890 p. 107. Pantheism
knows no distinction between the being of God and the being of the world
and, idealistically, lets the world be absorbed into God, or, materialistically,
God into the world. On this standpoint there is no place for creation and
therefore, in the proper sense, also not for preservation and government.
Providence coincides with the course of nature; the laws of nature are
identical with the decrees of God; and the government of God is nothing but
fixus et immutabilis naturae ordo sive rerum naturalium concatenatio,
Spinoza, Tract. theol. pol. c. 3, cf. Strauss Gl. II 384. Schleiermacher, Gl. §
46 and further part II 388-396. Of itself, with that, the miracle, the selfactivity of the causae secundae, personality, freedom, prayer, sin, the whole
of religion, falls away. Pantheism, however beautiful and seductive a form
it may present itself in, in fact leads into the arms of a pagan fate. There is
then no other being than the being of nature; there is no higher power than
that which works in the world according to fixed law; there is no other,
better life than for which the data are present in this visible creation; for a
time man may flatter himself with the idealistic hope that the world,
through immanent development, will perfect itself; soon this optimism turns
into pessimism, this idealism into materialism. Over against this pantheism,
Christian theology had to maintain the distinction of creation and
preservation, the self-activity of the causae secundae, the freedom of
personality, the character of sin, the truth of religion. And it did this by
rejecting the fatum and by clearly setting the confession of God’s
providence in distinction from it in the light. The characteristic feature of
the doctrine of the fatum does not consist in this, that all that is and happens
in time is grounded and determined in God’s eternal counsel, but it lies
herein, that all being and happening is determined by a power coinciding
with the world, which without consciousness and without will [10]
determines everything with blind necessity. According to Cicero, the fatum
of the Stoa was an ordo seriesque causarum, cum causa ex se causam gignit,
de divin. 1, cf. Seneca, de benef. IV 7. Nat. Qu. II 36. Commonly it was
then further distinguished into a fatum mathematicum or astrale, when the
events on earth were thought to be determined by the stars, and into a fatum
physicum, when they were thought to be determined by the nexus of nature.
In the latter form the doctrine of the fatum now appears with pantheism and
materialism; but it is remarkable that also the fatum astrale in the most
recent time is renewed and finds warm defenders, cf. Wetensch. Bladen
1896 IV 453. Christian theology now by no means contested that everything
was eternally known and determined by God; insofar it even acknowledged
a fatum and some also thought to be able to use the word in a good sense. If
we consider, says Augustine, that fatum comes from fari, and if we then
thereby designate the eternal, unchangeable word, whereby God bears all
things, then the name is to be approved, de civ. V 9. Boëthius spoke of the
fatum as inhaereus rebus mobilibus dispositio, per quam providentia suis
quaeque nectit ordinibus, de cons. philos. IV pros. 6. And even Maresius
thought to be able to connect a Christian sense with the word, Syst. Theol.
p. 149. But commonly one was more cautious; belief in fate nevertheless
proceeded from the thought that everything happens as a consequence of a
blind, irresistible power without consciousness and will, and fatalia were
called those events which praeter Dei et hominum voluntatem cujusdam
ordinis necessitate contingunt, Aug. de civ. V 3. In this sense the fatum was
most firmly contested by all Christian theologians, by Augustine and his
people no less than by those who defended free will. Omnia vero fato fieri
non dicimus, imo nulla fieri fato dicimus, Aug. de civ. V 9. The only ordinis
necessitas on the Christian standpoint is the wise, almighty, loving will of
God. Thereby it was not denied, as will later appear, that in the world of
creatures there is a connection of causes and effects and that there are fixed
ordinances, but the order of nature does not stand behind and above and
likewise not outside and over against God’s will, but it is grounded in that
will of an almighty and loving God and Father, determined by that will,
serviceable to that will; and it also does not stand as a blind, coercive
power outside and over against our will, for ipsae nostrae voluntates in
causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo ejusque praescientia continetur,
Aug. ib. and further comment. on Sent. I dist. 35. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu.
116. c. Gent. III 93. Petavius, de Deo VIII 4. Gerhard, Loc. VI 13. Calvin,
Inst. I 16, 8. Beza, Tract. Theol. I 313 sq. Alting, Theol. elenct. nova p. 290.
Heidegger, Corp. Theol. VII 2. Turretinus, Theol. El. VI 2. M. Vitringa II
On the other hand stands deism, which separates God and world; which,
after the creatures have once been created, lets them exist and work wholly
or partially, and then again for a greater or smaller part, by their own power
received along with creation; and thus essentially renews the pagan doctrine
of chance. In the sense of the magna Dei curant, parva negligunt,
Hieronymus once expressed that God’s providential care did not extend
over all small insects, cf. deel II 160. Pelagianism, like Cicero, Nat. D. III
36, ascribed virtue to man’s own will and power, and semi-Pelagianism
divided the work and ascribed something to both God and man. When later
this system penetrated into Roman theology, there arose, concerning God’s
cooperation in providence, no small difference; the Thomists conceived it
as a praedeterminatio physica, an applicatio ad operandum, Thomas, S.
Molinists, on the other hand, understood by it a concursus simultaneus,
mere cooperans, quo Deus cum alio concurrente in eundem actum et
effectum influit, cf. Daalman, Summa S. Thomae II 286-314. Theol.
Wirceb. I c. 2. Dens, Theol. I 66 sq. Liberatore, Instit. philos. III c. 4 a. 1, 2.
Scheeben, Dogm. II 22 f. Jansen, Prael. II 334. Socinianism set the infinite
and the finite over against each other so abstractly and dualistically, that
God could create the world not even out of nothing but only out of an
eternal and finite matter; and accordingly it also withdrew a great part of the
world from the providence of God and left it to the human being’s own
insight and judgment. The will is by nature also so free, that God cannot
even calculate with certainty beforehand what a human being will do in a
given case; only when the decision has fallen does God thereafter direct his
acting accordingly; the free causes therefore stand wholly independently
alongside and outside God. The relation of God to the world is like that of a
craftsman to the machine; after he has made it and set it in motion, he
leaves it to itself and intervenes only when something needs to be repaired,
Volkelius, de vera relig. II c. 7. Crell, de Deo et ejus attrib. c. 2-6. cf. Fock,
Der Socin. 496 f. The Remonstrants likewise were of the opinion that in
creation powers had been bestowed on the creatures, on which they could
now subsist. Preservation was therefore a negative act of God, whereby He
essentias, vires ac facultates rerum creatarum non vult destruere sed eas
vigori suo relinquere, quoad vigere ac durare possunt ex vi per creationem
ipsis indita, or at least this view was not called incorrect. In connection with
that, the concursus as a naturalis quaedam influentia in res omnes ex
naturae divinae perfectione emanens was rejected; the predestination of the
number of human beings, of the marriages, of the end of life, of the elect
and the lost was contested; free will defended and all providentia efficax
circa peccatum replaced by a negative permissio or non-impeditio, Conf.
Rem. c. 6, Apol. Conf. ib. Episc. Inst. Theol. IV sect. 4. Limborch, Theol.
Christ. II 25 sq. Arminianism was indeed condemned at Dordrecht and
placed outside the Reformed pale, but as a spiritual tendency it found
entrance everywhere and penetrated into all Christian countries and
churches. The period which began with the middle of the 17th century was
characterized by a powerful striving to emancipate nature, world, human
being, science, etc. from God and to make them independent over against
God, Christianity, church, theology; latitudinarianism, deism, rationalism,
pietism, Aufklärung, etc. agree in this. This world is the best possible, the
human being is sufficient to himself with his understanding and will;
natural law, natural force, natural right, natural religion, natural morality
together constitute a fund of powers given by God to the world at creation
and now completely sufficient for existence and development; revelation,
prophecy, miracle, grace are wholly superfluous. Deism did not deny the
existence of God, nor creation and providence either; on the contrary, it
gladly spoke of the Supreme Being and held broad discourses about
providence. But the power from this faith was gone. Deism denied in
principle that God worked in creation otherwise than according to and
through the natural laws and forces; it was anti-supernaturalistic from the
outset. The conservatio was enough; a cooperatio or an influxus Dei with
every action of the creature was unnecessary, Reinhard, Dogm. § 61.
Wegscheider, Inst. theol. § 106. In its 18th-century form this deism now
indeed belongs to the past. But in fact it still prevails even now in broad
circles, both in theory and practice. Since especially in this century the
knowledge of nature has been expanded and the firmness of its ordinances
has been recognized, many are inclined to withdraw the pitiless,
unchangeable nature from God’s government, to let it rest independently in
itself, and to restrict God’s providence to the religious-ethical domain. But
naturally then here too providence cannot be conceived absolutely; it finds
its boundary in human freedom, cf. Kreibig, Die Räthsel der göttl.
Vorsehung, Berlin 1886. Schmidt, Die göttl. Vorsehung und das Selbstleben
der Welt 1887. Beyschlag, Zur Verständigung über den christl.
Vorsehungsglauben, Halle 1888. No wonder that with such a view the old
doctrine of the concursus is no longer understood and is set aside as
superfluous or incorrect, Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 54. Müller, Sünde I5 318.
Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. II3 266. Indeed, the inference then lies close at hand,
with the ethical moderns in this country, to place the power of nature and
the moral power, as it were, as two Gods in Manichaean fashion alongside
and over against each other, at the risk that the domain of the latter, like that
of the Red Indians in America, will be more and more curtailed and finally
wholly taken possession of by blind, irrational power, cf. deel I 451. For
that is certainly the principal objection against deism: by separating God
and world, the infinite and the finite, and placing them dualistically
alongside each other, it makes both into two competing powers, which are
involved in continual struggle and dispute dominion with each other. What
is given to God is taken away from the world. The more God’s providence
extends, the more the creature loses its independence and freedom, and
conversely the creature can maintain its self-activity only if it pushes God
back and takes dominion away from Him. Peace therefore exists between
the two only with complete separation. Deism is in its ground irreligious.
Not in communion with but in separation from God lies the blessedness of
the human being; the deist feels at ease only when he is detached from God,
i.e. is practically an atheist; and because he realizes that he can never be
that, he is a fearful creature, always anxious that a piece of his territory will
be taken away from him. Hence there are in deism all sorts of degrees; the
boundaries between God’s activity and that of the world are drawn
differently each time. There are whole, half, three-quarter Pelagians, etc.,
according as world and human being are withdrawn wholly or for a greater
or smaller part from God’s government. In principle deism is always the
same, it sets God to non-activity, but one walks that path further than
another. A deist is a human being who in his short existence has not found
the time to become an atheist, Quack, Port Royal 180. That domain now,
which by deism is withdrawn from God’s government, then comes to stand
under the power either of fate or of chance. Also in this respect deism
repeatedly comes into conflict with itself. Especially nowadays, now all are
so deeply convinced of the firmness of the natural order, there is in it no
place for chance and deism falls back into the hands of the old fate; chance
remains chiefly preserved only for the religious-ethical domain. But the
doctrine of chance is no better than that of fate. Fatum could at need still
have a good meaning in the Christian view of life and the world; but casus
and fortuna are through and through unchristian. Something is accidental
only in human beings’ eyes, because at that moment they do not know the
cause. But objectively accidental there is nothing and there can be nothing.
Everything must have a cause and has it in the last instance in the almighty
and all-wise will of God, cf. Augustinus, qu. 83 qu 24. c. Acad. I 1. de ord. I
2. de civ. V 3. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 22 art. 2. qu. 103 art. 5. c. Gent. III
72. Gerhard, Loc. VI 3. Calvijn, Inst. I 16, 2. 9. Chamier, Panstr. Cathol. II
2, 4 sq. Turret., Theol. El. III qu. 12. Mastricht, Theol. III 10, 30. J. Müller,
Sünde II 34 f. Weisse, Philos. D. I 518. Kirchner, Ueber den Zufall, Halle,
Pfeffer 1888. G. Rümelin, Ueber den Zufall, Deutsche Rundschau März
1890 S. 353-364, and furthermore on deism: Lechler, Gesch. des engl.
Deismus 1841 and art. in Herzog2. Pünjer, Gesch. d. chr. Relig. Philos. I
209 f. Hanne, Die Idee der absol. Persönl. II2 76 f. Pesch, Die grossen
Welträthsel II2 534 f. Doedes, Inl. tot de leer v. God 80v.
4. The providence of God, thus distinguished from the knowledge and the
decree of God and maintained over against pantheism and deism, is,
according to the fine definition of the Heid. Catech., that almighty and
omnipresent power of God, by which He still upholds and governs heaven
and earth, together with all creatures, as it were with His hand. Even so, the
doctrine of providence is still of very wide scope. It properly comprises the
entire execution of all decrees which have reference to that which was once
called into existence by creation. If the act of creation is excepted, it is as
rich as the scientia libera, as the decrees of God, as all that exists and
happens in time. It extends over everything that is further treated in
dogmatics after creation and includes within itself both the works of nature
and of grace; all works of God outwardly, which follow upon creation, are
works of His providence. Only, the locus de providentia does not enter into
those works themselves, but describes in general the nature of the relation
in which God stands to the created world and which is always the same in
spite of the many different works which He brings about in the world in His
providence. Therefore it is also not desirable, in this locus, to bring up all
kinds of subjects, such as the miracle, prayer, the end of life, freedom of the
will, sin, theodicy, etc., for in part these subjects have already been treated
earlier in the doctrine of the virtues and the decrees of God, in part they
later come up in their own place at length. Not on the locus de providentia
alone, but on the whole of dogmatics rests the task of theodicy. The doctrine
of providence therefore does not include within itself the material for the
following loci, but confines itself to the description of the relation,
remaining like itself under all different works, in which God stands to the
creatures. That relation is expressed by the words preservation, cooperation,
and government, which gradually were conceived as parts of providence.
Whatever God may do in nature and grace [16], He is always the one who
preserves all things, flows into them with His power, and governs them.
Preservation, cooperation, and government are therefore not parts or pieces
into which the work of providence is split, and which, separated in
substance and in time, follow one upon another. Nor do they differ among
themselves in such a way that preservation would have reference only to the
being of the creatures, cooperation only to the activities, and government
exclusively to the guidance toward the final goal. But they are always
connected with one another, they interpenetrate one another at every
moment, preservation from the very first beginning is also government, and
government cooperation, and cooperation preservation. Preservation tells us
that nothing exists, not only no substance, but also no power, no activity, no
property, no idea, unless it all exists from, through, unto God. Cooperation
makes known to us that same preservation as such a one which does not
abolish the being of the creatures but precisely posits and maintains it. And
government points out both to us as leading all things in such a way that the
end goal established by God is attained. And always, from the beginning to
the end, providence is one simple, almighty, and omnipresent power.
When conceived as such a power and act of God, providence stands in the
closest connection with, and yet is also essentially distinct from, the activity
of God in creation. Pantheism and deism seek the solution of the problem
that here presents itself by denying either creation or providence. Theism
maintains both and seeks to set their unity and their distinction in the light
both for theory and for the practice of life. Always to be a theist in the full,
true sense, i.e. to see in everything God’s counsel and hand and work and
yet at the same time, indeed precisely for that reason, to develop every
power and gift to the highest activity, that is the glory of the Christian faith,
that the secret of the Christian life. Scripture leads us in this. On the one
hand it designates providence as a creating, Psalms 104:30, a making alive,
of his Word and Spirit, Psalms 104:30, 107:26, a commanding, Psalms 147:15,
Lamentations 3:37, a working, John 5:17, a bearing, Hebrews 1:3, a willing, Revelation 4:11,
so that everything without exception is from God and exists through
and unto him, Acts 17:28, Romans 11:36, Colossians 1:17. God is never idle. He
never looks on passively. He always works with divine power in nature and
grace. Providence is therefore a positive act, not a letting but a causing to
exist and to work from moment to moment. If it consisted only in a nondestruere, it would not be God who maintained things, but these would exist
in and through themselves, be it then also through a power bestowed at
creation. And this is absurd to think; a creature is by itself an absolutely
dependent being; what does not exist of itself can also not exist for a single
moment by itself. If God does nothing, then there is nothing and nothing
happens. Virtus Dei, ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si aliquando cessaret,
simul et illorum cessaret species omnisque natura concideret, Aug. de Gen.
ad litt. IV 12. Conf. IV 17, cf. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 104 art. 1-4. c. Gent.
III 65 sq. Calvin, Inst. I 16, 4. Leydecker, Fax verit. VIII 2. Alsted, Theol.
schol. 304 etc. And just as providence is a power and an act, so it is also an
almighty and omnipresent power. God is immanent with his being present
in all creatures. His providence extends to all creatures; everything exists in
him. Scripture states it most emphatically, that nothing, however small, falls
outside God’s providence. Not only all things in general, Ephesians 1:11, Colossians 1:17, Hebrews 1:3, but even the hairs of the head, Matthew 10:30, the sparrows, Matthew 10:29, the birds of heaven, Matthew 6:26, the lilies of the field, Matthew 6:28, the
young ravens, Psalms 147:9 are the object of his care. For what is small or great
for him who alone is great? In the coherence of the world the small is just
as much in its place as the great, just as indispensable and necessary, and
many times of still richer significance and of weightier consequences.
Providence may therefore be distinguished into in generalis, Ps. 104, 148:1-
3, specialis, Psalms 139:15v., Job 10:9-12, Matthew 12:12, Luke 12:7, and
specialissima, 1 Timothy 4:10. But it nevertheless extends as God’s power to all
and to each creature. Habakkuk complains in chap. 1:14 indeed about it,
that God by his chastisement makes men like fishes of the sea, that are
caught in the net and ְּכֶרֶמׂש ֹ ל א־ֹמֵׁשל, like creeping things, that have no ruler,
namely to protect it over against its enemies, but thereby in the least
does not express that God’s providence does not extend over these
creatures. With more appearance of right one appeals for the limitation of
God’s providence to 1 Corinthians 9:9; yet Paul, who everywhere else conceives
God’s sovereignty so absolutely, e.g. Acts 17:28, Romans 11:36, Colossians 1:17,
here in this place by no means denies that God also cares for the oxen, but
only indicates that the reason why this word is included in God’s law does
not lie in the oxen but in men. God says also this word concerning the oxen
δι’ ἡ μας, v. 10, cf. Romans 4:23, 24, 15:4, 2 Timothy 3:16, in order that we might
learn from it that the laborer in the gospel is worthy of his wages. Thus
providence is an act of God just as great, almighty, and omnipresent as
creation; it is a creatio continua or continuata; they are both one act and
differ only ratione, Aug. de Gen. ad litt. IV 15. Conf. IV 12 de civ. XII 17.
Thomas I qu. 104 art. 2. Quenstedt, Theol. I p. 351. Ursinus, Explic. Cat.
qu. 27. M. Vitringa II 183. Heppe, Dogm. d. ev. ref. K. 190.
Thus speaking, earlier theologians nevertheless in no way wished to
abolish the distinction that exists between creation and providence, as e.g.
Hodge I 577 fears. Scripture, on the other hand, represents providence as a
resting from the work of creation, Genesis 2:2, Exodus 20:11, 31:17 and further as
a seeing, Psalms 14:2, as a beholding, Psalms 33:13, as a paying heed, Psalms 33:15, as
a watching, Psalms 130:3 etc., which all presupposes the existence, the selfactivity, the freedom of the creature. These data of Scripture also may not
be neglected. Creation and providence are not the same. If providence were
a creation renewed every moment, the creatures would also be brought forth
out of nothing every moment. The coherence, the connection, the ordo
causarum would then be entirely lost, and of development, history there
could be no question. All creatures would then exist not really, but only in
appearance, and lack all independence, freedom, responsibility; God
himself would be the cause of sin. Although many called providence a
creatio continua, they nevertheless by no means intended thereby to erase
the distinction between the two; rather, they all at the same time conceived
providence as a causing to persevere in existence, as a conservatio,
which presupposes creation. Thus, e.g. Augustine says that God rested on
the seventh day and created no new genera any more, and he then describes
the work of providence in distinction from that of creation as follows:
movet itaque occulta potentia universam creaturam suam...... explicat
secula, quae illi cum primum condita sunt tanquam implicita indiderat, quae
tamen in suos cursus non explicarentur, si ea ille qui condidit provido motu
administrare cessaret, de Gen. ad lit. V 20. Providence may therefore
sometimes be called a creatio, it is always distinguished from the first and
proper creation in this, that it is a creatio continua. Both therefore agree
with each other in this, that it is the same Divine, almighty and omnipresent
power that is active in creation and in preservation; this is no lesser act than
that; for both, power, Divine omnipotence is required. Further, creation and
preservation are of course also not distinguished in God himself, for in
Him, the Eternal, there falls no change nor shadow of turning; He has not
passed over from not-creating to creating nor also from creating to
preserving; He is unchangeably the same, cf. deel II 411. Creation and
preservation are therefore not objectively and essentially, as acts of God, in
God’s being, but only ratione distinguished. That, however, does not mean
that our thinking simply arbitrarily makes a distinction between the two; no,
that distinction is indeed well grounded in the revelation of God and
derived from it by our thinking. There is a difference between creation and
preservation, but that difference does not lie in God’s being an sich, but in
the relation in which God places himself to the creatures. One thing is what
happens with the things through creation, and another thing what happens
with them through preservation. The relation in which through both acts the
creatures are placed to God is a different one. This difference is not to be
indicated thus, that creation is out of nothing and preservation out of the
existing; but creation calls forth the things that are not, that have no other
being than that of ideas and decrees in the being of God; through
preservation God calls forth with the same power those things that have
received an existence distinct from his being and nevertheless are solely and
only out of and through and unto God. Creation gives being; preservation,
the perseverance in being. The difficulty for thought, to maintain both
creation and preservation, lies again and again in this, that creatures through
creation have received a being of their own, distinct from God’s being, and
that yet that being cannot or may not be regarded for a moment as a being
independent of God, resting in itself. We stand here before a mystery that
far surpasses our understanding, and always we are inclined to do too little
to the one or to the other. On that inclination pantheism and deism rest.
Both proceed from the same error and set God and world over against each
other as two magnitudes. The first sacrifices the world to God, creation to
preservation, and thinks that the being of God is then only a Divine infinite
being when the being of the world is denied, dissolved in appearance,
swallowed up in the Divine being. And the second sacrifices God to the
world, preservation to creation, and judges that the creature comes the more
into its right, in proportion as it becomes less dependent on God and
removes itself more from Him. The Christian, however, confesses that the
world and every creature in it has received a being of its own but yet in that
same measure increases in reality, in freedom, in true being, as it is more
dependent on God, and from moment to moment is out of and through and
unto Him. A creature stands the higher, in proportion as God dwells in it
more and permeates it with his being. Preservation in so far even goes
beyond creation; for this gave only the beginning of being, but that is the
continuing and ever increasing communication of God to his creatures. The
providence is the progressive expression in the universe of his divine
perfection, the progressive realization in it of the archetypal ideal of perfect
wisdom and love, Sam. Harris, God the Creator and Lord of all, Edinb.
5. In this way the manner has also already been indicated in which God
exercises his providence in the world, and which in former times was
expressed by the doctrine of the concursus. This is as rich as the diversity
which in creation has been introduced into the creatures, Sicut creationis
magna est varietas, ita et gubernationis, Alsted, Theol. schol. 315. By
creation a world has been called into existence, which at the same time
deserves to be called a κοσμος and α ἰ ων [21] and is in both space and time
a speculum lucidissimum gloriae divinae, cf. deel II 420v. Providence now
serves to lead the world from its beginning on to its final goal; it comes into
operation immediately at creation and maintains and brings to development
what is given in that creation. Conversely, creation is adapted to
providence; the creation gives to the creatures such a being, that in and
through providence can be brought to unfolding. For the world was not
created in the state of pure potency, as a chaos or mass of mist, but as a
cosmos, and man was placed therein not as a helpless wretch but as man
and woman; only from such a ready world could development proceed and
thus it was by creation offered to providence. Further, that world was a
harmonious whole, in which unity was paired with the richest diversity;
each creature received its own nature and therein its own being, its own life
and law of life. Just as in Adam’s heart the moral law was implanted, as rule
for his life, so all creatures bore in their own nature the principia and the
laws for their development. All things are created by the word. Everything
rests on thought. The whole creation is a system of God’s ordinances, Genesis 31:25v., 33:20, 25. He gave to all creatures an order, a law, which they do
not transgress, Psalms 148:6, cf. deel I 259, 287v. It rests in all its parts on the
counsel of God, and this comes out in the small and in the great; it all
proceeds from the Lord of hosts, He is wonderful in counsel, He is great in
deed, Jes. 28:23-29. Thus Scripture teaches us to understand the world, and
thus also Christian theology has understood it. Augustine said that in the
creatures semina occulta, originales regulae, seminariae rationes had been
implanted, which, hidden in the secret womb of nature, are the principia of
all development. Quaecunque nascendo ad oculos nostros exeunt, ex
occultis seminibus accipiunt progrediendi primordia, et incrementa debitae
magnitudinis distinctionesque formarum ab originalibus tamquam regulis
sumunt, de trin. III 7. de Gen. ad lit. IV 33. The world is therefore pregnant
with the causes of beings; sicut matres gravidae sunt foetibus, sic ipse
mundus gravidus est causis nascentium, quae in illo non creantur, nisi ab
illa summa essentia, ubi nec oritur nec moritur aliquid nec incipit esse nec
desinit, de trin. III 9. It is an arbor rerum, which brings forth branch and
blossom and fruit out of itself, de Gen. ad lit. VIII 9. God nevertheless so
preserves the things and so works in them, that they themselves as causae
secundae cooperate. That does not say that one must stop with these second
causes; we must always ascend to the cause of all being and motion, and
that is only the will of God; voluntas conditoris conditae rei cujusque natura
est, de civ. XXI 8, cf. de trin. III 6-9. Insofar providence is not only a
positive, but also an immediate act of God. His will, his power, his being is
immediately present in every creature and in every event. Everything exists
and lives together in him, Hd. 17:28, Colossians 1:17, Hebr. 1:3. Just as he created
the world by himself, so he also sustains and governs it by himself.
Although God also works through the causae secundae, this is not to be
interpreted with deism in such a way that they would stand between God
and the workings with their consequences and remove these from him.
Immediate Deus omnibus providet, quoad ordinis rationem, Thomas, S.
Theol. I qu. 22 art. 3. qu. 103 art. 6. qu. 104 art. 2. c. Gent. III 76 sq.
Therefore a miracle is also no breaking of the law of nature and no
intervention into the order of nature from without. It is on God’s side an act
which has no more immediately and directly God as cause than every
ordinary event, and in the counsel of God and in the world-idea it takes an
equally ordered and harmonious place as every natural phenomenon. In the
miracle God only brings a special power into operation, which, like every
other power, works in accordance with its own nature and law and thus also
has its own product as consequence, cf. deel I 289. But at creation God laid
in the things his ordinances, an ordo rerum, by which the things themselves
stand mutually in connection with one another. God does not depend on
those causes, but the things do depend on one another. That connection is
manifold; although in general it can be called causal, causal in this sense is
nevertheless by no means to be identified with mechanical, as materialism
wishes. The mechanical connection is only one manner in which a part of
the things in the world stands in relation to one another. Just as the
creatures in creation received their own nature and differ mutually, so there
is also distinction in the laws according to which they work, and in the
relations in which they stand to one another. These are distinct on physical
and on psychical terrain, in the intellectual and in the ethical world, in
family and society, in science and art, in the kingdoms of the earth and in
the kingdom of the heavens. It is the providence of God, which in
connection with creation maintains and brings to full unfolding all these
distinct natures, powers, ordinances. In providence God does not destroy
but rather respects and develops what he called into existence in creation.
Thus he sustains and governs all creatures in accordance with their nature,
the angels otherwise than men and these again otherwise than animals and
plants. But insofar as God now in his providence maintains the mutual
relations of things and makes the creatures mutually serviceable to one
another’s existence and life, it can be called mediate. Immediate Deus
omnibus providet, quoad ordinis rationem, quoad executionem ordinis vero
per aliqua media providet, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 22 art. 3. Thus he created
the angels all at once but lets men proceed from one blood; thus he
preserves some creatures individually, others as species and genus; thus he
repeatedly makes use of all kinds of creatures as means in his hand, in order
to carry out his counsel and to reach his goal.
Christian theology did not deny this; on the contrary, following the lead of
Scripture, it has always emphatically maintained the order of nature and the
causal connection of phenomena. It is untrue that Christianity, with its
supranaturalism, would be hostile to a natural order and would make
science impossible, as Draper’s history of the struggle between religion and
science, 2e uitg. Haarlem 1887, with evident pleasure tries to demonstrate.
Much more correct is the judgment of Du Bois Reymond, when he said: die
neuere Naturwissenschaft, wie paradox dies klinge, verdankt ihren
Ursprung dem Christenthum, Kulturgesch. und Naturw. Leipzig 1878 S. 28,
cf. also Lange, Gesch. des Mater. 1882 S. 129 f. and others in Martensen
Larsen, Die Naturwiss. in ihrem Schuldverhältnis zum Christenthum, Berlin
1897. In any case Christianity made science, specifically that of nature,
possible and prepared the ground for it. For the more the phenomena of
nature, as in polytheism, are deified and regarded as visible images and
bearers of the Godhead, the more impossible a scientific investigation
becomes, which of itself acquires the character of sacrilege and disturbs the
mystery of the Godhead. But Christianity has distinguished God and world
and, by its confession of God as the Creator of all things, has detached God
from the nexus of nature and placed Him high above it; investigation of
nature is no longer an assault on the Godhead. Furthermore, by that it has at
the same time made man free from and placed him independently over
against nature, as the beautiful contemplation of nature among psalmists
and prophets, with Jesus and the apostles, so clearly proves; for the believer
nature is no longer an object of worship and fear; while in deep humility he
bows before God and is absolutely dependent on Him, he has precisely the
calling to rule the earth and to subject all things to himself, Genesis 1:26.
Dependence on God is something quite different from convenienter naturae
vivere and accommodating oneself to circumstances. Many reason in such a
way that they either ascribe all things and events to God’s will and consider
resistance unlawful, or that they limit God’s providence and place many
things in the hands of man, cf. e.g. Beyschlag, Zur Verständigung über den
christl. Vorsehungsglauben 1888 S. 24 f. Yet Scripture warns us against
both this antinomianism and this pelagianism and cuts off at the root all
false, fatalistic resignation and all arrogant self-confidence. Bowing before
the power of nature is something wholly different from submitting to God
in a childlike way; and ruling the earth is a serving of God. The captain
who, during a storm, went into his cabin to pray and read in the Bible, did
indeed submit to the power of the elements but not to God, Harris, God the
Creator and Lord of all I 545. There is much more true piety in Cromwell’s
word: trust God and keep your powder dry. Next, it is the confession of God
as the Creator of heaven and earth which at once brings with it the thought
of the one, absolute truth, never divided against itself; of the harmony and
the beauty of the counsel of God; and thus also of the unity of the worldplan and of the order of the whole of nature. Wenn in freier und
grossartiger Weise dem einen Gott auch ein einheitliches Wirken aus dem
Ganzen und Vollen zugeschrieben wird, so wird der Zusammenhang der
Dinge nach Ursache und Wirkung nicht nur denkbar sondern er ist sogar
eine nothwendige Consequenz der Annahme, Lange, Gesch. d. Mater. 130.
Scripture itself leads us in the recognition of such a natural order, of all
kinds of ordinances and laws for created things. And the miracle makes so
little breach in that, that it rather presupposes and confirms that fixed
natural order. The Christian church and theology have at all times gladly
acknowledged such an ordo rerum; Augustine repeatedly appealed to the
word in Wijsh. 11:20, omnia mensura numeroque et pondere ordinasti.
They have at least in the first period powerfully resisted the dreadful
superstition which in the third and fourth century rose to an extraordinary
height, and in particular also combated astrology, Aug. de civ. V 1-8.
Thomas, S. c. Gent. III 84 sq. Calvijn, Contre l’astrologie, C. R. 35 p. 509-
544. Turretinus, Theol. El. VI qu. 2. Moor II 435. M. Vitringa II 180 etc.
The struggle that often broke out was not waged between Christianity and
natural science; the parties were grouped quite differently; it was mostly a
struggle between old and new world-view, in which there were believing
Christians on both sides, cf. deel II 465.
This principially correct view of nature, which theology advocated, is
evident nowhere more clearly than from its doctrine of the concursus and
the causae secundae. In pantheism and in deism this doctrine cannot come
into its own. There there are no causae and here no causae secundae any
longer. In pantheism the causae secundae, i.e. the causes of things lying
alongside one another within the circle of the created, are identified with the
causa prima, that is God. There is between the two no distinction of
substance and operation; God is materialiter and formaliter the subject of all
that happens, thus also of sin; at most the so-called second causes are
occasions and passive instruments for the operations of God. Formerly
occurring only sporadically, this doctrine came to dominance in the newer
philosophy of Cartesius and thus led to the idealism of Berkeley and
Malebranche and to the pantheism of Spinoza, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Chr.
Gl. § 46, Strauss, Gl. II 384 etc. Thus Malebranche, e. g., says, qu’il
n’y a qu’une vraie cause parce qu’il n’y a qu’un vrai Dieu, que la nature ou
la force de chaque chose n’est que la volonté de Dieu, que toutes les causes
naturelles ne sont point de véritables causes, mais seulement des causes
occasionnelles. A true cause can be God alone, because He alone can create
and cannot communicate this power to any creature; if creatures could
really be cause of motions and phenomena, then they themselves would be
Gods, but toutes ces petites divinités des payens et toutes ces causes
particulières des philosophes ne sont que des chimères, que le malin esprit
tâche d’établir pour ruiner le culte du vrai Dieu, De la recherche de la
vérité, l. 6 p. 2 ch. 3 cf. also Eclaircissement 15. There are thus only
phaenomena, representations, and the only reality, power, substance, that
hides behind them, is that of God himself, cf. also Kleutgen, Philos. der
Vorzeit II2 336-347. Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 592. Conversely, in deism the
causae secundae are separated from the causa prima and made independent;
the causa prima is wholly restricted to creation, to the giving of the posse,
and in the velle and facere wholly excluded, as in original pelagianism; or
the two causae are conceived as causae sociae, which work alongside and
with one another, as two horses draw a wagon forward, even if the one is
then perhaps stronger than the other, as in semipelagianism and synergism;
the creature here becomes creator of his own acts. Now, however, Scripture
says, both that God works all things, so that the creature is only an
instrument in his hand, e. g. Jes. 44:24, Psalms 29:3, 65:11, 147:16, Matthew 5:45,
Hd. 17:25 etc., and that providence is distinct from creation and
presupposes the existence and the self-activity of the creatures, e. g. Genesis 1:11, 20, 22, 24, 28 etc. In accordance with that, Christian theology teaches
that the causae secundae are absolutely subordinated to God as prima causa
and yet in that subordination remain genuine, true causae. A few indeed
deviated here sideways, such as the nominalist Biel in the Middle Ages,
Zwingli in the time of the Reformation, who wrongly considered the second
causes so called and preferred to call them instruments, de provid. Op. IV
95 sq., and the American theologian Emmons in later time, cf. Strong, Syst.
Theol. New-York 1890 [27] p. 205. Hodge I 594. H. B. Smith, Syst. of
christ. Theol. 1890 p. 103. But nevertheless it was the constant doctrine of
the Christian church, that the second causes, though wholly and entirely
dependent on the first cause, are at the same time nevertheless also true,
essential causes. God flows with his almighty power into every causa
secunda and is with his being present in it at its beginning, progress, and
end. He is the one who posits it and brings it to action (praecursus), and
further also in its operation accompanies and leads it up to its effect
(concursus); He works the willing and the working according to his good
pleasure. But this influence of the causa prima in the causae secundae is so
divinely great, that He precisely thereby brings those causae secundae to
their own activity. Providentia Dei causas secundas non tollit sed ponit,
Wollebius in Heppe, Dogm. d. ev. ref. K. 191. The concursus is precisely
the cause of the self-activity of the second causes; and these, borne by
God’s might from the beginning to the end, work with a propria et insita
virtus. So little does the activity of God nullify the activity of the creature,
that the latter becomes the more powerful, the more richly and fully the
former reveals itself. The causa prima and secunda thus remain two distinct
causes; the first does not destroy the second but precisely bestows reality
upon it, and the second exists only through the first. Nor are the causae
secundae merely instrumenta, no organa, no sticks and blocks, but genuine,
essential causes, with their own nature, power, spontaneity, operation, and
law. Sathan et les mechans ne sont pas tellement instrumens de Dieu, que
cependant ils n’operent aussi bien de leur coste. Car il ne faut pas imaginer,
que Dieu besongne par un homme inique comme par une pierre ou par un
tronc de bois, mais il en use comme d’une creature raisonnable, selon la
qualité de sa nature, qu’il luy a donnée. Quand donc nous disons, que Dieu
opere par les mechans, cela n’empeche pas que les meschans n’operent
aussi en leur endroict, Calvin, C. R. 35, 188. With respect to God the causae
secundae can be compared with instruments, Jes. 10:15, 13:5, Jeremiah 50:25,
Hd. 9:15, Romans 9:20-23; with respect to their effects and products they are
causae in the proper sense. And precisely because the first and second cause
do not stand and work dualistically alongside one another, but the first
works through the second, therefore the operation that proceeds from
both is one, and the product also is one. There takes place no division of
labor between God and his creature, but the same operation is wholly and
entirely operation of the causa prima and likewise wholly and entirely
operation of the causa proxima; and the product is in that same sense
wholly product of the first and wholly product of the second cause.
Because, however, the causa prima and the causa secunda are not identical
but differ in essence, therefore the operation and the product are indeed
realiter wholly and entirely operation and product of both causes; but
formaliter they are nevertheless only operation and product of the second
cause. The wood burns, and it is God alone who causes the burning, but
formally the burning may not be ascribed to God but must be ascribed only
to the wood as subject. Man speaks, acts, believes, and it is God alone who
causes him to speak, act, believe, yet not God but man is the formal subject
of all these acts. And thus it is also God alone who grants the sinner all life
and power which he needs for the committing of a sin; but sin has not God
but man as subject and author. In this way Holy Scripture draws the lines
within which the reconciliation of God’s sovereignty and of man’s freedom
must be sought.
6. In providence, conceived as preservation or as cooperation, government
is already included. He who so maintains things that he bears not only their
being but even their powers and operations by his will and his being, he is
absolutely sovereign, king in the true sense. Government is therefore no
new element that is added to preservation and cooperation; it is, like each of
these two, in itself the whole providence, only now considered from the
standpoint of the final goal, toward which God leads all that is created
through his providence. It is a beautiful, rich thought when Holy Scripture
repeatedly calls God King and describes his providence as a government.
There are many in this time who reject every concept of sovereignty in
family, state, society and want to know of nothing but democracy and
anarchy. Under the influence of these views there are also those who in
theology find the representation of God as King Old-Testament and
antiquated and at most still want to speak of God as Father. But this
judgment is superficial and untrue. First, the name Father for God is not
New-Testament but was already customary in the Old Testament and even
among the Heathen; the N. Test. may have conceived its meaning more
richly and more deeply, it did not first give that name to God, cf. part II 113.
Conversely, the name of King for the Divine being occurs not only in the
Old, but also in the New Testament repeatedly, Matthew 6:10, 13, 33, 1 Timothy 1:17, 6:15, Op. 19:6 etc. And secondly, the designation of King is no less
worthy of God than that of Father. All πατρια in heaven and on earth is
named from Him, who is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Ef. 3:15. All
relations that exist among creatures between superiors and inferiors are a
likeness of that one original relation in which God stands to the works of
his hands. What a father is for his family, what an educator is for the youth,
what a commander is for the army, what a prince is for his people, all that
and so much more is God in an entirely original way for his creatures. Not
one, but all his virtues come to manifestation in the world and therefore
ought to be honored by us. And now especially also kingship is a glorious
Divine institution. It gives to the people not only a personal unity, but, as
hereditary kingship, also assumes the character of originality, exaltedness,
independence, and immutability. In all this it is a beautiful, though indeed
weak, image of the kingship of God. All sovereignty on earth is borrowed,
derived, temporal, limited, many times not for blessing but for curse. But
God is King in an absolute and in a true sense. The government of the world
is not democratic and not aristocratic, not republican and not constitutional,
but monarchical. God’s is the one, undivided, legislative, judicial, and
executive power; his sovereignty is original, eternal, unlimited, rich in
blessing. He is the King of kings and the Lord of lords, 1 Timothy 6:15, Op.
19:6. His kingdom is the entire universe. His are heaven and earth, Exodus 19:5, Psalms 8:2, 103:19, 148:13. He possesses all nations, Psalms 82:8, rules over
the Heathen, Psalms 22:29, 47:9, 96:10, Jeremiah 10:7, Malachi 1:14, and is the Most
High over the whole earth, Psalms 47:3, 8, [30] 83:19, 97:9. He is King forever,
Psalms 29:10, 1 Timothy 1:17; no opposition has anything to signify over against
Him, Psalms 93:3, 4. His kingdom surely comes, Matthew 6:10, 1 Corinthians 15:24, Op.
12:10; his glory shall be revealed and his name shall be feared from the
rising to the setting of the sun, Jes. 40:5, 59:19; He shall be King over the
whole earth, Zach. 14:9. Also in this government God deals with each thing
according to its nature. Deus regit res, naturae ipsarum convenienter,
Alsted, Theol. schol. 301. And therefore that government of God is also
presented in Scripture in different ways and called by different names.
Through his government He keeps the world standing and establishes it, so
that it shall not totter, Psalms 93:1; He disposes the light and the darkness, Ps.
104 vs. 19, 20, commands the rain and holds it back, Genesis 7:4, 8:2, Job 26:8, 38:22v., gives hoarfrost and snow and ice, Psalms 147:16, rebukes i.e.
reproves and stills the sea, Nahum 1:4, Psalms 65:8, 107:29, sends curse and
destruction, Deuteronomy 28:15v., everything does his word, Psalms 148:8. Equally
mighty and sovereignly He rules in the world of rational creatures, He rules
among the Heathen and possesses all nations, Psalms 22:29, 82:8, counts the
peoples less than nothing and vanity, Jes. 40:17, does with the inhabitants of
the earth according to his good pleasure, Daniel 4:35, and guides every heart
and thought, Spr. 21:1.
And this government of God over his rational creatures extends not only
to the good, of which He is the Giver both in nature and in grace, Jak. 1:17,
and also not only to his favourites, whom He elects, calls, preserves, cares
for, and leads to eternal salvation, but it also extends to the evil and to those
who love and do the evil. Indeed it is established throughout the whole of
Scripture that God hates sin with his whole being, Deuteronomy 32:4, Psalms 5:5-7, Job 34:10, 1 John 1:5 etc.; and his government, by the prohibition of sin in law
and conscience, by its judgments and sentences, bears an incontrovertible
testimony to that. But nevertheless the whole of Scripture at the same time
teaches that sin from beginning to end stands under his Divine regiment, cf.
Clemen, Die christl. Lehre von der Sünde, Göttingen 1897 I 123-151. At its
beginning God sometimes intervenes preventively; He prevents someone
from sinning, Genesis 20:6, 31:7, destroys the counsel of the ungodly, Psalms 33:10, grants power to remain standing in temptation, 1 Corinthians 10:13, and in
so far always restrains sin, insofar as He forbids it and curbs the sinner by
some anxiety and fear in the conscience. But this impeditio is by no means
the only form in which God governs sin. Many times He permits it and does
not prevent it. He gave Israel over to the good pleasure of his heart, Psalms 81:13, let the Gentiles walk in their own ways, Hd. 14:16, 17:30 and gave
them over to a reprobate mind, Romans 1:24, 28; and thus it can be said that
God permitted the fall of Adam, the murder of Abel, the unrighteousness of
men before the flood, Genesis 6:3, the sale of Joseph, Gen. 37, the
condemnation of Jesus etc. But this permissio is so little negative that sin
also in its very first beginning stands under God’s governing power and
sovereignty. He creates and orders the occasions and inducements to sin, in
order to test man and thereby either to strengthen and confirm or also to
10:13. Although sin at first seemed nothing other than an arbitrary act of
men, it nevertheless later appears that God had his hand in it and that it
happened according to his counsel, Genesis 46:8, 2 Chron. 11:4, Luke 24:26,
Hd. 2:23, 3:17, 18, 4:28. It is even, in its beginning, though not formaliter
and subjective but yet materialiter, ascribed to God. God is the potter and
man is the clay, Jeremiah 18:5, Klaagl. 3:38, Jes. 45:7, 9, 64:7, Amos 3:6; Hebrews 8:10, John 12:40, Hd. 28:26, Romans 9:18, 11:8; He turns the heart so that it is
105:24, Ezech. 14:9. He sends an evil spirit, a lying spirit, Richt. 9:23, 1
24:1, 1 Chronicles 21:1, makes Shimei curse, 2 Samuel 16:10, gives men over to
their sins, lets the measure of their iniquity become full, Genesis 15:16, Romans 1:24, sends a power of delusion, 2 Thessalonians 2:11, sets Christ for a fall and
rising, for an odour of death and of life, Luk. 2 vs. [32] 34, John 3:19, 9:39,
2 Corinthians 2:16, 1 Petr. 2:8 etc., cf. deel II 315v., 369v. And not only at the
beginning but also in the progress God keeps sin under his almighty
government; many times He restrains it, limits it, checks it in its course and
by judgments and sentences brings it to an end, Genesis 7:11, Ex. 15 etc., Matthew 24:22, 2 Petr. 2:9, but also where He lets it continue, He governs it, Spr.
16:9, 21:1, and in its end, whether He forgives it or punishes it, against its
will and intention, He makes it subservient to the execution of his counsel,
to the glorification of his name, Genesis 45:7, 8, 50:20, Psalms 51:6, Jes. 10:5-7,
Job 1:20, 22, Spr. 16:4, Hd. 3:13, Romans 8:28, 11:36. Just as sin, the malum
culpae, so also suffering, the malum poenae, stands under the dominion of
God. He is the Creator of the light and the darkness, of the good and the
evil, Amos 3:6, Jes. 45:7, Job 2:10. Death is his punishment and entered in by
his command, Genesis 2:17, and all disasters and adversities, all pain and
suffering, all visitations and judgments come to men from God’s almighty
hand, Genesis 3:14v., Deuteronomy 28:15v. etc. Already under Israel, however, the
disharmony was noticed that in this life exists between sin and punishment,
holiness and salvation, Ps. 73, Job, Pred. Faith wrestled with this dreadful
problem, but from it it nevertheless again lifted up its head triumphantly,
not because it saw the problem solved, but because it continued to cling fast
to the kingly power and the fatherly love of the Lord. The prosperity of the
ungodly is only appearance and in any case only temporary, and the
righteous, even in the heaviest suffering, are still partakers of God’s love
and favour, Ps. 73, Job. The suffering of the pious has many times its
ground not in their personal sin but in the sin of humanity, and its goal in
the salvation of humanity and in the honour of God. Suffering serves not
only for retribution, Romans 1:18, 27, 2:5, 6, 2 Thessalonians 1:9, but it also serves
for testing and chastisement, Deuteronomy 8:5, Job 1:12, Psalms 118:8, Spr. 3:12, Jeremiah 10:24, 30:11, Hebr. 12:6v., Op. 3:19; for strengthening and confirmation,
Psalms 119:67, 71, Romans 5:3-5, Hebr. 12:10, Jak. 1:2-4; for testimony to the
truth, Psalms 44:23, Hd. 5:41. Philippians 1:29, 2 Timothy 4:6; for the glorification of
God, John 9:2. In Christ justice and grace are reconciled with one another;
suffering is the way to glory, the cross points to the crown, lignum
crucis arbor vitae. The end to which all things are led by the providence of
God is the establishment of his kingdom, the revelation of his virtues, the
honour of his name, Romans 11:32-36, 1 Corinthians 15:18, Op. 11:15, 12:13 etc. In
this comforting way Scripture deals with the providence of God. Enough
riddles remain, both in individual life and in the history of world and
humanity; dogmatics from now on occupies itself with nothing else than
with the mysteries which the providence of God in sin, freedom,
responsibility, punishment, suffering, death, grace, reconciliation, prayer
etc. has set before us, and therefore does not need here to enter into all those
subjects. But over all those riddles and mysteries God lets the light of his
Word shine, not to solve them, but so that we through patience and comfort
of the Scriptures might have hope, Romans 15:4. The doctrine of providence is
not a philosophical system but a confession of faith, a confession that, in
spite of the fact that the appearance of things often speaks against it, yet no
Satan and no man and no single creature but God and He alone by his
almighty and omnipresent power upholds and governs all things. Such a
confession is able to preserve us both from a superficial optimism that fails
to recognize the riddles of life, and from a proud pessimism that despairs of
world and fate. For the providence of God extends over all things, over the
good not only, but also over sin and suffering, pain and death; for if these
were withdrawn from God’s guidance, what would then still remain in this
world for his government? It reveals itself not only and not chiefly in the
extraordinary events and in the miracles, but equally in the fixed order of
nature and in the ordinary occurrences of daily life; for what poor faith
would it be that saw God’s hand and counsel from afar in a few weighty
events, but did not perceive it in one’s own life and lot? And it leads all
these things, not against but in accordance with their nature, not apart from
the means but through these; for what power would be hidden in a faith that
praised stoic indifference or fatalistic resignation as true piety? Thus,
however, as the almighty and omnipresent power of God, it makes us
thankful in prosperity and patient in adversity; it causes us with childlike
submission to rest in the guidance of the Lord and yet at the same time
rouses us from our sloth to the highest activity; and it grants us under
everything a good confidence in our faithful God and Father, that He will
provide us with all the necessities of body and soul, and that He will turn to
our benefit all the evil that He assigns to us in this vale of tears, since He is
able to do so as an almighty God and also wills to do so as a faithful Father.
. The providence of God, as government of sin, goes the farthest
beyond all our thinking and understanding and at the same time, as
such, celebrates its highest triumph. Hardly had God created the world good
and perfect, when sin pressed into it. The mystery of being becomes still
more incomprehensible through the mystery of evil. Almost at the same
moment when the creatures come forth pure and glorious from the hand of
their Maker, they are robbed of all their splendor and stand corrupted and
unclean before his holy countenance. Sin has destroyed the whole creation,
turned its righteousness into guilt, its holiness into uncleanness, its glory
into shame, its blessedness into misery, its harmony into disorder, its life
into death, its light into darkness. Whence then that evil, and what is the
origin of sin? Scripture justifies God, and gives a continuous theodicy,
when it pronounces and maintains that in no case is God the cause of sin.
For He is righteous and holy and far from ungodliness, Deuteronomy 32:4, Job
tempting no one, James 1:13, abundant fountain of all that is good and clean
and pure, Psalms 36:10, James 1:17; He forbids sin in his law, Ex. 20, and in the
conscience of every human being, Romans 2:14, 15, has no pleasure in
ungodliness, Psalms 5:5, but hates it and is wrathful against it, Psalms 45:8, [35]
Romans 1:18; He judges and reconciles it in Christ, Rom. 3 vs. 24-26,
cleanses his people from it through forgiveness and sanctification, 1 Corinthians 1:30, and wills to punish it both temporally and eternally, Romans 1:18, 2:8.
For the origin of sin Scripture always points us to the creature. But
therefore God’s governance of sin, also in its origin, is not excluded. It is
God himself who created the possibility of sin. Not only did He form the
human being so that he could fall. But He also planted the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil, set the human being by the probationary
commandment before the choice between good and evil, and allowed the
temptation by the serpent. It was his will to walk with the human being the
dangerous way of freedom, rather than at once to raise him above the
possibility of sin. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil is
undoubtedly so called, because the human being, eating of it, would obtain
a knowledge of good and evil which he did not possess up to that point,
which was forbidden to him and which he was not permitted to obtain. The
question is, what is to be understood under that knowledge of good and evil.
The usual explanation is that the human being, by eating of the tree, would
obtain an experiential knowledge of the good and the evil; but rightly the
objection has been raised against this, that this knowledge of good and evil
would make the human being like God, Genesis 3:5 and yet God has no
empirical knowledge of evil or can have it; further, that the human being by
eating of the tree precisely lost the experiential knowledge of the good; and
finally, that Genesis 3:22a must then be taken as irony, which in itself is
already unacceptable and is definitely in conflict with vs. 22b. Others have
therefore thought that Gen. 3 related the development of the human being
from the animal state to self-consciousness and reason, and have therefore
seen in the fall the first venture of reason, the beginning of moral life, the
origin of culture, the happiest event in the history of humankind; thus
already in earlier time some Ophites, who held the serpent to be an
incarnation of the Logos, and later Kant, Mutmassl. Anfang der
Menschengesch. 1786. Schiller, Ueber die erste Menschengesellschaft
Bretschneider, Syst. Entw. § 89. This view, however, is so much in conflict
with the intention of the narrative that it is nowadays almost generally
abandoned. For it would presuppose that God created the human being in a
state of childish, even animal, innocence and had always wanted to keep
him in it; but knowledge, also moral knowledge, had already been bestowed
on the human being at his creation, as the creation in God’s image, the
naming of the animals, the receiving and understanding of the probationary
commandment proves; and that knowledge which the human being acquired
through his fall was a wholly different one, which was forbidden by God
and made him worthy of all manner of punishment. Gen. 3 does not relate a
Riesenfortschritt but a fall of the human being, Wellhausen, Gesch. Israels
1878 S. 344 f. Rütschi, Gesch. u. Krit. der k. Leben v. d. urspr.
Vollkommenheit, Leiden 1881 S. 8. Smend, Altt. Relig. 120. Marti, Gesch.
d. israel. Relig. 1897 S. 179. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 151 f.
These then also advocate the opinion that under the knowledge of good and
evil not the very first intellectual or moral knowledge is to be understood,
but rather, with appeal to 2 Samuel 19:35, 36 die intellectuelle
Welterkenntniss, die metaphysische Erkenntniss der Dinge in ihrem
Zusammenhange, ihrem Werth oder Unwerth, ihrem Nutzen oder Schaden
für den Menschen, m. a. w. wisdom, the art of world-mastery, which in fact
would make the human being independent and like God and would take
dominion away from Him. This opinion, however, is burdened by the same
objections as the previous one; only the manner in which Marti develops it
contains a hint toward the correct interpretation. For in Gen. 3 it is not in
the first place a matter of the content of the knowledge which the human
being would acquire through disobedience, but of the manner in which he
would obtain it, cf. Kuyper, Heraut 950, 951. Clearly the nature of the
knowledge of good and evil meant here is described by the fact that the
human being would thereby become like God, Genesis 3:5, 22. By eating of
the tree, he would detach himself from God, himself judge and determine
what was good and what was evil, set his insight and his wisdom over
against the wisdom of God, and thus make himself like God. Instead of
living and acting in dependence on God, in submission to his law, the
human being, eating of the tree and transgressing the commandment, would
stand on his own feet, himself choose the way which he wanted to go, and
himself seek his own happiness. When the human being fell, he then also
got what he desired, he made himself like God, independent, by his own
insight and judgment knowing the good and the evil; Genesis 3:22 is dreadful
seriousness. But this emancipation from God did not lead and cannot lead to
true happiness. Therefore God forbids in the probationary commandment
this urge for freedom, this lust for independence. But the human being
succumbed to the test and voluntarily and willfully struck out on his own
way.
Only a short time had he probably remained in the state of innocence,
when he was tempted from without by a serpent, which was more crafty
(ָערּום, LXX φρονιμος, prudens, cf. Matthew 10:16, 2 Corinthians 11:3) than all the
beasts of the field, and was brought to a fall. The serpent addresses itself not
to the man but to the woman, who had received the prohibition of eating of
the tree not herself directly from God but by means of her husband, and
therefore was more susceptible to reasoning and doubt. First of all, then, the
serpent also tries to awaken in the heart of the woman doubt concerning the
commandment of God, and to that end also represents it as given by God
out of harshness and selfishness. The woman shows, in the manner in which
she repeats and extends the commandment, clearly, that that commandment
of God has come to her consciousness as a sharp boundary and as a
restrictive provision. After doubt has been awakened and the
burdensomeness of the commandment has been brought to consciousness,
the serpent proceeds to sow both unbelief and pride in the prepared mind of
the woman; it now decidedly denies that the transgression of that
commandment will have death as its consequence, and it gives to
understand that God has given that commandment only out of selfishness; if
man eats of the tree he will, instead of dying, become like God and receive
a perfect, divine knowledge. The assurance of the serpent and the high
expectation which it aroused made the woman look at the tree; and in
proportion as she looked longer, she was enticed by its fruit. Lust of the
eyes, lust of the flesh, pride of life made the temptation irresistible; finally
she took of the fruit and she ate, and she also gave to her husband with her
and he ate. The speaking of the serpent has brought many to the thought
that this narrative was an allegory, or that at least the serpent was no real
animal, but a name and image for lust, Philo, Clemens Alex., Strom. III
14, 17; or for sexual lust, Schopenhauer, Die Welt als W. u. V.6 II 654, 666;
or for erring reason, Bunsen in his Bibelwerk; or also for Satan, Cajetanus,
Eugubinus, Junius, Rivetus, Amyraldus, Vitringa father and son, Venema e.
a., cf. Marck, Hist. Parad. III 5, 5. M. Vitringa, II 256, and also J. P. Val
d’Eremas, The serpent of Eden, a philol. and crit. essay on the text of Gen.
3 and its various interpretations, London 1888. But this explanation is not
plausible; the serpent is in Genesis 3:1 reckoned among the animals; the
punishment vs. 14, 15 presupposes a real serpent, and in 2 Corinthians 3:11 Paul is
of the same opinion. Also the mythical conception, which arose later and
found acceptance with many, is in conflict with the intention of the
narrative, with the whole setting in which it occurs, and with the continuous
doctrine of Scripture; moreover the mythical explanations also diverge very
widely among themselves, Hengstenberg, Christol. I2 5. Köhler, Bibl.
Gesch. I 6. Delitzsch on Genesis 3:1. The speaking of the serpent is therefore
to be explained in another way; yet not with Josephus, Ant. I 1, 4, from the
opinion of the narrator, that the animals before the fall had the gift of
speech, for he has just related that man is essentially distinguished from the
animals, gave them names and found among them no help; but undoubtedly
from the influence of a spiritual, superterrestrial power. Of what nature that
power has been, is not said with a single word in the narrative itself; Gen. 3
keeps to the visible facts, describes but does not explain. Many have indeed
been of the opinion, that Gen. 3 narrates nothing else than the origin of the
enmity between man and animal. But apart from the fact that this
explanation does not satisfy because of its flatness, it is in conflict with
what in Gen. 2 has been related concerning the relation of man and animal,
and it does not tell us how and why the serpent appeared as a seducing
power over against man. Hence many now again return to the old exegesis,
even if only because this is upheld in the apocryphal literature of the O. T.,
Clemen, Chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 158 f. Further, it is intelligible that Gen. 3
makes no mention of the spiritual background of the events. Only gradually,
with the advancing light of revelation, is the depth of the darkness unveiled.
Seemingly innocently begun, sin in its essence and power becomes known
only in the course of history. The deviation from the right way is at the
beginning slight and scarcely noticeable, but, continued, proceeds in a
wholly wrong direction and leads to an entirely opposite outcome. From
that it is also to be explained, that Scripture, both in Old and New
Testament, relatively so seldom looks back to the narrative of the fall; the
principal passages which come into consideration for this are Job 31:33,
Cor. 15:21v., 42v., 2 Corinthians 11:3, 1 Timothy 2:14, Op. 2:7, 22:2, cf. Krabbe, Die
Lehre v. d. Sünde und vom Tode, Hamburg 1836 S. 83-100. Hofmann,
Schriftbeweis, I 364 f. Kurtz, Gesch. d. A. Bundes I2 1853 S. 69 and for the
quotations in the apocryphal literature, Clemen t. a. p. 169 f. 173. Only Paul
sets over against the person of Christ the significance of Adam in the light.
Thus also only gradually in the history of revelation does the spiritual
power become known, which hides itself behind the appearance and
temptation of the serpent. Then it is gradually unveiled, that in the struggle
of evil here on earth also a conflict of the spirits is mingled, and that
humanity and the world are the booty, for which between God and Satan,
between heaven and hell, there is combat.
The whole power of sin here on earth is connected with a kingdom of
darkness in the world of spirits. There, too, a fall has taken place. Jesus
himself says in John 8:44, that the devil is a murderer of men ἀ π’ ἀ ρχης, i.e.
from the beginning of the existence of mankind, that he in the truth ο ὐ χ
ἑ στηκεν, has not placed himself and thus does not stand, because there is no
truth in him, and he, speaking a lie, ἐ κ των ἰ διων speaks. Likewise 1 John 3:8 teaches that he sins from the beginning; in 1 Timothy 3:6 Paul warns the
neophyte against conceit, lest he fall ε ἰ ς κριμα του διαβολου, into the same
judgment as has struck the devil; and Jude speaks in vs. 6 of ἀ γγελους τους
i.e. of angels who have not kept their beginning, origin, or also dominion,
and have left the dwelling-place assigned to them. It is clearly implied here
that many angels were not satisfied with the state in which they had been
placed by God. Pride took possession of them, to strive after another,
higher rank. Sin first broke out in the world of spirits; it arose in the heart of
beings of whom we possess only slight knowledge; under relations which
are to us as good as wholly unknown. But this is, on the basis of Holy
Scripture, certain, that sin did not first begin on earth but in heaven, at the
foot of God’s throne, in his immediate presence, and that the fall of the
angels took place before that of man. Scripture is silent about whether there
is a connection between that fall of the angels and the creation of man; it
also does not say what drove the fallen angels to seduce man. But for
whatever reason, Satan is ὁ σατανας, ὁ πειραζων, ὁ διαβολος of the human
came to Christ, the second Adam; and thus he also came to the first man.
That he did not himself come to him directly and personally, but made use
of a serpent, is indeed to be explained from this, that he hoped better to
succeed when the temptation took place through a being that was well
known to man as good. Without doubt the speaking of the serpent must
have seemed strange to the woman, but precisely this strangeness
strengthened the temptation; even an animal, rejecting God’s command,
came to higher perfection. Moreover, Scripture teaches us that the unclean
spirits also can do superhuman things and can temporarily take possession
of bodies and organs of speech, Matthew 8:28v., Mark 5:7v., Luke 8:28v., Hd.
19:15. The temptation by Satan had, in man, the fall as its consequence.
Scripture seeks the origin of sin only in the will of the rational creature.
2. The tradition of such a fall also occurs among other peoples. The
Avesta relates that the first evil deed of Ahriman consisted in bringing forth
a great serpent, Dahaka, with three heads, three mouths, six eyes and a
thousand powers, in order through it to ruin the world. Ahriman, who is also
himself called the serpent, the liar, the deceiver of mortals, has through it
disturbed the peace, destroyed paradise, sown doubt and unbelief in the
hearts of men, brought sickness and suffering upon the earth, for Jima, the
noble ruler in the golden age, has been disobedient to God; he fell through
pride and self-exaltation into sin, Ahuramazda left him and he was killed.
The Babylonian-Assyrian tradition also stands in unmistakable connection
with the biblical narrative; the serpent is there called Tiamat, brings man to
a fall through its seduction, but is for that also cursed and fought by
Merodach_toggle, cf. Fischer, Heidenthum u. Offenbarung 1878 S. 137 f.
208 f. Delitzsch op Genesis 3:1. Moreover, just as the essence, so also the
origin of sin is unknown to the heathen. Even the Jews, who acknowledged
the fall and the temptation by Satan, Wijsh. 2:24, and therefore often called
him the old serpent, sometimes taught that Satan on the sixth day was
created at the same time with Eve, that he, stimulated by sensual lust, tried
to tempt man, and that man also already before the fall alongside the יצר
הטוב received a יצר הרע, an inclination to evil, in order to overcome this and
thus to make his works truly meritorious, Weber, System 210 f. 242 f. And
thus elsewhere in the heathen world the origin of sin was sought not in the
will of rational creatures but in the essence of things. The fall is unknown.
Confucianism is a shallow rationalism and moralism, which held man to be
by nature good and sought the way of salvation in a virtuous life, in
agreement with the world order, Saussaye, Religionsgesch. I 249.
According to Buddhism the Atman or Brahman, the divine substance, is the
only real; the world of appearances is but a dream, has illusion, Maya, as
principle, and is in continual becoming and change. Therefore suffering and
pain are universal, for everything is subject to transience, to birth, old age,
death; and the cause of that suffering is to be sought in the desires, in the
desire for being, in the willing to be; deliverance therefore consists in
extinction of consciousness or also in destruction of being, nirvana, ib. 411
f. Parseeism traced evil back to an originally evil spirit, Ahriman, who
stands over against the highest God, Ahuramazda, has a kingdom of
darkness of his own, corrupts God’s creation, but is subordinate to
Ahuramazda and will one day succumb to him, ib. II 34 f. The Greeks and
Romans indeed have in the legends of an aurea aetas, of Prometheus
and Pandora something that can recall the biblical narratives; but they
originally knew no evil spirits that stood over against the good, and ascribed
to the gods all manner of evil desires and misdeeds. The human race also
did not fall all at once but degenerated more gradually, and man’s will still
possessed the power to live virtuously, to keep within bounds, and thus to
overcome sin, which essentially was ὑ βρις, ib. 191, cf. G. Baur, Stud. u.
Krit. 1848. S. 320. Philosophy usually adopted the same standpoint.
According to Socrates the cause and the essence of sin lie only in
ignorance; no one is voluntarily evil, i.e. unhappy; whoever therefore
knows well, is good and acts well; there is nothing other than development
needed, in order to bring man, who is by nature good, to the practice of
virtue, Xen. Mem. III 9, 4 sq. IV 6, 6. Plato and Aristotle did see the
inadequacy of this view; reason was after all far from always capable of
mastering the passions; sin was rooted deeper in human nature than that it
could be overcome by knowledge alone; Plato even came to a wholly
different doctrine about the origin of sin and sought this in a fall of the
praeëxistent souls. But both nevertheless maintained free will and remained
of the opinion that virtue stands in our power; external fate may be
determined, virtue is ἀ δεσποτος and depends only on the will of man, ἐ φ’
III3 588. The Stoa, on its pantheistic and deterministic standpoint, could not
seek the cause of sin in the will of man and therefore tried to insert physical
and moral evil into the order and beauty of the whole. It was not even
possible for the Deity to keep human nature free from every defect; sin is
just as necessary as diseases and disasters, and is in so far something good,
as it serves the good and brings this to manifestation, Zeiler, ib. IV3 175 f.
Yet the Stoa also knew no other way to overcome sin and to practice virtue
than man’s will, ib. 167 f. And finally with Cicero, Seneca, Plotinus, etc.,
the thought always returned again, that sin was an act of the will and also
could be undone again by the will, ib. 667. 717. 722. V3 585. Outside the
sphere of special revelation, sin was therefore always either explained
deistically from man’s will and conceived as a pure act of will, or also
derived pantheistically from the essence of things and understood as
something necessary in the order of the whole.
3. Both of these conceptions repeatedly returned in the Christian
centuries. The first was renewed by Pelagius, cf. Augustine, c. duas ep. Pel.
and c. Jul. Pelag., and then found, in the weakened form of
semipelagianism, more and more acceptance. After the Reformation it was
again taken up by Socinianism, Fock, Der Socin. 484 f. 653 f., gained,
through Remonstrantism, Episcopius, Inst. Theol. IV 3 c. 6. 7 IV 5 c. 1. 2.
Limborch, Theol. Christ. II 24 III 2 sq., important in influence and then
became, in the deism of Locke, Tindal, Rousseau etc. and in the rationalism
of Wegscheider, Inst. § 99. 112, Bretschneider, Dogm. II 17 f., the dominant
view of that time. At present it has again attained significance in the
theology of Ritschl and his school, Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. 2 II 241-246 III
304-357. Kaftan, Wesen der christl. Relig. 1881 S. 246 f. Dogmatik 1897 §
34. 40. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 319 f. Siebeck, Lehrb. der Religionsphilos. 436
f. However much presented in all kinds of modifications, the fundamental
thought is nevertheless always this, that sin does not root in a nature, is no
habit and no state but always an act of the will. The image of God in man
then consisted chiefly or exclusively in dominion; insofar as a status
integritatis is assumed, this consisted especially in childlike innocence, in
the freedom of indifference, in the possibility to choose the good or the evil.
The fall itself, if still acknowledged as a historical fact, loses its dreadful
significance and becomes an event, freely similar to that which takes place
at every moment in human life, when evil is chosen instead of good. And
the consequences of the fall are therefore also slight. The children are born
in the same condition as that in which Adam lived before his disobedience;
the freedom of will, i.e. the image of God, has remained; at most there is
transplanted from man to man a certain inclination to sin, but such an
inclination is actually not the consequence of Adam’s first sin but of all the
sins of all our forefathers; it is also no sin in itself but becomes this
only when the free will gives heed to that inclination; there is thus a
distinction between sin (stain, sinful inclination) and guilt (evil deed,
intentional, voluntary transgression); only the latter has need of atonement
and forgiveness, the former, the inclination to sin, and the unconscious,
involuntary yielding is actually no sin, it is more ignorance, which brings
no guilt with it. And likewise as sin and guilt, so also sin and suffering must
be distinguished; there is manifold suffering that exists independently of sin
and would also exist if there were no sin; death is essentially no
consequence of sin but by nature proper to man; spiritual and eternal death
has not at all been a punishment for the first sin; at most that punishment
consists in the moriendi necessitas, which in Adam, if he had remained
standing, would have been prevented by a miracle, or in the manner of
dying, which without sin would have been less painful and less premature.
It is understandable that this conception of sin, in the long run, can satisfy
neither intellect nor heart. It provokes too many and too serious objections.
It does not reckon with the seriousness and the power of sin, as everyone
comes to know it in his daily experience; it proceeds from an atomistic view
of the human race and does not explain how all without distinction are
subject to sin; it fails to recognize the priestly and kingly office of Christ
and is content with the teacher and prophet of Nazareth; it restricts the
operation of sin and thus the dominion of redemption to the religiousethical sphere and places the whole of culture detached alongside
Christianity. Among the proponents themselves, the need for another,
deeper conception repeatedly awakens; thus in semipelagianism over
against Pelagius, in Volkelius, de vera religione II c. 6 over against
Socinianism, in Wegscheider § 116 over against rationalism, and in Kaftan,
Nitzsch, Schultz e. a. over against Ritschl, cf. James Orr, The Ritschlian
Theology and the evang. faith London 1897 p. 213. G. Ecke, Die Theol.
Schule Albr. Ritschl’s und die evang. Kirche der Gegenwart, Berlin 1897 I.
The more deeply sin is conceived, the less it becomes something accidental
and arbitrary, the more it increases in power and significance, not only for
the religious and ethical, but also for the intellectual and aesthetic, for
the physical and the whole cosmic life. If, however, with this insight the
origin of sin is asked after, different answers again present themselves. Not
all go equally far. Some explain it from human nature, others from the
cosmos, still others from God.
4. To the former belong those who seek the origin of sin in the domination
of man by matter. Greek philosophy was in general of the opinion that
reason had the task of restraining the sensuous impulses and passions. The
Jews assumed in man by nature a יצר הרע, which with bodily development
continually increased in strength, reached its climax in sexual desire, and
lay at the basis of all disobedience to God’s commandments, Weber § 49.
50. In the ascetic tendencies this thought recurs again and again; Roman
theology even acknowledged its relative right, when it spoke, with respect
to man without the bridle of the donum superadditum, of a natural conflict
between flesh and spirit, of a morbus and languor naturae humanae,
Bellarminus, de gratia primi hom. c. 5. In more recent philosophy and
theology sin is repeatedly derived in the same way from an original
antithesis between nature and reason, sensuousness and understanding,
lower and higher self, flesh and spirit, egoistic and social inclinations.
Sensuousness is, from this standpoint, indeed not itself held to be sin, but is
nevertheless regarded as the occasion and the stimulus to sinning. All sin
thus essentially consists in this, that the spirit serves sensuousness and
allows itself to be ruled by it; and all virtue lies in this, that man by his
reason rule over nature and thus become a free, independent personality.
This view even gladly appeals to the Pauline doctrine of the σαρξ, and
rejoices in this Scriptural support. Cf. Cartesius, Wolff, Fichte, Hegel,
Werke XI 190 f. XII 209 f. bij Jodl, Gesch. der Ethik in der neuern Philos. I
1882 II 1889 en v. Hartmann, Das sittliche Bewustsein2 1836 S. 265 f., and
further Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 66. Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 459 f.
Biedermann, Chr. Dogm. § 763 f. Pfleiderer, Grundriss § 100 f. Lipsius,
Dogm. § 468 f. 477 f. Schultz, Grundriss d. ev. Dogm.2 [46] 1892 S. 61.
Scholten, The free will 177. L H K. II 422v. 574v. etc.
But this explanation of sin suffers from half-heartedness. One of the two,
indeed: the sensuous nature of man is in itself no sin, but sin arises only
when the reason and the will of man comply with its demands, then this
theory falls back into that of Pelagianism; or the sensuous nature is in itself
sinful and then sin is proper to matter as such and the anthropological
explanation must proceed to the cosmic. This has also been done by many.
Plato assumed an eternal ὑ λη alongside and over against God. The world
was indeed a work of reason, but from the beginning there also worked in it
another, blind power, which the δημιουργος could not wholly control. God
therefore could not make the world as good as He willed; He was bound to
finitude, to the ὑ λη. The cause of sin, suffering and death thus lies in the
σωματοειδες; the ὑ λη hinders the inworking and permeation of the idea; the
body is a prison for the soul, source of fear and unrest, of desire and
passion, Zeiler, Philos. d. Gr. II 765 f. 855 f. The ὑ λη has a similar
significance in Neoplatonism and Gnosticism and in manifold ascetic and
akin to this doctrine of Plato are all theories which derive sin from a matter
indeed created by God but nevertheless standing over against Him, Weisse,
Philos. Dogm. § 541 f. 561 f. Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 55, or from finitude and
limitation, l’imperfection originale des créatures, Leibniz, Theodicée § 156,
or in general from the realization of the world-idea.
This explanation of sin from the nature of creaturely being, however,
cannot escape the consequence of, in one way or another, going back to
God and seeking the origin of sin in his nature or work. With Plato the ὑ λη
itself had an eternal and independent existence alongside God. In Parzism
and Manichaeism two personal Divine beings as creators of light and
darkness stood eternally over against one another and gave to the existing
world its two-sided character, Schwane, D. G. II 503 f. Neoplatonism and
Gnosticism made creation, fall, redemption, etc. into moments in an
emanation, which proceeds from God as the βυθος ἀ γνωστος, the [47]
absolute pleroma, in ever descending formations, finally gives to the
material world with its ignorance, darkness, sin, suffering, death its aspect,
but then in the process of redemption leads that outflowed and from God
fallen world back again to God, Stöckl, Die spekulative Lehre v. Menschen
II 52 f. With these ideas the theosophy in Böhme and Schelling has
nourished itself, when it sought to explain the personality of God, trinity,
creation, fall, redemption out of the essence of God, cf. part II 304, 393.
The three Potencies, which are assumed in God, in order that He might
become person, spirit, are at the same time the principia of another being,
namely the world. As person God has the freedom and the power, to set the
Potencies, which are in Him but which He eternally controls, also outside
himself in tension, Schelling, Werke II 3 S. 272 f. 310. 338 f. In that tension
lies the possibility of sin. In the original creation, whether only ideal or also
real the first, these Potencies were at rest. Sin, misery, darkness, death, etc.
were indeed there but only potentially; they slumbered in the Urgrund of
creation. But man, in whom those Potencies were also present, broke that
unity and unleashed the evil powers, which were potentially present in
creation. A world like the present one with so much wildness and misery, is
only to be explained from a fall; this is the Urthatsache of history, cf. Joh.
Claassen, Jakob Böhme II 185 f. Schelling, Werke I 7 S. 336-416. I 8 S. 331
f. II 3 S. 344 f. 358 f. Still more strongly Hegel regarded it as an apostasy,
that the idea of the absolute realized itself in the world as its other-being.
However much nature in Hegel was a product of reason, he nevertheless
could not deny that it was powerless to realize the idea fully and therefore
he declared that the idea, giving existence to such a world, had become
unfaithful to itself and had fallen away from itself, Werke VI 413. VII 1 S.
23 f. VII 2 S. 15 f. Thus the way was paved for pessimism, which in the
manner of Buddhism holds being itself to be the greatest sin, committed by
the blind, alogical will, which is the Urschuldige, Schopenhauer, Die Welt
als W. u Vorst.6 I 193 f. II 398 f. v. Hartmann, Philos. d. Unbew. II9 198 f.
5. The origin of evil is, after that of being, the greatest riddle of life and
the heaviest cross of the intellect. The question: ποθεν το κακον, has
occupied the thoughts of men in all ages and still awaits in vain an answer
that satisfies better than that of Holy Scripture. Insofar as philosophy in this
matter taught anything of significance, it is, taken as a whole, a powerful
proof for the truth of Holy Scripture, that this world cannot be explained
without a fall. All great thinkers have, even if they did not know Gen. 3 or if
they reject it as a myth, in spite of themselves paid silent or explicit homage
to this simple narrative. And insofar as philosophy sought a solution to the
problem in another way, it has strayed miserably and lamentably from the
track. This applies first of all to the Pelagian explanation of sin, against
which the many objections above on p. 44 were already mentioned with a
single word and later, with the essence and the spread of sin, will come up
for discussion more broadly. But it applies further also to all those systems
which trace evil back, not to an act of will of the creature, but to the being
or the nature of man, world, or God.
In the first place, sin cannot be derived from the sensuous nature of man.
For then sin would always and everywhere bear a sensuous, fleshly
character; but this is by no means always the case; there are also spiritual
sins, sins with a demonic character, such as pride, envy, hatred, enmity
against God, which are more hidden but absolutely not less in degree than
the fleshly sins; and these are not explained by sensuality, just as, on this
standpoint, the existence of fallen angels is not possible. If sins sprang from
man’s sensuous nature, one would also expect that they would be strongest
and most frequent in the first years of life; that the spirit, in proportion as it
develops more, would also rule over it the more powerfully and finally
would overcome it entirely. But experience teaches quite otherwise. In
proportion as man grows up, sin, even the sensuous, becomes more
powerful over him; it is often not the child but the youth and the man who
is a slave of his lusts and passions; and the development of the spirit is
many times so little able to restrain sin that it rather provides the means to
seek satisfaction of desires in still stronger measure and in a more
refined way. And even when the sensuous sins in later age have lost their
dominion, they still remain secretly in the heart as desires or make room for
others which, though more spiritual in nature, are nevertheless no less
dreadful. If this explanation of sin from sensuality is then meant in earnest,
it must lead to seeking redemption in suppression of the flesh; but precisely
the history of asceticism is best able to cure once and for all of the error that
sin can be overcome in that way. Also in the monastery the heart of men
goes along, and out of that heart all kinds of sins and unrighteousness
proceed. Finally, this theory wrongly tries to maintain itself with an appeal
to the notion ָּבׂשר and σαρξ in Holy Scripture, specifically in Paul. This
word denotes first of all the material, the substance of the human body, 1
Cor. 15:39, then the body itself organized out of that material in contrast
with πνευμα, νους, καρδια, Romans 2:25, 2 Corinthians 7:5, Colossians 2:5, further, more in
the Old-Testament sense, man as an earthly, weak, frail, perishable being,
40:6, Jeremiah 17:5, Romans 3:20, 1 Corinthians 1:29, Galatians 2:16, and finally then in Paul
the sinful direction of life of man. Thus he speaks of σαρκικος, ἐ ν σαρκι,
forms an antithesis with πνευμα, yet not with the human πνευμα, which
indeed is also sinful and needs sanctification, Romans 12:1, 2, 1 Corinthians 7:34, 2
Cor. 7:1, Ephesians 4:23, 1 Thessalonians 5:23, but with the πνευμα ἁ γιον or θεου, Rom.
sanctifies the body and places it in the service of righteousness, Romans 6:13,
over against the old, sinful direction of life, the σαρξ, of the παλαιος
ἀ νθρωπος, Romans 7:5v., 8:1v., Galatians 5:13-25, Ephesians 2:3, 11, Colossians 2:4. Some
have now thought that the flesh according to this view is not only seat and
organ but also source and origin of sin, Baur, Holsten, Lüdemann, Zeller,
Pfleiderer, Der Paulinismus2 1890 S. 60 f. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol.
1897 II 13 f., Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 188 f., Matthes, Theol.
Tijdsch. 1890 blz. 225-239. But this cannot be maintained against nor
reconciled with these undeniable data, that Paul clearly derives sin from the
temptation of the serpent and the transgression of Adam, Romans 5:12, 2 Corinthians 11:3; that he speaks of a defilement of flesh and spirit and with respect to
both demands cleansing, 2 Corinthians 7:1; that he also names among the works of
the flesh all kinds of spiritual sins, such as idolatry, strife, wrath and even
heresy, Galatians 5:19v.; that he designates enmity against God as φρονημα της
σαρκος, Romans 3:7; that he assumes the existence of evil spirits, who
nevertheless have no σαρξ at all, Ephesians 6:12; that he nevertheless
acknowledges Christ, though γενομενος ἐ κ γυναικος, Galatians 4:4 and from
Israel το κατα σαρκα, Romans 9:5, as without any sin, 2 Corinthians 5:21; that he
calls the body a temple of God and claims all members for the service of
resurrection of the dead bodies, 1 Cor. 15, and in principle combats
asceticism, Colossians 2:16, 1 Thessalonians 4:4. The proponents of the opinion that Paul
holds the flesh to be the principle of sin therefore often turn back halfway
and say that the flesh is not itself sin and does not of itself bring sin with it,
but does provoke and tempt to sin, Clemen 204. Holtzmann II 38. Others
have therefore judged that Paul, when he uses the word σαρξ in an ethical
sense, entirely loses sight of its original meaning, Neander, Gesch. der
Pflanzung u. Leitung der christl. Kirche5 1862 S. 508 f. Tholuck, Stud. u.
Krit. 1855 S. 477 f. Weiss, Bibl. Theol.3 1880 § 68. Wendt, Die Begriffe
Fleisch u. Geist 1878 cl. Theol. Stud. van de la Saussaye c. s. 1878 blz.
361v. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 315 f. This, however, is in itself already not
probable and does not do justice to the connection that Scripture repeatedly
lays between the earthly, weak, perishable nature of man and his sin. There
is undoubtedly an intimate connection between both; the sensuous nature of
man is not sin itself nor also source or principle of sin, but is nevertheless
its dwelling, Romans 7:17, 18 and organ of its dominion over us, Romans 6:12.
Man is not purely spirit, but he is earthly out of the earth, has become a
living soul, 1 Corinthians 15:45v., thereby stands in connection with the
cosmos and always has the body as his instrument and as the organ of his
acting, Romans 6:13, 8:13. This sensuous nature gives to sin, as it is proper to
men, a particular character, distinct from that in the angels, both in its origin
and in its essence. The temptations come to him from without through the
lust of the eyes, the lust of the flesh, and the pride of life. And it is the
sensuous nature of man that gives to his sin this character, that he makes the
belly his God, that he minds the things that are below, that he seeks himself
and lives for himself, and that he honors the creature above the Creator,
Romans 1:21v., Philippians 2:4, 21, 3:19, Colossians 3:2, etc. Σαρξ denotes the sinful
direction of life of man, who according to soul and body turns away from
God and toward the creature. Cf. Hofmann, Schriftbew. I2 559. Müller,
Sünde I5 447 f. Ernesti, Die Ethik des Ap. Paulus3 1880 S. 32 f. Cremer in
6. The explanation of sin from the sensuous nature of man, however, as
was remarked above, cannot stop here, but must come to this, to seek its
cause in matter or in the finitude and limitation of the creature, and thus
further in an eternal, independent power alongside God or in a dark nature
or blind will in the Divine being itself. This opinion concerning the origin
of sin recommends itself above the previous one by its deeper insight into
the power and dominion of sin; it has an open eye not only for its ethical
and anthropological but also for its cosmic and theological significance; it
takes seriously the undeniable truth, that a power as tremendous as sin
cannot have arisen accidentally, outside God's will and counsel. It finds
support in the whole present condition of the world, both the physical and
the ethical. Everywhere, in nature and history, there are sharp, deep
oppositions, which seem to be necessary for life and development. Heaven
and earth, light and darkness, day and night, summer and winter, storm and
calm, war and peace, labour and rest, prosperity and adversity, love and
hate, joy and sorrow, health and sickness, life and death, truth and lie,
sin and virtue, they are the contradictory factors of which all that exists is
composed and without which there can apparently be no question of
progress and advance. What storms are in nature, wars and revolutions in
society, the peasants and slaves in a drama, the solecisms and barbarisms in
language, the antitheses in an oration, the discords in music, the shadow on
a painting, that is sin in the world; see these and similar images already in
Plato, the Stoa, Plotinus, cf. Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. II 765. 929. IV 173. V
548-562 and then later also in Augustine, Erigena, Leibniz etc. All activity
also presupposes hindrance; a dove might indeed think that it could fly
better in a vacuum, but the resistance of the air is precisely necessary for its
flight (Kant); and so a man too may think that he could live better without
sin, but sin is precisely necessary for his moral perfection. The law of
contradiction is the fundamental law of all that is, der Quellbronn des
ewigen Lebens. Was zum Handeln treibt, ja zwingt, ist allein der
Widerspruch. Ohne Widerspruch also wäre keine Bewegung, kein Leben,
kein Fortschritt, sondern ewiger Stillstand, ein Todesschlummer aller
Kräfte, Schelling, Werke I 8 S. 219. 321. What would a life without sin be?
It would be an existence without content, a vain abstraction, without
opportunity for struggle and victory, for conflict and reconciliation; without
material for drama and song, for science and art. Therefore Dante could
paint his hell with colours borrowed from this world; but for the depiction
of a heaven this earth offers no data (Schopenhauer). Indeed, the proponents
of this opinion concerning the origin of sin gladly appeal to many passages
of Holy Scripture, which speak of a necessity of sins and calamities, Mt.
Augustine and Calvin, who also let God's counsel and providence extend
over sin; to the well-known words in the Easter vigil of the missale
romanum: o certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum
est! o felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!
There is in this representation so much that is true, that it need not
surprise that it has at all times held minds spellbound. Sin is not
accidental or arbitrary, it is included in the counsel of God. It is so
interwoven with our whole existence, that we can form no conception of a
holy life, of a sinless history. Against its will it is made serviceable by God
Almighty to the revelation of his virtues and to the honour of his name. And
yet, despite all the truth that is hidden in this representation and will later
come to light still more clearly, yet it cannot and may not be accepted. In
the first place it deprives sin of its ethical character. Sin is certainly not only
and not always an act of the will, as Pelagianism says, but indeed also a
condition, a nature of the will; yet it never goes wholly outside the will.
Omne peccatum est voluntarium, understood in the sense of Augustine, is
undoubtedly correct. Here, however, sin is in gnostic and theosophical
fashion paralleled and identified with the physical phenomena of darkness,
sickness, death etc.; derived from the flesh, matter, the essence of creatures,
the nature of God, and thus made into a substance or into a necessary
quality of the existence of things. Thereby sin is deprived of its ethical
character and reduced to a physical phenomenon. Secondly, sin according to
this representation becomes eternal and unconquerable. For since it is not
ethical but physical in nature, it is necessarily proper to all that exists, both
God and the world, and is indispensable for the existence of everything. The
good is not only necessary for the evil, but conversely the evil also for the
good. The evil is here not attached to the good and to being, but it is itself a
being, itself a good, without which the good also cannot exist. The human
being who strives after deliverance from sin would cherish a godless wish
and work at his own downfall. A world without sin would be impossible; a
status gloriae nothing but a dream. Thirdly, sin hereby ceases to be an
antithesis, it becomes a lower, lesser degree of the good, in its place just as
good as the good itself. It becomes a moment in life and history always
destined to disappear and yet never disappearing; a not-yet-being of what
the creature ought to be and yet never becomes or can become; a pure
negation, which actually has no reality but exists only in our thought.
Bonum et malum quod attinet, nihil etiam positivum in rebus, in se
consideratis, indicant, nec aliud sunt praeter cogitandi modos seu notiones,
quas formamus ex eo, quod res ad invicem comparamus, Spinoza, Eth.
praef. cf. Ep. 32 en 34. Cog. metaph. I 6, 7, en voorts Hegel, Werke VIII
180 f. Strauss, Gl. II 365-384. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 81. Paulsen, Syst.
d. Ethik I 251 f. Scholten, L. H. K. II 34v. 422. 580. Fourthly, on this
standpoint God must become the author of sin. Parseeism and Manichaeism
still shrank back from this, set the kingdom of light and the kingdom of
darkness directly opposite each other and placed at the head of both an
eternal, Divine being. The God of nature is a wholly different one than the
God of the good, the moral power that asserts itself in conscience. But
gnostic philosophy and theosophy took up the oppositions into the one
Absolute. God himself must, in order to become person, spirit, carry a dark
nature in himself and eternally overcome it. He himself comes through a
struggle, a process, whether then before and outside or in and through the
world, to his Divine existence. An sich is Hij βυθος ἀ γνωστος, dark nature,
blind will and as such the Creator of matter. Damit des Böse nicht wäre,
müsste Gott selbst nicht seyn, Schelling, Werke I 7 S. 403. Against this now
not only does Holy Scripture testify, but the moral consciousness in all
people also rises up in resistance. Sin may be what it will, but this one thing
stands firm, that God is the Righteous and the Holy, who in his law forbids
it, in conscience testifies against it, in punishments and judgements visits it.
Sin is not rational and not lawful, it is ἀ νομια; it is not necessary for the
existence of creatures, it is much less necessary for the existence of God.
The good is necessary, so that even the evil could be; but the good does not
have need of the evil, holiness does not have need of sin, truth does not
have need of the lie, God does not have need of Satan. If nevertheless sin
still often serves to bring the good to greater manifestation and to glorify
God’s virtues, then this does not happen with and through but against its
will, through the wisdom and the omnipotence of God. Against its nature
sin is then compelled to be serviceable to the honour of God and to the
coming of his kingdom. Thus the evil often pays homage to the good, thus
the lie is overtaken by the truth, thus Satan must, in order to tempt, often
appear as an angel of light. But all that is not to be credited to sin but to the
omnipotence of God, who can cause the good to proceed from the evil, the
light from the darkness and life from death. Finally, this whole false
representation avenges itself in a dreadful way in the practice of life. If
philosophy proclaims it in so many words: God bears the blame for
everything, the human being goes free, then in practice libertinism and
pessimism do not wait long. Libertinism, which holds sin to be a delusion
and this delusion to be the only sin, which wipes out all boundaries between
good and evil, falsifies all moral concepts or with Nietzsche melts them
down and mints them anew, which under the slogan of the emancipation of
the flesh glorifies bestiality as geniality. Pessimism, which, blind to sin,
thinks only of suffering, casts the blame for all that suffering upon the
alogical act of an absolute will, and seeks in the destruction of what exists
the deliverance from suffering. Judged by the outcome, the so-called
independent philosophy also is guided by the striving proper to every
human being, to justify oneself and to accuse God of injustice. Cf. Müller,
Sünde I5 374 f. Weiszäcker, Zu der Lehre v. Wesen der Sünde, Jahrb. f. d.
Theol. 1856 S. 131-195. Kahnis, Dogm. I 478 f. Vilmar, Theol. Moral I 143
f. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 114 f. Orr, Chr. view of God and the world p. 193.
7. Yet with that, that God is no cause of sin, not everything has been said.
Scripture, which keeps God far from all ungodliness, on the other hand
speaks as decisively as possible that his counsel and government also
extend over sin; see the passages already mentioned earlier, part II 315, 369
and above p. 30v. God is not the author of sin, but it nevertheless does not
proceed apart from his knowledge, his will, and his power; how then is that
relation of God to sin to be conceived? Some, in order to keep Him free
from all sin, even deprived God of omniscience, part II 161. Others judged
that sin indeed did not proceed apart from God’s knowledge but did proceed
apart from his will and were satisfied with the concept of the permissio.
God did indeed know sin beforehand but did not will it; He only permitted
it and has not prevented it. Thus spoke the church fathers, Clemens
Alex., Strom IV c. 12. Orig., de princ. III 2, 7. Damasc., de fide orthod. II
29 etc., cf. Suicerus, s. v. προνοια and συγχωρησις. With this manner of
speaking and with this solution the Pelagians were content, cf. Augustinus,
c. Julianum Pelag. V c. 3; many Roman Catholic theologians, Trid. VI c. 6,
Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. II 16. Petavius, de Deo VI c. 6, 5;
the Remonstrants, Arminius, Op. 644 sq. 694 sq. Episcopius, Inst. theol. IV
sect. 4 c. 10. Limborch, Theol. Christ. II 29; the Lutherans, Gerhard, Loc.
VI c. 9. Quenstedt, Theol. I 533 Hollaz, Ex. theol. 449. Buddeus, Inst. theol.
560, Bretschneider, Dogm. I 506, and many more recent theologians,
Ebrard, Dogm. § 265. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 419. 444 etc. Now from this
side it was often indeed acknowledged that the permissio was no lack of
knowledge and power in God, that it also did not make Him into an idle
spectator of sin, but still the permissio was always defined as an actus
negativus, as a suspensio impedimenti, as neither a positive willing nor a
positive not-willing of sin but as a non velle impedire. It is clear that this
representation not only gives no solution but is also ambiguous and evades
the actual question. The question, on which it depends, is this: suppose that
such a more or less negative act of divine permissio precedes in a particular
case, does sin then follow or not, does it then still stand in the choice of the
free will of man or not, can he then still just as well omit it as do it? If the
decision then still rests with the free will of man, then Pelagius is right and
the government of sin is in fact wholly taken away from God and He is at
most an otiosus peccatorum spectator. If, on the other hand, God’s
permissio is of such a nature that man, placed in those circumstances, not
by compulsion but by virtue of the ordinances that apply specifically to the
moral life, must commit sin, then the right is on the side of Augustine, one
may judge about the word permissio as one will. Thus posing this problem,
Augustine had already seen that the permission could not be purely negative
but must be an act of God’s will. Non fit aliquid nisi omnipotens fieri velit,
vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo. God does all that pleases Him; He does
not will something without doing it, but what He wills, that He does; and
what happens, never happens apart from his will. Miro et ineffabili
modo non fit praeter ejus voluntatem, quod etiam contra ejus fit voluntatem,
quia non fieret, si non sineret (nec utique nolens sinit sed volens) nec sinere
bonus fieri male nisi omnipotens et de malo facere posset bene, Ench. 95-
100. de trin. III 4 sq. de civ. XIV 11, de gr. et lib. arb. 20. 21. Many
scholastic and Augustinian theologians still spoke in a similar spirit; even
though they also made use of the word permit, it was nevertheless
understood as velle sinere or velle permittere mala fieri, Lombardus, Sent. I
46. Thomas, S. Theol. I 19 art. 9. c. Gent. I 95. II 25. Comment. op Sent. I
In the essence of the matter the Reformed had no other conviction; hence
a certain Livinus de Meyer rightly said: ovum ovo non esse similius quam
doctrinam Calvinianam Thomisticae, bij Daelman, Summa S. Thomae II
308. Only, they had gained the experience that the word permissio was used
in a very ambiguous meaning and was misused to conceal Pelagianism.
Therefore they were not inclined toward the word. They had in itself so
little against it, that they nevertheless in fact all used it again, cf. bij Ebrard,
Dogm. § 265. But the permissio was then, according to their conviction, no
pure negation, no mera cessatio voluntatis, proceeding from ignorantia or
impotentia or negligentia, but a positive act of God, a volitio efficax, yet not
efficiens or producens but deficiens, upon which, according to the nature of
the moral life, sin must follow, Zwingli, Op. III 170 IV de provid. c. 5.
Gomarus, de provid. Dei c. 11. Twissus, de permissione Op. I 544-668.
Maccovius, Loci C. p. 206. Alting, Theol. El. nova p. 316. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v.
Tol. VI 277. M. Vitringa II 196 etc. It is true that in the heat of the struggle
dicta duriora have sometimes been used by the Reformed, cf. e.g. Calvin,
Inst. III 23, 7. Beza, Tract. Theol. I 319. 360. 401 Zanchius Op. V 2. And
Roman Catholics, Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. II c. 3 sq.
Petavius, de Deo VI c. 5 X c. 8. Möhler, Symb. § 2-4, Socinians, Cat.
Racov. X 16, Remonstrants, Apol. Conf. c. 2 and 6, Episc. Op. I 375 sq.,
and Lutherans, Gerhard, Loc. VI c. 10. Quenstedt, Theol. II 97 have
not failed to make use of it and time and again to accuse the Reformed that
they made God the author of sin. But in the first place those dicta duriora
are all still milder than those which sometimes occur in Holy Scripture, e.g.
2:11 etc.; further, all such harsh expressions have at all times been imputed
by the Judaizers to Paul, by the Pelagians to Augustine, by Hincmar to
Gottschalk, by the Jesuits to the Jansenists; next, they have always been
avoided by the Reformed in their confessions, Maccovius was questioned
about it at the Synod of Dordt, Archief v. Kerk. Gesch. III 1831 bl. 632;
moreover, they have been omitted by most Reformed theologians or also
elucidated and explained, Voetius, Disp. I 1119-1137, Maresius, Syst.
Theol. IV 18. Turretinus, Theol. El. VI qu. 7. 8. Trigland, Kerk. Gesch. IV
673v. V 694. Id. Antapologia c. 8-10, Chamier Panstr. Cath. II lib. 3 Moor II
487 etc.; and finally their meaning and intention is for everyone who wishes
to understand them completely transparent from the connection with the
whole of the Reformed doctrine. The matter is simply this, that the
permissio, taken in a negative sense, in the question of God’s relation to sin
offers not the least solution; does not in the least remove the objection that
God is its author, and in fact withdraws the whole of sin from God’s
providential government. For he who can prevent an evil and yet, looking
on silently, lets it happen, stands just as guilty as he who commits the evil
itself, Beza, Tract. Theol. I 315. Moreover, even if God has only and solely
permitted sin, there must nevertheless be a reason why He has not wished to
prevent it. That reason cannot in God lie in a lack of knowledge or power;
thus it must lie in his will. Therefore the permissio is then nevertheless
again an act of his will; He has willed to permit it; and this willing to permit
cannot be conceived otherwise than that sin now in fact also, not by God,
but by the creature, takes place.
Moreover, Christian theology, when it discussed God’s government over
sin, has nevertheless never remained standing with this permissio. If,
namely, both Scripture and Christian thought forbade placing sin wholly or
in part outside the will and providence, then only such a solution could still
be attempted that a distinction was made in the manner of God’s
government over the good and over the evil. And indeed, although in a
certain sense it can also be said that God has willed sin, i.e. that He has
willed that sin should exist, He has nevertheless willed evil in a wholly
different manner than the good; in the good He has good pleasure, but evil
He hates with divine hatred. In order that this difference in God’s
government over the good and over the evil may come to light, it must in
the first place be pointed out that God and man are never separated but yet
are always distinguished, cf. above p. 28. Faith is a gift, God causes to
believe, but yet it is formaliter not God but man who believes. Much more
does this apply to the sinful act. Materialiter this is most certainly to be
ascribed to God, but formaliter this remains at the charge of man. When a
murderer beats someone to death, all the deliberation and the strength that
he needs for that are derived from God, but the act is, formally considered,
his and not God’s. Yes, the fact of killing is, purely taken in itself, not yet a
sin, for the same has often taken place in war and on the scaffold. What
makes the killing into sin is not the materia, the substratum, but the forma,
i.e. the vitiositas, the ανομια; not the substantia but the accidens in the act.
Against this it has been objected that this distinction, even if it is correct,
nevertheless in fact gives nothing, because it places the formal element of
the act, i.e. precisely the sinful in sin, outside God’s government,
Episcopius, Op. I 180. Quenstedt, Theol. II 101. This remark is only partly
correct; it contains truth, not in general but only in this special case,
concerning sin. For with faith no one will from the fact that man is
formaliter its subject conclude that it lies outside God’s providence. But it is
true that with faith the situation is wholly different than with sin. Faith,
indeed, is an absolute gift and excludes all merit; sin, on the other hand, is
man’s act and brings guilt with it. Therefore sin must here not be set over
against faith, which is now bestowed by God out of grace, but over against
the good that man would have done if he had remained standing. That good
would have been materialiter wholly God’s work; formaliter, however, it
had man as subject and brought for him, not indeed from itself but
according to the foedus operum, a claim to reward. Just as now that good
would not thereby have been withdrawn from God’s government, so sin is
not placed outside his providence because in the formal sense it has not God
but man as subject. But there is more. With the good, God’s providence is to
be conceived in such a way that He himself by his Spirit works in the
subject and positively makes it capable for the good. With sin it cannot and
may not be represented thus. Sin is ἀ νομια, deformitas and thus has God
not as causa efficiens but at most as causa deficiens. Light cannot of itself
bring forth darkness; darkness arises only when the light is taken away. God
is therefore at most the negative cause, the causa per accidens of sin; in man
its real, positive cause is to be sought. Because, however, sin is only forma
and no substantia, it is in no respect placed outside God’s providence by the
fact that it is formaliter an act of man. He works in it, yet in a manner
wholly corresponding to the nature of sin. Just as in his government He
governs all things in accordance with their own nature, so also in the moral
domain He maintains the ordinances that He has established for it in
particular. Sin too arises and develops according to fixed law, not according
to the laws of nature or of logic, but according to those which are implanted
in ethical life and continue to operate even in the devastation. Sickness,
dissolution, death are the antipodes of health, development, life, but are no
less than these governed from the beginning to the end by fixed laws. And
so there is also a law of sin, which determines its whole history in man and
mankind. And precisely that law-governed element in sin proves that God
reigns kingly also in and over it. A man who sins does not make himself
loose and independent of God; on the contrary, while he was a son, he
becomes a slave. He who does sin is a servant of sin. Cf. on God’s relation
to sin: the church fathers Orig., Athan., Basil., etc. in Münscher-v. Coelln,
D. G. I 157, and further Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 49 art. 2. II 1 qu. 79 art. 2.
S. c. Gent. III 3. 71. Comm. op Sent. I dist. 46-48 II dist. 37. Bellarm., de
amiss. gr. et statu pecc. II 18. Petavius, de Deo VI c. 6. Quenstedt, Theol. I
and 37, 269-318. Beza, Tract. Theol. I 312 sq. 337 sq. Zanchius, Op. II 259.
Chamier, Panstr. Cath. II lib. 3. Twissus, Vindic. gratiae I 317 sq. 544 sq.
Trigland, Antapol. c. 9. 10. Gomarus, de provid. Op. p. 136. Mastricht,
Theol. III 10, 19, sq. Turretinus, Theol. El. VI qu. 8. Moor II 492. Vitringa
8. With the distinction between the material and the formal in sin,
however, the question has not yet been answered why God has included sin
in his decree and in the execution thereof. The answer lies enclosed in the
providence of God, as it also extends over sin. Scripture repeatedly
expresses it, that God uses sin as a means, for punishment of the ungodly,
2:11, 12, for the salvation of his people, Genesis 45:5, 50:20, for the testing
11:19, 2 Corinthians 12:7, for the glorification of his name, Exodus 7:3, Proverbs 16:4,
Romans 9:17, 11:33, etc. Precisely because God is the absolutely Holy and
Almighty, he can use sin as a means in his hand. Creatures cannot do that
and are themselves defiled and unclean at the slightest contact. But God is
so infinitely far from ungodliness, that he can make sin serviceable as
nothing but a will-less instrument to his glorification. There are examples in
abundance, to prove that in this too the proverb holds: duo cum faciunt
idem, non est idem. God wills that Shimei curses David, that Satan visits
Job, that Jews and Gentiles deliver up his holy child Jesus to death—and
yet in all these unrighteousnesses the creatures stand guilty and God goes
free. For even when he wills that evil be, he never wills this otherwise than
in a holy manner; he uses it but does not commit it. And therefore he has
also permitted sin in his creation. He would not have tolerated it, if he had
not been able to govern it in an absolutely holy and sovereign manner. He
would not have endured it, if he were not God, the Holy and the Almighty.
But because he is God, he has not feared its existence and its power; he has
willed it, in order that in and over against it he might bring his Divine
virtues to light. If he had not granted it existence, there would always
have been room for the thought, that he was not in all his virtues exalted
above a power whose possibility was given with creation itself. For every
rational creature, as creature, as finite, limited, changeable being, includes
the possibility of apostasy. But God has, because he is God, not feared the
way of freedom, the reality of sin, the outbreak of unrighteousness, the
power of Satan. And thus he always rules over sin, at its origin and at its
development. He does not compel it; he does not check it with violence; he
does not crush it by his might; but he lets it come to its full development of
power. He remains king and yet lets it have free play in his kingdom; he
grants it everything, his world, his creatures, his Christ even, for mala sine
bonis esse non possunt; he permits it to make use of all that is his; he grants
it opportunity to show what it can do, in order then nevertheless at the end
to step forth from the field of battle as King of kings. For sin is of such a
nature, that it perishes through the freedom granted to it, that it dies of its
own sickness, that it eats death to itself. At the summit of its power it is,
solely by the cross, publicly displayed in its powerlessness, Colossians 2:15.
Therefore God has willed that sin should exist. Quamvis ergo ea, quae mala
sunt, in quantum mala sunt, non sint bona, tamen ut non solum bona sed
etiam sint et mala, bonum est. Nam nisi hoc esset bonum, ut essent et mala,
nullo modo esse sinerentur ab omnipotente bono, cui procul dubio quam
facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est, quod non vult esse, non sinere.
Hoc nisi credamus, periclitatur ipsum nostrae confessionis initium, qua nos
in Deum omnipotentem credere confitemur, Aug., Enchir. 96. Because he
knew that he could absolutely control sin, melius judicavit de malis bene
facere quam mala nulla esse permittere, ib. 11. 27. de civ. XXII 1, de Gen.
ad litt. II 9. de Gen. ad Manich. II 28. He thinks and leads evil to good and
places it in the service of his glory. Augustine even makes use of all kinds
of images, to assign sin a place in the order of the whole. It has there the
same significance as the shadow in a painting, de civ. XI 23, the solecisms
and barbarisms in language, de ord. II 11, the contrasts in a song, de
civ. XI 18. God has composed the ordo seculorum as a pulcherrimum
carmen out of some antitheses, in order to increase the beauty and the
harmony of the whole, de civ. XI 18, XIV 11, de Gen. ad Manich. I 16, cf.
Erigena, de div. nat. V 35. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 48 art. 2 c. Gesch. III 71.
Leibniz, in Pichler, Theol. des Leibniz I 264 f. and also above p. 51. These
images do contain some truth, but they readily give occasion to
misunderstanding, they make sin appear far too much as necessary and in
the whole of things precisely in its place, they sacrifice the particular to the
general and thereby also offer to those who struggle with sin or are bowed
down under suffering, neither reconciliation nor comfort. But this is true,
that also and precisely in the government of sin the virtues of God come to
glorious revelation. The riches of God’s grace, the depth of his mercy, the
unchangeableness of his faithfulness, the incorruptibility of his
righteousness, the glory of his wisdom and power have, through sin, come
forth all the more clearly into the light. When man had broken the covenant
of works, he has put in its place the so much better covenant of grace. When
Adam had fallen, he has given Christ as the Lord from heaven. That now is
Divine greatness, thus to govern sin, that it even contrary to its nature and
striving becomes serviceable to the honour of his name. And therefore sin,
which is in the world, can so little take from us faith in God, in his love and
power, that it, rightly considered, rather confirms and strengthens us in that
faith. Si malum est, Deus est. Non enim esset malum, sublato ordine boni,
cujus privatio sit malum; hic autem ordo non esset, si Deus non esset,
Thomas, c. Gent. III 71.
9. Although sin from its beginning stands under God’s government, it
nevertheless does not have its origin in God but in the will of the rational
creature. But here at once a new problem arises. How is sin ever to be
explained from the will of a being that was created after God’s image in
true knowledge, righteousness, and holiness? The Pelagian representation,
that the first man was in a state of childish innocence, of moral indifference,
already appeared to us earlier to be unacceptable, part II 517; it does not
explain the fall of man but changes it into an insignificant accident,
and makes it incomprehensible that from it such dreadful consequences and
such terrible miseries have proceeded for the whole human race. If a source
can bring forth such a stream of unclean water, it must itself be inwardly
corrupted. It is therefore impermissible to reduce the distance between the
status integritatis and the status corruptionis so much that the transition
becomes easy and gradual. Man was created by God not morally indifferent
but positively holy. Yet in doing so the following must be considered. In the
first place God has very certainly willed the possibility of sin. The
possibilitas peccandi is from God. The thought of sin was first of all
conceived in his consciousness. God has eternally thought sin as his
absolute opposite, and thus, with that nature, included it in his decree;
otherwise it could never have arisen and existed in reality. Neither Satan nor
Adam and Eve were the first to arrive at the thought of sin; God himself, as
it were, set this visibly before their eyes. By the tree of the knowledge of
good and evil and by the probationary command God clearly pointed out to
man two ways, which he could take. And before his fall God even permitted
that an evil power from without penetrated into paradise, used the serpent as
its instrument and began to negotiate with Eve about the meaning of the
probationary command. The possibility of sin is thus without doubt willed
by God. In the second place: in agreement with that objective possibility
God created angels and men in such a way that they could sin and fall. They
did not yet have the highest; they were placed not at the end but at the
beginning of the way; the gift of perseverantia, which is a gift and always
remains so, which can never in the proper sense be merited and can never
belong to the nature of a creature, was still withheld from them. Otherwise
it would also have had the appearance as if God wanted to prevent sin by
force and feared its power. Angels and men therefore had the gratia, qua
potuerunt stare, not that qua vellent perpetuo stare, Heppe, Dogm. d. ev. ref.
K. 178, 179. They did not yet have the highest, inalienable freedom, i.e. the
freedom of no longer being able to will to sin. The image of God was thus
in man still limited; it was not unfolded in all its fullness; it still had a
boundary in the possibility of sin. Man indeed stood in the good, but the
possibility of evil still lay alongside it; he indeed walked on the good way
but could stray aside; he was good, but changeably good, mutabiliter bonus.
God alone is the being in all his virtues and therefore unchangeable. Every
creature, however, becomes and can therefore also become degenerate. If
materia and forma are distinct, as is always the case with creatures, then the
possibility always remains open that the materia changes from forma. What
is formed can be deformed and thus also reformed again; what is created
can be misshapen and thus also recreated again. Moral freedom, however
strong, is in itself essentially distinguished from logical necessity and
physical compulsion. A creatura naturaliter impeccabilis is therefore a
contradiction, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 63 art. 1. c. Gent. III 109. In the third
place, in the question concerning the origin of sin the capacity and activity
of the imagination come into consideration. Formerly little account was
taken of this in dogmatics, although one was also aware that temptation in
man first and most directs itself to the imagination and thereby works upon
desire and will, Voetius, Disp. I 943. Burmannus, Synopsis I 46, 54.
Edwards, Works III 122. In mysticism, however, the imagination took a
great place in; according to Böhme Lucifer has, through the Phantasey,
hinein imaginiert himself into the abyss of sin; er neigte sich in die
Phantasey, also ergriff sie ihn auch und ergab sich ihm in sein Leben, bij
Joh. Claassen, J. Böhme II 95. And in fact it always proceeds in the arising
of the sinful act as Thomas a Kempis describes it: primo occurrit menti
simplex cogitatio, deinde fortis imaginatio, postea delectatio et motus
pravus et assensio, de imit. Chr. I 13, 5. Consciousness takes the thought of
sin into itself, the imagination adorns it and transforms it into an alluring
ideal, desire stretches itself out toward it and the will accomplishes it. Thus
also in angel and man the imagination has been the capacity that made the
transgression of the command appear as the way to Godlikeness, cf. Weisse,
Philos. Dogm. II 422 f. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. I 433 f. Kuyper, Heraut
906. And finally attention must be paid to the fact that Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:45v. speaks of the first man as earthly out of the earth, as by
creation having become a living soul and thus sets him over against Christ,
the Lord out of heaven, who has become a life-giving spirit. This
comparison and contrast between Adam and Christ also has a deep
significance for the fall of the first man. Adam was earthly out of the earth,
also before the transgression of God’s command; by his creation he became
a living soul; the natural is first, afterward the spiritual. In this now is
expressed that the origin and the nature of sin in angels and men differ very
much. To be sure we know little of the fall of the angels; but with a view to
1 Timothy 3:6 and 2 Petr. 2:4 it may nevertheless be called highly probable that
pride, wanting to be like God in power and dominion, has been the
beginning and the principle of their fall. The angels were not tempted as
men were; the temptation did not come to them from without; they fell
through themselves. Jesus says that the devil speaks ἐ κ των ἰ διων when he
speaks a lie. He has from himself, through his own thinking, become
dissatisfied with his position and his power; he has brought forth the lie out
of himself and set it as a kingdom, as a system over against the truth of
God. But with man it is not so. He was not a pure spirit; he was not placed
so high, although as created after God’s image he still stood nearer to God
than the angels; he could not think so high and so boldly exalt himself; he
was earthly out of the earth, a living soul, indeed more refined and more
delicate but therefore at the same time also weaker and more fragilely
organized. As such a being indeed created after God’s image but
nevertheless earthly, sensuous, he offered Satan a suitable opportunity for
temptation. This came to him from without, accommodated itself as it were
to his nature, awakened in him the lust of the eyes, the lust of the flesh and
the pride of life, and thus brought him to a fall. Origin and essence of sin in
man bear an entirely different character than in the angels; in both it comes
out that man sins, not as a devil, but as a man, as a being that is earthly out
of the earth and that by creation has become a living soul. For this reason
Scripture and especially Paul lays such a close connection between the
sensuous nature of man and sin. There absolutely does not lie at the
basis of that the contrast of sensuousness and reason, and the thought that
matter is of a lower order and the principle of sin. This contrast and this
thought are not Israelite but Greek in origin. Scripture knows nothing of
such a dualism, but it does know of something else, namely of this, that
man from the outset is a sensuous, a psychic being. He is immediately
created as a living soul, earthly out of the earth. That therefore he was also
already in the status integritatis; and therefore he was, in spite of the
knowledge and the righteousness that he possessed, susceptible to seduction
and temptation. Already with the first sin it came out that man was σαρξ;
and all following sins have only always brought his temptability, weakness,
unreliability ever more clearly to light. All sin of man, also the spiritual,
bears a character that corresponds with his psychic nature and differs from
that of sin in the angels. The image of God was man before the fall not in
spite of, but in his peculiar, psychic nature; and from that his sin also
receives its stamp.
With all this nothing else and nothing more than the possibility of sin has
been demonstrated. How that possibility has become reality is a mystery
and will probably remain so. We can indicate that the thought of sin has
existed eternally in God’s mind, that it has been set before man’s eyes in the
probationary commandment, that he thus, besides the good, also had
knowledge of a forbidden evil, that the imagination is the faculty which
transforms thoughts into ideals. But thereby the transition from possibility
to reality, from mere representation to the sinful deed, has not yet been
explained. This explanation escapes us, not only in the origin of the first sin,
but repeatedly in all kinds of deeds and actions of man. In psychology and
biography we do indeed content ourselves with a few data; if we know
something of someone’s ancestry, parents, upbringing, etc., we think that
we have explained his personality, his life and deeds. But this is in fact
rather superficial; every human being is a mystery, and every action has yet
another and deeper root than that of the milieu. In a much stronger measure
this holds true with sin. Here we enter the mysterious domain of moral
freedom and we are confronted with a phenomenon which by its very
nature escapes an explanation in its origin. For a moral action is never like a
conclusion from premises, nor like a physical or chemical result. It is
essentially distinct from both and has a nature of its own; moral learning is
entirely sui generis, it is always a life of freedom, and this is by its very
nature a riddle. But much more is this the case with a sinful, and then
specifically with the first sinful deed. Sin cannot be deduced logically or
physically from preceding circumstances, reasonings, deliberations; it can
especially not be derived from a holy nature created in God’s image.
Whoever understood and explained sin, i.e. could demonstrate that it
necessarily had to follow from what preceded, would do its nature injustice,
erase the boundaries between good and evil, and reduce evil to something
good. The sinful deed has as its cause the sinful will, but who points out the
cause of this sinful will? Causas defectionum istarum, cum efficientes non
sint sed deficientes, velle invenire, tale est, ac si quisquam velit videre
tenebras vel andire silentium, Aug. de civ. XII 7. Sin began with a lie, John 8:44, it rests on a false imagination, on an untrue representation, on an
imagination of a good that was no good; it is thus in its origin a folly and an
absurdity; it has no origin in the proper sense, but only a beginning. Not
without reason has Satan therefore been called an Ironie aller Logik, cf.
Tholuck, Die Lehre v. d. Sünde, 8te Aufl. 1862 S. 15. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl.
III 256. H. Schmidt, Herz.2 15, 22. Vilmar, Theol. Moral I 37. Shedd,
Dogm. Theol. II 156. This impossibility of explaining the origin of sin is
therefore also not to be conceived as an evasion, as an asylum ignorantiae.
Rather it is to be stated openly and clearly; we stand here at the boundaries
of our knowledge. Sin is there, but it will never be able to justify its
existence; it is unlawful and unreasonable.
10. Concerning the time of the fall no precise determination is possible.
For Manichaeism and pantheism the question about it also has no
significance. Sin is then eternal; it is rooted in an evil being or in God
himself and coincides with the existence of the finite. Between creation
and fall there is no distinction; creation itself is an apostasy of God from
himself as pure being. According to the theosophists the fall of the angels
took place in the time that lies between Genesis 1:1 and 2. The desolation,
emptiness, and darkness of the earth cannot have been created by God, who
is the God of life and of light; they already presuppose a fall and a curse
that followed upon it. The angels first dwelt on this earth; this was their
ο ἰ κητηριον, Jud. 6; that is also evident from the fact that Satan is still now
called the prince of the world, that he wants to wrest it from man, who later
received it from God as an inheritance, that he wanted to hand it over to
Christ in the temptation in exchange for an act of worship, that he still now
dwells in the air, and that the world lies in the Evil One. Heaven and earth,
however, which were created in Genesis 1:1 and assigned to the angels, were
of an entirely different nature than those that were later prepared in the six
days, Genesis 1:3v. They were a spiritual, immaterial realm of light. The
physical, material earth, which arose in the six days, already presupposes
the fall of the angels, just as the desolation, emptiness, and darkness of Genesis 1:2. Matter is in itself unclean, selfish, and therefore cannot have been
produced directly by God. Nur ein ungeheures Verbrechen, weniger ein
Abfall als eine Empörung, konnte diese materielle Offenbarung als Krisis,
Hemmungs- und Wiederherstellungsanstalt veranlassen, und nur die
Fortdauer dieses Verbrechens macht den Fortbestand oder die
Forterzeugung dieser Materie begreiflich (Baader); cf. Joh. Claassen, Jakob
Böhme, Sein Leben u. seine theos. Werke II 1885 S. 127 f. Id. Franz von
Baader, Leben u. theos. Werke II 1887 S. 157 f. Keerl, Der Mensch das
Ebenbild Gottes I 166 f., and many others, Hamberger, Schubert, K. v.
Raumer, R. Wagner, Kurtz, Delitzsch etc., cf. Reusch, Bibel u. Natur4, 1876
S. 88. But this theory, however attractive, nevertheless has no sufficient
ground in Holy Scripture. In Genesis 1:2 it does not say that the earth became
desolate and empty, but that it was so; with not a single word is it said that
this desolation and emptiness was a devastation that followed upon an
ordered condition; and much less is there yet any mention that the fall of the
angels took place before that time and was the cause of that desolation.
Furthermore, it is not to be seen what connection there can be between the
fall of the angels—suppose that this already took place before Genesis 1:2
—and the desolation of the earth. In order to establish such a connection,
one must take refuge in all manner of gnostic ideas; one must then teach
that the angels in a certain sense are bodily beings and received the original
earth as a dwelling-place, just as they now, according to some, still dwell on
the fixed stars; that the first earth, which was created in Genesis 1:1, was an
essentially different one than that which was prepared in the six days and
consisted of a finer substance; that coarse matter, out of which it now
consists, although created by God, nevertheless presupposes the fall, is
something ungodly and by nature unclean and selfish—all together opinions
that are not derived from Scripture but from Gnosticism.
Little ground exists for the opinion that the fall of man already took place
before Gen. 3, whether in the pre-existent state of souls, or in Gen. 2 at and
before the creation of the woman. This was the doctrine of Pythagoras and
Plato: the souls first existed in the τοπος ὑ περουρανιος, whence they were
driven out by a fall and, as punishment, were shut up in earthly bodies as in
prisons, Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. II 819 f. Origen adopted this view, in order to
explain by it the inequality among creatures, part II 442. Theosophy often
connected with it still the opinion that man was first created androgynous
and that the creation of the woman was already proof of a fall that had
previously occurred, part II 548, and further also M. Vitringa II 265.
Related to this is the doctrine of Kant, who speaks of an intelligible act as
cause of the radical Hang zum Bösen and of the angeborne Schuld, Religion
ed. Rosenkranz 34. 42. 44 f., and likewise also Schelling, Werke I 7 S. 385.
Müller, Sünde II5 99 f. Steffens, Renouvier, Sécrétan, Dr. Edw. Beecher e.
a. But these assertions all lack every theological and also every
philosophical ground. In the first place they include the pre-existent
existence of souls, which for various reasons is not plausible, part II 565.
Further, the fall that is related in Gen. 3 is deprived of its character and
significance; it ceases to be a fall and becomes only the appearance of
something that already long ago has taken place; in connection therewith
the temporal, empirical freedom of man loses all its value; the soul alone
has fallen and has been placed as punishment in the body. Further, this
doctrine is also in conflict with the organic coherence of the human race.
Every man determines his own lot, das Wesen des Menschen ist wesentlich
seine eigene That (Schelling). Besides, it gives rise to astonishment that all
men individually, without any exception, determine themselves to evil, and
that only the first man, though fallen, nevertheless still received a trial,
whether he perhaps still wished to remain standing and to restore his fall.
And finally it is clear that humanity, thus dissolved into an aggregate of
individuals, can have neither a common head in Adam nor also in Christ.
There is no common fall, there is therefore also no common restoration;
each falls for himself, each must therefore also raise himself up; in spite of
the radical Böse Kant therefore also concluded from the du sollst to the du
kannst.
We must therefore remain with the data of Scripture, however few these
may be. The time of the fall of the angels is not mentioned at all. With a
view to the ἀ π’ ἀ ρχης, John 8:44, many theologians were of the opinion that
the angels, indeed not in the moment of their creation itself, in primo
instanti, but then nevertheless immediately thereafter, in secundo instanti,
by their first act of will were either confirmed in the good or fell into sin,
Aug. de civ. XI 13. Thomas. S. Th. I qu. 62 art. 5. qu. 63 art. 5 en 6. Others
assumed that a short time elapsed after their creation, and that their fall then
either still before the creation of heaven and earth in Genesis 1:1, Episcopius,
Inst. Theol. IV 3, 1; or within the six days of creation, Coccejus on John 8:44; or with a view to Genesis 1:31 first after the completion of the whole
work of creation took place, Voetius, Disp. I 919. 920. Turretinus, Theol. El.
IX 5. M. Vitringa II 261. Just as little can be said with certainty about the
time of man’s fall. Some speak of years after his creation; others think,
because Genesis after the account of the creation immediately passes over
to that of the fall and also on the ground of Genesis 4:1, that the fall of man
took place only a few days after or even on the same day as his creation,
Marck, Hist. Parad. III 7. Moor, Comm. IV 166 M. Vitringa II 261. Zöckler,
Urstand des Menschen 35 f. These determinations of time are also of less
weight. What is of importance is this, that according to Scripture the fall is
essentially distinct from the creation itself [72]. Sin is a phenomenon, for
which the possibility was indeed given in the creation of finite, changeable
beings, but the actuality of which could be called into existence only by the
will of the creature. It is a power that does not belong to the essence of
creation, that originally was not there, that has come there through
disobedience and transgression, that has unlawfully penetrated into the
creation and that ought not to be there. It is there, and its being is no
accident; indeed, with a view to the counsel of God, which took it up and
assigned it a place, it may to a certain extent and in a certain sense be said
that it had to be there. But then it nevertheless always had to be there as
something that ought not to be and that has no right to exist.
. The question concerning the essence of sin is not identical with that
concerning its beginning, for only in the development does it become
fully manifest what lies hidden in a principle. But yet in the first sin sin
itself is already active and in it therefore also already to some extent
knowable. Concerning the character and nature of the first sin, of which
angels and men made themselves guilty, however, there is difference. The
opinion that the sin of the angels began with lust has already been refuted
earlier, vol. II 436. Much more probable is it, with a view to the nature of
the temptation in Genesis 3:5 and Matthew 4:3, 6, 9 and the admonition 1 Timothy 3:6,
not to become puffed up and thus to fall into the same judgment as the
devil, that the first sin of the angels consisted in pride; but too little has
nevertheless been revealed of their fall for us to be able to speak here with
absolute certainty; others therefore also thought of lying, John 8:44, envy,
Wijsh. 2:24, or another sin, Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 157. According to
the Roman Catholics the first sin in man also consisted in pride,
Bellarminus, de amiss. grat. et statu pecc. III c. 4, who appeals to Sir. 10:13,
14, Tob. 4:13, Romans 5:19, August., de Gen. ad litt. XI 30. Enchir. 45. de civ.
XIV 13. Thomas, S. Th. II 2 qu. 163 etc. These proofs are not strong;
Sirach and Tobias speak only of pride in general, Paul calls the first sin
precisely disobedience, and church fathers and scholastics, when they call
the first sin pride, chiefly combat the view that makes it consist in sensual
lust. The Protestants, however, usually let the sin in Eve already begin with
doubt and unbelief, which were then followed by pride and covetousness,
Luther on Gen. 3. Gerhard, Loci IX c. 2. Calv. Inst. II 1, 4. Zanchius, Op.
IV 30. Synopsis pur. theol. XIV 9 sq. Marck, Hist. Parad. III 2. M. Vitringa
II 267. Yet it was rightly remarked by Tertullianus, adv. Jud. 2 and
Augustine, Enchir. 45, that the first sin already enclosed many kinds of sins
in itself and in principle was a transgression of all commandments; it was,
after all, disobedience to God, doubt, unbelief, self-exaltation, pride,
murder, theft, covetousness etc.; and correspondingly there were also
various thoughts, affections, desires, movements awakened in man;
understanding and will, soul and body took part in it. It was a conscious and
free act, ἁ μαρτια, παραβασις, παραπτωμα, παρακοη in the proper sense,
Romans 5:12v. Although tempted, the first men were nevertheless not brought
to a fall as innocent children, without knowing better. They transgressed
God’s command with consciousness and freedom; they knew and willed
what they did. Excuses are not in place here. The circumstances under
which the first sin was committed by angels and men do not serve for
extenuation but increase the guilt. It was committed against God’s express
and clear command; by a man who had been created after God’s image; in a
matter of very slight significance, which scarcely demanded any self-denial;
and perhaps a short time after the command had been received. It has
become the source of all unrighteousness and abominations, of all disasters
and misfortunes, of all sickness and death, which since then have been
committed and suffered in the world. Hinc illae lacrimae! The sin of Adam
cannot be a trifle; it must have been a principial reversal of all relations, a
revolution, whereby the creature detached itself from and set itself over
against God, a rebellion, a fall in the most proper sense, which was decisive
for the whole world and led it in a direction and on a path, away from God,
toward godlessness and the ruin, ineffabiliter grande peccatum, Aug.
Op. imp. c. Jul. I 165. Thus seriously was the first sin conceived in the
Christian church and theology, August. de civ. XIV 11-15. XXI 12. Enchir.
de am. gr. et st. pecc. III c. 8-10. Scheeben, Dogm. II 594. Ned. Gel. art. 14.
Heid. Cat. qu. 7. 9. Mastricht, Theol. IV 1, 15. Marck, Hist. Parad. III 2, 10
etc.
2. The many names which Holy Scripture uses for sin indicate its dreadful
character and its many-sided development. ַחָּטאת is called sin as an act that
misses its goal and consists in deviation from the right way; ָעֶול or ָעֹון
designates it as bending, crookedness, perversity, as deviation from the
good direction; ֶּפַׁשע makes it known as transgression of the set boundaries,
as breach of the covenant relationship to God, as apostasy and rebellion;
ְׁשָגָגה as a wrong deed that has happened unintentionally, by mistake; ֶרַׁשע as
a godless acting and walking, deviating from the law, culpable. Further, it is
characterized by ָאָׁשם as guilt, by ָעֶול as vanity, by ָׁשְוא as falsehood, by ְנָבָלה
as folly, by ַרע as an evil, malum, etc. The Greek words are especially
παραπτωμα, ὀ φειλημα, ἀ νομια, παρανομια; they speak for themselves and
describe sin as deviation, injustice, disobedience, transgression, apostasy,
lawlessness, guilt; and moreover the sinful power in man is also indicated
by σαρξ, ψυχικος and παλαιος ἀ νθρωπος and in the world by κοσμος. The
Latin peccatum is of uncertain derivation; the Dutch word zonde, which
probably is connected with the Latin sons, i.e. nocens, Müller, Sünde I 114
f., has in Christian usage become a thoroughly religious concept; it denotes
a transgression, not of a human, but of a divine law; places man in relation,
not to his fellow men, to society and state, but to God, the heavenly Judge;
is therefore also not loved in many circles and is then preferably replaced
by moral evil etc. By far the most of these names make sin known as a
deviation, transgression of the law. Scripture always conceives sin as
ἀ νομια, 1 John 3:4; its standard is the law of God. This law also had in
different times a different form. Adam was in a wholly special case; no one
can sin after him in the likeness of his transgression, Romans 5:14. From
Adam to Moses there was no positive law proclaimed by God. The
objection can therefore be made that if there is no law, there can also be no
transgression, sin and death, Romans 5:13, 4:15. In Romans 5:12v. Paul gives no
other answer to that than that through the one transgression of Adam sin as
a power entered into the world and ruled all and thus death passed through
to all men. The transgression of Adam has constituted all as sinners and
subjected all to death. This influence of Adam’s transgression does not
exclude but includes that all men themselves also personally are sinners.
For precisely because through the one transgression of Adam sin began to
rule in the world of men and all consequently were themselves also
personally sinners, therefore death also passed through to all. Paul says no
more in Romans 5:12v. That was there, in that connection, sufficient. But from
elsewhere this answer can be elucidated and supplemented. If from Adam to
Moses there has been sin and death, Romans 5:13, 14, then there must also
have existed a law, indeed no positive one, which with audible voice was
proclaimed by God as in paradise and on Sinai, but nevertheless a law,
which also then bound men personally and rendered them guilty. Paul also
says that clearly in Romans 2:12-16. The Gentiles do not have the Mosaic law,
but they nevertheless sin and perish ἀ νομως, because they are a law to
themselves and their conscience itself accuses them. There is a revelation of
God in nature both of religious and ethical content, which is sufficient to
take away all excuse, Romans 2:18v., 1 Corinthians 1:21. While God, however, let the
Gentiles walk in their own ways, He made His laws and ordinances known
to Israel in a clear way. And this law is now for Israel the standard of all
moral action. In recent times this has indeed been contested, Stade, Gesch.
des Volkes Israel I 1887 S. 507 f. Clemen, Chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 21 f. It is
thought that חטא originally only meant: to be in the wrong or to be placed in
the wrong over against a more powerful one, Exodus 5:16, 1 Kon. 1:21, 2 Kon.
18:14; that it thereafter indicated an acting in conflict with the custom
21:1-14, and that only gradually did it denote an ethical transgression of the
law of God. Through the prophets, indeed, Ihvh first received an ethical
character; while His wrath earlier often flared up without there being any
guilt on the part of man, 2 Samuel 16:10 and one thus could become a sinner
without knowing or willing it, Numbers 22:34, 1 Samuel 14:43 f., now Ihvh could
only be angry over sin; this consisted from now on truly in aberratio a lege
divina. This opinion, however, is contradicted by the facts. Even if חטא in
the first-mentioned three places should have the broader meaning of
suffering injustice in a juridical sense, without there being mention of
ethical guilt, then that would still prove nothing for the thesis that this was
the oldest and original concept of sin among Israel. The word properly
means to miss, Richt. 20:16, and thus alongside the ethical it can also have
had the broader meaning of: to suffer injustice, to be placed in the wrong.
But even that is not yet the case in Exodus 5:16, 1 Kon. 1:21, 2 Kon. 18:14. In
Exodus 5:16 the Israelites simply say to Pharaoh: we get no straw and yet must
make bricks, and if we do not make them, we are nevertheless beaten and
we get the blame, ְָוָחָטאת ַעֶּמ. In 1 Kon. 1:21 Bathsheba says to David: if you
do not decide and Adonijah becomes king, then we, Bathsheba and
Solomon, will soon be the guilty ones, who are killed by Adonijah because
we do not acknowledge him. And in fact we are nevertheless right, on the
ground of your oath v. 17. In 2 Kon. 18:14 Hezekiah makes a confession of
guilt, which is wrung from him in distress and which he himself later does
not acknowledge. Further, it is indeed a fact that the custom of the people
everywhere counts as a standard of moral action, but this is absolutely not
in conflict with the fact that nevertheless the law of God in the last instance
is the norma of good and evil. Joshua 7:15 teaches how both, the transgressing
of the covenant and the doing of a folly in Israel, can coincide. The custom
of the people is in itself as little in conflict with God’s law as the
conscience, which is also a subordinate, subjective norma of the moral life;
always it is and remains, also in the most Christian society, a norma
normata; and also in Israel the custom of the people, e. g. of [77]
hospitality, is not destroyed by the law but indeed acknowledged and
sanctified. Only, where it comes into conflict, it must yield to the law of
God. That now in fact the customs of the people in Israel always agreed
with God’s law or were purified by it, no one asserts, any more than that the
conscience of Christians is already fully conformed to God’s law. Many
deeds of the saints in O. and N. T., of Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Rachel,
David, Peter etc. are therefore also decidedly to be condemned and not,
because they were believers, to be excused with the Rabbis. The essence of
sin is in the end not determined by what under Israel, in the congregation, is
or is not customary, but by the law of God. And this is the standpoint that
Holy Scripture always takes. Sin may be great or small, it is always only
therefore sin, because it goes against God and His law, Genesis 13:13, 20:6,
42:24, Jeremiah 14:7, 20 etc. It always comes down to the Lord’s will and word
and law, to His rights and statutes, to His commandments and ordinances;
to know and to serve God is the all-embracing calling of Israel, and by that
it is tested by the prophets. And likewise it is in the N. T. Jesus sets no one
less than God Himself as example, Matthew 5:48, and judges everything
according to His law, Matthew 19:17-19, Mark 10:17-19, Luke 18:18-20. This is
for Him the content of law and prophets, and He maintains it fully, without
taking anything away from it, Matthew 5:17-19, 23v., 6:16v., 21:12v., 23:3, 23,
24:20 and judges precisely from that standpoint the human ordinances, Matthew 5:20v, 15:2v., Mark 2:23v., 7:8, 13 etc. In Matthew 7:12 he therefore sets forth no
new ethical principle but gives nothing other than a practical interpretation
of the commandment of love of neighbor. The Mosaic law has indeed in
Christ reached its goal and its end, Romans 10:4, Galatians 3:24, and the believer is
free from it and stands in grace, Romans 6:14, 7:4, 10:4, Galatians 2:19, 3:15v.,
5:18, but this freedom nevertheless does not abolish the law but confirms it,
Romans 3:31; its requirement is precisely fulfilled in him who walks
according to the Spirit, Romans 8:4. For that Spirit renews us and teaches us to
examine and know and do what God’s will is, Romans 12:2, Ef. 5:10, Philippians 1:10. That will is knowable from the O. Test., Romans 13:8-10, 15:4, 1 Cor.
and also finds resonance in one’s own conscience, 1 Corinthians 8:7, 10:25, 2 Corinthians 1:12; it is written in the heart of believers, Hebr. 8:10, 10:9. Everywhere in
Scripture the essence of sin is ἀ νομια, 1 John 3:4, deviation from the will of
God, revealed to Adam or Moses or Christ or to the congregation by the
Holy Spirit. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 20-42. Schultz, Altt,
Theol.4 659 f. Smend, Altt. Religionsgesch. 106 f. 119 f. 192 f. etc.
3. By this doctrine of Scripture the conception of sin in Christian theology
was determined. On the one hand, therefore, that opinion could not be
accepted which sought the essence of sin in some substance and therefore
reduced it to a principle of wrath in God (Böhme), or to an evil power
alongside God (Mani), or to some kind of matter, such as the ὑ λη, the σαρξ
(Plato, the Jews, Flacius, etc.). And on the other hand, the theory was also
to be rejected, that sin consisted in a not-yet-being, that it belonged to the
necessary oppositions in life and was by nature proper to the finite man,
developing himself, striving after perfection (Spinoza, Hegel etc.), cf. above
p. 45v. Over against this, Christian theology from the beginning maintained
that sin was no substance. There has never been any difference or conflict
about this. Petavius adduces numerous Church Fathers, who all teach the
same in this respect. Here too no doubt or hesitation was possible. If sin
were a substance, there would be a being that did not have God as author, or
God would also be its cause. Sin therefore had to be conceived and defined
ἀ γαθου, as ἀ σθενεια, ἀ συμμετρια, just as blindness is a deprivation of
sight, Athan. c. Gent. 3 sq. Greg. Nyss., Catech. c. 5. Dionysius, de div.
nom. c. 4. Damasc., de fide orthod. II c. 30. In the West Augustine in
particular brought this privative character of sin to light and maintained it
over against the Manicheans, cf. Nirschl, Ursprung und Wesen des Bösen
nach der Lehre des H. Aug. Regensburg 1854. All being is in itself good.
Omnis natura, in quantum natura est, bona est. Evil therefore can only
be in the good, non potest esse ullum malum nisi in aliquo bono, quia non
potest esse nisi in aliqua natura. It is even nulla natura, but amissio,
privatio, corruptio boni, vitium, defectus naturae; bonum minui, malum est.
de civ. XI 17. 22. Enchir. 11-13 c. Jul. I c. 3. etc. It therefore also has no
causa efficiens, but only deficiens, de civ. XII 7. 9. And likewise by the
scholastics, by the Roman, Luth. and Reformed theologians the concept of
sin in the metaphysical sense was reduced to that of privatio, cf.
Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 34 and 35 and comm. of Thomas, Bonaventura,
etc., further Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 48. 49. c. Gent. III 7 sq. Bonav., Brevil III
1. Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. I c. 1. II c. 18. V c. 1. Becanus,
Theol. schol. II 1 tract. 1 cap. 5 qu. 1. Melanchton, Loc. de peccato.
Gerhard, Loc. X c. 1. Quenstedt, Theol. II p. 50. Hollaz, Ex. theol. 501.
Buddeus, Inst. theol. p. 546. Zanchius, Op. IV 6 sq. Polanus, Synt. Theol. p.
335. Ursinus, Tract. Theol. 1584 p. 199. Hoornbeek, Theol. practica IV c. 1.
Turretinus, Theol. El. loc. IX etc.
On the other hand, however, it is clear that sin is not sufficiently described
by the concept privatio. For it is not a mere lack, not a purely non-being;
but it is an active and destructive principle, a dissolving, devastating power.
Scripture speaks of it mostly in a very positive sense as transgression,
perversity, disobedience, lawlessness, etc., and ascribes to it the activity of
bearing witness, ruling, moving, devising, fighting, etc. Various theologians
have therefore also rejected the distinction between materia and forma in
sin. They appealed, e.g., to the fact that blasphemy against God, idolatry,
hatred against God, etc. as acts were sinful and could never assume a good
forma, and they therefore preferred to define sin as an entitas quaedam
realis ac positiva, as a reale quid, Cajetanus in Becanus t. a. p. Theol.
Wirceb. VII 15. Vitringa Sr., Observ. Sacr. VI c. 15. 16. M. Vitringa, II 288-
290 and furthermore also Arminius, Op. 1629 p. 730. Limborch, Theol. Chr.
V 4. 2. Strauss, Gl. II 360 f. Müller, Sünde I 396-409. Shedd, Dogm. Theol.
I 371. For a correct understanding, however, let the following be noted here.
1o. When most Christian theologians conceived of sin as privatio, they
thereby had first of all the refutation of Manichaeism in view. Insofar their
opinion is also entirely correct and to be accepted without reservation. Sin
is not a substance, neither spiritual nor material, for then it would have God
as its cause, or God would not be the Creator of all things. 2o. Also the
essence of sin itself forbids thinking of it as a substance. For sin is not a
physical but an ethical phenomenon. It is a state and an act of the will and
has its cause in this; it is not given with creation but arose after creation
through disobedience. It therefore cannot be a materia, which existed
eternally or was created in time by God, but has reality only as deformation
of what is; insofar it can even be called an ο ὐ κ ὀ ν, a nihilum. 3o. By that it
is by no means meant that sin is a nihil negativum. Rather, the pantheistic
conception of sin as a pure negation, as a not-yet-being, as a necessary
moment in the development of a finite and limited being, as a delusion of
thought, has at all times been opposed by Christian theology as decisively
as possible. Sin was no mera negatio but a privatio. The difference between
the two consists in this, that negation indicates only lack (carere), privation,
on the other hand, indicates defect (egere); that a stone does not see is a
negation, that a human being does not see is a privation, because seeing
belongs to the qualities of a human being. Sin is a deprivation of that moral
perfection which the human being ought to possess. 4o. The definition of
sin as privatio therefore does not in the least exclude that it also, considered
from another side, is an actio. It is no ο ὐ σια, substantia, res, but indeed in
its deprivation of the good an ἐ νεργεια, just as the limping of the lame man
is not a not-walking but a wrong walking. Augustine, who repeatedly
describes sin as a privatio, therefore calls it a transgressio legis, de cons. Ev.
II c. 4, voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod justitia vetat, de duab. an. c.
Man. I. c. 11. Retract. I 11, a deficere, which includes a tendere, deficere
autem non jam nihil est sed ad nihilum tendere, c. Secund. Man. c. 11,
inclinatio ab eo quod magis est ad id, quod minus est, ib. c. 12, cf. de lib.
arb. I 16 II 19, and then gives this definition of sin: peccatum est factum vel
dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra aeternam legem; lex vero aeterna
est ratio divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari jubens,
perturbari vetans, c. Faust. Man. XXII 27. This definition was later adopted
by all, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 135. Thomas, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 71 art. 6;
sin is no mera or pura privatio sed actus debito ordine privatus, ib. qu. 72
art. 1 ad 2. qu. 75 art. 1 ad 1, a privatio cum positiva qualitute et actione, an
actuosa privatio, Zanchius, Op. IV p. 1 sq. Polanus, Synt. Theol. VI 3.
Heidegger, Corp. Theol. X 8. Bucanus, Inst. Theol. XV 7. Synopsis pur.
theol. XVI 4-9 etc.
4. On the basis of Holy Scripture and in accordance with the confession of
the Christian faith, the essence of sin can therefore be more precisely
described and elucidated in the following manner. 1o. Since sin is not a
physical or metaphysical but an ethical antithesis of the good, it has no
proper, independent existence, existing independently of the being of
things. Whoever regards sin as a substance may indeed seem deeply
penetrated by its power and significance, but in fact weakens it, transfers it
from the ethical to the physical domain, and makes the struggle between
good and evil into a wrestling between light and darkness, spirit and matter,
a good and an evil God, which never ends and makes all redemption from
sin impossible. Therefore it is of the highest importance to regard sin
always as an ethical phenomenon. The punishments and consequences of
sin certainly also extend over the physical domain, but sin itself is and
remains of an ethical nature. Then it also can have no proper principle and
no independent existence; it arose after and exists only through and by the
good. Evil is indeed dependent on the good, but not conversely. Τ ῳ μεν γαρ
τιμιωτερον προτερον ε ἰ ναι τ ῃ φυσει δοκει, Arist., Categ. c. 9. Good (true) is
the index of itself and of evil (false). The good has been the cause of evil by
free choice, and remains its substrate. Fallen angels and human beings are
and remain as creatures good, and exist from moment to moment only
through and in and unto God. And just as in its origin and in its being, so sin
also in its works and struggles remains dependent on the good. It is able
only to do something with and by means of the powers and gifts that
have been bestowed by God. Satan is therefore rightly called the simia Dei;
if God establishes a church, he builds a chapel; over against a true one, he
awakens a false prophet; over against the Christ he sets the antichrist. Even
a band of robbers can exist only if it respects justice within its own circle. A
liar adorns himself with the appearance of truth. A sinner pursues evil sub
ratione boni. Satan appears as an angel of light. Sin is always doomed, in its
operation and appearance, in spite of itself to borrow from virtue. It lies
under the unbreakable fatality, that, striving after the destruction of all
good, it simultaneously also works toward its own death. It is a parasite of
the good. 2o. Although sin thus by virtue of its nature strives toward nonbeing, it nevertheless has no power over being itself. It cannot create; it also
cannot destroy. Through sin, therefore, neither the essence of the angels, nor
that of human beings, nor that of nature has been changed. They are
essentially the same creatures before and after the fall, with the same
substance, the same faculties, the same powers. Before and after the fall, the
human being has soul and body, intellect and will, affections and passions.
What has changed is not the substance, the materia, but the forma, in which
it appears, the direction in which it works. With the same power of love
with which the human being originally loved God, he now loves the
creature. The same intellect with which he formerly contemplated the things
that are above him now makes him, with admirable acuteness and
profundity, honor the lie as truth. With the same freedom with which he
once served God, he now serves the world. Substantially nothing has been
taken away from the human being by sin and nothing has been brought into
him. It is the same human being, but now walking, not toward God, but
away from God, toward destruction. Peccatum non est essentia aliqua sed
defectus et corruptela, qua scilicet corrumpitur modus, species et ordo,
Bonaventura, Brevil. III 1. 3o. Also the loss of the image of God and the
breaking of the covenant of works is not in conflict with this conception of
sin. The image of God, after all, although not a donum superadditum and
belonging to the human being by nature, was not a substantia but an
accidens; i.e. the human being, as he was created, was so constituted that
his nature of itself, without supernatural grace, yet not without God’s
good providence, brought along and manifested knowledge and holiness
and righteousness, which were the principal content of the image of God.
When the human being, however, fell, he lost nothing substantial, not even
a faculty and no power, but because sin has damaged the forma of his whole
nature, of all his faculties and powers, all these now work in such a way that
they no longer produce the knowledge of God and righteousness but
precisely the opposite. The human being therefore by the fall did not merely
lose an insubstantial addition to his nature, a donum superadditum, while
otherwise his nature remained intact; he also did not become a devil, who,
incapable of re-creation, can never again display the traits of the image of
God; but while he has remained essentially and substantially the same, i.e.
human, and has retained all human constituent parts, faculties, and powers,
the forma of all these, the nature and character, the disposition and
direction, has been so changed that they now, instead of God’s will, fulfill
the law of the flesh. The image has been changed into a caricature. And
likewise the foedus operum has been broken, insofar as by the works of the
law no flesh can any longer be justified, Romans 3:20, Galatians 3:2, but it is so
little destroyed and abolished that the law of that foedus operum still
obliges every human being to absolute obedience, that it has been taken up
and perfectly fulfilled in the covenant of grace by Christ, and now remains
for believers still a rule of gratitude. 4o. Abstracting from the good substrate
by which sin is borne and to which it clings, it therefore can never be
described otherwise than as privatio boni. One should, however, well
consider that then sin is spoken of abstractive and metaphysice. And thus
described, it has no being, it is no substance, but a nihil, nothing positive
but only something privative; whoever wished to conceive it otherwise
would thereby, in a Manichaean sense, make evil independent and eternal
and set over against the summum bonum a summum malum. The abovementioned objection, raised against the definition of sin as privatio,
therefore actually rests on misunderstanding. Abstractive and metaphysice
sin is a privatio and on a Christian standpoint it cannot and may not be
conceived otherwise. But concretive it occurs in no other way than as a
wrong forma of a definite state or act and makes that state or that act itself
sinful, just as a disease, without being a substance, nevertheless makes the
body sick. In concreto sin is therefore always in and on something that is
substantially good. It may be difficult to distinguish in particular cases of
sin between materia and forma, and much more difficult to separate them,
just as at a given moment the heat of the stove cannot be separated. Yet, just
as therefore the stove is not the heat itself, so the being or the act to which
sin attaches itself is not to be identified with sin. Even in blasphemy the
power needed to utter it and the language of which it makes use are in
themselves good; what makes these and what makes all things wrong and
sinful is the deformitas, the aberratio a lege divina. 5o. For the standard of
sin is God’s law alone. What sin is is in the last instance determined, not by
the church (Rome) or the state (Hobbes), not by the independent moral law
(Grotius) or the autonomous I (Kant), not by humanity (Comte) or the
social instincts (Darwin), but solely and only by the law of God. The
concept sin expresses this clearly and is therefore avoided by all who know
no higher standard for moral evil than a human one. God is also the only
one who has absolute authority over us and can bind and obligate us in the
conscience. Now He gave many laws for the different creatures, laws for
sun and moon, heaven and earth, plant and animal, human being and angel;
and, as far as the human being is concerned, again different laws for his
bodily, spiritual, intellectual, aesthetic life, etc., also proper laws for his
moral life. More precisely, it is now this moral law which is the standard of
all sin. Transgression of all other laws, logical, aesthetic, social, political,
ecclesiastical, etc., is only then and insofar sin as it directly or indirectly
includes a transgression of the moral law, of the command of God. This
moral law, which was implanted in the human being at his creation,
continues to work after the fall in his conscience, was proclaimed by God
on Sinai, and also remains for believers a rule of life, is the source of
knowledge of sin, Romans 3:20, 4:14, 5:20, 7:7. Indeed, very certainly the
Christian faith is necessary in order to learn to know sin rightly, and indeed
in the gospel, as by way of contrast, the nature and the magnitude of
sin is made manifest, Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 112 5. Ritschl, Rechtf. u.
Vers. III2 384 f. Kaftan. Wesen der chr. Relig. 250, but all that nevertheless
does nothing to alter the fact that not the gospel but the law is the
Erkenntnissgrund of sin. In that moral law God comes to us not only as
Father with fatherly admonitions and chastisements, but, as the categorical
imperative testifies in everyone, also as Lawgiver and Judge with
commands and punishments. Although not coercive like the logical and not
unbreakable like the laws of nature, the moral law in majesty surpasses all
others; it addresses itself to the will, breathes in freedom, demands
fulfillment out of love; and yet it turns to all human beings without
distinction, comes to them in all circumstances, extends over their words
and deeds not only but also over their state, knows of no yielding and of no
excusing, speaks inexorably, categorically, with sovereign authority and
avenges each of its transgressions in strict punishment. It is a decretum
Numinis, revelation of God’s will, expression of his being. 6o. From this
character of the moral law it follows that sin can dwell only in a rational
creature. Irrational nature can suffer under the consequences of sin, but sin
occurs only in a being endowed with intellect and will. More precisely, the
will is the proper subject, το δεικτικον, of sin. The moral law is precisely
the law for the will of the creature; the moral good is of such a nature that it
can be realized only by the will. What absolutely and decisively proceeds
outside any influence of the will can be no sin. In that sense Augustine
rightly said: adeo peccatum voluntarium est malum ut nullo modo sit
peccatum, si non sit voluntarium, de vera relig. 14. But this word is
susceptible to misunderstanding. And when the Pelagians made use of it as
proof that sin can never exist otherwise than in an act of will, Augustine
later gave it such an explanation that sins of ignorance, of concupiscence,
and original sin were not excluded by it, Retract. I 13; and elsewhere he
expressly says that the law also forbids the motus concupiscentiae
involuntarios, de spir. et lit. c. 36. de nupt. I 17. 23. c. Jul. IV c. 2. VI c. 8.
de civ. XIV 10. In accordance with that, many scholastics still taught that
sin indeed had in the will its ultimate cause and thus in that sense
always had its seat in the will, but then nevertheless not in voluntate sicut in
subjecto sed sicut in causa, Thomas, Sent. II dist. 24 qu. 3 art. 2 ad 2. S.
Theol. II 1 qu. 74 art. 2. II 2 qu. 10 art. 2; sin therefore can also have its seat
in the sensualitas, even if it is then only a peccatum veniale, Lombardus,
Sent. II dist. 24, 8. Thomas, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 74 art. 3. Bonaventura,
Brevil. III c. 8 Sent. II dist. 24 pars. 2 art. 2 qu. 2. But various reasons
gradually brought about a modification in this doctrine. The concupiscentia
was an unclear concept; it could be understood equally in bonam as in
malam partem, since many natural desires that arise of themselves in us,
such as e.g. of the hungry person for food, are nevertheless no sin;
Augustine therefore spoke of the concupiscentia sometimes in such a way
that it was no sin and could not harm, if only it was not consented to in
conflict with the law, c. Jul. VI 5. de Gen. c. Manich. II 14 etc. Further,
scholasticism gradually began to distinguish between motus primo-primi,
secundo-primi and plane deliberati, i.e. between such thoughts and desires
as rise in us before all consent of the will, wholly involuntarily, and are no
sin at all; such as against which the will does indeed resist but by which it is
overcome and which are venial sins; and such as in which the will
consciously and fully consents and which are mortal sins. And in addition
there came still that original sin was increasingly conceived more weakly
and was regarded as wholly annulled by baptism; what remained, the
concupiscentia, was itself no sin but could only become an occasion for
sinning. Thus Rome also determined that guilt and stain of original sin are
wholly taken away by baptism, that the concupiscentia indeed remains but
does not harm those who do not consent to it, and can only be called sin,
quia ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat, Trid. V 5, and further Cat. Rom.
II 2, 7. Becanus, Theol. schol. II 1519 p. 145-150. Sylvius, Comm. in totam
primam sec. S. Thomae, ed. 4 II p. 336 sq. Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et
statu pecc. I 1. V 520. Daelman, Theol. II 1759 p. 174 sq. Dens, Theol. I
1828 p. 314 sq. Kleutgen, Theol. d. Vorz. II 644. The Reformation opposed
this and asserted that also impure thoughts and desires that rise in us before
and without our will are sin; by that it did not mean that all desiring in a
psychological and philosophical sense was sin, but that the concupiscentia
in Scriptural and theological meaning made us guilty before God. And in
this it undoubtedly was right. For certainly sin began with a conscious and
free act of will. But that first sinful act has not passed by us without trace; it
has corrupted the whole human nature and left a state that in all respects is
in conflict with the law of God. Although sin thus arose through the will, it
now in fact does exist outside the will and has its seat also in all other
faculties and powers of the human being, in soul and body, in lower and
higher cognitive and appetitive faculty, Genesis 6:3, 8:21, Exodus 20:17, Psalms 19:13,
voluntate non potest esse peccatum, quia sine voluntate non potest existere
ut sit; sine autem voluntate potest esse, quia sine voluntate potest manere
quod existit, Aug. in Dorner, Augustinus 129. Lutheran and Reformed
theologians therefore usually contested the proposition that all peccatum
was voluntarium. By that, however, they by no means meant that there
could also be sin that proceeded wholly and absolutely outside the faculty
of will. It only depends on forming a correct conception of the nature and
operation of the will. The will, namely, is absolutely not the whole
appetitive faculty, but of that only a particular power and activity, cf. my
Beginselen der Psychologie 1897 p. 166v. The will in this narrower sense
precedes only actual sins, as James 1:15 speaks of them, but absolutely not
state-sins and involuntary sins. If the voluntarium in this sense were a
necessary element of sin, not only would all impure thoughts and desires
cease to be sin, but with the slogan tout comprendre serait tout pardonner
almost all actual sins would also be excusable. In order to be able to
maintain the innocence of the concupiscentia, Bellarminus already came to
the explanation: non omne quod repugnat legi peccatum est, the motus
involuntarii are indeed in conflict with the law but nevertheless no sins, de
amiss. gr. et st. pecc. V 10. But even if it is the case that the voluntarium in
this narrow sense does not always constitute the concept of sin, nevertheless
the state-sins and the involuntary sins do not therefore proceed wholly
outside the will; there is not only a voluntas antecedens, but also a voluntas
concomitans, consequens, approbans; the will later approves in a
stronger or weaker degree the sinfulness of our nature, of our thoughts, and
takes pleasure in it. And also when later the will, instructed by reason,
resists it, or the regenerate can testify with Paul that he does not will the
evil that he does, then thereby certainly the degree of sin is diminished, but
the nature of sin is not determined. For this has its standard only in God’s
law; Paul calls what he does not will but nevertheless in fact does indeed
sin, and assents to the law that it is good. Yet even then, even the sin that is
committed without being willed does not proceed wholly outside the will.
For very certainly Paul can say: I no longer do it but the sin that dwells in
me, and thus make an antithesis between his reborn I and his unreborn
flesh, but Augustine has rightly already explained these words thus: etsi
concupiscentiae non consentio, etsi post concupiscentias meas non eo,
tamen adhuc concupisco et utique etiam in ipsa parte ego sum. Non enim
ego alius in mente et alius in carne. Sed quid igitur ipse ego? Quia ego in
mente, ego in carne. Non enim duae naturae contrariae sed ex utroque unus
homo, quia unus deus a quo factus est homo, de verbis apost. serm. 5. For it
is not another being that in the flesh does the sin, and another that
nevertheless does not will it. But it is in both cases the same human being,
who on the one hand in the concupiscentia in an impure way chases after
the forbidden and yet on the other hand in the deepest of his will turns away
from it and fights against it. And therefore, because the human being, even
the regenerate, as long as he is in the flesh, always in weaker or stronger
measure still desires the forbidden, even if it is the case that with his will in
the narrower sense he goes against it, therefore it can be said that all sin is
nevertheless in the deepest ground voluntary. There is no one and nothing
that compels the sinner to serve sin. Sin does not have its seat outside him
but in him and has directed his thinking and desiring in its direction. It is his
sin, insofar as he has made it his own by means of his various faculties and
powers. Cf. Melanchton, Apol. Conf. art. 2. Loci C. de peccato. Form.
Conc. II 1. Gerhard, Loc. X c. 6 en 11. Quenstedt, Theol. II 60. 92. 139.
56 sq. Beza, Tract. II 345. Polanus, Synt. p. 336, Martyr, L. C. 70.
Turretinus, Theol. El. IX qu. 2. XI qu. 21. Mastricht IV 2, 22. Burmannus,
Synopsis II 7, 9. C. Vitringa, Observ. Sacr. I 563. M. Vitringa II 293. Moor
III 132. Many Comm. on Exodus 20:17, Romans 7:7, Galatians 5:16, Heid. Cat, Q. 113
etc. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 131. 202. Müller, Sünde I5 251 f. My
Beginselen der Psychol. 145-148. Thus it finally appears 7o that sin is an
incomprehensible riddle. We do not know whence it is, nor what it is. It is
there and has no right of existence. It exists and no one explains its origin. It
itself came into the world without motive and yet has become the motive
for all thinking and acting of human beings. It is, abstractly considered,
nothing but a privation and yet in concreto a power that rules all and
everything. It has no proper, independent principle and yet is a principle
that devastates the whole creation. It lives from the good and combats it
unto destruction. It is nothing and has nothing and can do nothing without
the beings and powers which God has created, and yet organizes all these to
the revolt against Him. It combats with what is God’s all that is God’s. It is
the will of the weak, finite creature in resistance against the Creator;
dependence, in enmity against the Independent One and itself chasing after
independence; the becoming that has no permanence in struggle with the
eternally Being; the greatest contradiction, tolerated by God in his creation
and by Him, in the way of right and righteousness, used as an instrument
for his glory. Cf. Further on the essence of sin: Tholuck, Die Lehre v. d.
Sünde u. vom Versöhner8 1862. Müller, Sünde5 1867. Weiszäcker, Zu der
Lehre v. Wesen der Sünde, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1856 S. 131-195. Krabbe, Die
Lehre v. d. Sünde u. v. Tode 1836. Vilmar, Theol. Moral I 143 f. Philippi,
Kirchl. Gl. III. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk I3 181 f. Dorner, Gl. II
4 f. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrheit I2 417 f. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 287 f.
Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I Die biblische Lehre 1897. Walther,
Das Wesen der Sünde, Neue Kirchl. Zeits. April 1898 S. 284-325 enz.
5. Although sin is always one in principle and essence and always consists
in ἀ νομια, there are in its manifestations and operations very different
degrees. First of all there is a great distinction between diabolical and
human sin. In the Old Test. we do not yet find a developed demonology.
That in Gen. 3 an evil, spiritual power appears, we know only first from the
to be regarded as elements of revelation; and that with ֲעָזאֵזל, Lev. 16, one
must think of an evil spirit, is unprovable. Of evil spirits there is mention
only in 1 Samuel 16:14-23 and 1 Kon. 22:19v., and of Satan in Job 1, 1 Chronicles 21:1, Zach. 3. The separation between good and evil angels has not yet been
completed; the evil spirit still goes out from God, Satan still finds himself
among the sons of God; only gradually does the antithesis become sharper.
The word satan means adversary and can in itself have a good sense; it
hindrances on the way, 2 Samuel 19:23, of a human accuser, Psalms 109:6, 20, 29,
even of the Malak Ihvh, who steps in Balaam’s way, Numbers 22:22, 32. But
yet Satan in the O. T. is already thought of as a being that stands hostile
over against God and his people. And when revelation is completed and
Christ comes, to break the works of the devil, then also the βαθη του
σατανα become manifest. The N. Test. makes known to us a βασιλεια, Matthew 12:26, Mark 3:24, Luke 11:17, 18, of evil spirits, which forms the antithesis
of Christ and his kingdom. At the head stands Satan, called by different
12:10, βελιαρ (syr. for βελιαλ, worthlessness), πονηρος, Matthew 13:19, Ef. 6:16,
dwelling, but probably arisen from βεελζεβουβ, fly-god, art. Herzog3 2,
under him stand many δαιμονια, δαιμονες, πνευματα πονηρα, ἀ καθαρτα,
πνευματικα της πονηριας, which again are distinguished into all kinds of
classes and ranks, 1 Corinthians 15:21, Ef. 6:12, Colossians 2:15, Jud. 6, also in
wickedness the one still surpassing the other, Matthew 12:45, Luke 11:26, [91]
and together are Satan’s ἀ γγελοι, Matthew 25:41, 2 Corinthians 12:7, Op. 12:7, 9. Cf.
Hofmann, Schriftbeweis 12 418 f. Sander, Die Lehre der H. Schrift vom
Teufel 1858. Oehler, Theol. des A. T. § 200. Knenen, G. v. I. II 256v. Hahn,
Theol. des N. T. § 128 f. Schwartzkopff, Der Teufels- und Daemonenglaube
Jesu, Zeits. f. Theol. u. Kirche von Gottschick, VII 1897 S. 289-330.
Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I 53 f. 167. II 238 f. etc. Weser, Die verschiedenen
Auffassungen vom Teufel im N. T., Stud. u. Krit. 1882 S. 284 f. Everling,
Die paulin. Angelologie und Daemonologie, Göttingen 1888. Even if there
is thus among them still some difference in strength and wickedness, all
together they are nevertheless presented as thoroughly corrupt. They are
always and everywhere the opponents of God, the disturbers of his
kingdom, the combatants of Christ, the seducers of men, the accusers of
God’s children; they live in sin as in their element. Never do they occur as
an object of God’s love, although they are his creatures; Christ has not
assumed their nature; an object of our love, of our intercession they may not
be; for them there is no hope of restoration and preservation.
There is in the being and concept of the devils something completely
incomprehensible. Wir können des absolute böse Wesen immer nur unter
der Bedingung denken, dass wir entweder an der absoluten Bosheit oder an
der wahren Existenz etwas fehlen lassen, C. J. Nitzsch, Syst. d. chr. Lehr §
116. F. A. B. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 337. Absolutely evil they cannot be, for
they are creatures of God and thus as such good; and yet they are only the
object of God’s hatred and of his eternal wrath. Because of this
incomprehensibility of the nature of the devils many have denied their
existence, and have regarded them as souls of deceased human beings or as
personifications of our evil sins or as impersonal principles of evil, Bekker,
Betov. Werelt II c. 20v. Semler, de daemoniacis 1760. Schleiermacher, Chr.
Dogm. § 99 f. Mallet, art. Teufel in Herzog. Strauss, Chr. Gl. II 1 f.
Biedermann, Dogm. 614 f. Lipsius, Dogm. § 521-524 enz. But the reality of
Satan and his angels has been placed beyond doubt by Scripture; of
accommodation there is not the least to be thought; Jesus has, in a very
weighty point of religion, wholly and entirely erred, or it is thus, as He has
said. And the doctrine of Satan is for the whole Christian doctrine also
far from indifferent. It is of value over against Manichaeism, for Satan is
not an original being but a fallen angel; over against Pelagianism, for Satan
has by one decision of the will become wholly and entirely corrupted; over
against the conception of sin as weakness and sensuality, for Satan is a high,
glorious, rich spirit; over against the opinion that sin is a passing moment in
development, for Satan remains Satan and is never restored; over against
the lowering of man to a devil, for Satan has fallen of himself, man was
seduced by him, is not unschuldig but also not urschuldig; over against the
conception of the atonement as an ethical process, for Christ has come to
break the works of the devil. Faith in Satan’s existence is not an element of
saving faith in Christ; but it nevertheless is connected with it. There lies
truth in the: nullus diabolus, nullus redemptor! If there were no sin, there
would be no redeemer, and the seriousness of sin comes out precisely most
clearly in the doctrine of Satan. From everything that Scripture testifies
concerning the angels, it nevertheless appears that the moral life in them
bears another character than in human beings. Human beings are, in every
domain and thus also in the moral, subject to development; they are born
small, in knowledge, strength, virtue or vice, and gradually grow up in all
these. But thus it is not with the angels. They have all been created at the
same time with one another and mature; those who remained standing were
at once confirmed in the good, and they who fell were immediately
hardened and perfected in evil. Satan was not seduced, but he brought forth
the lie, the sin out of himself, John 8:44, and in that has at once become
hardened. The nature of his sin is such that he is no longer susceptible to
any repentance; of a moral consciousness, of a conscience there is in him no
question; he lives from hatred. Der eigentlich satanische Charakter besteht
in einem Hass alles dessen, was über ihm und bloss weil es über ihm ist
(Baader). Sin also in the devils is no materia but forma; there is no
summum malum, as there is a summum bonum; but the forma of sin has
become so one with the angelic nature that no separation is any longer
possible. It is indeed all too bold to assert that the fallen angels are also for
God’s omnipotence irredeemable; and it is better to rest here in God’s
good pleasure, Voetius, Disp. I 920. Turret., Th. El. IX 5, 8. Heidegger,
Corp. Th. VIII 49. Moor II 414. But yet it appears sufficiently that that good
pleasure is no arbitrariness. Here on earth there is already among human
beings a sin that is unforgivable, viz. the blasphemy against the H. Geest;
with death, i.e. with that peculiar dispensation in which we live here on
earth, the forgiveness of all sins ceases; the nature of sin cuts off, in the case
of the fallen angels, the way of redemption. To which then is added that the
angels are not one race. Human beings could fall and have fallen in one;
and they can be saved and are saved in one. But the devils have not fallen in
one, not in another, but each for himself and head for head; there was
among them no foedus operum, and therefore there is also for no foedus
gratiae place. The satanic sin is thus, with all agreement, nevertheless in
origin, nature, consequences a wholly other than the human. It bears an
absolute character; Satan is the highest revelation of evil. Therefore he is in
Scripture named with such mighty, lofty names as prince of the world, god
of this age, etc. But therefore also the victory over Satan is the complete
triumph of sin. God has in Satan given it every opportunity to show what it
is and can do. The highest and best, the noblest and greatest in God’s
creation it has made subservient to itself. And yet it appears at last, in the
struggle of power against right, to be powerless. Es ist der Charakter des
Bösen, dass es immer mit Energie anfängt und mit Schwäche aufhört
(Baader). Sin is not, it wants to be; it has no true reality and never attains to
that; it is lie in its origin and lie in its end. And therefore Satan at last, with
all his power, is subservient to God’s glorification. Luzifer ist, kann man
sagen, durch die Probe inne geworden, dass nichts wahrhaft ist als Gott.
Darum ist Luzifer so gut ein Beweis Gottes als ein Engel. Wenn der Gute
beweist, dass Gott ist, so beweist der Böse, dass nur Gott ist (Baader). Cf.
Augustinus, de civ. XI en XII. Anselmus, de casu diaboli. Lombardus, Sent.
II dist. 2-7. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 63. 64. Petavius, de Angelis l. III.
Gerhard, Loc. V c. 4. sect. 10 sq. Quenstedt, Theol. I 450 sq. Zanchius, Op.
III 167-216. Voetius, Disp. I 906 sq. Daub, Judas Ischarioth, Heidelb.
1816. 1818. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III 251 f. Lange, Dogm. II 559 f. Dorner II
188 f. Oosterzee § 76. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. I2 428.
6. Apart from between the devilish and the human sins, there is also again
great distinction among the latter. The Stoa, Novatian, Seb. Franck, Deurhof
and others have wrongly denied this, M. Vitringa II 377. Indeed, in
principle sin and virtue are indivisible; whoever has one has them all and
whoever lacks one lacks them all; between good and evil there is no gradual
transition, someone agrees with the law of God or not: and the law of God
is an organism which, if one of its commandments is transgressed, is
violated in its entirety, for God, who gave the commandment that was
transgressed, is the author of all the other commandments, Jak. 2:10, cf.
Vinet, L’unité de la loi, in his Nouvelles études évangéliques. Rothe, Theol.
Ethik § 730. 731. But for that reason not all sins are equal. The different
names, in use for sin, already point to that. In the offering of Cain and Abel
in Gen. 4 it comes out that the disposition is of more value than the gift. The
law, given to Israel, does indeed contain all kinds of ceremonial
commandments, but throughout the whole O. T. ethical action nevertheless
stands far above the cultic and liturgical; faith is reckoned for righteousness,
Genesis 15:6, obedience is better than offering, 1 Samuel 15:22, Amos 2:6, 5:14,
16:49, 18:5v., Zach. 7:5v., Malachi 3:5 etc., cf. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d.
Sünde I 70. When after the exile Pharisaism arises and reverses this
relation, Jesus and the apostles return again to law and prophets, Mt. 5-7,
5:19v., etc. The law itself moreover makes a distinction between sins ִּבְׁשָגָגה,
which are committed without evil intent, out of ignorance or weakness, do
not break the covenant and can be atoned for within the covenant, and sins
ְבָיד ָרָמה, which are committed with awareness and deliberately, place the
perpetrator outside the covenant and make him worthy of death, Lev. 4, 5,
22:14, Numbers 15:22v., 35:11v., Joshua 20:3, 9. Scripture never abandons the
objective standpoint, which seeks the standard of sin only in the law of
God. But nevertheless the guilt of the transgression is still smaller or
greater, according as the commandment was violated with weaker or
stronger awareness and will. On the one hand Stade, Gesch. des Volkes
Sam. 14:24v., 36v., that to ancient Israel the distinction between conscious
and unconscious transgressions was unknown and one thus could become
guilty wholly outside his knowing and willing; for all these passages hold
the ignorance to be a selbstverschuldete or speak of no guilt. But on the
other hand it is nevertheless also not true, dass Sünde im Allgemeinen nur
ist, sofern auch ein Bewusstsein derselben ist, Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. 68,
2. Sin does indeed presuppose some knowledge of the law; a human being
without the least moral sense would be not accountable but would also
cease to be human, Romans 2:14, 15; and sin does indeed usually go together
with some consciousness of guilt, but nevertheless the standard of sin is not
the consciousness of guilt but the law of God. There are sins which are
hidden not only from others, but also from ourselves, Job 11:4v., Psalms 19:13,
90:8, or are only later recognized and confessed as guilt, Psalms 25:7, 51:7.
Ignorance is also often itself sin, and the consciousness of guilt weakens,
the longer sin is served, Amos 2:11, Hosea 4:6, Mich. 3:1, 6:8, Spr. 24:12,
Pred. 4:17. Therefore the subjective consciousness of guilt cannot
determine the character of sin. Although ignorance thus can never make the
sin itself good, it nevertheless often, when it is not willful, serves as an
excuse. Paul says that he formerly was a blasphemer, persecutor and
oppressor, but adds that mercy was shown to him because he did it
ignorantly, 1 Timothy 1:13. And thus Holy Scripture speaks repeatedly of the
sins of the Jews and of the Gentiles, as done in ignorance, Luke 23:34, Hd.
sins are indeed not stripped of their guilty character, as Ritschl, Rechtf. u.
Vers.2 II 38. 241-246. III 350-354 seems to think; for Rom. 1-3, 5:12v., Ef.
nevertheless these sins, done in ignorance, are thereby distinguished from
sins that have arisen from hardening; the ignorance offers a ground of plea
for forgiveness. And just as sins differ in degree and measure,
according as they are committed out of ignorance and weakness or out of
intent and malice, so they are also distinguished according to the object
against which they are directed: sins against the first table are heavier than
against the second, Matthew 22:37, 38; according to the subject that commits
them: the more richly someone is endowed with gifts, the guilt of his
according to the circumstances under which they are committed: he who
steals out of poverty sins less heavily than he who does it out of greed, Spr.
6:30, Jes. 26:10; according to the degree to which someone yields to sin: he
who commits adultery with thought and word stands guilty but aggravates
his judgment if he completes the sin in deed, Matthew 5:28. There is also in sin a
development, there is a law of sin. A particular sin comes gradually into
being through suggestio, delectatio, consensus, operatio; in suggestione
peccati semen est, in delectatione fit nutrimentum, in consensu perfectio,
Gregorius M., cf. Lombardus, Sent. II 24, 8. Bonav., Brevil. III 8. And thus
sin also develops gradually with a person, in a household and family, with a
society and people, and also in the whole of humanity. Sin is indeed not in
itself so rich that it can assume so many forms, for it is no independent
principle and is metaphysically nothing but privatio boni. But as in its
origin, so it also exists in its development only in and through the good. It
connects itself with the endless richness of the created, devastates all that
exists, fights with the whole world as its instrument against God and his
holy law, and thereby assumes all those different forms and shapes which
all together give it the character of a well-governed kingdom, of an
organism animated by one principle, of a κοσμος, standing under the
guidance of the ἀ ρχων του κοσμου, den θεος του α ἰ ωνος.
Since sin in its essence is privatio, neither a principium dividendi nor also
a divisio can be derived from it itself. Privatio receives its species from the
form to which it is opposed. The earlier dogmatics and ethics therefore did
indeed speak of the character of the first sin, but otherwise made no effort
to trace out a so-called principle of sin and to reduce all transgressions of
the moral law to it. Only in later times has one attempted to establish such a
principle, and has sought it in turn in sensuousness, Schleiermacher,
Chr. Gl. § 66 e. a. or in selfishness, Müller, Sünde I5 178. Tholuck, Sünde8
18. 98. Vilmar, Moral I 136. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III2 3. Lange, art.
Selbstsucht in Herzog and further Thomasius, Kahnis, Frank, Zöckler etc.,
or also in both, Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 461. Lipsius, Dogm. § 480. Indeed,
human sins also for the most part display the character of sensuousness or
selfishness, of fleshly lust or spiritual pride, of weakness or wickedness;
sometimes sin seems to consist in the dominion of matter over the spirit,
sometimes also in a misuse of freedom, in revolt against God’s ordinances.
But yet it has succeeded neither for Rothe, to explain selfishness from
sensuousness, nor also for J. Müller with his praeëxistentianism, to explain
sensuousness from selfishness, cf. Dorner, Gl. II 90-98. And that is also
easy to understand. Metaphysically and abstractly sin cannot be otherwise
and cannot be more closely defined than as privatio boni; then it has no
principle of its own, no real existence; it exists only on the good. The forms
which it assumes it derives from the good, in which it dwells and which it
corrupts. It will therefore differ in appearance according as to the creatures
in which it is seated. Although always privatio boni, it bears in angels and
men and even in each of these again a particular character. And since man
by nature is neither only a sensuous nor only a spiritual being but always
both together, therefore all sin in him will also display this character. No
single sin of man is exclusively sensuousness or exclusively selfishness.
Just as with the first sin in Adam, there are in every sin various sides to be
noticed, even if it is also the case that usually the one is more striking than
the other. Every sin in man is aversio a Deo, disobedience, revolt, anarchy,
anomie and at the same time, since he never has enough in himself,
conversio ad creaturam, idolatry, pride, selfishness, sensuousness etc.,
Bonaventura, Sent. II dist. 42 art. 3 qu. 2. And since the creatures to which
man can turn are so many, therefore sin in him can also assume so many
forms. There are as many kinds of sins as there are different
commandments, duties, virtues, moral goods. Thomas divided the sins
according to the objects to which they are directed, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 72 art.
1, Scotus according to the virtues to which they are opposed, Sent. II
dist. 37 qu. 1, 9, cf. Liguori, Theol. mor. de pecc II. n. 32. And alongside
that there still existed many other divisions, such as that into seven capital
sins, superbia, avaritia, luxuria, via, gula, invidia, acedia (vox memorialis:
saligia); according to the norma into sins against the different
commandments of the law or into sins against God, the neighbour and
ourselves; according to the instrument with which they are committed, into
sins with thoughts, words and works, or into sins of the spirit and of the
flesh, or in accordance with 1 John 2:16 into peccata sentiendi, sciendi et
dominandi, or into sins of weakness, ignorance and wickedness; according
to the form into sins of omission and of commission, or into sins per se and
per accidens; according to the adjuncta into hidden and public, reigning and
not reigning, silent and crying sins etc., cf. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 42.
Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 72. Gerhard, Loc. X c. 5 sq. Ursinus, Tract. Theol.
202. Moor III 313. Mastricht, Theol. IV 3,10. Heidegger, Corpus Theol. X
61. Vilmar, Theol. Moral I 221. Zöckler, Das Lehrstück v. d. sieben
Hauptsünden, München 1893 etc.
Leaving further elaboration to ethics, we here discuss only the Roman
distinction of sins into peccata mortalia and venialia. This has its origin in
the practice of penance, cf. Pijper, Gesch. der boete en biecht in de Chr.
Kerk I 1891 bl. 306v., and in substance already occurs in Tertullian, de
pudic. 2. 3. 19. adv. Marc. IV 9, and in Augustine, who spoke of peccata
levia, brevia, minuta, minima, quotidiana, which still remain in believers,
Enchir. 44. 71. de civ. XXI 27. de nat. et gr. 39. de spir. et litt. 36. Worked
out by scholasticism, Lombard and others on Sent. II dist. 42. Thomas, S.
Theol. II 1 qu. 88. 89, it was established by the church, Trid. VI c. 11 can.
27 XIV 5. Cat. Rom. II 5 qu. 40, and since then defended by all theologians
with zeal against all opposition, Bellarmine, de amiss. gr. I c. 3 sq. Becanus,
Theol. Schol. II 1619 p. 117. Liguori, Theol. Mor., de pecc. n. 51 sq.
Busenbaum, Theol. mor., de pecc. qu. 31 sq. Antoine, Theol. Mor., de pecc.
c. 2 etc. According to this distinction there are sins which cause the received
grace to be lost and are worthy of death, and others, such as an idle word,
an overly boisterous laugh, an involuntarily surging desire, agitation, [99]
anger, a very small theft, etc., which do not cause grace to be lost, not so
much contra as praeter legem, and are by nature pardonable. The distinction
is grounded on the fact that Scripture speaks of different sins and
3:14, and yet often continues to recognize believers as such, even though
they stumble in many things, Spr. 24:16, Matthew 1:19, Luke 1:6, Jak. 3:2, and
furthermore also on the consideration that there exist curable and incurable
diseases and that there are small offenses which do not abolish friendship.
The Reformers rejected this distinction as in conflict with God’s Word.
They did not deny that there were degrees in sins; and they also still
retained the terms peccata mortalia and venialia, but they attached another
meaning to them. The Lutherans had, to a certain extent, still to adopt the
distinction, because believers could commit sins in which grace was
preserved, and others in which it was lost, Luther in Köstlin, Luthers Theol.
II 472 f. Melanchthon, Loci Comm., de peccato. Gerhard, Loc. X c. 20, cf.
also Bellarmine, de amiss. gr. I c. 4. But the Reformed went further and
wanted to know nothing of the whole distinction. If they sometimes still
used the words, they understood by them that all sins, except the blasphemy
against the H. Spirit, can be forgiven by God’s mercy and are in fact also
forgiven to believers, but that they all in themselves are worthy of death,
Tract. theol. 209. Gomarus, Theses theol. disp. 13. Moor III 308-312.
Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 4. Mastricht IV 3, 22. Pictet, Christ. Godg. VI 11.
Heppe, Dogm. 257. The Scripture passages on which the Romanists appeal
for their distinction are therefore all without any probative force. Only Matthew 5:22 offers some semblance of ground, but the intention of Jesus’ word
there is nevertheless entirely different from distinguishing light from heavy
sins. Over against the ancients, namely, who said that only the sinful deed,
the actual homicide, made one guilty and punishable before the local court,
Jesus says that not only the deed but already the first stirring of unlawful
anger, even if it does not yet express itself in a word, makes one
guilty and punishable before that court; that when that anger expresses itself
in a small, involuntary word, the sin is already so great that it must be dealt
with by the sanhedrin; and that when the anger expresses itself in a word of
abuse, it is at once, without form of process, worthy of the hellish fire.
There is therefore so little question here of pardonable sins, that Jesus,
precisely the reverse, regards the slightest sin as most punishable, as
punishable as the ancients regarded the sinful deed, i.e. murder. Jesus
equates the surging, unlawful anger with homicide; he says that the lightest
sin is precisely already a very heavy sin, which deserves as great a
punishment as, according to the ancients, homicide. What punishment this
stirring of anger is worthy of in the hereafter, Jesus does not say with a
word; but if that anger is accompanied by a word of abuse, then this sin is
so great that at that very moment it is worthy of hellish punishment; no
court is any longer needed to determine a punishment. Properly understood,
this text is therefore rather an argument against than for the distinction of
peccata mortalia and venialia. And so the whole of Scripture stands against
this division. The law is an organic whole Jak. 2:10, whoever transgresses
one commandment is in principle guilty of all; it must be fulfilled in its
entirety, Matthew 5:17-19; it demands us wholly with the whole heart and
understanding, with soul and body, Matthew 22:37; for it nothing is indifferent
and small, cursed is he who does not continue in all that is written in the
book of the law, that he do it, Deuteronomy 27:26, Galatians 3:10; even the smallest and
least transgressions of the law, such as a surging anger, an impure desire, a
superfluous affirmation, an idle word, Matthew 5:22, 28, 37, 12:36, Ef. 5:4 are
sin, in principle equal to sinful deeds, and thus as sin also ἀ νομια, enmity
against God. Considered according to the principle, there are no small and
slight sins. Nullum peccatum contemnendum ut parvum, cum revera nullum
sit parvum, quando Paulus de omni peccato generatim pronuntiaverit,
stimulum mortis esse peccatum, Basilius in Gerhard t. a. p. When a sin, e.g.
an idle word, is set by itself and detached from its whole connection with
the person, the circumstances, etc., the assertion seems excessively strict
that it deserves eternal death. But it is precisely that abstract, atomistic view
which, as in conflict with Scripture and with reality at the same time, was in
principle rejected by the Reformers. Sin is not a quantum which,
isolated from the doer, can be counted on the fingers or weighed in the
balance. The Roman distinction has in fact therefore led to all kinds of evil
practices. Not only do the theologians not agree as to whether the venial sin
offends God or not; whether it ought or ought not to be confessed; whether
for its restoration actual repentance is really necessary or whether the
performance of some meritorious work is sufficient. But all also
acknowledge that the distinction, both in theory and practice, is very
difficult and almost impossible to maintain. One must therefore take refuge
in all kinds of subtle reasonings, which in the process cause the whole
character of sin to be lost. Where reasonings fail, one counts up the
opinions of the doctores and contents oneself with a smaller or greater
degree of probability. Thus one arrives at an atomistic, casuistic,
mechanical, materialistic estimation of sins and of satisfactions, and keeps
souls continually in anxiety whether they may perhaps have committed a
mortal sin, or brings them to frivolity and indifference, because the sins are
mostly of a very light nature and very easily made good.
7. Only one sin is mentioned by Holy Scripture which is unforgivable in
this and the coming life, namely, the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. In
the O.T. there is no mention of it, although in the law no atoning sacrifice
was instituted for the sins ְבָיד ָרָמה, because they annulled the law itself,
Hebr. 10:28. Jesus speaks of it first, Matthew 12:31, Mark 3:28, Luke 12:10. When
He once completely healed a demoniac, who was also blind and mute, the
crowds were so astonished by this miracle that they acknowledged Jesus as
the Son of David, as the Christ. But the Pharisees were thereby driven up to
a pinnacle of hatred, which made them say, not only that He cast out
demons by the devil, but that He himself also was possessed by the devil,
Mark 3:22, βεελζεβουλ ἐ χει. This accusation was prompted solely and only
by hatred; it sprang forth from sheer, conscious, willed enmity. Jesus also
shows that, Matthew 12:25-30; a kingdom divided against itself cannot stand,
Satan does not cast out himself, but the casting out of Satan is a proof
that the kingdom of God has come to them, Jesus casts out the devil by the
Spirit of God. The contrast between Jesus and the Pharisees is here
therefore strained to the utmost; they say that Jesus is possessed, performs
his miracles by the devil, and establishes the kingdom of the devil. And
Jesus declares that He is the Christ, that He casts out the devil by the Spirit
of God and that He thus brings the kingdom of God to them. And in this
connection, on this occasion, Jesus speaks of the blasphemy against the
Holy Spirit as the unforgivable sin. Whether one now thinks that the
Pharisees at that moment had committed this sin, or whether one thinks one
must deny this, inter alia because the Holy Spirit had not yet been poured
out then, John 7:39, in any case the connection always makes it clear that the
sin against the Holy Spirit must consist in a conscious, willful, deliberate
blasphemy of the clearly recognized, and yet out of hatred and enmity
ascribed to the devil, revelation of God’s grace in Christ by the Holy Spirit.
The blasphemy against the Holy Spirit therefore does not consist in simple
unbelief, nor in resisting and grieving the Holy Spirit in general, nor in the
denial of the personality or deity of the Holy Spirit, nor in sinning against
better knowledge and to the end, without more. It is also not a sin against
the law alone, but specifically also against the gospel, and indeed against
the gospel in its clearest revelation. Much therefore precedes it: objectively
a revelation of God’s grace in Christ, the nearness of his kingdom, a
powerful working of the Holy Spirit, and subjectively an illumination and
conviction of the understanding, so vivid and powerful that one cannot deny
the truth of God, that one must acknowledge it as divine. And then it itself
does not consist in doubting or simply denying that truth, but in a denial
that goes against the conviction of the understanding, against the
illumination of the conscience, against the prompting of the heart; in a fully
conscious, willful and deliberate ascribing of what is clearly recognized as
God’s work to the influence and working of Satan, i.e. in a decided
blasphemy of the Holy Spirit, in a willful declaring that the Holy Spirit is
the spirit from the abyss, that the truth is the lie, that Christ is Satan himself.
Its root is therefore the fully conscious, deliberate hatred against God and
against what is recognized as divine; its essence is the sinful in its
highest manifestation, the completed, the consummated revolution, the
placing of God in the place of Satan and of Satan in the place of God; its
character is no longer human but demonic. Even if it is also the case that the
devils do not commit this sin in this particular form, because God’s grace
has not appeared to them, Christ has not assumed their nature, the Holy
Spirit has not been poured out among them and the kingdom of God has not
come to them; nevertheless the demonic sin bears the same character that
the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit displays among men. Therefore it is
also unforgivable; God’s grace is indeed not too small and too powerless for
it; but there are also in the kingdom of sin laws and ordinances, which have
been laid in it by God and are maintained by Him. And that law consists
here with this sin in this, that it excludes all repentance, sears the
conscience, utterly hardens and obdurates the sinner and in this way makes
his sin unforgivable. Apart from in the gospels, nowhere in Scripture is
there mention of this sin in direct words. But this blasphemy against the
Holy Spirit can be committed in different circumstances. And thus Hebr.
6:4-8, 10:25-29 cf. 12:15-17 says that those who have once been
enlightened and have tasted the heavenly gift and have become partakers of
the Holy Spirit and who then fall back to Judaism, trample and crucify and
put to shame the Son of God, regard the blood of the N. T. as unclean and
do insult to the Spirit of grace, that such cannot be brought again to
repentance. And likewise 1 John 5:16 testifies that there is a sin which
necessarily by virtue of its nature leads to death without repentance, and for
which John does not say, i.e. does not command, that one shall pray. The
prayer, if not unlawful, is nevertheless fruitless. Probably John here, in
connection with his whole epistle, thinks of the decided and willful denial
of the Christ as the incarnate Son of God. In both these passages we
therefore have to do with sins which harden man completely, and therefore
are themselves unforgivable. In fact and in substance these coincide with
the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. For the astonishingly rich literature
on this subject reference is made to Thomas, S. Theol. II 2 qu. 14 art. 1.
Comm. op Sent. II dist. 43. M. Vitringa II 378. Walch, Bibl. theol. sel.
I 88. 254. Schaff, Die Sünde wider den H. Geist, Halle 1841. Muller, Sünde
II 596 f. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 89-100.
. Sin, already so dreadful in its essence, acquires an even more serious
character through the extent of its dominion. Even outside special
revelation the absolute universality of sin is acknowledged. The various
religions with their priests and altars, their sacrifices and penances are all
built on the confession of sin; dogma and cultus, prayer and song, religion
and philosophy sometimes express in a moving way the general
το ὐ ξαμαρτανειν. Vitiis nemo sine nascitur. Communis hominum labes. Cf.
Pfanner, Theol. gent. IX 7. Bretschneider, Dogm. II4 16. Lamennais, Essai
sur l’indifférence III p. 393-408. Hettinger, Apol. d. Christ. III7 30. 412.
Still more clearly this universality of sin is expressed in Holy Scripture,
when He calls all without distinction to repentance and connects entrance
into the kingdom of God with rebirth from water and Spirit, Matthew 4:17, Mark 1:15, 6:12, Luke 12:47, John 3:3, 5. To be sure He speaks of healthy persons
and righteous persons, Matthew 9:12, 13, Mark 2:17, Luke 5:31, 32, but He does
that, without passing a judgment on the nature of that health and
righteousness, objectively, according to the opinion of those whom he thus
describes. How He Himself thinks about that righteousness appears
sufficiently from other passages; over the Pharisees He pronounces His
woe, but the weary and burdened He invites to His rest. Likewise the
apostles teach that all have sinned, that the whole world lies in the evil one
and is condemnable before God, that all have need of the forgiving love of
the Father, of redemption through Christ, of renewal by the Holy
Furthermore, according to Scripture sin is proper to the human being from
youth, from birth, even from conception onward, Genesis 6:5, 8:21, John 14:4,
5:7, John 3:6, Romans 7:7v., Ef. 2:3. David in his confession of guilt goes back
to the deepest ground of his sinfulness, finds it in the sins of his parents and
declares from that that he himself, from his conception and birth onward,
stands unclean before God, Psalms 51:7. In John 3:6 Jesus says that the flesh,
i.e. the human being as a sensuous being, can bring forth only flesh, that
such a human being has no entrance into the kingdom of God and for that
needs rebirth from the Spirit, that the human being as such a sensuous
being, as σαρξ, is unclean and corrupt from his birth onward. And in Ef. 2:3
Paul declares that Jews and Gentiles are τεκνα φυσει ὀ ργης; he certainly
does not set φυσει here over against actual sins, of which he is precisely
speaking, vs. 1-3, but says that they were φυσει children of God’s wrath,
while they now, after they have been made alive and saved by grace, are
objects of His love, and thus indicates that their former condition, their
being dead through sins and trespasses, was a natural condition, a φυσις,
which rested in their existence itself, cf. Romans 2:14, 11:21, 2:15, 4:8. For
the rest it is true that Holy Scripture presupposes the universality of sin and
the corruption of the human being reaching back into conception far more
than it describes it at length and repeatedly. Human beings themselves are
everywhere depicted as sinners; not only the generation before the flood
and all Gentiles and ungodly persons, but also the people of Israel; and
within that people many sins are also related of the pious, of the patriarchs,
Moses, Job, David, Solomon etc., indeed it is precisely the pious who, even
where they are convinced of the justice of their cause, nevertheless fall
down before God in humble confession of guilt and implore mercy and
heart of the human being that is corrupt, Genesis 6:5, 8:21, Psalms 14:1, Jeremiah 17:9,
Ezech. 36:26, Matthew 15:19; from it are the issues of life, Spr. [106] 4:23, from
it come all unrighteousnesses and also folly, Mark 7:22. The understanding
of the human being is darkened, Job 21:14, Jes. 1:3, Jeremiah 4:22, John 1:5,
unclean and has need of atonement and repentance, Leviticus 17:11, Psalms 19:8,
defiled and therefore must be broken, enlightened, cleansed, Psalms 51:19, Spr.
his conscience is stained and needs cleansing, Titus 1:15, Hebr. 9:9, 14,
10:22; his desire, inclination and will extend to what is forbidden and are
and the body, with all its members, eyes, Deuteronomy 29:4, Psalms 18:28, Jes. 35:5,
3:14, John 3:5-8 etc. stands in the service of unrighteousness. In one word,
sin does not adhere to and around but in the human being and spreads over
the whole human being and over all humanity, Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 670 f.
Of the passages that are cited for the opposite view, only Romans 7:7-26 needs
some further discussion. At all times the Pelagians have appealed to this
pericope as proof that the νους or the πνευμα in the human being has
remained free from sin and that this resides only in the σαρξ; in more recent
times this exegesis has been almost generally accepted. Augustine,
however, in his later period and all his followers both in the Roman and in
the Protestant churches, have always contradicted this interpretation and
understood verses 14-25 as spoken by Paul as one reborn and concerning
the present, an explanation that is still advocated today by Delitzsch,
Philippi, Luthardt, Harless, Thomasius, Umbreit, Kohlbrugge, e. a., cf.
Tholuck in his Comm. zum Brief an die Römer5, 1856 S. 333-369, and
further Meyer, Philippi etc. The latter exegesis deserves preference for
various reasons. 1o Paul argues in Romans 7:7-26 that the law, from which the
believer, by having died with Christ, has been released, is itself not sinful.
And he does that by pointing out that it first brought the believer to
knowledge of his sin and his death, 7-13 and that it now still has the assent
of his inner man, even though his flesh resists it, 14-26. In this connection
the argument that the law now still has the assent of the believer, even
though he has been released from it, is necessary. For for the proposition
that the law itself is holy, it is not enough that the unreborn, but it is
precisely necessary that the reborn approves it. And thus Paul also speaks
from verse 14 onward in the present tense, not out of vividness of
representation, but because he precisely as one reborn loves and approves
the law. Because the law indirectly granted him the painful experience of
his sin and death, because he in communion with Christ, vs. 4, Galatians 2:19, 20
through the law has died to the law and has been freed from its curse, Galatians 3:13, therefore and thereby he has learned to know it as holy and righteous
and good, he bears witness to it and confirms the law through faith, Romans 3:30. 2o Because Paul according to the course of his argument wants to
honor the law in its holy character, he casts all blame on the sin that dwells
in him, and he makes a sharp distinction between the center and the
periphery of his being. Inwardly, according to his will, according to his
inner man he loves God’s law, but in his members there dwells another
power and another law, namely sin. Such a deep distinction is nowhere
assumed in Scripture with the unreborn. With this one there is indeed a
knowledge of God and of the law and also a doing by nature of the things
that are of the law, Romans 1:19, 2:14, 15, i.e. thus a struggle between reason
and sensuousness, conscience and lust, understanding and heart; but a
struggle between flesh and spirit, as Paul depicts it here, exists only with the
reborn, Galatians 5:17; only they can say that they love the law of God, approve
it, will it with their whole heart. 3o Although Paul as one reborn still calls
himself σαρκινος, πεπραμενος ὑ πο την ἁ μαρτιαν, he nevertheless does not
thereby say that he is ἐ ν σαρκι, 8:8, 9 or walks κατα σαρκα, 8:1, for he calls
himself so only because on account of the sin dwelling in his members he
cannot do what he wills and thus is held captive by that law of sin in his
members. Although wretched, because with the flesh he serves the
law of sin, he nevertheless with his νους serves the law of God, vs. 26, and
it is precisely this latter that is further worked out in Rom. 8. In Christ he is
righteous and he walks according to the Spirit. 4o In addition there is still
this, that, if Romans 7:14v. were to be understood of the unreborn, rebirth
itself would be unnecessary, a helping grace would be sufficient and the
whole doctrine of Scripture about sin and grace, about justification and
sanctification, about faith and repentance would be overthrown. Rather
Romans 7:7-25 is a strong proof for the total corruption of human nature; for if
the reborn still has so to complain about the power of sin that dwells in him,
then the unreborn is wholly and entirely, without knowing it, a servant of
sin, being in the flesh and walking according to the flesh, and the minding
of that flesh is enmity against God.
This universality of sin is derived in Gen. 3 from the fall of the first man.
True, it is not stated there in so many words; Gen. 3 pays much more
attention to the change in the circumstances, which occurs as a consequence
of the fall (pain of the woman, curse of the ground, expulsion from the
garden), than to the moral reversal which took place in Adam and in his
descendants. But it nevertheless relates that immediately after the evil
committed shame and fear take hold of them, that the consciousness of guilt
awakens, that they flee from God. The punishments, pronounced Genesis 3:16v., relate not only to Adam and Eve but without doubt also to their
descendants, and these punishments, according to the whole conception of
the O. T., also presuppose common guilt. The first fact that is reported after
the fall is Cain’s fratricide; history itself becomes another, even without this
being said more precisely, it becomes a history of sin, misery, and death.
Man is now by nature evil, Genesis 6:5, 8:21. Likewise the further O. T.
Scriptures do not expressly connect the universality of sin with the fall of
the first man. They remain with the fact of the universality of sin or also
trace this back to the perishable, sensuous nature of man, Job 4:17v., 14:4,
cf. above p. 49v. It is only Paul who in 1 Corinthians 15:21v., Romans 5:12v. [109]
explains the universality of sin from Adam’s disobedience, cf. also Wijsh.
15:21v. he says that the death of all men has its cause in the man Adam in
the same way as the resurrection from the dead in the man Christ. It clearly
lies here that the death of all men is not first caused by their personal sins,
but has already been pronounced over all men and has passed to all men,
solely and only because of the disobedience of Adam; in the same way as
the resurrection is not merited by the personal good works, the faith, etc. of
believers, but exclusively by the obedience of Christ. Not in and through
themselves but in Adam they die; and not in and through themselves do
they rise, but only in Christ. How and why that death has passed to all is set
forth more precisely in Romans 5:12v. Since we through the death of Christ
have been reconciled as enemies, we are certain that with Him we shall also
live eternally; indeed so certain are we that we now already boast through
Christ, who granted us the reconciliation, vv. 10, 11. The grace and the life
of Christ therefore (δια τουτο, v. 12) far surpass the sin and death of Adam.
This is the theme of the pericope vv. 12-21, and it is worked out and proved
in this way. Through one man sin, as a mighty and all-governing principle,
has come into the world, and in that way and along that path death also has
passed to all men, since all sinned. The little words ἐ φ’ ᾡ are not to be
translated with Orig., Vulg., Aug., etc. by in quo, for they stand too far from
ἀ νθρωπος to be able to refer back to it, and they also do not mean in whom,
although this thought in itself is not unscriptural, Hebr. 7:10, 1 Corinthians 15:22,
but they are a conjunction, ἐ πι τουτ ῳ ὁ τι, eo quod, quia, quandoquidem,
Calvin, Martyr and most newer exegetes; ἡ μαρτον does not indicate a sinful
state, but an act. Paul therefore says in verse 12: Adam transgressed,
thereby sin and death came into the world and reigned over all. The causal
clause ἐ φ’ ᾡ παντες ἡ μαρτον does not make known that Paul seeks the
cause of the death of each man in his personal, actual sins, for in 1 Corinthians 15:22 he says expressly that all die in Adam; here in verse 14 [110] he
declares that death also reigned over those who did not sin in the likeness of
Adam’s transgression, and—so may we add—also over the children; and in
vv. 15 and 17 he expresses it as strongly as possible that through the
trespass of one many have died. Yet on the other hand, with that causal
clause it is not silently to be thought that all sinned in Adam. This is in itself
already improbable, but it is made impossible by the fact that vv. 13 and 14
precisely deal with the sin which men committed not in Adam but
themselves personally, even though they then also did not sin in the likeness
of the transgression of Adam. But Paul means to say that through Adam’s
transgression both sin and death, both in connection with each other, have
come to dominion in humanity, that as a consequence of Adam’s
transgression all men themselves personally have become sinners and all
die head for head. He argues this proposition in the following verses thus:
the sin which entered the world through Adam’s transgression was also
there and also reigned in the time from Adam to Moses, when God had not
yet promulgated his law; men sinned also then. But—so Paul, as it were,
objects to himself—sin is nevertheless not imputed when there is no law;
the law of Moses was not yet there, thus sin could then also not be imputed.
And to that he answers: most certainly it could, for death nevertheless
reigned from Adam to Moses, even if it is also the case that men then did
not transgress a positive law expressly and verbally promulgated by God
and thus could not sin in likeness of Adam’s transgression. They
nevertheless did sin, because they also then had a law which was known to
them by nature, Romans 1:18v., 2:12-15. If death therefore nevertheless
reigned then, then sin must also have reigned then. And it reigned then, not
because each person personally transgressed a positive command as Adam
and thus each for himself and through himself became a sinner; no, but
because through the transgression of Adam sin had come into the world and
reigned over all and as a consequence of that also death. Adam is therefore
precisely a type of Christ. It goes with sin and death, which come to us from
Adam, in the same way as with righteousness and life, which Christ has
acquired. There is a difference in intensity, grace is more abundant and life
is more powerful, but the modus quo, by which both become our portion, is
the same. The trespass of one was the cause of the guilt, the sin, and the
death of all men, and so the obedience of one is the cause of the
righteousness, acquittal, and life of all. In one all are condemned and have
died; in one they are all justified and saved. In both cases a judgment of
God, a κριμα, precedes; and from that κριμα are derived on the one hand
our sin and death, and on the other hand our righteousness and our life. And
thus the thought which Paul develops in this pericope comes down to this:
1o over the one transgression of Adam God has rendered a verdict,
consisting in declaration of guilt and condemnation to death. 2o that verdict
has been rendered in Adam over all men, because they in one way or
another, which Paul does not explain more precisely here but lets be
surmised from his line of argument, were included in Adam; all have been
declared guilty in Adam and condemned to death. 3o by virtue of this
preceding judgment of God all men have personally become sinners and all
also in fact die. God thinks and regards, judges and condemns all men in
one, and therefore they also all proceed from him as sinners and they are all
subject to death. Cf. Moor III 255. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 9. Ontw. v. h.
Ex. v. Tol. X 373. Dietzsch, Adam u. Christus, Bonn 1871. Hünefeld,
Römer 5:12-21, Leipzig 1895. Hofmann, Schriftbew. I 524 f. Thomasius,
Christi Person u. werk I 212. Pfleiderer, Der Panlin. 53 enz.
2. On these data of Scripture the doctrine of original sin was built in the
Christian church. From the beginning a certain connection was
acknowledged between Adam’s sin and that of his descendants, cf. many
citations in Vossius, Hist. Pelag. p. 134 sq. Horn, Comm. de sententiis
eorum patrum, quorum auctoritas ante Aug. plurimum valuit, de peccato
originali, Gott. 1801. Wiggers, Aug. u. Pelag. I 403 f. Münscher-v. Coelln,
the assertion that the doctrine of original sin is an invention of Augustine is
wholly incorrect, and he himself could testify: non ego finxi peccatum
originale, quod catholica fides credit antiquitus, de nupt. II 12. But yet it is
true that theology in the first period, especially in the East, laid the
emphasis much more, over against Gnosticism, on free will and personal,
actual sin than on original sin from Adam; and where it is acknowledged
that a malum animae ex originis vitio antecedit, Tert. de an. 41, the essence
of that original sin is nevertheless not more precisely determined and the
manner of its propagation not more deeply thought through. Pelagius could
therefore with some appearance of right appeal to many predecessors, but
he nevertheless went much further than they, taught something essentially
different, and denied original sin. According to Pelagius the image of God
consisted only in free personality, not in positive holiness, immortality, etc.
Adam’s transgression did not take away that image of God and in fact had
no harmful consequences at all. There is no original sin. Only insofar did
Adam’s transgression do damage to his descendants, as he set a bad
example, which, followed by others, made sin into a power in humanity.
Inheritance of sin is a Manichaean error; sin is not a condition but an act,
and always bears a personal character; it would be in conflict with God’s
righteousness to impute to us alien sins; also propagation in marriage would
be impermissible, if the inheritance of sin took place by that way; moreover
baptized parents can no longer propagate sin, since it has after all been
eradicated in baptism. Sin is therefore not propagated by generation but by
imitation. Human beings, whose souls are created pure by God, are even
now born in the same condition as that in which Adam found himself before
the fall; sickness, suffering, death etc. are no punishments of sin; the human
being is still completely free and can of himself know and do the good, he
has no need of grace; it is possible to abstain from all sins, and some human
beings have in fact also brought it so far, cf. the anti-Pelagian writings of
Augustine and the litt., part II 320. Pelagius in this denial of original sin
agreed with the Jews, who thought that the souls were created pure by God
and were in a position to resist the יצר הרע dwelling in the flesh and to live
sinlessly, Weber, System 217 f. And later the Socinians agreed with him,
Fock, Der Socin. 654 f., some Anabaptists, Cloppenburg, Op. II 151 sq.,
many humanists and rationalists, Wegscheider, Instit. theol. § 117, and
at present also Ritschl and his school. According to Ritschl we may not
assume behind the particular, actual sins a general concept of sin, for such a
concept is wholly incomprehensible; a passive inherited condition cannot be
conceived as sin; Scripture does not teach it, Psalms 51:7 is only an individual
confession, Ef. 2:3 refers to the former actual sins of those who are now
Christians, and Romans 5:12 is too unclear to derive anything from it; original
sin would remove all responsibility, make education impossible, do away
with the distinction of degree in sins; each human being would then in
original sin already have risen to the highest degree of sin and the personal,
actual sins would thereby hardly any longer come into consideration. No,
sin is not a unity by virtue of one principle but a collective unity as result of
all individual actions and inclinations; and subject of sin is not humanity as
a race, which is an abstraction and only a memory-image, but humanity as
sum of all individuals. Not first the sinful condition and then the act, but
conversely the self-determination of the will is the ground of all sins. Only
the will, which always does the evil, does indeed gradually acquire an
inclination, a habitus, and this then in turn works upon the acts of will. And
thus there does indeed arise in the human being a Gesetz der Sünde, a
kingdom of sin, a common sin, but this is quite something other than
original sin and was wrongly so named by Schleiermacher. A sinless
development of life can therefore also a priori not be denied, the will of
children is not directed toward evil, rather there is in them a general
inclination toward good, Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 311 f. Unterricht in d.
chr. Rel. 1886 S. 25. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 256.
This Pelagian explanation of the universality of sin, however, encounters
too many and too serious objections for it to be able to find acceptance for a
long time and among many. In the previous century, with its rationalism,
individualism, and optimism, there was room for it; Rousseau made the
thoughts from many a heart public, when he glorified uncorrupted nature
and sought the cause of all sin and misery in society. But the historical
sense, which awoke after the revolution; the insight into the incalculable
value of community, society, and state; the organic view, which has
penetrated everywhere; the doctrine of heredity above all, the significance
of which, also in the spiritual and moral domain, has been brought to light
more than formerly, have put an end to the individualistic and atomistic
conception of humanity and of the sin reigning in it. If anything is certain,
then it is indeed this, that sin is not merely an accidental phenomenon in the
life of individuals, but that it is a condition and mode of life of the whole
human race, a property of the species. The sinful deeds, which do not occur
now and then but are proper to all people in all ages and circumstances,
point back to a sinful disposition, just as bad fruits presuppose a bad tree
and turbid water points back to an impure source. From that, indeed, it
alone is explained that all children from youth show a desire for what is
forbidden and an inclination to all kinds of evil. To be sure, the Pelagians
have many times, with appeal to Jonah 4:11, Psalms 106:38, Matthew 18:3, 19:14,
Luke 18:17, John 9:3, 1 Corinthians 7:14, spoken of the innocence of children. And
in a relative sense that is also correct; there is difference in degree between
the sins; in connection with age and development, sin in children also has
not yet come to its full manifestation and cannot yet present itself in such
dreadful forms as at a later age; but the experience of all parents and
teachers also teaches, that with the increase in knowledge etc., in the
children also the sinful inclination develops. And if we ourselves review our
own life, we find sin as far back as we can remember; and the deeper our
consciousness of guilt descends, the more it goes back to the sins of youth,
yes, of birth and conception, Psalms 25:7, 51:7. The above-mentioned Scripture
passages therefore also offer the Pelagians no support; they speak at most of
a relative innocence, but do not teach the sinlessness of children.
Furthermore, the assertion that there have been people who have lived
without sin or can live without sin, is devoid of all probability and of all
ground. Xenophon’s testimony concerning Socrates, Mem. I 1, 11. IV 8, 11,
is understood by no one in an absolute sense; of the pious in O. and N. Test.
numerous sinful deeds are reported to us; those who have advanced farthest
on the way of sanctification have in that same measure felt their guilt and
imperfection all the more deeply. And so strong and general is the
conviction of the sinfulness of the whole human race, that, if someone
came forward with the assertion of being sinless, we all would at once
ascribe this to lack of self-knowledge, pride, or insanity, Müller, Sünde II
370. This absolute universality of sin is not to be explained by imitation. It
precedes every conscious and intentional act of will, and is in us all a
condition, long before it passes over into deeds. That Ritschl does not
acknowledge this, is connected in him also with nominalism; humanity is
not an organism but the sum of all individuals; sin is not a condition but
consists only in acts of will; things in general are, or in any case are only
knowable, in their effects. Yet Ritschl himself does not remain faithful to
his point of departure; for although he denies inborn sin and teaches the
integrity of human nature, he nevertheless, just like Pelagius, ascribes to the
bad example and the influence of society such a power, that thereby the
universality of sin is explained and there even arises a common sin. Now
one of the two: these influences from without work only accidentally and
then they explain nothing and the universality of sin is a riddle; or they in
fact cause the general sinfulness, but then they are of a much worse nature
than the Scriptural doctrine of original sin. Furthermore, Ritschl does
indeed combat this doctrine with the claim that it abolishes all degrees in
sin, but this rests on misunderstanding; he himself has only two classes of
sins, those of ignorance and of definitive wickedness, which certainly do
not encompass the many-sidedness of sinful life. And the attempts to
remove this doctrine from Holy Scripture, with all their acuteness,
nevertheless bear too violent a character for them to be called successful.
Cf. Pfleiderer, Die Ritschl’sche Theologie, in Jahrb. f. prot. Theol. 1889.
Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 149. Orr, The Ritschlian Theology, London 1897 p. 145.
3. Pelagianism was condemned by the Christian church. From the
beginning the church fathers assumed a certain connection between Adam’s
sin and that of his race. Even if this connection was not yet conceived,
Adam’s transgression nevertheless brought about a great moral change for
himself and for his descendants. The nature of that moral change, however,
was conceived very differently. According to semipelagianism the
consequences of Adam’s fall for him and for his descendants
consisted, besides in death, chiefly in a weakening of moral power. A proper
original sin, which would be guilt, does not indeed exist, but there is
nevertheless an Erbübel; through Adam’s fall man has become morally sick;
his will is weakened and inclined to evil; a struggle has arisen in him
between flesh and spirit, which makes it impossible that there lives a man
without sin; but he can nevertheless will the good, and if he wills this, grace
comes to his aid in the accomplishing, Wiggers, Aug. u. Pelag. II 54-82. On
this standpoint stands the Greek church, deel II 319, and although in the
West Augustine had much influence, the church nevertheless strayed more
and more toward semipelagianism, and taught at Trent, that freedom of the
will is indeed weakened but not destroyed and that the concupiscentia in
itself is no sin, cf. deel II 322v. Entirely in agreement herewith is the
opinion of the Anabaptists, bij Moor III 205, of Zwingli, cf. mijne Ethiek
van Zwingli bl. 17. 18, of the Remonstrants, Conf. c. 7 and Apol. Conf. ib.,
Episcopius, Inst. theol. IV sect. 5 c. 2. Limborch, Theol. Christ. III c. 2., the
Herrnhutters, Plitt, Zinzendorfs Theol. II 213 f., the Supranaturalists,
Reinhard, Dogm. § 81-84, Krabbe, Lehre v. d. Sünde u. v. Tode 148 f. and
many more recent theologians, Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 485 f. H. Schmidt bij
Herzog2 15, 31. Kaftan, Wesen der chr. Rel. 260 f. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 325.
Oosterzee, Dogm. II 278v. Doedes, Leer der Zaligheid n. 27 and Ned. Gel.
art. 15 etc. All agree in this, that Adam’s fall also had consequences for his
descendants, because they stand in physical connection with him. But the
moral condition, which as a consequence of Adam’s transgression has
entered into the human race, is not a condition of sin and guilt, but of
weakness, defect, sickness. In itself this original sin cannot damn man and
at most has a poena damni, without poena sensus, as a consequence; it is an
occasion for sin but not sin itself in the proper sense. But since the will is
weakened, it readily gives ear to the temptation that proceeds from the
flesh; and then, when the will consents and the concupiscence yields,
original sin becomes personal sin, which renders guilty and makes worthy
of punishment. In substance this doctrine concerning original sin entirely
agrees with the theory that sin proceeds from sensuousness,
Biedermann, Dogm. II 573.
This Semipelagian conception of original sin, however, is at bottom not
much better than that of Pelagius and runs up against equally great
objections. 1o. It fails to recognize the character and the seriousness of sin.
Sin, after all, is ἀ νομια, dislegalitas. The condition in which human beings
are born either accords with God’s law or deviates from it; it is good or evil,
either not sinful or sinful; there is no third. That condition is good and in all
parts accords with God’s law, the Semipelagians too do not dare to assert.
Yet they also do not call it sinful in the proper sense. And thus they create
an intermediate condition, and speak of original sin as a disease, defect,
infirmity, which is not sin in the proper sense but can only be an occasion
for sin; or they separate sin and guilt and say, as Rothe and Kaftan, that
original sin is indeed sin but no guilt. 2o. Both of these are impossible. Sin
and guilt are inseparably connected with one another, Galatians 3:10, Jak. 2:10, 1
John 5:17; if sin is ἀ νομια, then it is punishable, and conversely, where guilt
and punishment are, there must be sin. Now, however, original sin is of such
a nature that death follows upon it, Romans 5:14, that it makes the communion
of God and his heaven unworthy (Doedes), that it is in itself unclean, that it
is the occasion and the source of many sins, it therefore itself must indeed
be sin. Otherwise God would be unjust, who with death, the wages of sin,
Romans 6:23, punishes what is no sin and does not deserve death; the law
would lose its absolute validity, for there would be deviation that was not
worthy of punishment; communion with God would be withheld without
there being any mention of guilt; between heaven and hell, good and evil,
light and darkness there would come a condition in, which would be neither
of the two, a poena damni without poena sensus; what brings forth all
manner of sins would itself be no sin; the tree would be good and yet it bore
evil fruits; the source would be pure but unclean the water that flows out of
it. 3o. That this inborn sinfulness first becomes sin and guilt when the will
consents to it, does not improve the theory but makes it still worse. For one
of two: the will then stands, as it were, above and outside that inborn
inclination, and then original sin consists in nothing but the inborn sensuous
nature and the whole character of sin is lost; or the will itself is
affected and weakened by that original sin in greater or lesser degree; it
itself is rooted in the sinful nature and arises out of it, and then one loses
precisely in that same degree, as one lets the will be weakened, that which
one wanted to maintain with this theory, namely, that there is no sin without
a free decision of the will. But moreover, even if such a will, which stood
wholly or in part outside the inborn sinful nature, were conceivable; it
would nevertheless in fact not give what one aims at with it. The first
decisions of the will, which consent to the inborn concupiscentia, all fall in
the first years, when the will is still weak and powerless. No one is
conscious that with those first decisions of the will he loaded such a guilt
upon himself, that he in fact only then fell and became a child of wrath.
Over against whoever asserts this, everyone could excuse himself that he
did not know better and could not do otherwise, that for such a weighty
decision concerning his eternal weal or woe he was already placed in very
unfavorable circumstances; indeed, if original sin is no sin, then all other
later sins, which so easily and so necessarily flow from it, can also be no
sin. Schleiermacher too therefore rejected the representation that original
sin cannot be guilt earlier than before it breaks out into actual sins, indem ja
der Umstand, dass es noch an Gelegenheit und an äusserer Anreizung
gefehlt hat, den geistigen Werth des Menschen nicht erhöhen kann, Chr. Gl.
I 382. 4o. The Semipelagian theory not only does not solve the problem that
lies here, but it does not even touch it with the fingers and deliberately
closes its eyes to it. The universality of sin is a fact, which the
Semipelagians too acknowledge; they reject the explanation of it from
imitation; they assume that an unclean, defective, sick, sinful (even if then
also not sinful and punishable) condition precedes the sinful deeds; they
acknowledge that that unclean, sick condition in all without distinction
leads to sinful, guilty, punishable deeds, so that the weakened free will in
fact has very little significance. Well then, how is that dreadful phenomenon
to be explained? How is it to be reconciled with God’s righteousness, that
He, apart now from the covenant of grace, lets all human beings be born in
such a condition, which for the children who die earliest in any case brings
death and banishment from his communion and for all others eternal
perdition? The Semipelagian theory does not at all think this problem
through and contents itself with a superficial and insignificant doctrine of
free will. Cf. Müller, Sünde II 445 f.
4. To this problem, however, Paul had given an answer, taught by the
antithesis of Christ, that through the trespass of one, sin and death had come
into the world and had passed through to all men. Gradually, in Christian
theology, consciousness opened up for this profound doctrine, cf. Schwane,
D. G. II2 439 f. 480 f. Irenaeus said: in primo quidem Adam (Deum)
offendimus, non facientes ejus praeceptum, in secundo autem Adam
reconciliati sumus, obedientes usque ad mortem facti, adv. haer. V 16, 3.
Tertullian spoke of a malum animae, which had come to us ex originis vitio
and is to be derived from Adam’s fall; omnis anima eo usque in Adam
censetur donec in Christo recenseatur, tamdiu immunda, quamdiu
recenseatur, de an. 40. 41, cf. also Cypr. de op. et eleem. 1. ep. 64, 5.
Ambrose speaks most strongly, who more than others before him lays the
emphasis on the guilty character of all sin and on the sinful condition in
which we are born and traces this back to the fall of Adam; fuit Adam et in
illo fuimus omnes, periit Adam et in illo omnes perierunt, Harnack, D. G.
III 45. But yet it was especially Augustine who seized upon Paul’s thought
and developed it further; repeatedly, especially in his two writings against
Julian, he appeals to Romans 5:12, 1 Corinthians 15:22, Ef. 2:3; furthermore he cites
Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory Naz., Chrysostom e. a., in defense of
his opinion; then he also sees in the practice of infant baptism a powerful
proof for his doctrine of original sin; and finally he points out that the
dreadful misery of the human race cannot be explained otherwise than as a
punishment for sin. How can God, who is nevertheless good and righteous,
subject all men from their conception onward to sin and death, if they are
completely innocent? There must rest upon all an original guilt; the grave
jugum, which presses upon all children of Adam, is otherwise not to be
understood; whoever traces the miseries of human life, from the first crying
of the children up to the last sighs of the dying must with Paul come
to the acknowledgment of an originale peccatum. Quoniam Dei non est
iniquum judicium, ideo in miseria generis humani, quae incipit a fletibus
parvulorum, agnoscendum est originale peccatum, Op. imperf. c. Jul. III 77
and so passim, I 25. 49. II 107. III 44. 202. VI 17. 28 etc. The sin of Adam
must therefore be conceived as an act of him and of all his descendants.
Adam was not a private person, not an individual alongside others, but all
men were included in him. The manner of this is not completely clear in
Augustine; since he, in the question concerning the origin of the soul,
refrained from a choice between traducianism and creationism, he also here
does not express himself decisively as to whether, in the being-included of
the human race in Adam, he thinks only realistically or also federalistically.
On the one hand he repeatedly says that all were in Adam’s loins, like the
Israelites in those of Abraham, that Adam could bring forth no better than
he himself was, that Adam’s sin is transplanted by propagation and not by
imitation, that the sin of Adam becomes our share by birth in the same way
as the righteousness and the life of Christ by rebirth, de civ. XIII 3. Op.
imp. c. Jul. I 48 etc. But on the other hand the fact is nevertheless of
significance that he does not accept Tertullian’s traducianism, and that he
repeatedly expresses as strongly as possible that all were in Adam and
sinned in him; omnes ille unus homo fuerunt, omnes fuimus in illo uno, de
pecc. mer. et rem. I 10. de civ. XIII 14 etc. Original sin is distinguished
from actual sins in that it was not personally committed by us, but it is
nevertheless sin, because in a certain sense it was again our act. It is both a
foreign and a proper sin; aliena enim (sunt peccata originalia), quia non ea
in sua vita quisque commisit; nostra vero, quia fuit Adam et in illo fuimus
omnes, Op. imp. c. Jul. III 25, cf. I 48. 57; it is even a peccatum
voluntarium, quia ex primi hominis mala voluntate contractum, factum est
quodam modo haereditarium, Retract. I 13. c. Jul. III 5. de nupt. et conc. II
28 etc. The sinful condition in which we are conceived and born is a
consequence and punishment of our transgression in Adam, Op. imp. c. Jul.
I 47 VI 17; God often punishes sin with sin, c. Jul. V 3. de nat. et gr. 22.
And it consists in fact in the concupiscentia. Sometimes Augustine
takes this word in a broad sense and says that the inherited sinfulness is
seated not only in sexual lust but in quocunque corporis sensu cognosci,
Op. imp. c. Jul. IV 28; that the carnalis concupiscentia also has its seat in
the soul, ib. V 7, that original sin is not a substance but an affectionalis
qualitas, a vitium, languor, morbus, substantiae accidens, de nupt. et conc. I
24. 25 II 34. Op. imp. c. Jul. VI 7 Conf. VII 12 etc. But yet he thinks, with
concupiscentia, first of all of sexual lust; in the independent motus
genitalium, independent of the will, the corruption of nature especially
comes to expression, and shame serves as proof thereof; through sexual
drive, then, sin also propagates itself and makes the whole of humanity into
a massa corrupta, which is subjected to the misera necessitas non posse non
peccandi, cf. especially de nupt. et conc. passim, Harnack, D. G. III 190 f.
Wiggers, Aug. u. Pelag. I 107 f. This concupiscentia is better called
peccatum originale than naturale, because it is not of divine but of human
origin, Op. imp. c. Jul. V 9; it is sin, quia peccato facta est appetitque
peccare, ib. I 71, and makes man originaliter reum, c. Jul. VI 5. Children
dying unbaptized are lost on account of it; its guilt, however, is taken away
in baptism, it itself remains as a stimulus for the struggle, reatus ejus
regeneratione solutus est, conflictus ejus ad agonem relictus est, Op. imp. I
71. 101. c. Jul. VI 5. de pecc. mer. et rem. II 4, cf. also Gangauf, Die
metaph. Psych. d. h. Aug. 420 f. Scholasticism and Roman Catholic
theology built further on this foundation but nevertheless introduced a not
unimportant modification into Augustine’s representation. The thought was
retained that Adam’s transgression was the cause of all men’s sin and death.
Original sin consists first of all in the imputation to all men of that
transgression which Adam committed, because they all were included in
him; it is in the first place guilt, thereafter punishment. Scripture also
expressed this clearly, and the church took it up in its confession, conc.
Milev. can. 2. conc. Araus. c. 2. Trid. V 2. Cat. Rom. I 3, 2. Pighius and
Catharinus even went so far that they let original sin be wholly absorbed in
this imputation of Adam’s transgression and wanted to conceive all that
followed upon it, loss of original righteousness, corruption of nature etc.,
only as punishment but not as sin, in Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et
statu pecc. V c. 16. But undoubtedly these theologians thereby expressed a
thought that followed from the development of the doctrine of original sin
in Roman Catholic theology. There arose, namely, soon a difference
concerning the character of that moral condition which after Adam’s
disobedience entered in him and in all his descendants. In Augustine this
consisted in the concupiscentia, which then had in sexual drive its principal
seat and organ. Lombardus still remained at this, Sent. II dist. 30. 31. But
gradually the doctrine of the donum superadditum arose, which was
bestowed upon Adam but was lost by his fall. The first consequence of
Adam’s transgression was thus for him and all men the loss of the gratia
supernaturalis (justitia originalis); this was the first, negative element in
original sin, to which then the second, positive, namely the concupiscentia,
was added. Thus Anselmus already defined original sin, de casu diaboli 27,
and was followed therein by Halesius, Bonaventura, Albertus, Thomas.
Original sin thus consisted in privatio originalis justitiae and in quaedam
inordinata naturae dispositio (concupiscentia), Thomas, S. Th. II 1 qu. 82
art. 1 and further Schwane, D. G. III 393-413. But with further reflection,
difference had again to arise concerning this latter. For the image of God
was gradually conceived as a donum supernaturale, part II 518, thus there
was also a man conceivable and capable of existing without that image and
yet without sin, a homo naturalis; in such a man, however, flesh and spirit
would nevertheless by nature stand over against each other and wage
conflict with each other; i.e. the concupiscentia, the lust of the flesh against
the spirit, is by nature, necessary, by creation proper to man and thus cannot
in itself be sin. The image of God had indeed been bestowed upon Adam as
a remedium and frenum, but when he lost this, the conflict of flesh and
spirit arose of itself again; this lay in his nature, was indeed suppressed but
now became free again. The concupiscentia is a morbus seu languor naturae
humanae, qui ex conditione materiae oriebatur, part II 527; it can in itself be
no sin and thus also can form no part of original sin. The Roman doctrine of
the domum superadditum takes its revenge here in a questionable way upon
original sin. It is historically to be shown how therefore gradually in Roman
Catholic theology the center of gravity in the doctrine of original sin
was shifted from the concupiscentia to the privatio justitiae originalis, from
the positive to the negative. Augustine defined the whole of original sin by
concupiscentia; the scholastics added to that the loss of original
righteousness, but nevertheless still maintained original sin in a positive
sense as an inordinata dispositio, languor naturae, habitus corruptus,
Thomas, S. Th. II 1 qu. 82 art. 1. Trent speaks very cautiously; it says that
Adam not only lost righteousness but also was changed for the worse in
body and soul; that he, after he was defiled, poured out not only death and
the punishments of the body but also especially sin upon his descendants;
that the sin of Adam is not by imitation but by propagation proper to each,
inest unicuique proprium, and can be taken away only by Christ’s merit in
baptism, sess. 5. But the Synod intentionally refrained from narrower
determinations, Möhler, Symb. 57; the nature of this sin is not further
defined; the words in deterius say little; the concupiscentia, which remains
in the baptized, is itself no sin but only is ex peccato et ad peccatum
inclinat, ib. 5; free will is not lost but weakened, VI c. 5, and can also do
good works before faith, ib. 7. Taken all together, it is not to be seen in
what, apart from the imputation of Adam’s transgression and the loss of
original righteousness, original sin could further still consist. Nothing
remains for it. After Trent, therefore, the opinion of Lombardus is also
expressly contested, later still embraced by Henricus, Gregorius Arim.,
Driedo, that original sin would consist formaliter or materialiter in
concupiscentia, in a positive qualitas, Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et statu
pecc. V c. 15. Becanus, Theol. schol., de pecc. orig. qu. 3 and 4. Theol.
Wirceb. VII 84-94. With appeal to Thomas, Bonaventura, Scotus etc.
original sin is set only in the loss of the justitia originalis; Bellarminus
expressed it openly and clearly: non magis differt status hominis post
lapsum Adae a statu ejusdem in puris naturalibus, quam differat spoliatus a
nudo, neque deterior est humana natura, si culpam originalem detrahas,
neque magis infirmitate et ignorantia laborat, quam esset et laborasset in
puris naturalibus condita. Proinde corruptio naturae non ex alicujus doni
naturalis carentia neque ex alicujus malae qualitatis accessu sed ex
sola doni supernaturalis ob Adae peccatum amissione profluxit, de gr. pr.
hom. 5. The condition in which man is born after the fall is completely
equal to that of Adam before the fall without the donum superadditum. Of a
corruptio or vulneratio naturae there can be spoken only insofar as this
condition ought not to be there, because Adam received the donum
superadditum and lost it; the loss of it is guilt. But in substance that
condition is not wrong; it is naked naturalness; original sin nothing other
than reductio ad statum mere naturalem; supernaturalia amissa, naturalia
integra; in baptism this loss is restored by the gratia infusa; after death
original sin is punished only with poena damni. Some still attempt to
maintain a corruptio naturae, but the supranaturalistic conception of
Christianity makes this impossible. Only there is still difference over
whether the imputation of Adam’s sin, which had as consequence the loss of
the donum superadditum for all his descendants, rests on a nexus physicus
or on a nexus moralis (foederalis). Some say that all men were indeed not
formaliter but yet causaliter, materialiter, seminaliter included in Adam;
others think they can explain the imputation no otherwise than by assuming
that Adam was not only our progenitor but also our head and our
representative; still others connect both representations with each other. Cf.
Anselmus, de conceptu originali et de originali peccato. Lombardus, Sent.
II dist. 30-33 and the comm. of Thomas, Bonaventura etc. Thomas, S.
Theol. II 1 qu. 81 sq. Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. V 17-20. Becanus, Theol.
Schol. II tr. 2 c. 9 de pecc. orig. Theol. Wirceb. VII 65 sq. Vasquez, Suarez
e. a. in Schwane, D. G. der neueren Zeit 1890 S. 166-198. Schwetz, Theol.
cath. II 163-177. Dens, Theol. I 356 sq. Perrone, Prael. theol. III 1839 p.
189. 216-223. Scheeben, Dogm. II 633 f. Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. der
Menschheit 1887 S. 110 f. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit II 616-675. Simar,
Dogm. 351-367. Pesch, Prael. theol. III 111-152 etc.
5. Against this Roman weakening of original sin the Reformation rose in
protest. In itself it found no objection to the scholastic definition of original
sin as privatio justitiae originalis, homini inesse debitae, provided
only that it was not understood in a purely negative sense. This, however,
became more and more the case in Roman theology, and therefore the
Reformation laid emphasis precisely on the point that original sin was not
only a privatio but that in it there was at the same time a total corruption of
human nature. Frequently in the first period this corruption was still
designated by the name of concupiscentia, yet then this was not one-sidedly
conceived, with Augustine and Lombard, as sexual lust, but as ἀ ταξια
omnium appetitionum, seated as well in the higher as in the lower faculties
of man. Calvin says very clearly: they who define original sin as loss of
original righteousness do indeed describe it wholly, but do not sufficiently
express its power and operation. Our nature, namely, is not only deprived of
something good, but it is also malorum omnium fertilis et ferax. If original
sin therefore is described as concupiscentia, this is good, provided one adds,
quidquid in homine est, ab intellectu ad voluntatem, ab anima ad carnem
usque hac concupiscentia inquinatum refertumque esse, aut ut brevius
absolvam, totum hominem non aliud ex se ipso esse quam concupiscentiam,
Inst. II 1, 8. Further, the Reformers taught that this lust was sin also in its
primoprimi motus; it does not first become sin when the will has consented
to it, but it is sin in itself, not first as formata therefore but also already as
informis. Calvin again declares that in this point he departs from Augustine;
the latter calls the concupiscentia, when in baptism the guilt of it has been
taken away, by the name of infirmitas; nos autem illud ipsum pro peccato
habemus, Inst. III 3, 10. And finally this corruption of human nature was so
total that man by nature is incapable of any spiritual good, inclined to all
evil, and for it alone already worthy of eternal punishment. It cannot be
denied that one has sometimes, out of reaction against Rome, especially on
the Lutheran side, expressed oneself all too strongly. Even if it was not
meant so badly, it was nevertheless certainly liable to serious
misunderstanding, when Luther called original sin peccatum essentiale and
essentia hominis, Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 366 f. Flacius spoke still more
strongly of original sin as substantia hominis. And also the Formula
Concordiae said in Luther’s own words that man’s understanding, heart and
will in spiritual matters was prorsus corruptus atque mortuus, capable
of nothing more quam lapis, truncus aut limus, ed. Müller 589. 594, cf. also
Frank, Theol. d. Conc. I 138. However much the Romanists therefore tried
to accuse the Lutherans of Manichaeism, Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et stat.
pecc. V c. 1 sq. Becanus, de pecc. orig. qu. 2 sq. Möhler, Symbolik S. 66 f.,
yet they have in the Form. Conc. expressly confessed that sin was no
substance, and all theologians agree with that. Yes, although the Lutherans
in general had embraced traducianism and although they were therefore
inclined to have original sin propagated through the carnalis concupiscentia,
Luther in Köstlin II 367. Melanchton, Loci C. de pecc. orig. C. R. XXI. p
668 sq., cf. Frank, Theol. der Concordienformel I 50 f., yet Melanchthon
also says there that he has no objection, natos etiam propter lapsum Adae
reos esse; the Form. Conc. declares that original sin is culpa seu reatus, quo
fit, ut omnes propter inobedientiam Adae et Hevae in odio apud Deum et
natura filii irae simus, Müller, Symb. Bücher 576, and later various
Lutheran theologians say that Adam is not only to be regarded as caput
physicum but also as caput morale seu foederale generis humani, and that
therefore his transgression is imputed to all, Quenstedt, Theol. II 53. 118.
Hollaz, Ex. theol. 515. Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. 172 f. The Reformed
from the beginning guarded themselves against such strong expressions as
the Lutherans sometimes employed; Calvin absolutely did not approve the
above-mentioned images, Schweizer, Centrald. I 385. 394. But nevertheless
they too taught that original sin consisted negatively in carentia justitiae
originalis but also positively in corruptio naturae, and that it had its cause in
the imputed transgression of Adam, Calvin, Inst. II 1, comm. on Psalms 51:7,
Romans 5:12 etc. Beza, Tract. Theol. I 344. Martyr, Loci C. 68 sq. Polanus,
Synt. 336. Ursinus, Tract. Theol. 202. Explic. Catech. qu. 7. Zanchius, Op.
IV 30. Junius, Theses Theol. 19 20. Heppe, Dogm. 245 f. On this point
there prevailed a very great agreement. Rivetus collected a long series of
statements from ecclesiastical confessions and theological works, which all
teach the same, Testimonia de imputatione primi peccati omnibus Adami
posteris, Op. III 798-826, for the most part translated into English in
Princeton Theol. Essays 1846 p. 195-217. There came, however,
opposition to this doctrine from the school of Saumur; Placaeus taught
namely in his theses de statu hominis lapsi ante gratiam, Synt. thesium
theol. in acad. Salm. ed. 2 1665 p. 205, that the disobedience of Adam was
imputed to his descendants only mediately, i.e. only insofar and on the
ground that they were born from him already unclean. Formerly it was
taught unanimously: corrupti nascimur, quia primum peccatum nobis
imputatur; Placaeus reversed this and said: primum peccatum nobis
imputatur, quia corrupti nascimur, and explained his opinion still further in
Disp. bipartita de imputatione primi peccati Adami 1655. The Synod at
Charenton condemned his opinion 1645, Rivetus collected at the command
of the Synod his above-mentioned testimonia, various theologians opposed
the doctrine of Placaeus, Heidegger, Turretinus, Maresius, Driessen,
Leydecker, Marck, Comrie, Holtius etc. But the time seemed past for the
reformational doctrine of original sin. Placaeus found acceptance
everywhere, in France, Switzerland, England, America, among theologians
such as Wyttenbach, Endemann, Stapfer, Whitby, John Taylor, Roell,
Vitringa, Venema etc. cf. M. Vitringa II 349, and also among the Lutherans,
Walch, Bibl. theol. I 85. In America Jonathan Edwards did indeed still write
his famous tract Original sin defended 1757, Works II 305-310, against
Whitby, but he himself already advocated therein the mediate imputation of
Adam’s sin and brought the New England Theology of Hopkins, Edwards
Jr., Dwight, Emmons etc. entirely into the line of Placaeus. Pelagianism
made its entry everywhere; Protestantism, in the same measure as it became
unfaithful to its past, fell back into Romanism; man was good by nature but
succumbed very easily in the struggle against sensuality. Even the more
recent theologians, who assume an influence of Adam’s sin on his
descendants, have thereby still only in part returned to the doctrine of the
Reformation, Vilmar, Dogm. I 270. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III 40. Ebrard,
Dogm. § 340-344. Dorner, Chr. Gl. § 82. 83. Frank, System d. chr. Wahrh. I
460. 482. Müller, Sünde II 426-503 etc. Yet through all sorts of causes the
deep meaning of the doctrine of original sin has again become clear to
many. In 1845 Gervinus wrote: wir sind der Erbsündenangst entnommen,
die wie die Gespensterfurcht nur die Furcht einer abergläubischen
Religionslehre war, in Delitzsch, Christl. Apol. 119. There will not be
many who now still agree with this superficial judgment. The philosophy of
Kant, Schelling, Schopenhauer etc., the doctrine of heredity and of
solidarity, the historical and sociological studies have offered the dogma of
original sin an unexpected and important support. When theology had
rejected it, philosophy took it up again.
6. The doctrine of original sin is one of the weightiest but also one of the
most difficult subjects of dogmatics. Nothing is more familiar for preaching
than original sin, nothing more secret for understanding, Augustine, de mor.
eccl. cath. I 22. Chose étonnante, que le mystère le plus éloigné de notre
connaissance, qui est celui de la transmission du péché, soit une chose sans
laquelle nous ne pouvons avoir aucune connaissance de nous-mêmes. Car il
est sans doute, qu’il n’y a rien qui choque plus notre raison que de dire que
le péché du premier homme ait rendu coupables ceux qui, étant si éloignés
de cette source, semblent incapables d’y participer.... et cependant, sans ce
mystère, le plus incompréhensible de tous, nous sommes incompréhensibles
à nous-mêmes. Le noeud de notre condition prend ses replis et ses tours
dans cet abîme, de sorte que l’homme est plus inconcevable sans ce mystère
que ce mystère n’est inconcevable à l’homme (Pascal). Le péché originel
explique tout et sans lui on n’explique rien (de Maistre), and yet it itself
needs explanation more than anything. From of old it was designated in
theology as peccatum originale, not as though it were proper to man from
his origin by virtue of creation, but because in all men it is the origin and
source of all other sins. Much misunderstanding is prevented if this original
sin is clearly distinguished into peccatum originans (imputatum, culpa) and
peccatum originatum (inhaerens, poena). Properly, under original sin,
peccatum haereditarium, there is only to be understood that moral
corruption which man immediately brings with him at his conception and
birth from sinful parents. But this moral corruption, which is proper to all
men by nature and does not first arise in them later through their own
wrong deeds, must nevertheless have a cause. And this cause, according to
Holy Scripture and also for Christian thinking, can be no other than the first
transgression of the first man, through which sin and death came into
the world. Adam’s disobedience is the peccatum originans; Scripture says
that clearly, Romans 5:12, 1 Corinthians 15:22; and experience confirms it at every
moment, all men are conceived in sins and born in iniquity. This is now
conceivable in no other way than that that transgression of Adam concerns
us all in one way or another. If absolutely no connection existed between
Adam and us, it would be impossible that we are born in sins, because he
transgressed God’s commandment. Scripture and history thus together point
us to an original, common guilt of the human race. The hypothesis, to be
sure, of Plato and others, that every soul had already existed long before its
coming into the human body and had already fallen there, has earlier
appeared to us for conclusive reasons to be wholly untenable, above p. 70;
there lies only the undeniable truth at its foundation, that every man is born
under guilt. That guilt has not been brought upon himself by each
personally, individually, actually; it rests upon each man on Adam’s
o ἱ πολλοι, Romans 5:19. Apart from whether we can make it in any measure
intelligible that God immediately through and on account of Adam’s
disobedience constitutes all men sinners, the fact itself stands firm, on the
ground of Scripture and experience. But yet something can be said, in order,
if not to explain this manner of acting of God, then at least to remove it
from the appearance of arbitrariness. In the first place, for the human race is
not an aggregate of individuals, but an organic unity, one race, one family.
The angels all stand independently alongside one another; they were all
created at the same time and did not proceed the one from the other; among
them a judgment of God, as was pronounced in Adam over all men, would
not have been possible; each stood and fell for himself. But it is not so
among men. God has made them all from one blood, Hd. 17:26; they are
not a heap of souls on a piece of ground, but all related to one another in the
blood, bound to one another by all kinds of bonds, and therefore in
everything determining one another and determined by one another. And in
particular the first man occupies an entirely unique and incomparable place.
Like rami in radice, massa in primitiis, membra in capite, so were all
men included in Adam’s loins and have they all proceeded from his hip. He
was no private person, no loose individual alongside others, but he was
radix, stirps, principium seminale totius generis humani, our all caput
naturale; in a certain sense it can be said, that nos omnes ille unus homo
fuimus, that what he did was done by us all in him; his choice of will and
act of will was that of all his descendants. Undoubtedly this physical unity
of the whole of humanity in Adam is already of great significance for the
explanation of original sin; it is its necessary presupposition, its
praerequisitum; if Christ would be able to bear sin for us and make his
righteousness partaken of by us, he first had to assume our human nature.
But yet realism without more is insufficient for the explanation of original
sin. For, in a certain sense it can indeed be said that all men were included
in Adam, but then also only in a certain definite sense; it is repraesentative
but not physice true. In the covenant of grace too no one speaks thus. We
can and may indeed say that God so appropriates the righteousness of
Christ to us, as if we had performed all the obedience which Christ has
performed for us, Heid. Cat. vr. 60, but for that reason we are not personally
and physice yet those who have satisfied God’s righteousness; Christ
satisfied for us and in our place. And so it is also with Adam; virtualiter,
potentialiter, seminaliter we may have been included in him, but
personaliter and actualiter he transgressed the probationary commandment
and not we. If realism would not want to acknowledge this distinction, and
would want to be consistent to the utmost, then it would make all
imputation superfluous both with Adam and with Christ; in both cases it
would then have been each man himself who had personally sinned with the
deed and had satisfied by his suffering and death. Further, if Adam’s
transgression in this realistic sense has been ours, then man is also guilty of
all other sins of Adam, of all sins of Eve, indeed of all the sins of his
forefathers from whom he was born, for he was included in these just as
well as in Adam when he transgressed the probationary commandment; it is
then also not to be seen how Christ, who physice, i.e. as far as the flesh is
concerned, is from the fathers and from Adam and Eve, could then be free
from original sin; the physical unity on this standpoint nevertheless
brings the moral necessity along with it. Further, realism comes into no
small embarrassment with the covenant of grace; for if there is no foedus
operum, then also no foedus gratiae; the one stands and falls with the other.
If now the righteousness of Christ is not acquired and applied in the way of
the covenant, but in a realistic way, then this consists with Christ in that he
assumed our nature, and in that case satisfaction and salvation are the
portion of all men, for Christ assumed the nature of them all; or it consists
in that each first obtains this physical, realistic unity with Christ through
regeneration or faith, and then it is not to be seen how Christ could
beforehand satisfy for those with whom he first becomes one through faith;
then regeneration and faith run the danger of losing their ethical character,
the center of gravity is shifted from the Christ to the Christian, and the
benefits of the covenant come into being only after and through faith.
Finally, realism does indeed defend an excellent interest, namely the unity
of the human race, but in doing so it loses another interest out of sight,
which is of no less weight, namely the independence of personality. A man
is a member of the whole, very certainly, but in that whole he nevertheless
also occupies a place of his own; he is more than a wave in the ocean, more
than a passing form of appearance of the general human nature. Earlier, part
II 551f., it has therefore already been remarked that the relations in which
men stand to one another are distinct from those which are found among the
angels and among the animals; for related to both, he is nevertheless also
different from both; he is a creature with a nature of his own. And therefore
physical unity with him is not sufficient; there is added yet another, an
ethical, federal one. Cf. against Shedd, who is a strong supporter of realism,
Dogm. Theol. II p. 6 etc., also Arch. Alex. Hodge, The atonement, Philad.
Presb. Board of Publication n.d. p. 99 etc.
As soon as people in the Christian church began seriously to reflect on the
connection between Adam’s sin and ours, they did not have enough with the
physical unity. Shedd does indeed assert that Augustine, the scholastics, the
oldest Reformed theologians were all realists, t. a. p. II 37. But this is
incorrect; the doctrine of the covenant had not been worked out, but
the thought already occurs among the church fathers and the medieval
theologians, cf. vol. II 549, above p. 124 and further Schwane, D. G. III 393
f. IV 166 f. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit II 711. Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. d.
Menschheit 165. 167. Scheeben, Dogm. I 500. Pesch, Prael. III 136 etc. The
one fact alone, that they almost all adhered to creationism, says enough, for
a creationist cannot be a realist. Federalism therefore does not exclude the
truth that lies hidden in realism; on the contrary it accepts it fully; it
proceeds from it but it does not stop there; it recognizes a unitas naturae, cui
unitas foederalis est innixa. In humanity we encounter all kinds of forms of
community, which rest absolutely not only and even not chiefly on physical
descent, but on another, higher, moral unity. There are “moral bodies,”
family, kin, society, people, state, church, and associations and societies of
every kind and for every purpose, which lead a life of their own, are subject
to special laws, in particular also to the law which Paul formulates when he
μελος, συγχαιρει παντα τα μελη, 1 Corinthians 12:26. All the members of such a
body can be for one another a blessing or a curse, and that all the more, the
more excellent they themselves are and the more weighty a place they
occupy in the organism. A father, mother, guardian, caregiver, instructor,
teacher, patron, guide, prince, king etc. have the greatest influence on those
over whom they are placed. Their life and action decide the fate of their
subordinates, raise them up and bring them to honor or cast them down and
drag them along to ruin. The family of a drunkard is destroyed and laden
with shame because of the sin of the father. The family of a criminal is, in a
wide circle and for a long time, reckoned with and condemned with him. A
congregation languishes under the unfaithfulness of its minister. A people
perishes because of the folly of its prince. Quidquid delirant reges,
plectuntur Achivi. There is among human beings a solidarity in good and in
evil; a community in blessings and in judgments. We stand on the shoulders
of the preceding generations and inherit what they have amassed in material
and spiritual capital; we enter into their labor, rest on their laurels, enjoy
what they have often obtained through struggle and suffering. All that
we receive undeservedly, without having asked for it, it all lies ready at our
birth, it is bestowed on us by grace. No one who objects to that and rises up
in resistance against this law. But when that same law now also comes to
rule in evil and makes us participants in the sin and the suffering of others,
then the heart rises in revolt and the law is accused of injustice. The son
who accepts the inheritance of his father refuses to pay the debt of his
father. Thus the Israelites also complained in the days of Ezekiel. There was
in the O. T. a law of solidarity, Genesis 9:25, Exodus 20:5, Numbers 14:33, 16:32, Jos.
Jeremiah 32:18, Klaagl. 3:40v., 5:7 Ezra 9:6, Matthew 23:35, 27:25. But when Israel in
its supposed righteousness complains about it, the Lord has the prophet
proclaim, not what He can do justly, but what He will do, if Israel repents
and does not walk the way of the fathers. There is a solidarity of sin and
suffering, but God permits it and often grants the strength to break that
moral community and oneself to become the beginning of a generation that
walks in the fear of the Lord and enjoys his favor. But thereby the solidarity
itself is so little abolished that it is rather confirmed by it. Christ has proved
the truth of the solidarity of the human race in another and better way than
Adam. If this solidarity could also be broken, not only all compassion, but
also all love, friendship, intercession etc. would cease to exist; humanity
would fall apart into lifeless atoms; there would be no mystery, no
mysticism, no human life any more. Yet it is true what Shedd asserts,
Dogm. Theol. II 187, that this solidarity of suffering does not yet explain
the imputation of Adam’s sin to all his descendants; to suffer for the sin of
another is not the same as to be punished for the sin of another and thus also
oneself to be regarded as the perpetrator of that sin; there is suffering
without personal transgression, Luke 13:1-5, John 9:3. But this solidarity,
which we see daily, nevertheless takes the argument out of our hand, to
accuse God of injustice, if He makes the whole of humanity share in
Adam’s punishment. Thus He acts at every moment, both in blessings
and in judgments. If such a manner of acting is compatible with his
righteousness, then this is and must also be the case with Adam’s
transgression. But in addition there is still the fact that there is a special
reason why the above-mentioned law of solidarity in the case of Adam does
not apply wholly and entirely nor even can apply. The law of solidarity does
not explain the covenant of works and the covenant of grace, but is built
upon it and points back to it. It always rules within narrower circles than are
formed by humanity itself. However great the blessing or curse of parents
and guardians, of sages and artists, of founders of religions and reformers,
of princes and conquerors etc. may have been; there were nevertheless
always “circumstances” of place, time, country, people, language etc.,
which set bounds and limits to it; the circle in which their influence ruled
was always enclosed by other and greater ones. Only two human beings
have existed whose life and works have extended to the boundaries of
humanity itself, whose influence and dominion continues to work through
to the ends of the earth and into eternity. They are Adam and Christ; the first
brought sin and death, the second righteousness and life into the world.
From this wholly exceptional place occupied by Adam and Christ it follows
that they alone are to be compared with one another, and that all other
relations, derived from circles within humanity, can indeed serve for
elucidation and are of great value, but nevertheless offer only analogy and
no identity. That is to say, that Adam and Christ have both been placed
under a wholly special ordinance of God, precisely with a view to the
special place which they occupy in humanity. When a father plunges his
family, a prince his people, a philosopher his pupils, a patron his workers
with himself into misery, then we can go back behind their persons and in
the solidarity which rules within humanity and its different circles find, to a
certain extent, an explanation and satisfaction. But thus we cannot do with
Adam and Christ. They do not have humanity behind but before them; they
do not proceed out of it but bring it into being; they are not borne by it but
bear it themselves; they are not a product but, each in his own way,
beginning and root of humanity, caput totius generis humani; they are not
explained by the law of solidarity but explain this only by themselves;
they do not presuppose, they constitute the organism of humanity. If
humanity were really to remain a unity both in the physical and in the
ethical sense, as it was destined to be; if therefore there were really in that
humanity not only community of blood, as with the animals, but on that
foundation also community of all material, moral, spiritual goods; then that
could not be brought about and maintained otherwise than by judging all in
one. As it went with him, so it would go with the whole human race. If
Adam fell, humanity fell; if Christ remained standing, in him humanity was
raised up. Covenant of works and covenant of grace are the forms by which
the organism of humanity is maintained also in the religious and ethical
sense. Because God is concerned not with a few individuals but with
humanity as his image and likeness, therefore it had to fall in one and also
be raised up in one. Thus is the ordinance, thus the judgment of God. He
declares all guilty in one, and therefore humanity is born unclean and dying
out of Adam; He declares all righteous in one, and therefore that same
humanity is reborn out of Christ and sanctified unto eternal life. God has
shut them all up under obedience in order that He might be merciful to them
all. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 9. A. A. Hodge, The atonement p. 78-121. Ch.
Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 192. Princeton Theol. Essays 1846 p. 128-194.
Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit II 704 f. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk I3
211. E. Bersier, La solidarité. Paris 1870. Vercueil, Etude sur la solidarité
dans le Christianisme d’après St. Paul, Montauban 1894.
7. The consequence of the peccatum originans is the peccatum
originatum. Because all are reckoned as sinners in Adam, they are also all
born from him in a sinful condition. The hereditary stain is a punishment for
the hereditary guilt. From this point of view original sin was first
considered by Augustine, which provoked a powerful protest on the part of
the Pelagians, cf. August., c. Jul. V 3, as likewise later on the part of the
Remonstrants, Apol. Conf. VII 4. But Scripture speaks many times in that
spirit and sees in subsequent sins a punishment for the preceding, 2 Samuel 50:6-8, Romans 1:24-28, 2 Thessalonians 2:11, 12 etc. The sins too stand under God’s
governance; the laws and ordinances that apply to the life of sin have been
established by God and are maintained by him. And among those laws is
also this: Das eben ist der Fluch der bösen That, dass sie fortwährend Böses
muss gebähren. Sin has that nature, that it makes the sinner more and more
foolish and hardened, entangles him ever more firmly in its snares, and
makes him fall ever more quickly along a sloping plane into the abyss. It is
true that sin, considered in itself, can never be punishment for sin, for both
differ essentially and stand over against each other; sin arises from the will
and punishment is undergone by someone against his will; sin is
transgression, punishment is maintenance of the law; punishment has God
as author but sin does not. But nevertheless a subsequent sin may be called
a punishment of the preceding, because it removes the sinner still further
from God, makes him more wretched, and delivers him over to all kinds of
lust and passion, anxiety and remorse, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 36.
Thomas, S. Theol. I 2 qu. 87 art. 2, qu. 75 art. 4. qu. 84 art. 1-4. Gerhard,
Loc. VI c. 10 n. 140. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 15. Spanheim, Op. III 1268-
1270. Moor III 332-335. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 71, 2. Müller, Sünde II
589 f. Frank, Chr. Wahrh. I 489. Christ, Die sittl. Weltordnung S. 59.
According to this law, in Adam and all his descendants a sinful condition
followed upon the sinful act. The Pelagians represent it in such a way that
some act of will or other leaves absolutely no consequences; the will, which
at one moment did evil, can immediately thereafter, if it pleases it, do good
again; the will with them never has and never acquires a certain nature, a
definite character; it is and remains neutral, indifferent, without inner
inclination, always placed between opposite things and directing itself now
to the one side, then to the other, with incalculable arbitrariness. But such a
representation meets contradiction from all sides. There had taken place in
Adam and Eve, when they transgressed God’s commandment, a great moral
change; shame and fear of God took possession of them; the rest, the peace,
the innocence was gone; they hid themselves from God in the trees of the
garden; they cast the blame upon each other; Cain made himself guilty of
fratricide; and soon the Lord saw that the wickedness of man was
great on the earth, that all the imagination of the thoughts of his heart was
evil from his youth. With Adam’s transgression a dreadful degeneration of
the human race begins. We stand here before a terrible reality, the
explanation of which escapes us. How is it possible that one single sinful
act had such dreadful consequences and brought a radical reversal in the
whole human nature? In general it may be remarked that the relation
between an act and its consequences repeatedly appears to us in life very
disproportionate. One hour of thoughtlessness can make one weep for
years. One small mistake, a single misstep gives to the life of many people
a wholly different direction; small insignificant events work on through
generations; on a so-called accident our happiness or unhappiness often
depends. The one transgression of Adam brought an entire change in the
deliberations, dispositions, and inclinations of his nature. For experience
teaches that whatever a human being does, in greater or lesser measure
works back upon himself and leaves a trace in his character. At bottom
nothing is indifferent and nothing passes by us without leaving a trace.
Every act of will, arising from preceding inclinations and desires, works
back upon these and strengthens them. Every sin can in that way become a
habit, an inclination, a passion, which rules over the human being like a
tyrant. A human being is so changeable, so pliably formable; he adapts
himself to all circumstances, he adjusts himself to every milieu, he becomes
accustomed to everything and conforms everywhere. He who commits sin
becomes at once a servant of sin. A crime, a lie, a theft, a murder is never
past with the moment in which it is committed. The disobedience of Adam
has changed his whole nature. Moreover, his transgression had not only an
outward but also an inward side. It is not so that the sinful act of Adam,
consisting in the eating of the forbidden fruit, happened suddenly without
any preparation and only thereafter had all kinds of moral changes in his
nature as a consequence. In that way, with Adam guilt and stain do not
stand in relation to each other. The act of eating was itself already a
manifestation of an entire moral change that had taken place in the
inner man. Strictly speaking it was not the first sin but the first fully
developed sin in the sense of Jak. 1:15. The sinful act was preceded by
sinful deliberations of the understanding (doubt, unbelief) and sinful
inclinations of the heart (lust, pride), which had their occasion in the
temptation of the serpent and were fostered by the will of the human being.
Both before and during and after the eating of the forbidden tree, man’s
relation to God and to his law was changed. He became, not first the one
and then the other, but simultaneously and in connection with each other,
both guilty and unclean before the face of his Maker. Guilt and stain are
both simultaneous consequences of the one and the same sin, two sides of
the same matter. Finally, the change that entered in with Adam did not
consist in this, that any sinful principle was implanted in him or any
constituent part of his being, of his soul or body, of his faculties or powers,
was taken from him. But it consisted in this, that the human being through
his doubt and unbelief, through his pride and lust, and finally through the
sinful act itself, increasingly detached himself from God and from his law,
placed himself outside his favor and fellowship, and began to use all his
gifts and powers precisely against God and his commandment. And then
when this happens, when the human being places himself outside God’s
fellowship and outside God’s law, then the sinful condition enters of itself,
just as darkness enters when the light disappears. Fieri nequit quin maxime
sese amet creatura, quam non absorpserit amor Dei (Melanchton). The
human being, withdrawing himself from the fellowship of God in which he
was created, is not otherwise conceivable than as a sinner, guilty and
corrupt before his face.
That same religious and ethical change, which took place in Adam under
and at his fall, is also the lot of all his descendants. These are all born in that
same moral condition in which Adam fell through his transgression. This
fact is hardly susceptible of any denial. Scripture teaches it not only, but
experience and history prove it day by day. If anything is certain, then it is
this, that human beings are not conceived and born as righteous and holy
but as sinners. That points to the fact that they have one guilt in common
with Adam, for guilt and stain in sin always go together. Just as it did not
happen in Adam in such a way that he first committed the sinful deed,
thereby loaded guilt upon himself, and as a consequence of that now also
became morally unclean and corrupt, so also his descendants do not come
into the world, as it were, with a double guilt, first with that of Adam’s
transgression and then also with that of their moral corruption. For this
moral corruption is not a later additional, external appendage and not an
accidental consequence of the first transgression, but in it an essential
element and not to be separated from it. Just as Adam through his
transgression at the same time and in the same measure made himself guilty
and became unclean, so also with his descendants the being guilty in him
and the being born unclean out of him are two sides of the same thing,
Edwards, Works II 482. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 170. It is incorrect to infer
from that with Edwards that the stain precedes the guilt. There is here no
before and no after. The uncleanness in which all human beings are born is
the reverse side of the guilt of that transgression, which was committed by
Adam as caput foederale. Guilt, stain, death stand with Adam’s descendants
in the same relation as with himself and have thus, in that mutual
connection, passed on to all.
8. The way in which this peccatum originatum becomes the portion of all
human beings is not that of imitation but of generation. A κριμα, a judgment
of God, precedes it, and by virtue of that judgment all human beings are
born from Adam guilty, unclean, and dying. They do not first become all
this at a later age through their actual sins, but are it from their conception
and birth onward. Death is the proof, for this reigns not only over adults but
much more strongly over the little children, even the unborn; and that death
is according to Scripture not a natural process but a wage of sin. Now this
doctrine of original sin, however much it was formerly condemned as
unreasonable, has in recent times again found favor in the eyes of so-called
science. It proved after all not so foolish and absurd as earlier interpreters of
science had displayed it. Scientifically, now precisely the opposite holds of
what in a former century counted for that. The doctrine of the innate
goodness of man and of society as the cause of all evil has had its
day; one now teaches precisely the opposite: man, descended from an
animal, remains in his heart an animal; in every man lurks la bête humaine,
vitium hominis natura pecoris; and the “holy” society and the “divine” state
are what keep him happily in bonds and compel him to virtue; all vice is
innate, all virtue is acquired, cf. e.g. Brunetière, La moralité de la doctrine
évolutive, Paris 1896. It is not the newly discovered facts that have brought
about this change in the view. For that every species brings forth its like,
that children take after their parents, that not only bodily but also all kinds
of spiritual properties are inherited, that is no discovery of the 19th century
but was, as appears from the doctrine of traducianism, also formerly well
known. And that again not all properties are inherited, that each individual
is nevertheless something different and something more than the sum or the
product of his parents, that too was, as appears from the doctrine of
creationism, not unknown to earlier generations. Certainly the knowledge of
the facts has been extended and increased, but this was far from being of
such a nature that it alone could radically change an entire view. This
change is chiefly to be ascribed to the fact that one viewed approximately
the same facts from another point of view and with another eye, namely
from the standpoint of monism and with the eye of a dogmatist of
evolution. In conflict with all sober scientific sense, one has built upon a
few facts a series of deeply far-reaching conclusions and has brought these
in all manner of ways to the public in popular writings: man—that had
clearly appeared—was by no means an independent being, but nothing but
a product of existing factors, a plaything of circumstances; to speak of
freedom in his case is foolishness, he is a will-less instrument of fate;
criminals are a distinct type, who are already born as such and are
incorrigible and not responsible; every man must of necessity be what he is.
An army of partly talented writers, such as Zola, Ibsen, Nietzsche etc. have
depicted this view in novel and drama for the heated imagination. And
whoever now does not sing along in that choir and doubts the scientific
character of this view, is put under the ban. And yet for the sober observer
all that science has brought to light in this field comes down to this
little: 1o There is not only heredity but also variation, not only unity but
also change, not only memory but also imagination. Many properties pass
over from parents to children, for all species after all bring forth their like;
but yet not all properties pass over, for each individual is something new;
no single child resembles his parents exactly. With this nothing new has
been said and only an old familiar truth, denied by no one ever, has been
repeated. 2o. These two facts are very gladly labeled with the name of laws;
but how those laws rule is still as good as entirely unknown. Heredity and
variation are continually connected with each other, they work together and
cross each other, and hence the explanation of the facts is so difficult. And
this difficulty is further increased by the fact that inheritance in all higher
beings takes place through the mixing of two individuals (amphimixis, as
Weismann called it). 3o. This appears as soon as one specializes somewhat
more closely. That species-properties are inherited, i.e., that parents bring
forth children of the same species, is certain but does not carry one much
further. That race- and variety-properties are constantly transplanted is
subject to legitimate doubt; by selection the race, e.g. of animals or plants,
can indeed be improved; but this improvement is limited and temporary;
after four or five generations the height of the improvement is reached; as
soon as one ceases with the selection, the descendants return to the old type;
the properties are not taken up into the nature of the creatures, they retain
the tendency to revert to the original form. That finally individual, acquired
properties pass over from parents to children has indeed been asserted by
Darwin et al., but is by A. Weismann, professor at Freiburg, contested as
strongly as possible, and his theory nowadays finds ever more assent. 4o.
The attempt to bring together the phenomena that occur here under some
laws has not only not succeeded but is for the present to be regarded as very
premature. The phenomena are far too numerous and too complicated, as
e.g. those of the weather, to be able already now to make us speak of fixed
laws. The law of atavism therefore also gives entirely the impression of
having been invented merely in order to give a semblance of
regularity to the many cases in which the favorable properties are not
inherited and thus the “law” of heredity does not hold. Nicht begriffene
Thatsachen scheinen schliesslich bekannt, sobald man sie mit einem
bekannten Worte bezeichnet, Dr. Kohlbrugge, Der Atavismus, Utrecht 1897,
S. 3, who therefore, like Emery, holds atavism to be a saga. The hypothesis
of Lombroso concerning the criminal type already belongs again to the past.
And statistics, even if it may also indicate a certain regularity in births,
marriages, crimes etc., is thereby nevertheless by no means entitled to the
conclusion that each man is compelled to his deeds, any more than the fact
that the age of a population on average amounts to thirty years compels
every thirty-year-old to die, Wundt, Grundzüge der physiol. Psych. II2 397.
A. v. Oettingen, Die Moralstatistik3 1882 S. 24 f. Finally 5o. the different
theories for the explanation of heredity and variation have all up to the
present day proved insufficient. Already the great number that has been set
up proves that none of them satisfies. All natural philosophers and
biologists have tried their powers on it, without having unveiled this secret
of life. The professor at the Sorbonne, Yves Delage, has in his learned work:
La structure du protoplasma et les théories sur l’hérédité et les grands
problèmes de la biologie générale, Paris Reinwald et Cie 1895 discussed all
theories at length and then comes to the conclusion: après avoir étudié et
discuté les nombreuses théories émises pour résoudre les problèmes de
l’hérédité et de l’évolution, nous sommes obligés de reconnaître, qu’aucune
ne présente une solution acceptable. Toutes pèchent en quelques points, non
pas accessoires mais fondamentaux, et la plupart sont, en outre, appuyées
sur des hypothéses gratuites et tout à fait improbables, p. 743. He himself
therefore also does not venture to offer the reader a théorie complète; nos
connaissances sont loin d’être assez avancées pour que cela soit possible, p.
747; cf. also Hugo de Vries, Eenheid in veranderlijkheid, Album der Natuur
1898 bl. 65-80. Ribot, L’hérédité psychol.5 Paris Alcan 1894. van
Bemmelen, De erfelijkheid van verworven eigenschappen, 1890. R.
Schäfer, Die Vererbung, Berlin, Reuther u. Reichard 1897. Dr. Jonker, Erfel.
en Toerekenb. in Theol. Stud. v. Dr. Daubanton 1894 bl. 291-322 etc. With
all this we do not, however, deny the facts of heredity nor also its
extensive dominion. Christian theology has not the least interest in doing
any injustice to these even in the slightest degree; on the contrary it fully
acknowledges and respects the laws that have been established in this area
by God; the more fixed laws are traced in heredity, the greater becomes the
glory of Him who is the Creator of all ordinances and no God of confusion
but of order. It is also completely true that we can almost never indicate
with accuracy the boundaries that separate personal guilt from common
guilt. What Schleiermacher says of original sin is something quite different
from what Scripture and church pronounce concerning it, but in itself it is
nevertheless completely true of sin in general that it is a Gesammtthat und
Gesammtschuld des menschlichen Geschlechtes, i.e.: the sinful condition
and the sinful deeds of each man are on the one hand caused by those of the
forefathers and on the other hand again cause of the sinful conditions and
deeds of the descendants; sin is in Jedem das Werk Aller und in Allen das
Werk eines Jeden, Chr. Gl. § 71, 1. 2. But however true all this may be, so
long as biology alongside heredity must also acknowledge variation, all
right is lacking to deprive man of his independence and freedom and to
represent him as a will-less instrument of evil powers. Such a representation
does not rest on sound science but is a fruit of sick imagination and, by
killing all will-power in man, causes incalculable devastations. And further,
even if the support offered by the science of the day to the ecclesiastical
doctrine of original sin may to a certain extent be gratefully acknowledged,
it itself does not become stronger by it any more than it becomes weaker by
it if that same science perhaps tomorrow might again please to display it as
foolish and nonsensical. Original sin is still something other than what
nowadays is understood under heredity. For it is not a species-property that
belongs to the essence of man, for it has entered into human nature through
transgression of God’s command and can through regeneration and
sanctification be removed from it again; and on the other side it is also no
individual acquired property, for it is proper to all human beings without
exception and it is so inherent in human nature that even the
regenerate still bring forth children who by nature are children of wrath;
justus non generat unde ipse regeneratus sed unde generatus est
(Augustine). Original sin therefore occupies a special place; the present
doctrine of heredity may have rid it of its apparent absurdity, but it does not
explain it. Formerly this was attempted by traducianism or creationism. But
whatever standpoint one may take concerning the origin of souls, the
propagation of original sin always remains equally difficult. Original sin is
after all no substance that has its seat in the body and can be transplanted by
generation; it is a moral quality of man, who lacks the communion with
God which he according to his original nature ought to possess and has
possessed. Adam’s corruption entered of itself and at the same moment
when he in doubt and unbelief, in pride and lust tore himself loose from
God. And in the same way moral corruption enters in his descendants from
the first moment of their existence onward. As God withdrew his
communion from Adam on account of his transgression, so He does this
also to all his children. And just as He, while nevertheless sustaining Adam
after his transgression, by the withdrawing of his communion did not
become the positive cause of his corruption, so neither is He this in his
descendants, whether one thinks the origin of souls traducianistically or
creationistically. Each man is born under guilt and in stain by virtue of the
physical and ethical relation in which he stands to Adam. Est ergo quisque
sui individui peccati originalis et proximum principium et subjectum et
auctor, Voetius, Disp. I 1104, cf. Martyr, L. C. p. 70. Polanus, Synt. VI c. 3.
Zanchius, Op. IV 50. Voetius, Disp. I 1078 sq. Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 12.
Moor III 289. M. Vitringa II 358. Edwards, Works II 478.
9. Original sin is a property of human nature and therefore proper to all
creatures that partake of this nature. In Adamo persona corrumpit naturam,
in aliis hominibus natura corrumpit personam, Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 8
art. 5 qu. 69 art. 3. The Pelagian assertion, that there are men or at least can
be men without any sin, is contradicted by Scripture, by experience, by the
testimonies of all religions and peoples. To the rule that every human
being is a sinner there is only one exception, viz. Christ, but He was also
the only-begotten Son of God, the second Adam, head of another and better
covenant, and conceived in a special manner by the Holy Spirit. The Roman
Catholics, however, also make an exception for Mary, the mother of Jesus.
The three privileges, gradually ascribed to Mary in Roman theology, viz.
freedom from original sin (immaculata conceptio), freedom from all actual
sin (perfectio justitiae) and freedom from death (assumptio in coelum) are
simple inferences from the high rank of mediatrix, to which she, on the
ground of her virginitas and deipartus, has been elevated by the church.
With respect to the immaculate conception Pius IX determined in the bull
Ineffabilis, beatissimam virginem Mariam in primo instanti conceptionis
suae fuisse singulari omnipotentis Dei gratia et privilegio, intuitu meritorum
Christi Jesu Salvatoris humani generis, ab omni originalis culpae labe
praeservatam immunem. It is not implied herein that Mary would not be
included under Adam and would not have fallen in him, for Mary was
preserved free from original sin only by a special grace of God and with a
view to Christ’s merits. But it is also not expressed in it that Mary was first
conceived in sins and then immediately sanctified, for it is expressly
declared that in the very first moment of her conception she was preserved
free from original sin. For this dogma, however, not the weakest ground is
present in Scripture. Thomas said outright, quod de sanctificatione B.
Mariae, quod scilicet fuerit sanctificata in utero, nihil in Scriptura canonica
traditur, S. Theol. III qu. 27 art. 1. The Roman theologians are therefore in
no small embarrassment about this, seek all manner of reasons in order to
explain this “hiddenness of Mary” in Scripture, and force the strangest texts
into an appearance of proof. Thus they appeal to Genesis 3:15, Psalms 45:11v.,
12 and to types such as the ark of Noah, the dove with the olive branch, the
burning thornbush, etc.; but all these citations and reasonings serve only to
cover their poverty of arguments and have no need of refutation, cf. e.g.
Spencer Northcote, Maria in den Evang. Mainz [146] 1889. Schaefer, Die
Gottesmutter in der h. Schrift, Münster 1867. Scheeben, Dogm. III 455-472.
Rather, Scripture teaches decisively that all men, except Christ alone, are
sinners; for Mary an exception is never made; even though no definite
sinful words or deeds of hers are recorded, not even in Mark 3:21, John 2:3,
yet she rejoices in God her Saviour, Luke 1:47, is pronounced blessed
indeed on account of her motherhood of Christ but never on account of her
sinlessness, Luke 1:28, 48, is also in this motherhood in itself placed behind
those who are Jesus’ mother and brothers and sisters in a spiritual sense, Matthew 12:46v., Mark 3:31v., Luke 8:21, and perseveres with the apostles in praying
and supplicating, Acts 1:14. Nor do the church fathers teach either the
immaculate conception or also the sinlessness of Mary; Irenaeus, adv. haer.
III 16, 7, Tertullianus, de carne Chr. 7, Origenes, hom. in Luc. 17 etc. speak
with respect to her of actual transgressions; and even Roman scholars
cannot deny this. Dr. von Lehner, Die Marienverehrung der ersten Jahrh.
Stuttgart 1881 S. 151 says that this was the view prevailing at that time;
Schwane, D. G. I2 382 acknowledges that the tradition from that time
likewise furnishes no stringent proofs any more than Holy Scripture; and
Scheeben, Dogm. III 474, 476 concedes that the person of Mary in the first
four centuries recedes into the background and is in relative Dunkelheit. At
most it was believed only propter honorem Domini that Mary by special
grace had remained free from actual sins, Augustinus, de nat. et gr. 36.
Damasc., de fide orthod. IV 14. Even when since the fifth century the
veneration of Mary increased more and more and later still the feast of her
conception arose, the principal theologians—just as Canus, Loci VII c. 1,
Scheeben, Dogm. III 541 f. and others also acknowledge—did indeed teach
a sanctificatio B. Virginis post animationem et contractionem peccati in
anima but contested a praeservatio, which apriori kept Mary free from all
original sin, Anselmus, Cur Deus homo II 16. Lombardus, Thomas,
Bonaventura on Sent. III dist. 3. Thomas, S. Theol. I 2 qu. 81 art. 3. III qu.
27 art. 1. 2. Comp. Theol. c. 224 etc. But Duns Scotus introduced a change
in this; he argued that, even if Mary was included in Adam, God
nevertheless could in the very first moment of her conception bestow upon
her the gratia that kept her free from all sin. And because this was
more worthy of God, Christ, and Mary and was not in conflict with the
authority of Scripture and of the church, he considered it probabile, quod
excellentius est attribuere Mariae, Sent. III dist. 3 qu. 1. And thereby the
ground is also indicated on which at Rome this dogma rests. It has no
support in Scripture nor in the tradition of the ancient church, but it is, like
the assumption of Mary, simply an inference from the mediatorship that
was gradually ascribed to her. It is not fitting, not conveniens, that Mary
was conceived in sin, committed sin, and died. She must be sinless, and
therefore she is, even though it is taught neither by Scripture nor tradition.
Cf. Preuss, Die röm. Lehre v. d. unbefleckten Empfängniss 1865. Benrath,
Zur Gesch. der Marienverehrung, Stud. u. Krit. 1886. Art. Maria in
Herzog2. Bolland, Rome en de geschiedenis, Leiden 1897 bl. 1-53.
10. As extensive as original sin is in humanity, so it is also in the
individual human being. It rules over the whole human being, over intellect
and will, heart and conscience, soul and body, over all faculties and powers.
His heart is evil from youth on and a source of all kinds of sins, Genesis 6:5,
8:21, Psalms 51:7, Jeremiah 17:9, Ezech. 36:26, Mark 7:21; he cannot renew himself,
Jeremiah 13:23, Ezech. 16:6, cannot understand the things of God, 1 Corinthians 2:14,
cannot submit to the law of God, John 8:34, 36, Romans 6:17, 20, 8:7, is dead
through sins and trespasses, Ef. 2:1. Regeneration is therefore necessary for
entrance into the kingdom of God, John 3:3; the whole salvation is
objectively and subjectively a work of God’s grace, John 6:44, 15:5, 1 Corinthians 4:7, 15:10, Philippians 2:13 etc. Upon these definite statements of Holy Scripture,
Augustine and his followers and later the Reformers built the doctrine of
the incapacity of man for good. Because in Adam the whole human nature
has been corrupted, nothing truly good can any longer proceed from it, any
more than an evil tree can bring forth good fruits. Rather, the human being
now finds himself under the dura necessitas non posse non peccandi, his
virtues are vitia potius quam virtutes, he is by nature inclined to all evil,
inclined even to hate God and his neighbor. This discourse is undoubtedly
hard, and it is no wonder that it has at all times met with decided
contradiction [148]. The Heathens did not know this deep corruption of sin;
however much they also often expressed its general spread, they
nevertheless continued to believe in the natural goodness of man and in the
possibility of virtue, Sunt ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutum, quae si
adolescere liceret ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret, Cic. Qu.
Tusc. II 1. Erras, si existimas, nobiscum nasci vitia, supervenerunt, ingesta
sunt, Seneca, Ep. 96. In Pelagianism this paganistic doctrine was renewed;
it denied original sin entirely. Through its mechanical conception of the
image of God the Roman church came to the doctrine that the homo
naturalis after loss of the donum superadditum can still do truly good
works, indeed not in a supernatural but yet in a natural sense, Trid. VI can.
5. 7. Socinians, Remonstrants, Anabaptists, Quakers, Rationalists, etc. fell
back to this Roman standpoint. Coornhert took offense at the 5th and 8th
question of the Heid. Catechism. Rousseau preached the natural goodness
of man. And Allard Pierson testified of himself that he was absolutely not
inclined to all evil but indeed to much good, Gids Nov. 1895 bl. 259. To the
natural aversion, which involuntarily arises in the heart against the doctrine
of the complete moral corruption of man, there is undoubtedly also joined,
among its opponents, much misunderstanding. For if this doctrine is clearly
set in the light, it is confirmed day by day by everyone’s experience and
justified by the testimonies of its opponents themselves. 1o. The doctrine of
Scripture and church is, after all, not that every human being lives in all
possible actual sins and stands actu guilty of the transgression of all
commandments. It speaks only of the deepest inclination, the most inward
disposition, the fundamental direction of human nature and confesses that
this is not turned toward God, but turned away from Him. If the human
being is an organic unity, then one of the two must nevertheless be the case.
Many dispose of it by saying that the human being by nature is neither of
the two or both at the same time, Hegel, Werke XII 209 f., but this betrays
lack of reflection, is in conflict with the nature of the good and was
therefore also very seriously opposed by Kant, Religion, ed. Rosenkranz
23-26. Whoever commits one sin stands in principle guilty of the
transgression of all commandments, and whoever possesses one virtue in
truth has them in principle all. The human being is at the root of his
being either good or evil—there is no third. 2o. Sin, however, is not a
substance; it dwells indeed in and on and with the human being, but it is not
and cannot be the essence of the human being. The human being has also
after the fall remained human; he has retained reason, conscience, and will,
can thereby control his lower sensuous impulses and inclinations and thus
compel himself to virtue; Augustine, who called the virtues of the Heathens
splendida vitia, nevertheless acknowledged this wholeheartedly; many of
their deeds are not only no reproach but rather worthy of our praise and our
imitation, cf. Wiggers, Aug. u. Pelag. I 119-123. The Lutherans spoke of the
natural human being as a block and a stick in the spiritual domain, but in
the so-called lower hemisphere of civil life they nevertheless still ascribed
to him all kinds of powers for good, Frank, Theol. der Conc. I 144 f. And
more than they all, Calvin and the Reformed have honored the virtues of
unbelievers and have many times set them as an example even to Christians
themselves, cf. my address on the Common Grace bl. 27v. The doctrine of
the total corruption of human nature, therefore, by no means implies that
the sinful inclination, which lies at the bottom of the heart, always breaks
out in such deeds as clearly betray enmity and hatred against God and the
neighbor. There are various circumstances that intervene between the two
and prevent the inclination from expressing itself fully. Not only are many
sinful deeds restrained by the sword of the government, civil propriety,
public opinion, fear of disgrace and punishment, etc.; but all kinds of
factors, such as the natural love still proper to each human being, the moral
character cultivated by upbringing and struggle, favorable circumstances of
constitution, environment, sphere of work, etc., lead the human being many
times to the practice of beautiful, praiseworthy virtues. Only, thereby the
sinful inclination of the heart is suppressed but not eradicated; in all kinds
of evil deliberations, thoughts, desires it repeatedly comes to the surface;
when the opportunity is favorable and necessity presses, it often breaks
through all dams and dikes that held it in; and those who in dreadful words
and deeds show that they hate God and the neighbor bear no other nature
than that which all human beings share. 3o. When it is taught that the
human being through sin is incapable of any good and this incapacity is
called a natural one, then no physical necessity or fatalistic compulsion is
meant thereby. The human being has through sin not lost his will and the
freedom implanted in him; the will by virtue of its nature excludes all
compulsion and cannot but will freely. But the human being has indeed lost
the free inclination of the will toward the good; he now no longer wills to
do the good; he now does freely, out of inclination, the evil: the inclination,
the direction of the will has been changed; semper est in nobis voluntas
libera, sed non semper est bona, Aug., de gr. et lib. arb. 15, cf. also the
Reformed in Heppe, Dogm. 237, 264. The inability for good is in this sense
not physical but ethical in nature; it is an inability of the will. Some
therefore preferred to speak of moral rather than of natural inability,
Amyraldus, Testardus, Venema bij Moor III 231-233, and especially
Jonathan Edwards. Edwards had namely in his days to defend the inability
of man against Whitby and Taylor, who denied original sin and considered
the human being capable of keeping God’s law. They objected to him that,
if the human being could not keep God’s law, he also did not have to do it
and, if he then did not do it, was also not guilty. In order to defend himself
against that, Edwards made a distinction between natural and moral
inability, and said that the fallen human being did have the natural, but not
the moral power, to do the good. And he added that only natural inability
was really inability, but moral inability could be so called only in an
improper sense. Sin is namely not a physical defect in the nature or the
powers of the will; but it is an ethical defect, a defect of affection, love for
the good, see his Freedom of the will, Works II 1-190 passim. Now
Edwards did say that the human being could not bestow that affection for
the good upon himself and could not change his will; in this respect he
stood entirely on the side of Augustine and Calvin. But by his refusal to call
this unwillingness for good natural inability, he has fostered much
misunderstanding and in fact promoted Pelagianism. The Reformed have
therefore before and after spoken of natural inability. This word natural can,
however, have different senses. One can thereby have in view the
original human nature, created by God in Adam according to His image, as
the Protestants said that the image of God was natural,—then the inability
for good is not natural. One can also thereby mean the physical substance or
power of any creature, and then too the inability, since all substance and
power has been created by God, is not to be called natural. The incapacity
for good is no physical impossibility, such as it is for example impossible
for a human being to touch the stars with his hand. But one can, speaking of
natural inability, also think of the properties of fallen human nature and
thereby indicate that the incapacity for good now in the fallen state is “by
nature” proper to every human being, is inborn to him from the first
moment of his existence and is not first introduced into him from outside by
habit, upbringing, imitation. In this sense the name of natural inability is
perfectly correct, and that of moral inability is liable to misunderstanding.
For morally impossible is after all often called that which, on the ground of
someone’s character, habit, upbringing, is held to be impossible for him to
do; it is morally impossible that a virtuous man suddenly becomes a thief, a
mother hates her child, a murderer strangles an innocent child. That morally
impossible nevertheless does indeed occur in some circumstances. It is not
so with the incapacity for good. It is indeed ethical in nature and an inability
of the will, but it is proper to the human being by nature, it is inborn to him,
it is a property of his willing itself. And precisely because the will even now
in the fallen state by virtue of its nature cannot but will freely, it cannot will
otherwise than what it wills, than that to which it is by nature inclined, cf.
Thomas, S. c. Gent. IV 52. Calvin on Ef. 2:3. Ursinus and other comm. on
Heid. Cat. vr. 5. 8. Form. Conc. I 12. Cons. Helv. § 21. 22. Turret., Theol.
El. X 4. 39. Moor III 232. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 257-272. Shedd, Dogm.
Theol. 219-257. III 364-374. 4o. Finally one must keep in view that
Scripture and church, teaching the complete corruption of man, thereby
apply the highest standard, namely the law of God. The doctrine of the
incapacity for good is a religious confession. According to the standard that
people usually use in daily life or also in philosophical ethics, it can
be wholeheartedly acknowledged that much good and beautiful is done by
human beings. The follower of Augustine can with this standard in hand in
the assessment and appreciation of human virtues still be milder and
broader than the most convinced Pelagian. There is, however, still another,
higher ideal for the human being; there is a divine law, to which he must
correspond. Virtues and good works are distinct. Good, truly good, good in
the eyes of the holy God, is only that which is done from faith, according to
God’s law and to God’s honor. And tested by this standard, who then dares
to say that any work is done by human beings that is completely pure and
needs no forgiveness and renewal? With Rome and in part also with the
Lutherans to divide the human being in two and to say that in the
supernatural and spiritual he can do nothing good but in the natural he can
do something completely good, that is in conflict with the unity of human
nature, with the unity of the moral law, with the doctrine of Scripture that
the human being must always be the image of God, must do whatever he
does to God’s honor and must love God always and everywhere with his
whole heart and understanding and strength. If this now is so, if the essence
of the human being consists in this that he is image and likeness of God,
then in the human being, as he now lives and works, nothing can stand
before God’s face. Weighed in the balance of God’s sanctuary, all his doing
is found too light.
One can differ over this standard, and, in order to arrive at a more
favorable conclusion, bring down the law of God from its height and make
it ready-made to fit human conduct. But given this standard, no other
judgment is possible than that of Scripture, that there is no one who does
good, not even one. And this judgment of Scripture is confirmed by all
kinds of testimonies. Let those who do not believe Scripture listen to the
voices of the greatest of our race. As soon as one, in oneself or in others,
does not remain with the words or deeds but investigates the hidden
motives, the secret intentions, the sinful nature of all human striving comes
to light. Nos vertus ne sont le plus souvent que des vices déguisés
(Rochefoucauld). L’homme n’est que déguisement, que mensonge et
hypocrisie, et en soi-même et à l’égard des autres (Pascal). Homo
homini lupus; without the state human society would be a bellum omnium
contra omnes (Hobbes). According to Kant, human beings are von Natur
böse; there is in him a natural Hang zum Bösen, ein radicales, angebornes
Böse; the terrible facts which the history of humanity makes known to us
prove this sufficiently. Ein jeder Mensch hat seinen Preis, für den er sich
weggiebt. What the apostle says is general truth: there is no one who does
good, there is also not one, Kant, Relig. ed. Rosenkranz 35 f. Diejenigen,
welche ein servum arbitrium behaupteten und den Menschen als einen
Stock und Klotz charakterisirten.... hatten vollkommen Recht, Fichte, Syst.
der Sittenlehre 1798 S. 265. Das natürliche Herz, worin der Mensch
befangen ist, ist der Feind, der zu bekämpfen ist, Hegel, Werke XII 270.
Der Mensch hat sich von Ewigkeit in der Eigenheit und Selbstsucht
ergriffen und alle, die geboren werden, werden mit dem anhängenden
finstern Princip des Bösen geboren. Dieses ursprüngliche Böse im
Menschen, das nur derjenige in Abrede ziehen kann, der den Menschen in
sich und ausser sich nur oberflächlich kennen gelernt hat, ist in seinem
Ursprung eigne That, Schelling, Werke I 7 S. 388. Die Haupt- und
Grundtriebfeder im Menschen, wie im Thiere ist der Egoismus, d. h. der
Drang zum Daseyn und Wohlseyn. Dieser Egoismus ist im Thiere wie im
Menschen mit dem innersten Kern und Wesen desselben aufs genaueste
verknüpft, ja eigentlich identisch. This egoism is indeed restrained by all
kinds of bonds of decency, fear, punishment, government, etc.; but when
these are removed, that unersättliche Habsucht, that niederträchtige
Geldgier, that tief versteckte Falschheit, that tückische Bosheit spring forth.
Kriminalgeschichten und Beschreibungen anarchischer Zustände muss man
lesen, um zu erkennen, was in moralischer Hinsicht der Mensch eigentlich
ist. Diese Tausende, die da vor unseren Augen in friedlichen Verkehr sich
durcheinander drängen, sind anzusehen als eben so viele Tiger und Wölfe,
deren Gebiss man durch einen starken Maulkorb gesichert hat. Even
conscience is mostly composed of 1/5 fear of people, 1/5 deisidaemonie,
1/5 prejudice, 1/5 vanity and 1/5 habit, Schopenhauer, Die beiden
Grundprobleme der Ethik, 3e Aufl. 1881 S. 186 f. Welt als Wille u. V. I6
391 f. Parerga u. Paral. II5 229 f. The adherents of evolution have [154]
returned to the doctrine of Mandeville, Helvetius, Diderot, d’Alembert etc.,
that egoism is the basis of morality and the norm of all human action; man
is descended from the animals and he remains at bottom an animal, led by
egoistic instincts; civilization can tame but never make of man anything
other than what he originally is and by disposition is; what we call moral
life is an accidental product of circumstances, of the life of human beings in
a particular society; under other circumstances and in another society good
and evil would have a wholly different content, Darwin, Afst. des
menschen, hoofdst. 3-5. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff 16e Aufl. 478-492. In his
Ethisch idealisme Amst. 1875 de Bussy makes a great distinction between
the moral man, whose egoistic nature has been constrained by the
community in its arbitrariness but not destroyed, whose virtues are many
times splendida vitia, 22v., and the ethical man, in whom a new principle
has been planted. It is truly not Scripture alone that judges harshly of man.
It is human beings who have pronounced the harshest and strictest judgment
over human beings. And then it is always still better to fall into the hand of
the Lord than into that of man, for his mercies are many. For if God
condemns us, then at the same time in Christ He offers us his forgiving
love, but if human beings condemn human beings, they many times thrust
them away from themselves and give them up to their contempt. If God
condemns us, then He has this judgment brought to us by human beings,
prophets and apostles and ministers, who do not set themselves above us on
high as saints but include themselves with all in a common confession of
guilt; but the philosophers and moralists, despising human beings, thereby
mostly forget that they themselves are human beings. If God condemns us,
then He speaks of sin and guilt, which indeed is great and heavy but which
nevertheless can be taken away because it does not belong to the essence of
man; but the moralists speak many times of egoistic, animal inclinations,
which are proper to man by virtue of his origin and belong to his essence;
they do indeed strike him down but do not raise him up; if we are animals
from the outset, why then ought we to live as children of God? [155]
. The punishment of sin cannot yet be treated fully in this paragraph.
The whole, deserved punishment was indeed threatened beforehand by
God upon sin, but after it had been committed it was not executed; nor does
it enter in completely upon anyone in this life, indeed it is not yet applied in
full even at death; only after the judgment on the last day does it strike the
guilty one in its whole weight. In Genesis 2:7 God had expressly said: on the
day that you eat of it you shall surely die. This definite threat, however, has
not been carried out. An element has intervened between the two, which has
moderated and postponed this punishment. Adam and Eve remained alive
for many years after the fall; Eve even became the mother of the living; a
human race has proceeded from them, which is borne and nourished by the
earth. The beginnings of history continue after the fall, even if in a very
altered form. All this is not to be ascribed to God’s justice, but, as will later
become clearer, to his grace. This comes into operation immediately after
the fall. It receives the guidance of history, not at the expense of but in
connection with the right of God. All consequences and punishments, which
enter in after sin, therefore at once bear a double character. They are not
merely consequences and punishments, instituted by God’s justice, but all
without distinction, under another point of view, also means of grace,
proofs of God’s longsuffering and compassion. It cannot be objected against
this, that God would then have spoken untruth in Genesis 2:7. For there only
the true, full punishment is announced, which sin deserves; sin breaks
communion with God, is spiritual death and deserves death. That that
punishment would be moderated, postponed, even remitted, was by the
nature of the case not susceptible of communication before the
transgression. God therefore in Genesis 2:7 makes mention only of the one,
great punishment of sin, i.e. death. With that, after all, everything ceases at
once, life, joy, development, labor, also the possibility of repentance and
forgiveness, of restoration of communion with God. Sin deserves
nothing other than the whole, full death. All other punishments, which after
the fall have in fact entered in and been pronounced, such as shame, fear,
hiding from God, curse upon the serpent, upon the earth etc., are indeed
punishments but at the same time presuppose that God does not at once and
in full carry out his threat, that He still has another plan with humanity and
world and therefore lets these continue to exist in his longsuffering and
grace. Yet they are under a certain point of view very certainly also
punishments and in so far ought here to come under discussion. God’s grace
expresses itself in them, but also his justice. Punishment, according to the
general thought of Scripture, has the intention to restore the right of God,
which has been violated by sin. Under Israel it had the tendency to maintain
the laws instituted by God and to put away the evil from the midst of the
people, Deuteronomy 13:5, 17:7, 12, 22:21v., 24:7, and then further, to prevent such
transgressions and to cause Israel in fear to walk in the Lord’s statutes,
Deuteronomy 13:11, 17:13, 19:20, 21:21. The purpose of punishment was thus
twofold, had reference to the past and the future, had to restore committed
transgressions and to prevent future ones. The standard of punishment was
not arbitrariness or revenge, Leviticus 19:18, Spr. 24:29, but the nature of the
crime, Exodus 21:23-25, Leviticus 24:19, 20, Deuteronomy 19:21, without, however, the jus
talionis always being applied strictly, literally, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, e.g. Exodus 21:30v. Pharisaism applied this rule, which applies
only to the government, also in private life, in conflict with the O. Test.
itself, Leviticus 19:18, Deuteronomy 32:35, Spr. 24:29. Against that Jesus rises up, Matthew 5:38; He forbids all lust for revenge, whether one seeks this privately or by
public means, and commands patience and mercy. Retribution, however, is
throughout the whole of Scripture the objective standard of punishment, not
only for the earthly government but also for God himself. Not only does He
threaten punishment upon sin, Genesis 2:7, Deuteronomy 27:15v., Psalms 2:9v, 5:5, 11:5,
also determines the measure of punishment according to the nature of the
crime and repays each one according to his work, Exodus 20:5-7, Deuteronomy 7:9, 10,
2. In agreement with this, Christian theology spoke of a justitia judicialis,
distinguished into justitia remunerativa and vindicativa, part II 199v., and
derived from that the right and the essence of punishment. Indeed, there is
no other ultimate and deepest principle from which punishment can be
deduced than the righteousness of God. All punishment presupposes that he
who pronounces and imposes the punishment is invested with authority
over him who transgressed the law. This authority, this right cannot have its
origin in man, nor in his physical nature, for this creates only the right of
the strongest, nor in his ethical nature, for all men are sinners and the right
to punish never rests in the fact that someone stands morally higher than the
guilty person. All so-called relative theories, which have been devised apart
from Divine righteousness for the maintenance of penal law, such as the
self-defence-, the preventive-, the deterrence-, the improvement-theory, are
insufficient to vindicate the right to punish and are also in conflict with the
essence of punishment; they may perhaps be moments in, but cannot be
principle of punishment; punishment is always in the first place poena
vindicativa and only thereafter poena medicinalis and exemplaris. Utility
creates no right. All the mentioned theories, which build penal law on the
interest of the state, society, the transgressors, therefore all fall back into the
theory of the right of the strongest; right is exchanged for power. If there is
no moral and legal order, above and independent of man, and if its
maintenance has not been entrusted to anyone by a higher authority, then
punishing may be useful for some persons, for an accidental majority, but
there is no right to it. Atheism is the undermining and destruction of all law
and morality; ni Dieu ni maître. Only then is there a right to punish, if there
exists a legal order, established by God and in his name to be maintained by
the government even at the cost of the life of its transgressors, because it is
more precious than any good and far surpasses every creature in value. To
be sure, at first hearing it seems strange that the legal order—and behind it
the moral order—of is of such incomparable value and demands the
good and life of man for its maintenance and restoration. But this moral
world-order is no idea of man, no state of affairs produced by him; it is also
no independent power resting in itself, of which no one can say what it is;
but it is the revelation and operation of the righteousness of God in this
world, it rests in the perfect, holy will of Him who sustains and governs all
things; whoever assails it assails God himself. Therefore it stands high
above man and is worth more than all creatures together; if it comes to a
conflict, man perishes thereby; fiat justitia, pereat mundus; wenn die
Gerechtigkeit untergeht, so hat es keinen Werth mehr, dass Menschen auf
Erden leben (Kant). In order to maintain it, punishment has been instituted;
it intends restoration of law, maintenance of God’s righteousness; if it does
not serve that, it becomes coercion and overpowering force. Cf. Lombardus,
Sent II. dist. 36. Thomas, S. Theol. I 2 qu. 87. Stöckl, Lehrb. d. Philos. III
53. 97. Polanus, Synt. p. 340. Hoornbeek, Theol. pract. I 412. Moor III 329.
Buddeus, Inst. theol. mor. I 612-629. Stahl, Philos. d. Rechts5 II 1 S. 160 f.
2 S. 681 f. Ulrici, Gott u. d. Mensch II 391 f. Dorner, Gl. I 286 II 324.
Kohler, Das Wesen der Strafe, Würzburg 1888. H. Seuffert, Was will, was
wirkt, was soll die staatliche Strafe? Bonn 1897. Caro, Problèmes de morale
sociale 1887 p. 193. Dale, The atonement, 18th ed. 1896 p. 373. Harris,
God the Creator and Lord of all, Edinb. 1897 II 442. F. C. Domela
Nieuwenhuis, Het wezen der straf I Utrecht 1867. H. L. Lindaal Jacobs,
Beschouwingen over straf en straffen, Amst. 1884. Kuyper, Ons Program
Punishment always consists in a certain suffering, in deprivation of some
good, whether of property or freedom, of body or life; it is a malum
passionis, quod infligitur ob malum actionis. Why the juridical order
demands suffering from him who violates it and how it is thereby restored
and satisfied, is difficult to say. Arbitrariness and chance this certainly is
not. Behind that juridical order stands the living, true, holy God, who by no
means holds the guilty innocent; and with Him punishment does not rest on
a dominium absolutum in the sense of Duns Scotus, cf. deel II 207. 216, but
on the demand of His justice. If He did not punish sin, He would grant to
evil equal rights as to good and deny Himself. In order that God may
remain God, the punishment of sin is necessary. As soon therefore as the
moral or the juridical order is assailed, it rises up and cries out for
restoration. It avenges itself in punishment, both inward and outward,
presses the transgressor down and shows therein its incomparable majesty.
God cannot tolerate that the sinner, instead of standing under His law and
obeying it, exalts himself above it and in principle makes himself equal to
God. And therefore He maintains in punishment His divine sovereignty; by
suffering He presses the sinner down to the place where he ought to stand,
and brings him, where he does not wish to accept it voluntarily, by
punishment to the forced acknowledgment that he is the lesser, that he is not
God but a creature. He who will not listen must feel. Punishment is a
powerful proof that only righteousness has a right to exist, that God alone is
good and great. In part punishment flows from sin itself; sin by its nature
brings separation from God, and thus darkness, ignorance, error, falsehood,
fear, unrest, consciousness of guilt, remorse, misery, slavery; the service of
sin is so unspeakably hard. But in part punishment is also added to the
transgression from without by the competent authority. Thus it happens in
the family, in the school, in society and the state, and thus it is also with the
punishments which God lets follow upon sin. Many have denied this latter
and in this sphere have wished to know only of natural, but in no case of
positive punishments, Spinoza, Eth. V prop. 42, many rationalists in the
previous century, cf. in Bretschneider, Syst. Entw. 391 and Dogm. I 527.
Strauss, Gl. I 603. Scholten, L. H. K. II 108v. 569v. Vrije Wil 236, cf. also
Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 84, Biedermann, Dogm. II 575 f. Lipsius, Dogm.
§. 393. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 397 III2 326 f. Kaftan, Dogm. § 36 etc.
On this standpoint there is actually no reward and no punishment; virtue
bears its reward, vice its punishment in itself; a heaven or hell exists only in
the mind of man himself; die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht; at most
there exists a subjective necessity for the guilty man, to conceive his
suffering as punishment. Now the word of the poet is true: Das Leben ist
der Güter grösstes nicht, Der Uebel grösstes ist die Schuld. Puniri non
est malum, sed fieri poena dignum. Culpam quam poenam plus de ratione
mali habere certum est, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 48 art. 6. Guilt makes
suffering into punishment; if it is taken away from it, suffering can remain
the same and yet wholly change in character. Death as a fact is the same for
believers and unbelievers, but for the latter it is a punishment, for the
former a passage to eternal life. Therefore also from the suffering that
befalls someone one may not conclude to his personal sin, Luke 13:4, John 9:1; suffering namely in God’s hand according to His grace and wisdom
serves not only for punishment, but also for testing, chastisement,
education; He is so mighty that He can make all things work together for
good for those who love Him, Romans 8:28. But with all this the objective
connection between sin and suffering, established by God, is not broken.
Scripture furnishes proofs for it on almost every page. History is indeed not
the, but it is nevertheless a world-judgment; it makes facts known to us that
compel even the most unbelieving to the confession: this is the finger of
God. Though suffering often may not have its cause in a personal sin, it
nevertheless does have it in the sin of race, people, or humanity. One’s own
conscience testifies in every human being that there is a connection and
must be a connection between holiness and blessedness, between virtue and
happiness. Kant was so convinced of that, that from the disharmony which
exists here on earth between the two he concluded to an afterlife. Not for
the reward does the pious man serve God, but he is just as little indifferent
to it, as the advocates of an amour desintéressé claim to be; Paul says that
believers would be the most miserable of all men, if they were hoping in
Christ only in this life. After the fall God has laid between ethos and physis,
between moral and natural order, between fallen man and the devastated
earth, such a connection that they together are serviceable to the honor of
His name and the coming of His kingdom. The positive punishments, which
God often already in this life lets follow upon sin, are therefore no
arbitrariness but take, even though we do not discern it, their ordered place
in the history of human sin and guilt. He who denies them or ascribes to
them only a subjective existence, runs the danger of seeing in sin [161]
itself no more than an imagination and a delusion; history becomes for him
a discord, which is never resolved into a higher chord. Cf. Stapfer, Wederl.
Godg. IV 448v. Bretschneider, Dogm. I 525 f. Van Voorst, Over de
Goddelijke straffen, Haagsch Gen. 1798. V. d. Wijnpersse, Over de
straffende gerechtigheid, ib. 1798. Dorner, Chr. Gl. I 287 f. II 224 f.
3. The punishments which God has set upon sin in this life are guilt, stain,
suffering, death, and the dominion of Satan. Guilt is the first and heaviest
punishment. The word, which is connected with zullen, at first indicates
only that someone is the agent of something, just as α ἰ τια, causa. For the
most part it already includes the thought that someone is the cause of
something that ought not to be or to happen (it is his guilt). In this sense
guilt presupposes that we were obliged to do or to omit something; we are
guilty to keep the whole law, Luke 17:10, Galatians 5:3. And if we then have not
done that, we stand guilty; because we are the cause of the transgression of
the law, we are in a state of accusation (α ἰ τιασθαι, accusare, reus), the deed
is imputed to us, we must answer for it and are obliged to satisfy the law;
we are liable to punishment. Guilt is the obligation resting upon someone
on account of transgression of the law, to satisfy the law by a proportionate
suffering of punishment. It binds the sinner immediately after his
transgression to the law, to its demand for satisfaction and punishment. Man
thinks by transgression to become free from the law, but precisely the
opposite takes place, he becomes in another way much more firmly bound
to its demand. God, who cannot cease to be God, even though he gives man
freedom to set himself against Him, never lets man go, and this one never
becomes free from God. At the same moment that he places himself outside
the law, i.e. outside love, it strikes him with its curse and binds him to its
punishment. Guilt is obligatio ad poenam justam sustinendam, subjectio
peccatoris ad poenam, Polanus, Synt. p. 338. Moor III 135. Turret., Theol.,
El. IX qu. 3. Mastricht, Theol. IV 2, 7. Müller, Sünde I 264. Vilmar, Moral I
195. Art. Schuld in Herzog2 and Wuttke, Ethik II 97. Scholten, Vrije wil
217v. Hoekstra, Vrijheid 303v. Roman theology makes a distinction
between reatus culpae and poenae, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 42. Thomas, I
2 qu. 87 art. 6. Trid. VI c. 14 can. 30 XIV de poenit., c. 8 and can. 12-15.
Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. V 19. Theol. Wirceb. VII 27. But
this distinction clearly betrays its intention, to justify the satisfactorial
punishments for believers here on earth and in purgatory, and is in direct
conflict with the nature of guilt and punishment. It is indeed true that the
sins of believers, i.e. of those who have received full forgiveness, in
themselves always remain sins and deserving of punishment; against the
Antinomians, who denied this and therefore considered the prayer for
forgiveness for believers unnecessary, the Reformed have always
maintained this and made the distinction of reatus potentialis and reatus
actualis, Moor III 135. But when the guilt has been taken away from the
sins, then thereby of itself all satisfaction and punishment also lapses, for
guilt is nothing other than obligation to punishment. God is then no longer a
Judge but a Father; he does indeed chastise the son whom he loves, 2 Samuel 12:13, 14, but does not punish him; and demands no satisfaction from him,
for whom the whole righteousness has been brought about by Christ. Thus
Augustine also says of the baptized: omni peccato caret, non omni malo,
quod planius ita dicitur, omni reatu omnium malorum caret, non omnibus
malis, c. Jul. VI c. 16, cf. Alting, Theol. el. nova XVII 5. Turret., Theol. El.
IX qu. 3. Moor III 136. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 414.
That sin now truly entails guilt is established by the testimony of God in
Scripture as well as in the conscience. In Scripture sin, guilt, and
punishment are concepts so mutually connected that the words for sin, such
as ָעֹון, ַחָּטאת, imperceptibly acquire the meaning of guilt, Genesis 4:13, Exodus 34:7, Leviticus 24:15, Numbers 9:13 etc. The proper word that designates sin as
guilt is ָאָׁשם, Genesis 26:10, Leviticus 4:13, 5:2, Numbers 5:7 etc., and ὀ φειλημα, Matthew 6:12, cf. 5:26, Luke 7:41, 42, 13:4., Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 684 f. God by no
means holds the guilty innocent and pronounces the curse upon all who do
not remain in the book of the law, Deuteronomy 27:26, Galatians 3:10. Curse, ָעָלה, ְמֵאָרה,
ְקָלָלה, καταρα, ἀ ναθεμα, maledictum, is the opposite of blessing, ְּבָרָכה,
ε ὐ λογια, benedictio, Deuteronomy 11:26, 30:19. Just as God’s blessing assigns to
someone all manner of salvation and life, so the divine curse is the
surrender of someone to ruin, destruction, death, judgment, Satan. Human
beings can only wish blessing and curse, but God’s blessing and cursing is
always exhibitive; it sends what it wishes. At first God’s blessing rested
upon creation, Genesis 1:22, 28, 2:3, but that blessing has been turned into a
curse, Genesis 3:17. To be sure, later the blessing of God was again
pronounced over the earth and humanity, but this flows forth from God’s
grace. The heathen therefore do not know the concept of the divine
blessing. All the more do they know of the divine curse; classical antiquity
is governed by fear of the vengeance of the Erinyes (Moiren, Furiën), the
goddesses of the curse. In all pagan religions anxiety (δεισιδαιμονια,
religio) far outweighs trust in the gods; religion passes more and more into
superstition; everywhere one deems oneself surrounded and governed by
ruin-bringing gods, whom one seeks in vain to reconcile by sacrifices and
tortures. There truly rests a curse of God upon humanity and world. To wish
to explain life and history solely from the love of God is impossible. There
is a principle of the wrath of God active in the whole creation, which only
the superficial can deny. There is no communion but separation between
God and the human being; the covenant is broken; God has a dispute with
his creature. All stand guilty and punishable before his face, παντων ἐ νοχοι,
Matthew 5:21, 22; Mark 3:29, Jac. 2:10. The whole world is ὑ ποδικος τ ῳ θε ῳ,
Romans 3:19; it stands under the judgment of God and has nothing to answer.
Art. Segen in Herzog2, ἀ ναθεμα bij Cremer. Subjectively this is confirmed
by the testimony of God in the conscience of every human being. Guilt and
consciousness of guilt are not the same. Whoever wishes to ascend from
consciousness of guilt to guilt cuts off for himself the way to understand
guilt in its proper meaning and weight. Ignorance can to a certain extent
excuse sin, Luke 23:34, Hd. 17:30, just as conscious and intentional
transgression aggravates sin, Luke 12:47, John 15:22, 9:41, but there are also
sins hidden from ourselves and others, Psalms 19:13; and also sins of ignorance
guilt reflects itself more weakly or more strongly in the consciousness
of the human being. Immediately after the fall the eyes of Adam and Eve
were opened and they became aware that they were naked. In this lies that
they also know and acknowledge that they have done evil. Shame is fear of
disgrace, an unpleasant painful feeling about something wrong or improper.
And with that shame comes fear of God and the urge to hide oneself from
Him. That is, in the human being the conscience has awakened. Before the
fall there was in the human being, strictly speaking, no conscience; there
was no chasm between what he was and what he knew that he had to be.
Being and self-consciousness coincided. But through the fall separation
arises. The human being still retains, by God’s grace, the awareness that he
ought to be otherwise, that he had to correspond in all parts with God’s law.
But reality testifies otherwise; he is not what he ought to be. And this
testimony is the conscience. The conscience is therefore not the
consciousness of the communion of God with the human being, as Schenkel
conceived it, art. Gewissen in Herzog1 and Die christl. Dogm. vom
Standpunkt des Gewissens aus 1858. It is rather the opposite; it is precisely
a proof that communion with God is disturbed, that there is a distance and
chasm between God and the human being, between his law and our
condition. This comes out clearly when the conscience appears accusingly,
but also where it excuses in a given case, i.e. in fact is silent, that separation
from God lies at the foundation, Romans 2:14, 15. The conscience is the
subjective proof of the human being’s fall, the witness of his guilt before
the face of God. God does not only accuse the human being; in the
conscience the human being condemns himself and takes sides for God and
his verdict against himself. The finer and more conscientious the conscience
judges, the more it justifies God’s thought about the human being in
Scripture. The best and noblest of our race have confirmed God’s
truthfulness and pronounced themselves guilty over their own head. Cf.
concerning the conscience my Beginselen der Psychologie 1897 bl. 111.
4. Another punishment of sin is the stain. Just as with the first sin, so also
with sins in general the outward transgression is manifestation and proof of
the inward. Sin consists not only in the deed but also in the thought, desire,
inclination, etc. On each of those stages sin is at once both guilt and
stain. Adam did not first become guilty when he ate, but he already also
loaded guilt upon himself when he desired the fruit of the tree. Guilt and
stain are always the two sides of sin, they go together inseparably; where
the one is, the other is. Sin is guilt, because it conflicts with God’s
righteousness; it is stain, because it is opposed to his holiness. Guilt binds
us to punishment, stain defiles us. Through guilt the objective relation to
God, through stain the subjective communion with God is disturbed. Sin is
at once breach of the covenant of works and destruction of the image of
God. The first implies that God is no longer man’s covenant partner; He
cannot turn in favor and love toward the guilty one, and the sinner no longer
stands in that covenant, can no longer love and keep the law and thus by
this way can no longer acquire life. Out of the works of the law no flesh can
any more be justified, Psalms 143:2, Romans 3:20, 2 Corinthians 3:6v., Galatians 3:2, 10. Even
if it is also the case that the law of the covenant of works, besides obliging
us to restoration of the evil committed by suffering punishment, also still
remains obliging us to complete obedience to its commandments, Matthew 5:48,
22:37; although God himself keeps his promise and remains attaching life
to the keeping of the law, Leviticus 18:5, Matthew 19:17, Luke 10:28; indeed, even if
the covenant of works is in that sense unbreakable, that God in the covenant
of grace lays the demand for satisfaction and absolute obedience to the law
upon Christ, yet it is broken in this respect, that man is incapable of
entering into life by this way. Paradise is closed to him, the tree of life
denied him. Cf. Moor III 105-108. Marck, Hist. Parad. II c. 15. Ex. v. h.
ontw. v. Tol. X 478-480. Witsius, Oec. foed. I c. 9. Mastricht, Theol. III 12,
22. And at the same time with that the image of God has been destroyed by
sin. Rome understands by that, that the supernatural gifts have been lost and
the natural have remained uninjured. The Lutherans originally taught that
man had wholly lost the image of God, since it consisted only in the moral
qualities, and that man was now like a stick and a block. But the Reformed
maintained that the image of God in the narrower sense had indeed been
lost and in the broader sense wholly damaged and corrupted, but yet
had not been destroyed, Ned. Gel. art. 14. The image of God is not an
outward, mechanical addition to man, but is organically connected with his
being; it is the health of man. The man who transgresses God’s law does not
cease to be man; he retains his body, his soul, his faculties, his powers, his
understanding, will, etc., but they all stand in the service of sin and work in
a wrong direction. As deprivation and disturbance of the image of God, the
stain of sin is by nature proper to all men, except Christ; qualitatively there
is no difference. But for that reason there is nevertheless quantitative
difference. All have indeed turned away from God and by nature walk on
the path that leads to destruction. But not all have advanced equally far on
that wrong way and are not equally far removed in a quantitative sense from
the kingdom of heaven. There is an endless variation and transition between
the beginning and the highest development of the sinful life. Men, families,
generations, families, classes, estates, peoples also diverge widely in sin.
There are those who are not far from the kingdom of God; there are also
those who drink in sin like water, are given over in unrighteousness,
hardened, obdurate, and are incapable of any good impression. And this
quantitative difference among men does not first come about through their
personal deeds and individual actions, but is already given with conception
and birth. Original sin, which comes to us from Adam’s side, is indeed the
general presupposition and source of all individual, actual sins, but the
sinful deeds of individuals also in turn react upon that inborn moral
corruption, strengthen it, and develop it in a particular direction. Just as a
sinful deed, repeatedly performed, cultivates in us a sinful inclination, e.g.
to drink, sensual enjoyment, lust; so also can sinful morals and customs in
family, kin, generation, people strengthen the inborn corruption and develop
it toward a particular side. And also that peculiar modification of the inborn
corruption often transmits itself from parents to children, from the one to
the other generation. Man is no individual. Das Individuum ist eine Fiktion
so gut wie das Atom, Natorp, Archiv f. syst. Philos. III 1 S. 81. Man is born
out of the community and lives from the very beginning in a
particular circle, condition, and time. Family, kin, society, people, climate,
way of life, culture, century, etc., everything exercises influence on the
individual man and modifies his inborn moral corruption. Sin is therefore
essentially indeed always the same, but it presents itself in different
persons, families, estates, peoples and in different conditions and times each
time in another way and in another form. Each man also as a sinner bears an
own physiognomy. The sins in the East bear another character than those in
the West, in the hot zone another than in a cold region; in the countryside
another than in the cities, in the state of culture another than in a state of
savagery, in the nineteenth century another than in the eighteenth, etc. There
are family-, generational-, kin-, national-, social sins. Statistics has proved
that in certain times and conditions and circles there also prevails a
shuddering regularity of crimes, e.g. of homicide, suicide, extra-marital
births, etc., A. von Oettingen, Die Moralstatistik in ihrer Bedeutung für eine
Socialethik, 3te Aufl. Erlangen 1882. We all stand on every terrain under
the influence of wrong habits, sinful examples, of the spirit of the age and
public opinion. Besides properly so-called original sin there is also a
Gesammtschuld and Gesammtthat der Sünde. Just as men, so also their
sinful inclinations and deeds stand in connection with one another.
Penetrating into the endless richness of all that is created, sin also forms a
realm, which, animated by one principle of life, organizes itself in manifold
forms and appearances. Cf. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 71. 72. Ritschl,
Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 311 f. Frank, Syst. der chr. Wahrh. I 463 f. H. Schmidt
in Herzog2 15, 33 f. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 158 f. and above p. 96.
5. Besides guilt and stain, according to Holy Scripture suffering too is a
punishment for sin. Through it man lost not only true knowledge,
righteousness, and holiness but also dominion and glory. This is already
evident immediately after the fall and is further confirmed by the whole of
Scripture. God sets enmity between man and the serpent and thereby in
principle deprives him of the dominion which originally had been
bestowed on him over the animal world, Genesis 1:26, 2:19. Further, God
pronounces over the woman the punishment of painful pregnancy and of a
desire for the man which nevertheless ever torments her. The man himself
receives his share of suffering in the curse that is pronounced over the earth
and that obliges him to laborious toil for the bread of his modest portion.
With this the history of suffering is opened for humanity and for the whole
earth. And all the suffering that befalls human beings here on earth, a short
life, a sudden violent death, famine, pestilence, war, defeat, childlessness,
painful losses, deprivation of goods, impoverishment, crop failure, death of
the cattle, etc., it all has its cause, indeed not always in personal sins, for
there is also a sparing of the ungodly, Genesis 18:26v., and a punishing for the
testing of the righteous, Job 1, Luke 13:21, John 9:1, 11:4, 2 Corinthians 12:7, but
still in sin in general; without sin there would also be no suffering, Leviticus 26:14v., Deuteronomy 28:15v., Ezech. 4:21, Hosea 2:8v., Openb. 18:8, 21:4. Even the
irrational creation has been subjected by God, on account of man’s sin, to
the ματαιοτης and φθορα, and now groans together, as being in travail,
awaiting the revelation of the glory of God’s children, in hope of then itself
also being delivered from the bondage of corruption, Romans 8:19-22.
Scripture is not pessimistic in the common sense of the word, but it knows
and acknowledges suffering and interprets it in the most moving
89, 90 etc. Eccl., Lam., Matthew 6:34, Romans 7:24, 8:19v., 1 Corinthians 15:19 etc. And
such complaints continually rise up from the whole of humanity. Teachers
of religion, moralists, philosophers, poets, artists, richly gifted and
disadvantaged persons, all speak in the same spirit. The light-hearted and
superficial get over it, but all who are serious-minded have always sensed
something of the mysterious connection of life and suffering. Greek
antiquity also makes no exception to this; the basic mood there was not so
cheerful as people formerly thought; it was rather bitter and sad. To live in
pain is the lot that the gods have ordained for mortals; only they themselves
are free from cares (Homer). Besides God, no one is happy
(Euripides). No mortal remains free from misfortune, no one escapes his
fate; man is perishable as a shadow, vain as a dream, his happiness is
appearance; the best is not to be born, and if one is born, to die as soon as
possible (Sophocles). Death is perhaps the greatest good (Socrates). A
sudden death is the greatest happiness, a short life the greatest benefaction,
the desire for death the deepest wish (Plinius), cf. Pfanner, Theol. gent. c.
17 de morte. Nägelsbach, Homer. Theol. 310 f. Paulsen, Ethik I 80 f. Weiss,
Apol. d. Christ. I3 475-501 II3 464-517. The optimism of the previous
century already turned into pessimism with Voltaire, Candide 1759, and
Hegel’s rationalism made way for the philosophy of Schelling, which
elevated not reason but the will to the principle of the world, part II 204.
Reason may be able to explain what and how things are; that they are, is
only to be inferred from a will; and this existence of things is the properly
positive, is the irrational remainder that in the end remains at the bottom of
all that exists. Nach der ewigen That der Selbstoffenbarung ist nämlich in
der Welt, wie wir sie jetzt erblicken, alles Regel, Ordnung und Form; aber
immer liegt noch im Grunde das Regellose, als könnte es einmal wieder
durchbrechen, und nirgends scheint es, als wären Ordnung und Form das
Ursprüngliche, sondern als wäre ein anfänglich Regelloses zur Ordnung
gebracht worden. Dieses is an den Dingen die unergreifliche Basis der
Realität, der nie aufgehende Rest, das, was zich mit der grössten
Anstrengung nicht in Verstand auflösen lässt, sondern ewig im Grunde
bleibt..... Ohne diess vorausgehende Dunkel giebt es keine Realität der
Creatur; Finsternis ist ihr notwendiges Erbtheil..... Alle Geburt ist Geburt
aus Dunkel ans Licht, Werke I 7 S. 359 f. For this reason Schelling also had
a wholly different view of life and world than Hegel; for the latter
everything was rational, but Schelling saw the irrational, the lawless, the
darkness, the chaotic lying at the basis of everything and acknowledged the
path of suffering of the world-process. Es ist vergebliches Bemühen, aus
friedlicher Ineinsbildung verschiedener Kräfte die Mannichfaltigkeit in der
Natur zu erklären. Alles was wird, kann nur im Unmuth werden, und wie
Angst die Grundempfindung jedes lebenden Geschöpfs, so ist alles was
lebt, nur im heftigen Streit empfangen und geboren. Wer möchte [170]
glauben, dass die Natur so vielerlei wunderliche Produkte in dieser
schrecklichen äussern Verwirrung und chaotischen innern Mischung.....
anders als im heftigsten Widerwillen der Kräfte habe erschaffen können?
Sind nicht die meisten Produkte der unorganischen Natur offenbar Kinder
der Angst, des Schreckens, ja der Verzweiflung? Werke I 8 S. 322, cf. 328.
335 II 1 S. 582. There is even in God ein Quell der Traurigkeit, die aber nie
zur Wirklichkeit kommt, sondern nur zur ewigen Freude der Ueberwindung
dient. Daher der Schleier der Schwermuth, der über die ganze Natur
ausgebreitet ist, die tiefe unzerstörliche Melancholie alles Lebens; Freude
muss Leid haben, Leid in Freude erklärt werden, I 7 S. 399. The present
world, in which we live, is only to be understood as an aussergöttliche. Of it
man by his fall is the cause, II 3 S. 352 f., diese aussergöttliche Welt ist die
Welt des göttlichen Unwillens, alle Menschen, Juden und Heiden, sind
τεκνα φυσει ὀ ργης, von Natur Kinder des göttlichen Unwillens, ib. 372 etc.,
cf. v. Hartmann, Ges. Stud. u. Aufs. 1876 S. 683 f. All these thoughts return
in systematic connection with the philosophers Schopenhauer and von
Hartmann, in poetic form with Rückert, Lenau, Byron, Shelley, George
Sand, Alfred de Musset, Leopardi and above all also in the more recent finde-siècle literature; Buddhism, which sees in the will to live, in being itself,
the cause of all suffering, is honored as the highest wisdom. Life is
suffering, it swings back and forth between pain and boredom, it is not
worth the trouble of living. The world with its hospitals, lazareths, surgical
torments, prisons, torture chambers, slave stables, battlefields, courts of
justice, dwellings of misery, etc., offers a suitable material for the
description of hell and is itself a hell, in which the one man is a devil for the
other. If it were a little worse, it could not exist from misery. All that exists
is therefore worthy that it perish, Schopenhauer, Die Welt u.s.w. I6 366 f. II
657 f. Parerga II5 303 f. v. Hartmann, Philos. d. Unb. II 273-390 etc., and
further literature on pessimism in Ueberweg-Heinze, Gesch. d. Philos.8
1897 S. 183 f. 481. Concerning origin and goal of suffering the reflections
have been many. Philosophy is almost always intent on casting the blame
for it, as also for sin, directly or indirectly upon God. Suffering is then
derived from an independent, evil principle (Parzism, Manichaeism), from
an originally evil being (Daub), from a dark nature in God (Böhme,
Schelling), from the blind, alogical will to be (Buddhism, Schopenhauer,
von Hartmann), from the self-objectification and Entäusserung of God
(Hegel), from matter (Plato, Aristotle, Philo), from natural necessity
(Weisse, Rothe), from the finitude of the creature (Leibniz), from the
developmental state of the world (Ulrici), from the sinful consciousness of
man, which conceives the in themselves necessary imperfections of the
world as evil (Schleiermacher, Lipsius, Ritschl) etc. That, however,
suffering is not to be ascribed to God in that sense that it was given with
creation itself, stands firm on the ground of the doctrine of Holy Scripture,
of the testimony of our conscience, and the essence of religion, which most
closely connects holiness and blessedness. Yet an existence and
development of world and humanity without suffering seems to be an
impossible thought. Of a history without sin and misery we can form no
conception; as soon as we think these away, there remains in the empty
framework of time and space no event any longer. To the physical organism
pain and death seem by nature, necessarily, to be proper; impassibilitas is a
property that cannot be conceived in a sensuous creature. For human beings
this already holds, much more still for plants and animals; modern natural
science has shown us everywhere in organic and inorganic nature a struggle
for life, in which all creatures stand hostile toward one another and have set
their aim on one another’s death.
And yet, however natural pain and suffering may seem, against the
preceding consideration the following may with good reason be urged: 1o.
If we could once remove from world and humanity all suffering that
without any doubt has been caused directly or indirectly by sin, then at once
by far the greatest and heaviest suffering would have disappeared and the
problem of suffering would have been reduced to very small dimensions.
No one can deny that there exists a very closest connection between sin and
misery; many sins, in everyone’s judgment, drag along all kinds of dreadful
consequences after them, not only spiritual, such as fear, regret, shame,
disgrace, remorse etc., but also material, such as sickness, misery, pain,
poverty, brutalization etc. And not only is this the case with carnal
sins, such as sensual pleasure, drunkenness, lust etc., but also with such sins
as bear a more spiritual character, such as idolatry, superstition, unbelief,
lying, greed, vanity, pride, hatred, envy, wrath etc. They all, in greater or
lesser degree, also act upon the body and bring devastations upon it. A
stream of spiritual and bodily misery in individual persons, in families,
households, generations, peoples, in state, church, society, science, art takes
its origin in sin. Take this away, and according to everyone’s agreement
almost no suffering remains. Die Welt ist vollkommen überall, wo der
Mensch nicht hinkommt mit seiner Qual (Schiller). Die Hauptquelle der
ernstlichsten Uebel, die den Menschen treffen, ist der Mensch selbst, homo
homini lupus, Schopenhauer, Die Welt II6 663. 2o. Yet, however much truth
may lie in Schiller’s word, it is not entirely true. Even if we think away the
suffering that in everyone’s judgment has its cause directly or indirectly in
sin, the world would nevertheless not at once thereby become perfect. There
would still remain all those disasters which befall man from without and do
not, for everyone’s consciousness, stand in connection with sin, such as
earthquake, storm, thunderstorm, flood, famine, plague, railway accident
etc. Here too, according to the testimony of Scripture, there is connection
with sin, but it is nevertheless different than with the above-mentioned
suffering. Pharisees and Motazilites also sought the explanation of that in
personal sins, but Jesus judged otherwise, Luke 13:4, John 9:1. Not in
personal sins, but in the sin of humanity, the disharmony and enmity of
nature has its cause. God, because of the sin of man, struck the earth with
the curse and subjected all creation to vanity and corruption. Fallen man no
longer belongs in a paradise; with his condition the earth corresponds,
which stands between heaven and hell. Man has, together with knowledge
and righteousness, also lost dominion and glory; the forces and elements of
nature stand many times hostile over against him; he can now subject them
to himself in no other way than through laborious, strenuous work. In its
entirety humanity is worthy of no better place than this earth; and for its
development, education, preservation there is also no better possible.
Of particular disasters we can almost never indicate the intention with
which God sent them, although they certainly are never absolutely
speechless for the one whom they strike. But all the more presumptuous is
it, with Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, to take the scales in hand, in them
to weigh against each other the joy and the sorrow of the whole world, in
order then to draw up the judgment that the punishment very far exceeds the
joy. For every creature and every human being, even the most accomplished
pessimist, in fact gives preference to painful being over painless non-being
and strives to persist in his existence. And humanity as a whole has, in the
struggle with nature, found a stimulus for its energy, a material for its labor,
a spur for its development. The curse over the earth has, by God’s grace,
been turned for it into a blessing. 3o. That the whole of nature shares in the
fall of man stands firm not only on the ground of Scripture, but flows, as of
itself, from the central place which man occupies in creation, and is also,
with a view to contemporary natural science, more than probable. There has
sometimes been reasoned very strangely about the condition of the world
before the fall and about its change by and after the fall, part II 548. 549,
but the Reformed have here in general observed a wise sobriety, ib. 559.
560, and followed the golden rule, that indeed the forma of things has been
changed by sin but the materia has remained the same. Sin is, after all, no
substance and can neither increase nor diminish the substance of things,
which has God alone as author. Just as man after the fall has essentially
remained man, so it is with the whole of nature. No new species have been
added in the plant or animal kingdom; thorns and thistles have not been
newly created by a word of God like the grass and the herb and the trees on
the third day, Genesis 1:11; and creeping and wild animals also already existed
before the fall, Genesis 1:24. But just as in man the same faculties and powers,
corrupted by sin, went to work in another direction, so it is also with the
whole creation, after it was struck by God with the curse. Left to itself,
emancipated from the dominion and the care of man, burdened with God’s
curse, nature has gradually run wild and degenerated and has brought
forth thorns and thistles, all kinds of vermin and ravenous beasts. The
possibility of such a degeneration is by the newer natural science raised
above all doubt. Palaeontology supplies only very few fossils of ravenous
animals; the great animals of the oldest time, rhinoceros, mammuth,
mastodon were all plant-eating. Of the so-called saurians, which one takes
for lizards, it is uncertain; but even the whales live in part on plants. Insects
are all plant-eating; only there are some which in an undeveloped state,
such as caterpillars, larvae, ichneumon wasps (ichneumon) feed on the
constituent parts of animal beings, but beetles, ants, bees, butterflies etc., all
live on vegetable food. Among the birds there are indeed many that use
animal food, but they can nevertheless also live on plants. To the ravenous
animals belong the three genera of felis (lion, tiger, cat, panther, leopard
etc.), canis (dog, wolf, fox) and ursus (bear etc). But of all these animals it
is at least doubtful whether flesh-eating belongs to their nature. Darwin has,
in his in this respect too for theologians very instructive work, Het varieeren
der huisdieren en cultuurplanten, trans. by Dr. H. Hartogh Heys van
Zouteveen, Arnh. Nijm. Cohen, proved that animals can become
accustomed to changed nourishment and for that adduces various examples,
II 344v. And likewise, by running wild branches can change into thorns, and
by cultivation thorns into branches, II 361. Nature is now in many respects
become an antithesis of man, 2 Kon. 17:25, Job 5:22, 23, Hosea 2:20, Jes.
11:6v. 7:23, 65:20v., Ezech. 14:15, 21, Op. 21, Sir. 39:32v.; plants and
animals have become living images of human sinful inclinations and
passions; fear of animals and veneration of animals prove the abnormal
relation of man to the world around him. But the wondrous power over the
animals still occurring now and then among men; the many changes which,
as palaeontology shows, have entered into the plant and animal kingdom;
domestication and the slow variability in plants and animals supply proofs
in abundance that a condition such as Isaiah in chapters 11 and 65 depicts
for us by no means belongs to the impossibilities. There is nothing absurd in
the thought that, just as with man, so also with nature as a
consequence of the judgment of God an important change has entered in. In
any case Scripture is far more rational than what is sometimes brought to
market under the name of science; according to Lindenschmitt men had
formerly been ravenous animals, who had to protect themselves against
each other by pile-dwellings built in the water, but the beasts of prey had
then been highly innocent creatures, with Weiss, Apol. II3 497. 4o. Besides,
finally, let one not forget that, theologically speaking, creation itself in a
certain sense was infralapsarian, Delitzsch, Genesis 1887 S. 67. The fall has
for God been no surprise and no disappointment. He foresaw it, had
included it in his counsel and already took account of it in creation. This
therefore took place in such a way that the whole world, in case man as its
head fell, could become such as it now is. The condition of man and of the
whole earth was before the fall a provisional one, which could not remain
so. It was of such a nature that it could be led up to higher glory but also, in
case of man’s transgression, could be subjected to vanity and corruption.
Through sin and the curse of God there came to appearance everywhere
from beneath and from behind the harmony the lawless, the chaotic, the
demonic, that confuses and frightens us. Over the whole creation a Schleier
der Schwermuth has been spread. Πασα ἡ κτισις συνστεναζει και
συνωδινει. Cf. Naville, Le problème du mal, Genève 1868. Delitzsch, Syst.
d. chr. Apol. 1869 S. 141 f. Ebrard, Apolog. I 275 f. Pressensé, Le problème
de la douleur, Etudes évang. 1867 p. 1-168. Keppler, Das Problem des
Leidens in der Moral, Freiburg Herder 1895. Sterling Berry, Das Problem
menschl. Leidens im Lichte des Christ. Aus d. Engl. Heilbronn 1895.
Holliday, The effect of the fall of man on nature, Presb. and. Ref. Rev. Oct.
1896 p. 611-621. Paul Cadène, Le pessimisme légitime, Montauban 1894.
James Orr, Christian view 217. 495. Harnisch, Das Leiden beurteilt vom
theist. Standpunkt, Halle 1881. Kübel, in Herzog2 15, 702 f. Lamers, Het
probleem des lijdens, Theol. Stud 1896. Illingworth, The problem of pain,
3d essay in Lux Mundi ed. by Ch. Gore, 13 ed. 1892 p. 82-92. Henry
Hayman, Why we suffer and other essays, London 1890 p. 1-109. [176]
6. This suffering is completed in that other punishment for sin, which is
called death. Many are of the opinion that Scripture, except in a few places,
does not regard death as consequence and punishment of sin. Indeed, in
Genesis 2:17 the sudden death, entering in immediately, is threatened as
punishment for sin, and this is also always regarded as a calamity and a
punishment. But death in itself is much more natural and is given of itself
with the material organism of man, Genesis 3:19, 18:27, Job 4:19, Psalms 89:48v.,
90:3, 103:14v., 146:4, Ecclesiastes 3:20, 12:7. Thus formerly already the
Pelagians, Socinians, Rationalists judged, and thus still many theologians
judge, such as Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 59 Zusatz. Lipsius, Dogm. § 414.
Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III 308 f. Smend, Altt. Rel. 504. Marti, Gesch. d.
israel. Rel. 193. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 233 f. Matthes, Theol.
Tijdschr. 1890 bl. 239-254 etc. There lies in this representation some truth.
In Genesis 2:17 indeed it is not death in general, but specifically the death
entering in immediately after the transgression, that is threatened upon sin.
Genesis 3:19 therefore also does not relate the full execution of the threatened
punishment; but modifies it and postpones it. Consequently the O. T. sees
precisely in sudden death, entering in in the bloom of years, a punishment
for sin, Genesis 6:3, Numbers 16:29, 27:3, Psalms 90:7-10, just as also the death
penalty is conceived thus. This view is connected with the then economy of
the covenant and with the pedagogy of the people of Israel. God attached to
the keeping of his commandments in the days of the O. T. a long and happy
life and set upon transgression all kinds of punishments on this side of the
grave. Thus the eye of the righteous was especially directed to the lot of this
life and limited within the circle of earthly existence; only rarely did it
penetrate to the other side of the grave. The distinction between righteous
and ungodly therefore lay not first of all in death as such, for this was the
same for all, but in the different dispensation of the lot that preceded death.
And if that dispensation also often differed so little, then the distinction
between the righteous and the ungodly was sought in the different intention
that suffering had for the former and the latter, Deuteronomy 8:2v., Hosea 2:5v. Isaiah 3:11v., Job 1 etc. The righteousness of God, which visits the sins, becomes
for pious Israel again principle of deliverance and salvation, part II 197v.
But from this it by no means follows that death itself was regarded as
natural and necessary. For the view that death is consequence of the
material organism of man by no means excludes that that death is
punishment of sin. Only for that reason can for man the punishment of sin
consist in death, because he is dust and taken from the earth. Paul likewise
teaches that Adam is earthly from the earth and that nevertheless death has
come into the world through sin. And all Christians speak in the same way;
man is dust, flesh, perishable, and yet his death is consequence of sin.
Further, there is no people that has felt the dreadfulness and the
unnaturalness of death more deeply than Israel; man is dust and must return
to dust again, but natural this is not, sin has gradually weakened the lifeforce of men, Enoch and Elijah have escaped death, it is in conflict with the
inner nature of man, Job 14:1-12, righteousness and life are intimately
judgment of God becomes manifest, Psalms 90:7-12, cf. Krabbe, Die Lehre v. d.
Sünde u. v. Tode 1836. Schultz, Altt. Theol. 690 f. Oehler, Theol. d. A. T. §
77. In the apocryphal and Jewish literature, Sir. 25:26, 39:29, 40:9, Enoch
expressed that death is wages of sin. There is therefore least of all for those
who always exalt the N. T. at the expense of the O. T. reason to deny the
connection of sin and death. Yet this happens many times on the ground of
testimonies of history and pronouncements of natural science. There are
namely many who seem to have overcome all fear of death and fall asleep
very calmly; others by suicide even put an end to life; Rousseau asserted
that the natural men all die in peace and without fear; Lessing thought that
the ancients held death for a brother of sleep and saw nothing
terrifying in it; romanticism often raved in a sentimental way about death.
And yet, even if some in stoic apathy have brought it so far that they see
death with calmness as a fate, fear of death is innate to all that lives. We do
not believe in the ground that we must die. Death plays such a great role in
human life that philosophy can rightly be called a μελετη θανατου,
Schopenhauer, Die Welt I 324 f. II 528 f. Death has always been for man
the last and greatest enemy; all finally recognize in it an unnatural power
and flee it as long as possible. Indeed natural science has often called death
natural and necessary; Lauvergne said e.g., la mort de l’homme est une
conséquence logique et naturelle de son être. Tout prend fin, dura lex sed
lex, in Delitzsch, Apol. 132, cf. also H. Wagner, De dood toegelicht van het
standpunt der natuurwet, Utrecht 1856. But speaking thus, science has
asserted more than it could justify. Death is a mystery in the full sense.
According to natural science matter and force are, and according to
Weismann and others also the unicellular protozoa are immortal. Why then
is the physical organism mortal, which is composed of such substances and
forces and cells? That organism moreover according to science in a man is
renewed every seven years; it is from day to day nourished and
strengthened; why can this process not continue and does it already cease
after some tens of years? Let one not speak of old age and decline of
powers, for these are names that indeed indicate the phenomena but do not
explain them, and themselves precisely have need of explanation. Weshalb
die Zellen sich abnutzen und dahinsiechen, weshalb sie im Alter
Veränderungen unterliegen, von denen sie in der Jugend bewahrt bleiben,
das ist uns bis jetzt noch verborgen, H. de Varigny, Wie stirbt man? Was ist
der Tod? Uebers. von S. Wiarda, Minden z. j. 52. Many plants and animals
moreover surpass the life-span of man up to sometimes by hundreds of
years; why is the life-force in man so quickly exhausted and does he bring it
at most to seventy or eighty years, if he is very strong? To that there comes
still, that death by decline of powers occurs as good as never, neither in
men, nor in plants and animals. Almost always death enters in as a
consequence of a disease, a disaster, an accident etc.; even if a single time a
man so-called dies of decline of powers, death nevertheless still bears a
pathological character and is caused by one or another disturbance of
certain cells in the body. What then is the reason that death takes away
almost all men before the time and often even in the strength of years, in the
bloom of youth, in the first hours of their existence? Science does not know
the cause which makes death into a necessity, de Varigny 18. That man dies,
therefore says Prof. Pruys van der Hoeven in his Studie der Christ.
Anthropologie, is a riddle that can only be explained by the degeneration of
his nature, in Delitzsch, Apol. 126. Le mystère de la mort reste aussi intact
que celui de la vie, Delage, La structure du protoplasme etc. 1895 p. 354.
771, and cf. further Sabatier, Le problème de la mort, 2 ed. 1896. Bourdeau,
Le problème de la mort, ses solutions imaginaires et la science positive, 2
ed. Paris 1896. Newman Smyth, The place of death in evolution, London
Unwin 1897.
7. The last punishment of sin to be discussed here consists in this, that the
world in an ethical sense has come into the power of Satan and his angels.
Since Satan has seduced man and brought him to a fall, John 8:44, 2 Cor.
lies in the evil one, 1 John 5:19, he is the prince of the world and the god of
this age, John 12:31, 16:11, 2 Corinthians 4:4. Even if it is the case that the devils
after their fall have been cast into hell, to be kept for judgment, 2 Petr. 2:4,
Jud. 6; they have nevertheless not yet been struck by that judgment, Matthew 8:29, Luke 8:31, Jak. 2:19. They still come into the assembly of the angels,
Job 1, Luke 10:18, Op. 12:7, keep themselves in the air, Ef. 2:2, 6:12,
wander about, dwell and work on this earth, and have great power here.
Especially the heathen world is the territory of their activity, Hd. 16:16,
came to earth, they also within the boundaries of the people of God entered
into the struggle against Him. Satan ruled and worked in the Christ-hostile
Jews, John 8:44v., tempted Jesus, Matthew 4:1-11, sent unclean spirits,
entered into Judas, Luke 22:3, John 6:70, 13:2, 27 etc.; it was then his hour,
Luke 22:53, John 14:30. But Christ was the stronger, Luke 11:22, fought
against him his whole life, Luke 4:13, overcame him and cast him out, Luk.
principle withdraws the territory of the church from his dominion, Hd.
26:18, Colossians 1:13, 1 John 2:13, 4:4, Op. 12:11. Yet he still always works into
the church from without; he wanders about over the earth, Job 1, tempts the
believers and works against them, Luke 22:31, 1 Corinthians 12:7, 1 Thessalonians 2:18,
seeks to seduce them and bring them to a fall, 1 Corinthians 7:5, 2 Corinthians 2:10, 11:3,
13-15, 1 Petr. 5:8, 1 Thessalonians 3:5, Op. 12:10, so that the church is called to
fight against him continually, Matthew 6:13, Ef. 6:12v., Romans 16:20, 1 Petr. 5:9,
Jak. 4:7, Op. 12:11. Once at the end of the days he raises himself up once
more in all his power, Mt. 24, Mk. 13, Luk. 21, 2 Thessalonians 2:1-12, Op. 12v.;
but then he will also be overcome by Christ and with all his angels be cast
into the lake of fire, 2 Thessalonians 2:8, 1 Corinthians 15:24, Op. 20:10, cf. Litt. above p.
Belief in evil spirits occurs among all peoples and in all religions.
Sometimes the fear of the evil spirits has almost entirely displaced trust in
the good, Roskoff, Gesch. des Teufels 1869 I 20. And in almost all pagan
religions physical evil is ascribed to one or more spiritual beings, who in
nature and rank are equal to the good gods, ib. 24-175. Scripture, however,
teaches otherwise, and in the first period Christianity in all kinds of ways
subdued and opposed Jewish and pagan superstition; church and state made
all kinds of regulations against sorcery, soothsaying, etc., and yet, down to
the thirteenth century, applied to those who were guilty of it nothing other
than disciplinary punishments, ib. I 287. 293. Even when later one had
recourse to the death penalty, one nevertheless actually had in view thereby
the extermination of pagan superstition. It is therefore not permissible,
without more, to hold the Christian religion and church responsible for all
the superstition that has also prevailed among Christians, and especially
from the 13th to the 18th century. There cooperated thereto all kinds
of causes, the wretched conditions in state and society, the dreadful
visitations of famine and plague, the gross ignorance of the people, the
defective knowledge of nature, the magical, kabbalistic direction among the
practitioners of natural science, etc., ib. II 314 f. Yet the church does not go
free in this. Many a time it adopted pagan superstition in theory and
practice. Already among the church fathers that emerges. Just as every
human being has his guardian angel, so he also has his daemon. Outside
Christianity the devil has almost unlimited dominion. Redemption in Christ
is in the first place a deliverance from the devil. All physical evil in the
world, sickness, crop failure, famine, plague, death, is ascribed to Satan. He
is the invisible cause of all idolatry, magic, astrology, heresy, unbelief;
superstition rests on a daemonic reality. When the in many respects
superficial conversions of the peoples of Europe, under a Christian varnish,
caused all kinds of pagan doctrines and practices to live on, there was added
in the Middle Ages the belief that the devil, in all kinds of forms, of tomcat,
cat, mouse, goat, swine, werewolf, could appear, create all kinds of vermin,
as incubus or succubus make himself guilty of whoredom, induce people to
a covenant sealed with blood, bewitch them, enter into them, ride through
the air with them, change them into animals, and also in nature could bring
about all kinds of mischief. Rome has always taken the daemonic reality of
this superstition under its protection, not only in the Middle Ages (bull of
Innocentius VIII 1484. Malleus maleficarum 1487), but also after the
Reformation down to the present day; in Roman theology, e.g. of Suarez,
Vasquez, Lessius, Liguori, Görres, e. a., belief in the power of the devil
occupies an extraordinarily broad place, cf. Graf Paul von Hoensbroech,
Religion oder Aberglaube, Berlin Walther 1897 S. 56 f.; and how much
superstition lives on in practice among Roman Christians has only recently
come to light in a sad way in the notorious history of Leo Taxil, cf. H.
Gerber, Leo Taxil’s Palladismusroman, 2 Th. Berlin 1897. For Rome all that
exists falls apart into a lower, unconsecrated and a higher, consecrated
domain; in the first Satan rules with almost unlimited power, the second
must by sign of the cross, holy water, conjurations, etc., be secured against
his influence and operation, De Harbe’s Verklaring der Kath. Geloofsen zedeleer, bew. en verm. door B. Dankelman, Utrecht IV 1888 bl. 598v.;
the Roman Christian sees himself threatened everywhere by the devil and
must take all kinds of measures in order to drive him away, Kolde, Die
kirchl. Bruderschaften, Erlangen 1895 S. 47. It is true that Protestantism in
the first period left this Roman and at bottom pagan superstition almost
entirely untouched; belief in witches and witch trials were defended by the
Protestants just as strongly as by the Roman Catholics and later were
opposed by the Roman Catholics (Spina, Molitor, Loos, Tanner, von Spee)
just as well as by the Protestants (Weier 1563, Godelmann 1562, Reginald
Scott 1584, van Dale 1685, Bekker 1691, Thomasius 1701); following
Luther’s lead, the Lutherans ascribed a very great power to the devil,
derived all evil from him and maintained exorcism, Köstlin, Luthers Theol.
II 351 f. Müller, Symb. Bücher 477. 483. 771, cf. Roskoff, t. a. p. II 364 f.
Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III 341. But nevertheless the Reformation, especially in
its Calvinistic branch, did indeed bring about an important change in belief
in the devil. Going back to Scripture and remaining with its data, confessing
the absolute sovereignty of God, it could in Satan and his angels, however
powerful, nevertheless see nothing other than creatures, who without God’s
will can neither stir nor move. The Reformation was not rationalistic. It
maintained that there were evil spirits, who act upon human beings,
especially upon their imagination, and could even degrade them to their
instrument. But this power of Satan over humanity was nevertheless always
subject to God’s providence; it was in the first place ethical in nature and
had its origin in sin; it was moreover limited within narrow bounds; not
Satan, but God is the Creator of the light and the darkness, of the good and
the evil; sickness and death are sent to us by Him, Jes. 45:7. Hebr. 2:7 says
only that Satan has the power of death, because through sin he has brought
death in the world to dominion and thus is a murderer of men from the
beginning, John 8:44. Our life and end of life is not in Satan’s but in God’s
hand. Luke 13:11, 16 and 2 Corinthians 12:7 give no right to ascribe all sickness
and ailment to Satan. And furthermore Satan cannot create and bring
forth something out of nothing, he can produce children neither as incubus
nor as succubus, he can change no human beings into animals, put them to
death or call them back to life; he cannot act immediately upon
understanding and will, he cannot change the substance and the quality of
things, etc., Voetius, Disp. I 906 sq., and further Polanus, Synt. V c. 12.
Zanchius, Op. III 167-216. Synopsis pur. theol. XII 36 sq. Turretinus,
Theol. El. VII qu. 5. Mastricht, Theol. III c. 8. Brahe, Aanm. over de vijf
Walch. art. 1758 bl. 195v. Moor II 328. M. Vitringa II 117 sq.
Only through such a faith, which closely adheres to Holy Scripture, is
superstition to be overcome, which has struck such deep roots in the human
heart and, in spite of all so-called intellectual development, keeps coming
up again and again. Rationalism first combated the influence of evil spirits
upon human beings and thereafter their existence; and the result has been
that indeed faith in Scripture has been abandoned, but superstition has not
been eradicated. On the contrary, this now, under all kinds of forms of
magnetism, hypnotism, telepathy, spiritism, astrology etc., makes its entry
precisely in the circles of unbelief; occultism, which has flourished through
all centuries and among all peoples, cf. Kiesewetter, Gesch. d. Occultismus,
3 Bde, Leipzig 1891, A. Lehmann, Aberglaube und Zauberei, Stuttgart
1898, counts also in the last decades of this century its adherents by
millions and is even glorified in art and science as the highest wisdom. Also
over against this modern superstition the foolishness of God is wiser than
men. For not only is there nothing reasonable to be brought in against the
existence of fallen spirits, but also the possibility that they can seduce
human beings cannot be disputed on any single ground. Just as human
beings by word and deed, by example and conduct exercise influence upon
others, so there is nothing absurd in the thought that also from the fallen
world of spirits a seductive power proceeds upon the imagination,
understanding, and will of human beings. It is indeed objected against this
that then the human being can always cast his guilt upon the devil; but this
is also the case if someone is seduced by his fellow human being;
furthermore, temptation always takes place in an ethical way and does not
remove one’s own guilt; and in the circles where the existence of [184]
fallen angels is believed, the sense of guilt is usually not weaker than there
where their existence is denied. Faith in the devil at the same time
maintains the dreadful seriousness of sin and the capacity of the human
being for redemption; entweder ein Teufel ausserhalb der Menschheit oder
Tausende von Teufeln in Menschengestalt, Weiss, Apol. d. Christ. II3 519.
There manifests itself in human beings sometimes such a savage, wellconscious, intentional hatred against God and all that is divine, ib. 574-587;
children of God, and among them not the weakest and the smallest, but the
most advanced, such as stand in the forefront in the struggle, who live most
closely in communion with God, they complain many times of such terrible
temptations and assaults, they speak of such godless thoughts and
inclinations, which suddenly rise up in their heart, that it is a privilege to be
allowed to believe in the existence of devils. There are βαθη του σατανα,
which in Scripture, in the history of humanity, in the struggle of the church
of Christ, in the experience of believers are sometimes uncovered for a
moment. And besides, let one consider that the sinful power forms a
kingdom and in its combating of God and his kingdom proceeds
systematically. Whoever could survey it entirely would without doubt
discover in the history of its struggle a plan of attack and defense. There is
in the sinful life of the individual human being, but much more still in that
of families, generations, peoples, humanity through all centuries, a wellconscious, planned combating of God and all that is God’s. And the
leadership of this struggle rests with him who in Scripture is called the
prince of this world and the god of this age. Thus he has already
immediately appeared at the temptation and the fall of the first human
being. In Heathendom he has organized a power which stands hostile over
against all true religion, morality, civilization. When Christ appeared on
earth, he has concentrated his power against Him, not only by attacking
Him personally and restlessly persecuting Him, but also by surrounding
Him on every side with daemonic powers and thus holding back and
breaking off his work. The δαιμονιζομενοι in the N. T. were not ordinary
sick persons, although symptoms of illness, such as deafness, dumbness,
epilepsy, insanity etc., also occur with them. For they are repeatedly clearly
distinguished from ordinary sick persons, Mt. [185] 4:24, 8:16, 10:1, Mark 1:32, 3:15, Luke 13:32. The special thing with the possessed is that out of
them another subject speaks than they themselves are, that that subject
recognizes Jesus as the Son of God, stands wholly hostile over against Him,
and does not leave the sufferer except at his command, Matthew 1:34, 8:29, 31,
now, however dreadful also, is so little impossible that we in hypnotism,
whereby the one human being is subjected to the thought and will of the
other, see an analogous phenomenon appear; that even today such cases of
possession present themselves; and that whoever deems it impossible would
also have to deny all influence of the soul upon the body, and of God upon
the human being and the world. Satan imitates everything; God reveals
himself through theophany (incarnation), prophecy, miracle; the daemonic
caricature thereof are obsessio, mantics and magic, to which Scripture
which it most firmly condemns and forbids, Exodus 22:18, Leviticus 20:27, Deut.
toward the end of the days will be revealed by Satan in all their seductive
besides the literature already earlier mentioned concerning daemonology,
above p. 91, Ebrard, art. Dämonische in Herzog1. Joh. Weiss, in Herzog3.
Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych.2 293. Hofmann, Schriftbew. I 445 f. Philippi,
Kirchl. Gl. III2 334 f. Kahnis, Dogm. I 445 f. Beck, Vorles. über Chr. Gl. II
390 f. Weiss, Leben Jesu I 454 f. Justinus Kerner, Geschichten Besessener
neuer Zeit, nebst Reflexionen von C. A. Eschenmayer über Besessensein
und Zauber 1834, and with that Strauss, Charakteristiken und Kritiken 1830
S. 301. Demon Possession and allied themes, being an inductive study of
phenomena of our own times, by Rev. John L. Nevius D. D. for forty years
a missionary to the Chinese. With an introduction by Rev. F. F. Ellinwood
D. D. 2 ed. New-York, Chicago and Toronto, Fleming H. Revell Company
1896. Hafner, Die Daemonischen im N. T. 1894. Laehr, Die Daem.
des N. T. Leipzig 1894. Zimmer, Sünde oder Krankheit, Leipzig 1894. J. A.
H. van Dale, Possession and Insanity, Heusden 1896. Florenz Chable, Die
Wunder Jesu, Strassb. Theol. Stud. II 4. 1897 S. 45 f. Bodelschwingh, Die
Mitarbeit der Kirche an der Pflege der Geisteskranken, 1896 S. 13 f.
. Sin and misery are, to a certain extent, acknowledged by all men.
And from this acknowledgment there is born in all a weaker or
stronger desire for deliverance; the need of deliverance too is universal.
Indeed all men are, in greater or lesser degree, conscious that deliverance
must come from above. Παντες δε θεων χατεους’ ἀ νθρωποι. But the
Heathens nevertheless did not know the grace which alone can deliver man
from sin and misery; they had only surmises and wishes. Humana ad deos
transferebat Homerus; divina mallem ad nos (Cicero). Only in Holy
Scripture does the grace of God in all its richness and glory come to meet
us. Immediately after the fall it already makes a beginning. The punishment
threatened in Genesis 2:17 has evidently not been carried out in full. Adam and
Eve did not die on the day of their transgression. If the righteous
punishment for sin had been executed immediately and in full, then in the
first human pair the whole human race would have been destroyed, the
earth laid waste, the cosmos into a chaos, indeed returned again to nothing.
But then Satan too would have triumphed and God would have lost it.
Therefore, immediately after the fall another principle comes into operation,
which restrains, combats, and conquers sin. Not only is the punishment not
applied in full; but also that punishment which is applied is at the same time
also still a blessing. Everything that takes place immediately after the fall is
revelation and proof of God’s wrath and of God’s grace at the same time.
The consciousness of guilt that awakens in Adam and Eve, the
conscience that rises up accusingly, the shame over their nakedness, the fear
and the hiding from God, Genesis 3:7v. are all a proof that they have
transgressed God’s law and are worthy of his wrath and punishment; but
they nevertheless also show that man is not obdurate or hardened, that he
has not become a devil but has remained man. With the angels it is so, that
they, falling, also at once fall toward hell, Jud. 6, they are immediately
obdurate in evil and irredeemable. But man is so created, that he, falling,
can nevertheless be raised up again; he remains susceptible to deliverance.
God holds back the full working-through of the principle and the power of
sin in man. More still, God does not withdraw after the fall and even then
does not let man go for a moment. When immediately after the
transgression feelings of guilt, shame, fear awaken in man, then all this is
already an operation of God’s Spirit in man, a revelation of his wrath but
also of his grace, a revelation that is the foundation of all religious and
ethical life that is still in man after the fall. But God also reveals himself in
another way. When man hides himself from Him, He seeks him out and
calls him. It is true, God comes to him from afar and man out of fear wants
to hide himself and make the distance between himself and God still
greater. There is no longer any communion between God and man but
estrangement and separation; the covenant is broken. And yet, God comes
to man and seeks him out; He no longer leaves him over to his own folly
and fear, which makes him seek salvation in hiding from God. But He
himself, of his own initiative, calls man back to himself. And in doing so He
does not overtake and frighten man. He comes, as it were, from afar; He
does not come to him in storm or thunderstorm but in the רּוַח ַהּיֹום, that is, in
the evening coolness, amid the solemn rustling of the trees in the evening.
And by that they knew the voice of God and perceived that He was drawing
near. That drawing near was grace. God gives man time, to come to himself
and to consider what he shall answer. Still more clearly, in the examination
and in the punishment this revelation of God’s grace comes out, Genesis 3:9-
13. The Lord calls Adam specifically, for this one is the head and the
responsible person. God does not come at once with his verdict but
institutes an inquiry, proceeds to questioning, and gives man every
opportunity to give account. When man makes use of that, and indeed does
not deny all guilt but yet also does not fall down humbly and penitently
before God, but seeks to excuse himself, then God does not kindle in wrath,
then He lets that excuse count to a certain extent. And then He pronounces
judgment, while He in the examination began with Adam, now in the
pronouncing of the punishment first turns to the serpent, then to Eve,
thereafter to Adam.
And in that punishment mercy boasts against judgment. The punishment,
Genesis 3:14, 15, first of all has reference to the serpent as an ordinary animal.
God humiliates the serpent, and sets enmity between it and man; from now
on, instead of the former subjection of the animals to man, a struggle
between the two will prevail, in which man will indeed conquer but will
nevertheless have much to suffer from the animals, particularly from the
serpent. But further, this punishment, through the serpent, goes back to the
evil power, whose instrument it was. With it man had concluded a covenant
and for that had broken the covenant with God; God graciously annuls this
covenant of man, sets enmity between the seed of the serpent and the seed
of the woman, brings the seed of the woman, i.e. humanity, back over to his
side, thus declares that from Eve there will yet proceed a humanity, and that
that humanity in the struggle against the evil power will indeed suffer much
but will nevertheless in the end triumph. The way for the human race will
from now on go through suffering to glory, through struggle to victory,
through the cross to the crown, through the state of humiliation to that of
exaltation. This is the fundamental law, which God here proclaims for the
entrance into the kingdom of heaven. The punishment over the woman,
Genesis 3:16, strikes her both as mother and as woman; she will, precisely as
woman, have much pain to bear; the highest, what she desires, namely to be
a mother, she will not be able to obtain otherwise than in the way of
manifold suffering, desire for, subjection to the man, bearing with pain; but
thus she will nevertheless obtain her highest desire, and reach her
destination; she will be a mother of the living, although by her transgression
and exaltation above the man she had deserved death, and she will be saved
in bearing children, 1 Timothy 2:15. The punishment over the man, Genesis 3:17-19, consists in this, that the earth is cursed for his sake, that he will eat
bread in the sweat of his face and after a life of labor and trouble will return
again to dust. In connection with that he is then driven out of paradise and
sent into the wide world, Genesis 3:22-24. But this punishment too is a
blessing. Labor ennobles; it preserves man from moral and physical ruin,
stimulates his energy and increases his activity. Even if it is the case that
man is banished from paradise, he is nevertheless not consigned to hell; he
is sent into the world, in order that he may subdue and rule it by toilsome
and strenuous labor. Herein lies the beginning and the principle of all
culture; the dominion of man is not wholly lost but is extended by labor, Ps.
8; also in fallen man the image of God, after which he was created, is still
recognizable. Yes, even temporal death is not only a punishment but also a
benefaction; God has instituted death, in order that sin might not be
immortal, Iren., adv. haer. III 23. 6. After the fall, therefore, twofold
principle at once comes into operation: wrath and grace, justice and mercy.
From that alone is also a world to be explained, such as we know it. This is
a world full of humor, δακρυοεν γελασασα, standing in the sign of the
cross, and immediately after the fall given to Christ, the man of sorrows, in
order that He might preserve and subdue it.
After God has thus pronounced the punishment, Adam and Eve humbly
bow the head; they bring in nothing more, lay the hand upon the mouth, and
accept the word of God without any objection. That word indeed sounds
unbelievable, its truth can first become apparent in the distant future, but
nevertheless they believe it, blind as to the future and seeing as to the
commandment. Relying on God’s promise Adam calls his wife Eve, life,
source of life, mother of the living. Before the fall he saw in her especially
the woman who was given to him for help, and therefore called her woman.
But now he beholds in her first of all the mother and calls her Eve. Death
and ruin are indeed deserved, but God’s blessing nevertheless makes the
woman fruitful, and brings forth from her a humanity, which in her greatest
son, the Son of man, shall overcome all evil power of sin. Adam sees
in the promise of God the propagation, the existence, the development, the
preservation of the human race guaranteed and accepts it as such with a
truly childlike faith. And this faith was reckoned to him for righteousness.
In principle Genesis 3 contains the whole history of humanity, all the ways
of God to the salvation of what is lost and to the overcoming of sin. In
substance the whole gospel, the entire covenant of grace, is present here. All
that follows is the development of what has now already been planted as a
seed.
2. Yet in Gen. 3 the word covenant is not yet mentioned; only with Noah,
Abraham, and Israel at Sinai is there mention of it. The new criticism thinks
that it has also here been antedated, and that Israel’s religion originally did
not differ from that of other peoples. The relationship of Ihvh to Israel was
like that of Chemosh to Moab. The idea of a covenant existing between
Ihvh and his people was wholly foreign to ancient Israel. It knew nothing of
this, that God as the God of heaven and earth had chosen Israel out of all
peoples, made it his possession, and placed it with himself in a covenant.
All these thoughts arose only much later. Even with Amos the covenant
relationship does not yet occur; Hosea only says that one can compare
Israel’s unfaithfulness with a breach of covenant, 6:7. Only Deuteronomy is
in truth a covenant book; it was introduced and accepted in covenant-wise
fashion, 2 Kings 23:3, cf. Jeremiah 34:8v. Ezra 10:3, Nehemiah 10:1. But now that
covenant, when it arose, was again understood very differently than later.
One then understood by it especially the obligation of Israel toward Ihvh, to
be a holy people and to keep his laws. If, therefore, Israel did not keep the
covenant, then it was broken and Israel burdened with the curse, Deut. 27
and 28. But although Israel formally accepted the covenant in Josiah’s
reformation, it did not adhere to it, was punished, and sent into exile. And
then gradually the thought arose that God’s covenant consisted in a law that
he had given, that God had obligated himself to remain faithful to Israel and
also, if it fell away, not to abandon it; God could indeed punish Israel, but
not destroy the covenant. The Israel that returned from the exile clung fast
to this covenant idea and projected it back into the past, into the [192]
history of the patriarchs, cf. Wellhausen, Gesch. Israels I 434 f. Smend, Altt.
Theol. 116 f., and especially R. Kraetzschmar, Die Bundesvorstellung im A.
T. in ihrer gesch. Entw. Marburg Elwert 1896. But this result has been
obtained by means of a violent criticism, which strikes the facts in the face
and in the end is nothing but arbitrariness. Thus, e.g., in Genesis 18:21 the
words: so shall the Lord be to me a God, which really make one think of a
covenant, are certainly a later addition. Ex. 21-23 indeed bears the name of
the book of the covenant and Ex. 34 indeed contains the words of the
covenant, but these pieces are not from Moses’ time, and even if they are
pre-deuteronomic, they nevertheless contain no formal covenant such as is
spoken of in the days of Josiah; perhaps they are also post-deuteronomic.
Hosea 8:1 is interpolated. In Genesis 15:18 the word covenant is only the
solemn name for the oath by which God obligates himself to give the land
of Canaan to Abraham’s seed; of mutual obligations there is no mention etc.
A criticism that reasons in this way obtains no certainty except that which it
itself wishes to have. First it constructs, on the basis of the alleged
spuriousness of the writings, the history of the religious conceptions, and
later it uses this same reconstructed history to demonstrate the spuriousness
of the writings directed against it. Cf. G. Vos, Recent Criticism of the early
prophets, Presb. and Ref. Rev. April 1898 p. 214-238, also Strack in a
review of Kraetzschmar’s book, Theol. Lit. Blatt 1898 n. 5. Furthermore,
the main question in the investigation into the covenant idea in Holy
Scripture is absolutely not this, whether the word ברית originally meant
covenant or rather ordinance. Some, such as Delitzsch, Gesenius, Dillmann,
Schultz, Oehler, Wellhausen, Guthe, Bredenkamp, König, Cremer say the
former, assume as a second meaning covenant condition, and thus let the
sense pass over into ordinance, law, because a law obtains legal validity in
the way of the covenant. Others, such as Hofmann, Buhl, Friedrich
Delitzsch, Orelli, Strack, Siegfried, Stade, Nowack think that determination,
ordinance is the oldest meaning, and that this passed over into that of
covenant, because a law regulates a reciprocal relationship. These
explanations do not look plausible; it is also impossible, in Scripture, to
demonstrate historically the transition from the one to the other meaning;
now this meaning predominates, then that, without one being able thereby
to distinguish older or younger sources. The concept of ברית is therefore to
be determined differently. The derivation sheds little light on this.
According to most, it comes from ברה, to cut, and thus points back to the
ancient Eastern custom, at the conclusion of a covenant, of walking
between the pieces of slaughtered animals laid opposite one another, to
indicate that the same fate as these animals might befall the breaker of the
covenant, hence כרת ברית, ὁ ρκια τεμνειν, foedus ferire, cf. Genesis 15:8v., Jeremiah 34:19; according to others it comes from an Assyrian stem that means to
bind, Kraetzschmar 245. However this may be, from Genesis 21:22v., 26:26v.,
31:44v., it is clearly evident that three things belonged to a ברית, an oath or
promise that contained the agreed determinations, a curse that invoked the
divine punishment upon the breaker, and a cultic ceremony that
symbolically represented the curse. The conclusion of a ברית was thus
always a religious act. The word was indeed first customary in the profane
sphere of determinations and treaties between men. Long before God
establishes his covenant with Noah and Abraham, covenants had already
been established between men. And this also had to be so, if Noah,
Abraham, Israel were to understand and appreciate religion as a covenant.
Therefore the word also does not yet occur in Genesis 3:15. Only when, in
sinful, deceitful human society, covenants were repeatedly needed for the
defense or acquisition of some good, could the meaning and the value of a
covenant be perceived and religion be conceived under this point of view.
But even if ברית is first used of human covenants, it nevertheless always
denotes a religious act. The main thing in ברית is not whether it denotes a
covenant or an ordinance. But it indicates in general such a promise,
agreement, treaty, covenant, determination, disposition, etc., which is
placed under God’s guardianship by a solemn ceremony and thus acquires a
character of unbreakableness, Kraetschmar t. a. p. 29. 30. 39-41. Whether
ברית denotes more a bilateral covenant or a unilateral disposition depends
not on the word nor also on the historical development of the concept, but
simply on the parties who are involved in it. In proportion as one of the two
parties is more subordinate and has less to say, the ברית involuntarily
acquires the character of a disposition that is imposed by the one party upon
the other; ברית then becomes synonymous with ֹחק, Exodus 34:10, Jes. 59:21,
Jeremiah 33:20, 31:36, 34:13, and כרת ברית is construed not only with עם and בין
but also with ל, Joshua 9:6, Jes. 55:3, 61:8, Jeremiah 32:40. When the victor
concludes a ברית with a vanquished one, or a king with his subjects, all the
emphasis falls on the duties that the latter have to fulfill thereby, Jos. 9, 1
Sam. 11, 2 Samuel 5:3, 1 Kon. 20:34, Ezra 17:13. Still stronger does the meaning
of disposition and ordinance become, when there is figuratively mention of
a ברית with the eyes, Job 31:1, with the stones and the animals, Job 5:22,
40:28, with death, Jes. 28:15, of God with nature, Genesis 8:22, Jeremiah 33:20, 25,
or with the animals, Genesis 9:12, Hosea 2:17-22, Jes. 11:6 etc. But also when
God and man conclude a covenant, the monopleuric character repeatedly
comes strongly to the foreground of itself; they are after all not equal
parties, but God is the Sovereign, who imposes his ordinances upon the
creatures. When God in Genesis 15:8v. concludes a covenant with Abram, that
is no proper pactio but a sponsio; God gives his promise, he binds himself
to its fulfillment and passes between the pieces of the sacrificial animal.
And elsewhere he swears by himself, Genesis 22:16, by his life, Deuteronomy 32:40,
by his soul, Amos 6:8, Jeremiah 51:14, in order to prove to man the
unchangeableness of his counsel, Hebr. 6:17. And this monopleuric
character of the covenant had to come to light ever more clearly in history.
For indeed God’s covenant also imposed obligations upon those with whom
it was concluded; obligations namely, not as conditions for entering into the
covenant, for the covenant was concluded and rests only in God’s mercy,
but as the way which those taken up into the covenant by grace now
Deuteronomy 5:29, 27:10v, 28:1v., 30:1v. etc. But although Israel repeatedly
accepted God’s covenant anew, Exodus 19:8, 24:3, 7, Deuteronomy 29:10-13, Jos.
walk in the way of the covenant and profaned and broke it at every moment.
Thus the question arose whether this covenant of grace was then as unstable
as the covenant of works before the fall. And to that revelation gave
answer, and ever more powerfully and loudly, as apostasy increased: no,
this covenant does not totter; men may become unfaithful, but God does not
forget his promise, the covenant is fixed solely and only in his mercy, Lev.
break his covenant; he has bound himself to it voluntarily, of himself, with a
costly oath; his name, his honor, his very being depends on it, Ex. 32, 33,
Ezech. 20:9, 14, 22, 43, 44, Joel 2:17-19 etc. And herein shines the glory of
religion, which we as Christians confess. Earlier, part II 551v. it has been
shown why true religion must bear the form of a covenant. In it God
descends to man, and takes him up into his communion. But if God thus
gives himself to man, then man is also bound to give himself wholly to
God. The covenant, which proceeds from God and takes us up, admonishes
and obligates us to a new obedience. But if we then sometimes fall into sins
out of weakness, we nevertheless must not therefore despair of God’s grace
nor remain lying in sins, for the covenant of grace is fixed in the
unchangeable good pleasure of God. This unbreakableness, which is
enclosed in the word ברית, is probably also the reason why in the LXX it
has been rendered not by συνθηκη but by διαθηκη. The N. T. adopted this
and applied it both to the O. and to the N. T. dispensation of the covenant of
grace. It deserves remark that our Statenvertaling, as also the English
translation, translates the word διαθηκη in the first case by covenant Luke 9:4, and in the second by testament, Matthew 26:28, Mark 14:14, Luke 22:20, 1
thought that the concept foedus fits better the dispensation of the O. T. and
the concept testamentum more that of the N. T., cf. Bengel on Matthew 26:28.
After the covenant with the fleshly Israel has been broken, in its place has
come the spiritual Israel, which according to God’s election is
gathered out of all peoples, which receives the goods of salvation as by
testamentary disposition of the Son, stands in a relationship of sonship to
God and expects the heavenly blessedness as an inheritance, Luke 22:29,
on the doctrine of the covenant in Scripture in Kraetzschmar t. a. p. 1v.
3. From Scripture this covenant-idea of itself passed over into Christian
theology. With the church fathers it occurs repeatedly, especially in their
commentaries. But the doctrine of the covenant acquired dogmatic
significance because the Christian religion had to be understood in its
connection with and at the same time in its distinction from the Israelite.
Two directions stood here, already from the days of the apostles onward,
over against each other. Judaism, which in almost all congregations
opposed Paul’s person and doctrine, demanded observance of the Mosaic
law, specifically of circumcision, also by the Christians from the Gentiles,
2:16, 21, Titus 1:10, 14, 2:9, 1 Timothy 1:7v., and, after the breach between Jews
and Christians had been effected, Jerusalem destroyed, the Christian
congregation fled to Pella, a Gentile-Christian congregation in Jerusalem
had been founded in 135 etc., became more and more a sect (Nazarenes,
Ebionites), which became Jewish in its doctrine about God and denied the
divinity of Christ. On the other side stood Gnosticism, which also already in
the time of the apostles had its origins (Simon Magus, Cerinthus), but
especially in the 2nd and 3rd century spread from the East over the West
and in the person of Marcion directed its sharp attacks upon the O. Test.
Proceeding from an eternal dualism between God and matter, he thought the
transition between both mediated by all manner of aeons, and ascribed the
creation of the world to a lower god, the demiurge or the Jewish god. This
one was not the highest, true God, but a God of lower rank, the God of the
law, of righteousness and of vengeance. The O. T. stood much lower than
the N. T., for the God of the O. T. is jealous, vindictive, creator of evil; He
hardens and makes obdurate, commands all manner of sins such as the
robbing of the Egyptians, the killing of the Canaanites; He gave laws
that were not good, and entered into covenant with men such as Abraham,
Isaac, Jacob, David etc., who made themselves guilty of all manner of sins
of deceit, lying etc. It is that Jewish god, the demiurge, who even had Christ
nailed to the cross, but was by Christ himself consigned to hell. In Christ a
wholly different God has revealed himself, the God of grace and of love.
The whole legalistic standpoint is therefore past. The Christian is free from
the law and from the whole O. Test. The only one who has at once seen this
well is Paul; he is the only, true apostle.
Over against these two parties the Christian church and theology saw
itself called to a twofold task. It had, over against Gnosticism, to maintain
the unity, and over against Judaism the distinction, of the two testaments,
cf. especially Irenaeus, adv. haer. IV. Tertull., adv. Marc. II and III. For that
purpose it made use of Paul’s doctrine concerning the παλαια and καινη
διαθηκη, 2 Cor. 3, lat. testamentum or instrumentum, which was then first
applied to the oeconomies, thereafter to the Scriptures. Both are one in
origin and content; God or the Logos is the author of both, and in both one
faith, one covenant, one way to salvation is set forth. Distinction exists only
in the form, and this also had to be so. For God is indeed one, but men
differ and must therefore also be educated differently; God reveals his grace
successively ever more richly and fully. In the days of the O. T. there was
servitude, but now freedom, then image, now truth; then twilight, now light;
then grace for one people, now for all; then the Messiah promised, now
come, etc. This distinction, however, does not detract from the essential
unity, for the law was given specially to Israel and given only on account of
its stubbornness, Amos 5:17, Jeremiah 7:21, Ezech. 20:19, pointed typically to
Christ, educated Israel for the Christ, and has in Christ reached its goal and
end. And therefore: N. T. in Vetere latet, V. T. in Novo patet. Vetus Novum
praeoccupat et Vetus interpretatum est Novum, Vetus T. est occultatio Novi,
κατα την των χρονων ἐ υαλλαγην. Even the O. T. in the hierarchy,
priesthood and idea of sacrifice, in the legalistic conception of the gospel, in
cultus, painting, etc. obtained a great power over the church, which in
many respects wanted to be an O. T. theocracy, cf. art. διαθηκη in Suicerus.
Diestel, Gesch. des A. T. in der Chr. Kirche Jena 1869. Harnack, D. G. I2
531 f. But nevertheless the church in the new dispensation was thereby
placed high above the old. In scholastic and Roman theology the distinction
of the two testaments was indicated in such a way that the promissa in the
O. T. were temporalia and now are coelestia; that the praecepta then were
exterius regulantia, but now are pleniora, non solum manum sed et mentem
regulantia; that the sacramenta then were only figuralia, now gratiam
conferentia, Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 40 and other comm. Thomas, S. Th.
III qu. 60 art. 6 ad 3. qu. 61 art. 4 ad 2. In connection therewith the
believers of the O. T. also did not at once come into heaven, but into the
limbus patrum, from which they were first transferred by Christ to heaven,
Thomas, Suppl. S. Theol. qu. 69 art. 4-6. Bellarminus, de Christo IV 10. 11.
4. The Reformation saw over against and alongside itself all manner of
directions, over against which it also had to determine its relation on this
point. Judaistic and gnostic ideas had propagated themselves in the Middle
Ages and even now made their influence felt. Anabaptism was radical,
wanted not only religious-ethical but also social and political reform, and,
with appeal to Scripture, demanded abolition of interest, polygamy,
community of goods, etc. The same antithesis of nature and grace, from
which it at first wished the introduction of all manner of O. and N. T.
ordinances, gradually caused the whole of Scripture to be set aside in favor
of the inward word. Scripture was a dead letter; especially the O. T. lacked
all evangelical content; Israel, as a herd of swine, was fed only with
temporal goods; the law has lost all value and power for us, M. Vitringa IV
238. Diestel 307 f. Socinianism, by its rationalistic principle, arrived at the
same result. The O. T. stands much lower than the New; it teaches
polygamy, restricts love of neighbor, prescribes many virtues not at all,
determines far too severe punishments for small sins; it knows only servile
fear and earthly promise; it knows of no full righteousness and forgiveness;
it is therefore completely abolished, and Christ has appeared as novus
legislator, Fock, Der Socin. 325. Diestel 535. Arminianism did not speak so
boldly but nevertheless conceived the O. T. as a covenant that promised
only temporal goods, Episcopius, Disp. II disp. 18-20. IV disp. 12-14.
Limborch, Theol. Chr. III c. 9. M. Vitringa IV 242. Even Luther often set O.
T. and N. over against each other as law and gospel, but later became more
cautious and taught that there were also in the O. T. rich, evangelical
promises, Köstlin, Luthers Theol. I. 84 f. II 258. Yet this conception
continued to have an effect in Lutheran theology. To be sure, it assumes that
in O. and N. T. there is only one Messiah, one faith, one way of salvation,
but it nevertheless refuses to say that there is only one testament. The word
testament with it denotes that legalistic covenant which was established on
Sinai with Israel; and in this sense it differs essentially from, is opposed to,
and is abolished by the N. Test. There are indeed in the O. T. many
promises given to Israel that still apply to us as well, but the O. Testament
as a legalistic covenant of God with Israel was no foedus gratiae. The
promises of the gospel, given to Adam, Abraham, etc., may indeed be
summarized under the name of foedus gratiae, but even this foedus gratiae
in the O. T. then differs not only in accidentia but also in substantia from the
N. Test., just as the promise differs from the fulfillment, the shadow from
the body, Gerhard, Loci XIV 119 sq. Quenstedt, Theol. IV p. 255-280.
Hollaz, Examen 1043-1053. Heppe, Dogm. d. d. Pr. II 258.
The richest development is that of the doctrine of the covenant in
Reformed theology. Federal theology does not originate with Cocceius, as
Ypey thought, Beknopte letterk. Gesch. der syst. Godg. II 70v., and it is also
not a peculiarity of that German-Reformed theology which would have its
father in Melanchthon, as Heppe proposed it in his Geschichte and in his
Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus. The incorrectness of these
opinions is now acknowledged by all, Sepp, Godg. Ond. II 220. Schweizer,
Gl. der ref. K. I 103. Gass, Gesch. d. prot. Dogm. II 265. Schneckenburger,
Vergl. Darst. des luth. u. ref. Lehrbegriffs II 146. Diestel, Studien zur
Foederaltheol., in Jahrb. f. d. Theol. X 209. Van den Bergh, Calvijn over het
Genadeverbond bl. 7 v. Heppe, Gesch. d. Pietismus u. d. Mystik in der ref.
Kirche [200] 1879 etc. These all go back to Olevianus, Calvin, or Bullinger.
The covenant-idea, however, was already taken up by Zwingli, who in his
Elenchus contra Anabaptistas 1527, Opera III 412 sq. 418 sq. 421 sq. V 45
maintained the essential unity of Old and New Testament. From Zwingli it
was then taken over into Swiss theology, Bullinger, de testamento seu
foedere Dei unico et aeterno 1534, Comp. relig. Christ 1556, Decades
1549v., Calvin, Inst. II c. 10. 11, cf. van den Bergh, Calvijn over het
genadeverbond and the assessment of this dissertation by Dr. van Dijk,
Studien VII 1880 1e stuk; in German Reformed theology by Olevianus,
Ursinus, Sohnius, Eglin, Boquinus, Hyperius etc.; in English theology by
Rollock, Howie, Cartwright, Preston, Thomas Blake, Perkins, Amesius,
John Ball, James Usher, the Westm. conf. c. 7, Francis Roberts, Thomas
Boston etc. cf. Vos, De verbondsleer in de Geref. Theol. 1891; in the
Netherlands by Snecanus, Junius, Gomarus, Trelcatius father and son,
Nerdenus, Ravensperger etc. Long before Cloppenburg and Cocceius,
therefore, the doctrine of the covenants was indigenous in Reformed
theology. But these two made the covenant-idea the point of departure and
governing principle of the whole dogmatics, Cloppenburg, Disp. de fordere
Dei, Op. I 487-570, Cocceius, Summa doctrinae de foedere et test. explicata
1648, and so also Burman, Synopsis 1671, Braun, Doctrina foederum 1688,
Witsius, de oec. foed. 1677. The struggle against Cocceius did not directly
at all concern the doctrine of the covenant, which was acknowledged by all,
but concerned the sabbath with Essenius and Hoornbeek 1655-1659, the
condition of the church in the twofold economy with Maresius 1662, the
παρεσις in the O. T. with Voetius 1665. What was contested in Cocceius
was not his concept of foedus, but his biblical theology and his historical
method. Just as Cartesius in philosophy, so Cocceius in theology rose up
against scholasticism and traditionalism; he pressed for study of Scripture
and wanted a summa theologiae ex Scripturis repetita, as the title of his
dogmatics ran. In order to obtain that, he did not proceed from God and
from his eternal counsel, but he took his standpoint in history and the
covenant of God with human beings. His dogmatics thus became salvationhistory, a biblical theology in historical form, of which Scripture was not
principium and norma but object and content. That covenant, i.e. the
true religion, he traced historically from its first beginnings down to the
present time; and everywhere he pointed out the development and the
progress of that covenant, of the true religion. There was thus not only
difference, as the Reformed said, in clarity of revelation, i.e. in brightness
of insight and clearness of consciousness. No, there was difference in the
objective benefits themselves under the different administrations of the
covenant of grace. Salvation was in the O. T. objectively less than in the N.
T. In the O. T. the sabbath consisted in cessatio operis, Israel did not yet
have vera et permanentia bona, but it was a people of hope, longing for a
long earthly life, and still seized by fear of death. It did not have full ἀ φεσις
but only παρεσις; justification was imperfect; the animal sacrifice could
bring about no reconciliation; the comfort of believers was still weak, their
conscience not yet at rest, the circumcision of the heart was indeed
promised but first became a good of the N. T., the law was administered by
angels, i.e. in the O. T. everything was indeed present, but only in type and
shadow; the reality of the thing itself was lacking or at least much less. Not
subjectively but also objectively, not only in accidentia but also in
substantia, the O. T. was another than the new. Yes, Cocceius even
undermined the whole doctrine of the covenant, when he conceived the
covenant of grace exclusively negatively, as a slow, historically and
successively completing abolition of the covenant of works. In the end
nothing remained of the covenant; it was only a temporary, human, everchanging form of religion. Cf. Gass, Gesch. der prot. Dogm. II 266 f. Art.
Coccejus by Ebrard in Herzog2. Heppe, Gesch. des Pietismus 217 f.
Diestel, Jahrb. f. d. Th. 1865. Van der Flier, De Johanne Coccejo 1859, also
part I 121 and Dr. Geesink, De Ethiek in de Geref. theol. 1897 bl. 49v.
Cocceius thereby without doubt left the point of departure and the line of
Reformed theology. This was immediately felt by many, and therefore also
more or less opposed. But it was more an attack on subordinate points than
a principled opposition. Cocceianism, soon in alliance with Cartesianism,
gained ever more entrance and led not only to opposition against various
dogmas but also contributed to the degradation of the O. T. Everywhere,
unconsciously, the opinion pressed through that the O. T. had only
historical value and was of no dogmatic importance any longer. From this
changed dogmatic view, in due time the historical criticism of the O. T. was
of itself born, since Spinoza and R. Simon. Rationalism and
supranaturalism had not the least awareness of the significance and value of
the O. T. According to Kant, Judaism was only ein Inbegriff bloss
statutarischer Gesetze, auf welchen eine Staatsverfassung gegründet war;
the moralischen Zusätze were only an appendage and not essentially its
own; Judaism did not at all want to be a church but only a state and
therefore demanded only outward observance of the commandments, no
inward disposition. Christianity did not arise out of Judaism, but is its full
abolition, Religion ed. Rosenkranz S. 150 f. With Schleiermacher Judaism,
because of its particularism, is still akin to fetishism, Chr. Gl. § 8. 4 and in
its relation to Christianity it stands on a par with paganism, § 12, cf. § 132.
Hegel placed Judaism as the Religion der Erhabenheit still below the Greek
religion of beauty and the Roman religion of purposiveness, Werke XII 39
f. Vatke and Bruno Bauer, both pupils of Hegel, sought to confirm this
philosophical view of the O. Test. by the historical criticism of the biblical
books. The scriptural criticism of the last century has not changed the
worldview, but the altered worldview demanded an often very negative
judgment about the great facts of Holy Scripture, v. d. Bergh van Eysinga,
Levensbeschouwing, Zutphen Thieme bl. 25. In O. T. scriptural criticism,
then, today all views have returned that were formerly advanced about the
O. T. by the Gnostics, Anabaptists, Socinians, Rationalists. Jahveh is not the
one, true God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, but a national god of
Israel, originally a sun-god. The people of Israel is not chosen by God, but
in ancient times was a wild horde of various tribes, which were given over
to all kinds of polytheism. The narratives of creation, fall, flood, patriarchs,
judges etc. are myths and legends, in part borrowed from other peoples. The
law stands much lower than the prophets and often bears an outward,
sensuous, eudaemonistic character. The saints of the O. T., such as
Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and especially David, are not worthy of that
name and have not existed at all or have been idealized by posterity. The
distinction between true and false prophets is wholly subjective.
Christianity was prepared at least as much by paganism as by Judaism.
5. The doctrine of the covenant is of the greatest significance for
dogmatics and at the same time for the practice of the Christian life. More
than the Roman and Lutheran, the Reformed church and theology has
understood this. On the basis of Holy Scripture it always conceived the true
religion of the O. and N. T. as a covenant between God and man, whether
this was established with the unfallen man (foedus operum), or with
creation in general in the case of Noah (foedus naturale), or with the people
of election (foedus gratiae). And even here it did not stop, but for these
covenants in time it sought a firm, eternal foundation in the counsel of God,
and again conceived this counsel, as intending the salvation of the human
race, as a covenant of the three persons in the Divine being itself (pactum
salutis, counsel of peace, covenant of redemption). This latter covenant
occurs briefly and succinctly already in Olevianus, Wezen des
Genadeverbonds, 2e art. § 1. Junius, Theses Theol. c. 25 th. 21. Arminius,
de sacerdotio Christi 1603. Gomarus on Matthew 3:13, Luke 2:21. Theses Theol.
XIX 1. Amesius, de morte Christi I 5. Voetius, Disp. II 266. Essenius, de
subjectione Christi ad legem X 2; is then further developed at length by
Cloppenburg, de foedere Dei III 4-28 and Coccejus, Summa de foedere c. 5;
thereafter receives a definite place in dogmatics with Burman, Braun,
Witsius, Vitringa, Turretinus, Leydecker, Mastricht, Marck, Moor, Brakel,
and then is opposed by Deurhof. Over natuurkundige en schriftuurlijke
samenstelling van de H. Godg. I 12, Wesselius in the preface to Pictet’s
Godgeleerdheid and others, and gradually disappears entirely from
dogmatics again. The development of the doctrine of the pactum salutis
among the Reformed was also not free from scholastic subtlety. The locus
classicus Zach. 6:13, which was cited for this doctrine, proves nothing and
says only that the Messiah, uniting in himself the kingship and the
priesthood, will deliberate and promote the peace of his people (Keil). [204]
From Job 17:3, Isaiah 38:14, Psalms 119:122, which however none of them look
to the Messiah, and Hebrews 7:22, where it only says that Christ, because He
lives forever, is surety that the new covenant will remain in existence
forever, it was derived that Christ from eternity had become surety in the
pactum salutis; and indeed not of God with us, as Crell on Hebr. 7:22,
Limborch, Theol. Christ. III 21, 7, asserted, for God as the Truthful has no
need of a surety, but of us with God, Coccejus, de foedere V § 150-162,
Owen on Hebr. 7:22, Witsius, Oec. foed. II c. 5, Heidegger, Corp. Theol. XI
23, van den Honert, Het Hoogepr. van Christus 1712 bl. 403, Boston. Eene
beschouwing van het Verbond der genade, 2e dr. 1868 bl. 68 etc. Further,
from the jurists the distinction was borrowed between fidejussor and
expromissor and the question was treated whether Christ in the pactum
salutis had taken upon himself the sins of the O. T. elect conditionally, or
rather absolutely; the former was said by Coccejus, de foed. § 150-162,
Wittichius, Theol. pacif. § 290, Allinga, van Til, d’Outrein, Perizonius and
others cf. Heppe, Dogm. 270; the latter was said by Leydecker, Fax Verit. V
7, Vis Verit. II 1, Filius Dei sponsor 1674, Turretinus, Th. El. XII 9,
Mastricht V 1, 34, Voetius, Disp. V 346, Moor IV 569-580, M. Vitringa III
12 etc. And finally the point of dispute was also discussed whether this
pactum salutis bore more the character of a testament with appeal to Luk.
Heidegger, Schiere, Doctrina test. et foed. I c. 10 asserted, or rather of a
covenant, as Leydecker, Fax Verit. V 6, Wesselius and others maintained.
Yet this doctrine of the pactum salutis, despite its defective form, rests on a
Scriptural thought. For as Mediator the Son is subordinate to the Father;
calls Him his God, Psalms 22:3, John 20:17, He is his servant, Isa. 49v., to
whom a work has been assigned to do, Isaiah 53:10, John 6:38-40, 10:18,
12:49, 14:31, 17:4, and who for the accomplished obedience Matthew 26:42, Joh.
11, 17, 24, Ephesians 1:20v. Philippians 2:9v. This relation between Father and Son,
although coming out most clearly during the walk of Christ on earth,
nevertheless did not first begin at the moment of the incarnation, for this
incarnation already belongs to the execution of the work assigned to the
Son; but it falls in eternity and thus also already existed during the time of
the O. T. Scripture also teaches this clearly, when it ascribes the guidance of
Numbers 20:16, Isaiah 63:8, 9, and also already lets Christ be officially active in
the days of the O. T., John 8:56, 1 Corinthians 10:4, 9, 1 Petr. 1:11, 3:19. For there
is indeed only one Mediator of God and of men, John 14:6, Hd. 4:12, 1 Timothy 2:5, who is yesterday and today and forever the same, Hebr. 13:8, who from
eternity has been chosen as Mediator, Isaiah 42:1, 43:10, Matthew 12:18, Luk.
Scripture gives us through all this a rich and glorious representation of the
work of redemption. The pactum salutis makes known to us the relation and
the life of the three persons in the Divine being as a covenant life, as a life
of the highest self-consciousness and of the highest freedom. Here, within
the Divine being, the covenant has its full reality; while the covenant of
God and man, because of their infinite distance, always bears more or less
the character of a sovereign disposition, διαθηκη, here between the three
persons it is a συνθηκη in the full sense. The highest freedom and the most
complete agreement coincide here. The work of salvation is a work of the
three persons, to which all cooperate and in which each performs his
particular task. In the decrees, also in those of predestination, the one will
of God came to the foreground and the trinitarian character did not yet
come out so clearly. But here in the pactum salutis the work of redemption
comes out in its full Divine beauty. It is the Divine work par excellence.
Just as in the creation of man God beforehand deliberately takes counsel
with himself, Genesis 1:26, so in the re-creation each of the three persons
comes forward still more clearly in his distinct character. The re-creation,
like the creation, is a work of God alone; from, through, to Him are all
things; no man has been his counselor or has first given to Him, that it
should be repaid to him. It is God triune alone, Father, Son and Spirit, who
together devise, determine, execute, and bring to completion the
whole work of salvation. But further, this pactum salutis also connects the
eternal work of God unto salvation with that which He does thereto in time.
The covenant of grace, which is revealed in time, does not hang in the air,
but rests on an eternal, unchangeable foundation. It is fixed in the counsel
and in the covenant of God triune, and is the application and execution
infallibly following from that. Yes, in the covenant of grace, which in time
is established by God with men, man is not the acting one and the one
appearing actively. But it is again God triune, who, after having designed
the work of re-creation, also brings it to pass. It is not so that God first
establishes his covenant with Adam and Noah, with Abraham and Israel,
and finally only with Christ. But the covenant of grace lies ready from
eternity in the pactum salutis of the three persons and is realized by them
from the moment after the fall. Christ does not first begin to work with and
after his incarnation, and the Holy Spirit does not first begin his labor with
his outpouring on the day of Pentecost. But just as creation is a trinitarian
work, so also re-creation from the first moment has been a work of the three
persons. All grace that after the fall flows to creation accrues to it from the
Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit. The Son immediately after the
fall appeared as the Mediator, as the second and last Adam, who takes the
place of the first and restores and accomplishes what he ruined and left
undone. And the Holy Spirit immediately appeared as the Comforter, as the
applier of salvation, to be acquired by the Christ. All change, development,
progress in insight and knowledge thus falls on the side of the creature. In
God there is no change nor shadow of turning. The Father is eternally
Father, and the Son eternally Mediator, and the Holy Spirit eternally
Comforter. Therefore the O. T. is also to be understood as one in essence
and substance with the N. T. For, although God communicates his
revelation successively and historically and makes it richer and fuller, and
humanity thus advances in knowledge, in possession and enjoyment of the
revelation, God is the same and remains so. The sun illuminates the earthly
realm gradually, but it itself is the same, in the morning and in the evening,
in the day and in the night. Although Christ first accomplished his work on
earth in the midst of history and although the Holy Spirit was first
poured out on the day of Pentecost, God could nevertheless also distribute
in full the benefits to be acquired and applied by them in the days of the O.
T. The believers of the O. T. have not been saved in any other way than we.
There is one faith, one Mediator, one way of salvation, one covenant of
grace. Cf. Schneckenburger, Verlg. Darst. II 135 f. Dr. Vos, De Verbondsleer
in de Geref. Theol. Grandrapids 1891.
6. In the execution of the pactum salutis in time, however, a distinction is
indeed to be made between the foedus gratiae in a broader and in a
narrower sense. It is not good, in the discussion of the covenant of grace in
time, immediately to pass over to Israel and to the church of the N. T. For
Scripture itself does not at once pass from Adam to Abraham; it does not let
go of humanity, but describes in main outlines its development up to the
time of Abraham. When from humanity Abraham and Israel are chosen, the
bond with that humanity is not cut through; Israel does not float like an oildrop upon the peoples, but remains in all manner of connection with those
peoples, and holds fast to the end the expectation also for those peoples. In
the fullness of time Jew and Gentile are reconciled in the one man;
humanity gathers itself around the cross; and the church, chosen out of that
humanity, stands with that humanity in the closest connection. Nature and
grace, creation and re-creation are to be set in that mutual relation in which
Scripture places them. And then it deserves remark, that the first promises
of grace, which after the fall go forth from God’s mouth to Adam and Eve,
are wholly universal and concern the whole of humanity. Above it has been
pointed out, that all punishment, pronounced in Gen. 3 over sin, is at the
same time to be recognized as a revelation of God’s grace. And that grace
there extends without any limitation to the whole of humanity. General and
special grace still flow in one bed. In the punishment, which God after the
transgression pronounces over the serpent, the woman and the man, it is
mercy even more than wrath that speaks; it is punishment and promise at
the same time, it is eine gnädige fröhliche Strafe (Luther). Therefore in it
lies the origin and the guarantee of the continuance, the expansion and
development, the struggle and the triumph of humanity. Religion and
morality, cultus and culture there take their beginning. In the long
period from Adam to Noah these all develop under the influence of God’s
general and special grace. The original powers, laid by God at the creation
in the different creatures, are indeed broken but also after the fall still
continue to work for a long time. Especially this comes out in the strength
and the much greater life-span of men before the flood, Genesis 5:5v., and in
the much more powerful operation of the elements of nature, which are only
after the flood put under restraint, Genesis 8:22. This history of Scripture is
confirmed by the tradition of the peoples, which in its golden, silver, copper
and iron age speaks of a slow decline of humanity, and also by geology,
according to which to this our period another preceded, in which over the
whole earth a higher temperature prevailed, the seasons were not yet
bounded and fire and water played a much greater role than at present; at
the transition from the mesozoic to the kainozoic period there nevertheless
took place all manner of weighty changes, a great expansion of the
mainland, by the uplifting of extensive parts of the sea-bottom above the
water; the formation of the mountains such as the Alps, Pyrenees,
Carpathians, Himalaya, Cordilleros etc.; a strong change in the climate; the
extinction of the great, prehistoric animals and plants etc., Pfaff,
Schöpfungsgeschichte, kap. 11-15. Haeckel, Nat. Schöpfungsgesch.5 320 f.
Wossidlo, Leitfaden der Mineralogie und Geologie, Berlin Weidmann 1889
S. 196 f. In connection with all this, the greater strength and the longer lifespan of men in the period from Adam to Noah is absolutely not improbable;
the simpler manner of life, the less strenuous labor, the smaller number of
malignant diseases, the afterworking of the condition before the fall explain
this fact sufficiently; even now by way of exceptions ages of 120 to 150
years still occur; and there is no physical necessity to be conceived why
human vital force after 70 or 80 years must be exhausted. Cf. Fürer, Das
Lebensalter des Menschen usw., Beweis des Glaubens 1868 S. 97 f. 184 f.
Zöckler, Die Lehre vom Urstand des Menschen 1879 S. 244-288. Schanz,
Das Alter des Menschengeschlechts, Freiburg 1896. Büchner, ’s Menschen
Levensduur, holl. door Schwencke, Amst. 1892. Religion also
remains after the fall and receives a fixed form in offering, Genesis 3:3, prayer
and preaching, Genesis 4:26; culture takes a beginning with agriculture, cattlebreeding, city-building etc., Genesis 4:2, 17; arts and sciences come to
development, Genesis 4:20v. But this first period in the history of humanity
was also already soon characterized by the most dreadful godlessness;
corruptio optimi pessima; the extraordinary powers and gifts were misused
in the service of sin. With fratricide this period was introduced; the Cainites
separated themselves from the Sethites, applied themselves to the mastery
of the earth, Genesis 4:20v, and sought their strength in the sword, Genesis 4:24.
But only when Sethites and Cainites mingled, did godlessness rise to the
top; wickedness was manifold on the earth; the imagination of the thoughts
of man’s heart was every day only evil, Genesis 6:5; it was a period so full of
unrighteousness, as there later has never been one and only in the future of
the Son of man will return, Matthew 24:37. In the mighty flood this whole
generation perishes, except Noah’s family, which then becomes the origin
of a second humanity. The period after the flood differs essentially from the
preceding. From Adam to Noah nature, the plant- and animal-world,
humanity bore an entirely different character than after Noah. Strong and
richly provided with gifts, the world was in a certain sense left to itself; but
it soon appeared, that, if God did not powerfully intervene, the world would
perish in its own godlessness. Therefore with Noah another period begins.
The grace, which immediately after the fall revealed itself, now steps forth
more powerfully in the restraining of evil. God formally makes a covenant
with all his creatures. This covenant with Noah, Genesis 8:21, 22, 9:1-17,
indeed has its origin in God’s grace; it also stands in the closest connection
with the proper foedus gratiae, because it bears and prepares this; but it is
not identical with it. It is rather a foedus longanimitatis, made by God with
all men and even with all creatures. The curse over the earth is thereby
limited; nature is put under restraint; its destructive power is curbed; the
water is subdued in its dreadful violence; a regulated alternation of seasons
is introduced; the whole irrational nature is bound to fixed
ordinances, which are fixed in God’s covenant; and as sign and pledge the
rainbow is set in the clouds, Genesis 8:21, 22, 9:9-17. There appears a
humanity which, in comparison with the former, is much gentler in nature,
much smaller in strength, much shorter in duration. The blessing of
multiplication is expressly pronounced again, Genesis 9:1, the fear and dread
of man laid upon all animals, v. 2, the green herb and the flesh is given to
man for food, v. 3. The life of man is guaranteed by the institution of the
death penalty for murder of man, and therewith in principle of government,
v. 5, 6; and when later humanity at Babel’s tower-building forms the plan to
continue dwelling together and to found a world-empire, then God
frustrates that plan, causes humanity to disperse into peoples and languages,
and in that way also opposes the development and the outbreak of
godlessness. The grace of God thus after the flood steps forth much more
powerfully than before that time. To it is due the existence and the life of
humanity, the expansion and development of the peoples, the states and
societies, which have gradually formed, the religion and morality, which
even among the most savage peoples have not wholly perished, the arts and
sciences, which have risen high; everything, which after the fall also in
sinful man still is good in every domain, the whole justitia civilis, is fruit of
God’s general grace. God indeed let the Gentiles walk in their own ways,
Hd. 14:16, but He did not withdraw himself from them; He did not leave
himself without witness to them, determined their dwelling, was not far
from each one of them, revealed himself to them in the works of his hands,
man, coming into the world, John 1:9. The H. Spirit is author of all life,
power and virtue also among the Gentiles, Genesis 6:17, 7:15, Psalms 33:6,
104:30, 139:2, Job 32:8, Pred. 3:19. Through this grace, and under the
dispensation of this foedus naturae, humanity has been led before Christ
and prepared for his coming. There indeed falls in a good sense to speak of
an education of mankind by God. The capacity for redemption has been
maintained, the need for redemption has been awakened. Compare [211]
concerning the Noachic covenant the older litt. in M. Vitringa IV 286;
concerning the virtues of the Gentiles the litt., earlier part I 239 indicated
and in M. Vitringa III 333; concerning the late time of Christ’s coming,
Bonaventura, Brevil. IV 4. Petavius, de incarn. II c. 17. Jansen, Prael.
Theol. II 561; concerning the Divine education of humanity the works of
Lessing, Herder, van Heusde, Hofstede de Groot, Lotze, Mikrok. III 20 f.
Ritschl, Rechtf. u Vers. III2 282 f.; concerning general grace, the
significance of Heathendom, the preparation of Christ’s coming and the
fullness of the times my Rede over de Algem. Genade, Kampen 1894.
Kuyper’s art. in de Heraut 923v. D. Zahn, Die natürliche Moral, Gotha
1881. Schelling, Werke II 4 S. 74-118. A. Wuttke, Gesch. des Heid. Breslau
1852-53. Tholuck, Der sittl. Character des Heid. Werke VIII 1-91. Uhlhorn,
Der Kampf des Christ. mit dem Heid. c. 1-2. Rocholl, Die Fülle der Zeit,
Hann. 1872. Id. Philosophie der Gesch. Gött. I 1878 II 1893. Kahnis, die
Erfüllung der Zeiten, Leipzig 1877. Dorner, Gl. I 672 f. Thomasius, Christi
Person u. Werk I3 306. Frank, Chr. Wahrheit II2 35. Talbot, The preparation
in history for Christ, 4th essay in Lux Mundi ed. by Charles Gore 1892 p.
93-131. H. M. van Nes, De adventstijd, Rott. 1893.
7. Of an essentially different character was the preparation of salvation in
Israel. Yet the connection of the foedus gratiae and the foedus naturae, of
Israel and the nations, must not be lost from sight. Israel was taken from the
nations; it was not different and not better than other nations, surpassed
them even in stubbornness and rebelliousness, and was chosen only by
grace, Deuteronomy 7:7, 9:13, 32:5v. Jeremiah 5:23, Ezech. 16:3v. Amos 9:7, Matthew 11:21v.
Nor does the distinctive character of Israel’s religion lie in this, that all sorts
of elements occur in it which are not encountered in other religions; on the
contrary, there is nothing in Israel of which the analogy is not also to be
found elsewhere; circumcision, sabbath, feasts, sacrifice, prayer, priesthood,
temple, altar, ceremonies, morals, customs, political and social laws etc.,
occur also among other nations, and conversely institutions which first
arose after the fall, such as polygamy, slavery etc. are also found in Israel.
Even theophany, prophecy and miracle have in Heathendom their
analogy and caricature, cf. Schelling, Werke II 4 S. 119-151. It is not only
the right but also the duty of Old Test. scholarship, to bring all this to light.
But yet, on account of the affinity and connection, let the essential
difference not be overlooked. And that lies in grace, the gratia specialis,
which was unknown to the Heathens. All the religions of the Heathens are
self-willed and legalistic. They are all after-effects and degenerations of the
broken covenant of works. Man here always attempts himself to bring about
his salvation, by purification, asceticism, penance, sacrifice, observance of
law, ceremony etc. But all this is different under Israel. 1o First of all,
Jahveh is for Israel from the beginning also Elohim, the Creator of heaven
and earth. Even the oldest pieces according to the newer criticism express
this faith clearly, Genesis 2:4, Exodus 20:11. Never has the relation of God and
world in Israel been conceived otherwise than as that of Creator and
creature, Schultz, Altt. Theol.4 565. With this one dogma all paganism is in
principle banished; it is the foundation of true, pure religion. 2o This
Creator of heaven and earth is also the one who sustains and governs it, and
who in particular has voluntarily and graciously entered into a special
relationship with Israel. Israel is taken from the nations; Abraham was from
Shem, in whose generations the knowledge and service of God was
preserved the longest and the purest. The covenant with Abraham is
prepared in history from the days of Adam onward. Israel’s religion is built
upon the broad foundation of the original religion of humanity. But yet the
covenant with Abraham is a new and higher revelation, which again
proceeds wholly and solely from God. He takes the initiative in this
covenant. He establishes it, He chooses Abraham. By the wondrous birth of
Isaac He shows Himself to be both Israel’s Creator and Re-Creator. In
Israel’s religion it is not man who seeks God, but God who seeks man. 3o
This covenant with the fathers remains, even when it later at Sinai assumes
another form with Israel; it is the foundation and core also of the Sinaitic
covenant, Exodus 2:24, Deuteronomy 7:8. The promise has not been nullified by the
law, which came later, Galatians 3:17. The covenant with Israel was essentially
no other than that with Abraham. Just as God first voluntarily and
graciously gives Himself to Abraham, without any of his merits, as a
shield and reward, as a God for him and his seed, and now on that basis also
calls Abraham to an upright walk before His face, so it is also God who
chooses the people of Israel, delivers them from Egypt, and gives Himself
to that people and now on that basis also obligates Israel as a people to be
holy and to be His people. The covenant at Sinai is and remains in essence a
covenant of grace. I am the Lord your God, who have led you out of the
land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage, Exodus 20:2, that is the preface and
the foundation of the law, that is the essence of the covenant of grace. The
Lord is Israel’s God prior to and apart from all worthiness of Israel and He
remains that eternally. It is an eternal covenant, which cannot be destroyed
even by any sins and iniquities on Israel’s side, Deuteronomy 4:31, 32:26v., Richt.
benefits bestowed by God upon Israel in His covenant are the same as those
to Abraham but further elaborated and specialized. Already Genesis 3:15
contains in germ the whole covenant and all the benefits of grace. God
breaks the covenant concluded by man with Satan, sets enmity between the
two, brings man over to His side and promises him the triumph over the
hostile power. The one great promise to Abraham is: I will be your God, and
you and your seed shall be my people, Genesis 17:8. And this is the principal
content also of God’s covenant with Israel. God is Israel’s God and Israel is
His people, Exodus 19:6, 29:46 etc.; and therefore Israel receives all kinds of
blessings, not only temporal, such as the land Canaan, fruitfulness of
marriage, a long life, prosperity and welfare, victory over the enemies, but
also spiritual and eternal, such as God’s dwelling among them, Exodus 29:45,
Leviticus 26:12; the forgiveness of sins, Exodus 20:6, 34:7, Numbers 14:18, Deuteronomy 4:31,
Amos 3:1, 2 etc.; the sanctification, Exodus 19:6, Leviticus 11:44, 19:2, etc. 5o All
these benefits, however, are not set before the eyes in the O. Test. clearly
and distinctly as in the N. Test. They would then not be understood and
comprehended in their spiritual nature. The natural is first, afterward the
spiritual. All spiritual and eternal benefits are therefore under Israel clothed
in sensible forms. The forgiveness of sins is bound to sacrifices of
animals. The dwelling of God among Israel is symbolized in the temple on
Zion. The sonship of Israel has in the first place a theocratic, and the
expression people of God not only a religious but also a national meaning.
Sanctification in the ethical sense is symbolized in the Levitical, ceremonial
purity. Eternal life hides itself for the Israelite consciousness in the forms of
a long life on earth. Foolish it would be to suppose that therefore those
benefits of forgiveness and sanctification, of regeneration and eternal life
also objectively did not exist in the days of the O. T. They were indeed also
then bestowed by Christ, who is eternally the same. But the consciousness
and the enjoyment of those benefits was in the O. T. far from as rich as in
the days of the N. T. And in order that this consciousness of the pious might
gradually in the course of time be opened up to the richness of God’s
benefits, to that end the covenant of grace under Israel assumed such a
peculiar, symbolic form. Religion under Israel attaches itself to the religious
forms occurring among all nations of sacrifice, altar, temple, priesthood,
ceremonies etc.; the spiritual and eternal wraps itself in the garment of the
natural and temporal; God Himself, who is Elohim, Creator of heaven and
earth, descends as Jahveh, as God of the covenant, to the creature, enters
into history, assumes human language and affections and forms, in order
thus to communicate Himself with all His spiritual blessings to man and to
prepare His incarnation, His enduring and eternal dwelling in humanity.
Indeed we would not even have had words to name the spiritual, if that
spiritual had not first revealed itself in the form of the natural. The spiritual
we, sensible creatures, can after all never express otherwise than
analogically. If therefore the eternal had not been brought within our reach
in the temporal, if God had not become man, then His thoughts also could
not have been communicated to us in our language in Holy Scripture. God
would then have remained eternally unknowable to us, and we would
always have had to be silent about Him. 6o Just as Abraham, when God
binds Himself to him, is obligated to a walk before His face, so Israel as a
people is also by God’s covenant admonished to a new obedience.
The whole law, which the covenant of grace at Sinai takes into its service,
intends to cause Israel to walk in the way of the covenant. It is only an
explication of the one word to Abraham: walk before my face and be
upright, and therefore just as little an overthrow of the covenant of grace
and an establishment of the covenant of works, as this word spoken to
Abraham. The law of Moses is therefore not opposed to grace but
subservient to it and is thus by Israel’s pious also time and again understood
and praised. But considered apart and detached from the covenant of grace,
then it was indeed a letter that killed, a ministry of condemnation. Now the
covenant of grace in the days of the O. T. also took the law into its service
for this purpose, that it might awaken the consciousness of sin, increase the
need for deliverance, strengthen the expectation of a still richer revelation
of God’s grace. From that side Paul especially views the O. T. dispensation
of the covenant of grace. And then he says that Israel, as an underage child
placed under the care of the law, had to be led to Christ, Romans 10:4, Galatians 2:23v., 4:1v., and that in connection therewith sin would be increased, the
unworthiness of works for justification and the necessity of faith would be
seen, Romans 4:15, 5:20, 7:7v., 8:3, Galatians 3:19. The law thus on the one hand
stood in the service of the covenant of grace, it was not a disguised
covenant of works, it did not intend that man by his own works would
obtain his justification. But on the other hand it nevertheless intended to
prepare a higher, better dispensation of that same covenant of grace, in
whose service it stood, in the fullness of time. The impossibility of keeping
the Sinaitic covenant and of satisfying the demands of the law made
another, better dispensation of the covenant of grace necessary. The eternal
covenant of grace is by the imperfection of the temporal form which it
assumed under Israel provoked to a higher revelation. Sin has become
greater, in order that grace might be all the more abundant. Christ could not
immediately become man after the fall and grace could not immediately
reveal itself in all its richness. Preparation and education were necessary.
Non decuit a principio humani generis ante peccatum Deum incarnari, cum
non detur medicina nisi infirmis; nec statim post peccatum, ut homo
per peccatum humiliatus recognosceret se liberatore indigere: sed in
plenitudine temporis quod ab aeterno disposuit, Thomas, S. Th. III qu. 1 art.
5. The necessity of this education and preparation does not lie objectively in
God, as if He were changeable; not in Christ, as if He were not yesterday
and today and eternally the same; not in the spiritual benefits, as if they did
not exist and could not formerly be communicated by God. But it lies
subjectively in the condition of the human race, which precisely as a race
had to be saved, and therefore had to be prepared and educated gradually
for salvation in Christ, Calv. Inst. II 11, 13. 14. Therefore Christ is truly the
turning point of the ages, the cross the center of world history. First
everything is led toward the cross, thereafter everything is derived from the
cross. 7o When then also the fullness of time has come and Christ has
accomplished His work on earth, the covenant of grace passes over into a
higher dispensation. The believers in Israel knew indeed that the Sinaitic
dispensation was only temporary, and therefore looked longingly toward the
day of the N. Covenant. And Jesus and the apostles, who thus read the O.
T., saw therein the same covenant of grace with the same benefits, which
now came fully to light. Old and New Testament are in essence one
covenant, Luke 1:68-79, Hd. 2:39, 3:25; they have one gospel, Romans 1:2,
Galatians 3:8, Hebr. 4:2, 6, 2 Timothy 3:15; one Mediator, namely Christ, who also
existed in the days of the O. T., John 1:1, 14, 8:58, Romans 8:3, 2 Corinthians 8:9,
Galatians 4:4, Philippians 2:6 etc., exercised His mediatorial office, John 8:56, 1 Corinthians 10:4, 1 Petr. 1:11, 3:19, Hebr. 13:8 and is the only Mediator for all men and
in all times, John 14:6, Hd. 4:12, 1 Timothy 2:5; one faith as the way to
same promises and benefits of God’s communion, 2 Corinthians 6:16, Op. 21:3,
forgiveness and justification, Hd. 10:43, Romans 4:22, eternal life, Matthew 22:32,
Galatians 3:18, Hebr. 9:15, 11:10 etc. The way was the same on which the
believers in O. and N. T. walked, but the light differed by which they
walked, Calvin on Galatians 3:23. Therefore with the unity there is also
distinction. Old and New Testament stand as different dispensations of the
same covenant of grace over against each other as promise and
fulfillment, Hd. 13:32, Romans 1:2, as shadow and body, Colossians 2:17, as letter
that kills and as Spirit that makes alive, 2 Corinthians 3:6v., as bondage and
freedom, Romans 8:15, Galatians 4:1v., 22v., Colossians 2:20, Hebr. 12:18v., as particular
8o The new in the New Testament is thus the falling away of the notarbitrary, but nevertheless temporary, sensible, national forms, under which
the one and the same grace in the old day was revealed. The new
dispensation in a certain sense already begins when with the birth of John
the Baptist and of Jesus the Old Test. promises begin to be fulfilled. Yet the
old dispensation remained in force until the death of Christ. Jesus Himself
was an Israelite, fulfilled all righteousness and still turned only to the lost
sheep of the house of Israel. But at His death the veil is torn, Matthew 27:51, the
testator dies, Hebr. 9:15-17, the New Testament is founded in His blood,
Matthew 26:28, the handwriting of the law that was against us is blotted out, Colossians 2:14, the middle wall of partition is broken down, Ef. 2:14 etc. In fact the
old dispensation may long continue to have effects, in law it is abolished.
Or better still, nothing is abolished, but the fruit is ripe and breaks through
the husk; the church, which as a little child was carried in Israel’s mother’s
womb, is born to an own independent life and receives in the Holy Spirit an
own, immanent principle of life; the sun of righteousness has risen to the
zenith of heaven and shines over all nations; law and prophets are fulfilled
and have in Christ as their end and goal reached their destination. The law
was given through Moses, but grace and truth has come through Jesus
Christ, John 1:14; He is the truth, John 14:6, the body, Colossians 2:17, in whom all
promises and shadows are realized. In Him everything is fulfilled. He is the
true prophet, priest and king; the genuine servant of the Lord, the true
ἱ λαστηριον, Romans 3:25, the true sacrifice, Ef. 5:2, the true circumcision,
Colossians 2:11, the true passover, 1 Corinthians 5:7, and therefore His congregation is
the true seed of Abraham, the true Israel, the true people of God, Matthew 1:21,
Ef. 2:22, 2 Thessalonians 2:4, Hebr. 8:2, 9, the true Zion and Jerusalem, Galatians 4:26,
Hebr. 12:22, her spiritual sacrifice the true religion, John 4:24, Romans 12:1,
Philippians 3:3, 4:18 etc. Nothing of the Old is lost in the New Testament, but
everything is fulfilled, is completed, reaches its maturity and now brings
forth from the temporal envelope the eternal kernel into view. It is not so
that under Israel there were a real temple and sacrifice and priesthood etc.,
and that all these have now disappeared. No, rather the reverse, under Israel
there was of all that only the shadow, now however there is the body itself.
The things that are seen are temporal, but the things that are not seen are
eternal.
8. This foedus gratiae, which through various dispensations has now been
fully realized in the N. T., from the first moment of its revelation onward
was and is still always on all sides surrounded and borne by the foedus
naturae, which God has established with all creatures. The gratia specialis is
indeed essentially distinct from the gratia communis, but nevertheless
stands in the closest connection with it. For, although the covenant with
Noah, by way of distinction, is called foedus naturae, for that reason it has
nevertheless not flowed forth from God’s nature or been given with the
nature of things; it also rests on grace, has proceeded from God’s
longsuffering, and bestows all natural benefits and blessings out of God’s
general goodness; it is a covenant of grace in a broader sense. Further, it is
the Father, who not apart from the Son but specifically through the Logos
and the Spirit works all powers and gifts in nature and unregenerate
and this Spirit, who dwell and work in all creatures and men, are the same,
who as Christ and as Spirit of Christ are the acquirer and applier of all
benefits in the covenant of grace. Father, Son, and Spirit thus in the foedus
naturae prepare the foedus gratiae and, as it were, repeatedly reach back
from the foedus gratiae into the foedus naturae.
The essential nature of the covenant of grace therefore consists in this,
that it flows forth from God’s special grace and has as its content nothing
but grace, unmerited and forfeited blessings. In so far it is distinct in
its essence from the foedus operum established before the fall but broken by
the fall. Certainly God was also not obliged to establish the covenant of
works; it is condescending goodness, and thus also grace in a general sense,
which caused Him to bestow this covenant upon man; He then also
established it and determined all its parts; it is His ordinance and institution.
But in that covenant of works God nevertheless came to man with the
demand of obedience and promised him, first in that way and after that
accomplished obedience, to grant him the salvation of heaven, eternal life,
the enjoyment of His beholding. The covenant of works thus reckoned with
the free will of man, it rested in part in man, and therefore it was shaky and
unstable. In fact it has then also been broken, not by God but by man. God
adheres to the rule that whoever keeps the law shall receive eternal life. He
says that in His law, He testifies it in everyone’s conscience, He makes this
word good in Christ. But man has broken the covenant of works; on his part
he can now no longer acquire life by keeping the law; by the works of the
law no flesh can be justified. Therefore God, in distinction from and in
opposition to the covenant of works, has established another, better
covenant, not a legalistic, but an evangelical covenant. But He has
established this not with one who was merely man, but with the man Christ
Jesus, who was His own, only-begotten, much-beloved Son. And in this
one, who partakes of the Divine nature and of the Divine attributes, it lies
fixed unshakably. It can no longer be broken, it is an eternal covenant. It
does not rest in any work of man, but only in the good pleasure of God, in
the work of the Mediator, in the H. Spirit, who remains eternally. It is
dependent on no condition of man, it bestows no gift on any merit, it does
not wait for any fulfillment of the law on man’s side. It is from and through
and unto grace. God Himself is the only and eternal, the faithful and true, in
whom it rests; who establishes it, maintains it, carries it out, completes it;
the covenant of grace is the Divine work par excellence, His work alone,
His work entirely. All boasting is here excluded for man, but all glory
belongs to Father, Son and H. Spirit. [220]
Yet by this the full content of the covenant of grace has not yet been
brought to light. To that end the covenant of grace must be brought to light
not only in its distinctness from but also in its kinship with the covenant of
works. After the breach of the covenant of works God did not immediately
devise a wholly different covenant, which has nothing to do with the former
and bears an entirely different character. That cannot be the case, because
God is unchangeable, because the demand set for man in the covenant of
works is no whim and no arbitrariness, because the image of God, the law,
religion in their essence can be only one, because grace cannot or may not
nullify nature, faith the law. And it is not so either. The covenant of grace is
not, as Coccejus taught, the successive abolition; it is rather the fulfilment
and restoration of the covenant of works. Gratia reparat et perficit naturam.
God holds to the demand that only in the way of obedience eternal life is to
be obtained; and if man transgresses his law, then that demand is increased
with another, namely, that the transgression must be expiated by
punishment. After the fall God thus has a double demand upon man, that of
the claim for punishment for the evil committed and that of perfect
obedience to his law, satisfactio and obedientia. Arminius thought in a letter
to Uytenbogaerdt that man before the fall was indeed obligated to
obedience but now after the fall was obligated only to punishment, because
the contract was broken and thus the party was released from his obligation.
But obedience to God’s law is indeed cast in the covenant of works in a
particular form and applied to a particular end, namely, to the obtaining of
eternal life, yet it is in itself grounded in the nature of man and therefore an
obligation from which man can never be released. Otherwise by one
transgression he could thereafter release himself from keeping all God’s
commandments, and thus from all sins and punishments. Scripture therefore
also pronounces God’s judgment over the sinner not only, Deuteronomy 27:26, Galatians 3:10, Romans 6:23, Hebr. 10:27, but also maintains for man after the fall the
demand for perfect obedience as the way to eternal life, Leviticus 18:5, Mt.
The difference between the covenant of works and the covenant of grace
therefore consists herein [221], that God in the latter appears not with a
single but with a double demand, and that with that double demand He
comes not to humanity in Adam but to humanity in Christ. The foedus
operum and the foedus gratiae differ chiefly in this, that Adam is exchanged
for and replaced by Christ. Paul says in Galatians 3:16-18, that the covenant with
Abraham has not been annulled by the law that came in later, but in fact had
reference to and essentially rested in Christ, who has fulfilled every promise
and bestowed the inheritance. Still further he goes back in Romans 5:12-21
and 1 Corinthians 15:22, 45-49; from Adam sin and death flow to humanity, from
Christ righteousness and life flow to it. Christ is the second and last Adam,
who restores and takes over what the first has corrupted and left behind, the
mediator of the covenant of grace, the head of the new humanity. Reformed
theology has brought this thought of Scripture to its due in its doctrine of
the covenant better than any other. The course of development was in brief
this, that first, for the maintenance of the essential unity of Old and New
Testament, the doctrine of the covenant of grace arose; that accordingly also
the relation of God and man before the fall was presented as a covenant,
and indeed as a covenant of works; that reflection on the agreement and the
difference between the covenant of works and the covenant of grace led to
the insight that the covenant of grace, insofar as it was established with
Christ, was essentially a covenant of works; that therefore in the covenant
of grace again a distinction had to be made between the covenant, as it was
established with Christ from eternity (pactum salutis, counsel of peace) and
the covenant, as it is established in time with the elect or believers as the
execution of that counsel of peace; and that finally this distinction in turn
was abolished, counsel of peace and covenant of grace were conceived as
essentially one, and the covenant of grace itself was transferred into
eternity, as being established there with Christ and in Him with all His own.
The last point, the identification of counsel of peace and covenant of grace,
first came to development in England, with Rollock, Preston, Blake, Westm.
Catech.major, cf. Vos, De verbondsleer in de Geref. theol. 1891 bl. 27v.,
further Th. Boston, A consideration of the covenant of grace, from the
eng. by Al. Comrie 1741 and then taken over from the English by Comrie,
Brahe, Explanation of Ps. 89, preface bl. V-XXXVI e. a., cf. also Shedd,
Dogm. Theol. II 360. Many, however, continued to cherish objections
against this identification, such as Turretinus, Theol. El. XII 2, 12. Witsius,
Oec. foed. II 2, 1. Misc. Sacra II 820-824. R. Schutte, Two treatises on
God's testament and covenant 1785 bl. 143v. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 358.
There is also indeed a distinction between pactum salutis and foedus
gratiae; in the former Christ is surety and head, in the latter mediator; the
former remains limited to Christ and requires of Him the bearing of the
punishment and the fulfilling of the law in the place of the elect, the latter
extends over and through Christ to human beings and requires of them faith
and repentance, which Christ has not fulfilled in our place or been able to
fulfill; the former concerns the acquisition of salvation, is eternal and
knows no history, the latter deals with the application of salvation, takes a
beginning in time and has distinct dispensations. But yet, with this
distinction, the connection and the unity must not be overlooked. There are
in Scripture only two covenants, two ways for man to heaven, namely the
covenant of works and the covenant of grace. The covenant of works is the
way to heaven for the unfallen, the covenant of grace that for fallen man.
The covenant of works was concluded with humanity in Adam, the
covenant of grace in Christ; He and He alone is the Head substituting for
and representing humanity. If then it is said in Scripture that the covenant of
grace has been established with Adam, Noah, Abraham, Israel etc., then this
must not be understood in such a way as if they were the actual parties and
heads in this covenant. No, Christ was then and now, in O. and N.
Testament the head, the party in the covenant of grace, and through his
administration it came to the patriarchs and to Israel. He who existed from
eternity and had set himself as surety, also immediately after the fall
actually appeared as prophet, priest and king, as second Adam, as head and
representative of fallen humanity. In the covenants with Adam, Noah,
Abraham, David etc. He is the mediator, the surety, who stands surety for
the realization of the covenant, who realizes it by his Spirit in the hearts,
who administers it to sinners, who bestows its benefits, who receives
his own into the covenant. The whole covenant is entrusted to Him from the
beginning to the end; only in Him does it lie fixed; just as the Father has
ordained the kingdom for Him, so He ordains it for those who have been
given to Him; He distributes the benefits acquired by Him as an inheritance.
The covenant is firm as a testament, it is a foedus testamentarium and a
testamentum foederale. It is relatively indifferent and touches no principle,
whether one places the duality or the unity of pactum salutis and foedus
gratiae in the foreground; provided only it stands firm that in the pactum
salutis Christ can never for one moment be thought of apart from his own,
nor also in the foedus gratiae can the believers for a single moment be
considered outside Christ. It is in both the Christus mysticus, Zanchius, Op.
II 400 sq. Mastricht, Theol. V 1, 4, Christ as the second Adam, who appears
as the acting party. Adam and Abraham and David etc. may be types, but
the antitype is Christ. And since Adam already before the fall was a type of
Christ, so the covenant of grace was not first prepared by Noah and
Abraham, and not first by the covenant of grace with Adam but already in
and through the covenant of works. God, who knows and determines all
things and also included the breach of the covenant of works in his counsel,
has already at the creation of Adam and at the institution of the covenant of
works reckoned with the Christ and with his covenant of grace, part II 546.
9. Thus the doctrine of the covenant maintains, in a wonderfully beautiful
way, God’s sovereignty in the whole work of salvation. It far surpasses the
covenant of works, as far as Christ surpasses Adam. Much more clearly
than in creation, God’s threefold being comes to revelation in re-creation. It
is the Father who purposes and wills redemption; it is the Son who stands
surety for it and actually acquires it; it is the Spirit who works it out and
applies it. And in that whole work of salvation, from beginning to end,
nothing of man enters in. It is God’s work wholly and alone; it is pure grace
and unmerited salvation. But all the more it is important to note that this
doctrine of the covenant, notwithstanding that it, or rather precisely because
it, in the work of salvation so purely and fully maintains God’s
sovereignty, at the same time causes the rational and moral nature of man to
come into its own in so beautiful a way. With the covenant of works this has
already been set forth at length, part II 553. But in the covenant of grace
this comes out even more strikingly. In this respect it is greatly distinct from
election. Indeed, the two are not so distinct that election is particular and the
covenant of grace universal, that the former denies free will and the latter
teaches or presupposes it, that the latter retracts what the former confesses.
But they do differ in such a way that in election man is absolutely passive,
but in the covenant of grace he also appears as active. Election says simply
and without more who are elect and will infallibly obtain salvation; the
covenant of grace describes the way along which these elect will reach their
destination; it is the channel in which the stream of election moves onward
toward eternity. Christ indeed appears in the covenant of grace as head and
representative of his own, but he does not efface and destroy them. He
stands surety for them, but in such a way that they also themselves, taught
and enabled by his Spirit, consciously and voluntarily consent in the
covenant. The covenant of grace is indeed concluded with Christ, but it
extends over and through him also to his own and takes these wholly and
entirely, body and soul, into itself. The pactum salutis extends to a foedus
gratiae; the head of the covenant of grace is at the same time its mediator.
And therefore, immediately at its promulgation, it also comes forward with
the demand of faith and repentance, Mark 1:15. In the first period the
Reformed spoke freely of conditions of the covenant. Calvin, Inst. IV 15,
17, on Genesis 15:6, 17:4, Matthew 3:7, 9, Gomarus, de foedere, Maresius, Syst.
Theol. VIII 5, Trigland, Antopologia c. 18, Preface of the Statenvert. to the
N. Test., Voetius, Disp. V 272. 273 etc. But when the nature of the covenant
of grace was thought through more deeply and had to be defended against
Roman Catholics, Lutherans, and Remonstrants, many felt objections to
that, Olevianus, Wezen des genadeverbonds I 13. 14. Junius, Disp. Theol.
Cloppenburg, de foedere § 29. Witsius, Oec. foed. III 1, 8-16. Franken,
Kern c. 23. Brakel, Red. Godsd. XVI 17. Comrie, Heid. Catech. I 352
etc., cf. M. Vitringa IV 224, in England especially also the Antinomians,
Tobias Crisp and others, against whom R. Baxter, Dan. Williams and others
came forward.
Properly speaking, in the foedus gratiae, i.e. in the gospel, which is the
proclamation of the covenant of grace, there are no demands and no
conditions. For God gives what He demands; Christ has accomplished
everything and has also, regeneration, faith, and conversion, although He
did not accomplish them in our place, nevertheless acquired them for us;
and the H. Spirit applies them. But nevertheless the covenant of grace, in its
administration through Christ, assumes this demanding, conditional form, in
order to acknowledge man in his rational and moral nature, in order also, as
fallen, still to treat him as created after God’s image, in order also on this
highest terrain, where it concerns eternal salvation and eternal perdition, to
set him responsible and inexcusable, in order to cause him with
consciousness and freedom to enter into this covenant and to break with sin.
The covenant of grace is therefore indeed monopleuric, it proceeds from
God; He has designed and established it. He maintains and realizes it; it is a
work of God triune and completely finished within the three persons
mutually. But it is destined to become dupleuric, to be, in the power of God,
consciously and voluntarily accepted and preserved by man. This is the will
of God, which in the covenant comes to light so clearly and so beautifully,
that the work of grace may be clearly reflected in human consciousness, and
may arouse man’s will to vigorous energy. The covenant of grace does not
kill man, and does not treat him as a stick and block; but it takes up man
wholly and entirely with all his faculties and powers, as to soul and body,
for time and eternity; it encompasses him wholly, does not destroy his
power but removes his impotence; does not kill his will but makes it free
from sin; does not benumb his consciousness but delivers it from darkness;
it recreates the whole man and then causes him, renewed by grace, free and
independent, with his whole soul and spirit and body, to love God and to
devote himself to Him. The covenant of grace expresses that God’s honor
and glory are obtained not at the expense but for the benefit of man and in
the recreation of the whole man, in his illumined consciousness and in
his restored freedom celebrates its triumphs.
At the same time, thereby yet another thought is given, which in the
covenant of grace, in distinction from election, comes to light. In election
the elect appear as so many persons known to God by name; indeed they
are chosen in Christ and form an organism with Him as their Head. But yet
this does not in election come clearly and strongly to the foreground. Quite
otherwise is this in the covenant of grace. Here Christ appears as the
substitute of Adam, as the second Head of the human race. Here Christ
stands with His church in connection with humanity under Adam. Election
chiefly regards the individuals, and in itself it left open the possibility that
the elect, each by himself, individualistically, by leaps, would be taken out
of the human race, regenerated, and transferred to heaven. But the covenant
of grace says that that election is realized in a wholly different way. It
expresses the deep, beautiful truth, that Adam has been replaced by Christ;
that humanity, which fell in the first, is restored in the second; that not some
loose individuals are saved but that in the elect under Christ the organism of
humanity and of the world itself is saved; that not only the persons of the
elect but also, so to speak, the structure of the organism, which they form in
Christ, is derived from the original creation in Adam. Therefore the
covenant of grace also does not leap from individual to individual, but it
continues itself organically and historically. It runs through a history, and
has various dispensations. It adapts itself to the times and occasions,
determined by the Father as Creator and Preserver. It is never concluded
with a single person alone but then always also therein with his seed; it is a
covenant from generations to generations. It never comprises the person of
the believer alone, in the abstract, but that person concretely, as he
historically exists and lives, thus not him alone, but also everything that is
his; him not for his person alone but him also as father or mother, as parent
or child, with all that is his, with his family, with his money and his goods,
with his influence and power, with his office and position, with his
understanding and his heart, with his science and art, with his life in
society and state. The covenant of grace is the organization of the new
humanity under Christ as its Head, which connects itself to the order of
creation, reaches back into it, and takes up into itself the whole of that
creation qualitatively and intensively. It therefore speaks for itself, that the
covenant of grace temporally, in this earthly administration and
dispensation, also takes up into itself such as inwardly remain unbelieving
and are not partakers of the spiritual benefits. The Reformed, with a view to
this, made a distinction between an inward and an outward covenant,
Mastricht V 1, 28; or between covenant and covenant-dispensation,
Olevianus, Wezen des Genadeverbonds I 2, Alting, Theol. catech. p. 33,
Turretinus, Theol. El. XII 6, 5; or between an absolute and a conditional
covenant, Maresius, Theol. syst. VIII 7, Koelman, Historie der Labadisten
bl. 566; indeed some, such as Blake with Dr. Vos, De Verbondsleer bl. 12,
45, Stoddard at Northampton with Edwards, Works I 34, J. Schuts, Het
verbond der genade verduisterd 1713 and Verhandeling over het H.
Avondm. 1722, M. Swarte 1740, R. Schutte, Tweetal verhandelingen 1785
e. a. went so far, that they assumed two covenants, the one with the elect
and true believers, the other with the not sincerely believing, outward
members of the church, and thereby sought to justify the membership of the
latter and their access to the Lord’s Supper. But others, such as Edwards,
Works 185-295, Koelman, Historie der Labadisten bl. 95v., Appelius, De
Herv. Leer 1769, Vitringa, Obs. Sacr. II c. 6, Brakel, Red. Godsd. c. 16,
Moor V 470, also Ds. de Herder, cf. Heraut 937 e. a. rightly protested
against this. The covenant of grace is one; and its outward and inward side,
although here on earth never coinciding, cannot and may not be detached
from one another and placed alongside each other. There are very certainly
evil branches on the vine, there is chaff among the wheat, there are in a
great house golden and earthen vessels, Matthew 3:12, 13:29, John 15:2, 2 Timothy 2:20. But we lack the right and the power, to make a separation between the
two; God himself will do that in the day of harvest. So long as they,
according to the judgment of love, walk in the way of the covenant, they are
to be regarded and treated as covenant-partners. Although not de foedere,
they are nevertheless in foedere and will once be judged as such.
They are here on earth in all manner of ways connected with the elect; and
the elect, because they are members of the Adamic humanity, as an
organism cannot otherwise be gathered under Christ as their Head into one,
than in the way of the covenant.
. The covenant of grace is distinguished from the covenant of works
also in this, that it has a mediator, not of union but of reconciliation, in
order to restore again the broken communion between God and man. Also
with this doctrine of a mediatorship Holy Scripture does not stand alone,
but is supported and confirmed on all sides by the analogies which occur
thereof in the religions among the peoples. In general the words and deeds
of great men are of the richest significance for the history and the life of the
peoples; but specifically this holds true in the religious sphere. Almost
everywhere there occur holy persons, who effect and maintain communion
with God for others. Prophets appear as interpreters of the Deity and make
known its will; priests represent men in their approach to God, convey their
sacrifices and prayers and distribute to them God’s blessing; kings are many
times regarded as sons of the gods, as bearers of their wisdom and power.
The origin of all these holy persons is not related to us by history; but their
universality proves that we have here to do with a phenomenon that is not
accidental but is connected with the essence of religion itself and with a
## § 41. The Person of the Mediator.
deep need of humanity. Many historical religions are moreover connected to
the names of particular founders, who are then later raised above the rank of
ordinary men, or even, as in Buddhism, wholly and entirely deified;
apotheosis and incarnation occur almost in all religions. The distinction that
Tiele makes between theocratic and theanthropic religions is also according
to his own admission not strictly to be maintained and only a
difference of more or less, Introduction to the science of religion. Amst.
1897 p. 141v., 221v. Finally there is even in all religions not only in general
an expectation that evil will once be overcome by good, but more than once
that expectation also attaches itself to a particular person, such as e.g. to
Krishna in the Indian and Baldur in the Norse religion. Also the myth of
Heracles, the well-known statement of Plato about the righteous man in
Rep. VII, the fourth eclogue of Vergil are in this respect noteworthy. In its
most beautiful and noblest expressions Heathendom points unconsciously
toward Christianity; cf. part I 238-240 and furthermore also still Lamennais,
Essai sur l’indifférence III 408 s. Tholuck, Lehre v. d. Sünde, 4te Beilage.
R. Ch. Trench, The Hulsean Lectures for 1845. 1846. 4th ed. Cambr. 1859
p. 153: Christ the desire of all nations or the unconscious prophecies of
Heathendom. Pfleiderer, Religionsphilos.3 1896 S. 714 f.
But what among the Heathen was no more than an unconscious and
indeterminate longing, that became in Israel the object of a firm faith and
ardent hope. God gave his promises to that people. He did not let humanity
begin its history without the hope that the woman’s seed would one day
triumph over the serpent’s seed. Yes, it has been Christ himself who, as
Angel of the covenant, led the people of God in the day of the O. T.,
through Israel prepared his own coming in the flesh, and by his Spirit
caused his own image to be drawn in history and prophecy, John 5:39, 1
Petr. 1:11, Op. 19:10. Therefore the O. T. also does not contain a few, selfcontained Messianic texts, which in a Christology of the O. T. are
atomistically gathered together; but the whole O. T. dispensation with its
persons and events, its offices and institutions, its laws and ceremonies is a
pointing and movement toward the fulfilment in the N. T. There is a
“Symbolik der Schöpfung”, a typology in nature, which, as is evident from
Jesus’ parables, attains its realization in him and in his kingdom. There is an
unconscious expectation and hope in the religion and in the history of the
peoples, which comes to its truth in Christianity. There is a direct and
intentional preparation and foreshadowing of the λογικη λατρεια in the
institutions and events of the O. T. Temple and altar, priest and
offering, Zion and Jerusalem, prophet and king, all are examples and
shadows of a higher, spiritual, true reality. And especially the kingship
received under Israel such a typical significance. The theocratic king, who
was embodied especially in David with his humble origin, his rich lifeexperience, his noble nature, his deep feeling, his poetic disposition, his
great gifts, his unbroken courage, his brilliant victories, Smend, Altt. Rel.
Gesch. 58, was a son of God, 2 Samuel 7:14, Psalms 2:6, 7, Psalms 89:27, the
anointed one par excellence, Psalms 2:2, 18:51, to whom all kinds of bodily and
spiritual blessings were wished, Psalms 2:8v., 21, 45, 72, who was even
addressed as Elohim, Psalms 45:7. The king is bearer of the highest, of the
divine dignity on earth. In David the theocratic king found his purest image;
therefore the kingship will also remain in his house, 2 Samuel 7:8-16. This
promise of God to David is then the foundation, the centre of all subsequent
expectation and prophecy. The prophecy, which is added to the typology for
explanation, looks from the past and present toward the future and
delineates the expected Davidide ever more clearly in his person and work.
The opinion, e.g. of Paul Volz, Die vorexilische Jahweprophetie und der
Messias, Göttingen 1897, that the Messianic idea is foreign to the pre-exilic
prophets, is refuted by the facts and can be maintained only by an arbitrary
criticism. In proportion as the kingship in Israel and Judah corresponded
less to its idea, prophecy took up the promise of 2 Sam. 7 and clung fast to
come forth from David’s house, when this shall have fallen into lowliness,
been thrust from the throne, become like a hewn-down stump, Jes. 11:1, 2,
Mich. 5:1, 2, Ezech. 17:22; God will cause him to spring forth as a shoot
from David’s house, Jeremiah 23:5, 6, 33:14-17, so that he even bears the name
of Shoot, Zach. 3:8, 6:12. But despite his humble birth, he will nevertheless
be the genuine, true, theocratic king. Although originating from the small,
despised Bethlehem, where the Davidic royal house has its origin and,
driven out of dominion, withdraws, Mich. 5:2, cf. 3:12, 4:9, 14, the
Messiah will nevertheless be a Ruler over Israel, whose goings forth and
origins as Ruler, from God, are all from of old, from the days of eternity,
deel II 243. He is given by God, is an eternal king, bears the names of
Wonderful Counsellor, mighty God, cf. 10:21, Deuteronomy 10:17, Jeremiah 32:18,
everlasting Father (for his people), Prince of Peace, Jes. 9:5, 6, is anointed
with the Spirit of wisdom and of understanding, of counsel and of might, of
knowledge and fear of the Lord, 11:5, is laid as a tried precious cornerstone
in Zion, 28:16, is a righteous, victorious, gentle and therefore riding on a
she-ass king, who is not proud of his power but is supported by God, Jeremiah 33:17, 20, 22, 26, Zach. 9:9v., whom the people call and acknowledge as
the Lord our righteousness, Jeremiah 23:6, cf. 33:16, where Jerusalem is so called
as the city in which Ihvh causes his righteousness to dwell; who will be a
hero like David and whose house will be like God, like the Angel of God,
who once went before Israel’s host at the exodus, Zach. 12:8, cf. Malachi 3:1,
who will reign eternally, establish a kingdom of righteousness, peace and
prosperity, and will extend his dominion also over the Heathen, to the ends
of the earth, Ps. 2, 45, 72, Ezech. 37:25, Zach. 6:13, 9:10 etc. This glorious
Messianic image is then further completed by the fact that this future king is
also depicted as prophet and priest. To be sure, these features do not come
to the foreground, for in the kingdom of God the Spirit of God will be
poured out upon all, Joël 2:28, Zach. 12:10, 13:2v., Jeremiah 31:34, and all the
people will be priestly and holy to the Lord, Jes. 35:8, Joël 3:17, Zach.
14:20, 21; but nevertheless the Messiah is also presented as prophet, upon
whom in a special measure the Spirit of the Lord rests, and who will bring a
glad message to Israel and the Heathen, Deuteronomy 18:15, Jes. 11:2, Jes. 40-66,
Malachi 4:5; and he will unite the priestly and the royal dignity in himself, Jeremiah 30:21, Zach. 3, 6:13, Ps. 110. In the servant of the Lord in Isaiah all three
offices clearly come to light; he is priest, who by his suffering atones for the
sins of his people, he is prophet, who anointed with God’s Spirit proclaims
the acceptable year of the Lord, he is king, who is glorified and enjoys the
fruit of his labour. How deeply this Messianic expectation has penetrated
into Israel, the psalms show us; many proceed from the Davidic kingship
66, 68, 87, 93, 95-100, 145-150. Cf. the works on the Christology of the O.
T. by Hengstenberg, 2e Ausg. 1854, by Oosterzee, 1859-61, Bade, 2 Bde, 2e
Aufl. Münster 1858, Böhl 1882, R. Gordon, Christ as made known to the
ancient Church, 4 vol. Edinburgh 1854; further works on the O. T.
predictions such as by Riehm, Die messian. Weissagung, Gotha 1875.
Hofmann, Weissagung und Erfüllung 1841, ’44. Schriftbeweis, 2e Aufl.
1859, Orelli, Die alttest. Weissagung von der Vollendung des Gottesreiches
in ihrer gesch. Entw. 1882; then works on the theology of the O. T. by
Schultz, Oehler, Smend, Dillmann, Riehm, Kayser, Kuenen, De profeten I
234v., Duhm, Die Theologie der Propheten 1875. König, Die Theologie der
Psalmen 1857. Dornstetter, Das endzeitliche Gottesreich nach der
Prophezie, Würzburg 1896. Stade, Die mess. Hoffnung im Psalter, in
Gottschick’s Zeits. f. Th. u. K. II 1895 S. 369-413. Boehmer, Das Reich
Gottes in den Psalmen, Neue Kirchl. Zeits. VIII 1897, Heft 8-10; and finally
also still dogmatic textbooks, such as by Dorner Chr. Gl. I 702. Grétillat,
Exposé IV 95. Runze, Katech. der Dogm. Leipzig Weber 1898 § 75.
2. Even after the extinction of prophecy, the Messianic expectation
continued to live in the heart of Israel’s people. In the apocryphal literature
we do indeed find the expectation of Israel’s future deliverance and
dominion, but without therewith any mention of the Messiah occurring
Philo too has nothing about the Messiah. In general the self-righteousness
of Judaism was not favorable to the Messianic expectation; Israel after all
had the law, was righteous through its observance, and therefore had no
need of a deliverer; at most there was room for an earthly king, who repaid
the Jews according to their merits and brought them to dominion over the
peoples of the world. The Messiah became solely and only a political
person. But among the people the Messianic expectation nevertheless
remained alive and repeatedly came to the surface again, especially in times
of oppression. It was maintained and nourished by the reading of the
O. Testament; many passages were declared Messianic, as the LXX proves;
the Jews found in the Scriptures even 456 Messianic promises, 75 in the
Pentateuch, 243 in the Prophets, and 138 in the Hagiographa; and especially
the apocalyptic literature of Enoch, the Psalterium Salomonis, Baruch, the
Sibyl, 4 Ezra took up the Messianic expectation again and elaborated it.
One expected in general that He would appear at the end of the ֹעָלם ַהֶּזה,
after anxious times, the so-called Messianic birth-pangs and Elijah or also
another prophet like Moses or Jeremiah had preceded. He was usually
designated as Messiah, Son of Man, Chosen One, Son of David, a few times
also as Son of God, and was conceived as a man who already existed
beforehand and was hidden with God, who would come forth to appear
from Bethlehem, righteous, holy, and equipped with many gifts by God, and
who would establish the kingdom of God on earth. In the main this
corresponds with the expectation which, according to the testimony of the
N. T., Luke 1:38, 74, 2:25 etc., was encountered in popular circles, Schürer,
Neutest. Zeitgesch. 613. Weber, System 333. Baldensperger, Das
Selbstbewusstsein Jesu im Lichte der Mess. Hoffnungen seiner Zeit,
Strassb. 1888, 2e Aufl. 1892. Herzog2 9, 653. Marti, Gesch. d. isr. Rel. 289.
Holtzmann, Lehrb. der neut. Theol. I 68. Ludwig Paul, die Vorstellungen
vom Messias u. vom Gottesreich bei den Synopt. Bonn 1895.
Amid these expectations Christ himself appears, and in his preaching he
immediately attaches himself to them. The kingdom of God, which was
foretold and expected by the prophets, in which God will be king and his
will will be everyone’s delight, which by origin and nature is a heavenly
kingdom and is now already present in the heavens, Matthew 6:10, that kingdom
also comes on earth, it is near, Mark 1:15. But, connecting with those
expectations, Jesus immediately introduces a great change into them; from
the Jewish tradition he goes back to Scripture, and understands by the
kingdom not in the first place a political, but a religious-ethical dominion.
The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Mark 12:26, the God of Israel, Matthew 15:30, whom Jesus acknowledges and confesses as his God, is certainly
also and above all King, Matthew 5:35, 18:23, 22:2, the Lord of heaven and of
earth, Matthew 11:25, but he is also the Father in the heavens, who in his
kingdom wishes to rule as a Father over his children; his kingdom is also a
thoughts of the kingship and the fatherhood of God do not harm but
promote one another. Further: entrance into that kingdom is not by
Pharisaic observance of the law, but by conversion, faith, regeneration, Matthew 18:3, Mark 1:15, John 3:3, and therefore it is precisely open to the poor, the
That kingdom, which on the one hand must above all be sought and
presupposes another and better righteousness than that of the Pharisees, Matthew 5:20, 6:33, 13:44-46 and is then presented as a reward, kept in the heavens,
Matthew 5:12, 6:20, 19:21, 20:1-7, 24:45, is nevertheless on the other hand, with
its whole content, forgiveness of sins, Matthew 9:2, 26:28, Luke 1:77, 24:47,
righteousness, Matthew 6:33, eternal life, Matthew 19:16, 25:46, Mark 8:43 a gift far
6:32v., 12:32, 37, 17:10, 22:29. Insofar as salvation is not yet enjoyed here
in full, the kingdom is thus still indeed future; but insofar as it is already
initially planted here in the hearts through regeneration, forgiveness,
10:18, 17:21. Schmoller, Die Lehre vom Reiche Gottes in den Schriften des
N. T. Leiden 1891 and others, such as Joh. Weiss, Gunkel, have wrongly
denied this latter. The kingdom of God with Jesus is not only a good lying
ready in heaven, bestowed on righteousness as a reward, and thus only a
religious concept; but it is also initially realized on earth in the benefits of
conversion, faith, regeneration, renewal, it gradually grows and permeates
everything, it is at the same time an ethical concept. That is, Jesus takes
over the concept of the kingdom of God, as it had been developed in
Scripture and especially later in apocalyptic literature in an eschatological
sense. But he connects with it the thought later neglected by Judaism, that,
although the kingdom of God in an eschatological sense will only at the end
of days be realized by an act of God intervening in the world, it
nevertheless must be preceded and prepared by a religious-ethical [235]
renewal, by the kingdom of God in this sense. With the prophets of the O.
T. these thoughts go together and are interwoven. They know only one
coming of the Messiah. The kingdom of God is the sum of all spiritual and
natural benefits; it brings at the same time conversion and return
(restoration of Israel as people and kingdom); it is at the same time an
ethical and a religious concept. But Jesus distinguishes between these. The
kingdom exists in a religious-ethical sense, it comes in an eschatological
sense. The one idea of the kingdom of God is realized in two great
moments. The one coming of the Messiah splits into a double one, for
salvation and for judgment, for preparation and for completion. Das
Messiaswerk wird Heilswerk, es entwindet sich der Eschatologie und
mündet ein in die Soteriologie, Baldensperger, Das Selbstbew. Jesu 114.
Leaving aside the question how long a time, for Jesus’ consciousness and
that of the apostles, would elapse between his present and his future
kingdom; the fact stands firm that both are also temporally distinct. Cf.
Holtzmann I 215-225, and further the literature on the kingdom of God,
which is to be found in Frédéric Krop, La pensée de Jésus sur le royaume
de Dieu d’après les évangiles synoptiques avec un appendice sur la question
du fils de l’homme. Paris Fischbacher 1897 p. 7. s. Cf. also A. Ritschls Idee
des Reiches Gottes im Lichte der Gesch., kritisch untersucht von Dr. Rich.
Wegener, Leipzig Deichert 1898.
Jesus did not arrive at this distinction because his labor, begun hopefully
in Galilee, later remained without result and he could now remain faithful to
his calling in no other way than by at the same time revealing his
Messiahship and the program of suffering, Holtzmann, I 284. For from the
beginning Jesus’ place in that kingdom, whose Gospel he preached, was
perfectly clear and distinct to him. Apart from the indication in the baptism
by John, Matthew 3:11v., John 1:26v., this is evident from the fact that Jesus
immediately appeared with the names Son of man and Son of God. The first
name Jesus derived, as is now, especially after Baldensperger’s important
study on Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu, Strassb. 1888, 2e Aufl. 1892, fairly
generally recognized, with awareness from Daniel 7:13, in order thereby to
indicate both that he was the Messiah, without whom the kingdom of
God could not come, and that he was so in an entirely different sense than
his contemporaries imagined this in their earth-minded expectations. The
name son of man is thus not a symbol for the future kingdom of God
(Hoekstra), nor a designation of Jesus as the true, ideal man (Herder,
Schleiermacher, Neander, Lange, Ebrard, Thomasius, Godet, Beyschlag
etc.) or as the humble, weak man (Grotius, de Wette, Ewald, Baur, Strauss,
Kuenen, Schenkel, Stier, Nösgen etc.), but is a definite indication of his
Messianic dignity exalted above all, in the sense as he himself understood
it. Now, just as earlier already the rationalist Paulus, Comm. über das N. T.
op Matthew 8:20 and Uloth in de Godg. Bijdragen 1862, so in the most recent
time Lagarde, Wellhausen, Brandt, Oort and especially Lietzmann have
indeed asserted that Jesus never called himself in the Aramaic בר נוש or used
it only to designate himself in the third person as the man; that the Aramaic
words were later wrongly translated by ὑ ιος του ἀ νθρωπου and in Christian
apocalyptic, in connection with Daniel 7:13, were understood of the Messiah,
and in that meaning then were put into Jesus’ mouth. But this hypothesis is
nevertheless very improbable; it lacks any explanation of when and why the
Aramaic expression was thus rendered in Greek, was understood in a
Messianic sense, and without any reason was put into Jesus’ mouth, cf.
Schulze, Die Religion Jesu und der Glaube an Christus, Halle 1897 S. 7-13.
Fréd. Krop, La pensée de Jésus sur le royaume de Dieu 124 s. Kähler, Zur
Lehre v. d. Versöhnung, Leipzig 1898 S. 78. Rather it is probable that the
expression בר נוש already in Jewish apocalyptic designated the Messiah, or
that Jesus himself intentionally derived that title from Daniel, in order to
designate himself clearly and yet in another sense than his contemporaries
thought, as Messiah. In any case, Jesus calls himself so where, by his
humble life, Matthew 8:20, 11:19, by his serving, Matthew 20:28, by his seeking and
saving of the lost, Matthew 18:11, by his forgiveness of sins, Mark 2:10, by his
power over the Sabbath, Mark 2:18, by his suffering, Mark 8:31, 9:12, 31,
10:33, by his return, Mark 13:26, 14:62, he founds, extends and [237]
completes the kingdom of heaven on earth. With this claim and this name
Jesus did not first appear toward the end of his life; he was conscious of his
Messiahship from the first moment of his public activity onward and began
it by virtue of that consciousness. Already at twelve years of age he knew
that he had to be in the things of his Father, Luke 2:49. In the baptism by
John he received the divine sign and seal of his calling, Luke 3:21. And
immediately he appeared with the name Son of man, long before the event
in Caesarea Philippi, Mark 2:10, 28. From the beginning he gives himself a
special and wholly unique place in the kingdom of God, does works that
presuppose his Messiahship, and demands an honor that belongs to him
indeed true that he uses the name Son of man sparingly in the first period,
and that he employs it all the more frequently when, after the event at
Caesarea, he can connect with the Messianity also the program of suffering.
Jesus had to educate his disciples in such a way that they would recognize
him as Messiah and yet would not transfer to him all those earthly political
expectations that in Jesus’ time were connected with the Messianic idea.
Literature on the expression Son of Man in Oort, De uitdrukking ὁ υ ἱ ος του
ἀ νθρωπου in het N. T. Leiden 1892 bl. 5v. H. Lietzmann, Der
Menschenson, Freiburg Mohr 1896. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I 246. H.
Appel, Die Selbstbezeichnung Jesu, Der Sohn des M. Stavenhagen 1896.
Also Theol. Tijdschr. Nov. 1894. Mei 1895. Theol. Stud. van Dr. Daubanton
enz., Mei 1895. Kähler, Zur Lehre v. d. Versöhnung 1898 S. 75 f. Fréderic
Krop, La pensée de Jésus etc. p. 118-132. With this it is said that Jesus’ selfconsciousness as Messiah cannot be explained historically or
psychologically. It is immediately present at Jesus’ appearance; it is not to
be derived from the influence of apocalyptic literature, which without doubt
is overestimated by Baldensperger in general and also in relation to Jesus.
Therefore he also sees himself compelled to go further back, namely to the
religious consciousness of Jesus, to his consciousness of God, and to say
that at the baptism, together with his consciousness of God, his Messianity
became immediately conscious to him; then he perceived God’s nearness as
never before, then he heard inwardly within himself the voice: You are my
Son, Baldensperger, Das Selbstbew. Jesu S. 160. To a certain extent
this is correct. Jesus’ consciousness that he was the Messiah flowed from
the knowledge that he stood in a wholly unique relation to God. He called
himself Son of man but also Son of God, cf. part II 243. In the O. T. thus
either the people Israel, or the king and especially the Messiah were
designated. This theocratic meaning the name Son of God perhaps still has
in the mouth of the demoniacs, Matthew 8:29, the Jews, Matthew 27:10, the High
Priest, Matthew 26:63, and even of the disciples in the first period, John 1:50,
11:27, Matthew 16:16. But Jesus places in this name another and deeper sense.
He is Son of God, not because he is Messiah and King, but he is the latter
because he is the former, because he is Son of the Father. God is his Father,
Luke 2:49; he is the one Son whom the Father loved and whom he sent at
last, Mark 12:6; at the baptism Matthew 3:17, and later at the transfiguration, Matthew 17:5, God calls him his beloved Son, in whom he has all his good pleasure;
and in Matth. 11:27 he says that everything that is necessary for the
execution of God’s ε ὐ δοκια has been handed over to him and that only the
Father knows the Son and the Son the Father. This Sonship is the source of
all his life, thinking and acting. In that consciousness he places himself
above the ancients, Matthew 5:18v., above Jonah and Solomon, Luke 11:31, 32,
above even the angels, Mark 13:32. Knowing that he stands in a wholly
unique relation to the Father and is king of the kingdom of God, he
pronounces blessed, Matthew 5:3v., Luke 10:23, he forgives the sins, Mark 2:20,
he demands to leave everything for his sake, Matthew 5:11, 10:18, 22 etc., and
connects with that the entrance into eternal life. The Synoptics already
contain in germ everything that later was taught by the apostles and also by
the Christian church about the person of Christ. It is true that the disciples
before Jesus’ resurrection still had no right insight into his person and work.
The gospels tell us that themselves. Hence Jesus in his instruction also
reckoned with the capacity of his young men, gradually led them to the
knowledge of his Sonship and his Messianity and left much to the
instruction of the Spirit, John 16:12. But the resurrection already caused a
wondrous light to dawn over the person and the work of Christ; from then
on he counted for all disciples as ein himmlisches Wesen; the doctrine of
Paul and John about the being of Christ found with none of the
disciples opposition, Weiszäcker, Das apost. Zeitalter2 16. 110. What they
add to it is nothing new, but only expansion and development. Jesus is true
man, become flesh and come in the flesh, John 1:14, 1 John 4:2, 3, from the
fathers, as far as the flesh is concerned, Romans 9:5, seed of Abraham, Galatians 3:16, from the tribe of Judah, Hebr. 7:14, from the lineage of David, Romans 1:3, born of a woman, Galatians 4:4, Hebr. 2:14, man in full, true sense, Romans 5:15, 1 Corinthians 15:45, 1 Timothy 2:15, who was weary, thirsty, sorrowful, joyful as
we are, John 4:6v., 11:33, 38, 12:27, 13:21, Hebr. 4:15, was under the law,
suffered, died and was buried etc. But this same man was at the same time
also risen, been glorified, seated at God’s right hand, Hd. 2:34, 5:31, 7:55
etc. He existed already before his incarnation, John 1:1, 17:5, 1 Corinthians 10:4, 9,
Hebr. 11:26, was then in the form of God, Philippians 2:6, firstborn of all creation,
Colossians 1:15, higher than the angels, Hebr. 1:4, through whom God created all
things and in whom all things subsist, John 1:3, 1 Corinthians 8:6, Colossians 1:16, Ef.
3:9, Son of God in a wholly unique sense, John 1:14, 5:18, Romans 8:3, 32,
Schriftlehre van Kähler in Herzog3 4, 4 with the literature cited there.
3. This apostolic testimony concerning Jesus the Christ was too
comprehensive for it to be immediately taken up into the Christian
consciousness and to be expressed in a clear formula cutting off all error.
With the apostolic fathers there is therefore as yet no mention of this,
although they assign to Christ an altogether unique place and although they
call Him by all manner of glorious and exalted names, part II 250. Only
through the errors arising on the left and on the right side, of Ebionitism and
Gnosticism, was Christian thinking first awakened, to appropriate the
apostolic testimony to itself in its many-sidedness and to bring to clarity the
relation of Christ, both to God and to humanity. Ebionitism did indeed
regard Jesus as the Messiah, sometimes also believed that He was
conceived in a supernatural manner and at baptism was equipped with a
divine power, but otherwise it saw in Jesus nothing but a man, from David’s
lineage, anointed with God’s Spirit and appointed as king over an earthly
kingdom to be established at His return. Gnosticism, despising matter and
ascribing the creation of the world to a δημιουργος, also made in the case of
Christ a sharp separation between the divine and the human; the highest
aeon, namely Christ, had descended from heaven and had united Himself
for a time with the earthly man Jesus, or brought with Him from heaven a
psychic body or temporarily assumed a phantom body, in order to free
humanity from the bonds of matter. Harnack indeed thinks that the
recognition of Jesus as a man chosen by God and equipped with the Spirit
was not ebionitic but Christian, D. G. I 245, and also says that the doctrine
of the two natures of Christ was originally gnostic, I 220, 516, but he must
nevertheless concede that in the oldest tradition Jesus was also confessed as
Son of God and was never held to be a ψιλος ἀ νθρωπος, I 153-168, cf.
Loofs in Herzog3 4, 18 f. There may have been different conceptions of
how one and the same subject could at the same time be Son of God and
man; but thus Christ was recognized by all from the beginning. This
confession had to lead and did lead under Justin, Irenaeus and Tertullian, cf.
part II 250-256, to the doctrine of the two natures. The expression δυο
ο ὐ σιαι χριστου occurs for the first time in a fragment of Melito, the
authenticity of which, however, is doubted, Harnack, D. G. I 165, according
to Loofs, Herzog3 4, 31 wrongly. Irenaeus does not yet have the formula of
the two natures, but teaches clearly that Christ is truly the Son, the Logos,
and Himself God, that He as such became man, and that this incarnate
Logos is an indissoluble unity. He is vere homo et vere deus, adv. haer. IV
6, 7, it is one and the same Christ who created the world and who was born
and died, III 9, 3. 16, 6. 19, 1 etc. Tertullian teaches likewise and speaks
still more strongly of two substances in Christ, carnea and spiritalis, of two
conditiones, divina et humana, de carne Chr. 5, and assumed in Him
duplicem statum, non confusum sed conjunctum in una persona, Deum et
hominem verum, adv. Pr. 27. Soon thereafter in the West, for this doctrine
of Christ the formula was used that He was una persona with duo naturae.
Augustine regularly expresses himself thus; ita vero inter Deum et homines
mediator apparuit, ut in unitate personae copulans utramque naturam, et
solita sublimaret insolitis et insolita solitis temperaret, Ep. ad Volus. 3. In
the East, however, the terminology, as in the doctrine of the Trinity,
remained for a long time unstable and therefore susceptible to all manner of
misunderstanding. The words ο ὐ σια, φυσις, ὑ ποστασις, προσωπον still
lacked strict definition and were therefore used interchangeably; even Cyril
still often designates the human nature of Christ as ὑ ποστασις instead of as
φυσις, and then yet again speaks of one nature in Christ, μια σεσαρκωμενη
φυσις; the union of both natures was designated by Gregory Naz. and Nyss.
as a μιξις, ἀ νακρασις, and by Cyril as a ἑ νωσις φυσικη or κατα φυσιν; and
that which came about through the hypostatic union was more than once
called not ε ἱ ς but ἑ ν, Schwane, D. G. II 294 f. 341 f. The epistola dogmatica
of Pope Leo the Great to Flavianus, however, contributed much to promote
also in the East clear insight and precise usage of language in the doctrine
of Christ, Halm, Bibl. der Symbole u. Glaubensregeln3 321-330. And at
Chalcedon, after rejection of Nestorianism, Patripassianism, Eutychianism
etc., the confession of Christ was established as of one and the same Son
the original reading; not ἐ κ δυο φυσεων) ἀ συγχυτως, ἀ τρεπτως,
4. Therewith the boundaries were sharply and clearly drawn, within which
the ecclesiastical doctrine of Christ could be further developed. But it was
far from the case that by this agreement was obtained earlier and later. The
question: what think ye of the Christ? has in Christian life and also in
theology elicited all manner of answers; it has divided the heads and hearts
of men through all centuries [242]. Even within those churches which
together accept the Chalcedonense, in spite of all agreement there is
nevertheless also still considerable difference. In the theology of the East
the fundamental thought remained this, that God himself had to become
man, in order that man might become partaker of the Divine nature,
immortality, eternal life, the θεωσις. The consequences of sin are much
more physical than ethical in nature, and therefore alongside rationalism in
the Greek church mysticism always runs. This mysticism had to lead to this,
that, even if the human nature of Christ was also acknowledged, the
strongest emphasis nevertheless fell on his Godhead, on the entering of the
Divine nature into the human, on the unity of both, on the essence of Christ
more than on his historical appearance, on his incarnation more than on his
satisfaction. With the person of Christ, therefore, it depended especially on
his Divine essence, which was communicated in human form and thus is
received and enjoyed by man. For a strict distinction of the two natures,
therefore, there was by no means any need felt; it is lacking in Athanasius,
the Cappadocians, indeed even still in part in Cyril; the Greek reading of
the Chalcedonense is a correction of the original text; the expression ἐ ν δυο
φυσεσιν has been replaced by ἐ κ δυο φυσεων. Monophysitism was in the
East a power; however much condemned and suppressed, it nevertheless
kept coming to the surface again, in the doctrine of the theopaschites, of the
aphthartodocetes, of the aktistetes and of the monotheletes; it contributed to
wiping out the boundary line between the Divine and the human and to
making the churches in the East more and more ripe for destruction in
Heathendom, cf. deel II 292. 293.
In contrast, the West strictly distinguished between the divine and the
human nature of Christ; the terminology of una persona and duo naturae
had already been fixed since Tertullian; the emphasis lay more on the
ethical than on the physical, more on satisfaction, suffering, and death than
on the incarnation. Yet here, too, not every danger of the deification of the
human nature of Christ was avoided. The East took almost no notice of the
West and in particular did not at all undergo the influence of Augustine. But
conversely, the West did adopt the theology and specifically also the
mysticism of the East. Thereby, in the Latin church and theology as
well, the thought of a deification of the human penetrated. Mystical
contemplation, the doctrine of the donum superadditum, transubstantiation,
all rest on the thought that the finite can have a share in the infinite. This
could not remain without influence on Christology, for the human nature
was united with the Godhead more closely than any other creature. If Adam
through the donum superadditum, if the believers through the gratia infusa,
if the mystics through contemplation already became partakers of the divine
nature and in a certain sense were deified, cf. part I 220v. 276v. II 152v.
518. 522v., then this had to be the case in a much stronger measure still in
the case of the man Christ. Entirely in agreement with Joh. Damascenus, de
fide orthod. III 3. 7. 17. 19, cf. Dorner, Lehre v. d. Person Christi II 267 f.,
scholastic and Roman theology therefore taught that each nature in Christ
indeed remains itself and that the communication of the divine properties to
the human nature is not to be thought of as real, but that nevertheless the
divine nature wholly penetrates and permeates the human, as heat does iron,
and makes it partaker of the divine glory and wisdom and power
(περιχωρησις, θεωσις). From that it is then inferred that Christ as man
already here on earth possessed the scientia beata, the visio Dei; Jesus was
already on earth a comprehensor ac viator, walking by sight and not by
faith; of faith and hope there can and may be no question in His case.
Further, all the gifts for which the human nature of Christ was capable were
granted to Him not gradually, but immediately, all at once at His
incarnation. As man He did indeed remain finite and limited; He also had in
the state of His humiliation all kinds of defects (susceptibility to suffering
and death) and affects (affections of sorrow, hunger, cold, etc.). But He
nevertheless received at His incarnation all at once all the wisdom of which
His human nature was capable. His increase therein, Luke 2:52, is to be
understood not objectively but subjectively; it seemed so to others; He also
did not pray out of need, but only for our sake, to give us an example. Jesus
was actually never a child; He was immediately a man. And because His
human nature is thus so glorified and deified by the divine, therefore it too
has a right to and is also a object of worship; indeed every part of the
human nature of Christ, such as in particular the sacred heart, is worthy of
divine veneration. Cf. Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 9. 13 sq. 23. Thomas, S.
Theol. III qu. 7-15. 25. 33. 34. Bonaventura, Brevil. IV 6. Bellarminus, de
Christo III. IV. Petavius, de incarn. X. XI. Theol. Wirceb. IV 260 sq.
Scheeben, Dogm. III 1-261. Kleutgen, Theol. d. Vorz. III 213 f. Pesch,
Prael. IV 86 sq. 111 sq. Jansen, Prael. II 669. C. v. Schaezler, Das Dogma v.
d. Menschw. Gottes 1870 S. 164 f. Simar, Dogm. 420 f.
The same fundamental idea we encounter in Lutheran theology. But it is
nevertheless worked out and applied differently here. Greek and Roman
theology did indeed teach a communication of divine gifts, but not of divine
attributes to human nature; and they also did indeed teach a true and
essential communication of the divine attributes, but then not to human
nature as such, but to the hypostasis of both natures. Luther, however,
taught that already in the state of humiliation the humanity of Christ was
where the divinity was, and that both natures were united and mixed with
one another with their attributes not only in the person but also mutually,
Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 392. f. Therefore the Roman theologians could
unanimously combat the Lutheran Christology and especially the doctrine
of ubiquity, Bellarminus, de Christo III 9. Petavius, de incarn. X 7-10 etc.
But yet there is, here as in the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper, affinity. The
Lutherans do indeed expressly teach that the two natures in Christ are never
mixed or changed into one another, but that each of the two remains itself
unto eternity and retains its essential attributes and never receives the
attributes of the other nature as its own, Form. Conc. ed. Müller 675.676.
Nor do they say that all divine attributes are communicated to human nature
in the same sense and in the same degree; the quiescent attributes of infinity
etc. were not bestowed upon it itself directly, but only through mediation of
the other attributes; the operative ones, however, such as omnipresence,
omnipotence, omniscience, became directly and immediately the portion of
human nature; and one even often ascribed to it not only the
multivolipraesentia or ubiquitas in the sense of Chemniz but
specifically the omnipraesentia, ib. 685 sq. And in substance Roman and
Lutheran theology agree in this, that they elevate human nature above the
limits set for it and dissolve the human development of Jesus together with
the state of his humiliation into appearance. In Lutheran theology that has
already emerged very clearly. At the incarnation, namely, a distinction was
indeed made not temporally but logically between the incarnatio (assumtio
carnis) and the exinanitio (conceptio in utero). Of the former the Logos
alone is the subject; and it consists in this, that he makes the human nature,
finite in itself, capable of the indwelling of the fullness of the Godhead and
communicates to it the above-mentioned divine attributes. But in this way
not only the distinction between divine and human nature but also that
between the state of humiliation and of exaltation threatened to be lost
entirely. Therefore it was assumed that in the second moment, in the
exinanitio, of which not the Logos but the God-man was the subject, he had
again in a certain sense laid aside the attributes first communicated. But
about the nature of this exinanitio there was great difference and there was
even waged between the Giessen and Tübingen theologians a protracted
(1607-1624) struggle. According to the Tübingen theologians Christ laid
aside only the public use of those attributes; he did indeed retain them and
he also used them, for the distinction between potentia and actus does not
apply to the divine attributes; a potential omnipresence, omniscience etc. is
absurd; but Christ used those communicated attributes in the state of his
humiliation only in a latent, hidden way (κρυψις χρησεως); the state of
exaltation is nothing other than a visible display of what invisibly already
existed from the hour of conception onward. In this way, however, the
whole human development of Jesus, his increase in knowledge and wisdom,
his hungering and thirsting, his suffering and dying, became mere
appearance. And therefore the Giessen and the later Lutheran theologians
preferred to say that Christ in the moment of the exinanitio had laid aside
the whole use of the communicated attributes (κενωσις χρησεως); he did
indeed retain them, but only potentia, not actu; only at the exaltation did he
also take them into use. Cf. Chemniz. de duabus naturis in Christo 1570.
Gerhard, Loc. IV c. 11-14. Quenstedt III 79 sq. Hollaz 765 sq.
Buddeus, Inst. theol. IV c. 2 and further Dorner, Entw. II 771-847. Gesch.
der prot. Theol. 569 f. Frank, Theol. der Concordienformel III 165-396.
Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. § 26 Id. Zur kirchl. Christologie. Die
orthodoxe Lehre vom doppelten Stande Christi nach luth. und ref. Fassung
1868. Sartorius, Christi Person und Werk I3 520 f. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV 1
S. 243 f. Herzog1 art. Double state of Christ. Herzog2 art. Kenotiker und
Kryptiker. Herzog3 art. Comm. idiom.
The Reformed were from the beginning in a much more favorable
condition; they have also in the doctrine of Christ in principle overcome the
Greek, Roman, and Lutheran mingling of the divine and the human.
Although maintaining the unity of the person in the strictest manner, they
have also applied to the human nature of Christ the rule: finitum non est
capax infiniti and have maintained this not only in the state of humiliation
but even also in that of exaltation. Thus Reformed theology obtained room
for a purely human development of Christ, for a successive communication
of gifts, for an essential distinction between humiliation and exaltation. And
yet in doing so it has earnestly avoided Nestorianism, of which it was
always accused. And that came about because in Greek, Roman, and
Lutheran theology the emphasis always fell on the incarnation of the divine
being, of the divine nature. If that nature does not become flesh, the work of
salvation, communion with God, seems to be endangered. But Reformed
theology places in the foreground that the person of the Son became flesh;
not the substance but the subsistentia of the Son assumed our nature. In that
person the unity of the two natures, in spite of the strict distinction of both,
is immovably established. As in the doctrine of the Trinity, of man as the
image of God, and of the covenants, so also here in the doctrine of Christ
the Reformed thought of personal, conscious life as the richest and highest
life comes very clearly to the foreground. Cf. Calvin, Inst. II c. 12-14. Beza,
de hypostatica duarum in Christo naturarum unione, Tract. Theol. I 625-645
II 74-101. Ursinus, Tract. theol. 652-663. Martyr, Loci Comm. loc. 17 p.
212. Zanchius, de incarnatione Filii Dei, Op. VIII p. 15-296. Polanus, Synt.
VI c. 12 sq. Owen, Declaration of the glorious mystery of the person
of Christ, God and man, Works, Edinb. I. and more literature in Walch,
Bibl. theol. sel. I 259. M. Vitringa V p. 45. 202.
5. All these developments of the doctrine of Christ proceed from and
move within the boundaries of the symbolum Chalcedonense. But by no
means could all Christians find themselves in this confession. At all times
there were those who deviated to the right or to the left and followed in the
footsteps of the old Ebionitism or Gnosticism. On the one side stand
Arianism, Nestorianism, Socinianism, Deism, Rationalism etc., cf. deel II
260-264, and on the other side Patripassianism, Sabellianism,
Monophysitism, medieval Pantheism, Anabaptism, Theosophy etc., cf. deel
II 264-268 and further Petavius, de incarnatione I c 1: synopsis haeresum
omnium, quae cath. in carnationis fidem oppugnarunt. Forbesius à Corse,
Instruct. hist. theol. lib. 2. 3. 5. 6. M. Vitringa V 46 sq. Baur, Lehre v. d.
Dreiein. u. Menschw. Gottes 1841-43. Dorner, Entw. der Lehre v. d. Person
Christi2 1851-54. Réville, Histoire du dogme de la divinité de Jésus-Christ
1869. Münscher-v. Coelln, D. G. Art. Christologie, Kirchenlehre van Loofs
in Herzog3 4, 16. Especially in more recent theology the thought has
become dominant that the doctrine of the two natures did indeed fit with
Greek theology and church, but has now lost for us all religious value, that
it has also under the criticism of Socinianism and Rationalism irrevocably
fallen and therefore now, in an entirely new, religious-ethical sense, ought
to be modified. This new Christology has its principal representatives in
Kant, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl.
Kant could not accept the biblical and ecclesiastical doctrine of Christ,
because he denied the knowability of the supernatural and, reasoning from
the du sollst to the du kannst, had no need of a Redeemer. Christ therefore
could for Kant remain only an example of morality and a teacher of virtue.
All that Scripture and church further still pronounced of that Christ had
only symbolic value. The ecclesiastical Christ is the symbol of the humanity
well-pleasing to God; this is the true, only-begotten, much-beloved Son, for
whose sake God created the world. The incarnation of Christ symbolizes the
arising of the true moral life in man; his vicarious suffering signifies
that the moral man in us must atone for the evil of the sensuous man; faith
in Christ indicates that man, for his salvation, must believe in the idea of the
humanity well-pleasing to God. In one word, the historical man Jesus is no
mediator or saviour, but all that the church confesses of that person applies
in full to the idea of humanity, Religion ed. Rosenkranz, 69 f. Kant began in
the new philosophy with, just like the ancient Gnostics, separating the
historical Christ from the ideal one; and others have continued that. Fichte
proceeded from the thought that God and man were absolutely one. But
Christ first recognized this unity in himself and clearly expressed it; that is
his great, historical significance; thousands have through Him come to this
recognition, to this communion with God. But even if this has historically
been so, yet it is not thereby said that man cannot from himself, not
otherwise than through Christ, come to that communion. If Jesus came
back, He would be completely satisfied that Christianity ruled in hearts,
even if his person were entirely forgotten. Only the metaphysical, eternal
truth, the recognition of unity with God, makes blessed; the historical is a
self-standing, transitory fact, Anweisung zum seligen Leben, especially 6th
Vorl. With Schelling in his first period the absolute is not an unchangeably
existing being but an eternal becoming, which thus in the world comes to
revelation as its logos and son. Theology thinks that Christ is the onlybegotten and incarnate Son of God. That is incorrect; God is eternal and
cannot at a definite moment in time have assumed human nature;
Christianity as a historical fact has transitory significance. But the idea
remains eternal; the world is the son of God; the incarnation of God consists
in this, that the absolute, in order to be itself, comes to revelation in a world,
in a multiplicity of individuals, in a rich history, in a historical process. The
world is thus God himself in his becoming; the incarnation of God is the
principle of all life and history; the finite is the necessary form for the
becoming manifest of God; everything must be understood from the idea of
the incarnation. And this is also the esoteric truth of Christianity; the
historical clothing is only a temporal form for this eternal idea,
Vorles. über die Methode des akad. Studiums, 1803, Werke I 5 S. 286 f.
Likewise Hegel said that what theology represented symbolically in
presentations was converted by philosophy into concepts; Christ is not the
only God-man, but man is essentially one with God and also becomes
conscious of this at the highest standpoint of his development,
Religionsphilos., Werke XII 235 f. From these philosophical praemisses
Marheineke, Rosenkranz, Göschel, Daub, Conradi e. a. did indeed still seek
to maintain the incarnation of God in Christ, but Strauss drew the
consequences and said in his Leben Jesu, 1835 II 716 f. 734 f., that the idea
does not pour out its fullness in one specimen but only in a multiplicity of
individuals; humanity is the God become man, who is conceived of the H.
Spirit, lives sinlessly, rises from the dead, ascends to heaven etc. In modern
dogmatics, which proceeds from this philosophical thought, there therefore
remains no place any longer for Christ, other than a religious genius, a
teacher of virtue, a prophet, who has understood religion most deeply, has
most clearly revealed God’s love and has most clearly expressed the unity
and communion of God and man; but the person of Christ itself in fact
stands outside the essence of Christianity, Strauss, Dogm. II 214 f. Alte u.
neue Gl.2 24 f. Schweizer, Chr. Gl. § 116 f. Pfleiderer, Grundriss § 128.
Biedermann, Chr. Dogm. II2 580 f. Lipsius, Dogm.2 § 588. Scholten, Initia
c. 4 p. 171. Kielstra, Het godsd. leven 1890 bl. 39. Not without reason did
von Hartmann, with a view to this modern theology, speak of a crisis and a
Selbstzersetzung des Christendoms, Die Krisis des Christ. u. die moderne
Theologie 1880. Die Selbstzersetzung des Christ. u. die Religion der
Zukunft3 1888. And Dr. Boekenoogen, Christol. Beschouwingen, Theol.
Tijdschr. March, May, Sept. Nov. 1892 Nov. 1897, attempted in vain to
maintain the doctrine of Christ in modern dogmatics still as symbolic
imagining of religious ideas.
Another direction was taken by Schleiermacher. Although decidedly
rejecting the ecclesiastical doctrine of Christ, he nevertheless tried to avoid
the error of speculative philosophy, namely, to seek the essence of
Christianity in an abstract idea and to detach this from the historical person
of Christ. To that end he proceeded from the experience of the
congregation, from the Christian consciousness, which has as its content
reconciliation and communion with God. The ultimate cause of this is to be
found nowhere else than in the founder of the Christian congregation, in
whom therefore the God-consciousness must have been present in absolute
power. And this strength of his God-consciousness was the being of God in
Him, so that He is the religiöse Urbild der menschheid, sinless, perfect,
highest product of the human race and at the same time brought forth by a
creative act of God as the perfect subject of religion. Not on his doctrine but
on his person, not on what He did but on what He was, not on his ethical
example but on his religious life does it depend in the first place, Chr. Gl. §
91 f. By thus seeking the realization of the religious idea not in humanity
but in the person of Christ, Schleiermacher exercised a powerful influence
and again secured for Christology a place in dogmatics. First,
Schleiermacher’s influence became noticeable in that, in contrast with Kant,
Fichte, Hegel, one tried to maintain in Christ a wholly special and entirely
unique revelation of God. If the God-consciousness in Christ had been
absolute and never disturbed by any sin, God must also have dwelt in Him
in a wholly unique way. Naturally one could attempt this in different ways,
according as one thought differently about the Trinity. Those who reject the
ontological Trinity assume in Christ a special manifestation of God, a
perfect indwelling of God, the realization of God’s eternal world-thought or
human-idea, Rothe, Ethik § 533 f. Weisse, Philos. Dogm. I 437-556.
Schenkel, Dogm. II 2 S. 717. 724. Ewald, Göschel, Redepenning,
Beyschlag etc. Others do indeed acknowledge an ontological Trinity but
think the relation of the Son to the Father as subordinatian, and therefore
arrive at an Arian Christology, Thomasius, Kahnis, Gess, Keerl, Hofstede
de Groot, Doedes etc. Still others coordinate the Son with the Father and
therefore approach the ecclesiastical doctrine, K. I. Nitzsch, Twesten,
Müller, Martensen, Sartorius, Liebner, Lange, Voigt, Philippi, Vilmar,
Ebrard, Oosterzee e. a. Subsequently, through Schleiermacher there arose in
newer Christology an interest, previously unusual, in the human, historical
development of the person of Christ. The doctrine of the
communicatio idiomatum was therefore all but abandoned; the human
nature of Christ was brought to the foreground; the doctrine of the two
states was changed into a life of Jesus, and that life was traced in its
preparation, development, and influence. Therefore the history of Israel, of
the classical world, and especially of Jesus’ own time (Neutest. Zeitgesch.
of Hausrath, Schürer etc.) became very popular; further, the incarnation had
to be regarded as not accidentally necessary on account of sin but as
flowing from the idea of God and given with creation itself (Steffens,
Göschel, Baader, Nitzsch, Martensen, Liebner, Lange, Rothe, Ehrenfeuchter
etc.); and then the development of Jesus as man had to be traced in its
historical development, until He became second Adam, head of humanity,
Centralindividuum (Rothe, Liebner, Schneckenburger, Martensen, Lange,
Neander, Kahnis, Beyschlag, Keerl). Finally, in newer Christology, which
still held fast to the confession of Christ as God-man, there arose the
striving to maintain the unity of these two in another and better way than
had occurred in the confession of Chalcedon and ecclesiastical dogmatics.
To that end, in part to God himself but then especially to the God-man, the
idea of becoming was applied. Schelling began with that in his second
period, cf. part II 304 f. The Son was in a certain sense indeed eternal in the
Father, but as generated by the Father, as Son outside (praeter) the Father,
He first appears in creation. Even then, however, the Son does not exist as
actual, but as a Potenz, which can and must actualize itself. Through the sin
of man, however, the world becomes an aussergöttliches Sein, and the Son,
who is generated for that world and remains bound to it, acquires a being
not inwardly but outwardly independent of the Father, Werke II 3 S. 317 f.
He was in an intermediate state, ἐ ν μορφ ῃ θεου, He becomes Christ,
remains bound to the fallen world, which the Father leaves over to Him,
leads it back to the Father himself in the way of self-annihilation and
obedience, and thus at the end of the world becomes himself Son in the full
sense, II 4 S. 35 f. This thought about the becoming of the God-man had in
theosophical circles, e.g. on Baader, Steffens, etc., great influence. And
even Rothe and Dorner adopted the thought that God or the Logos
came to dwell more in the historical person of Jesus in that same measure as
this one developed himself into religious personality, into spirit; the
incarnation of God increases with the deification of man. In another and yet
related way the explanation of the God-man has been attempted by the
doctrine of the κενωσις, i.e. by the supposition that the Logos at the
incarnation emptied himself of all or of some properties down to the level
of human development and then gradually regained these in the way of
development, cf. Gess, Die Lehre v. d. Person Christi 1856 S. 281 f. 309 f.
Liebner, Die Chr. Dogm. aus d. christol. Princip, 1849 and Jahrb f. d. Theol.
1858. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk I3 409-445. Sartorius, Lehre v. d.
heiligen Liebe II2 21. Lange, Dogm. II 594 f. Ebrard, Dogm. § 350 f.
Schöberlein, Prinzip u. System der Dogm. 167 f. Martensen, Dogm. § 133.
Hofmann, Schriftbeweis II 1 S. 20 f. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych.2 326 f. Kahnis,
Dogm. II 83. Frank, Chr. Wahrheit II 137 f. Kübel, Ueber den Unterschied
zw. der posit. u. d. liber. Richtung in der mod. Theol.2 1893 S. 124. H.
Schmidt, Zur Lehre v. d. Person Christi, Neue Kirchl. Zeits. VII 1896 S.
972-1005, especially 982 f. Godet, Comm. op John 1:14. Grétillat, Exposé
IV 180 s. Recolin, La personne de J. C. et la théorie de la kenosis Paris
1890. Saussaye, cf. my Theol. van Ch. d. l. S. 44. Oosterzee, Chr. Dogm. II
Finally, Schleiermacher’s Christology agrees with that of Ritschl; only it,
attaching itself more closely to the philosophy of Kant, lays more emphasis
on the work than on the person of Christ and assigns, in the essence of
Christianity, a greater place to the ethical. Ritschl too rejects, in the doctrine
of Christ, all metaphysics and everything that is condemned by natural
science and by historical criticism, e.g. the pre-existence, the supernatural
conception, the resurrection, ascension, return. Christ is in that respect an
ordinary man. But his peculiarity lay in his calling, in the work that he has
done, namely the founding of a kingdom of God. As an ethical person
Christ stands high above all men; his will was perfectly one with the will of
God, with the plan and the goal, which God, in relation to world and
humanity, had set before himself. But for that reason Christ also has
great religious significance; in Him God himself, his grace and faithfulness,
his will and intention with humanity, has come to revelation; Christ has
shown it to us and confirmed with his death, that the kingdom of God is the
destination of all men, that his will must become the will of the whole of
humanity. Therein consists the royal power, the world-dominion of Christ;
and therein also consists his Godhead. Christ is not God in a metaphysical
sense, but the name God indicates in Him his rank and station, is not a name
of essence but an official name; Christ may be called God because He, with
respect to us, takes the place of God and the value of God, Ritschl, Rechtf.
u. Vers III2 358 f. Kaftan, Wesen der chr. Rel. 1881 S. 295 f. Id. Brauchen
wir ein neues Dogma, 1890 S. 49-72. Id. Dogmatik 1897 S. 404 f. Schultz,
on Romans 9:5, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. XIII 1868 S. 462-507 Die Lehre v. d.
Gottheid Christi 1881. Gottschick, Die Kirchlichkeit der s. g. kirchl.
Theologie 1890 S. 207. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 513. Lobstein, Etudes
Christologiques, Strassb. 1892. Chapuis, La transformation du dogme
christol. au sein de la théol. moderne, Lausanne Bridel 1893.
6. The doctrine of Christ is not the point of departure but indeed the centre
of the whole of dogmatics. All other dogmas prepare for it or are derived
from it. In it, as the heart of dogmatics, the whole religious-ethical life of
Christendom beats. It is the μυστηριον ε ὐ σεβειας, 1 Timothy 3:16. From this all
doctrine of Christ has to proceed. If, however, Christ is the Word become
flesh, then the incarnation is also the central fact of the whole of world
history, then it must be prepared from the times of the ages and continue to
work after and through into all eternity. Schelling rightly says that it must
be difficult for someone, einer Persönlichkeit, die ihm nicht eher als von
dem Augenblick an bekannt ist, wo sie in menschlicher Gestalt erschienen
ist, die für ihn eine bloss historische ist, es muss ihm ungemein schwer
fallen, einer solchen Persönlichkeit nachher eine vormenschliche, ja
vorweltliche Existenz zuzuschreiben; er wird sich natürlich geneigt finden,
diess nur als eine Vorstellung anzusehen, mit der im weiteren Fortgang die
Person des grossen Religionsstifters umgeben und verherrlicht worden,
Werke II 4 [254] S. 35. Quite different does this become, if, like every fact
of revelation, so also the person of Christ is in the first place considered
theologically. In the first place, the incarnation then has its presupposition
and foundation in the trinitarian being of God. In deism and pantheism,
there is no place for an incarnation of God; there God is separated from
world and man in an abstract manner, here God loses himself in the
creatures and has no being and life of his own. It is therefore quite natural,
if from this standpoint the incarnation is rejected as absurd. The Socinians
came out openly for this and made their exegesis serviceable to this dictum
rationis, Cat. Rac. qu. 98. 111; they called the incarnation a human dreamimage and a monstrous dogma, and considered it easier that a man should
be a donkey than that God became man, Fock, Der Socin. 525. Likewise
Spinoza said that the becoming-man of God was just as absurd as that
circulus naturam quadrati induerit, Ep. 21, cf. also Bretschneider II 195.
theistic and trinitarian confession of God’s being opens the possibility for
the fact of the incarnation. For here God remains who he is and yet can
communicate himself to others. If, according to the word of Vinet, one must
first have oneself in order to give oneself, then absolute love is only to be
conceived as perfection of a triune Divine being. For then alone is there a
distinction between being and person, and therefore communion of man
through the person with the being of God, without this being being
identified with man or overflowing into him. The Trinity, in a word, makes
it possible that there be a mediator, who himself partakes of both the Divine
and the human nature and thus connects God and man with one another.
However much, then, the theosophy of Böhme and Schelling went astray
when it attempted to derive the becoming-man from the being of God, yet
the trinitarian being is the presupposition and condition of the incarnation of
God, Dorner, Gl. II 394.
It is therefore also important to maintain that not the Divine nature as
such, but specifically the Person of the Son became man. The
patripassianism of Praxeas, Hermogenes, Noëtus, Beron, Beryllus,
Sabellius, cf. M. Vitringa V 52. Dorner, Entw. I 518, has been condemned
by the church at all times, e.g. at the synod of Aquileia, and no longer
occurs in this form. But according to its basic idea it is proper to all
pantheistic systems, especially those of Hegel, Schelling, von Hartmann
etc., which conceive the absolute not as being but as becoming and let the
Divine pour itself out into the world and come to an end; the world and
humanity with all its pain and misery is then a moment in the life of God,
the history of revelation is then the history of the suffering of God, cf. also
A. von Oettingen, Das göttliche noch nicht, Leipzig 1895. Although in this
now also, as will appear presently, a component of truth can be recognized,
yet Holy Scripture always ascribes the incarnation to the Son, John 1:14,
Philippians 2:6, Hebr. 2:14, 15. Indeed the Reformed preferred to speak of the fact
that the person of the Son, rather than with the Lutherans, that the Divine
nature in Christ had become man. By that they did not wish to deny that the
fullness of the Godhead dwelt bodily in Christ, Colossians 2:9, that the Son
partakes of the same Divine essence with the Father and the Spirit, and thus
insofar also the Divine nature had assumed our flesh. But yet, against all
mixing, they emphasized that the person of the Son, in whom the Divine
nature existed in a particular manner, had assumed the human nature. The
difference is certainly not of great significance, as Mastricht V 4, 15, Moor
III 480 remark, but yet it is noteworthy that many Lutherans prefer to
express themselves thus, that the Divine nature in the person of the Son has
become man; it undoubtedly stands in connection with their basic idea. But
the Reformed gave preference to the manner of speaking that the person of
the Son immediately and the Divine nature in Him mediately was united
with the human nature, Zanchius VIII 47. Polanus VI c. 13. Synopsis XXV
8. Alting, Loci Comm. p. 74. Maresius, Syst. IX 12. M. Vitringa V 51. 63.
Thus it had also earlier been taught by the patres and confessed by the
church. The 6th Synod at Toledo 638 declared: although the whole trinity
cooperates in the incarnation, because all works of the trinity are
inseparabilia, solus (Filius) tamen accepit hominem in singularitate
personae, non in unitate divinae naturae, in id quod est proprium Filii, quod
non commune trinitati, Hahn, Bibl. d. Symbole u. Glaubensregeln3 237; cf.
also Anselmus with Dorner II 376. Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 5.
Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 3 art. 4. Bellarminus, Contr. I lib. 3 c. 8. Becanus,
Theol. schol. III 1 c. 4 qu. 1 etc. Questions, such as were treated in
scholasticism on Sent. III dist. 1, whether also the Father and the H. Spirit
could have become man, therefore need not cease. The Father could not be
sent, for He is the first in order and exists of himself; the H. Spirit proceeds
from the Son, follows after Him and is sent by Him. But the Son is the one
designated for the incarnation. He occupies in the Divine being the place
between Father and Spirit, is Son and Image of God by nature, was already
Mediator in the first creation and could as Son restore us again to children
of God, Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 1. Thomas, S. Th. III qu. 3 art. 8.
Petavius, de incarn. II 15. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorz. III 180 f. Turretinus,
Th. El. XIII qu. 4. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 266. Dorner, Gl. II 394. Yet,
although the incarnation is subjective and terminative only proper to the
Son, it is nevertheless originaliter, principiative, quoad efficientiam a work
of the whole trinity; Christ is sent by the Father and conceived of the H.
Spirit. Reformed theology already gave expression to this in its doctrine of
the pactum salutis. The whole work of re-creation is not merely a decree of
God, it rests on the free, conscious deliberation of the three persons; it is an
opus personale, not naturale. The Father is eternally in the Son the Father of
His children; the Son is eternally their Surety and Mediator; the H. Spirit is
eternally their Comforter. Not only after the fall, not even only at the
creation, but in eternity the foundations of the covenant of grace have been
laid. And the incarnation is no accidental decision that arose later; it is
intended and determined from eternity. There was no time when the Son
was not. There was also no time when the Son did not know and was not
willing to assume the human nature from the fallen race of Adam. The
incarnation is prepared from eternity; it does not rest in the essence but in
the persons; it is not a necessity as in pantheism but also not an arbitrariness
or chance as in pelagianism.
7. Apart from the Trinity, the incarnation further has its presupposition
and preparation in creation. Creation gives existence to finite, limited
beings; it is absolutely impossible that God would create something which
in essence was like Him and were God. God has therefore eternally
conceived finite creatures and has also given them existence within the
necessary limits of space and time. In those creatures He has thus, as it
were, limited His eternal thoughts, His infinite omnipotence. Specifically,
the creation of man after God’s image is a presupposition and preparation of
the becoming-man of God. Under the influence of the pantheistic doctrine
of identity and also in connection with the Lutheran communicatio
idiomatum, more recent theology has made much misuse of this. In place of
the old finitum non est capax infiniti it set the rule: homo divinae naturae
capax, pointed to the affinity of God and man, erased the distinction of
both, and proceeded from the thought that for the perfection of both the
becoming-man was necessary, Dorner, Entw. II 1227. This is forbidden by
Christian theism. But yet, man is akin to God, His image, His son, His
offspring; and therefore the becoming-man of God is possible, Thomas,
Bonaventura e. a. on Sent. III dist. I, so that questions whether God can also
assume the nature of a stone, a plant, or an animal, Sent. III dist. 2, as
Occam answered affirmatively, Stöckl, Philos. d. M. A. II 1620, are out of
place. And if God then creates man after His image, and in that man dwells
and works with His Spirit, causes influences to go out upon his heart and
head, speaks to him and makes Himself known and understood to him, then
that is a descent of God to, an accommodation to His creature, an
anthropomorphizing of God, and thus in a certain sense and insofar a
becoming-man of God. With and in creation the possibility of revelation
and also of the becoming-man is given. Whoever deems the incarnation
impossible must, upon reflection, also come to the denial of creation;
whoever accepts the latter has in principle lost the right to combat the
former. Earlier, part II 310. 401, it has appeared that the possibility of
creation is given with the generation of the Son; if God were
incommunicable, He would have been able to give life neither to the Son
nor to any creature. Now it must be added that, if God has been able to
create and has been able to reveal Himself to beings essentially distinct
from Him, then He must also be able to become man. For the [258]
becoming-man is certainly indeed distinct from all other revelation, but it is
nevertheless also related to it, it is its point, its crown, its completion, cf.
Athan. and Greg. Nyss. with Harnack, D. G. II 167. All revelation works
toward and groups itself around the incarnation, as the highest, richest, most
perfect revelation. Generation, creation, incarnation stand in close
connection, even though the following does not proceed necessarily from
the preceding. But there is more. Creation itself is already to be thought
infralapsarian and Adam was already a type of Christ. This is unacceptable
from the standpoint of those who think that God proceeded to creation
without counsel and decision and in creation passively awaited what man
would do. But Scripture teaches otherwise. In the creation of Adam God
already reckoned on the Christ. Creation itself in this sense already
prepared the incarnation. The world is so created that it, falling, could be
raised up again; humanity is so organized under one head that it, sinning,
could be gathered together again under another head; Adam is so appointed
as head that Christ could immediately take his place; and the covenant of
works is so arranged that it, broken, could be healed in the covenant of
grace. Therefore one has wrongly thought that the incarnation of God’s Son
would also have taken place without sin. Among the church fathers this
opinion does not yet occur clearly, cf. only Tertullianus, de resurr. carnis 6.
adv. Prax. 12. But in scholasticism this question was much discussed; apart
from the Trinity the incarnation was an article of faith also before the fall
and necessary, in order to bring man to his supernatural goal, cf. part I 518
II 528. The question was therefore answered affirmatively by Rupert v.
Deutz, Duns Scotus, Sent. III dist. 7 qu. 3, Alexander Halesius, Albertus
Magnus, Joh. Wessel, Catharinus, Pighius, Suarez, cf. also Bellarminus, de
Christo V c. 10, who does not decide; further by Osiander, Socinus,
Praelect. theol. c. 10; and then by many more recent theologians, Steffens,
Göschel, Baader, Nitzsch, Martensen, Liebner, Lange, Rothe, Schöberlein,
Ebrard, cf. Dorner, Entw. II 1243-1260, Chr. Gl. I 642; many English
theologians, who try to explain everything by the incarnation, such as
Westcott, Christus Consummator, London 1886 p. 99v. Illingworth, The
incarnation in relation to development, 5 essay in Gore’s Lux Mundi,
also Van Oosterzee, Christol. III 85v. Dogm II 107. 495 etc. It is
understandable how, by reasoning, one came to this opinion. A fact such as
the becoming-man of God cannot be accidental, and cannot have its cause
in sin as an accidental and arbitrary act of man; sin may be able to modify
God’s plan, it could not destroy it; and therefore the becoming-man must
stand fast abstracted from sin; sin only caused that that becoming-man had
to take place for the redemption of the sinner. There is then added to that
still, that religion before and after the fall cannot differ essentially; if a
mediator is now necessary, then such a one was also necessary in religion
before the fall; Christ’s person and work then also by no means are
exhausted in the reconciling of sins, in the acquiring of salvation; He is not
only mediator but also head; He is not a means but also an end,
not there only for the church, the church is also there for Him; the
predestination of Christ to glory precedes that of man. These considerations
contain so much truth that the assent which the hypothesis of the becomingman of God outside sin has found cannot be surprising. If the Pelagian
freedom of the will is taught and sin is thus for God a contingency and
disappointment, there is no better means to unite free will and God’s plan
with one another than by saying that the becoming-man was nevertheless
determined and has only been altered in something subordinate. On the
standpoint of Augustine and still more closely of Reformed theology,
however, there is no need at all for this whole hypothesis. There is only one
plan and decree of God; for another reality than the existing one there is,
with a view to God’s counsel, no place. However much sin then also came
into the world through the will of the creature, it is nevertheless from
eternity included in God’s counsel and is for Him not contingent or
unforeseen. In that eternal counsel the incarnation also has a place on
account of sin; it does not depend on man but only on God’s good pleasure.
Yes more still, the Son was also abstracted from sin for man mediator
unionis; many Reformed persons acknowledged this with Calvin, Inst. II
12, 4. 6. Because this was not well understood by Quenstedt, Theol. did.
pol. I 110 cf. Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. II 190, he could count
Zanchius, Bucanus, Polanus among the proponents of the incarnation
outside sin. The intention was only that religion in covenant of works and
covenant of grace was essentially one and the same, and salvation thus must
always consist in communion with the triune God. Only Comrie, by his
strictly maintained supralapsarianism, came to the doctrine that the
predestination of man in Christ preceded that of the fall, part II 339. But
otherwise most theologians adhered to Scripture, which always and only
brings the incarnation of Christ into connection with sin and in it sees the
greatest proof of God’s mercy, Matthew 1:21, 9:13, 20:28, Luke 1:67, 2:30, Joh.
The opposite opinion also so easily leads to the thought that the becomingman is in itself fitting and necessary for God, that is, to the pantheistic
doctrine of the eternal self-revelation of God in the world. Cf. Iren., adv.
haer. V c. 14. Greg. Naz., Or. 36. August., de verbis Apost. 8, 2. 7. Thomas,
S. Theol. III qu. 1 art. 3, but otherwise Sent. III 1 qu. 1 art. 3. Bonaventura,
Sent. III dist. 1 art. 2 qu. 2. Petavius, de incarn. II c. 17. Schaezler, Das
Dogma v. d. Menschw. Gottes 307. Kleutgen, Theol. III 400. Quenstedt II
108-116. Calovius, Isag. ad theol. 59-99. Calvijn, Inst. II 12, 4-7. Mastricht
V 4, 17. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIII 3. Moor III 759. M. Vitringa V 47. J.
Müller, Dogm. Abh. 1870 S. 66-126. Philippi, K. Gl. IV 376. Frank, Chr.
Wahrh. II2 80. Heraut 264. 265. Orr, Chr. View 319-327.
8. A third and final preparation for the incarnation is the history of
revelation from paradise onward. The incarnation did not take place
immediately after the fall; but many centuries elapsed from the first sin
until the coming of Christ in the flesh. Scripture points this out, when it
speaks of the fullness of time, Ef. 1:10, Galatians 4:4, that this was no accident
or arbitrariness, but had thus been determined by God in his wisdom. The
incarnation first had to be prepared in the preceding history by all manner
of means and along all manner of ways. Just as the incarnation presupposes
generation and creation [261], so now there is added yet another
presupposition and preparation, namely, revelation. It is especially John in
his prologue who sets this preparation of the incarnation in the preceding
history before us in the light. Not only was the Logos in the beginning with
God and himself God; and not only are all things made through him. But
this Logos has also, from the moment of creation onward, communicated
his life and light to the creatures. For in him was life and the life was the
light of men. Even after the fall this revelation did not cease. On the
contrary, the light of that Logos shone in the darkness and enlightened
every man, coming into the world. In particular he revealed himself in
Israel, which he had chosen for himself as an inheritance, and as Angel of
the Covenant led and blessed. He continually came to his own, in
theophany, prophecy, and miracle. Thus the Son prepared and made ready
the whole world, Jews and Gentiles together, for his coming in the flesh.
World and humanity, land and people, manger and stable, Bethlehem and
Nazareth, parents and blood relatives, nature and environment, society and
civilization, it is all a moment in the fullness of the times, in which God
sent his Son in the flesh. It was the Son himself, who thus immediately after
the fall as Logos and as Angel of the Covenant made ready the world of the
Gentiles and of the Jews for his coming. He was coming from the beginning
of the times onward and finally came for good into humanity and by his
incarnation made his dwelling in it. Cf. Baldensperger, Der Prolog. des
vierten Evangeliums, Freiburg Mohr 1898. The incarnation connects with
the preceding, both general and special revelation. It stands and falls with
this. For if God has been able to reveal himself in such a way as Scripture
testifies with respect both to the Gentile world and to Israel, then the
possibility of the incarnation lies therein of itself enclosed; and if the latter
were not possible, the former also would not be maintainable. Revelation,
after all, rests on the same thought as the incarnation, i.e. on the
communicability of God, both within the being of God to the Son
(generation) and outside the being of God to the creatures (creation). This
whole preparation of the incarnation in the preceding centuries now, as it
were, concentrates itself and is completed in the election and bestowal of
grace upon Mary as mother of Jesus. Mary is the blessed among
women. She has received an honor which has fallen to no other creature.
High in unmerited grace, bestowed upon her, she surpasses all men and
angels. Rome has rightly maintained this; whoever denies it is not in earnest
about the incarnation of God. Only, the Roman church has, without any
ground, proceeded from this acknowledgment to the doctrine of the
immaculata conceptio B. Virginis, see above 211v. What has guided it
therein and brought it thereto is not the authority of Scripture or of tradition;
nor is it the attempt to explain and to guarantee thereby the sinlessness of
Jesus, for this rests causally in his divine nature and instrumentally in the
conception by the Holy Spirit. But the driving force for this dogma lies
again for Rome in the hierarchical idea. In proportion as a creature stands
nearer to God, it must also all the more have a share in his nature and in all
his attributes; it must all the more share in the θεωσις, in the deificatio. Now
above Mary no creature stands; she is united with God in the closest
manner, she is θεοτοκος, Deipara, she has carried God’s own Son under her
heart, God himself has dwelt in her. Whether there are proofs from
Scripture and tradition is not the main point; but the Roman cannot think of
the mother of the Savior otherwise than above all children of men and
above all angels of heaven, pleasing to God, pure and spotless. Was she not
bound to the God-man, and thus also to the Divine Person of the Word, to
holiness itself, by the closest and tenderest relations? Has God, by the fact
itself of her election to so high a dignity and so intimate a familiarity, not
shown most clearly that he loved that pure virgin above all creatures? And
is it therefore also, apart from the proofs from Scripture and tradition, not
very plausible that God has endowed the holy virgin above all creatures
with his gifts of grace? The honor of the Savior demanded that his chosen
mother remain free from every trace and shadow even of sin. It is fitting
that a creature which had to associate so intimately with God, stood in so
intimate and tender a relation to him, should remain preserved from the
least stain of sin. It is fitting that the house of the Lord was holy. Thus
Bensdorp in the Katholiek, CXII 1897 bl. 429. 445. 447. In the hierarchical
system of the Roman church and theology the doctrine of the
immaculate conception, the sinlessness of Mary, fits, and therefore this has
gradually been incorporated into it; even the doctrine of her assumption is a
question of time. Therefore the predicates ascribed to Mary increase more
and more, both in number and in quality; she is daughter of the Father, bride
of the Son, temple and organ of the H. Spirit, complementum, Ergänzung
der Dreieinigkeit, die instrumentale und theilweise die meritorische Ursache
unserer ewigen Auserwählung, the principal reason of natural and
supernatural creation, the wise one, working all miracles, equipped with
unlimited dominion, almighty ruler of the church, as God rules the world
etc., see e.g. Wörnhart, Maria die wunderbare Mutter Gottes und der
XIV. Scheeben, Dogm. 69. 93, a Jesuit Salazar in Rivetus, Op. III 681.
Mariolatry with Rome displaces true, Christian worship of God entirely and
completely. Prof. Schoeler, Das vatik. Bild, Gütersloh 1898 sees this
superstition typically expressed in a wall painting in the Vatican, which
represents the Madonna, placed high in the middle, while Father and Son,
as instruments of her almighty will, are seated on the right and left side. It is
against this deification of man that the Reformation rose in protest. It would
not be surprising if, out of fear of such an idolatry, it had not always shown
to Mary the honor due to her. But that too is not the case, although it was of
course cautious in its praise. Mary also stands in high honor with all
Protestants who confess the incarnation of the Word. She has been chosen
and prepared by God to be the mother of his Son. She is the graced one
among women. She has been desired by Christ himself as his mother, who
received him from the H. Spirit, who bore him under her heart, who nursed
him at her breast, who instructed him in the Scriptures, in whom, in one
word, the preparation of the incarnation was completed.
9. Yet, although Christ in his incarnation connects with the preceding
revelation and by nature and history prepared his own coming, He is not a
product of the past, no fruit of Israel or of humanity. Up to a certain
extent it holds true of every human being, that he cannot be fully explained
from his parents and environment. Therefore Kuenen too, G. v. I. II 506v.,
Volksgodsd. en Wereldgodsd. 158. 193, after he had indicated the
conditions and building materials for Christianity, could acknowledge that
thereby the person of Christ is still not understood. But it holds true of
Christ in another and higher sense than was meant by him. For according to
Scripture, in Christ that Word has become flesh, which in the beginning was
with God and itself was God. At all times and from all sides this divinity of
Christ has been denied and contested. But 1o Scripture teaches nothing else,
above bl. 231, 238. We are, as Ch. de la Saussaye once said, accustomed to
the superlatives of Holy Scripture and often no longer understand the force
of its expressions. But if a human being spoke of himself as Jesus always
did, if others so venerated a human being as prophets and apostles do the
Christ, then everyone would hold that for insane fanaticism or dreadful
blasphemy. Scripture ascribes to Christ, not in a single place but repeatedly,
Galatians 4:4, Philippians 2:6, a divine Sonship in a supernatural sense, Matthew 3:17,
the acquisition for all and each of all salvation and blessedness, Matthew 1:21,
15:27, Ef. 1:20-22, Philippians 2:9, Colossians 2:10, Hebr. 2:8, the judgment over the
living and the dead, John 5:27, Hd. 10:42, 17:31, Romans 14:10, 2 Corinthians 5:10; it
calls Him directly and unambiguously by the name of God, John 1:1, 20:28,
θεος. 2o It is true that all contesting of the divinity of Christ begins with an
appeal to Scripture against the confession. But this illusion lasts only a very
short time. Impartial exegesis soon shows that the doctrine of the church
has far more ground in Scripture than one originally had expected.
Thus one then sees oneself compelled to go back again from the Christ of
the apostolic proclamation to the Jesus of the Synoptics and then to criticize
this for so long until all the supernatural disappears from it. The divinity of
Christ can then be declared to be a fruit of profound theological or
philosophical speculation, originally wholly foreign to the church, Nitzsch,
Ev. Dogm. 522. Schultz, Gottheit Christi 417 f. 438. 468. This, however,
always lasts only so long as one sets store by it and has an interest in
presenting one’s own faith as the original, pure Christianity. As soon as that
standpoint is abandoned, impartiality resumes its voice and gives the
ecclesiastical confession its due. Negari nequit, in dictis eorum (scriptorum
s.) semina quaedam doctrinae ecclesiasticae vere inesse, Wegscheider §
128. Es ist unleugbar, dass auch dasjenige, was die Kirchenlehre über die
göttliche Natur Christi lehrt, Stützpunkte im N. T. besitzt, Nitzsch ib. 518.
521, cf. also Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I 353. 418. Baldensperger, Der
Prolog. des vierten Ev. 4 f. Thereby the explanation of this dogma from
later, theological or philosophical speculation again falls away. 3o. Just as
the study of Scripture, so dogma-historical research also again and again
sets the seal of truth upon the ecclesiastical confession of the divinity of
Christ. The development of the Christological dogma shows a logical
course, which in the end is noticed and acknowledged by every investigator,
v. Hartmann, Die Krisis des Christ. 6. Simple was the faith with which the
church stepped forth into the world. But it knew one thing, that in Christ
God himself had come to it and had taken it up into his communion. That
stood firm, that it did not allow to be taken from it, that it defended against
all manner of contesting and formulated clearly and distinctly in its
confession. In the doctrine of the divinity of Christ it maintained the
absolute character of the Christian religion, the reality of its communion
with God. In Christianity Christ occupies a wholly different place than
Buddha, Zarathustra, Mohammed in their religions. Christus ist nicht der
Lehrer, nicht der Stifter, er ist der Inhalt des Christenthums, Schelling,
Werke II 4 S. 35, cf. v. Hartmann, Die Krisis des Christ. 1880 S. 1. Strauss,
Dogm. II 174. Therefore, judged according to the doctrine of Scripture and
the faith of the church, in the end men such as Irenaeus, Athanasius,
Augustine are again and again put in the right over against their opponents.
Everyone counts agreement with them as an honor; no one is gladly named
after Arius, Pelagius, or Socinus. 4o. It is clear that the Christian religion,
i.e. the true communion of God and human being, cannot be maintained
otherwise than by the confession of the divinity of Christ. For if Christ is
not true God, then He is only a human being. And however highly He may
then be placed, He can be neither in his person nor in his work content and
object of the Christian faith. Whether Christ then for himself stood in
unbroken communion with God (Schleiermacher), first pronounced the
unity of God and human being (Hegel), fully realized the sonship of God in
himself (Lipsius), revealed God’s love and founded the kingdom of God
(Ritschl); Christianity is now nevertheless, now that it once exists,
independent of Him; He is its founder, historically his significance remains
great, and his example continues to work, but He himself stands outside the
essence of Christianity. The Arian Christology, the moral Christology of
rationalism, the symbolic of Kant, the ideal of Hegel, the aesthetic of de
Wette, the anthropological of Feuerbach, none of them leave to Christ in
dogmatics a place. Wird die Persönlichkeit Christi als eine menschliche,
wenn auch noch so sehr idealisirte, festgehalten, so kann nicht sie selbst als
Persönlichkeit die erlösende Kraft für den Gläubigen sein, v. Hartmann ib.
15. 5o. Ritschl and his followers, however, still try to maintain for Jesus,
although only human, the title of God, because He for the church takes the
place of God and possesses the value of God. Formerly this was attempted
in the same way by the Socinians. They contested the divinity of Christ as
strongly as possible and said that Christ, in those few Scripture passages
where He was called God, such as John 1:1, 20:28, Romans 9:5, was thus
called on account of his rank, dignity, and dominion, to which He especially
after his resurrection was exalted, Cat. Rac. qu. 94-190. Christ works by
divine power those same things, quae ipsius Dei sunt, tanquam Deus ipse,
ib. 120. 164. Hoc nomen Deus non est nomen substantiae cujusdam
proprium vel personae, sed auctoritatis, potentiae, just as also angels and
authorities in Scripture according to Jesus’ own word, John 10:34, are
sometimes called Gods, Socinus, on John 1:1. The same is now taught by
Ritschl and his school; the name of God is indeed used in Scripture and in
the church for Christ, but is then an office-name, not an essence-name. This
representation, however, is wholly untenable. Indeed angels and authorities
are sometimes called God in Scripture, but then the figurative, official sense
is clear and strikes everyone’s eye. With Christ that is a wholly different
case. To Him a personal, eternal continuance is ascribed; of Him it is said
that He was God, existed in his form, was the radiance of God’s glory, onlybegotten Son of God, Image of the invisible God, indeed God above all to
be praised unto eternity—who can possibly understand this of a human
being, who only on account of the office that he bore and the work that he
did received the honorary title of God? Further, the Christian church, in
calling Jesus God, never meant thereby an office-name but always an
essence-name. When one begins to use that same word and that same name
in a wholly different sense, one intentionally gives occasion for
misunderstanding and confusion and makes oneself guilty of dishonesty
toward the church. Further, if Christ is not God in an essential sense, then
He may also not be so called and venerated. Even if one says that He has
perfectly revealed God’s love, that He has wholly taken up into himself
God’s plan with world and humanity, that He has fully made God’s will his
own, all this does not justify, on a scriptural, Christian standpoint and also
logically and philosophically, for the human being Jesus the designation of
God. To be one with God in a religious and ethical sense is something
wholly different than to be it in a metaphysical sense. A Werthurtheil is
untrue if it does not have its ground in a Seinsurtheil. Finally, the
designation and veneration of Jesus as God, while He is only a human
being, is a pantheistic mixing of Creator and creature, a pagan idolatry, a
return to Roman creature-deification, in direct conflict with the essence of
Christianity and with the principle of Protestantism. If Jesus, although only
a human being, may be invoked and venerated as God, then thereby in
principle also the Roman veneration of Mary, the saints and the angels, and
all pagan idolatry is justified. In contesting that God can become
human, one at the same time teaches that a human being can indeed raise
himself to the rank and dignity of God, Schultz, Gottheit Christi 386 f. 389.
407. 411. 454. 463. Incarnation is impossible, but apotheosis will be able to
exist very well. The becoming-human of God is absurd, but the becoming-
God of the human being will be reasonable; as if what proceeds from
development could ever be God. Το γαρ προκοπτον ο ὐ θεος, Greg. Naz. bij
Schaezler t. a. p. 56, and cf. further Fock, Der Socin. 538 f. Lipsius, Theol.
Jahresbericht X 378, Pfleiderer, Jahrb. f. prot. Theol. 1889 S. 168 f.
Dieckhoff, Die Menschw. des Sohnes Gottes. Ein Votum über die Theol.
Ritschl’s, Leipzig 1882. Stählin, Kant, Lotze, Albr. Ritschl, Leipzig 1888 S.
165 f. Hoensbroech, Christ u. Widerchrist. Ein Beitrag zur Vertheidigung
der Gottheit Christi u. zur Char. d. Unglaubens in der prot. Theol. Freiburg
10. This Son of God became man according to the doctrine of Holy
Scripture through conception by the Holy Spirit and through birth from the
virgin Mary. The supernatural conception was already denied in ancient
times by the Jews, Eisenmenger, Entd. Judenthum I 105 f., by the Ebionites,
by Cerinthus, Carpocrates, Celsus, cf. Moor III 722, deists and rationalists
in the previous century, such as Morgan, Chubb, cf. Bretschneider, Entw.
567, by the more recent critics such as Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Renan etc.,
and in the most recent time by Harnack, Das apost. Glaubensbekenntniss,
Berlin 1892; his judgment, that the words: conceived of the Holy Spirit and
born of the virgin Mary did not constitute a component part of the original
proclamation of the gospel, gave occasion for a serious struggle, in which
many ranged themselves on his side, such as Achelis, Zur Symbolfrage
Berlin 1892, Herrmann, Worum handelt es sich in dem Streit um das
Apostolikum? Leipzig 1893. Hering, Die dogm. Bedeutung und der relig.
Werth der übernat. Geburt Christi, Zeits. f. Th. u. Kirche von Gottschick,
1895, S. 58-91. Lobstein, Die Lehre v. der übernat. Geburt Christi, 2e Aufl.
1896, but others also decidedly set themselves over against him, especially
Wohlenberg, Empfangen vom h. Geist, geboren von der Jungfrau Maria
1893. Cremer, Zum Kampf um das Apostolikum, Berlin 1892, Th. Zahn,
Das apost. Symbolum, Erl. u. Leipzig 1893. This struggle gained still
more importance through the discovery of a Syriac translation of the
gospels by Mrs. Lewis and her sister Mrs. Gibson in a palimpsest of the
Katharinenkloster on Sinai in the summer of 1892, The four gospels in
Syriac, transscribed from the Sinaitic palimpsest. By the late Robert L.
Bensley and by J. Rendel Harris and by F. Crawford Burkitt. With an introd.
by Agnes Smith Lewis, Cambridge 1894. Matthew 1:16 indeed reads in this
Syriac translation as follows: Joseph, to whom the virgin Mary was
betrothed, begot Jesus, who is called Christ, cf. Theol. Tijdschr. May 1895
bl. 258v. Gids, July 1895 bl. 88-104. But even if this Syr. translator were
thereby to deny the supernatural conception of Christ, this fact would stand
entirely by itself in the history of the gospel among the Syrians and would
have remained without influence. The Syriac diatessaron of Tatian, the
Syriac Gospel fragments, published by Cureton in 1858, and all later Syriac
editions of the Gospels teach it clearly. Further, the newly found translation
in Matthew 1:16 calls Mary virgin and betrothed to Joseph; v. 18 reads likewise
as in our Gr. text and thus teaches the conception of the Holy Spirit,
likewise v. 20, and with Luke 3:23 it is the same case. There is not the least
proof that the Syr. translator by his text of Matthew 1:16 intended to deny the
conception of the Holy Spirit, Th. Zahn, Theol. Lit. Blatt 1895 col. 28. But
further, the supernatural conception by the Holy Spirit was certainly a
component part of the original proclamation of the gospel. The old Roman
symbol, which certainly existed before the middle of the second century
and probably already toward the end of the first century, already contained
the words: qui natus est de Spiritu Sancto et Maria virgine, (τον γεννηθεντα
ἐ κ πνευματος ἁ γιου και Μαριας της παρθενου), later somewhat altered for
clarification. The opponents of the supernatural conception, including
Cerinthus, a contemporary of John, never appealed to the fact that this
doctrine had arisen later; in their time this must therefore have been content
of the general Christian faith; there is not a single ground and it is moreover
also strange, to hold the heretics Cerinthus etc., with Harnack, for the pure
bearers and preservers of the faith of the first Christian congregation.
Further, this doctrine is found in the letters of Ignatius, ad Smyrn. I 1-
3, ad Eph. VII 1-2, who suffered martyrdom about the year 117, and in the
Apology of the philosopher Aristides of Athens found some time ago,
which he presented in the year 125 to Emperor Hadrian. It must all the more
have been content of the apostolic preaching, because the pagan fables of
sons of gods would otherwise certainly have deterred the Christians from a
doctrine that seemed so closely related to them. Of an influence of those
pagan fables on the origin of the evangelical narrative of the supernatural
conception, as Usener, Religionsgesch. Untersuchungen, I Das
Weihnachtsfest Bonn 1880 S. 69 f. and Hillmann, Die Kindheitsgesch. Jesu
nach Lukas, Jahrb. f. prot. Theol., 1891 S. 192 f. assumed, there is nowhere
any trace; Harnack, Theol. Lit. Z. 1889 No 8 therefore explains it only from
Jewish data, specifically from an incorrect exegesis of Isaiah 7:14, cf. also
Weiss, Leben Jesu I 217 f. Finally, it occurs indeed in the N. T. directly only
in Matthew and Luke, but that which it comes down to in these narratives in
Matthew and Luke is the doctrine of all evangelists and apostles. Jesus is
namely, in the first place, genealogically a son of David; for that he was
generally held, by the crowd that surrounded Him time and again, and by all
22:16. Further, He is the Holy One, who has never done or known any sin,
born of Mary, is the Son of God in an altogether unique sense, Matthew 1:23,
35 etc. In order that this might now be obtained, that a son of David, born
from his lineage, would nevertheless be free from all sin and would be
God’s Son, for that the supernatural conception was necessary; for that it
occurred; and therefore it also has a high religious and ethical importance.
This is, however—to dispose of this point here briefly—not the case [271]
with the theologoumenon that Mary remained a virgin in and after the birth.
The virginity of Mary in partu and post partum is not yet encountered
among the church fathers before Nicaea; Tertullian, de carne Christi c. 23,
Origen, hom. 14 in Luc., Irenaeus, adv. haer. IV 66 do not yet know the
virginitas in partu, and Tertullian, de carne Christi 7 also denies the
virginitas post partum. The virginitas in partu occurs for the first time in the
apocryphal Evang. Jacobi c. 19 and was also, as some persons’ opinion,
already known to Clemens Alex., Strom. VII c. 16. But after Nicaea the
virginitas of Mary both in partu and post partum in connection with her
Gottesmutterschaft (θεοτοκος, deipara) is taught ever more clearly, by
Epiphanius, Hieronymus, Greg. Nyss., Ephraim, Ambrosius, Augustinus
etc., and defended against the Apollinarians, Helvidius, Jovinianus,
Bonosus, cf. Bellarminus, de sacr. euch. III c. 6. Petavius, de incarn. XIV c.
3 sq. Lehner, Die Marienverehrung S. 120 f. The fifth ecumenical council
can. 6 adopted the title ἀ ειπαρθενος of Epiphanius for Mary, and the
Lateran synod of 649 established in can. 3 her virginity also in and after the
birth of Jesus, cf. Cat. Rom. I 4, 8. The semper virgo was also included in
the Art. Smalc. I 4, Form. Conc. II 7, 100 and 8, 24. Zwinglii Expos. Chr.
fidei 5, but Lutherans and Reformed nevertheless taught that the birth of
Jesus had taken place in the ordinary way and that the virginitas of Mary,
post partum, although acceptable for piety’s sake, was nevertheless not an
article of faith and in no case had been undertaken by Mary by way of a
vow. That Mary bore Jesus utero clauso, Scripture teaches with not a single
word. That she bound herself by vow to virginity is not to be derived from
Genesis 3:15, Isaiah 7:14, Luke 1:34 and from so-called types, Judges 6:36, 11:29,
Daniel 2:34, Ezekiel 44:2. And that she later brought forth no more children is
difficult to maintain in the face of Matthew 1:18, 25, 12:46, 13:55, Mark 3:31, 6:3,
1:34. Polanus, Synt. VI c. 17. Rivetus, Apol. pro S. Virgine Maria, Op. III
601-744. Chamier, Panstr. Cath. II 4 c. 3. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIII 10.
Mastricht, Theol. V 10, 12. Moor III 563. 716. Quenstedt, Theol. III 401.
11. The case is quite different with the supernatural conception. This is of
the highest significance for the person of Christ and therefore also of
religious importance. Scripture ascribes Jesus’ conception to the Holy Spirit
or to the power of the Most High. The Holy Spirit, who is the author of all
physical, psychical, and pneumatical life, part II 230, is in Matthew 1:18, 20, as
is evident from the prep. ἐ κ, conceived as the causa efficiens of that
conception, while this in Luke 1:35 is ascribed to the power that will go
forth from God, the Most High, and will come upon Mary. Clearly it
appears from this that the activity of the Holy Spirit in this conception did
not consist in the pouring out of any heavenly, divine substance into Mary,
but in a manifestation of power, which made her womb fruitful, in an
overshadowing as with a cloud, cf. Exodus 40:34, Numbers 9:15, Luke 9:34, Acts 1:8. If the old dispute between spermatists and ovists were decided in favor
of the latter, which, however, is by no means yet the case, Schäfer, Die
Vererbung, Berlin 1897 S. 74-80; then this activity of the Holy Spirit would
thereby also be physiologically elucidated. But however this may be, what
is conceived in Mary, το ἐ ν α ὐ τ ῃ γεννηθεν is ἐ κ πνευματος ἁ γιου, from the
Holy Spirit as causa efficiens, has its cause in the activity of the Holy Spirit
and not in the will of man or of the flesh. Besides this making fruitful of
Mary’s womb, the Holy Spirit also effected the sanctification of the little
child, that would be born from her. It is a ἁ γιον, that is born from her; it will
be called Son of God, Son of the Most High, Luke 1:35. It is now of
importance to note that this activity of the Holy Spirit with respect to the
human nature of Christ by no means stands by itself; it did indeed begin at
the conception but did not end; it continued throughout his whole life, even
into the state of exaltation. In general, the necessity of this activity can
already be inferred from the fact that the Holy Spirit is author of all life in
the creatures and in particular of the religious-ethical life in man. The true
man, who bears God’s image, is not conceivable for a moment without the
indwelling of the Holy Spirit, part II 540. Furthermore, the human nature in
Christ had to be prepared for union with the person of the Son, i.e. for a
unity and communion with God, as to which no other creature has
ever been deemed worthy. If man in general already cannot have
communion with God except through the Holy Spirit, then this applies in an
even stronger measure to Christ’s human nature, which had to be united
with the Son in an altogether unique way. This special union, which far
surpasses and essentially differs from the immanence of God in his
creatures, the revelation of God in the prophets, the indwelling of God in
his people, makes an altogether special activity of the Holy Spirit already a
priori probable and even necessary. But Holy Scripture also teaches this
expressly. Prophecy already proclaimed that the Messiah would in a special
sense be anointed with the Holy Spirit, Isaiah 61:1, and the N. T. relates that
Christ received that Spirit without measure, John 3:34. Not only was he
conceived by him, but that Spirit descends upon him at baptism, Matthew 3:16,
fills him wholly and entirely, Luke 4:1, 18, leads him away to the
wilderness and to Galilee, Matthew 4:1, Luke 4:14, gives him the power to cast
out devils, Matthew 12:18, to offer himself to God without blemish, Hebrews 9:14, in
order, just as he became David’s Son in the way of the flesh, so through the
resurrection to be appointed as Son of God in power, as Lord, with a
glorified body, Romans 1:4, to justify himself as such before all eyes, 1 Timothy 3:16, to depart from the earth and to ascend into heaven, 1 Peter 3:19, 22,
and to reveal himself as life-giving Spirit, whose the Spirit is and who
works through the Spirit, to his own, 1 Corinthians 15:45, 2 Corinthians 3:17, 18, cf.
Gloël, Der H. Geist, Halle 1888 S. 113 f.
Placed in this context, the conception by the Holy Spirit acquires a rich
significance. Jesus had, according to his human nature, from the first
moment onward, through his whole life, even unto the state of exaltation, to
be formed into Messiah, Christ, Son of God of the Most High. He could not
become this except κατα σαρκα, in the way of the flesh, through birth from
a woman, Romans 1:3, 9:5, Galatians 4:4, but at the same time, in order to be that,
he could not be the fruit of the will of man or of the flesh. What is born of
flesh is flesh. Jesus would then perhaps have been David’s son and heir of
his earthly kingdom, but not David’s Lord, the Messiah, the Son of God,
who is appointed to be king in the Kingdom of God. And that he
nevertheless was. Paul does indeed say that he was appointed Son of God
and Lord by the resurrection, Romans 1:4, but this does not exclude that he
already at and before his conception was Son of God, Romans 1:3; any more
than the υ ἱ οθεσια, expected by believers in the future, Romans 8:23, excludes
that they already possess it now, Romans 8:15. Christ was Son of God from
eternity; he was in the beginning with God; he is the firstborn of all
creatures. Thus he also could not be begotten and brought forth by the will
of man; he himself was the acting subject, who by the Holy Spirit prepared
for himself a body in Mary’s womb. In the O. T. he is therefore especially
promised as the seed of the woman, Genesis 3:15, as the one given by God,
Jes. 9:5, as the one begotten by the Lord, Jeremiah 23:5, 6, 33:14-17, as a shoot
from the hewn-down trunk of Jesse, Jes. 11:1, as the son of an ַעְלָמה, in
general a young woman, and especially an unmarried one, Genesis 24:43, Exodus 2:8, Psalms 68:26, Song of Songs 1:3, 6:8, Proverbs 30:18, 19, who shall bear the
name Immanuel, Jes. 7:14. In the O. T. nothing further is said about the
manner of his conception; only, he shall be the son of a woman and at the
same time a gift and revelation of God. This has thus been fulfilled in
Christ. Leaving aside the difficult question whether Luke gives the
genealogy of Mary and Mary herself was also of David’s lineage, cf. Luke 1:30-33, 35, 48; not according to Mary but according to Joseph was Jesus a
Davidide. Even if he was not from Joseph, he nevertheless was, through
Mary, who was betrothed to Joseph, civilly and legally the son of Joseph,
Luke 2:27, 41, 48, and inherited from him the rights to David’s throne.
Therefore Joseph was also admonished by God to take Mary to himself as
his lawful wife, to act as head and father of the family, and as such to give
the child the name Jesus, Matthew 1:18-21. Thus Christ became David’s son and
at the same time remained David’s Lord. This exclusion of the man in his
conception at the same time brought about that Christ, as not included in the
covenant of works, also remained free from inherited guilt and therefore
also according to his human nature could be preserved before and after his
birth from every stain of sin. As subject, as I, he was not from Adam, but he
was the Son of the Father, who from eternity had been chosen as Head of a
new covenant. Not Adam but God was his Father. As person he did
not come forth from humanity but he himself came to it from outside and
entered into it. And because he thus, according to God’s righteous
judgment, remained free from all inherited guilt, therefore he could be
conceived by the Holy Spirit and by that Spirit remain freed from every
stain of sin. The conception by the Holy Spirit was not the deepest ground
and final cause of Jesus’ sinlessness, as many assert, Ebrard, Dogm. II 4-10.
Rothe, Ethik § 533 f. Müller, Sünde II 535, but it was the only way in which
he, who as person already existed and had been appointed Head of a new
covenant, now also in a human way, in the flesh, could be and remain what
he was, the Christ, the Son of God of the Most High. Cf. Polanus, Synt. XI.
13. Frank, Chr. Wahrh. II 109 f.
12. Through this conception by the Holy Spirit and birth from Mary the
Son of God became a true and perfect man. But no less strongly than his
Godhead, his manhood has been contested. The Gnostics could not
acknowledge it by virtue of their dualism, and therefore said that the aeon
Christ had assumed only an apparent body (Saturninus, Marcion), or that
He had brought with Him a glorious, spiritual body from heaven and had
only passed through Mary as water through a pipe (Valentinus, Bardesanes),
or that at His descent to the earth He had indeed formed for Himself a body
out of the elements and had suffered in it, but at His return to heaven had
dissolved and abandoned it (Apelles), or that He had only temporarily at
baptism descended upon the man Jesus and had left him before the suffering
(Cerinthus), or had, before the suffering, exchanged Himself with Simon of
Cyrene and had delivered him over to death on the cross (Basilides), or that
Christ, the Jesus impatibilis, who from the world of light already descended
to Adam and only appeared on earth in an apparent body, is indeed to be
distinguished from the Jesus patibilis, who was the son of a poor widow and
an envoy of the devil, and, because he set himself against Christ, was struck
by Him on the cross (Mani). All these ideas propagated themselves in the
medieval sects and, under the influence of pantheistic mysticism,
kabbalistic theosophy, and the more recent philosophy of nature, in the
century of the Reformation among the Anabaptists came to a new, extensive
dominion. They too taught that Christ could not assume his human
nature from Mary, from Adamic humanity, because then He would
necessarily have had to be a sinner; but He assumed it from eternity out of
Himself, thus brought His body with Him from heaven and passed through
Mary as through a channel (Hofmann, Menno Simons; cf. related
representation of an eternal corporeality of God in the kabbala with its
Adam Kadmon, in Swedenborg, Dippel, Oetinger, Petersen); or He formed
for Himself this heavenly, invisible corporeality from eternity out of the
eternal virgin, the Divine Eve, the wisdom of God, dwelt with it already
immediately after the fall in Adam, Abel, etc., and then made it visible and
mortal through the conception and birth from Mary (Weigel); or He
assumed that glorious human nature already at once at the creation from
Adam before the fall, who then still had a fine, heavenly corporeality, in
order later to clothe it from Mary with a weak, mortal humanity (Ant.
Bourignon, Poiret, Barclay); or also He formed for Himself his human
nature from Mary, but not from the fleshly, rather from the regenerated
Mary, who through her union with the Divine wisdom had received a holy,
Divine element in herself and had regained the virginal being of Adam
before the fall (Schwencfeld e. a.), cf. the works of Dorner, Schwane,
Harnack etc. cited earlier. These thoughts seem to us very strange. Yet in
other forms they express nothing other than what the more recent
philosophy since Kant and Hegel with its separation of the ideal and
historical Christ has presented. The ideal Christ is the eternal Logos, the
absolute reason, the one substance which in the world realises itself
eternally and cannot pour out its fullness in a single man but in humanity as
the Son of God assumes human nature. But the historical Jesus is not the
true, essential Christ; in the process of incarnation He indeed forms an
important but nevertheless only a transient moment; He has been a weak,
mortal, sinful man, who has indeed revealed the idea of the true Christ, but
by no means coincides with him and is one with him, cf. Runze, Dogm. §
Now it needs no lengthy argument that Holy Scripture here stands in
direct opposition. Under the O. T. promised as the Messiah, who will
proceed from a woman, from Abraham, Judah, David, He is in the
fullness of time conceived in Mary, ἐ ν α ὐ τη, Matthew 1:20 by the H. Spirit, and
born from her, ἐ κ γυναικος, Galatians 4:4. He is her son, Luke 2:7, fruit of her
womb, Luke 1:42, according to the flesh from David and Israel, Hd. 2:30,
Romans 1:3, 9:5, partaking of our flesh and blood and like us in all things,
except sin, Hebr. 2:14, 17, 18, 4:15, 5:1, a true man, the Son of man, Rom.
hungering, Matthew 4:2, thirsting, John 19:28, weeping, Luke 19:41, John 11:35,
troubled, John 12:27, sorrowful, Matthew 26:38, wrathful, John 2:17, suffering,
dying, etc. For Scripture it is so certain that Christ has come in the flesh,
that it calls the denial of that antichristian, 1 John 2:22. And not only does it
teach that Christ has assumed a true, but also that He has assumed a perfect
human nature. Arius denied this and said that the Logos, who after all was a
creature, could not become man but had only appeared in human form and
to that end had assumed only a body, but no soul. In contrast, Apollinaris
wished precisely to maintain that Christ was not merely a man illumined by
the Logos, an ἀ νθρωπος ἐ νθεος, as Paul of Samosata said, but that He
Himself was God and His work divine; and thus he came to the doctrine
that the Logos had assumed an ensouled human body, without pneuma, and
Himself filled the place of that pneuma, cf. art. Apoll. in Herzog3 1, 671.
But Scripture says clearly that Jesus was a complete man and ascribes to
Him all the constituent parts of human nature, not only a body, Matthew 26:26,
John 20:12, Philippians 3:21, 1 Petr 2:24, flesh and blood, Hebr. 2:14, bones and
side, John 19:33, 34, head and hands and feet, Matthew 8:20, Luke 24:39, but also
a soul, Matthew 26:38, spirit, Matthew 27:50, Luke 23:46, John 13:21, consciousness,
Mark 13:32, will, Matthew 26:39, John 5:30, 6:38 etc. Apollinarianism was
therefore condemned by the Christian church and theology at all times; they
understood the importance that was at stake here: totus enim Christus totum
assumpsit me, ut toti mihi salutem gratificaret; quod enim inassumptibile
est, incurabile est, Damasc., de fide orthod. III 6. Lombardus, Sent. III 2.
Petavius, de incarn. V c. [278] 11. The denial of the true and the perfect
human nature always proceeds from a certain dualism. The σαρξ, matter, is
by nature sinful and therefore cannot be a constituent part of the true Christ;
therefore this one has not derived his substance from the sensible, material
world, but from the invisible, heavenly essence in God, in himself, in the
divine wisdom, in the unfallen Adam or the reborn Mary. The connection
between this ideal Christ and the historical Jesus can therefore only be
accidental, mechanical; it does not come to a true unity, that is, therefore
also to no true communion of God and man. God and world, creation and
re-creation, nature and grace, the eternal and the temporal, the heavenly and
the earthly remain eternally alongside and over against one another. Among
the Gnostics and the Anabaptists all this is clear. But however strange it
may sound, this same dualism is also proper to the more recent pantheistic
philosophy, which so gladly adorns itself with the name of monism. For
indeed, it is an axiom of this philosophy that the idea cannot pour itself out
fully in one individual; that is, no unity, no communion of God and man is
possible. In order to come to communion with God, the individual must
lose himself, erase his personality, sink away like a wave into the ocean of
the all. God and man, eternity and time, and in particular holiness and
finitude stand over against one another; the finite is in its nature defective,
imperfect; sin is necessary. Hence, Hegel, in Dorner, Entw. II 1115 f.,
Strauss, Gl. II 164, Leben Jesu 1835 II 716-718, Baur, Dreieinigkeit III 963
f. e. a. cannot maintain the sinlessness of Jesus; a finite individual cannot be
perfect and enjoy full communion with God. Now this pantheism thinks to
be able in another way to compensate what it first has taken away. It
ascribes to the whole what it takes away from the parts; not one single man,
but humanity is the true Christ, the son of God, it enjoys the highest unity
and communion with God, in it God assumes human nature. But this
compensation is apparent and gives nothing. Not only does humanity exist
only in the individuals and is the all nothing other than the sum of the parts;
but it is also not true that the all, that humanity stands nearer to God
than the individual human beings. Goethe did indeed say, willst du ins
Unendliche schreiten, so geh’ ins Endliche nach allen Seiten; but the
endless is something wholly different from the infinite, eternity something
wholly different from the unspeakable sum of all moments of time, and
perfection something wholly different from the total of all imperfections.
Even if pantheism exchanges the individual for humanity and the part for
the whole, it thereby advances not a step; it leaves the transition from the
infinite to the finite, from eternity to time, from God to the world
completely unexplained and gives for explanation nothing but words and
images, part II 392. If God cannot become man in one, then He also cannot
become it in all. Over against this dualistic and atomistic view Scripture
now places the organic. In one God comes to all, not in appearance but in
truth. There is one Mediator of God and of men, the man Christ Jesus. But
therefore it depends just as much on His Godhead as on His true and perfect
human nature. If one essential constituent part in the human nature of Christ
is excluded from the true unity and communion with God, then there is an
element in creation that remains standing dualistically alongside and over
against God. Then there is an eternal ὑ λη. Then God is not the Almighty,
Creator of heaven and earth. Then the Christian religion is not truly
catholic. Quod enim inassumptibile est, incurabile est.
13. Thus in Christ God and man are united with one another. Scripture
does not speak in the language of later theology, but in substance contains
that same thing which has been confessed by the Christian church in its
doctrine of the two natures. The Pauline christology, says Holtzmann, Neut.
Theol. II 75, ist allerdings ein erster Ansatz zur kirchlichen Lehre von der
Doppelnatur. For according to Scripture the Word, which was with God and
itself was God, became flesh, ὁ λογος σαρξ ἐ γενετο, John 1:14. He, who
of our flesh and blood and became like us in all things, Hebr. 1:3, 2:14, God
sent his own, only-begotten Son into the world, who was born of a woman,
δουλου λαβων, Philippians 2:7. From the fathers κατα σαρκα, He is nevertheless ὁ
of the invisible God, firstborn of all creatures, Creator of all things, He is
nevertheless also πρωτοτοκος ἐ κ των νεκρων, Colossians 1:13-18; David’s son,
He is nevertheless at the same time David’s Lord, Matthew 22:43; walking about
on earth, He is also thus still always ε ἰ ς τον κολπον του πατρος, John 1:18, ὁ
ὠ ν ἐ ν τω ο ὐ ραν ῳ , John 3:13, being before Abraham, John 8:58; in one
word, the fullness of the Godhead dwells σωματικως in Him, Colossians 2:9. At
every moment in Scripture divine and human predicates are ascribed to the
same personal subject, a divine and a human being, omnipresence and
limitation, eternity and time, creative omnipotence and creaturely weakness.
What is all this other than the ecclesiastical doctrine of the two natures,
united in one person? The more recent theology, however, feels for a part of
this doctrine of the two natures a deep aversion, finds it the height of
absurdity, and replaces it by the Doppelseitigkeit, Holtzmann, Neut. Theol.
II 65. 94, by the Doppelheit von Gesichtspunkten, Pfleiderer, Grundriss §
129. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 513, by the doctrine of two successive states
before and after the resurrection, Schultz, Gottheit Christi 417, or by that of
idea and appearance, Schweizer, Chr. Gl. II 12 etc. It is clear that in these
considerations the doctrine of Scripture concerning the person of Christ
does not at all come into its own. Even if it is true that Christ, especially in
Paul, only through his resurrection enters into the full Sonship, Romans 1:4,
becomes Lord from heaven and life-giving Spirit, 1 Corinthians 15:45, 2 Corinthians 3:17
and receives a name above every name, Philippians 2:9, thereby Paul in the least
does not deny that Christ also before his incarnation already had a personal,
divine existence, 2 Corinthians 8:9, Philippians 2:6, Colossians 1:15-17 and was God’s own
Son, Romans 1:3, 8:32, Galatians 4:4. The doctrine of the two natures is something
altogether different from the doctrine of two sides to or two states in the life
of Christ. Jesus in Scripture bears all those glorious predicates not because
He on the one hand as man devoted himself completely to God and
therefore was truly man, and because He on the other hand as that same
man completely revealed God’s love to us, Schultz, Gottheit Christi
338, but because He truly was God and man in one person. A man, however
highly placed in religious and ethical sense, can and may nevertheless,
precisely according to the strict monotheism of Holy Scripture, not bear
those divine predicates which are precisely by it attributed to Christ. It then
also appears convincingly that they who replace the doctrine of the two
natures by that of the two sides or that of the two states nevertheless can
and dare by no means speak of Christ in such a way as Scripture does. The
names of God, Son of God, Logos, Image of God, firstborn of all creatures
etc. are therefore all deprived of their scriptural meaning and understood in
a wholly different sense. Modern theology, assuming in Jesus only a human
nature, can honor Him neither according to his religious side, as revelation
of God’s love, nor also in the state of exaltation, in which He would have
become Lord, with the names which Scripture ascribes to Him. Its exegesis,
supposing that it were correct, would give it not the least gain for its own
Christology. For this is no longer there, if Jesus is only a man, and not also
the eternal and only Son of God.
In order to maintain all the data of Scripture concerning the person of
Christ, theology gradually arrived at the doctrine of the two natures. It did
not set this up by way of hypothesis and did not intend by it a explanation
of the mystery of Christ’s person either; in it it only summed up, unmaimed
and undiminished, the whole doctrine of Scripture concerning Christ and by
that maintained it over against the errors which, on the left-hand and on the
right-hand side, appeared in ebionitism and gnosticism, arianism and
apollinarism, nestorianism and eutychianism, adoptianism and
monotheletism, and in more recent times in the doctrine of Rothe and
Dorner concerning the becoming God-man and in the doctrine of Gess e. a.
concerning the kenosis. Nestorianism arose from the Antiochene school,
had its preparation in Diodorus of Tarsus and Theodorus of Mopsuestia, and
was then developed by Nestorius in such a way that the eternal, natural Son
of God was distinct from and was another than the Son of David, who was
born from Mary; for there is, after all, a distinction between the temple and
him who dwells therein; between Him who was in the form of God, and
him who walked about in the form of a servant; between the God and the
man in Christ, who both exist personally [282]. Mary therefore cannot be
called θεοτοκος, and the man who was born from her is not the eternal Son
of God but his adopted son (adoptianism). The union of God and man in
Christ is not a natural but a moral one, as between man and woman in
marriage, not an ἑ νωσις but a συναφεια; the indwelling of God in Christ is
not specifically but only gradually distinct from that in believers, and it
increases, in proportion as the man Jesus advances in virtue and more and
more becomes organ and instrument, temple and garment of the Godhead,
in proportion as he is more θεοφορος, cf. Schwane, D. G. II 317 f. To that,
in the most recent time, the doctrine of Dorner is related, according to
which the Logos gradually communicates himself more to the man and
grows together with Him more intimately, in proportion as this one
develops morally under his influence, Chr. Gl. § 102 f. This whole
conception is condemned by Scripture. This ascribes all kinds of and very
different predicates to Christ, but always to one and the same subject, the
one, undivided I, that dwells in Him and speaks out of Him. Specifically it
also says that the Logos has not dwelt in a man but has become flesh, John 1:14. What someone has become, that he is. If the Son of God has become
man, then He himself is man. Of a person many things can be predicated,
but never another person. Of many people it can be said that they are one, in
one respect or another; but never can it be said of the one person that he is
the other person. Man and woman are one flesh, but never is the man the
woman or conversely. If, therefore, in Christ the man was another subject
than the Logos, then Scripture could never have said that the Logos has
become flesh and thus is. With Nestorius, therefore, the union between God
and man in Christ is not a personal and natural one, but a moral one; they
always remain two distinct subjects, however much they may also morally
become more and more one. And even this moral union is not point of
departure but final goal and result; it is not even, as with Origen, fruit of the
merit of the pre-existent soul, which has not fallen but has acquired for
itself the union with the Logos in its pre-existence, de princ. II 6, 3. c. Cels.
VI 47; but it comes about gradually in the earthly life of Jesus and depends
on all kinds of conditions, it is only gradually distinct from the union
of God with other people; that is, Christ loses his wholly unique place, He
is only a man, in whom God reveals himself more than in others; the idea of
the God-man is lost and the work of redemption is undermined.
Nestorianism is related to deism and pelagianism.
Chalcedon therefore rightly declared that the union of the divine and
human nature in Christ was ἀ διαιρετος and ἀ χωριστος. But just as much it
maintained, over against the other direction, that it was ἀ τρεπτος and
ἀ συγχυτος. Over against Nestorius Cyril defended that the union in Christ
was not a moral one, but a ἑ νωσις κατα φυσιν or καθ’ ὑ ποστασιν, a ἑ νωσις
φυσικη; but because he did not yet distinguish the words προσωπον,
ὑ ποστασις, φυσις as clearly as later writers, he hesitated to speak of δυο
φυσεις in Christ and also sometimes said that Christ has become one ἐ κ δυο
φυσεων, that He is μια φυσις, and that divine and human nature are united
in Him ε ἰ ς ἑ ν τι, ε ἰ ς μιαν ο ὐ σιαν. This could be misunderstood, and was
misunderstood by Eutyches, according to whom both natures through and
after the union lose each their particular properties and were changed and
melted down into one new divine-human nature, cf. Schwane, D. G. II 351
f. To this monophysitism, in more recent times, the doctrine of the κενωσις
is related. It was prepared by the Lutheran doctrine of the communicatio
idiomatum, above p. 245, was further developed by Zinzendorf, Plitt,
Zinzendorf’s Theology II 166 f., and then in this century, under the
influence of the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel, which took up the idea
of becoming in God, was by many warmly defended as the only possible
explanation of the person of Christ. It holds that the Logos at His
incarnation has divested Himself of all His divine attributes, also the
immanent ones, or at least of His transient attributes, has descended to the
standpoint of a pure potency, and then from there in union with the human
nature has again gradually developed Himself into a divine-human person,
above p. 252. But this theory too is just as unacceptable as that of Dorner.
Scripture knows only one person, one subject, one Christ, but nevertheless
ascribes to that a double kind of attributes, divine and human. He is [284]
Logos and became flesh; He is according to the flesh from Israel and yet
God above all to be praised etc., above p. 239. Whether one now more, as
formerly, lets the human nature be changed into the divine, or, as now, more
lets the divine empty itself down to the human, or also lets both natures
wholly or in part flow together into a third, into a mixtum quid; always, in a
pantheistic way, the boundary between God and man is erased and the idea
of the God-man is falsified. The monophysite and kenotic doctrine is in
conflict with immutability, with all attributes, with the essence of God, and
likewise also with the nature of the creature and of finite man. A deity or a
divine attribute that is only potentia and not actu is unthinkable; and a man
who by development can make the divine nature his own ceases to be a
creature and passes from time into eternity, from finitude into infinity.
Indeed, the whole thought of a God-man, in whom the union of both natures
is replaced by the mixing of both, is a monstrum, of which no one can form
any conception. Such a one cannot be the Mediator of God and of men,
because He is neither of the two; He does not truly bring about the union,
the reconciliation, the communion of God and man, because He himself, by
his mixing of both natures, is distinguished from both and is a tertium
genus. Cf. Form. Conc. ed. Müller 550, which rejects the kenotic theory.
Dorner, Entw. II 1261-1276. Id. Gl. II 337 f. Id. Gesammelte Schriften 207-
241. Vilmar, Dogm. II 54. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV 386. Kähler, Wiss. d. chr.
Lehre II 348. Lipsius, Dogm. § 579. Schultz, Gottheit Christi 277 f. Bruce,
The humiliation of Christ, Edinb. 1870. Orr, Chr. view 280. Lobstein,
Revue de théol. et de philos. Mars 1891 p. 186 s. Id. Etudes christol., Paris
Fischbacher 1891. Chapuis, Revue de théol. et de philos. Sept. 1891 p. 426
14. For the time being, theology, if it truly wishes to be Scriptural and
Christian theology, cannot do better than to maintain the doctrine of the two
natures. In doing so it must deeply impress upon itself the defective
character that clings to its language, specifically also in the doctrine of
Christ. But all other attempts, which up to now have been employed
to formulate the Christological dogma and to bring it closer to our
consciousness, fall short of the richness of Scripture and of the honour of
Christ. And against this theology has, in the first place, to be on its guard.
Whatever objections to the doctrine of the two natures have been raised
earlier and later, it nevertheless has this in its favour, that it neglects no data
of Holy Scripture, maintains the name of Christ as the only Mediator of
God and of men, and in the end also gives the clearest and most lucid
conception of the mystery of the incarnation. For this incarnation does not
stand isolated in history. It is indeed essentially distinct from all facts and
occupies an entirely unique place, but it nevertheless stands in close
connection with all that has taken place before and alongside and after it. It
has, as became clear to us earlier, as preparation and presupposition
generation, creation, revelation, and inspiration. Finally, it must still be
added here that it also stands in connection with the essence of religion.
Religion is communion with God; without it a human being can be no true,
perfect human being; the image of God is no donum superadditum but
belongs to his nature. That communion with God is a unio mystica; it far
surpasses our understanding; it is a most intimate union with God through
the Holy Spirit; it is a unio personarum, an indissoluble and eternal
covenant of God and man, which is far too weakly described by the
designation ethical and is therefore indicated as mystical; it is so intimate
that it transforms man according to God’s image and makes him a partaker
of the divine nature, 2 Corinthians 3:18, Galatians 2:20, 2 Petr. 1:4. If this communion
of God and man is now truly understood, not as an imagination but as
genuine reality, then its affinity and analogy with the incarnation is evident.
Whoever truly confesses generation, creation, immanence, revelation,
inspiration, religion, i.e. whoever truly confesses the communicability of
God, has in principle also acknowledged the incarnation. Not in the sense as
though the incarnation would of itself follow from the essence of religion,
but indeed in such a way that the recognition of the one removes all right to
deny the other. For if the incarnation is not possible either on God’s side or
on that of man, then religion also cannot truly exist in communion of
God and man. But religion in this sense has been disturbed by sin; there is
no true, blessed communion of God and man. Therefore the union that in
Christ was concluded between divine and human nature had to bear an
altogether special character. It could not be identical with the religious
relation between God and man, for it had to be precisely the beginning, the
principle, the objective realization of true religion again. A covenant cannot
be improvised; it must be concluded with a people in its king or
representative. And so also God, in order to make his communion with
humanity a reality again, in Christ as its Head united himself with it.
Therefore Christ is not an individual alongside others, but Head and
Representative of humanity, the second and last Adam, the Mediator of God
and of men. The union of divine and human nature in Christ is therefore
essentially distinct from the indwelling of God in his creatures and in
believers. It is not a unio personarum but a unio personalis et substantialis;
it is not a moral union, which finds its image in marriage, no agreement of
disposition and will, no communion of love alone. But it is a ἑ νωσις
φυσικη, as Athanasius, c. Apoll. I 8 and Cyrillus, Anathem. 3 called it.
Thereby it is not made known that that union was necessary and of itself
proceeded from one of the two or from both natures, but it is called so
because it is not moral in nature, but a union of the natures in the person of
the Son, a unio naturarum, not naturalis but personalis, Petavius, de incarn.
III 4. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIII 6, 3. And the result of that union is not a
new nature nor also a new personality, but only the person of Christ as
Christ. He who was in the form of God, from now on also existed in the
form of a man.
By virtue of this its wholly unique nature, the union cannot be conceived
otherwise than as a union of the person of the Son with an impersonal
human nature. For if the human nature in Christ had had an own, personal
existence, no other union than a moral one would have been possible. Then
Christ also would not have been personally God, but only a man,
living in close communion with God. Then also Christ would have been a
definite man with an own individuality, but not the second Adam, head of
the human race. He, however, had to be not an individual alongside others;
his work did not consist in this, that he brought back to communion with
God one single man, with whom he united himself. But he had to assume
the seed of Abraham, be Head of a new humanity and firstborn of many
brethren. To that end he had to assume an impersonal human nature. This is
not, with the Anastasius Sinaita and others, to be understood thus, that
Christ assumed the human nature in its generality, in the sense of the
Platonic idea, for this indeed exists in humanity but not in itself, in a
numerical unity, Schwane, D. G. II 369. The human nature in Christ was, on
the contrary, insofar indeed thoroughly an individual one, that he thereby
was distinguished from all men, though partaking of the same nature, by
definite properties. Yet Christ is therefore no individual alongside others,
for the human nature had in him no own, personal existence alongside the
Logos but was from the beginning by the H. Spirit so prepared for the union
with the Logos and for his work, that it in that Logos could represent the
whole human race and for all men of all generations and estates and ages, of
all centuries and places could be the Mediator of God. Cf. Greg. Nyss.,
Hilarius, Basilius, Ephraem, Apollinaris e. a. bij Dorner, Entw. I 958 f.
Damascenus, de fide orthod. III 3. 6. 11. Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 4 art. 4.
Petavius, de incarn. V 5. Moor III 776. Pictet, Christ. Godg. I 552.
Schneckenburger, Zur kirchl. Christol. 74 f. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2
405. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 295.
It is, however, precisely this distinction between nature and person which
both in the Trinity and in the doctrine of Christ encounters the greatest
objection and therefore in both doctrines is also the cause of most errors.
Both Nestorius and Eutyches could not allow this distinction to stand and
therefore concluded from the two natures to two persons or from the one
person to one nature. Christian theology, however, was led to this weighty
distinction in the doctrine of God and of Christ. In God there was one
nature and three persons; in Christ one person and two natures. The
unity of the three persons in the divine being is in the full sense naturalis,
συνουσιωδης, coessentialis; the unity of the two natures in Christ is
personalis. This distinction is also philosophically justified. Nature and
person do not relate, as in Hegel’s philosophy, as essence and appearance,
as potentia and actus, so that nature, in all creatures essentially one, in man
develops into person by immanent power. But nature is the substrate, the
suppositum, that whereby something is what it is, principium quo; and
person is the subject, not of a nature in general, but of a rational nature,
individua substantia rationalis naturae, principium quod. Person is that
which is in and for itself, which is the owner, possessor, and lord of nature,
a complementum existentiae, sustentans et terminans existentiam naturae,
the subject, which by nature with its whole rich content lives, thinks, wills,
acts, etc., whereby nature becomes one existing for itself and is no accidens
of another, Schwane, D. G. II 369 f. Kleutgen, Theol. d. Vorzeit III 71 f.
Schaezler, Das Dogma v. d. Menschw. Gottes 3 f. Thus now the human
nature in Christ is united with the person of the Son. The Son does not first
become person in and through the human nature, for He was this from
eternity; He needed neither the creation nor the incarnation in order to come
to Himself and to become personality, spirit. But the incarnation does
include that the human nature, which was formed in and from Mary, did not
exist for a single moment on and for itself but from the very first moment of
conception was united with and taken up into the person of the Son. The
Son created it in Himself, in se ipso creavit et creando assumsit. Therefore
that human nature is nevertheless not incomplete, as Nestorius and now still
Dorner, Entw. II 1225 asserts. For although by an own personality and Iness it did not close itself off within itself, it was nevertheless from the
beginning personal in the Logos, who as subject in and through it, with all
its constituent parts, faculties and powers lived, thought, willed, acted,
suffered, died, etc. That it did not receive in an independent I-ness its own,
separate complementum existentiae, did not proceed from a defect, but
precisely from this, that it had to be the human mode of existence of the
Logos. Naturae assumptae non deest propria personalitas propter
defectum alicujus, quod ad perfectionem humanae naturae pertineat, sed
propter additionem alicujus, quod est supra humanam naturam, quod est
unio ad divinam personam, Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 4 art. 2 ad 2.
Therefore the human nature in Christ is not coordinated with the Logos by
a personal subsistence of its own, but subordinated to Him. Both natures are
and remain indeed ἀ λλο και ἀ λλο, but not ἀ λλος και ἀ λλος. It is always the
same person, the same subject, the same I, that lives and thinks, speaks and
acts through the divine and the human nature. The human nature is the
tabernacle in which the Son has gone to dwell; the garment which He
Himself has prepared and put on; the μορφη in which He has appeared to
us; the instrument and organ which He has sanctified for Himself and of
which He makes use with divine wisdom for His office and work. In
Christo humanitas quasi quoddam organum divinitatis censetur, Thomas,
Comp. Theol. c. 212, cf. S. Theol. III qu. 19 art. 1. Petavius, de incarn. IV 8,
6. Turretinus, Theol. XIII 6, 7. In this, now, there is nothing that deserves
our contradiction. Without thereby doing anything short of the self-activity
of the creature, we confess that the whole world is an instrument of the
revelation of God, a garment in which He at the same time reveals and
conceals Himself to us. The congregation and every believer desires
nothing higher than to stand with soul and body and all powers in the
service of God and to be an instrument in His hand. What, then, would be
against it, that in a much richer measure, in an absolute sense, the human
nature in Christ is the glorious, willing organ of His Godhead? High above
all our speaking and thinking goes the union of divine and human nature in
Christ. Every comparison fails us, for it is without any equal. But it is then
also the μυστηριον ε ὐ σεβειας, into which the angels are eager to look and
which the congregation admiringly marvels at in worship.
15. Yet this is always again brought forward as a weighty objection
against the doctrine of the two natures, that it does not allow the human
nature of Christ to come into its own and makes a human development in
Him impossible. Roman Catholic and Lutheran Christology do indeed [290]
give occasion for this misgiving. The union of the two natures in Christ,
namely, entailed in earlier dogmatics three consequences, communicatio
idiomatum, apostelesmatum and charismatum. The first implied that in the
incarnation both natures with all their properties were communicated to the
one person and the one subject, which therefore can be designated with
Divine and human names; one may thus say, the Son of God was born,
suffered, died, Acts 20:28, 1 John 1:7, and also the man Christ Jesus exists
from eternity, has descended from heaven, etc., John 3:13. By the second it
was understood that the proper mediatorial or redemptive works all bear a
Divine-human character, i.e., that they all have as efficient cause the one
undivided, personal subject in Christ; that they have been brought to pass
by Christ with the cooperation of both His natures and with a double
ἐ νεργεια, and that they nevertheless again form an undivided unity in the
result, because they are the work of one person. The third indicated that the
human nature of Christ from the first moment of its existence was adorned
with all manner of glorious and rich gifts of the H. Spirit. Over these three
effecta unionis there arose an important difference, above pp. 242-246. The
Lutherans construe the communicatio idiomatum in such a way that the
properties of both natures were communicated not only to the one person,
but those of the Divine nature also to the human. The human nature was by
the union elevated to Divine omnipotence and omnipresence, Symb. Bücher
ed. Müller 679. 680; it received singulares, excellentissimas, maximas,
supernaturales, impervestigabiles, ineffabiles atque coelestes praerogativas
majestatis, gloriae, virtutis ac potentiae, which are not merely created and
finite gifts, ib. 685, but Divine and infinite such as vivificare, omnipotentia,
omniscientia, omnivolipraesentia, 686. 689. 691. 692. It is clear that this
conception of the communication of the properties deprives the
communication of the gifts of its entire significance; what gifts are still
needed, if Divine properties are communicated. Lutheran Christology does
indeed still speak of gifts, ib. 686, but it really does not know what to do
with them, cf. Dorner, Entw. II 914-916, and has even no place any longer
for the anointing of Christ with the H. Spirit, Schneckenburger, Zur
kirchl. Christol. 30. On the other hand, the Roman Catholics do indeed
teach a communication of gifts and also combat the Lutheran doctrine of
the communicatio idiomatum, but they say that the human nature of Christ
by virtue of the unio hypostatica immediately in the first moment of its
conception uberrimam Spiritus Dei copiam atque omnem charismatum
abundantiam accepit, Cat. Rom. I 4, 4. Both, Lutheran and Roman Catholic
Christology, thus contain within themselves a docetic element; the purely
human development of Christ does not here come into its own; in reaction
one in this century swung over to the other extreme and failed to recognize
the Godhead of the Lord. The Reformed, however, have understood the
communication of the gifts in such a way that a human development of
Jesus was thereby possible. Although the second Adam, Christ was
nevertheless another than Adam. Adam was created adult, received as
dwelling-place a paradise and was not subject to any suffering and death.
Christ, however, was conceived in Mary of the H. Spirit and born as a
helpless little child; He was not placed in a paradise but came into a world
that lies in the evil one; He was exposed to temptation from every side; He
bore a nature that was susceptible to suffering and death. His was not the
human nature of Adam before the fall, but God sent His Son ἐ ν ὁ μοιωματι
σαρκος ἁ μαρτιας, i.e. in such flesh as in form and appearance was like the
By this fine doctrine of the communicatio charismatum the Reformed
theology, better than any other, was in a position to maintain in Christ,
alongside the Godhead, also the true, genuine humanity. It is of incalculable
value for that purpose. 1o Among the Reformed there was still a difference
over whether the incarnation in itself, abstracted from the state of sin in
which it took place, was already an act of humiliation. On the one side one
could appeal to the fact that the distance between God and man is so great
that the assumption of human nature without more is already humiliating.
But on the other side one could object to this that Christ would then now
still, while He is glorified at the Father’s right hand, be in the state of
humiliation, Heraut 284, 285. The struggle is easily ended thus, that the
incarnation in itself, without more, always is and remains an act of
condescending goodness, but is not in the narrower sense a step in the state
of humiliation. It was that by the fact that it was an enfleshment,
assumption of a weak, human nature. About this there was, after all, no
struggle, that Christ assumed a weak human nature, subject to suffering and
death, and that this was an act of humiliation for the Son of God. Scripture
also establishes this beyond all doubt, Isaiah 53:2, 3, John 1:14, 17:5, 1 Corinthians 2:8, 2 Corinthians 8:9, Philippians 2:7, 8 etc. 2o As soon as, however, we try to give
ourselves an account of what is enclosed in that weak human nature, the
question becomes more difficult. For very certainly Jesus had all kinds of
needs for food, drink, rest, sleep etc., but these were nevertheless also
proper to Adam before the fall. And conversely it is difficult to think that
Jesus according to his human nature was of himself susceptible to sickness,
infirmity, death; He nevertheless himself had the power to lay down his life,
John 10:17, but was not of himself, without his will, subject to death. From
of old the opinions about this were therefore divided. About Jesus’ outward
appearance there was difference; some such as Origen, Chrysostom,
Hieronymus and others ascribed to Him a beautiful form with appeal to Psalms 45:3, others such as Justin, Clement, Tertullian etc. thought that He was
bodily without form or glory, Psalms 22:7, Isaiah 53:2, 3; still others held the
middle between these two representations or refrained from a judgment, cf.
Vitringa V 501. Walch, Bibl. theol. III 439. Menzel, Symbolik 1855 I 177 f.
Schotel, Iets over de uitwendige gedaante van Jezus Christus, Bosch 1852.
Riehm, Handw. I 724 and art. Christusfiguren in Herzog3. And so also with
respect to susceptibility to suffering and dying the aphthartodocetes and the
phthartolatri stood over against one another. There is now no doubt that the
Son of God assumed a human nature that was susceptible to suffering and
dying, otherwise these would have been appearance and no truth; even
Roman Catholics and Lutherans must acknowledge this. Further, on the
other side it is also true that Christ assumed this human nature wholly
voluntarily and in the abstract always retained the right to lay aside this
weak human nature or to change it into a glorious one exalted above all
suffering and death [293]. Insofar suffering and dying always remained his
free act. He had and retained the power to take up and to lay down his life.
No one could inflict any pain on Him nor take away his life, unless he
himself gave the power thereto. He disposed the hour and the power of
darkness. But this his will presupposed, suffering and dying were for Him
naturally given with the nature of the human nature which He assumed.
Hilary, in Schwane, D. G. II 269 and others have often represented it
precisely the other way around and have seen in the pain, the suffering etc.
of Christ the non-natural, the miracle, and in the miracles of Christ
precisely the natural. Although this can be taken in a good sense, it
nevertheless does not sufficiently reckon with the fact that Christ assumed
the weak human nature and in it was distinguished from Adam. From that it
may not be inferred that Christ was also susceptible to all kinds of sickness
and infirmity; for He did indeed take upon himself the general
consequences of sin, suffering and death, which now belong to human
nature, but not every particular infirmity that proceeds from particular
circumstances, weak bodily constitution, disordered or imprudent manner
of life, Thomas, S. Th. III qu. 14. Moor III 591. IV 26. Ebrard § 417. Nor
was the human nature in Christ unfolded much more richly than in Adam;
for in the status integritatis there was for many emotions, anger, sorrow,
compassion, mercy etc. no occasion. But Christ has not only visited us with
the inner movements of God’s mercy; He has in his human nature opened to
us that rich world of the heart, which in Adam did not yet exist and could
not exist. 3o There has been in Christ a human knowing, an intellectual
development, an increase in wisdom and knowledge. The Arians and
Apollinarians, according to whom in Christ the Logos takes the place of the
pneuma, could not assume a human knowing in Christ. The Monophysites
also had to oppose this, but could just as well teach an omniscience of
Christ when namely the human nature had been absorbed into the divine, as
in the opposite case an ignorance (Themistius, head of the Agnoëten), with
John 11:34, Schwane, D. G. II 366. Over against these parties the church
fathers came, the longer the more, to posit the human knowledge of Christ
from the first moment as perfect and not susceptible to any increase; and
from them this opinion passed over into the scholastic and Roman and also
into the Lutheran Christology. By this they came into conflict with the
above-mentioned clear statements of Scripture, and had to take refuge in a
docetic explanation. The true ground for this doctrine is therefore only the
convenientia, that God to a human nature that was so closely united with
Him must indeed grant this gift of knowledge, Kleutgen, Theol. III 251; the
Scripture passages on which one appeals, such as John 1:14, 2:24, 25, 6:64,
13:3, Colossians 2:3, 9 do not prove the contrary, because they speak of the whole
Christ and not specifically of his human nature, and still much less of this in
its historical development. The Reformed said over against this, first, that
the scientia infusa and acquisita in Christ was not at once complete, but
gradually increased and multiplied, and second, that Christ here on earth
was not a comprehensor but viator, that He walked by faith and hope and
not by sight, that the scientia beata was not yet his portion here on earth.
Naturally the faith in Christ was not as in us a leaning on the grace and
mercy of God, but this peculiarity faith has received only through the state
of sin in which we are; by nature faith in Adam and in Christ is nothing but
a clinging fast to the word and promise of God, a holding fast of the
Invisible. And that Jesus also did, Matthew 27:46, Hebrews 2:17, 18, 3:2. That faith
and that hope were in Christ also not wavering and doubting, but firm and
strong; they kept Him, who in us awakens and perfects faith, standing in the
temptation and made Him, for the joy awaiting Him as reward for his labor,
endure the cross and despise the shame, Hebrews 12:2. Thus there was therefore
an increase in wisdom and knowledge in Christ; the human consciousness
in Him, although having the same subject as the divine consciousness, knew
that subject, that I, only very partially, indeed ὁ λον but not ὁ λως. Behind
our limited consciousness there lies in us still a world of being; so behind
the human consciousness of Christ there lay still the depth of God, which
could shine through that human consciousness only gradually and always in
a limited way, Gomarus, Op. I 196. Voetius, Disp. II 155 sq.
Turretinus, Theol. El. XIII 12. 13. Moor III 804. M. Vitringa V 246. Heppe,
Dogm. d. ev. ref. K. 315. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 281. 307. 329. Kuyper,
Het werk v. d. H. Geest II 281v. C. Lucassen, Der Glaube Jesu Christi,
Neue Kirchl. Zeits. VI 1895 S. 337-347. From this, however, it may not be
inferred that Jesus could err on different terrains. Indeed this is nowadays
taught in wide circles, in order specifically to escape Jesus’ authority in the
matter of the O. Test. But one thereby attacks Christ himself. For it is
indeed true that Jesus gave no instruction in any human science and also did
not come to earth for that. He came to declare the Father to us and to
accomplish his work. But for that purpose He also had to know that Father
in his revelation and works, and thus also to know whether the O.
Testament was God’s Word or not. This was not knowledge of a purely
scientific but of a religious nature, and for the faith of the congregation of
the highest importance. Whoever in this respect ascribes error to Jesus
comes into conflict not only with his divine nature but also with his
prophetic office, cf. part I 333. Herzog1 21, 204. Herzog2 6, 27. Voigt,
Fundamentaldogm. 527 f. Tholuck, Das Alte Test. im N. 4e Aufl. 1854.
Caven, Presb. and Ref. Review, July 1892. Schwartzkopff, Konnte Jezus
irren? Giessen, Ricker 1896. Id. Die Irrthumslosigkeit Jesu Chr. und der chr.
Glaube ib. 1897. 4o There is in Christ a moral development. Theodore of
Mopsuestia, Nestorius and all who proceed from the human nature of Christ
assume that He has perfected himself through all kinds of struggle and
temptation. Jesus was not positively holy, He did not bring with him the non
posse peccare; on the contrary such an inborn holiness is impossible and
ethically worthless. But Jesus was a man who brought with him the
possibility of sinning yet by moral exertion and struggle has in fact kept
himself free from all sins, has developed himself ethically to the highest
standpoint and has made himself worthy of the union with God, cf.
Schwane, D. G. II 319, 325 etc. This representation rests on a factual not
reckoning with the Godhead of Christ; it proceeds from the erroneous
thought that there is no other virtue than that which was acquired through
struggle and it at most only attains to a historical, factual sinlessness,
which is insufficient for Jesus as Mediator. The attempts to prove Jesus’
sinlessness historically such as by Ullmann, De zondeloosheid van Jezus,
Tiel 1851, Dorner, Ueber Jesu sündlose Vollkommenheit, Jahrb. f. d. Theol.
VII 1862 S. 49-107. Art. Sündlosigheit Jesu in Herzog1 suppl. Gouda
Quint, De zondeloosheid des Heeren 1862. Schaff, Jezus Christus, het
wonder der geschiedenis 1866. van Oosterzee, Leven v. Jezus I 569v.
Dogm. § 93. Chapuis, La sainteté de Jésus, Revue de théol. et de philos.,
Juillet, Sept. Nov. 1897 etc., are insufficient, Philippi, K. Gl. IV 161. We do
not have enough with historical certainty, which presently is again made
uncertain by others. However much it deserves appreciation that so many,
from whom according to their principle otherwise would be expected, still
have a deep sense of Jesus’ moral perfection, such as Daub, Marheineke,
Rosenkranz, Vatke, Schleiermacher, Beyschlag, Hase, Schenkel, Lipsius
etc., yet the faith is wavering that does not rest on the testimony of
Scripture and therefore is always pressed and distressed by all kinds of
philosophical and historical objections. Scripture, however, makes us
recognize in Christ not only an empirical sinlessness but also a necessary
impeccability. He is the Son of God, the Logos, who in the beginning was
with God and himself was God; He is one with the Father and always
accomplishes his will and work etc. For whoever confesses this of Christ,
the possibility of sinning and falling is an Ungedanke, Holtzmann, Neut.
Th. II 446. Frank, Chr. Wahrh. II2 178. Therefore Christian theology
maintained over against Arians, Pelagians, Nominalists, such as Scotus,
Biel, Durandus, Molina etc., that Christ could not sin. For then either God
himself would have had to be able to sin— which is blasphemy; or the
union of divine and human nature is regarded as breakable and in fact
denied, Augustine, Enchir. c. 36. 40. 41. Lombardus, Sent III dist. 12 and
comm. by Thomas and Bonaventura. Moor III 692. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II
330. Philippi IV 161 f. etc. But thereby the essential distinction is
nevertheless not abolished that exists between the holiness of God and the
holiness of Christ as man. Taking note of that, Jesus could say that no one is
good, goodness itself, except God alone, Matthew 19:16, 17, Mark 10:17, 18,
Luke 18:18, 19. The goodness or holiness of Christ according to his human
nature is not a divine, original one, but it is a bestowed one, infusa;
and therefore it also had to reveal itself, hold itself upright, and confirm
itself in the way of struggle and temptation. The bonitas infusa does not
exclude the bonitas acquisita. The latter presupposes the former; no good
fruits except from a good tree; but the virtue of the tree must nevertheless
come out in the soundness of the fruits. And so Christ also had to reveal his
inborn holiness through temptation and struggle; these are not made
superfluous or idle by the non posse peccare. For although actual
temptation could come to Jesus not from within but only from without, He
nevertheless had a human nature that looked up against suffering and death.
Thus He was then tempted in all kinds of ways throughout his whole life,
by Satan, his enemies, even by his disciples, Matthew 4:1-11, Mark 1:13, Luke
temptations He had to keep himself standing in struggle; the non prosse
peccare was not compulsion but was ethical in nature and therefore also had
to come to manifestation in an ethical way. 5o The same holds for the
power of Christ. Although as the Son of God omnipotent, He was
nevertheless limited as regards the power of his human nature. The
Monophysites do not distinguish these two, and let the two natures, the two
wills and the distinct power merge into one another. But Scripture and
church made distinction between the two and let the two natures be so
connected that in the one divine-human work each nature does what is its
own. And therefore the doing of miracles, the forgiving of sins, the granting
of eternal life and all that belongs to the work of mediation belongs not only
to his Godhead but also to his manhood. Therefore Christ precisely as Son
of man, as Messiah, ascribes to himself this power of forgiveness and of
judgment, Matthew 9:2-8, John 5:27. At touch power goes out from Him, Luke 6:19. His flesh is the bread that gives the world life, John 6:51. The Father
has given Him all things into his hand, John 3:35, 13:3, 17:2. No one can
snatch the sheep out of his hand any more than out of the hand of the
Father, John 10:28-30. Just as the Father does, He hears prayer, John 14:13,
cf. 16:23, he sends the Spirit, 15:26, cf. 14:26, he grants eternal life, 10:28,
17:2. But all this nevertheless does not exclude that his power, as human, is
susceptible to increase. He is born as a little child, weak and helpless; He
had need of food and drink, He was weary from the journey and sat down
by the well, John 4:6; even in the doing of miracles He was dependent on
the faith of men, Matthew 13:58; in the garden He was strengthened by an angel,
Luke 22:43. Only after the resurrection does He say that all power is given
to Him in heaven and on earth, Matthew 28:8, Mark 16:20, Luke 24:19. Then He
receives back the glory that He as Son already previously had with the
Father, John 17:5, and in it also makes his human nature share. By the
resurrection Christ has also as man become Lord over living and dead, has
He received a name above every name and power over all creatures, Mt.
16. The confession concerning Christ finds its practical application in the
veneration which is rendered to Him, in the honor adorationis. With those
who, with Arius, deny the Godhead of Christ, or, with Nestorius, separate it
from the human nature, or, with Socinus, see in Jesus only a man, every
ground for the worship of the Mediator falls away. Yet one then still
attempts to maintain this in all manner of ways. Nestorius said that the man
Jesus also, as confessor and defender of the divine honor, might be
worshiped: separo naturas, conjungo reverentiam, Schwane, D. G. II 349.
Socinus defended it by this, that Christ had been exalted to Lord and had
received all power and thus in need and misery could help us; many of his
party, however, such as Davidis, Francken e. a. contested it, because God
alone might be worshiped and the power of Christ in any case was a limited
one; Socinus then also saw himself compelled to make a distinction
between the veneration of God as prima causa and that of Christ as causa
secunda of our salvation, Vitringa V 252. Fock, Der Socin. 538 f. The
Remonstrants also derived the ground for the worship of Christ chiefly from
this, that He was Mediator, King, Lord and as such had received from the
Father a honor adorationis, which indeed was verus and divinus but yet not
Op. 436. Limborch, Theol. Christ. V 18. Episcopius, Inst. theol. IV 35 VII
27, 6, cf. against that Censura in conf. Rem. c. 2. 3. 12. Trigland, Antapol. c.
44. Heydanus, Causa Dei V 12. Vitringa V 268. The defense of the worship
of Christ by Ritschl and his school essentially agrees with that of Socinus:
Christ, as man in relation to God, may indeed be venerated but not
worshiped, but Christ, religiously considered, as revelation of God, as that
person in whom the congregation has God, is indeed to be worshiped, for
then we do not worship Him alongside God, but God in Him. This worship
of Christ then further belongs indeed in the public religion of the
congregation but not in the prayer of private persons; the latter is unhealthy,
makes Christ into a subject distinct from God, fosters a sentimental
tendency and leads to creature-worship, Schultz, Gottheit Christi 1881 S.
706 f. Just as among the Socinians, so among the followers of Ritschl there
are those who reject the worship of Christ entirely, and indeed call Him an
object of faith and an example for imitation but not an object of religious
veneration, Chapuis, Revue de théol. et de philos. Nov. 1895 p. 560-586, Id.
Die Anbetung Christi in Gottschick’s Zeits. f. Theol. u. Kirche 1897 S. 28-
79. Socinianism and Ritschlianism thus end up with Unitarianism, which
deprives Christ of all religious veneration. Insofar as they nevertheless still
attempt to maintain a worship of the man Christ, they are related and offer
support to those who, although acknowledging Christ’s Godhead,
nevertheless also derive from his human nature a ground of worship. To
these belong in the first place the monophysites, against whom the fifth oec.
Council c. 9, in Denzinger n. 180, determined that the worship of Christ
does not rest on a συγχυσις της θεοτητος και της ἀ νθρωποτητος but must be
directed to God, the incarnate Logos with his flesh. But the scholastic and
Roman theologians also have gradually come to venerate the human nature
of Christ in itself religiously. The point of departure was thereby the general
doctrine of the church fathers, that the person of Christ in the undivided
unity of her two natures, as incarnate Word, as God and man together, had
to be venerated with one worship. From that it was inferred that the human
nature of Christ itself, in itself, in se, might and must also be an object of
divine veneration (λατρεια); however not for its own sake, per se and
propter se, but on account of its hypostatic union with the Son of God. To
that it was then further added that, although the human nature is in itself to
be worshiped and thus objectum materiale of the adoratio, it nevertheless is
always an objectum partiale and not totale; i.e. whoever worships it,
worships with it always Him who has united himself with that human
nature; and thus it was thereby permitted and made possible not only to
make the human nature of Christ in itself, but even a part of it, such as e. g.
the sacred heart of Jesus, into an object of worship; the worship
nevertheless does not apply to that heart alone but applies to the whole
Christ, who caused his divine love to dwell in that heart. And finally many
theologians still said that the human nature of Christ not only on the ground
of its hypostatic union with the Logos is an object of λατρεια, but also on
the ground of the many gifts bestowed upon it without measure might be an
object of δουλεια, and then more specifically again an object of
ὑ περδουλεια, according to the hierarchical rule: adoratio est diversa pro
diversitate excellentiae, quae est ejus objectum formale. Cf. Damascenus,
de fide orthod. III c. 8. Lombardus and other comm. on Sent. III dist. 9.
Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 25. Bellarminus, de imag. sanct. II c. 12 sq.
Petavius, de incarn. XV c. 1-4. Theol. Wirceb. IV 330. Perrone, Prael. theol.
IV 274. Scheeben, Dogm. III 51 f. Pesch, Prael. theol. IV 97 sq. Simar,
Dogm. 411. By virtue of their doctrine of the communication of the divine
properties to the human nature, the Lutherans also teach that the human
nature of Christ is to be worshiped, Gerhard, Loc. IV § 23. Quenstedt,
Theol. III 199-208 V 353. Buddeus, Inst. theol. p. 771 sq. And finally
among the Herrnhutters the man Christ has almost entirely taken the place
of God; He is not the mediator but the substitute of God and almost the only
object of religious veneration, Plitt, Zinzendorfs Theol. III 20 f. Römheld,
Theol. sacrosancta 1888.
Wholly in accordance with their doctrine of Christ the Reformed now said
that the Mediator was indeed an object of worship, but that the ground for
that worship lay in his divine nature. Yet among them there was still [301]
some difference of opinion. All were agreed in this, that Christ also as
Mediator had to be worshiped and honored, but some thought that the
ground for that worship lay only in the Godhead of Christ, Voetius, Disp. I
520 sq. II 304 sq. Maccovius, Coll. theol. I 369 sq. Macc. Redivivus c. 91.
Hoornbeek, Socin. confutatus I 36 sq. Mastricht V 2, 26 etc.; others judged
that the objectum formale was not only the Godhead but the Mediatorship
of Christ, Amesius, de adoratione Christi. Walaeus, Loci Comm. Op. I 389.
Trigland, Antapol. c. 46. Alting, Theol. problem. XII 20. Cloppenburg, Op.
I 461. Bucanus, Inst. XXXV qu. 9. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIV qu. 18.
Hottinger, Heidanus, Burman, Heidegger, Moor III 829. Vitringa V 247.
Now Scripture leaves no doubt about it, that Christ, just as he is the object
of our faith and trust, John 14:1, 17:3, Romans 14:9, 2 Corinthians 5:15, Ef. 3:12,
5:23, Colossians 1:27, 1 Timothy 1:1 etc., so also may be the object of our religious
20, cf. Loofs in Herzog3 4, 21. Th. Zahn, Die Anbetung Jesu im Zeitalter
der Apostel, Stuttgart 1885, also in Skizzen aus dem Leben der alten Kirche
1898 S. 271-308. But nevertheless the ground of the worship of Christ
according to Scripture can be derived from nothing other than his Godhead.
For the word of Scripture stands firm: the Lord your God you shall worship
and Him alone serve. That is the commandment which in principle
condemns all pagan and Roman creature-worship. If in addition the royal
power of Christ or also his mediatorship is still adduced as a ground for
religious worship, then this commandment of God is weakened and
violated. As mediator, king, priest, prophet, Christ is not absolute summus,
but subordinated to God; in that capacity he has a different glory and a
different power than that which he as Son shares with the Father and the
Spirit; in that quality he is not the causa efficiens, which God alone is, but
the causa instrumentalis of our salvation. If therefore the ground for the
worship of the Mediator, besides in his Godhead, also still lies in his
Mediatorship, then the ground also in fact lies in his human nature, for as
Mediator Christ cannot be conceived without this; then the Father and
the Spirit, who are not Mediator, have one ground for their worship less
than the Son and this one thus comes to stand above the Father and the H.
Spirit; then there are two grounds for adoration, one which is derived from
the Godhead, another which is derived from something else, that is from
something creaturely, and then in principle the Roman distinction of
λατρεια and δουλεια is brought in and creature-worship is legitimized.
Christ therefore is most certainly to be worshiped as our Mediator, just as
God is also honored and invoked as Creator etc., but the ground for that lies
only in his Godhead. He is not God because he is Mediator, but he is
Mediator because he is God, with the Father and the Spirit one single God,
to be praised above all unto eternity. The mediatorial worthiness and the
mediatorial works can and may be motives of worship, just as all kinds of
benefits compel us to worship God. They can also insofar be called grounds
of worship, as the divine being works and reveals itself therein; but the
foundation of worship is the being-God alone.
. Among all peoples we encounter some awareness of sin and need of
reconciliation and redemption. There also occur in almost all religions
holy persons, who effect and maintain communion with God for others.
Kings and prophets often act as such mediators, but especially the priests
are charged with this service. The word priest comes from presbyter, elder,
and thus originally had no hieratic sense at all; the names in other
languages, such as ֹּכֵחן, ἱ ερευς, sacerdos designate the priests as such
persons, who stand before God and perform a holy work, specifically bring
sacrifices. However much such a priesthood occurs in almost all religions,
cf. Julius Lippert, Allgemeine Geschichte des Priesterthums, Berlin 1883-4,
yet its origin is unknown to us. According to Scripture, in the earliest time
there were as yet no special priests; Abel, Cain, Noah, the patriarchs
still themselves bring their offerings, Genesis 4:3, 4, 8:20, 12:7 etc.; only when
among the peoples the consciousness of sin and the awareness of separation
between God and man increases, does the idea of a mediation arise
everywhere. The principal means of which this priesthood makes use, in
## § 42. The Work of the Mediator.
order to obtain communion with God, is the offering, ִַמְנָח, ֹעָלה, ֶזַבח, ִאֶּׁשה,
δωρον, ἱ ερειον, προσφορα, θυσια, τελετη, oblatio, sacrificium. The origin
and essence of sacrifice too is shrouded in darkness for us. Some explain
sacrifice from the disposition of man, to make the Deity favorable by some
gift or other and to obtain all kinds of help from it (do ut des, gift theory),
Saussaye, Religionsphilos. I 101. v. Hartmann, Religionsphil. I 35. In
addition, many then think that men at first thought the gods like themselves
and therefore in the sacrifices offered them chiefly foodstuffs (food theory),
ib. and Siebeck, Religionsphilos. 279. Others adhere to the mystical or
sacramental theory and see the essence of sacrifice not in a gift to but in
communion with the gods, enjoyed thereby, that one sits together at one
table and consumes one food and drink, Marti, Israel. Relig.3 36. Smend,
Att. Rel. 24. Pfleiderer, Religionsphilos.3 648. According to another, the
symbolic theory, the sacrificer in the gift that he offers to the gods gives a
proof of his reverence and submission, of his denial of all that is earthly and
of his complete devotion to God, Wuttke, Gesch. des Heidenthums I 127 f.
Finally there are still those who consider the destructive element in sacrifice
essential and therefore give to every sacrifice an atoning character,
Bellarminus, Vasquez and many Roman theologians, cf. Thalhofer, Das
Opfer des alten und neuen Bundes, Regensb. 1870. Id. Handbuch der kath.
Liturgik, Freiburg 1894 I2 197 f. The question concerning origin and
essence of sacrifice becomes still more difficult when we think of the
bloody and then again specifically of the human sacrifices. How did
humanity come to this manner of worship of God? Which sacrifices were
the oldest, the bloody or the unbloody? Whence the broad place and the
tremendous significance, in the cultus, assigned to blood? History gives no
answer here. Only Scripture relates that sacrifice already exists from the
earliest time of humanity. Before the fall it makes no mention of sacrifice.
Yet there is nothing absurd in the thought that even then sacrifice in a
broader sense belonged to the elements of the cultus, just as much as prayer.
Offering indeed is, according to the definition of Augustine, de civ. X 6,
omne opus, quod agitur, ut sancta societate inhaereamus Deo. As such it
also suited man in the status integritatis. He was after all created in God’s
image in true knowledge, righteousness and holiness; he was prophet, priest
and king and as such had to glorify God’s name, devote himself with all that
was his to God, and govern and direct everything according to the will of
God; he also received in the Sabbath a special day for the service of God
and for that purpose needed definite forms of cultus; there is nothing
strange in it, if for that purpose besides prayer also offering belonged.
Indeed man can properly give nothing to God, for the earth is the Lord’s,
and the fullness thereof. But God nevertheless gave the earth to man and
appointed him as lord over it. And therefore man can in a symbolic sense
offer something to God, as proof of his reverence and dependence. If
offering from the outset belonged to the religion of man, which also before
and after the fall cannot be different in essence, then it also explains easily
that soon after the fall there is spoken of Cain’s and Abel’s offering, without
God intentionally instituting the sacrificial cultus. Protestants and Roman
Catholics formerly contended about whether sacrifice rested on a positive
command of God or rather on an inner religious impulse of man, M.
Vitringa IV 275-280. Herzog2 11, 31. But if sacrifice already existed before
the fall, this dispute is thereby also resolved. Yet sin has brought great
change in the offering, not only such that to the existing the sin-offering
was mechanically added, but also specifically in the sense that the offering
itself has changed in character. Man after the fall fears God and hides
himself from his face, and therefore the disposition and the intention have
also changed with which he offers and with which he prays. The sinoffering (sacrificium propitiatorium, propter offensam commissam) comes
to stand in the center and forms and bears the other offerings (sacr.
latreuticum, propter Dei majestatem, praise-offering; sacr. impetratorium,
propter beneficia sperata, prayer-offering; sacr. eucharisticum, propter
beneficia jam suscepta, thank-offering), Thomas, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 102 art.
3 ad 10. Among those sin-offerings the bloody sacrifices take a first
place, and these bear a destructive and a substitutive character; what is
offered to God is destroyed, slaughtered; and because properly man himself
for his reconciliation had thus to sacrifice himself, he takes an animal or
also another man in his place. And finally there gradually arises in all
religions a separate class of priests; man feels himself removed from God
and has need of a mediator, who brings him into the proximity of God. Thus
all sacrifices of humanity, directly in Israel, indirectly also among the
Heathen, point toward the great perfect offering, which has been brought by
Christ, the Mediator of God and of men, on the cross of Golgotha. Cf.
Pfanner, Theol. gent. c. 15. Lasaulx, Die Sühnopfer der Griechen u. Römer
u. ihr Verh. zu dem Einen auf Golgotha, Würzburg 1841. Nägelsbach,
Nachhom. Theol. 1857 S. 315 f. Bähr, Symb. des mos. Cultus II 217 f. 269
f. Stöckl, Das Opfer nach seinem Wesen u. Geschichte2, Mainz 1861.
Weiss, Apol. d. Christ. II3 248-304. Oswald, Die dogm. Lehre v. d. h. Sakr.
der kath. Kirche I2 503 f. Gihr, Das heilige Messopfer6, Freiburg 1897 S.
10 f. Scheeben, Dogm. III 387 f. Daniel Dewar, The nature, reality and
efficacy of the atonement 1831 ch. 1. Trumbull, The blood covenant. A
primitive rite and its bearings on Scripture, 2 ed. Philad. 1893. Art. Blut in
Herzog3.
2. The alteration, introduced into the offering by sin, manifested itself
only gradually at first. At first the offering was a simple ִמְנָחה, gift, Genesis 4:3;
and the offerings were brought by the offerers themselves. When sacrificial
cultus and priesthood had already developed among other peoples, these too
were regulated for Israel. Just as the prophetic and the royal, so too the
priestly office according to the law rests on election by Ihvh, Numbers 16:7,
Hebr. 5:4. The task entrusted to the priests is a double one; they must
instruct the people of Israel, also by means of the urim and thummim,
concerning the rights and laws of the Lord, Exodus 28:30, Deuteronomy 17:9, 33:8-10,
approach Ihvh with the offerings of the people, Leviticus 21:8, Numbers 16:5 etc.,
and then on his behalf bless the people, Leviticus 9:23, Numbers 6:23. The
sacrifices which Israel had to bring were different. The Passover
sacrifice, Ex. 12, occupies an independent place, is sin-offering and burntoffering, sacrificium and sacramentum at the same time; the covenant
sacrifice, Exodus 24:3-11, served, just as that with Abraham, Genesis 15:9, Jeremiah 34:18v., for confirmation of the covenant; it therefore consisted of burntofferings of bulls, whose blood for the covering of sin and for sanctification
by Moses as mediator of the covenant was sprinkled partly on the altar
partly on the people, and was thereafter concluded with thank-offerings; the
burnt- and thank-offering, Lev. 1, 3, served to maintain the communion
with God resting on the foundation of the covenant; the sin- and guiltoffering, Lev. 4-6, presupposed that the communion with God had been
disturbed by a sin of weakness and offered in the sprinkling of the blood of
the slaughtered sacrificial animal covering of sin and restoration of
communion with God. The atonement now came about thus: by the laying
on of hands the offerer transferred his sin to the animal; this is indeed often
denied, but wrongly; laying on of hands in Scripture always includes some
transfer, of blessing, Genesis 48:13, Matthew 19:13, curse, Leviticus 24:14, office, Numbers 27:18, Deuteronomy 34:9, the H. Spirit, Hd. 8:17 etc., and thus with the bloody, also
the burnt- and the thank-offerings, Leviticus 1:4, 3:2, of acknowledged and
confessed sin, Leviticus 4:4, 15, 16:21, 2 Chronicles 29:23; the offering itself was
called חטאת or אׁשם. Thereby the sacrificial animal was now worthy of
death. But because it served not only to undergo the punishment for the
offerer but precisely to make atonement for his sin, therefore the killing of
the animal is always called a slaughtering. It was not to do death as death,
but in order thereby to obtain the blood, which had to make atonement. God
had precisely given that blood of the animal for an atonement on the altar;
and indeed because that blood is the seat of the soul, the seat of a life freed
again from sin after and through the slaughtering, Leviticus 17:11. When this
blood now came on the altar or on the mercy-seat in God’s proximity, then
thereby the offerer or his sin was covered before the holy face of God; or
rather, God himself was it, Deuteronomy 21:8, Jeremiah 18:23, Mich. 7:19, and as his
representative the priest, Leviticus 5:13, 10:17, 15:15, who by the offering
conceived as ֹּכֶפר, λυτρον, ransom-price, covered the persons of the offerers
from their sins away or also those sins themselves before his face, ִּכֶּפר with
the praep. על or בעד. Litt. on the O. T. sacrificial cultus in Herzog2 11,
61 and further still Smend, Altt. Relig. 319. Marti, Gesch. d. isr. Rel. 226.
It deserves remark, however, that the expiatory sacrifices by no means
atoned for all but only some, definite, unintentional sins; upon sins with a
raised hand there stood extermination from the midst of the people, Numbers 15:30. Even if the sins through error were also taken very broadly, Lev. 5, 6;
yet the atonement, which was effected by the expiatory sacrifices, remained
very limited. Besides, the covenant of grace, established by God with Israel,
did not rest on those expiatory sacrifices but preceded them and had its
foundation only in God’s promise: I am the LORD your God. The sin- and
guilt-offerings served only to atone for unintentional transgressions, which
were no definite breach of covenant, and to restore the fellowship with God
disturbed thereby. This is also evident from the fact that they were ordained
for cases in which there was only Levitical uncleanness but not subjective
guilt, Leviticus 5:2, 12:6, 7, 15:14. There thus remained numerous sins for which
the law indicated no atonement by sacrifices; not only some sins with a
raised hand, which were punished with extermination, but further all kinds
of spiritual and fleshly sins, sins with thoughts and words, sins of pride and
selfishness. For all these sins no sacrifices were prescribed. It is true, that
by no means only the sin- and guilt-offerings but that also the burnt- and
thank-offerings bore an expiatory character, Leviticus 1:3, 4, 9:7, and that on the
great day of atonement all sins of the people were atoned for, Leviticus 16:16,
23:26-32, Numbers 29:7-11. Yet it remains remarkable, that in that connection
there is no mention of all the above-mentioned sins and that the proper sinand guilt-offerings provide only in certain cases. On special occasions,
when the people have sinned grievously and have made themselves guilty
of breach of covenant, the atonement is therefore also obtained in an
extraordinary way, through Moses’ intercession, Exodus 32:30-35, Num. 14, Ps.
Chron. 29:8-11. And the pious in Israel knew that too; they knew, that the
expiatory sacrifices opened a way to atonement only in very few cases; and
therefore they go back behind those sacrifices and plead upon the mercy of
God. And that is what the O. T. sacrificial cult also intended to teach Israel.
Those few sacrifices, which were prescribed, did not cover the whole
life; they brought about no true atonement; they served only to awaken the
consciousness of sin and were types, which pointed onward to another and
better sacrifice. The O. T. sacrificial cult was imperfect; the priests were
themselves sinners; the blood of bulls and goats could not take away sins;
the sacrifices had to be repeated endlessly. Everything indicated, that the
ceremonial dispensation of the O. T. had only a transient, symbolic, typical
significance. And therefore, according to the prophecy, there comes another
covenant, which is not broken but is kept by all, Jeremiah 31:31; another prophet,
who in special measure will be anointed with the Spirit of God and will
bring a glad message to Israel and the Gentiles, Deuteronomy 18:15, Jes. 11:2, Malachi 4:5; another priest, who will be appointed not after the manner of Aaron but
after the order of Melchizedek and therefore will unite in himself the
priestly and kingly dignity and will bear both eternally, Ps. 110, Jeremiah 30:21,
Zach. 6:13; another king, who will come forth from David’s house and will
be a Ruler in Israel, Mich. 5:1, 2. And so there will also come another,
better sacrifice. The sacrifices of animals are not the true ones, Psalms 40:7,
true sacrifices of God are obedience, 1 Samuel 15:22, mercy, Hosea 6:6, a
broken spirit, Psalms 51:19, hearkening to God’s voice, Jeremiah 7:23. And that
sacrifice will be brought by that servant of the Lord, who will take Israel’s
place, accomplish his work, be for a covenant of the people and for a light
of the Gentiles, Jes. 42:6, 49:6, and for the sins of his people will set his
soul as a guilt-offering, Jes. 53:10.
In the O. T. this promise of the suffering servant of the Lord and that of
the anointed king still run in part parallel. Both promises are rooted in the
steadfastness of God’s covenant; God cannot forget his covenant, in spite of
Israel’s unfaithfulness and apostasy; He cannot do it for his name’s sake; it
is an eternal covenant, which knows of no wavering. And therefore Israel,
however it may have fallen into misery on account of its sin, nevertheless
again receives a king from David’s house. That king will be of humble
birth, Jes. 11:1, 2, Mich. 5:1, 2, Ezech. 17:22, He will be not only king but
also priest, Jeremiah 30:21, Zach. 3:1, 6:13, Ps. 110, bring about the [309]
righteousness for his people, Jeremiah 23:6, make the sacrifices superfluous, Jes.
Alongside this now runs the other promise, that this righteousness for Israel
will be acquired only in the way of suffering. The sacrificial cult
symbolized the necessity of the expiatory offering; history showed it in so
many an example, in Moses, David, Job, the prophets and in that small band
of the faithful, who did not bow the knee to Baal, that the best suffer the
most, that they who stand up for the cause of God and in so far are
righteous, must enter through suffering into glory; and in the exile and
thereafter as congregation Israel became the servant of the Lord, who, being
in distress and misery and hard pressed on all sides, would nevertheless be
delivered by the Holy One of Israel, Jes. 41:8v. Yet Israel too is not the true
servant of the Lord; and itself has need of deliverance, Jes. 41:14, 42:19v.;
where could the prophet also in the past or present find the Israel or an
individual person, a prophet, a martyr, who had been so wonderfully
equipped by Jhvh, who remained so unwaveringly faithful, who in the
proclamation of the truth to the Gentiles underwent the heaviest suffering
and the most shameful death? Modern exegesis makes vain efforts to find,
in the few pious among Israel, in the prophets, or also in Jeremiah or
another sufferer, the figure for Isaiah’s portrayal of the servant of the Lord.
Israel itself with all its pious and prophets places itself in Jes. 53 over
against that servant of the Lord, acknowledges that it despised Him on
account of his suffering and confesses that He was wounded precisely for
their transgressions and crushed for their iniquities. Even if it is not said
directly, the servant of the Lord can be no other than the Messiah, who after
all will also be priest and will bring about the righteousness for his people.
Cf. Delitzsch on Jes. 42v. Oehler, in Herzog2 9, 649 and the litt. cited there,
also Smend, Altt. Rel. 257. It is a difficult question, whether Jewish
theology before Jesus’ coming already let these two lines in prophecy
coincide and thus expected a suffering Messiah, cf. Wünsche, Leiden des
Messias, Leipzig 1870. Dalman, Der leidende u. sterbende Messias der
Synagoge 1888. Weber, System 344 f. Schürer, Neut. Zeitgesch. 597.
Baldensperger, Selbstbew. Jesu 121 f. Oehler in Herzog2 9, 670.
Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I [310] 65 f. But even if this question is also
answered affirmatively; the expectation of a suffering Messiah was
nevertheless not the content of popular belief; Jesus’ disciples show
themselves wholly incapable of it, Matthew 16:22, Luke 18:34, 24:21, John 12:34.
3. According to the N. T. all these different testimonies of law and
prophecy converge upon Christ; the whole O. T. is in principle fulfilled in
Him; in Him all the promises of God are yea and amen, Romans 15:8, 2 Corinthians 1:20. He is the true Messiah, the king from David’s house, Matthew 2:2, 21:5,
27:11, 37, Luke 1:32 etc.; the prophet, who proclaims the gospel to the poor,
Luke 4:17v.; the priest, who in his person, his office, his appointment, his
offering, his sanctuary far surpasses the O. T. priesthood, Hebr.; the servant
of the Lord, who as a δουλος, Philippians 2:7, 8, came to serve, Mark 10:45,
subjected himself to the law, Galatians 4:4, fulfilled all righteousness, Matthew 3:15
and was obedient unto the death of the cross, Romans 5:19, Philippians 2:8, Hebr.
5:8. As such Jesus now makes a distinction between the kingdom of God, as
it is now founded by Him in a spiritual sense and as it will once be revealed
in glory; between his first and second coming, which for the O. T. prophecy
still coincided; between his work in the state of humiliation and that in the
state of exaltation. The Christ must enter into his glory through suffering,
Luke 24:26. The work, which He now accomplishes in the state of
humiliation, is described in the N. T. in many-sided fashion. It is an ἐ ργον,
entrusted to Him by the Father, John 4:34, 5:36, 17:4; it consisted in general
in accomplishing God’s will, Matthew 26:42, John 4:34, 5:30, 6:38, and then
more particularly comprised the declaration of God, John 1:18, the
revelation and glorification of his name, 17:4, 6, 26, the communication of
God’s words, 17:8, 14 etc. Christ is a prophet, mighty in words and works,
Luke 24:19; He is no novus legislator, but he explains the law, Mt. 5-7,
12:16-21, Luke 4:17-21, and in both preaches himself as fulfiller of the law
and content of the gospel. He is the law and the gospel in his own person.
He is not a prophet only by what He speaks, but first of all by what He is.
He is the Logos, John 1:1, full of grace and truth, John 1:18, anointed
with the Spirit without measure, 3:34, the revelation of the Father, John 14:9, Colossians 2:9. The source of his preaching is He himself; it is not the
inspiration but the incarnation. God’s Spirit did not merely come upon Him;
God did not merely speak with Him, as with Moses, face to face, but God
was in Him and spoke through Him, Hebr. 1:3. He is not a prophet
alongside others but the highest, the only prophet; source and center of all
prophecy; and all knowledge of God, in the O. T. before his incarnation,
and also now in the N. T. after his resurrection and ascension, is from Him,
1 Petr. 1:11, 3:19, Matthew 11:27. Next, the will of God, which Jesus came to
accomplish, also comprised the miracles which He did; the one work falls
apart into many ἐ ργα, John 5:36, which are the works of his Father, 5:20,
9:3, 10:32, 37, 14:10, prove that the Father loves Him and is in Him, 5:20,
10:38, 14:10, testify that the Father has sent Him, 5:36, 10:25, and reveal
his divine glory, 2:11, 11:4, 40. Yes, He not only does miracles, but He
himself in his person is the absolute miracle; as the Son of God become
man, conceived of the H. Spirit, risen and glorified, He himself is the
greatest miracle, center of all miracles, author of the re-creation of all
things, firstborn from the dead, in all things the First, Colossians 1:18. Further, the
will of God especially comprises that the only-begotten Son of the Father
lay down his life for his own, John 10:18. The N. Test. sees in Christ an
offering, and the fulfillment of the O. T. sacrificial cult. He is the true
covenant-sacrifice; just as the old covenant was confirmed by the covenantsacrifice, Exodus 24:3-11, so the blood of Christ is the blood of the new
testament, Matthew 26:28, Mark 14:24, Hebr. 9:13v Christ is a θυσια, ֶזַבח, the
victim for our sins, Ef. 5:2, Hebr. 9:26, 10:12; a προσφορα, δωρον, ָקְרָּבן,
someone free out of prison, and hence means of atonement, to cover
another’s sin by an offering and thus to save them from death; a τιμη, 1 Corinthians 6:20, 7:23, 1 Petr. 1:18, 19, a price that has been paid for the redemption; a
sin-offering, which for us has been made sin, 2 Corinthians 5:21, 1 John 2:2, 4:10;
the Passover sacrifice, which for us has been slain, John 19:36, 1 Corinthians 5:7, the Lamb of God, who bears the sin of the world and for it has been
slain, John 1:29, 36, Hd. 8:32, 1 Petr. 1:19, Op. 5:6 etc.; the ἱ λαστηριον,
Romans 3:25, i.e. not the mercy-seat, ַכֹּפֶרת, although this word has also been
rendered thus in LXX because no better aequivalent was to be found in
Greek, but that which serves for reconciliation, means of atonement, or scil.
θυμα, atoning sacrifice, cf. Deismann, Die sprachl. Forschung der griech.
Bibel, Giessen 1898 S. 16. 17; a καταρα, Galatians 3:13, which took over from
us the curse of the law; as the serpent in the wilderness, lifted up on the
cross, John 3:14, 8:28, 12:33, and as a grain of wheat, dying in the earth, in
order thus to bear much fruit, John 12:24. The relation in which this offering
of Christ stands to us and our sin is likewise expressed in very different
ways. He gives or sets his life, Mark 10:45, John 10:15, sanctifies himself,
John 17:19, is made sin and curse, 5 Cor. 5:21, Galatians 3:13, is delivered up,
Romans 4:25, has given himself up, Galatians 2:20, has suffered, 1 Petr. 3:18, has
been crucified and has died, John 11:50, 51, Romans 5:6, 1 Corinthians 15:3, 2 Corinthians 5:15, 1 Thessalonians 5:10, and indeed as a λυτρον ἀ ντι πολλων, Matthew 20:28, Mark 10:45, in the place of many, or ὑ περ c. gen. pers., John 10:15, 11:50, 51,
us, of his people, cf. Phil. 13, ὑ περ σου, in gratiam tuam, so that you do not
need to do it; or ὑ περ c. gen. rei, John 6:51, 1 Corinthians 15:3, Hebr. 10:12, for the
benefit of the sins, to take them away, or for the benefit of the life of the
world, so that this through Christ’s death may obtain life; or περι c. gen.
pers., Matthew 26:28, 1 John 2:2, for, for the sake of many or of the whole world;
for, for the sake of sin; or δια c. acc. rei, Romans 4:25, on account of, because
of sin.
That which Christ has acquired by this his sacrifice is almost too much to
enumerate. For himself he thereby acquired his entire exaltation, the
resurrection, Ef. 1:20, the ascension, 1 Petr. 3:22, the session at the right
hand of God, Ef. 1:20, Hebr. 12:2, the elevation to Head of the church, Ef.
1:22, the name above every name, Philippians 2:9-11, the Mediatorial glory, Hebr.
2:9, the dominion over all things in heaven and on earth, Matthew 28:18,
Ef. 1:22, 1 Corinthians 15:24v., the last judgment, John 5:22, 27. And further he
acquired for his own, for humanity, for the world an immeasurable series of
blessings. He himself in his person is the sum of all those blessings, the
light of the world, John 8:12, the true bread, 6:35, the true vine, 15:1, the
way, the truth, the resurrection and the life, 11:25, 14:6, our σοφια,
δικαιοσυνη, ἁ γιασμος, ἀ πολυτρωσις, 1 Corinthians 1:30, our ειρηνη, Ef. 2:14, the
firstborn and the firstfruits, who is followed by many, Romans 8:29, 1 Corinthians 15:23, the second and last Adam, 1 Corinthians 15:45, the head of the church, Ef.
1:22, the cornerstone of the building of God, Ef. 2:20; and therefore there is
no participation in his benefits except through participation in his person.
But from him all benefits nevertheless flow forth: the entire σωτηρια, Matthew 1:21, Luke 2:11, John 3:17, 12:47, and then more specifically the forgiveness
of sins, Matthew 26:28, Ef. 1:7, the taking away, α ἰ ρειν, of our sins, John 1:29, 1
John 3:5, the cleansing or deliverance from an evil conscience, Hebr. 10:22,
justification, Romans 4:25, righteousness, 1 Corinthians 1:30, the υ ἱ οθεσια, Galatians 3:26,
4:5, 6, Ef. 1:5, free access to God, Ef. 2:18, 3:12, the laying aside by God of
his wrath on the ground of Christ’s sacrifice, i.e. the ἱ λασμος, Romans 3:25, 1
John 2:2, 4:10, Hebr. 2:17, the new, reconciled, no longer hostile but
favorable relation of peace toward the world, which has taken the place of
that with God, καταλλαγη, Romans 5:10v., 2 Corinthians 5:18-20, and the relation of
peace of man in relation to God, Romans 5:1; further the gift of the H. Spirit,
John 15:26, Hd. 2, Galatians 4:6, regeneration and sonship from God, John 1:12,
13, sanctification, 1 Corinthians 1:30, participation in Christ’s death, Romans 6:3v.,
the dying off of sin, Romans 6:6v. Galatians 2:20, crucifixion to the world, Gal.
Op. 1:5, 7:14, of sins by the sprinkling with the blood of Christ, Hebr. 9:22,
12:24, 1 Petr. 1:2, the walk in the Spirit and in the newness of life, Romans 6:4, participation in the resurrection and the ascension of Christ, Romans 6:5,
Ef. 2:6, Philippians 3:20, the following of Christ, Matthew 10:38, 1 Petr. 2:21v.; further
still the deliverance from the curse of the law, Romans 6:14, 7:1-6, Galatians 3:13, Colossians 2:14, the fulfillment of the old and the inauguration of a new
covenant, Mark 14:24, Hebr. 7:22, 9:15, 12:24, deliverance from the power
of Satan, Luke 11:22, John 14:30, Colossians 2:15, 1 John 3:8, Colossians 1:13, the victory
over the world, John 16:33, 1 John 4:4, 5:4, deliverance from death and from
the fear of death, Romans 5:12v., 1 Corinthians 15:55v., Hebr. 2:15, escape from
judgment, Hebr. 10:27, 28; and finally, the resurrection, on the last day, Joh.
heavenly inheritance, John 14:1, 1 Petr. 1:4, eternal life, already beginning
here with faith, John 3:15, 36 and once revealing itself fully in glory, Mark 10:30, Romans 6:22, the new heaven and earth, 2 Petr. 3:13, Op. 21:1, 5, the
restoration of all things, Hd. 3:21, 1 Corinthians 15:24-28.
4. The history of the doctrine of Christ’s work exhibits a different
character from that of the dogma of the Trinity and of Christ’s person. No
definite conflict has been waged over it, which has led to a sharp and clear
formulation. Scripture was also so many-sided in the description of that
work; and in the history of theology all kinds of conceptions of the work of
Christ arose, which contained a kernel of truth, cf. Bähr, Die Lehre der
Kirche vom Tode Jesu in den drei ersten Jahrh. 1832. Baur, Die christl.
Lehre v. d. Versöhnung in ihrer gesch. Entw. 1838. Dorner, Entw. d. Lehre
v. d. Person Christi2 1851. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk II3 113 f.
Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers., part I. Art. Versöhnung in Herzog1 by
Schoeberlein, in Herzog2 by H. Schmidt, and furthermore the dogmahistorical works of Hagenbach etc. The apostolic fathers attach themselves
to the usage of the H. Scripture and say only, that Christ out of love for us
suffered and sacrificed himself, Barn. 7. Ign. ad Eph. 1. Polyc. ad Phil. 1.
Diogn. 9. Soon, however, people attempted to give themselves some further
account of the work of Christ. And then immediately different conceptions
occur alongside one another; from the beginning Christ was regarded not
only as prophet but also as king and priest. Sometimes these three offices
are also expressly mentioned alongside one another; Eusebius speaks of
related statements also occur in Lactantius, Greg. Nyss., August., de civ. X
6 etc., cf. Krauss, Das Mittlerwerk nach dem Schema des munus triplex,
Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1872 S. 595-655. That does not prevent one or another
conception from sometimes coming one-sidedly into the foreground. The
emphasis then falls on the fact that Christ is the Logos, who appeared on
earth, in order to reveal the full truth to men and to give them an example of
virtue, Just. Apol. I 10. Iren., adv. haer. V 1. Tertull., de orat. 4. Clem. Alex.,
Strom. V 12. Orig., de princ. III 5, 6. c. Cels. I 67. 68. Athan., de incarn. 16.
Or else sin is felt more as power than as guilt and correspondingly the work
of Christ is conceived more as redemption than as reconciliation; God has
become man, in order that He might deliver men from sensuality, mortality,
and dominion of demons and might make them like God, partakers of
eternal life and immortality, Iren., adv. haer. III 16, 6. 20, 2 IV 2 V 1.
Athan., de incarn. 7. Greg. Nyss., Catech. magna 17-26 etc. Another, wellknown conception, and in spite of the contradiction of Gregorius Naz., Orat.
42, 48, embraced by many, was that Christ in his death had given himself
over to Satan as a ransom, bait, or trap and thus had overcome him by
cunning and had delivered men from his dominion, Orig., op Matthew 20:28.
Greg. Nyss., Orat. cat. 22-26. Damasc., de fide orthod. III 1. 27 etc. And
finally, from the beginning already, the thought also occurs that Christ in his
suffering and dying offered himself for us and in our place to God, in order
to acquire reconciliation, forgiveness, sanctification, and the whole
salvation. Very beautifully we find this thought already in the epistle to
Diognetus c. 9, cf. Clemens Rom., I ad Cor. 7. Barnabas c. 5. 6. 7.
According to Justin Martyr Christ not only became man, in order to make
himself a partaker of our suffering and to bring healing, in order to put an
end to the disobedience that had come into the world, in order to overcome
the power of Satan and of death; but his death is also a sacrifice for all
sinners who wish to repent, the passover that has been slaughtered for all,
the cause of the forgiveness of sins, Dial. c. 40. 111, cf. Semisch,
Justin der Märtyrer II 416 f. Much more clearly Irenaeus says that Christ,
who through his incarnation stands in communion with us and has entered
into our whole condition, V praef. cf. III 18. 7. V 16, 2, through his
suffering and death has reconciled us to God, III 16, 9, has restored us to the
favor of God, against whom we had sinned, has reconciled the Father for
us, has made good our disobedience by his obedience and has bestowed on
us in faith the forgiveness of sins, V 17, 1. And a similar conception of the
suffering of Christ as a sacrifice for our sins, which acquired for us
righteousness and life, also occurs in Origen, Athanasius, Cyrillus,
Gregorius Nyss., Damascenus, Thomasius, II 125 f. In the West too this
conception was adopted and further developed. Tertullian saw in religion a
legal relationship, in which man is subject to God’s law and for
transgressions has to render satisfaction to God through the poenitentia; as
in the Trinity, so Tertullian in the doctrine of penance brought various terms
into use, deo offenso satisfacere, deum iratum placare, reconciliare, deum
promereri etc., which indeed were not yet applied by himself but already by
Cyprian, Hilarius, Ambrosius and others to Christ and his offering,
Harnack, D. G. III 15 f., cf. I 524. Augustine enumerated various fruits of
Christ’s offering, which all come down to this, that on the one hand it has
delivered us from guilt, stain, death, and devil and on the other hand has
bestowed on us illumination, life, and salvation, Kühner, Augustinus
Anschauung von der Erlösungsbedeutung Christi, Heidelberg 1899 S. 18.
Alongside the ethical, the mystical, and the ransom theory, the juridical or
satisfactorial also occurs in him. Christ is mediator, reconciliator,
redemptor, salvator, medicus, pastor etc., He is sacerdos and sacrificium at
the same time; He is the true and only sacrifice for sins, de civ. X 6. Enchir.
33. 41; himself without guilt, He took over our punishment, in order thereby
to pay our guilt and to put an end to our punishment, c. Faust. Man. XIV 4.
Delicta nostra sua delicta fecit, ut justitiam suam nostram justitiam faceret.
His maledictio is our benedictio; Christus de te sibi habebat carnem, de se
tibi salutem, de te sibi mortem, de se tibi vitam, de te sibi contumelias, de se
tibi honores, Enarr. in ps. 60.
The representations that we encounter among the church fathers
concerning the suffering of Christ recur in scholasticism. But
Anselm’s writing Cur Deus homo nevertheless gave to the satisfactorial
conception a preponderance over all others. What was new in Anselm did
not consist in this, that he regarded Christ’s death as an offering for our sins.
But while earlier one had mostly said that the incarnation and satisfaction
were not absolutely necessary, Anselm sought a ground in order to prove
the contrary. He found it in this, that upon sin there must always follow aut
poena aut satisfactio and that, if God wills to forgive and preserve
humanity, none other than a God-man can bring that satisfactio to God and
give back to Him His honour. But because Christ was God-man, his wholly
voluntary death was of so great value, that He not only delivered from
punishment but moreover also merited; and that merit He, since He did not
himself need it, ceded to humanity, in whose place He had given back to
God the honour. No one took over this view of Anselm unchanged. The
absolute necessity of Christ’s incarnation and satisfaction was mostly
denied; Duns Scotus stood wholly on the other side, denied the infinity of
the guilt and the infinity of Christ’s merit, denied that Christ’s offering was
sufficient in itself, taught that it was reckoned sufficient by God, and
reduced incarnation and satisfaction to pure arbitrariness, to the dominium
absolutum in God, cf. deel II 211; but Thomas also did not deem them
absolutely necessary and called them conveniens, S. Th. III qu. 1 art. 1. 2.
qu. 46 art. 1-3. Further, a single one, viz. Abaelard, contested the whole
satisfaction-doctrine and set over against it, that Christ’s incarnation and
suffering was not a revelation of God’s righteousness but only of his grace
and love; that Christ from the beginning to the end of his life had taught us
by his word and example and thereby awakens in us a love which delivers
from sin and makes us God’s children, and that herein the redeeming and
reconciling power of Christ’s person and work is situated, Herzog2 1, 16.
Various elements in Anselm’s representation were later rejected by all, such
as the whole private-law character that he gives to the satisfaction, the
conception of sin as an insult and of satisfaction as restoration of honour,
the one-sided emphasis that he lays on Christ’s death with disregard
of his life, the antithesis that he makes between poena and satisfactio, the
mechanical connection that he lays between satisfactio and meritum,
between Christ’s merit and the reason why it benefits humanity. But that
does not take away, that the doctrine of Anselm nevertheless in its essential
constituent parts, as satisfaction for the debt of sin to God’s righteousness,
in order thereby to acquire for us righteousness and life, has obtained in
later theology an enduring significance. The redemption brought about by
Christ was by Anselm first and most clearly conceived as a deliverance, not
in the first place from the consequences of sin, from death and from the
power of Satan, but first of all from sin itself and its guilt; the redemption of
Christ became in the first place a reconciliation of God and man. Yet this
has come much less into its own in scholastic and Roman theology than in
Protestant. Thomas does not, with Anselm, limit the satisfaction chiefly to
the death, but extends it to the whole suffering and the entire obedience of
Christ, S. Theol. III qu. 46; he also explains the transfer of Christ’s merit to
his own better than Anselm from this, that Christ is the head and the church
his body, ib. qu. 8; but he nevertheless does not bring it in the consideration
of Christ’s suffering to any unity, conceives it successively as meritum,
satisfactio, sacrificium, redemptio, ib. qu. 48 and then names as its fruits the
liberatio a peccato, a potestate diaboli, a poena peccati, reconciliatio, aditus
paradisi, ib. qu. 49. The reconciliation is here not yet in the foreground and
it also comes about only fully thereby, that Christ as a forma virtutis et
humilitatis awakens us to imitation, by his love and grace moves us to love
and in faith delivers us from sin; objective and subjective side of the
reconciliation, forgiveness and renewal are not sufficiently kept apart from
one another, ib. 48 art. 1. 49 art. 1 and further Lombardus and other comm.
on Sent. III dist. 18. 19. Bonaventura, Brevil. IV 7. 9. Later this also still
remains so with many Roman theologians, Petavius, de incarn. XII. XIII.
Theol. Wirceb.3 IV 295 sq. Deharbe’s explanation of the Catholic doctrine
of faith and morals, Utrecht 1888 II 267v., but others nevertheless place the
whole work of Christ under the concept redemptio, or satisfactio (and
meritum) or also treat it in the schema of the three offices, Cat. Rom.
I c. 3 qu. 7. Perrone, Prael. theol. IV 1839 p. 309. Liebermann, Instit.
theol.8 II 264. Dieringer, Kath. Dogm.4 465. Scheeben, Dogm. III 309-454.
Pesch, Prael. dogm. IV 198 sq. 256 sq. Jansen, Prael. theol. II 708.
The Reformation originally had no other doctrine concerning the work of
Christ than Rome, and defended the satisfaction of Christ tooth and nail
against the Socinian attack. Yet, by virtue of its principle, it placed it under
a new point of view and in another connection. Because it had learned to
know sin first of all as guilt, in the work of Christ reconciliation came to
stand in the foreground. Sin was of such a nature that it angered God; in
order to appease that wrath, in order to satisfy God’s justice, to that end, in
the first place, satisfaction by the God-man was necessary. He brought this
about by placing Himself, as Surety of the Covenant, in our place, taking
upon Himself the full guilt and punishment of sin, and subjecting Himself
to the entire demand of the law of God. The work of Christ therefore
consists not so much in humilitas, not only in His death, but in His entire
obedience, both active and passive. And He accomplished this work in His
threefold office, not only as prophet by teaching us and giving an example
and stirring us up to love, but also as priest and king, Calvin first in the
Catech. Genev., thereafter in the edition of the Institutio of 1539 and then
by him gradually taken over by Reformed, Lutheran, and Roman
theologians. The objective and the subjective side of reconciliation are
thereby clearly distinguished. Christ has accomplished everything. All
benefits are objectively enclosed in His person. Because Christ by His
offering has satisfied God’s justice, He has objectively changed the relation
of God and man and thereby also all other relations of man to sin, death,
Satan, world. The first benefit is therefore the forgiveness of sins, and as a
consequence thereof also the deliverance from stain, death, law, Satan.
Christ is the only Mediator of God and of men, the all-sufficient Saviour,
the highest prophet, the only priest, the true king. Cf. Luther and
Melanchton bij Thomasius II 168 f. Gerhard, Loc. IV 320-331. XVI 31-63.
Quenstedt III 450-460. Hollaz, Ex. 728-764. Buddeus, Inst. theol. 806-859.
Calvijn, Inst. II 15-17. Polanus, Syst. Theol. VI c. 27-29. Maccovius,
Coll. theol. I 228 sq. Voetius, de merito Christi, Disp. II 228-284.
Turretinus, Theol. El. XIV. Id. De satisfactione Christi 1691. Owen, various
tractates in vol. X of his Works, Edinburgh Clark 1862. Moor III 842 sq. M.
5. The work of Christ, however, like his person, was understood by others
in a wholly different way. The Ebionites saw in Christ only a prophet, who
by his teaching and example gives man strength for the struggle against sin.
For the Gnostics Christ was an aeon of Divine wisdom, who had appeared
on earth in an apparently human form, in order by illumination and
knowledge to free men from the bonds of matter and to make them
πνευματικοι. Over against this speculative rationalism the Montanists
maintained the supernatural, transcendent character of Christianity, not only
in the person of Christ, but also in the revelation continuing through the H.
Spirit, which now still is the portion of believers and causes the Christian
religion to pass from the childish into the manly age. In the dualistic,
pantheistic, apocalyptic and libertinistic sects of the Middle Ages likewise
no other significance remained for Christ than that he in his time had
revealed to men their true essence and destination, whereby they now
themselves in the age of the Spirit can become what Christ was; what
Scripture teaches of Christ is realized in every Christian; the actual dying
and rising of Christ takes place in the regeneration of every man. All these
thoughts continued to operate in the century of the Reformation and led to a
strong combating of the doctrine of Luther and Calvin. Not the Christ for
us, but the Christ in us, not the Word but the Spirit was the essence of
religion. Osiander taught that Christ had brought the eternal, Divine
essential righteousness in his human nature, and pours this into his own
through faith and thus justifies them, Herzog2 11, 125 f. Carlstadt, Frank,
Schwencfeld, Weigel e. a. saw in trust in Christ’s imputed righteousness a
dangerous error; our salvation lies not in what Christ outside and for us
but in what he does in and through us, in the mystical communion
with God, Erbkam, Gesch. d. prot. Sekten 247 f. 340 f. 441 f. This mystical
conception of redemption through Christ also later found acceptance with
many. Böhme regarded the wrath of God and death as real, physical powers,
which Christ has conquered by his death and in whose place he pours out a
new Divine life into humanity, Joh. Claassen, J. Böhme, sein Leben u. seine
theos. Werke III 31-76. Among the Quakers redemption indeed has its cause
in Christ, but Christ himself is nothing other than the summary of grace and
light in humanity; the actual, true redemption is that which takes place in
us, Barclay, Verantwoording van de ware Christ. Godgel. Amst. 1757 bl.
154. Antoinette Bourignon and Poiret called vicarious suffering impossible
and improper; Christ did not come to earth to make satisfaction for us, but
to preach to us God’s forgiving love and by his teaching and example to
cleanse us from sin, M. Vitringa VI 51. Likewise J. C. Dippel conceived the
suffering and dying of Christ as an example of his spiritual mediatorship,
whereby he kills the old man in us and causes the new to rise; redemption
takes place in us; an objective reconciliation is not necessary, for there is no
wrath in God, ib. 56. Dorner, Entw. II 924. According to Zinzendorf Christ
is the Creator and Sustainer of all things, the Jehova of the O. T., who
therein has revealed God’s love, that he has become so small, so poor, so
humble and has suffered so much; his suffering is not so much punishment
and satisfaction to God, as rather voluntary and loving martyrdom; his
blood, his death is thereby the source of the life of humanity; the martyrwounds of Christ’s side are the matrix of the human race, the origin of the
Spirit, who from Christ pours himself out into all, Plitt, Zinzendorfs Theol. I
291. II 194 f. Schneckenburger, Vorles. über die Lehrbegriffe der klein.
prot. Kirchenparteien 195 f. Swedenborg held the belief that the suffering
on the cross was the redemption to be a fundamental error, which together
with the doctrine of the Trinity had brought the church to ruin. The
suffering on the cross was not the redemption but was for Jesus the last
temptation and, because he stood firm, the means of his glorification; then
the human in him was united with the Divine of his Father, then God truly
became man, could he approach the hostile, sensuous powers of hell
and overcome them; redemption is a continuing subjugation of hell and
ordering of heaven, brought about by God as man, Swedenborg, Die wahre
christl. Religion2 1873 S. 169-205.
But not only from the mystical side, but also from the rationalistic side,
there arose opposition to the ecclesiastical doctrine concerning the work of
Christ. To this may be reckoned the doctrine of Stancarus, that Christ only
according to his human nature is our mediator and our righteousness,
Herzog2 14, 590 f.; and also the denial of the obedientia activa by Karg
(Parsimonius), and by Joh. Piscator, who first set forth his ideas in a letter
in the year 1604, included in the Epist. praest. virorum p. 156, cf. Theses
theol. XV 18. 19. Karg retracted his opinion in 1570, but Piscator found
support with Martinius, Crocius, Pierius, Pareus, Wendelinus, H. Alting e.
a., and later exercised through Camero, Placaeus, Capellus etc. a harmful
influence on Reformed theology. But the most serious and solid opposition
to the satisfactio vicaria came from the side of the Socinians. Indeed they
still call Christ prophet, priest, and king, Cat. Rac. qu. 101, but in fact they
make the priestly office an appendage of the kingly office. When Christ was
on earth, He was only a prophet, who before the beginning of his public
activity had been taken up by God into heaven (raptus in coelum, John 3:13,
acquainted by God himself with the truth, and thus was in a position to
perfect the law with new commandments, Cat. Rac. qu. 209v, and to
promise to the keepers of those commandments eternal life, ib. qu. 352 and
the sanctifying power of the Spirit, qu. 361. This his doctrine Christ
confirmed by his sinless life, by his miracles, and especially by his death
and his resurrection ib. qu. 374. His death was necessary, in order to cause
his followers to persevere to the end in their piety and holy walk, qu. 380,
and in order clearly and distinctly to confirm God’s love toward us, qu.
383.; and his resurrection served, to cause us by his example to see that they
who are obedient to God are delivered from all death, and in order to grant
to Christ himself the power to grant eternal life to all who obey Him, qu.
384. The death of Christ thus had here a wholly different significance
than in the doctrine of the church; it formed no independent moment in the
work of Christ but served only, on the one hand to confirm his doctrine and
on the other hand to cause Him to come to the resurrection, which first
made Him King and Lord in heaven, qu. 386. And even this He in fact first
became through his ascension. The resurrection still belongs to the state of
humiliation, for even thereafter He still had a mortal body, qu. 465. But at
the ascension He received a glorified body, and was exalted to King, Lord,
and God. As such He received from God the power, to support those who
follow his example in all distress and at last to reward them with
immortality. That He can do this, is his kingly office; that He will do this, is
his high-priestly office, qu. 476. Priest, therefore, He was not yet on earth,
qu. 483; his death was not the actual sacrifice, but the introduction and
preparation for it; the true sacrifice He now brings in heaven, just as the O.
T. high priest first brought about the reconciliation in the most holy place,
qu. 413. And that sacrifice consists in this, that He accomplishes the
reconciliation, i.e. delivers us from the service and the punishment of sin.
From this standpoint the Socinians had to oppose the doctrine of
satisfaction just as strongly as that of the Trinity and the Godhead of Christ,
cf. especially Catech. Rac. qu. 388-414 and F. Socinus, Praelect. theol. c. 15
and de Jesu Christo Servatore, Bibl. Fr. Pol. II 121-252. First, in their
judgment it is in conflict with Scripture; the proponents cannot adduce a
single certain passage for their opinion; Scripture says clearly that God
forgives sin out of grace and forgiveness excludes satisfaction; the
expression that Christ has suffered for us etc. has no substitutionary
meaning, but says only that Christ has suffered for us, not to satisfy God,
but to deliver us from sin; the words redemption, reconciliation and the like
indicate only that Christ has shown us the way to be delivered from the
service and the punishment of sin, but absolutely not that God had to be
reconciled by a sacrifice, for God was graciously disposed toward us and
has made this known to us through Christ. Further, satisfaction is also not
necessary; the justice and mercy in God are not in conflict with one
another, they are also not attributes naturally proper to God, but they are
effectus ipsius voluntatis and depend on his will; whether God wills to
punish or to forgive sins is not at all determined by his nature but by his
will; God can just as well and better than a man forgive sins without
satisfaction; indeed his justice is nullified by satisfaction, because it
punishes the innocent and lets the guilty go free, and his mercy loses its
value if it can show itself only after satisfaction; God has therefore always
promised forgiveness to the penitent and willed that we should imitate Him
therein. Next, satisfaction is also impossible; the obedientia passiva is
impossible, because indeed money debts but no personal moral debts can be
transferred to another; to punish an innocent person for the sin of another is
unjust and cruel; and even if this were possible, that other would then at
most be able to undergo the punishment of sin, i.e. eternal death, for one
single man, but never for many or for all men; and as regards the obedientia
activa, this is even much less possible, for to the keeping of God’s law each
is personally obligated for himself, but the one can never take it over for the
other; moreover the obedientia passiva and activa are in conflict with one
another, whoever accomplishes the one is free from the other; Christ
therefore has not accomplished them, He has not suffered eternal death but
rose on the third day from the dead; however severe, his suffering was
finite; his divine nature could not make it infinite in value, because it could
not suffer and die, or it would at every moment in that suffering be infinite
and thus make all the rest superfluous; moreover, what could that benefit us,
since man had sinned, and how could God (the Son) satisfy God himself
(the Father)? Finally, the doctrine of satisfaction is also harmful, because it
exalts Christ with his mercy above God with his demand for satisfaction,
obliges us to greater gratitude to Christ than to God, and also opens the door
to carelessness and ungodliness; all sins have, after all, been satisfied, we
can then sin as much as we wish. And the death of Christ intended precisely
that we should be delivered from sin and should walk in a new godly life!
Faustus Socinus’ criticism of the doctrine of satisfaction was so sharp and
complete, that later opponents could do nothing other than repeat his
arguments. The Remonstrants did indeed still try to maintain the
satisfaction of Christ, but in fact adopted all objections raised against it;
they taught not only, with Roman Catholics and Lutherans, that Christ had
made satisfaction for all men, but they also denied that Christ suffered all
punishments which God had imposed upon sin, that He underwent eternal
death, that His obedientia activa was vicarious. Even His suffering and
death was no satisfactio plenaria pro peccatis, no solutio debitorum, which
after all would make forgiveness on God’s side and faith on our side
superfluous; but an offering, a perfect, unto death maintained, dedication of
Christ to God, which was regarded by Him as sufficient for all sins. On the
ground of that offering God now, through the gospel, has forgiveness of sins
offered to all, in order that everyone who believes may be saved; but Christ
did not acquire actual salvation for His own, but only the possibility of
becoming saved, for all; whether someone actually is saved depends on
himself, Conf. en Apol. Conf. c. 8. Limborch, Theol. Christ. III c. 18-23.
Hugo Grotius also, in his Defensio fidei catholicae de satisfactione Christi
1617, undertook an attempt at justification of the doctrine of satisfaction. To
that end he derived it, not from the will of God nor also from His punitive
justice, but from the justitia Dei rectoria, i.e. from the necessity for God to
maintain in the world order and law, right and justice, and to take account
of the bonum commune. By conceiving that legal order, however, as a
world-order which stood outside God, he made God’s justice subservient
and subordinate to it; he changed the satisfaction of Christ into an
undeserved suffering, into a penal example for the deterrence of others, into
a measure of regents’ wisdom; and he left unexplained how Christ for that
had to be God, and how God could thus cause an innocent person to suffer
and could regard his suffering as satisfaction for others. Yet, however many
objections the Socinian and Remonstrant doctrine could provoke, it
gradually gained the upper hand. The supranaturalists, such as Michaelis,
Storr, Morus, Knapp, Steudel, Reinhard, Dogm. § 107, Muntinghe, Vinke,
Egeling, Weg der zaligheid II 175 etc., although sometimes still
thinking to defend the ecclesiastical doctrine, in substance propounded no
other doctrine than that of the Remonstrants or of Hugo Grotius. The same
was the case in the New England Theology. The older Jonathan Edwards
still defended the orthodox doctrine, Works I 582; but Edwards Jr., Smalley,
Maxey, Burge, Dwight, Emmons, Spring, propounded the governmental
theory of Grotius, cf. E. Park, The atonement, discourses and treatises of
Jon. Edwards, Smalley, Maxey, Emmons etc., New-York 1860. A. A.
Hodge, The atonement p. 328. But many went still further and rejected the
whole doctrine of satisfaction. Ernesti, de officio Christi triplici, Opusc.
theol. 1773 p. 413, contested the doctrine of the three offices with the
argument that the names of prophet, priest, and king are unclear, Old Test.
representations and that each office already includes the other two within
itself. Töllner, in his de obedientia Christi activa commentatio 1755,
renewed all Socinian objections, not only against the active obedience of
Christ but against the whole doctrine of satisfaction. And with him Bahrdt,
Steinbart, Eberhard, Löffler, Henke, Wegscheider, Inst. § 140-142, Hobbes,
Leviathan ch. 41, Locke, Chubb, Coleridge, John Taylor, Priestley etc.,
argued that Christ was not a revelation of God’s justice but of His love and
mercy; that God does not punish sin except with such natural punishments
as proceed from sin itself and bear a paedagogical character; that the
doctrine of substitution is an absurd thought of Augustine and Anselm and
occurs in Scripture not at all or only from accommodation, in O. T.
symbols; that the active obedience of Christ, if it were vicarious, would on
our side make all faith, conversion, moral improvement unnecessary; and
especially, that forgiveness of sins, adoption as children of God,
justification cannot precede moral renewal or sanctification but must follow
it and be dependent on it. Religion was built upon morality; the center of
gravity shifted from the objective to the subjective; Versöhnung made
dependent on Erlösung; God a servant of man. Thus the death of Christ
could only still be an example of virtue and confirmation of the truth
(Eberhard, Löffler), or a sacrifice for the benefit of men and a proof of
God’s love (Schwarze), or a factual declaration of God that He wishes
to forgive sins to whoever repents (Morus, Köppen, Klaiber, Stäudlin), or a
means to awaken trust in God, to deter from sin (Töllner, Egeling), or also,
to free us from the erroneous thought that God is wrathful and punishes
(Steinbart), or a symbolic representation of the voluntary assumption by the
moral man of the punishment which he has deserved in his sinful condition,
Kant, Religion 84 f., cf. v. d. Willigen, Oordeelk. Overzigt over de versch.
wijzen, op welke men zich heeft voorgesteld het verband tusschen den dood
van J. C. en de zaligheid der menschen, Godg. Bijdr. II 1828 bl. 485-603.
Bretschneider, Syst. Entw. 608 f. Baur, Chr. Lehre v. d. Versöhnung 478 f.
Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I cap. 7. 8.
6. In more recent theology there has been no lack of attempts to modify
the doctrine of Christ’s office and work in accordance with the many
objections raised against it, and yet to maintain it in a new form. In general
it was thereby guided by the striving to transform the juridical doctrine of
satisfaction, in which Christ in our place fulfilled the demand of God’s
justice, into that of a personal, religious-ethical activity of Christ, by which
He brought about change not in God, who is always love, but in us, whether
then more in our understanding or in our heart or in our will. Schelling and
Hegel, however, ascribed to Christianity as a historical phenomenon only a
transitory value. That God becomes man in a particular person and then
suffers and dies for another’s sin is unthinkable. But, taken symbolically, it
contains profound truth. The person and the work of Christ are the historical
clothing of the idea that the world as Son of God, proceeding from Him and
returning to Him, must necessarily suffer and thus enter into glory; the
world and humanity subjected to time and finitude is the suffering and
dying God, Schelling, Werke I 5 S. 386-305; the reconciliation of God is a
necessary, objective moment in the world-process, God reconciles himself
with himself and returns from alienation to himself, Hegel, Werke XII 249-
256. Reasoning further in this way, von Hartmann said, God cannot redeem
me, but I can redeem God, nur durch mich kann Gott erlöst werden. Das
reale Dasein ist die Incarnation der Gottheit, der Weltprocess die
Passionsgeschichte des fleischgewordenen Gottes und zugleich der Weg zur
Erlösung des im Fleische Gekreuzigten, Das sittl. Bewustsein2 1886 S. 688.
In modern theology, which does not go that far but is nevertheless in
principle governed by the philosophy of Hegel and Kant, the person of
Christ accordingly attains no higher significance than that of liberator from
the legalistic, historical starting-point of the Christian religion; archetypal
realization of the sonship of God, of the unity of God and man; proclaimer
of God’s fatherly love and example of the congregation, Pfleiderer,
Dogm. § 802. 815 f. Lipsius, Dogm. § 619 f., cf. v. Hartmann, Die Krisis d.
Christ. in der mod. Theol. 1880. Scholten, L. H. K. I 410v. Hoekstra, Godg.
Bijdr. 1866 bl. 273v. Id. Grondslag, wezen en openb. van het godsd. geloof
Higher stands the person and the work of Christ with Schleiermacher;
indeed he taught something entirely different from what the church
confessed, although he also attached himself to her usage of language and
to the doctrine of the three offices, but it was nevertheless his concern to
assure Christ a lasting place in Christianity. The Erlösung comes about with
Schleiermacher through the mystical union of the human being with Christ.
Christ namely always shared in the communion with God, and was thereby
holy and blessed. As such He came to us, entered into our communion,
received a share in our suffering, suffered with us in priestly fashion, and
maintained his holiness and blessedness down into the deepest sorrow, even
unto the death of the cross. Thus, first entering into our communion, He
then, not through his word and example only but through the mystical
operation that proceeds from his whole person, takes us up into his
communion, and causes us, through his redeeming activity, to share in his
holiness and, through his reconciling activity, to share in his blessedness;
the Erlösung, i.e. regeneration, sanctification, goes, as with Rome and
rationalism, before the Versöhnung, before the forgiveness of sins, Chr. Gl.
§ 101-104. This mystical substitution theory remained the fundamental
thought in the doctrine of reconciliation of the Vermittelungstheologie,
Nitzsch, Syst. d. chr. Lehre § 80. 134-136. Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 541-558.
Schoeberlein, art. Versöhnung in Herzog1 en Princip u. Syst. d.
Dogm. 182 f. 647 f. Lange, Dogm. II 813-908. Martensen, Dogm. § 156-
169, also Hofmann in his Schriftbeweis, which for that reason was
contested by Philippi, Thomasius, Delitzsch e. a., cf. Weiszäcker, Um was
handelt es sich in dem Streit über die Versöhnungslehre? Jahrb. f. d. Th.
1858 S. 155-188. Related is also the doctrine of reconciliation with Ritschl.
This is not to be brought into connection with God as judge, with his
avenging righteousness or wrath, with a legal order of reward and
punishment; for that is a juridical, Pharisaic conception of the relation of
God and human being, which does not belong in religion. God is essentially
love, and his righteousness consists in this, that He unchangeably wills to
bring human beings to blessedness and to realize a kingdom of God in
them. But now humanity, because of sin, is far from God; it goes bowed
down under the consciousness of guilt, it has the feeling that it is in a state
of punishment, it fears and does not dare to approach God, it does not live
in communion with God. Therefore Christ has come to reveal to us the love
of God. The doctrine of the three offices meets with objection with Ritschl;
the word office belongs only in a legal community; in a moral community
of love it is better to speak of a calling; the three offices are also not to be
kept apart in Christ and run into one another; if one wishes to retain them,
the kingly office stands in the foreground, Christ is appointed as king, in
order to found a congregation, a kingdom of God on earth, and to that end
He has revealed God as prophet, and has sacrificed himself to God for his
own as priest. Christ namely stood in an altogether special relation to God;
He made the goal of God, namely to unite human beings into a kingdom of
God, into his task of life; and his whole life, suffering and dying must be
conceived under this point of view, as a moral calling, which He fulfilled,
not as a suretyship or mediation, as a substitution for us. In that moral task
of life Jesus was absorbed, to that He devoted himself wholly, He remained
faithful to it unto death. Thus living, He has fulfilled God’s will, realized his
goal with humanity, revealed his love, grace, faithfulness, and at the same
time, in this his holding fast to his task of life unto death, sacrificed and
devoted himself to God for the benefit of his own. Through this his moral
obedience Christ has exercised no effect upon God, as if He had been
disposed from wrathful to favorable, nor also brought it about that the
believers are bought free from the power of Satan or of death; but indeed
obtained that all who, like Christ, make God’s will their own, in his
communion may lay aside the consciousness of guilt, unbelief, distrust, the
erroneous thought as if God were wrathful and punished, and in spite of
their sins may believe in God’s love and faithfulness and may glory in the
forgiveness of sins (justification), and thereafter also themselves can
positively enter into the new relation in which God stands to them, and can
lay aside all enmity against God, Rechtf. u. Vers. III especially c. 6-8, and
further Herrmann, Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott 1886 S. 93 f. Schultz,
Grundriss d. ev. Dogm. § 44-46. Kaftan, Wesen der chr. Rel. 246 f. Dogm.
S. 446 f. Haering, Zu Ritschl’s Versöhnungslehre, Zurich 1888. Id. Zur
Versöhnungslehre, Gött. 1893. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 504-513. Ziegler in
Gottschicks Zeits. f. Th. u. K. 1895. Riebergall, ib. 1897 S. 461-512.
Ecklin, Der Heilswert des Todes Jesu, Basel 1888. Kühl, Die
Heilsbedeutung des Todes Christi, Berlin 1890.
Similar attempts at a mystical or ethical reconstruction of the doctrine of
satisfaction were also tried in other countries. In our country the Groningen
theologians combated the ecclesiastical doctrine and saw in Jesus’ death,
which was done by men, suffered by Jesus, and permitted by God,
especially in connection with his resurrection, a revelation of God’s love, of
Jesus’ perfection, and of the sin of men, which makes them shudder at their
wickedness, teaches them to admire Jesus’ greatness, and to believe God’s
love, Hofstede de Groot, De Gron. Godg. 181. Chantepie de la Saussaye, in
his doctrine of reconciliation, adopted the ideas of Schleiermacher and of
the Vermittelungstheologie, cf. my Theol. van Ch. d. I. S. 48. In England
Thomas Erskine, The unconditional freeness of the gospel 1828, and Dr.
John Mc Leod Campbell, The nature of the atonement, 5 ed. 1878, taught
that Christ did not acquire God’s love but revealed it and thus was God’s
representative with us. But He was also our representative with God, in that
He, entering into our fellowship, suffered the deepest sorrow over sin as
guilt before God and as the source of all misery, pronounced the amen upon
God’s judgment over sin and, as it were, made confession of it in our
place, and thus as our Head acquired a righteousness and life which is not
juridically imputed to us but is indeed mystically and ethically
communicated to us. Horace Bushnell, Vicarious sacrifice grounded in
principles of universal obligation, ed. New-York 1866, attempted to explain
the suffering of Christ entirely from the vicarious character which all love
bears. Maurice, Doctrine of sacrifice 1854, Kingsley, F. Robertson e. a. saw
in the perfect self-surrender of Christ to the will of the Father the essence of
the reconciliation brought about by Him; for all salvation for man flows
from the offering of himself. Cf. Orr, Chr. view 346. Pfleiderer, Entw. der
prot. Theol. 1891 S. 460 f. Clemen, Stud. u. Krit. 1892 S. 644 f. In France,
for this mystical or ethical conception of the doctrine of reconciliation, the
following are especially to be considered: Pressensé, Essai sur le dogme de
la Rédemption, Bulletin Théol. 1867. Durand, Etude sur la Rédemption,
Revue de théol. et de philos. 1889. Ménégoz, Péché et Rédemption. Bovon,
Etude sur l’oeuvre de la Rédemption 1893 s. Unchanged, the ecclesiastical
doctrine remained with scarcely anyone, but yet it was still presented in the
main by Tholuck, Lehre v. d. Sünde u. v. d. Versöhner 1823. Philippi,
Kirchl. Gl. IV 2. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk II. Vilmar, Dogm. §
48. Böhl, Dogm. 361 f. Bula, Die Versöhnung des Menschen mit Gott durch
Christum oder die Genugthuung, Basel 1874. Koelling, Die satisfactio
vicaria, d. i. die Lehre v. d. stellvertr. Genugthuung des Herrn Jesu, I
Gütersloh 1897. Gess, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1857 S. 679-752. 1858 S. 713 f.
1859 S. 467 f. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 612 f. Ebrard, Dogm. § 396 f. Id. Die
Lehre v. d. stellvertr. Genugthuung 1857. Frank, Chr. Wahrheit II2 157 f.
Kähler, Wiss. v. d. chr. Lehre S. 363 f. Id. Zur Lehre v. d. Versöhnung,
Leipzig 1898. Ch. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 480. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 378.
Arch. Alex. Hodge, The atonement, Philad. 1867. Dale, The atonement, 18
ed. London 1896. Crawford, The doctrine of H. Scr. resp. the atonement,
Edinb. London 1871. Candlish, The atonement, its reality, completeness and
extent, London 1861. Hugh Martin, The atonement in its relations to the
covenants, the priesthood, the intercession of our Lord, Edinb. Hunter z. j.
George Smeaton, The doctrine of the atonement as taught by Christ
Himself, Edinb. Clark Lyttelton, The atonement, in Gore’s Lux mundi
1892 p. 201-229. John Scott Lidgett, The spiritual principle of the
atonement as a satisfaction made to God for the sins of the world2, London
1898. Merle d’Aubigné, L’expiation de la croix, 2 ed. Paris 1867. Bois, La
nécessité de l’expiation, Revue théol. de Montauban 1888. Id. Expiation et
solidarité, ib. 1889. Grétillat, Exposé de théol. syst. IV 300 s., etc.
7. The whole confession of Christendom concentrates in this, that Jesus is
the Christ. With this claim, that He was the Christ, Jesus Himself appeared;
through this faith the Christians came to stand as a particular sect both over
against the Jews and over against the Gentiles; after the name of Christ the
believers at Antioch were first called Christians. The name Jesus, ְַיהֹוׁשּו and
thus He, viz. Ihvh, will help, later shortened to ֵַיׁשּו, Ιησους, Jhesus, Jesus,
was indeed given to His son by Joseph on the express command of the
angel, Matthew 1:21, because He was the perfect Saviour, Hd. 4:12, Hebr. 7:25,
but was nevertheless in Israel a common name, Numbers 13:16, 1 Samuel 6:14, 18, 2
10:24 etc., Hd. 7:45, Hebr. 4:1, Colossians 4:11. In the name Christ, on the other
hand, His office, His dignity is expressed. The Jesuits name themselves
after the name Jesus and thereby arrogate to themselves a name that belongs
to no one, for saviour is Christ alone; but they have also often brought upon
themselves the judgment that they become the less Christians the more
Jesuits they are. But the believers name themselves after the name Christ,
for they are anointed with Him as prophets, priests, and kings. Of the other
names that indicate His office and work, that of μεσιτης especially comes
intercessor, interventor, because He in the covenant of grace by His person
and work unites and reconciles God and man with one another. In the age of
the Reformation there arose over this mediatorship of Christ a not
unimportant dispute. Over against Osiander, who held the essential
righteousness of God in Christ to be the materia of our justification,
Stancarus, professor at Königsberg, defended the proposition that
Christ was mediator only according to His human nature and thus also
could justify us only on the ground of His humanly acquired righteousness,
Herzog2 14, 590. He could appeal for that to Augustine, de civ. XI 2, Conf.
X 43, Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 19, Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 26 art. 2, who
all said that Christ was only mediator, in quantum homo, nam in quantum
Deus non mediator sed aequalis Patri est; and these theologians were by
Stancarus esteemed quite a bit higher than the Reformers: plus valet unus
Petrus Lombardus, quam centum Lutheri, ducenti Melanchtones, trecenti
Bullingeri, quadringenti Petri martyres et quingenti Calvini; qui omnes si in
mortario contunderentur, non exprimeretur una uncia verae theologiae.
Lutherans and Reformed opposed this most strongly and asserted that
Christ was mediator according to both natures, that He as such had been
appointed from eternity and that He had also already fulfilled the office of
mediator in the days of the O. T. Die symb. Bücher der ev. luth. K. ed.
Müller 622. 684. Gerhard, Loc. IV 325. Quenstedt III 273. Calvin, in two
letters, C. R. XXXVII 337-358, the ministers of the church of Zurich in two
letters, Herzog2 14, 592. Polanus, Synt. theol. p. 430. Turretinos, Th. El.
XIV qu. 2. The Roman Catholics maintained that Christ was mediator only
according to His human nature, but they nevertheless had to acknowledge
that Christ, in order to be mediator, had to be both God and man, that both
natures constituted the suppositum and the substantia mediatoris and thus
could only still assert that Christ accomplished the mediatorial works,
offering, suffering, dying, in His human nature, that this therefore alone was
the principium quo, principium formale of the mediatorial works,
Bellarminus, de Christo V c. 1-8. Petavius, de incarn. XII c. 1-4. But this
separation between the person and the work of the mediator is not to be
maintained; the mediatorial works have precisely this peculiarity, that they
have been performed by the one person with both natures. That does not
mean, as Petavius imputes to Lutherans and Calvinists, ib. XII 4, 9, that
these ascribe the mediatorial work to the divine nature of Christ per sese et
ab humana divulsa. Not according to His divine nature as such, as one and
equal with the Father and the Spirit, is the Son mediator, but indeed
according to that divine nature κατ’ ο ἰ κονομιαν, quatenus secundum eam
voluntaria illa dispensatione gratiae se submiserit, Polanus p. 430. Scripture
therefore also more than once calls Christ according to His divine nature
subject of the humiliation, John 1:14, 2 Corinthians 8:9, Philippians 2:6; the church fathers
more than once express themselves in the same spirit, Petavius XII 1;
Augustine, Lombardus and Thomas meant nothing else than that Christ was
not mediator according to His divine nature as such, ab humana natura
divulsa, but only as the incarnate Son of God was and could be mediator;
and finally the Roman theologians themselves again had to defend this
against Stancarus.
Yet there lies behind this another difference. If Christ, namely, is mediator
only according to his human nature in the sense of Bellarmine and Petavius,
then He also was no mediator before his incarnation but only began to be
this at the moment of his conception, and the O. Test. thus in fact has been
without a mediator, Petavius, de incarn. XII 4, 10. But even if it is the case
that the Son first became flesh in the fullness of time, yet He has from
eternity been chosen and appointed as mediator. It cannot be objected
against this that David, Solomon, etc. also have from eternity been chosen
as king and in that sense anointed. For herein consists this great distinction,
that David, Solomon, etc. and all the elect before their conception existed
only in the idea and the decree of God, but the Son was in the beginning
with God and Himself God. His election to mediator did not take place
outside of Him; it bears the character of a pactum salutis; the work of
redemption is a common work of Father, Son, and Spirit, and has
immediately after the fall been begun to be carried out by all three persons.
In the same sense as the Father has from eternity been Father of his children
and the H. Spirit has from eternity been Comforter of the believers, the Son
has from eternity been appointed as mediator and immediately after the fall
has appeared as mediator. Already under the O. T. He was active as prophet,
priest, and king. The fallen world has immediately been delivered over to
the Son as mediator for reconciliation and redemption. And in the fullness
of time He, who already was mediator, has been manifested in the flesh, 1
John 1:2, 3:5, 8. From this it is to be explained that the kingly office in
Christ comes to the foreground; as such He is especially portrayed and
foretold in the O. T.; and with that title He especially appears among his
people. But that kingship of Christ is very distinct from that of earthly
princes; it has its type only in the theocratic, in the Davidic kingship, which
is essentially distinct from that of other kings; it is a kingship in God’s
name, subordinate to God’s will, leading everything to God’s honor; it is
not a kingship of violence and weapons, but it rules and governs in a wholly
other, much better way; it rules through Word and Spirit, through grace and
truth, through right and righteousness. The king is therefore at the same
time prophet and priest; his power stands in the service of the truth and the
righteousness. Because the kingship of Christ bears an entirely peculiar
character, many raise objection to speaking of his kingly office or use the
title of king with Christ in a figurative sense, Wegscheider § 144. Scholten
L. H. K. I4 369v. Yes, many consider it better, with Christ, not to speak of
office but of personal calling, for office belongs in a community of law and
Christ’s kingdom is a kingdom of love and not of law, Ritschl, Rechtf. u.
Vers. III2 402. Indeed an office is distinguished from calling, craft, position
in that it presupposes an authority, rests on an appointment by that authority,
and serves that authority with his person, not for wages. But thus it is
precisely the word office that ought to be used with respect to Christ. For
He has not taken the mediatorial dignity to Himself, but God has chosen
Him, called Him, appointed Him, Psalms 2:7, 89:19-21, 110:1-4, 132:17, Jes.
42:1, Hebr. 5:4-6; the name Christ is not a calling-name, but an officename, a title, a dignity, to which Jesus lays claim, because He has been
chosen by God Himself. Under the O. T. especially the kings were anointed,
Kon. 1:39, Psalms 89:21; anointed was the name of the theocratic king, Psalms 20:7, 28:8, 84:10, 89:39 etc. The anointing with oil was symbol of the
divine consecration, of the equipment with the Spirit of God, 1 Samuel 10:1,
9, 10. And this anointing, not in an outward, symbolic, but in a
spiritual, essential sense, Christ partook of, Jes. 11:2, 42:1, 61:1, Psalms 2:6,
conception from the H. Spirit, Luke 1:35 and at the baptism by John, Matthew 3:16, Mark 1:10, Luke 3:22, John 1:32. And as real as his anointing, of which
that under the O. T. was only shadow, was also his kingship. The theocratic,
Davidic kingship was only the weak type of it, and has in the kingship of
Christ received its essential fulfillment. Christ is king not in a lesser but in a
greater, in a much truer sense than David and Solomon. For to the idea of
the theocratic king belonged that he had to be a man after God’s heart, had
to be bound to God’s law and might not exalt himself as a despot above his
brothers, Deuteronomy 17:14-20. To this kings’ law Israel’s kings did not adhere,
and thus prophecy expected another, better king, who, himself anointed of
the Lord and servant of God, would rule his people through truth and
righteousness, and would overcome his enemies. As such a king Christ
appears; He establishes a kingdom of God, which now exists only
spiritually and morally but is destined also outwardly and bodily once to
reveal itself in the city of God, where all the ungodly are banished and God
will be all in all. And because He is such a king, a king in a true, full sense,
therefore his kingship also includes the prophetic and priestly office.
8. This threefold office of Christ, however, meets with objection among
many, because the one is not to be distinguished from the other, Ritschl,
Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 520 f. III2 386 f. Frank, Chr. Wahrh. II2 158. 202.
Kaftan, Dogm. 486. 531. It must then also be conceded that no single
activity of Christ is to be restricted exclusively to one office. His words are
a proclamation of law and gospel, and thus point to the prophetic office; but
He speaks as one having authority and everything obeys his command, Mark 1:122, 4:41, Luke 4:32 etc.; He himself calls himself king, come into the
world, to bear witness to the truth, John 18:37. His miracles are signs of his
doctrine, John 2:11, 10:37 etc., but also revelation of his priestly
mercy, Matthew 8:17 and of his kingly power, Matthew 9:6, 8, 21:23. In his
intercession not only his high-priestly but also his prophetic and kingly
office is expressed, John 17:2, 9, 10, 24. His death is a confession and
example, 1 Timothy 6:13, 1 Petr. 2:21, Op. 1:5, but also an offering, Ef. 5:2 and
a display of his power, John 10:18. Dogmatics has therefore also been at a
loss as to what, in particular, was to be brought under each office from
Jesus’ life and works. Under the prophetic office there was usually treated
teaching, foretelling, and doing miracles; under the priestly office offering,
interceding, and blessing; but for the kingly office, in the state of
humiliation, there then remained no more than the homage of the wise men
from the east, the entry into Jerusalem, the appointment of the apostles, the
institution of the sacraments; isolated facts, which in part can just as well be
brought under the other offices. Still more difficult was the indication of the
distinction in the state of exaltation; for Jesus’ prophetic activity does
indeed continue in the teaching of his congregation through Word and
Spirit, but also as king He rules and protects his church through these two;
and his high-priestly intercession is no supplication but a kingly willing,
John 17:24. It is then also an atomistic view, which detaches certain
activities from the life of Jesus and assigns some of them to the prophetic,
and others to the priestly and the kingly office. Christ is yesterday and today
the same forever. He performs not merely prophetic, priestly, and kingly
activities, but is himself in his whole person prophet, priest, and king. And
everything that He is, speaks, and does, brings that threefold dignity to
revelation. To be sure, for us in the one activity more of his prophetic, and
in another his priestly or his kingly office can come to expression; and
indeed his prophetic office comes more to the fore in the days of the O. T.
and in his walk on earth, his priestly office more in his suffering and dying,
his kingly office more in his state of exaltation; but in reality He bears all
three offices simultaneously and exercises all three always at the same time,
both before and after his incarnation, both in the state of humiliation and
that of exaltation. Therefore, however, speaking of three offices in Christ is
no arbitrariness, no oriental figurative speech, which can be surrendered
without objection; nor is the one office to be reduced to one of the
other two. Separation is not possible, but distinction is most certainly there.
In order to be mediator, to be perfect saviour, He had to be appointed by the
Father to all three offices and to be made fit by the Spirit for all three. For
the idea of man already contains this threefold dignity and activity in itself;
he has a head, in order to know, a heart, in order to give himself, a hand in
order to rule and to lead; and correspondingly he was in the beginning
equipped by God with knowledge and understanding, with righteousness
and holiness, with dominion and glory (blessedness). Sin, which corrupted
man, worked upon all his faculties and was not only ignorance, folly, error,
lie, blindness, darkness, but also unrighteousness, guilt, moral corruption
and furthermore misery, death and destruction. Therefore Christ, both as
Son and image of God for himself as well as as mediator and saviour for us,
had to bear all three offices; He had to be prophet, in order to know and to
reveal the truth of God; priest, in order to consecrate himself to God and in
our place to offer himself to God; king, in order according to God’s will to
rule and to protect us. Teaching, reconciling and leading; discere, acquirere
and applicare salutem; wisdom, righteousness and redemption; truth, love
and power, all three are necessary for our complete salvation. Prophet is He
in his relation from God to us; priest in his relation from us to God; king in
his relation as head to humanity. Rationalism acknowledges only his
prophetic, mysticism only his priestly, chiliasm only his kingly office. But
Scripture sees in Him all three, and these always and simultaneously, our
highest prophet, our only priest, our eternal king. He is king, yet He does
not rule by the sword but by his Word and Spirit; He is prophet, but his
word is power and comes to pass; He is priest, but He lives by dying,
conquers by suffering and is almighty by his love. He is always everything
together, never the one without the other, in his speaking and acting mighty
as a king and in his kingly dominion full of grace and truth. Witsius, Exerc.
10 in Symbolum, Amesius, Med. Theol. I 19, 11. Leydecker, de verit. relig.
ref. IV 9, 3. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 102. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV 2
9. This Christ is, in his whole person and in his entire work, a revelation
of God’s love. The Gnostics and especially Marcion made a sharp contrast
between the God of wrath, of vengeance, of righteousness, who revealed
himself in the O. T., and the God of love and of grace, who in the N. T. had
made himself known in Christ, part II 200. But such a contrast is unknown
to Scripture. Ihvh Elohim in the O. T. is indeed righteous, holy, zealous for
his honor and wrathful against sin, but He is also gracious, merciful, readily
forgiving and great in lovingkindness, Exodus 20:5, 6, 34:6, 7, Deuteronomy 4:31, Psalms 86:15 etc. In the N. T. God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is the God
of all grace and mercy, Luke 6:36, 2 Corinthians 1:3, 1 Petr. 5:10; there is no
contrast between the Father and Christ; as loving, merciful, and readily
forgiving as Christ is, so also is the Father; they are his words that Christ
speaks, his works that He does. The Father is himself the Savior, σωτηρ,
Luke 1:47, 1 Timothy 1:1, Titus 3:4, 5, the one who in Christ reconciled the world
with himself and did not impute its sins to it, 2 Corinthians 5:18, 19. Christ
therefore did not first move the Father by his work to love and grace, but
the love of the Father precedes and comes to revelation in Christ; Christ is a
gift of God’s love, John 3:16, Romans 5:8, 8:32, 1 John 4:9, 10. To be sure,
Paul says in Romans 3:25, 26, that God publicly, before all eyes, set forth
Christ Jesus as a reconciliation through faith in his blood ε ἰ ς ἐ νδειξιν της
δικαιοσυνης α ὐ του; and here, without doubt, righteousness as a virtue of
God is to be thought of, which, because of the passing over without
reconciliation of the sins formerly committed by Jews and Gentiles under
God’s forbearance, seemed not to come to revelation and therefore seemed
not to exist; it was thus necessary that God, in the present time, in the
fullness of time, set forth Christ as a reconciliation through his blood, in
order that He himself might appear to be righteous and might also justify
the one who is of the faith of Jesus. But also here God’s righteousness is not
conceived as in conflict with his grace and love. For God’s righteousness
showed itself not in this, that it punished sinners for their
transgressions, but that it set forth in Christ a reconciliation through his
blood, so that God now, in the forgiveness of sins, nevertheless appeared
himself righteous and at the same time could justify the believer. God’s
righteousness, namely, consists in Scripture first of all in this, that He
judges righteously, does not hold the guilty for innocent and the innocent
for guilty; and then subsequently, that He helps and saves the poor, the
wretched, those who personally are indeed guilty but objectively have the
right on their side, and acknowledges them in their right. In this latter sense
righteousness is then related to mercy, faithfulness, truth; but it is always
distinguished from these in that it especially pays attention to the anomaly
that exists between the right that someone has and the condition in which he
finds himself, part II 194v. Also here with Paul God’s righteousness is not
identical with his goodness, mercy, faithfulness, truth, but it is still much
less opposed to them. For it is precisely that virtue of God which gave
Christ as a reconciliation, so that God could forgive sins out of grace. Of a
conflict of God’s righteousness and love, as the evangelical hymn 125:5
represents it, there is therefore no question. In our sinful condition this can
indeed appear so to us; but in God all virtues are one and in full harmony.
On the one hand, therefore, the representation is to be rejected, as if Christ
were only a revelation of God’s punishing righteousness. The God of
revelation, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is no pagan god, whose envy
and hatred against human beings must be averted by all kinds of sacrifices;
the sacrifice in Scripture, also in the O. Test., bears an entirely different
character; it presupposes the covenant of grace. Then there would also arise
a gnostic contrast between Father and Son, which would exalt the Son as
the God of grace far above the Father as the God of vengeance and would
tear apart Old and New Test., creation and re-creation, nature and grace. But
on the other hand Christ is also not to be conceived as a manifestation of
God’s love alone, at least not of a love such as we often imagine it and
which differs entirely from the love of God in Scripture. In that case, not
only would the suffering and death of Christ, which Scripture undoubtedly
presents as a punishment for our sin, remain wholly unexplained; but
Paul’s word would also be directly contradicted, that God gave Christ for
that purpose as a reconciliation, in order that He himself might appear to be
righteous and might justify the one who is of the faith of Jesus. Scripture
teaches us rather that in Christ and his offering all God’s virtues came to
glorious revelation. Grace takes the lead there, but it is followed by all the
others. It realizes itself in the way of right and righteousness, Jes. 1:27,
5:16. Hinter dem Zorne ist als letztes Agens die Liebe geborgen, wie hinter
Gewitterwolken die Sonne (Delitzsch). Cf. on Romans 3:25, 26, besides the
commentaries of Philippi, Tholuck, Meyer etc., Pfleiderer, Der
Paulinismus2 143 f. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. II 100. Fricke, Der Paulin.
Grundbegriff der δικ. θεου, erörtert auf Grund von Röm. 3:21-26, Leipzig
10. This naturally leads to the question much discussed in theology,
whether this way of justice before God was necessary in order to reveal his
grace, or whether He could also forgive without satisfaction. Scotus
proceeded from the absolutum dominium Dei and considered incarnation
and satisfaction to be determined only by God’s arbitrariness; Athanasius,
Augustine, Thomas, Calvin, Musculus, Zanchius, Twissus, and others
judged them not absolutely necessary but nevertheless in accordance with
God’s wisdom as most fitting and suitable; Irenaeus, Basilius, Ambrosius,
Anselmus, Beza, Piscator, Voetius, Turretinus, Owen, de Moor, and others
inclined to hold them to be absolutely necessary, cf. deel II 207-216 and
Voetius, Disp. II 238. It is understandable that many preferred to walk the
middle way rather than to elevate arbitrariness to the throne in God or to
limit his omnipotence by an absolute necessitas. Yet there is no objection to
speaking here of necessity, provided this is rightly understood. The will in
God is neither a formal arbitrariness separated from all virtues and from the
whole being of God, nor also a choice bound by all those virtues and by that
whole being and therefore unfree. The will of God is often for us the final
ground of things and we have to acquiesce in it, even if we do not know
why God has acted thus and not otherwise. But in God that will always has
wise and holy reasons for his acting thus and not otherwise, for He [342]
never acts except in accordance with all his virtues, with his love, wisdom,
righteousness, etc. And this accordance of the will of God with all his
virtues is no compulsion, no limitation for that will, but precisely the true,
highest freedom. To will and to act as his holy, wise, almighty, loving nature
itself wills, that is for God both the highest freedom and the highest
necessity. So it is also with the incarnation and satisfaction; they may be
called necessary, not as a compulsion imposed on God from without and
from which He cannot escape, but indeed as deeds and acts that are in
accordance with his virtues and bring these to revelation in the most
glorious manner. For first of all Scripture teaches that God does everything
for his own sake, Spr. 16:4, Romans 11:36; the final ground and the final goal,
also of incarnation and satisfaction, cannot lie in the creature, in the
salvation of the sinner, but must lie in God himself. For his own sake He
has sent his Son into the world as an atonement for our sins, in order that
thus his virtues might come to revelation. And indeed there is no fact that
sets those perfections of God so in the light as the incarnation and the
satisfaction. Not a single virtue comes thereby into the clearest light, but all
together, his wisdom, grace, love, mercy, longsuffering, righteousness,
holiness, power, etc. Even if there is usually only mention of God’s grace
and righteousness, yet the other virtues may not be forgotten. Christ is in his
person, word, and work the highest, most perfect, most all-sided revelation
of God, his servant, his image, his Son; He has declared the Father to us. If
God wished to reveal himself in the most glorious manner, then for that the
creation and the re-creation, the incarnation and the satisfaction, were
necessary. In creation his virtues were already made manifest, but much
more richly and more highly still in the re-creation; sin He knows how to
use omnipotently as a means to glorify himself. Secondly, it is the teaching
of Scripture that God as the absolutely righteous and holy hates sin with
32. There is an absolute antithesis between God and sin, necessarily coming
to expression in this, that He reacts against it with all his virtues; He does
not will sin, He has no desire and pleasure in it, He hates it and is wrathful
against it. Sin cannot exist without its being hated and punished by God.
God cannot deny himself; He cannot acknowledge the right of sin; He
cannot give Satan equal rights with himself. Precisely because He is the
absolutely holy, He must hate sin. Actually everyone concedes that; even if
one says that God can forgive sin without satisfaction and as the highest
love also must forgive; yet everyone still acknowledges that God forgives
sin, i.e. that He out of grace does not punish it, but does possess the right
and the power to that punishment. Even Mr. Chavannes found at the
meeting of modern theologians little assent to his thesis that the expression
“forgiving love” is a contradictio in adjectis and means nothing, Bijbl. v. d.
Herv. 28 Juni 1895. Thirdly, God is very certainly Father of men, but this
name by no means represents the whole relation in which God stands to his
creatures. He is also Creator, Preserver, Ruler, Sovereign, Lawgiver, Judge,
etc., and it is one-sided and leading to error if one, in one of these names
with overlooking of the others, beholds the full revelation of God. Thus
God with respect to sin is not a creditor and not an offended party only, who
can remit the debt and forget and forgive the offense. But He is himself the
Giver, Protector, Avenger of the law, personal righteousness, and as such He
cannot forgive sin without satisfaction, Hebr. 9:22. In that quality He cannot
nullify the right of the law; for here it is not a personal, private right, of
which one can renounce, but the righteousness, i.e. the virtues and the
honor of God himself. One could indeed appeal against this to the right of
pardon, which the earthly government exercises many times; but this right
of pardon is granted to it only because it is fallible and in many cases
imposes a too heavy or even undeserved punishment. In God such a thing
cannot occur; He is righteousness itself, does not need by grace to restore
the justitia, does not by it also nullify it, but lets it come to revelation
together in the cross of Christ. Fourthly, the moral law as such is not an
arbitrary, positive law, but grounded in the nature of God himself; it is also
not an impersonal power independent of God, resting in itself power,
so that Christ satisfied not God but its demand, cf. Dale, The atonement,
lect. 9; but it is expression of his being. God, maintaining the law, maintains
himself and conversely. Therefore it is unbreakable and inviolable.
Throughout the whole of Scripture it bears that character; our own
conscience bears witness to it; and the whole so-called moral world-order
with its phenomena of responsibility, sense of duty, guilt, remorse, fear,
compunction, punishment, etc., is built on this inviolability of the moral
law. Christ, then, has not come to dissolve the law but to fulfill it, Matthew 5:17,
18, Romans 10:4; He has maintained its majesty and glory; and faith does not
nullify the law but confirms it, Romans 3:31. Fifthly, sin bears in Scripture
manifold character; it is lack of understanding, folly, guilt, stain,
uncleanness, shame, etc., it is compared with a money debt, and under
another viewpoint is again an offense against God. But thus it also occurs in
Scripture as a crime, crimen, a transgression against righteousness, a
violation of the majesty of God, which brings us under his judgment, Romans 3:19, and makes us worthy of death, Romans 1:32. In this character it demands
punishment and without satisfaction there is no forgiveness; only in the way
of justice is it, both as regards its guilt and stain and as regards its power
and dominion, completely to be overcome. Sixthly, it may still be added to
this, that sin is so great that God, before He let it remain unpunished,
punished it upon his beloved Son Jesus Christ with the bitter and shameful
death of the cross. If righteousness could have been obtained in another
way, Christ would have died in vain, Galatians 2:21, 3:21, Hebr. 2:10. To
summarize everything, incarnation and satisfaction have occurred for this,
that God would again be acknowledged and honored as God by his
creatures. Sin was non-recognition of God and of all his virtues, turning
away to and worship of the creature. But in Christ God has again revealed
himself, restored his sovereignty, justified all his virtues, glorified his name,
maintained his Godhead. It was God, also in the work of redemption, first
of all about himself, about his own glory. Cf. Voetius, Disp. I 372 II 238 sq.
Mastricht, Theol. V 18, 34. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIV 10. Id. de satisf.
Christi, disp. 1 en 2. Heidegger, Corpus Theol. XIX 80 sq. Heppe,
Dogm. 341. Ebrard, Dogm. § 427. Martensen, Christl. Ethik II2 155 f.
Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 614. Ch. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 487. A. A. Hodge, The
atonement p. 48. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 378. Hugh Martin, The atonement,
11. The Socinians and their kindred spirits, however, have very seriously
contested this necessity of satisfaction; their arguments all come down to
this, that justice and grace, satisfaction and forgiveness, and thus further
also law and gospel, Old and New Testament, creation and re-creation etc.,
are in conflict with one another and exclude one another. The Christian
religion is namely, according to them, the absolutely spiritual and moral
religion, freed from all natural and sensuous elements. God is not to be
conceived as Judge but as Father; punitive justice, holiness, hatred, wrath
against sin are no virtues in God but only love. The O. T. religion still stood
on the standpoint of the law, conceived the relation of man to God as a legal
relation; Pharisaism drove this to the extreme and Paul still made use of this
Pharisaic manner of speaking and did not combat the Pharisaic combination
of law-fulfilment, righteousness and reward. But yet Paul does not derive
the unfulfillableness of the law from man’s sinfulness but from the nature of
the law itself, which does not serve to give life but to increase sin. The
Christian religion he thus nevertheless conceives purely as
Erlösungsreligion, as grace, forgiveness, faith. And that it is indeed. It is
purely religious-ethical, has no cosmic, juridical, metaphysical constituents
any more, it is purely doctrine of salvation, and all the other, the doctrine of
God, man, sin, the world etc., must from this standpoint, christologically
and soteriologically, be revised and reworked. The state is the sphere of law,
but religion and law stand diametrically opposed to each other. Cf. above p.
322v. and further Wegscheider, § 142. Hofstede de Groot, De Gron. Godg.
181. Scholten, L. H. K. II 46v., 57v. Schweizer, Gl. der ev. ref. K. § 63 f.
Holtzmann, Neutest. Theol. II 108 f. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 8-14, 223-
265. Kaftan, Dogm. 544 f. v. Hartmann, Religionsphilos. I 546 f. This
whole antithesis, however, is false and has in Christian theology always
been rejected as Marcionitic. In the first place, it is untrue that
righteousness and grace (love) in God would be an antithesis; not only does
the whole of Scripture also ascribe to God the virtues of righteousness,
holiness, wrath and hatred against sin, vol. II 195v., but grace even
presupposes righteousness in God and cannot be maintained without it. For
grace is that virtue in God by which He for one reason or another
relinquishes his right; if He thus does not as the righteous and holy One
have the right to punish, there can be no question of grace with Him.
Likewise the highest love in God, i.e. forgiving love, which has been
revealed in Christ, is no longer love, if sin according to God’s righteous
judgment deserved no punishment. Whoever denies right, also denies grace.
In the second place, law and religion (morality) are absolutely no antithesis.
Religion and morality are themselves a right that God has over us; He
demands in his law that man love Him above all and the neighbour as
himself. Thereby religion and morality are not lowered or externalized, but
on the contrary maintained in their true meaning. God wills that man shall
love Him with his whole heart and with his whole understanding and with
all his powers; He claims the whole man for his service of love. Religion
and morality could not exist if they did not root in God’s right over his
creature. The moral order is in this sense borne by the legal order. Much
deeper than the religious and the ethical consciousness, there roots in man
still the sense of right. Even in those who have shaken off all religion and
all morality, it often still lives up powerfully. And indeed it is true that the
perfect man loves God and the neighbour spontaneously and according to
the prompting of his holy nature; but this changes nothing about the fact
that precisely that service out of love corresponds with God’s law and is
prescribed therein. The moral law is indeed an exigency and a right of God,
even though it claims the whole man and demands a service in spirit and
truth. For just as religion and morality root in a right of God, so conversely
that right of God is no abstract, formal arbitrariness, but is grounded
precisely in God’s nature; the legal order itself in turn bears an ethical
character and finds in the moral order confirmation and support, part II 201.
In the third place, therefore, the assertion is incorrect, that the moral
world-order has first become a legal one through sin, Kaftan, Dogm. 370.
545. Legal it has indeed become for man through sin, in the sense that the
love to God and the neighbour now stands as a command outside and over
against him, to which he cannot correspond, which he has transgressed, and
whose punishment he deserves. But legal it has not become through sin, as
though it did not rest in a right and a law of God. Lutheran theology has
indeed taught it thus, part II 556. 558, but the Reformed has judged
otherwise and better. The law is indeed the norm for the whole moral worldorder, grounded in God’s being, even apart from sin. This is not even
conceivable without a law. All religion and morality presupposes a law.
Where there is no law, there is also no transgression. Whoever detaches the
moral world-order from the law, makes it objectively and subjectively into
arbitrariness and digs away the foundation from under its feet. In the fourth
place, whoever thus places law and grace dualistically over against each
other, comes into conflict with Scripture at all points. The status integritatis,
as life of man created after God’s image in accordance with the moral law,
is no longer to be maintained. Sin is no guilt and deserves no punishment,
other than in the consciousness of the sinner. The law has no eternal but
only a temporal, transitory, paedagogical significance. The O. Test. as
religion of the law, no longer concerns us. The doctrine of the righteousness
of God and of the satisfaction in Christ is a Jewish, Pharisaic intrusion into
the theology of the N. Test. The forgiveness of sins is a subjective coming
to insight that they are no guilt and deserve no punishment. Sanctification is
moral, autonomous self-development. The church is only a religious-ethical
community and has nothing to do with law and statute. Under the
appearance of conceiving the Christian religion more purely, it is robbed of
its heart and core. Finally, in the fifth place, if, however, grace, love,
forgiveness are wholly undeserved and all presuppose the voluntary
relinquishing of a right, then very certainly with Socinus, de Christo
Servatore I 1, the question can still be asked whether God cannot relinquish
that right without demanding satisfaction; God is nevertheless slow to
anger, long-suffering and merciful and in Scripture forgives many times,
without there being any mention of any satisfaction, if only sincere
18:24v., Luke 15:11v. With this question, if it is really meant seriously, there
is then no difference any more de jure but only de facto. God had the right
to demand satisfaction; grace and forgiveness presuppose it; only there is
difference over whether God has demanded that satisfaction. It will appear
presently that suffering and dying in truth bears a satisfactorisch character.
Over against this reality, the question about the possibility, whether God
could not have relinquished his right to satisfaction, is of very subordinate
significance. But in any case it is impermissible, with forgiveness, to
combat satisfaction, as though the one excluded the other. For not only are
they connected with one another in Scripture, Leviticus 4:31, Romans 3:24-26,
Hebr. 9:22, but they are also placed in that relation to one another, that
satisfaction precisely opens the way to forgiveness. With money debts
satisfaction does indeed cancel forgiveness, because here it does not matter
at all about the person who pays, but only about the sum that is paid. But
with moral debts that is wholly different. These are personal and must be
punished in the guilty person himself. If here a substitute is at all admitted,
then the admitting of such a substitute and the letting of his merits count for
those of the guilty person is nevertheless always an act of grace.
Satisfaction Christ renders to God, but forgiveness God grants to us;
forgiveness is not with a view to Christ but with a view to us grace. The
satisfaction of Christ opens for God the way, without violation of his right,
out of grace to forgive sins and to justify the ungodly. If sin is of such a
nature that right and righteousness, law and truth suffer not the least
damage even if it is not punished, then the grace of forgiveness is also not
great. But if sin is so great that God, before He left it unpunished, has
punished it with the bitter and shameful death of the cross upon his beloved
Son Jesus Christ, then the riches of God’s grace, the power of his forgiving
love, comes to light. Then man also finds in that satisfaction rest and
comfort for his accusing conscience and can without any fear rejoice in the
forgiveness of his sins; for the perfect satisfaction guarantees the absolute,
unrepentable, eternal forgiveness. Cf. Maccovius, Coll. theol. I 274.
Mastricht, Theol. V 18, 35. Turretinus, Th. El. XIV qu. 10, 8. Id. De
satisfactione p. 44. Hoornbeek, Socin. Confut. II 629. Petrus de Witte,
Wederlegginge der Socin. Dwalingen, Amst. 1662 II 90v. Leydecker, Vis
verit. p. 82. Moor III 1031. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 382. Martin, The
atonement 183 etc.
12. The work which Christ accomplished for his own consisted in general
in his absolute and perfect obedience to God’s will, Matthew 3:15, 20:28, 26:42,
etc. This rich thought has in theology many times not come into its own.
The suffering of Christ has often been detached from the act of obedience
which expressed itself therein, and thus made an object of pious meditation.
In the Christian church, successively the martyrs, the monks, the beggars,
the flagellants have been regarded as the true disciples of Jesus; asceticism
and self-torment in every form were the Christian virtues par excellence;
the imitation of Christ consisted in a copying and imitating of deeds and
conditions from his life, specifically from his suffering; Christ was the great
sufferer, the exalted martyr, whose suffering had to be an object of
contemplation and imitation, Zöckler, Askese und Mönchthum, I 1897 S.
145 f. Moll, Joh. Brugman II 1-97. With Anselm the satisfaction of Christ,
since he was already obligated for himself to obedience to God’s law,
consisted only in his suffering and dying, which by him was added to his
life as an opus supererogationis and offered as a voluntary gift to the Father.
Roman theology does not express itself unanimously and unambiguously
about the active obedience of Christ. Trent does indeed make mention of the
sanctissima passio of Christ, VI c. 7, but the theologians reject it entirely or
at least construe it in such a way that Christ did not fulfill God’s law in our
place, Bellarminus, de justif. I 2, de Christo V 9. Bossuet, Gesch. der
veranderingen v. d. Prot. kerken, trans. by Berends 1829 II 340. Scheeben,
Dogm. III 321. 341. Also among the Protestants, among Mystics,
Anabaptists, Herrnhutters etc., there occur conceptions of the suffering of
Christ as Etwas Sachliches, which do injustice to his active obedience
[350]. Even Parsimonius and Piscator denied it, because Christ was already
obligated for himself to this obedience and this obedience thus was indeed a
necessarium requisitum personale, to our benefit, nostro bono, but no
constituent part of his satisfaction, accomplished nostro loco; because Holy
Scripture always connects our entire salvation, both the forgiveness of sins
and eternal life, only with the suffering and dying of Christ; and because
believers, even though they have forgiveness and eternal life, nevertheless
remain obligated to the keeping of the law. The Lutherans saw in this
Nestorianism and said that the person of Christ according to both natures
was Lord of the law and thus also as man was not of himself subject to the
law for his person, Gerhard, XVI 57. 59. Quenstedt III 284.
Schneckenburger, Zur kirchl. Christol. 58-73. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers I2
274. But the Reformed could not speak thus, because Christ as true man
was certainly obligated to keep the law, and to love God above all and the
neighbor as himself. Yet they rightly rejected the opinion of Piscator. For in
the first place, Holy Scripture conceives the whole life and work of Christ
as one whole and never makes a separation between an obedientia vitae,
which he accomplished for himself, and an obedientia mortis, which he
accomplished for us. It is one work which the Father has assigned to him
and which he brings to completion in his death, John 4:34, 17:4, 19:30. His
service is completed in the giving of his soul as a ransom for many, Matthew 20:28. Even Paul, who lays all emphasis on the cross of Christ, sees in his
death not his entire but the completion of his obedience. He has become
under the law, Galatians 4:4, in the likeness of sinful flesh, Romans 8:3, has not
lived to please himself, ο ὐ χ ἑ αυτ ῳ ἠ ρεσεν, Romans 15:3, has already
annihilated himself at his incarnation and assumed the form of a servant,
has continually humbled himself and has become obedient unto death, μεχρι
θανατου, Philippians 2:7, 8, 2 Corinthians 8:9, and thus it is one δικαιωμα and one
ὑ πακοη, which grants to many the δικαιωσις ζωης, Romans 5:18, 19. It is
therefore wholly in conflict with Scripture to limit the satisfactorial work of
Christ to his suffering, or even, as Jac. Alting did, Op. V 393-395, cf.
however p. 478-480, to the suffering during the three hours of darkness on
the cross. The appeal to passages such as Zach. 3:9, John 19:30, Romans 6:10, Hebr. 7:27, 1 Petr. 3:18, where it is said that Christ has suffered once,
on the wood, and has cried out: it is finished, proves nothing against this,
because in the suffering and dying the whole preceding life of Christ is
taken up, summarized, and completed, cf. Moor III 985 sq. Mastricht V 11,
34. 18, 29. Witsius, Oec. foed. II 6. Misc. S. II 771. Maresius, Syst. Theol.
IX 46. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. X 467-471. Rather, the whole life and work of
Christ from his conception up to and including his death is substitutionary
in nature. The assumption of human nature itself and in itself does not yet
bear this character, because all mediatorial works presuppose the two
natures; but his holy conception and birth and all his holy works are
included in the one work of Christ, Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 18, 2. Heid.
Cat. qu. 36 and 60. Ned. Gel. art. 22, cf. Acta Syn. Dordr. sess. 172. 173.
Voetius, Disp. II 282. Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. I 91. 122 f. Ritschl,
Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 287. In the second place it is certainly true that Christ as
man, for himself, was subject to the law; only, his incarnation and his
being-man did not take place for himself but for us. Christ has never been
and may never be regarded as a persona privata, an individual alongside and
on an equal line with others; he was from the beginning a persona publica,
the second Adam, sponsor et caput electorum. Just as Adam sinned for
himself and thereby loaded guilt and death upon all whose representative he
was; so Christ by his righteousness and obedience has acquired forgiveness
and life for all his own. More still, certainly Christ as man was subject to
God’s law as rule of life; even believers are never released from the law in
that sense. But Christ has placed himself in a wholly different relation to the
law, namely to it as law of the covenant of works. Adam was not only
obligated to keep the law, but in the covenant of works the law was held
before him under another forma, namely as way to eternal life, which he did
not yet possess. Christ, however, by his union with the divine nature had the
eternal and blessed life. Of that he voluntarily renounced; he has subjected
himself to the law of the covenant of works as way to eternal life for
himself and his own. The obedience which Christ rendered to the law
was thus an entirely voluntary one. Not his death alone, as Anselm said, but
his whole life was a self-denial, one self-offering, brought by him as Head
in the place of his own. In the third place, that believers are still always
obligated to keep the law as rule of life proves nothing against this. If this
proved anything, all that is satisfactorial from Jesus’ life and suffering
would disappear. For believers still have to bear all kinds of suffering as a
consequence of sins, they are still tempted by Satan and enticed by the
world, they still sin time and again and still must die etc., and thus Christ
would have freed them from nothing, neither from sin nor from its
consequences. Jac. Alting reasoned thus and therefore said that Christ had
freed his own only from eternal death by his hellish agonies during the three
hours of darkness on the cross, but not from suffering, bodily death etc. But
this view of the work of redemption is without doubt wrong. The
redemption is complete, a redemption of the whole man according to soul
and body, from all sins and consequences of sin. And this has been
accomplished in and through Christ’s life and dying. But just as his
kingdom is by him distinguished into an invisible, spiritual and a visible
kingdom to be established on earth one day; just as he himself has once
come to suffer and will soon come again to judge the living and the dead; so
the redemption brought by Christ is gradually worked out and applied, first
spiritually, thereafter bodily. Now in this dispensation believers are
spiritually freed from every guilt and power of sin and its consequences,
from world, Satan, death; they have the forgiveness of sins and eternal life;
law, Satan, death can no longer rob them of these; and one day they will
also outwardly, bodily be freed from all sin and power of sin. The whole recreation, as it will be completed in the new heaven and the new earth, is
fruit of the work of Christ. Just as it is one-sided, with Alting, to see the
fruit of Christ’s work only in the redemption from eternal death; just as onesided is it, with Ritschl, to limit that fruit to the spiritual, ethical dominion
of the Christian over sin and world in the Diesseits. The whole person of
Christ, both with his active and passive obedience, is the surety for
the whole redemption. Cf. on the active obedience. Calvijn, Inst. II 16, 5. III
Junius, Theses theol. 36, 8. Synopsis pur. theol. 29, 35. Turretinus, Th. El.
XI 22. XIV 13. Cloppenburg, Op. I 504 sq. Witsius, Oec. foed. II 3, 18 sq.
Coccejus, de foedere V 93. Quenstedt, Theol. III 281. Gerhard, XVI 57 sq.
Walch, Comm. de obed. Christi activa 1755. Baur, Versöhnung 478v.
Philippi, Der thätige Gehorsam Christi 1841. Id., Kirchl. Gl. IV 2 S. 142 f.
Frank, Chr. Wahrheit II 172. Id., Neue kirchl. Zeits. 1892 S. 856. Ritschl,
Rechtf. u. Vers I2 271 f. A. A. Hodge, The atonement 248-264 etc.
13. While Piscator and many others excluded the obedientia activa from
the satisfaction, in more recent theology the obedientia passiva does not
come into its own. After Socinianism and Rationalism had subjected the
ecclesiastical doctrine of satisfaction to a sharp criticism, many in the
present time attempted still to maintain it, by recasting it in a mystical or
ethical sense, above p. 327v. The representation is then in the main this, that
Christ’s suffering and death was not necessary in order to satisfy God’s
justice nor was it demanded by God as a sacrifice for our sins, but that it
was the consequence of his life in obedience to God’s will, the proof that
He in his religious-ethical calling remained faithful to God even unto death,
the historically necessary result of his holy life in the midst of a sinful
world. Over against such conceptions, which detach the suffering and death
of Christ entirely from the person and set it up as Etwas Sachliches in itself,
this representation possesses an unmistakable right. Christ is, after all, the
faithful witness, Op. 1:5, He has under Pontius Pilate testified the good
confession, 1 Timothy 6:13, his suffering and death is no fate but an act, He has
power to lay down his life, as also to take it again, John 10:18. But yet it
itself is pressed by no less serious objections. 1o Already this is of
significance, that the mystical and ethical theories with Jesus speak only of
a calling and no longer of an office. Herein already lies all the difference. If
Christ exercised a calling, then He himself by his disposition, upbringing
etc. developed himself thereto, He does not stand above but alongside us,
He has only advanced beyond us in a religious and ethical sense, and
we can and must conform ourselves as much as possible to his example. If,
on the other hand, Christ is anointed to the office of prophet, priest, and
king, then He is appointed by God, has received from Him a work to do,
stands with authority above us, to teach us, to represent us before God’s
face, to govern us according to his will, Martin, The atonement 105. 2o
Consequence of this conception is, that the suffering and death of Christ
remains totally unexplained. Schleiermacher derived it from this, that Christ
as holy entered into our sinful community; he let it consist in Mitgefühl mit
menschlicher Schuld und Strafwürdigkeit and saw in his death a
consequence of his Eifer für seinen Beruf, Chr. Gl. § 104, 4. Ritschl
likewise says, that it is the faithfulness to his calling which qualifies Christ
as a sacrifice; his death was no sacrifice but an unintended consequence of
the conflict between Him, the holy one, and sinful humanity, das Accidens
seiner positiven Treue im Berufe, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 525, cf. 415 f. 441 f.
II 334 f., Kaftan, Dogm. 565-569. Kühl, Die Heilsbedeutung des Todes
Christi 190 f. The Groningen theologians saw in the death of Christ a matter
done by men, suffered by Jesus and permitted by God, and interpreted the
δει in Matthew 16:21, Mark 8:31, Luke 9:22 in a moral sense, Pareau et H. de
Groot, Lineam. theol. christ. ed. 3 p. 153. H. de Groot, De Gron. Godg. 181.
A theory now, which declares the suffering and death of Christ to be
accidental, is thereby already fully judged. 3o Scripture, after all, says
clearly, that Jesus’ suffering and death was determined beforehand and was
necessary. To be sure, in more recent times one attempts to show, that Jesus
at first appeared gladly and with great expectations among his people and
first perceived the necessity of his death since the day at Caesarea Philippi,
Matthew 16:20v., as a consequence of the hostility which gradually developed
against his person, e.g. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I 284-295. But Kähler
rightly calls this a legend. The Messianic consciousness, which Jesus, as
appears from his baptism by John, possessed from the beginning of his
public appearance; the name Son of Man, which He with clear
consciousness and a definite intention ascribed to himself; the application to
himself of Isaiah’s prophecy, Luke 4:21; the prediction, that He as the
bridegroom of his disciples would be taken away, Mark 2:20; the
comparison of himself with Jonah, Matthew 12:40 and with the serpent in the
wilderness, John 3:14; the preaching of the kingdom of heaven in a spiritual
sense, of self-denial and bearing the cross, of the hatred and hostility of the
world, Mt. 5, 10, 11:16v., 12:25v., prove abundantly, that for Jesus’
consciousness death stood fixed from the beginning as the goal of his life;
thus prophecy had instructed Him, Nösgen, Gesch. d. neut. Offenbarung I
1891 S. 395 f. Kähler, Zur Lehre v. d. Versöhnung 1898 S. 159 f. The day of
Caesarea Philippi brought only this change, that Jesus openly proclaimed to
his disciples, that He was the Messiah, that He would be delivered up and
would rise on the third day, Mark 16:21, Mark 8:31, Luke 9:22. And He adds
thereto, that this must be so, not because He was morally obligated to die or
could only thus remain faithful to his calling, for a moral obligation to be
delivered up, killed, and even raised, does not exist, but because it was thus
determined in God’s counsel and was foretold in Scripture, Matthew 26:54, Luk.
Hd. 2:23, 4:28, 1 Corinthians 15:3, cf. Scholten, L. H. K. II 45. 4o The two texts
Matthew 26:39 and Hebr. 5:7 are by no means in conflict with this. According to
Hebr. 5:7 He did not pray for deliverance from death, as if He had not
acknowledged this as necessary; for it is stated clearly, that his prayer,
notwithstanding his death, was heard by God; but Christ prayed, that He
might not perish in death but might be delivered from it and raised and
glorified; He came precisely, to do God’s will by his dying and sanctified us
by that will, Hebr. 10:5-10. This throws light on Matthew 26:39-42; Jesus there
prays not according to his will, which He precisely subjects to that of the
Father, but according to the inclination which is implanted in human nature
to flee its own destruction, Kantt. St. Vert.; He looks upon death as death,
but prays precisely, that God might strengthen Him, to do God’s will in his
dying, that God’s will might take place not only to Him but through Him.
5o The suffering and death of Christ takes such a place in Scripture, that it
cannot be conceived as the accidens of his faithfulness to his calling. To the
description thereof the greatest part of the gospels is devoted. And it
is not described as a martyrdom but as a judgment of God, as the will of the
Father, as the offering of a priest. He does not die for his faith, but is
judicially condemned, because He claims to be the Son of God, the
Messiah. He does not go joyfully to meet death, but is moved, sorrowful,
astonished, anxious unto death and is in heavy struggle, so that his sweat
became like drops of blood, Matthew 26:37, 38, Mark 14:33, Luke 22:44, John 12:27, Si la vie et la mort de Socrate sont d’un sage, la vie et la mort de
Jésus sont d’un Dieu (Rousseau). In the preaching of the apostles the cross
of Christ is the center and the cause of all benefits of salvation. Much more
than on the life, the emphasis falls on the death of Christ; and that death is
always brought into connection with our sins; for the sake of sins Christ has
died and thereby He has acquired for his own righteousness and life. Even
though that suffering and death may not be detached from the person, it is
nevertheless determined by God as such willed, accomplished by the Son; it
forms in the life of Christ not an accidental component, become necessary
only through the circumstances, but an essential, indispensable constituent;
thereby in the first place the reconciliation of sins, righteousness, and
salvation has been acquired. 6o To be sure, it is objected against this, that
God does not propter but only per Christum bestow upon us the benefits of
the covenant of grace; thus earlier already Socinus et al. and now e.g.
Scholten, L. H. K. I 20 II 426v. Gottschick, Propter Christum, Zeits. f.
Theol. u. Kirche 1897 S. 352-384. The Lutherans even took pleasure in
accusing the Reformed, that by virtue of their doctrine of predestination
they had to deny the satisfaction of Christ and could only regard Him as
causa instrumentalis of salvation; the Reformed themselves, after all, also
said, that Christ was not fundamentum and causa electionis, part II 380; the
elect were already objects of God’s love before Christ was designated as
their mediator and were elected not because of but in and unto Christ,
Gerhard, Loc. XVI de justif. § 36. Schneckenburger, Zur kirchl. Christol.
1848 S. 45 f. Id. Vergl. Darst. II 264 f. Schweizer, Gl. d. ev. ref. K. II 379.
389. But this accusation is untrue. Christ is most certainly proof and
revelation of the love of the Father; logically our election to salvation
precedes his election to mediator; God therefore is not first moved by Christ
to love sinners. But precisely herein consists the love of God, that He has
that salvation, which He wills to bestow upon sinners, acquired for them in
time by his own Son, and thus bestows it upon them in accordance with his
justice. God’s grace therefore does not nullify the satisfaction and the merit
of Christ, but is precisely the ultimate ground for that merit, quia mero
beneplacito mediatorem statuit, qui nobis salutem acquireret, Calv. Inst. II
17, 1. Imo quia prius diligit, postea nos sibi reconciliat, ib. 16, 3. Jam nos
diligenti reconciliati sumus, ib. 4. And these two, God’s love and the
satisfaction of Christ, had to and could therefore go together, because we
were at the same time as creatures the object of his love and as sinners the
object of his wrath, ib. 3. Thus it is therefore pure grace, out of which God
forgives sins, He does it for his own sake, for the sake of his great name,
Jes. 43:23-25, Ezech. 36:21, Ef. 1:17, 1 John 2:12, but this is so little in
conflict with it, that God forgives us sins for Christ’s sake, that the name of
God has first been revealed to us in Christ. That God forgives sins and
bestows life only out of grace, for his own sake and not because of anything
that is in us, that Christ has proclaimed to us, that He has acquired for us.
Forgiveness out of grace, as disposition in God eternally present and
preceding the election and sending of Christ (amor benevolentiae), is
nevertheless first made possible in time by Christ’s offering (amor
complacentiae). The benefits themselves have been acquired by Christ,
even though the inclination to bestow them upon the elect has been present
in God from all eternity. Christ is made to be sin, that we might be God’s
righteousness in Him. He is become of a woman and become under the law,
that He might redeem us from the curse of the law and that we might
receive the adoption as children. As Adam is the cause of sin and death, so
Christ is the source of righteousness and life, Matthew 20:28, 27:28, John 1:18,
4:9. Thus understood, the expression, that God forgives us sins and bestows
eternal life propter Christum, for Christ’s sake, is scriptural and taught by
the whole of Christendom, also by the Reformed, Calvin, Inst. II 16
Gel. art 21. 22. 23, cf. Scholten, L. H. K. I 20. Heppe, Dogm. d. d. Prot. I
190. Heid. Cat. qu. 37. Petrus de Witte, Wederl. der Soc. dwalingen II 170v.
Mastricht, Theol. V 18, 20. 41v. Maresius, Syst. Theol. IV 40 X 30.
Turretinus, de satisf. p. 7. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 265 f. Finally 7o, the
mystical and the moral theory come into conflict at all points with Scripture
and with the Christian religion. The former considers the essence of religion
to lie in the mystical unity of God and man. This has been disturbed by sin
but restored by Christ, and indeed not so much by what He does as by what
He is, by his person more than by his work, by his birth more than by his
cross. How that mystical unity of God and man has now been restored by
Christ is, from this standpoint, difficult to say. Hegel said, that that unity
exists objectively, but by Christ was first clearly perceived and expressed.
Schleiermacher represents it thus, that Christ, first entering into our sinful
community, thereafter takes us up into the community of his holiness and
blessedness. The mediation theology often expresses itself thus, that Christ
pours into us a new divine-human life. All these modes of representation are
derived from pantheism and are, without this philosophical system, simply
unintelligible. The moral theory proceeds from the thought, that God
demands no satisfaction but in his love gave us Christ, in order that this one
by his teaching, life, and dying might assure us of God’s love, change us in
our hostile disposition, and frighten us away from sin. And also the
governmental theory of Grotius sees in God the Rector mundi, who
personally indeed could and would forgive, yet in the interest of the world
order must punish sin exemplarily, as a deterrent for others. With all these
theories now one can indeed continue to speak of Christ as Son of God, of
his priesthood and offering, but one then speaks in a figurative sense, uses
the words in an unusual meaning and gives occasion to misunderstanding.
For it is clear, that in pantheism and deism there is no place for the Christ of
the Scriptures. The high priesthood of Christ then changes into a
martyrdom, his offering into an example, the Christian religion into a
pedagogy and the church into a school. Justice is no virtue of God, but only
in the state in its place. Sin is no guilt and punishment no restoration of
right. Man is not so evil, or he can be changed for the better by a moral
example, by a shock or an impression, cf. Ch. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 566
etc. A. A. Hodge, The atonement, ch. 21. The objective satisfaction is
transformed into the subjective reconciliation; the proper, true reconciliation
then first takes place, when man follows the example of Jesus and changes
himself. The believers under the O. T. did not yet have the example of
Jesus, thus are either all lost or have become blessed in another way than
we, and Christ is not the only name, under heaven given to men for
salvation. Above all, with all the theories mentioned the connection remains
unexplained, which Scripture lays between the death of Christ and the
forgiveness of our sins and eternal life. It is not to be seen, how the death of
Christ as an example of these benefits can be the ground why God for
Christ’s sake forgives us sins and bestows life. In fact everything comes
down to this, that Christ by his image makes a deep impression on the
understanding or on the will or also on the feeling of man, and thus delivers
him from the opinion, that God is angry with him on account of his sin, or
from the selfishness which holds him bound, or from the feeling of
unblessedness which weighs him down. But in none of these cases is true
peace and rest bestowed upon man. For the conscience is not thereby
cleansed and the feeling of guilt is not thereby taken away. Peace exists
only in the blood of the cross!
14. This active and passive obedience of Christ, which is taught so clearly
in Scripture, cannot be maintained except by conceiving it as satisfactio
vicaria. The opponents of this doctrine, however, often represent it in such a
way that, with respect to the work, just as with respect to the person of
Christ, one must distinguish between the pure facts and the theories which
have been set up in explanation thereof. First this distinction is made with a
view to the ecclesiastical doctrine of the satisfactio vicaria, but soon
thereafter also with a view to the teaching of the apostles. Finally, then,
nothing remains but the naked fact of the death of Christ itself; the
interpretation and appreciation of the fact is left to each person’s
arbitrariness. The matter, however, is not so. Word and fact go together in
God’s revelation; Christ is priest but also prophet; He has explained His
own person and work; He Himself has interpreted His death in His word,
and Christian theology is bound to that. There are therefore not many
theories, the moral, the governmental, the mystical, the private- and the
public-juridical, which are set up by theology by way of hypotheses in
explanation of the facts and phenomena and, as different attempts at
solution, all have an equal right to exist. But the question is, what in all
these opinions and doctrines corresponds with Scripture and is grounded
therein. If the question is posed thus, there is scarcely any doubt possible
that the satisfactio vicaria is taught by Scripture. The exegesis which the
Socinians and the Rationalists applied in order to remove it from Scripture,
no one any longer takes upon himself. And the interpretation of Ritschl,
however much it may for a time have captivated by its acuteness, its
untenability is scarcely doubted by anyone any longer, cf. Kreibig, Die
Versöhnungslehre auf Grund d. chr. Bew. 1878. Frank, Die Theol. Ritschls
1891. Pfleiderer, Die Ritschl’sche Theologie, Jahrb. f. pr. Theol. 1889. Id.
Entw. der prot. Theol. 228 f. Orr, The Ritschlian theology, London 1897.
Impartial reading of Holy Scripture always finds in it again the
ecclesiastical doctrine of vicarious satisfaction, Wegscheider, Instit. theol. §
136. Pfleiderer, Der Paulinismus2 136 f. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I 68. II
Holy Scripture, however, shows us in the whole work of Christ a
fulfilment of God’s law, a satisfaction of his demand, above p. 310. As
prophet, priest, and king, in his birth and death, in his life and suffering, in
his words and miracles, in his speaking and acting, he always accomplishes
God’s will; he has come to do that will; the law of God was in the inward
parts of his bowels; his whole life is one perfect offering, to God for a
sweet-smelling savour. That will of God is one, and one also is the will of
Christ, and one his offering. But yet, in it a double side can be distinguished
very clearly. Twofold, namely, was the demand set by God to fallen man,
viz. that he should keep the law perfectly and also restore its
transgression by punishment, above p. 220. Twofold are the benefits which
Christ has acquired for us, viz. the forgiveness of sins and eternal life. Both
are not identical; justification does not of itself coincide with heavenly
blessedness. Adam was indeed righteous before his disobedience, but
nevertheless still had to acquire eternal life in the way of works. The
bearing of punishment is in itself still by no means one with the fulfilment
of the law; the criminal who is punished but hardens himself under the
punishment fulfils justice but in no way answers to the whole demand of the
law. Moreover, Christ was the second Adam; he came not only to bear the
punishment for us but also to acquire for us that righteousness and that life
which Adam had to acquire by his obedience; he did not deliver us from
guilt and punishment only and place us not at the beginning but at the end
of the way which Adam had to walk. He bestows on us much more than we
lost in Adam, not only the forgiveness of sins and the remission of
punishment, but also immediately in faith the non posse peccare and the
non posse mori, part II 557: he who believes in him is not condemned and
has eternal life, John 3:16, 18. Both kinds of benefits are therefore also,
although in concreto they are never to be separated, yet often named
separately alongside one another, Daniel 9:24, John 3:36, Hd. 26:18, Romans 5:17, 18, Galatians 4:5, Op. 1:5, 6. And so it is also with the active and passive
obedience of Christ. They are distinct, but in concreto, in the life and death
of Christ, always coincide. The active obedience is no external addition to
the passive, nor conversely. No single act and no single event in the life or
suffering of Christ is to be brought exclusively under the one or under the
other. Just as Christ always and in everything is at the same time prophet,
priest, and king, so he is also continually active for reconciliation of the
guilt of sins and for acquisition of eternal life. Indeed it is not good to say
that the forgiveness of sins has been acquired only by his passive, and
eternal life only by his active obedience. For his suffering was not a bearing
of punishment only but also fulfilment of the law; and his working was not
fulfilment of the law merely but also a bearing of its punishment. His doing
was suffering and his suffering was act. It was one work that Christ
accomplished, but so rich, so valuable in God’s eye, that the righteousness
of God is completely satisfied by it, every demand of the law is fully
fulfilled by it, and the whole, eternal blessedness is acquired by it. The
satisfactorious element of Christ’s obedience does not consist in this, that he
satisfied a vengeful deity by blood, stilled its hatred and envy by a quantity
of suffering; but it lies herein, that from the beginning to the end of his life
he subjected his will to the whole, perfect, holy, and loving will of God, and
consecrated himself with body and soul and all powers to God as a perfect
offering. But that will of God, according to the teaching of Scripture,
included not only the life but also the suffering of Christ; and that offering
consisted not only in his “moral vocation” but also in his death on the cross.
What God has united, man shall not separate. Cf. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIV
13, 11 sq. Mastricht, Theol. V 18, 14. Moor III 960 sq. Heppe, Dogm. d. ev.
ref. K. 326. 341. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. 104, 2. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers.
The obedience of Christ, however, is not only a satisfactio; it is a
satisfactio vicaria. On this too Scripture expresses itself clearly. Properly
speaking, in every sin offering the idea of substitution is enclosed; it puts in
the place of the offerer, who is worthy of the wrath of God, something else
that can again make Him favorable. In Israel’s history we already encounter
the idea of substitution with Abraham, when, at the command of the Angel
of the Lord, he does not stretch out his hand toward his son, but offers a ram
as a burnt offering in his son’s place, Genesis 22:12, 13. In the Old Test. cultus,
in the case of the sin offerings, the laying on of hands transferred the sins of
the offerer onto the sacrificial animal, Leviticus 16:21; the reconciliation itself
comes about not in one but in three acts, viz. slaughtering, sprinkling of
blood, and burning; although laden with the sins of the offerer and thus
worthy of death, the sacrificial animal is nevertheless not simply killed but
slaughtered. It is not a matter of death as such, without more, for the
sacrificial animal is destined to make reconciliation and to restore the
offerer into God’s favor. That favor is not to be obtained by the death of the
sacrificial animal without more, but by the fact that the blood, the soul, the
life of the sacrificial animal, which indeed is laden with the sins of the
offerer and therefore killed, but nevertheless in itself completely innocent,
is brought and consecrated to God. Thus that blood, as the self-offering of a
living being, which therefore is not killed but slaughtered, makes
reconciliation over the sins of the offerer; it causes that the whole animal in
the burning is to God for a pleasing odor; the offerer himself then shares
completely in His favor, the animal has from the beginning to the end
replaced his place and thus reconciled him and restored him into God’s
communion. From this cultus Isaiah borrowed the features for his depiction
of the servant of the Lord; the poena vicaria cannot be expressed more
strongly than in Jes. 53; the servant of the Lord has taken our sicknesses
upon himself and borne our pains; He is wounded for our transgressions, for
our iniquities He is crushed; the punishment that brings us peace was upon
Him, and by his stripes healing has come to us. The Lord has caused the
iniquities of us all to meet upon Him. For the transgression of the people the
plague was upon Him. He has set his soul as a guilt offering. Himself a
righteous one, without injustice or deceit, He bears the iniquities of his own.
All this becomes still clearer in the N. Test. In the first place the expression
λυτρον comes into consideration here, Matthew 20:28, Mark 10:45, 1 Timothy 2:6; it
is, according to its derivation, from λυειν, to loosen, the means to loosen
someone, to free from prison, and hence often ransom money. In the LXX it
translated by ἐ ξιλασμα, 1 Samuel 12:3, Psalms 49:8 or ἀ λλαγμα, Amos 5:12, Jes.
43:3, or δωρον, Joshua 36:18. Now it is true that in the word λυτρον the
substitutive and aequivalente is not yet understood of itself. But
nevertheless it is incorrect, with Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. II 69, to
understand the words in Mark 10:45 in such a way that Jesus’ voluntary
death is a gift, a covering, a protective means, by which many remain
preserved, not from death as the lot of all creatures, but from full
annihilation and the purposelessness of life and thus are freed from the fear
of death. For although the word λυτρον may in itself not yet express that the
ransom price outweighs what is bought free by it; yet the thought lies at
hand that someone who has a right to something will in general not
relinquish it except for proper compensation; in Jes. 43:3, Spr. 21:18 it
therefore alternates with תחת, in the place of. And then especially, the
ransom price that Christ brought is elsewhere called a τιμη, a costly price, 1
Cor. 6:20, 7:23, 1 Petr. 1:18. 19; it is expressly said that a man cannot give
an ἀ νταλλαγμα, ransom price, compensation, aequivalent, for his soul, Matthew 16:26, Mark 8:37, cf. Psalms 49:8; and the word λυτρον is in the N. T. further
strengthened by the praepositie ἀ ντι, Jesus gives his life as a ransom price
in the place of many, who indeed ought to but could not do it, cf. Cremer s.
v. But besides the expression λυτρον, in the second place the whole N. T.
doctrine of the offering of Christ comes into consideration here. The
praeposities that indicate the relation of that offering to us and our sins,
ὑ περ, περι, δια, above p. 312, do not in themselves mean: in the place of,
but for the benefit of, for the sake of, on account of, in order to, because of;
yet they establish between Christ’s offering and our sins such a connection
that the mystical, moral, and symbolic interpretation does not at all exhaust
the sense of Scripture. Naturally it is indeed true that Christ also suffered
and died for us as an example, and that all in Him have been crucified, have
died, and have been buried. But the sense of Scripture is not exhausted in
that; indeed the mystical and moral conception of Christ’s suffering and
dying cannot be maintained unless it is previously acknowledged that He, in
a legal sense, suffered and died substitutively for us. And that Scripture
teaches as clearly as possible, even though it uses the expression satisfactio
vicaria no more than that of trinity, incarnation, God-man, etc. For when it
says that Christ, although personally without any sin, according to the will
of God has taken our sin upon himself and borne it, has been made sin for
us and has become a curse, according to that same will of God has been
punished for that with the accursed death of the cross, and thereby as causa
meritoria has acquired for us the reconciliation, the forgiveness, the
righteousness, the life, the whole salvation for us, then that cannot be
thought otherwise than that He has placed himself in our stead and has
borne our punishment. Cf. Weiss, Lehrb. der bibl. Theol. § 49 b. 80 etc.
Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I 64 f. II 97 f. etc. On the praep. ὑ περ, Holwerda,
Jaarb. v. wet. Theol. 1862 p. 521v. [365]
15. However, from of old very weighty objections have been raised
against this satisfactio vicaria. Monetary debts one person can take over
from another and pay for him; but sins are moral debts and adhere to the
person. They cannot, by the nature of the case, be taken over by another. It
conflicts with God’s justice, which does not hold the guilty innocent and the
innocent guilty. It conflicts with the nature of sin, for whoever would wish
to bear them for another would nevertheless never be able to take over the
most dreadful thing in sin, i.e. self-accusation, repentance, remorse, but
only the outward suffering and dying, and this would then for him be no
punishment of sin but a chastisement, a trial, a martyrdom. It conflicts with
reality, for Christ did not bear the wrath of God but always shared in his
love and favor; He did not bear the whole punishment of sin, for He died
neither the spiritual nor the eternal death; and if He had borne it as well,
then in any case only for one single human being, never for many, for He
has then borne that punishment only once; even if He was God, this cannot
increase the value of his offering, since his Godhead could not suffer, above
324. Many of these objections flow from misunderstanding, which therefore
must first be removed out of the way. In the first place, then, it is
completely true that Christ has never personally, in and for himself, been
the object of God’s wrath; He has never in his own person been a sinner.
Gnostics and Anabaptists did indeed many times distinguish between a
divine, heavenly, immortal, holy and a human, earthly, unclean, mortal
corporeality in Christ, above 275v. And the Antinomians understood the
substitution in such a way that upon Christ not only the guilt and
punishment but also the stain and uncleanness of sin had been transferred;
the exchange between Christ and the elect was so absolute that He himself
is sin and they are righteousness; in Christ they have been sorrowful over
their sins, justified, born again; the sins which they themselves do are no
sins any more, no longer torment them in the conscience, have no need of
forgiveness any more and are only deeds of the flesh, of the old man,
Hulsius, De hedendaagsche Antinomianery, 2e dr. 1738 bl. 377v.
Hoornbeek, Summa Controv. [366] 1653 p. 704. Witsius, Misc. S. II 758-
780. And in later time these sentiments have sometimes been renewed by
the Methodists, Schneckenburger, Vorles. über die kleineren protest.
Parteien 146, by the Irvingians, Herzog2 7, 154, by some followers of
Kohlbrugge, Bula, Die Versöhnung des Menschen mit Gott durch Christum
1874. Böhl, Von der Incarnation des göttl. Wortes 1884 Id. Dogmatik 299 f.,
cf. Kuyper, De vleeschw. des Woords Amst. 1887, Inleiding en bl. 155v. But
Scripture teaches as decisively and clearly as possible that Christ personally
was free from all sins, above 296, and the few passages to which one
appeals for the contrary, John 1:14, Romans 8:3, Hebr. 2:14 speak only of this,
that the Son of God assumed a weak nature subject to suffering and death,
but not that He himself in a subjective sense was a sinner. Some theologians
such as Chrysostomus, Oecumenius, Luther, Marlorat, also Calvin on Galatians 3:13, have indeed called Christ a sinner, but meant that only in an objective
sense, as Paul says that Christ was made sin and became a curse, 2 Corinthians 5:21, Galatians 3:13, cf. Jes. 53:12. Thereby the apostle does not indicate that
Christ in himself was a sinner and accursed, but that He was regarded and
treated by God as one who was guilty of the transgression of the law and
had loaded its curse upon himself. Self-accusation, repentance, remorse,
confession of personal sins could therefore not occur in Christ; spiritual
death, as incapacity for good and inclination to all evil, was not suffered by
Him. Precisely in order to bear the sins of others and to make satisfaction
for these, He could and might himself not be a sinner. The permutatio
personarum, which took place between Christ and his own, is not to be
understood in a pantheistic physical or mystical sense, but bears a legal
character; Christ has voluntarily come to stand in that relation to the law
and its demands in which we stood to it through our transgression. In the
second place, the substitutionary character of Christ’s obedience of itself
also brings with it that it is aequivalent, fully answering to the demand of
the law. But this equivalence was nevertheless conceived by the
Reformation differently than by Rome. Duns Scotus judged that also a holy
man or an angel could have made satisfaction for our sins, if God had
approved it, for tantum valet omne creatum oblatum, pro quanto Deus
acceptat illud et non plus, 8ent. III dist. 20 qu. un. n. 9 cf. dist. 19 qu. un. n.
7. And likewise later the Remonstrants taught that not the justitia Dei but
only the aequitas demanded some satisfaction and that meritum quod
Christus persolvit juxta Dei Patris aestimationem persolutum est, Limborch,
over against that Thomas called, S. Theol. III qu. 48 art. 2 the passio Christi
not only sufficiens sed superabundans satisfactio pro peccatis humani
generis, cf. Cat. Rom. I 5 qu. 13, 2. Theol. Wirceb. IV 317. Billuart, Summa
S. Thomae Pars III tom. 2 p. 206-226. Scheeben III 206. 343 etc. One even
treated the question whether not one drop of Christ’s blood would have
been sufficient for reconciliation, cf. Quenstedt, Theol. III 327. Dorner,
Entw. der Lehre v. d. Person Christi II 843. This whole conception both in
Thomas and in Duns Scotus rests on a sensuous, quantitative calculation of
the suffering of Christ. In principle the Reformation broke with this system
of calculation. That appears from this, that it rejected both the acceptilatio
(from acceptum ferre) of Scotus and the superabundance of Thomas,
Voetius, Disp. II. 247. Mastricht V 18, 38. Moor III 1084. Alting, Theol.
probl. pr. 41; that it included in the work of Christ alongside the passive
also the active obedience; that it called the offering of Christ indeed
aequivalent but not identical with what we were obligated to render; that it
held it to be perfectly sufficient, so that neither in a Roman nor in a
Remonstrant way was an addition by our faith and our good works
necessary; and that in particular the Reformed said that Christ’s work in
itself was perfectly sufficient for reconciliation of the sins of the whole
world, that it, if He had wished to save a smaller number, could not be less,
and if He had wished to save a greater number or all men, would not have
needed to be greater. Sins are also indeed no monetary debts, and the
satisfaction is no arithmetic sum. The transfer of our sins to Christ did not
proceed so mechanically that these were first accurately added together
from all the elect, thus laid upon Christ and each separately satisfied by
Him. Christ also did not pass through all human ages nor did He therein
separately make satisfaction for the sins of each age, as Irenaeus, adv.
haer. II 22, 4 and others represented it. He also did not suffer precisely the
same, idem, as we nor in the same way; for consciousness of guilt etc.,
could not occur in Him, spiritual death as inclination to evil He did not
know, and eternal death He suffered not in form and duration but only
intensively and qualitatively, as abandonment by God, Thomas, S. Th. III
21. Moor IV 122-133. Witsius, Misc. S. II 770. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II
454. Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. II 239. Phillippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV 2, 29.
Sartorius, Lehre v. d. h. Liebe II 75. v. Oosterzee, Dogm. II 586. There is
even some truth in the acceptilation, for the strict justice of God demanded
that each human being personally for himself made satisfaction; and it was
his grace which gave Christ as a mediator of the covenant and imputed his
righteousness to the covenant partners. With a quantitative calculation we
therefore do not get out of the satisfactio vicaria. They are other than
measurable and weighable magnitudes with which we have to do in the
doctrine of satisfaction. Sin is a principle governing and corrupting the
whole creation, a power, a kingdom, which extends and organizes itself in
many actual sins. The wrath of God is an indignation which is directed
against the sin of the whole human race, Heid. Cat. 37. His justice is that
virtue by which He cannot tolerate that He is as God unacknowledged or
dishonored by his creatures. Therefore the satisfactio vicaria consists in this,
that Christ as surety and head has come to stand in that relation to God, to
his wrath, his justice, his law, in which the human race stood over against it.
He has for that humanity which is given to Him for reconciliation been
made to be sin, become a curse and has taken its guilt and punishment upon
himself. When the Socinians say that Christ in any case could only make
satisfaction for one human being and not for many, since He has borne the
punishment of sin only once, then this reasoning proceeds from the same
quantitative calculation as the acceptilation of Duns Scotus and the
superabundance of Thomas. For although the sin that has come into the
world through Adam manifests itself in an innumerable series of sinful
thoughts, words and deeds; although the wrath of God is individually felt by
every guilty human child; it is and remains nevertheless always the one,
indivisible law that has been violated, the one indivisible wrath of God that
has been kindled against the sin of the whole human race, the one,
indivisible justice of God that has been injured by sin, the one,
unchangeable, eternal God who has been mocked by sin. And therefore the
punishment of Christ is also one, but one that intensively and qualitatively
outweighs the sin and guilt of the whole human race, reconciles the wrath
of God against that whole human race, fulfills the whole law, fully restores
God’s justice and brings God himself in all his virtues of truth and justice,
of love and grace again to recognition in the human race. For that
punishment was also laid upon Him who was not merely an individual
alongside others, but the second Adam, head of the human race, the Son of
man and the Son of God at the same time.
16. Thus understood, the doctrine of the satisfactio vicaria can only still
be defended against the objection that in the moral sphere such a
substitution is not possible. In the first place, however, it is to be remarked
against this, that the idea of substitution is also deeply grounded in human
nature in the moral sphere, and among all peoples has embodied itself in
priesthood and sacrifice and has also been expressed in all sorts of ways in
poetry and mythology. Origen compared Christ in his death already with
those who, according to classical traditions, have died for their fatherland in
order to deliver it from plague or other disasters, for it seems, according to
hidden laws, to lie in the nature of things that the voluntary death of a
righteous man for the common good breaks the power of the evil spirits, c.
Cels. I 31. Christian theology also many times adduced the examples of
Codrus, Curtius, Kratinus, Zaleucus, Damon and Phintias and the hostages,
in order thereby to elucidate the vicarious suffering of Christ. Naturally
these examples have no other value than to show that the idea of
substitution occupied a great place in the world of thought of Greeks and
Romans. The same is the case with tragedy, whose fundamental thought
certainly is not always to be rendered by Schuld und Sühne but indeed by
Leidenschaft und Leid. The death of the hero is in many tragedies not an
actual reconciliation for committed sin, but yet always a deliverance, made
necessary by some or other mistake, error, etc., and therefore in the end
reconciling us and granting satisfaction. But even thus conceived, tragedy
proclaims a great truth: all that is great in humanity walks along abysses of
guilt, and satisfaction is there only then, when the noble and great perishes
in death. The downfall of Orestes, Oedipus, Antigone, Romeo and Julia,
Max and Thekla, Iphigenie etc., reconciles us with them and with their race;
alle menschlichen Gebrechen sühnet reine Menschlichheit (Goethe). And so
it is also often in history: the last, noble Constantine is, fighting and dying
for his people and land, an atonement for the horrors of the Byzantine
emperors, and the in comparison with his predecessors innocent Louis XVI
expiates in his death for the sins of his house. If the history of the families
and lineages were known to us, it would furnish us with numerous such
examples. In the de mortuis nil nisi bene we all honour the reconciling
power of suffering and death. Yes, all life and joy here on earth is fruit of
pain and death. Everything lives from one another’s death. The grain of
wheat must die in order to bear fruit. What the one has sown is reaped by
the other. The mother gives, in labour-pain and sometimes dying, life to her
child. All birth, also in the sphere of thought and of art, is from darkness to
light. Some work, struggle, suffer, and others enjoy their labour. We all live
from the treasures of the forefathers acquired with exertion. All noble goods
of humanity have been conquered under struggle and suffering by some for
all. Above all, love bears a vicarious character; here on earth it is scarcely
conceivable otherwise than as co-suffering, συμπαθεια; whoever loves
most, suffers most. The mother suffers for, in, with her child; the father
bears mourning in the heart over the wandering of his son. Nature and
humanity teach that there are stellvertretende Kräfte. Cf. above p. 135 and
furthermore also Maresius, Syst. Theol. X 24. Turretinus, de satisf. 51.
Petrus de Witte, Wederl. der Soc. dwal. II 221v. Bushnell, Vicarious
sacrifice 1866. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 622. de Maistre, Soirées de St.
Petersbourg, éclairc. sur les sacrifices.
All these examples and reasonings are without doubt suitable, to
elucidate to some extent the vicarious suffering of Christ. Over against the
individualism and atomism that tear humanity apart and know nothing of
the mysticism of love, they are of excellent value. But yet they are not able
to explain the suffering of Christ. Many indeed remain with these examples
and attempt to understand the suffering of Christ as a natural consequence
of his entering into our sinful community, e. g. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. §
Der Begriff des stellvertr. Leidens, Basel 1864 etc. But thus the sacrifice of
Christ does not come into its own. Indeed human sympathy for Christ, and
above all for Him as the holy and merciful High Priest, has been the cause
of deep, painful suffering, Matthew 8:17, 9:36, 14:14 etc., but it is not the only
and the principal cause, any more than hunger and thirst, persecution by his
enemies, temptation by Satan, abandonment by his disciples. For then the
suffering for Christ would be only suffering and no punishment, and He
himself no more than a witness, a martyr, a sufferer, only differing in degree
from others. But Christ himself regarded his suffering as a punishment, laid
upon Him by God for our sins, Matthew 20:28, 26:28, 27:46, and the whole of
Scripture teaches that He was made sin for us and became a curse, 2 Corinthians 5:21, Galatians 3:13. One step further go those who explain the suffering of
Christ in a realistic way from the place which He occupies in the human
race. He is namely not an individual alongside others, but
Centralindividuum; He did not assume a human person but the human
nature; that nature bore sin and lay under the curse; and thus Christ with
that nature also took its guilt and punishment upon himself. Just as Adam
therefore could be our representative, because he was the progenitor of the
whole human race, so Christ is substitute of the congregation, which as his
body is born from Him as the head and is one with Him. And just as we e.
g. are punished on our back for what we have done wrong with our hand, so
Christ is punished for our sins because He is one with us, Thomas, S. Theol.
III qu. 48 art. 1. 2. Suppl. qu. 13 art. 2. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 57v. 533v.
Dale, The atonement, lect. 10. Scott Lidgett, The spiritual principle of
the atonement, ch. 7. Sartorius, Lehre v. d. h. Liebe II 67 f. Bilderdijk, Opst.
v. godg. en zedek. inhoud, I 1-15 etc. This realistic-mystical conception of
Christ’s substitution is in itself completely correct and is also clearly taught
by Scripture; for the believers themselves are crucified, died, buried, raised,
and set in heaven with Christ, Rom. 6-8, Galatians 2:20, Ef. 2:6, Colossians 2:11, 3:3
etc., cf. Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. II 114-121. Because Christ is not only
reconciler but also redeemer, not only had to remove objectively the guilt of
sin but also had to break subjectively the power of sin, this mystical union
of Christ and the believers in the work of salvation forms an essential and
indispensable constituent. But yet it is not the only and the first relation
which exists between Christ and his own. In Scripture it is built upon the
federal; Rom. 6-8 follows upon Rom. 3-5. When it is detached from that, it
loses the foundation on which it must rest; it goes to seek its support in
pantheism, which changes the re-creation into a process; and it shifts the
objective reconciliation more and more into the subjective redemption;
Shedd e. g. already makes the imputation of Christ’s righteousness depend
on regeneration and faith, ib. 534, cf. Dale 422 etc. Only then is this
mystical union in its scriptural meaning to be maintained together with the
objective reconciliation of Christ’s sacrifice, when Christ is first of all
regarded as Head of the covenant and in a federalistic, legal sense has taken
the place of his own. The covenant of grace precedes the person and the
sacrifice of Christ. For that covenant does not begin after Christ has
completed his work, with the H. Spirit, with the benefits of regeneration and
faith; but Christ himself also stands in that covenant, He is its surety and
mediator, Hebr. 7:22, 8:6, 12:24; his blood is covenant blood and therefore
reconciling, Matthew 26:28. Yes more still, the covenant of grace is not first
established in time, but it has its foundation in eternity, it rests in the
pactum salutis, it is in the first place a covenant of the three persons in the
Divine being itself. Father and Son and Spirit are all three active in that
covenant; and so little does it begin first in time with the activity of the H.
Spirit, that it rather has from eternity in the counsel of God triune its
existence and stability. And from that the satisfactio vicaria of Christ
is also explained. It rests on an ordinance, on a free, almighty, gracious
disposition of God. That absolutely does not mean that it is arbitrary and
unreasonable. All kinds of relations in nature and humanity offer analogy of
the substitution in Christ. But analogy is here and can here, just as little as
with Adam, above p. 129v. be identity. Both occupy a peculiar place in
humanity; they alone are heads of the whole human race; their influence
and operation extend to all places and times. And above Adam Christ stands
yet again. For Adam was representative, Christ is substitute of humanity.
Adam acted in our name but took over nothing of us; Christ came to us, put
himself in our place, bore our guilt and punishment and acquired our
righteousness. Adam was head of a covenant of works, which was unstable;
Christ is head of a better covenant, which knows of no instability. Adam
was a man, though without sin, earthly out of the earth; Christ was the Word
made flesh, the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, the
Lord from heaven. Adam spoiled what was good, Christ restored and
perfected what was spoiled. As far as the covenant of grace goes beyond the
covenant of works, and the gospel beyond the law, so high does Christ stand
above Adam. His satisfactio vicaria is not even to be understood according
to the covenant of works with its law; it is indeed not contra legem, for it
confirms the law, but it is nevertheless supra legem and goes very far
beyond all our thoughts. It is not to be reduced to any general rule nor to be
explained by any general law, for it is no phenomenon alongside others, but
it is a concrete fact, wholly unique in the history of humanity, explained by
nothing and itself explaining everything, resting in a special ordinance of
God. And this ordinance of God is no isolated act of will, but bears a
covenantal character. The satisfactio vicaria has its foundation in the
counsel of God triune, in the life of the highest, the perfect and eternal love,
in the unshakable covenant of redemption. According to the ordinances of
that covenant Christ takes the place of his own and exchanges their sin for
his righteousness, their death for his life. Ὠ της γλυκειας ἀ νταλλαγης, ὠ της
ἀ νομους δικαιωσ ῃ, Ep. ad Diogn. 9. Cf. A. A. Hodge, The atonement 198
etc. Hugh Martin, The atonement p. 9 etc.
17. This obedience Christ fulfilled in the whole state of his humiliation.
The formal treatment of the doctrine of the two states arose among the
Lutherans, in order to bring the communicatio idiomatum into agreement
with Jesus’ humiliation, but was soon also taken over by the Reformed,
Olevianus, Subst. foed. II 5. Polanus, Synt. VI c. 13. Junius, Theses Theol.
c. 29. Synopsis pur. theol. c. 27. 28 etc. Since Schleiermacher’s critique,
Chr. Gl. § 105, it has, however, either been entirely abandoned or
importantly modified. Those who deny the pre-existence and the
resurrection of Christ have, with this doctrine, no interest any longer either,
Biedermann, Chr. Dogm. § 824 f. Lipsius, Dogm. § 567 f. Others, who
accept these testimonies of Scripture, have often transformed it into a
description of the gradually being completed incarnation of the Logos, or of
the divine-human development and perfection of Christ; his humiliation is
then conceived as eine stete Erhöhung seines inneren Lebens, which had as
a consequence the exaltation of the same, Martensen § 139 f. Dorner § 104.
Lange II 635. Rothe, Ethik § 533 f. The doctrine of the two states is
replaced by a biography of Jesus, which, however, with a view to the
sources is impossible, with a view to the person is impermissible, and
therefore always results in a false antithesis between the historical Jesus and
the apostolic Christ, Strauss, Leben Jesu 1864 § 1. Weiss, Leben Jesu I 180.
Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III1 3. 63. Kähler, Der sogen. histor. Jezus und der
geschichtliche, bibl. Christus 1892. Id. Zur Lehre v. d. Versöhnung 68 f.
Kuyper, Enc. III 158. No separation can be made between a vita Christi and
an officium Christi, as Ebrard wishes, Dogm. § 408. His entire life stood in
the service of the office to which he had been appointed by the Father and
sent into the world. The dogma of the apostolic preaching is the only key to
unlock the evangelical tradition of Christ; the only means to provide us with
an image full of life of the Savior of the world, Kähler, Versöhnung 69.
Christ did not live a moment for himself, Romans 15:3, but always for
his church, in order to give her an example, Matthew 11:29, John 13:14-16 etc., in
order to serve her and to give his life as a ransom for many, Matthew 20:28, in
order to share with her his grace and truth, his light and his life, John 1:16,
6:33v., Colossians 3:4. The incarnation itself was already a κενωσις, consisting in
ἰ σα θε ῳ, i.e., who in the form of God existed, in the same manner as God,
and did not regard this as something robbed or usurped, nevertheless
relinquished this divine mode of existence and assumed the μορφη δουλου,
so that he truly became like a human being and was found in appearance as
a human being, Philippians 2:7, 8, 2 Corinthians 8:9, cf. Weiffenbach, Zur Auslegung der
Stelle Philippians 2:5-11, Karlsruhe u. Leipzig 1884. In the exchange of the μορφη
θεου with the μορφη δουλου, of the divine mode of existence with the
human, consisted his κενωσις, exinanitio. And as soon as this had taken
place, his ταπεινωσις, humiliatio, began, consisting in this, that he was and
remained obedient to God unto death. The whole life of Christ from the
conception on to death was thus a humiliation as a consequence of his
obedience, an ever deeper entering into the fellowship of our sin and an
ever further removing of himself from the heavenly joy. His circumcision,
Luke 2:21, served as proof that he was truly human and Abraham’s seed,
that he as such stood in the fellowship of our sin and had to receive the sign
of the cutting off of that sin, and that God was his God and he was God’s
Son. His baptism, which he as the Holy One no more than circumcision
needed for himself, Matthew 3:14, took place because it befitted him as mediator,
πληρωσαι πασαν δικαιοσυνην, to satisfy all the right of the law and to bring
about the whole, full righteousness which the law demanded of him;
because he, as such standing in the fellowship of sinners, had to receive the
sign and seal of his fellowship with God, as the Son in whom the Father had
all his good pleasure; and because he had to be anointed and qualified with
the H. Spirit and thus inaugurated for his public appearance as the Christ
who alone himself can baptize with the H. Spirit and with fire, Matthew 3:11-17,
cf. parall., Hd. 10:38, Bornemann, Die Taufe Christi durch Joh. in der
dogm. Beurteilang der christl. Theologen der vier ersten Jahrh.,
Leipzig 1896. The temptation, which took place immediately after the
baptism and further repeatedly repeated itself up to Gethsemane, cf. ἀ χρι
as its purpose that Christ, who had just received the sign and seal of his
fellowship with God and the gifts of the H. S., would also maintain this
fellowship over against all temptation of Satan and world, as the second
Adam would not break the covenant with God but would maintain and
confirm it for himself and his own, and as the merciful High Priest, having
been tempted in all things as we are, would come to our aid in our
weaknesses and temptations. All the words and works which Christ during
his life spoke and did are an execution of God’s will, John 5:19v., 6:38 and
have as their purpose to make known the name, the virtues, the counsel and
the good pleasure of God both in law and gospel, Matthew 11:27, John 1:18; to
show his priestly mercy to all poor, sick, and lost, Matthew 8:17, 11:5; to prove
his kingly power over Satan, world, sin, and all their workings. Luke 10:18,
John 12:31, 14:30, 16:33, 18:37. The suffering of Christ, which begins with
his incarnation but is completed in the passio magna, is the will and the
command of the Father, Matthew 26:39, 42, John 10:17, 18, proof of his absolute
obedience, Philippians 2:8, Hebr. 5:8, and for his own as an example for their life,
1 Petr. 2:21, as a ransom for their sins, Matthew 20:28, 26:28, as a victory over
the world, John 16:33, Colossians 2:15. His condemnation, not only by the
sanhedrin but also by the secular Roman judge Pontius Pilate, took place for
this purpose, that he would not die secretly by an assassination or in a riot,
but according to the verdict of the then best and most virtuous law, after
proper investigation, would be killed publicly, in the way of justice, and that
thereby both his personal innocence, Matthew 27:18-24, and the ground of his
condemnation, namely his confession to be the Son of God and the Messiah
of Israel, Matthew 26:63, 27:11, and the will of God, Hd. 2:23, 4:27, 28, and the
character of his death as a dying for others, Matthew 20:28, would come to light
clearly and incontrovertibly before everyone’s eyes. The death of
crucifixion, crudelissimum teterrimumque supplicium, and usually
applied only to slaves and serious criminals, had this meaning, that Christ,
in the name of the law having been condemned to the most dreadful and
most disgraceful punishment, has satisfied the strictest demand of the law,
as one hanged has become a curse to God, but thereby has also taken away
from us the curse of the law, Deuteronomy 21:23, Galatians 3:13, and has completely
delivered us from all evil to which the law condemns us on account of our
sins; the cross is therefore the center and the core of the gospel, 1 Corinthians 1:23,
2:2, Galatians 6:14. The blood that Christ shed—non infirmitate, sed potestate
mortuus est, Aug., de nat. et gr. 26—proves that he voluntarily consecrated
his life to God, that he brought it as an offering, and thereby brought
reconciliation and peace into being, Matthew 26:27, Hd. 20:28, Romans 3:25, 5:9,
Ef. 1:7, Colossians 1:20, Hebr. 9:12, 22. Finally, the burial of Christ also has a
special significance; it is repeatedly mentioned, Jes. 53:9, Matthew 12:40, 27:59,
only proof of the fact that he truly died and thus also rose from the dead, but
its significance lies especially herein, that Christ, although giving up his
spirit into the hands of his Father, who received him into paradise, Luke 23:43, 46, nevertheless for three days remained in the state of death,
belonged to the realm of the dead, and thus bore the punishment of sin,
Genesis 3:19, in full. To that state of death, Hades, he was not abandoned, his
flesh did not see corruption, for he was raised on the third day; but he
nevertheless was in Hades, Matthew 12:40, Hd. 2:27, 31.
No other places of Scripture exist that speak of the burial of Christ or of
his sojourn in the state of death, for the descent ε ἰ ς τα κατωτερα της γης,
Ephesians 4:9, as is evident from the contrast, points to his descent to the earth
by his incarnation, cf. Meyer t. p.; and 1 Peter 3:19-22 in no case speaks of
what Christ did between his death and resurrection, but either of what he
did after his resurrection or before his incarnation; the words ζωοποιηθεις
δε πνευματι indicate that Christ, who, because he partook of a sarkic body,
was put to death, yet, because the πνευμα was proper to him, was raised
again, so that his life after the resurrection was not a sarkic but a
pneumatic life. The descensus ad inferos, τα κατωτατα, Hades, not hell,
gehenna, in the Greek, Roman, Lutheran sense therefore nevertheless finds
no support in this text. But soon in the Christian church the thought arose
that Christ in the time between his death and resurrection had gone to
Hades. The Evangelium Petri vs. 41 42, discovered some time ago, has a
voice from heaven say to Jesus: ἐ κηρυξας τοις κοιμωμενοις, to which the
answer is: γυμναι, the infernal powers are laid bare. According to Hermas,
Sim. IX 16, 5-7, the apostles after their death continued their preaching, and
indeed to those who formerly had fallen asleep in righteousness, cf. also
Clemens Alex. Strom. VI 6, 45. 46. And Tertullianus, de an. 55. Irenaeus,
adv. haer. I 27, 3. IV 27, 2 and V 31, 1-2, teach that Christ descended apud
inferos or in ea quae sunt sub terra, in order to make the believers of the O.
T. share in the benefits of his work. According to Rufinus †410 the symbol
of the church at Aquileia also had this article: crucifixus sub Pontio Pilato et
sepultus descendit in inferno; probably from here this article passed over
into various confessions, into that of the synod at Sirmium 359, Nice 359,
Constantinople 360, Toledo 633, into the symbolum Quicumque and thus
also into various later forms of the so-called apostolic symbol, cf. besides
the many dogmatics-historical works of Harnack, Hagenbach etc., the
works on the apost. symbol of Caspari, Harnack art. Apost S. in Herzog2,
Zahn, Das ap. Symbol, Erlangen 1893. Kattenbusch, Das apost. Symbol I
1894 S. 103 f. Id. Christl. Welt 1889 n. 27. 28. Id. Zur Würdigung des
Apostolikums, Hefte zur Chr. Welt n. 2, Leipzig 1892 S. 29. Hahn, Bibl. der
Symb. u. Glaubensregeln der alten Kirche3 1897. The Greek church, Conf.
Orthod. qu. 49, understands by the descensus ad inferos, that Christ with his
divine nature and with his soul went to Hades and freed the souls of the
holy forefathers and, with the murderer on the cross, transferred them to
paradise. The Roman church, Cat. Rom. I c. 6, cf. Bellarminus, de Christo
IV 6-16. Petavius, de incarn. XII 19. 20 XIII 15-18 Scheeben III 298 f. etc.,
teaches that Christ, really, with his soul, after his death, descended ad
inferos and remained there as long as his body rested in the grave, in order
to free the souls of the pious, who there sine ullo doloris sensu, beata
redemptionis spe sustentati, quieta habitatione fruebantur, but nevertheless
lacked the vision of God, in order as victor to strike down the demons and
to wrest from them the booty of souls. The Lutheran church, Symb. B. ed.
Müller 550. 696 confesses that Christ according to both natures, with soul
and body after the burial went to hell, overcame the devil, disturbed the
power of hell and took from the devil all force and power; the theologians
extended this so far that Christ on the morning of the third day, after the
vivificatio, resurrectio interna and before the resurrectio externa, with soul
and body went to hell, and there to Satan and all condemned spirits, by a
praedicatio non evangelica sed legalis, elenctica, terribilis, made known his
victory over death and Satan, Frank, Theologie der Concondienformel III
397-454. Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. 277. 288 f. The Reformed
confessions are not unanimous and understand by the descent into hell the
infernal pains that Christ suffered on the cross, Calvin, Inst. I 16, 8-12, Cat.
Genev. 1, Cat. Heid. qu. 44, and thus Beza, Danaeus, Pareus, etc.; or the
actual going of Christ with his soul alone to hell, in order there to make
known his power, Repet. Anh. 9, and likewise Zanchius, Aretius, Alsted; or
the going of Christ to hell with soul and body both with the same purpose,
Coll. Lips. 9; or the state of death, in which Christ was for three days, Cat.
Westm. bij Niemeyer 55, and thus Olevianus, Perkins, Amesius, Molinaeus,
Bronghton, Vossius, Bochartus, Pearson, Schultens, Vriemoet etc.; while
some tried to unite these different opinions, Sohnius, Op. III 311. Witsius,
Explanation of the apost. symbol, 18 § 9v. Burmannus, Synopsis theol. V
Corpus theol. 18, 32. etc. The great diversity of opinions explains that many
did not know how to attach a good sense to the article and rejected it
entirely, Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 99, 1, or also seized upon this article in
order to give a churchly stamp to their doctrine of a continuing preaching of
the gospel and of a Missionsanstalt in place of the intermediate state, cf.
especially Güder, Die Lehre v. d. Erscheinung Jesu Chr. unter den Todten
1853. Spitta, Christi Predigt an die Geister, Göttingen 1890. In fact
the matter stands with this article thus, that 1o the expression descended
into hell, insofar as it might have been derived from texts such as Acts 2:27,
31, Ephesians 4:9, historically has acquired a wholly different meaning than that
which is contained in those texts; 2o that the Greek and Roman explanation
of this article, as though Christ had gone to Hades in order to free the pious
of the O. T., finds not the least support in Scripture; 3o that the Lutheran
conception, that Christ made known his power to Satan, indeed, as will later
appear, is grounded on definite statements of Scripture, but cannot be
regarded as a correct explanation of the words: descended into hell, since
these in that case would not belong to the state of humiliation but to that of
exaltation, which begins only with the resurrection; 4o that the more recent
opinion, as though Christ had gone into hell in order to preach the gospel to
all who have not heard it here on earth, likewise for the same reason cannot
be considered a correct explanation of this article of faith; 5o that 1 Peter 3:19 at most says, although it will later be shown that this too is not the
correct opinion, that Christ after his resurrection proclaimed the gospel to
the contemporaries of Noah but gives absolutely no right to an extension of
the preaching of the gospel to all or to other lost ones; and 6o that the words
descended into hell, in agreement also with what Rufinus says, that they are
an expansion of Jesus’ burial, are still best understood of the state of death,
in which Christ as mediator was for three days, in order to bear the
punishment of sin to the end and to deliver us from it. Thus the whole life
of Christ has issued in his death as the perfect satisfaction to the
righteousness of God. And by that one offering he has perfected for ever all
those who are sanctified.
18. The fruit of this obedience of Christ is no less than the whole
salvation. Under this concept are comprised all the benefits which Christ
has acquired for his own. God is called in Scripture σωτηρ, Luke 1:47 etc.,
but Christ also bears that name, because He saves his people from their sins,
Matthew 1:21, Luke 2:11. He is the ἀ ρχηγος της [381] σωτηριας, Hebr. 2:10,
α ἰ τιος σωτηριας α ἰ ωνιου, Hebr. 5:9, and his gospel is the gospel της
σωτηριας, Ephesians 1:13. This σωτηρια is a deliverance from sin and all its
consequences and a participation in the highest blessedness; it therefore
stands over against θανατος, 2 Corinthians 7:10, ἀ πωλεια, Philippians 1:28, ὀ ργη, 1
Thess. 5:9, and endures unto eternity, Hebr. 5:9. Therefore it comprises
many particular benefits under itself, which are all also mentioned
separately in Scripture. At the top stands the καταλλαγη, reconciliatio,
reconciliation. The offering of Christ has namely according to Scripture
objective significance, also valid for God. In the O. T. the sacrifices had the
intention to cover the sins of the offerer before God’s face, כפר, LXX
ἐ ξιλασκεσθαι. This reconciliation now indeed nowhere has God as direct
object, but it nevertheless takes place with reference to Him, occurs before
intends, by the covering of sin, to avert his wrath, Numbers 8:19, 16:46, and to
render Him gracious, ἱ λασκεσθαι, ἱ λαον ποιειν, propitium reddere, placare.
Likewise Christ in the N. T. is ἱ λαστηριον, Romans 3:25, ἱ λασμος, 1 John 2:2,
4:10, a merciful and faithful high priest with reference to the things with
God, ε ἰ ς το ἱ λασκεσθαι τας ἁ μαρτιας του λαου, Hebr. 2:17; as high priest
He has with the offering of his perfect obedience covered the sins of his
people and thus averted God’s wrath and acquired his grace. Indeed by
Socinians, Remonstrants, Rationalists and also most newer theologians, cf.
e.g. Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. 104, 4. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. II2 230 f.
Kaftan, Dogm. 460, it has been asserted that God is love, does not need to
be reconciled but is himself the author of reconciliation. But this rests in
part on misunderstanding and is otherwise contradicted by Scripture. For
this teaches clearly, also in the N. T., that God is wrathful over sins, Romans 1:18, Galatians 3:10, Ephesians 2:3, that He also on his part had to be reconciled,
Romans 5:9, 10, 2 Corinthians 15:18, 19, Galatians 3:13, and that Christ to that end has
been a ἱ λασμος, Romans 3:25, Hebr. 2:17, 1 John 2:2, 4:10. This, however,
absolutely does not conflict with the fact that God is love and has himself
given the Christ as a reconciliation for our sins. For his wrath is no evil
passion of hatred or envy, his righteousness is no thirst for vengeance, but
both are compatible with the highest love. Just as a mother has the
more pain over the straying of her son, the more she loves him; just as a
judge sometimes must condemn a blood relative or friend, to whom he as a
person feels intimately bound, so also in God the wrath against sin can go
together with the love toward his creatures. Odit in unoquoque nostrum
quod feceramus, amavit quod fecerat, Bede in Turret., de satisf. 86. Diligit
omnes homines quantum ad naturam quam ipse fecit, odit tamen eos
quantum ad culpam, quam contra eum homines contraxerunt, Thomas, S.
Theol. III qu. 49 art. 4. Because of our sins we are indeed objects of God’s
wrath, verum quia Dominus quod suum est in nobis perdere non vult, adhuc
aliquid invenit, quod pro sua benignitate amet, Calvin, Inst. II 16, 3. And
this again is not to be thought in such a way as if God at the moment of
Christ’s offering suddenly changed disposition and mood. For in God there
is no change nor shadow of turning; all his attributes are one with his being;
in eternity there is no before and no after. When Scripture speaks of God’s
wrath and of his reconciliation with us, then it speaks not untruthfully but
yet according to our human comprehension. There is no change in the being
of God, but there is in the relation in which He stands to his creatures. He
also does not set himself in relation to the creature as if this would in any
way exist outside Him, but He himself sets all things and all men in those
relations to himself which He eternally and unchangeably wills and
precisely thus, in that way and in that moment of time, in which they take
place in reality, cf. part II 125v. Therefore it is also God himself who in
Christ brings about the reconciliation, 2 Corinthians 5:19; He reconciles himself
through the offering of the cross; He brings in the obedience of Christ
himself and all his virtues to recognition and maintains himself as God
before the eye of all his creatures; it is, because Christ is true God and for
this divine work also had to be true God, it is God himself, who through the
cross reconciles all things with himself. He places in Christ the church in
that relation to himself, that it no longer beholds Him, the unchangeable
one, in his wrath but in his grace. Jam diligenti nos sibi reconciliavit. Quia
prius diligit, postea nos sibi reconciliat. Cf. Augustine, de trin. V 16. Enchir.
33. Lombardus and others on Sent. III dist. 19, 6. Thomas, S. Theol.
Moor III 448-450. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV 2, 263. Dorner, Chr. Gl. II 612.
Frank, Chr. Wahrh. II 181 f. 194 f. Kähler, Zur Lehre v. d. Vers. 362 f.
Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 401 etc. A. A. Hodge, The atonement ch. 9 etc.
By the offering of Christ, therefore, a relationship of reconciliation and
peace has been brought about between God and man. Christ, as ἱ λασμος,
has expiated sin and thereby reconciled God. The distinction between
ἱ λασμος and καταλλαγη does not consist in this, that the former is objective
and the latter subjective. The καταλλαγη also is an objective relation,
brought about by God himself, between Him and the world, 2 Corinthians 5:18, 19.
But in the ἱ λασκεσθαι Christ as mediator is the subject, turns away, by his
offering covering sins, God’s wrath and acquires his grace. But in the
καταλλασσειν God himself is the subject, 2 Corinthians 5:19; by giving Christ as
ἱ λαστηριον, He brings about between himself and the world a relationship
of peace. He is no longer wrathful; what made Him our ἀ ντιδικος, namely
sin, has been covered by Christ’s offering; He established in Christ such a
relationship, in which we no longer have Him against us; He laid aside his
enmity, because its cause, sin, has been removed by the death of Christ, and
now stands toward the world in a relationship of friendship and peace;
καταλλαγη is therefore the reconciliatio, Versöhnung, brought about by
expiatio, placatio, Versühnung. This καταλλαγη is the content of the gospel;
all is accomplished, God is reconciled, there is on our side nothing more to
do; and the whole διακονια κης καταλλαγης consists in the invitation to
men: καταλλαγητε τ ῳ θε ῳ , you too on your side lay aside the enmity, enter
into that relationship of peace, in which God through the offering of Christ
has placed himself toward sinners, believe the gospel, Romans 5:9, 10, 2 Corinthians 5:18-21, cf. Ef. 2:16, Colossians 1:20-22, Cremer s. v. ἱ λ. and καταλλ., Philippi on
Romans 5:10, Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. II 99 f. Already by this the whole
representation is judged, which separates satisfaction and reconciliation and
has the latter come into being only when man believes and repents. Men do
not reconcile themselves with God, as if they, with and alongside God, were
the subject of reconciliation; but God has reconciled the world with
himself, without its cooperation, apart from it, without its having
contributed the least to it or needing to contribute to it; men only receive the
reconciliation as a gift, Romans 5:11, and accept it by faith, 2 Corinthians 5:20. But
from this one benefaction of reconciliation, acquired by Christ, all kinds of
benefactions flow forth. That cannot be otherwise. If the relationship
between God and the world is set right, then in due time everything comes
into order, also the relationship between heaven and earth, angels and men,
men among themselves, and also the relationship of men to sin, death,
world, Satan etc. In the sphere of justice the case is decided. God is in the
right and therefore He will sooner or later everywhere, on every terrain, and
for all creatures be put in the right. The right is on his side and it will once
be acknowledged by all, willingly or unwillingly. In the καταλλαγη, the
peace-relationship of God in Christ to the world, therefore all kinds of other
benefactions are enclosed. The fruits of Christ’s offering are not limited to
any one terrain; they do not confine themselves, as so many nowadays
think, to the religious-ethical life, to the heart, the inner chamber, the
church, but they extend to the whole world. For mighty though sin may be,
not as the trespass is the gift of grace; the grace of God and the gift through
grace is exceedingly abundant, Romans 5:15. The benefactions, which come to
us from the καταλλαγη of God in Christ, are too many to name, above p.
312v. They can be divided into: juridical, namely forgiveness of sins, Mk.
Cor. 5:21, adoption as children, Galatians 3:26, 4:5, 6, right to eternal life and the
heavenly inheritance, Romans 8:17, 1 Petr. 1:4, also redemption,
ἀ πολυτρωσις, Ef. 1:7, Colossians 1:14, Hebr. 9:15, which however sometimes has
1:18, 19; mystical, consisting in being crucified, buried, raised, and set in
heaven with Christ, Rom. 6-8, Galatians 2:20, Colossians 3:1-13; ethical, namely
according to body, soul and spirit, 2 Corinthians 5:17, 1 Thessalonians 5:23; moral,
consisting in the imitation of Christ, who has left us his example, Mt.
Petr. 2:21, 4:1; oeconomical, namely the fulfilment of the Old Test.
covenant, the inauguration of a new covenant, Mark 14:24, Hebr. 7:22, 9:15,
etc., the blotting out of the handwriting of the law, the breaking down of the
wall of partition, the reconciliation of Jew and Gentile and of all other
oppositions existing in humanity to the unity in Christ, Galatians 3:28, Ef. 2:11-
22, Colossians 2:21; physical, namely the victory over the world, John 16:33, over
creation, the complete restoration of the world and humanity, burdened with
guilt, corrupted and shattered by sin, is the fruit of Christ’s work.
Objectively, in principle, in the sphere of justice, He brought about that recreation by his cross. Then between God and world the καταλλαγη was
established. And therefore Christ in due time—for everything proceeds in
fixed order—will once present the church without spot or wrinkle to the
Father, deliver the kingdom to God and God will be all in all, 1 Corinthians 15:22-
In theology this richness of the benefits of Christ has always been
acknowledged. Through Christ, said Clemens Alex., the earth has become a
πελαγος ἀ γαθων. People spoke of Christ as mediator, redemptor,
reconciliator, liberator, dispensator, salvator, medicus, dominus, pastor, rex
etc., designated the work brought to pass by Him as θεοποιησις, θειωσις,
deificatio, vivificatio, salvatio, liberatio, redemptio, restitutio, purgatio,
regeneratio, illuminatio, resurrectio etc., and sometimes attempted also to
classify all those benefits in some measure, as in the well-known lines of
verse: Propitians, purgans, redimens, ut victima, sponsor Salvavit, sic jura
Dei verumque requirunt, or under the heads expiatio, remissio,
consummatio etc., cf. Athan., de incarn. 54. Greg. Naz., Or. 2. Eusebius,
Dem. Ev. IV 21. Aug. de pecc. mer. I 26. Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 48. 49.
Bonaventura, Brevil. IV 1. Petavius, de incarn. XII c. 6. 7. Polanus, [386]
Synt. VI c. 18. Voetius, Disp. II 229 sq. Mastricht, V 18, 22. Turretinus, de
satisf. 317. M. Vitringa VI 121. But it nevertheless usually did not come to
a logical order and regulated treatment. The consideration of the work of
Christ as satisfactio and meritum, which arose since Anselmus, could not
make good this lack; both are only logically distinguished, for the same
work of Christ is satisfactio, insofar as He brought His offering to God and
satisfied His demand, and it is meritum, insofar as Christ thereby acquired
salvation for us with God, Thomas, III qu. 48 art. 1 and 2. Petavius, de
incarn. XII 9. Perrone, Prael. IV 311. Calvijn, Inst. II 17 1. Voetius, Disp. II
228. Mastricht, Theol. V 18, 14. 20. Quenstedt III 225. Ritschl, Rechtf. u.
Vers. I2 283 etc. Both concepts also place the work of Christ too onesidedly under the category of work and merit; it is much more the question
what Christ has “merited” and how this stands in connection with His
offering. In more recent times one has therefore almost entirely dropped
these terms and in their place designated the fruit of Christ’s work as
Erlösung or Versöhnung. The first description came especially into honor
through Schleiermacher; to be sure he also speaks of a new creation, which
is brought to pass through Christ, but this nevertheless coincides for him
with the Erlösung, Chr. Gl. § 89, 1. 2; and by it he understands the
communication of His sinless perfection, § 88, the reception of believers
into the power of His God-consciousness, § 100, which takes place not
magically, nor empirically, but mystically through creative divine activity,
through the self-revelation of Christ in His congregation, § 100, 2, 3.
Alongside this Schleiermacher then still assumes a reconciling activity of
Christ, consisting in this, that He receives believers into the communion of
His undisturbed blessedness and through means of His life-communion
with Him makes them share in the forgiveness of sins, § 101. Ritschl, on the
other hand, comprehends the working of Christ under justification and
reconciliation; the fruits of His life do not consist in Umstimmung of God
from an angry judge into a gracious Father, II 208 f. 217 f. III 439, not in
actual ransoming, II 221, not in deliverance from death, II 86, nor also in
the mystical dying and rising with Christ, for Rom. 6 is strong symbolism
and provides no material for a dogma, II 226 f.; but Christ assures and
guarantees us through His whole person and life that God is love; He admits
us, in spite of our sins, to communion with God, III 506 f. The justification
which Christ grants us is not remission of guilt and punishment, not
imputation of His righteousness, but removal of the consciousness of guilt,
and thereby of the separation between us and God, III 51, 61, the removal
of the thought that sin hinders communion with God, III 60. Consequence
and working of this justification is reconciliation; this consists in this, that
he who accepts in faith the justification, which is properly a good of the
congregation, now also subjectively enters into that new relation to God, on
his part lays aside enmity and places himself in a relation of peace to God;
it is an ethical change in us, II 230 f. 342 f. III 74-76. Unterricht § 37. There
is a great difference between Schleiermacher and Ritschl: with the former
the person, with the latter the work of Christ stands in the foreground; with
the first the subjective change of man comes to pass by a mystical way,
through communication of life, with the second by an ethical way, through
teaching and example; the first benefit with Schleiermacher is the Erlösung,
the communication of Christ’s sinless perfection, and with Ritschl the
objective, synthetic justification, which in the first place is a good of the
congregation. But with that difference the agreement is still greater: with
both Christ is the sinless man, who stands in special communion with God;
passive obedience is denied by both in the work of Christ; His suffering and
death is only the necessary consequence of His faithfulness to God
maintained to the end; the connection between Christ’s work and the fruits
thereof in the believer, in the congregation, remains unclear with both; both
shift the center of gravity of redemption and of reconciliation from the
objective work of Christ into the subjective change of believers; and even,
although Ritschl seems to let justification as an objective benefit of the
congregation and as a synthetic judgment precede faith, in fact with him
too, not for the congregation as a whole but indeed for each individual,
justification is made dependent on subjective reconciliation, cf. Jahrb. f. d.
Theol. 1888 S. 21. 22. Kübel, Ueber den Unterschied der posit. u. der liber.
Richtung in der mod. Theol.2 1893 S. 150. Kähler, Zur Lehre v. d.
Versöhnung 32 f. Above all, however, both agree in this, that they limit the
working of Christ’s life and suffering to the religious and ethical domain.
Now it is true that even with this limitation neither of them sets clearly in
the light how the person and the work of Christ can bring about this change
in the religious and ethical domain. But yet on the other side it is to a
certain extent understandable that, if the fruit of Christ’s work is limited to
this terrain, His work and His person are also conceived as happened with
Schleiermacher and Ritschl; for it is true what the former says: die
eigenthümliche Thätigkeit und die ausschliessliche Würde des Erlösers
weisen auf einander zurück und sind im Selbstbewusstsein der Gläubigen
unzertrennlich eins, Chr. Gl. § 92. With this conception it is understandable
that passive obedience is denied, that the Godhead of Christ is only a being
of God in Him, that resurrection, ascension etc., are unnecessary; a
pantheistic-mystical or a deistic-moral working of Christ’s person and work
is then sufficient unto salvation.
But that is truly not in accordance with the doctrine of Holy Scripture; it
is a failure to recognize the person of Christ and a belittling of his work.
Christ is not merely an ἀ νθρωπος ἐ νθεος but the eternal and only-begotten
Son of God, the radiance of his glory and the expressed image of his
substance, himself God, above all to be praised unto eternity. And the fruit
of his life and death is not merely a certain magical or moral influence that
proceeds from him into the world, but is no less than the ἀ ποκαταστασις
τοις ο ὐ ρανοις και ἐ πι της γης, Ef. 1:10. This work of re-creation has its
principle and origin in the perfect offering of Christ, or rather still in the
καταλλαγη, which God in Christ has brought about between himself and the
world. God does not wish to win by overpowering force. Easy it would
have been for him to destroy the whole world in his wrath and to grant the
prospect to another world and humanity, Numbers 14:12. But God exalts
himself in judgment and sanctifies himself in righteousness, Jes. 5:16. Sin is
not a physical, but an ethical power. Satan has in sin his ungodly [389]
power over the world, and sin has its power in the law, 1 Corinthians 15:56. Thus it
has pleased God to overcome this power in a moral way, in the way of right
and righteousness. Not by violence or power, but by the cross, which made
void the certificate of debt of the law, has God triumphed over the
principalities and powers, stripped them of their armor, and publicly
displayed them in their shame, Colossians 2:15. And therefore now, because God
in the way of right has overcome sin and all its power, therefore he is free,
even while his adversaries are judges, to justify the ungodly, Romans 4:5; no
one can bring an accusation against the elect of God, Romans 8:33. It is God
who justifies, and who in the justification of him who is of the faith of Jesus
himself appears to be the righteous one, Romans 3:26. God can do that,
without prejudice to, indeed to the glory of his righteousness, because
Christ has died and has been raised, Romans 8:34. On the ground of that
offering he can wrest world and humanity away from sin, extend his
kingdom, gather all things together under Christ as head and once be all in
all. No one, not even Satan, can bring anything against that; at the end each
will have to acknowledge that God is righteous and that Christ is the lawful,
the legitimate Lord, Philippians 2:11. Between the benefits that Christ has
acquired and his person and offering, there exists therefore no physical or
magical connection, as if some substance of God-human life, divine nature,
etc. were poured over from him into us, as theosophists imagine it. But God
has himself in Christ paved the royal way of right, in order to glorify to his
fallen creature the riches of his grace. From the objective καταλλαγη
established by him himself, apart from the world, all the above-mentioned
benefits flow to humanity for Christ’s sake, justification, sanctification,
complete redemption, the entire re-creation. And because this work of recreation is so great, greater still than that of creation and of preservation,
therefore he to whom this work was entrusted had to be not only true and
righteous man, but also stronger than all creatures, i.e. at the same time true
God. The same one through whom God created the world could also alone
be the mediator of the re-creation, Bonaventura, Brevil. IV c. 1. [390]
19. Intensively the work of Christ is of infinite worth, but also extensively
it extends to the whole world. Just as the world has been the object of God’s
love, John 3:16, so Christ has come in order not to condemn that world but
to save it, John 3:17, 4:42, 6:33, 51, 12:47; in him God has reconciled the
world, all things in heaven and on earth, to himself, John 1:29, 2 Cor, 5:19,
Colossians 1:20 and gathers them in this dispensation into one, Ef. 1:10; the
world, created by the Son, is also destined for the Son as its heir, Colossians 1:16,
Hebr. 1:2, Op. 11:15. From this Origen derived that Christ by his suffering
and death has redeemed the whole world, not only all human beings but
also all other rational beings, namely the fallen angels, and furthermore all
και ὑ περ των λοιπων λογικων, in Joann. I 40. He indeed died only once, in
the consummation of the ages, Hebr. 9:26, but the power of his death is
sufficient for redemption not only of the present world but also of that
which existed earlier or will exist later, and not only of human beings but
also of the heavenly spirits, de princ. II 3, 5. Hom. in Lev. I 3, cf. Schwane,
D. G. I2 254. This universalism, however, has always been rejected by the
Christian churches, e. g. Const. 543 can. 7. 12; and in fact these have
always been particularistic insofar as they limit τα παντα in Colossians 1:20 and
do not extend it to the fallen angels. But nevertheless from these and other
passages, where the word world or all is brought into connection with the
drawn that Christ had made satisfaction for all human beings, head for
head, and that the satisfactio vicaria therefore had to be understood as
universal. The church fathers before Augustine commonly speak very
universalistically about the saving will of God and about the reconciliation
of Christ, cf. Petavius, de incarn. XIII c. I. 2; but the actual question did not
yet exist in that time and could then also not yet arise, because on God’s
side one assumed only a praescientia and on man’s side one laid the
emphasis on his freedom of will, though weakened by sin, part II 319. In
the Pelagian struggle, however, it had to come onto the agenda; and
Augustine was the first who clearly taught the particular satisfaction. To be
sure Augustine says repeatedly with Scripture that God wills the salvation
of all, that, if one has died for all, all have died, that those who perish have
not wanted to believe, that whoever believes does so voluntarily, Petavius,
ib. c. 3, that Christ is a reconciliation for the whole world and has
reconciled all things, heavenly and earthly, with one another, Kühner,
Augustins Anschauung v. d. Erlösungsbedeutung Christi 1890 S. 62. But all
this proves absolutely nothing over against this other, expressed by
Augustine just as clearly and distinctly, that the saving will of God and the
reconciliation in Christ is limited to the praedestinati. In the first place this
already follows in general from Augustine’s doctrine of predestination and
of grace, part II 320; if the number of those who will be saved is eternally
and unchangeably determined by God and to them alone the grace of faith
and of perseverance is bestowed, then in between the proposition can no
longer be maintained that Christ has made satisfaction for all human beings
head for head. In the second place Augustine always takes 1 Timothy 2:4 in a
restricted sense; to be sure he gives of that text different explanations, now
once, that omnes qui salvi fiunt nisi ipso volente non fiunt, Epist. 107, de
civ. XIII 23, and then, that by all human beings are to be understood all
praedestinati, who are chosen from all peoples and classes of the human
race, Enchir. 103. de corr. et gr. 14. c. Jul. IV 8, but everywhere, where he
deliberately explains the text, he understands it in a restricted sense, cf.
Petavius, de Deo XI 7, 10. de incarn. XII 4. And in the third place he
connects the person and the work of Christ time and again only with the
elect; God called through Christ populum credentium to adoption, Conf. IX
1; Christ by his resurrection called nos praedestinatos to a new life, by his
blood redeemed justificandos peccatores, de trin. IV c. 13. Omnis, qui
Christi sanguine redemptus est, homo est, non tamen omnis, qui homo est,
etiam sanguine Christi redemptus est, de conj. adult. I 15. Non perit unus ex
illis, pro quibus Christus mortuus est, Epist. 102 ad Evod., cf. Wiggers,
August. und Pelag. I 313. Vitringa VI 147. Although semipelagianism soon
gained the upper hand, there nevertheless remained many who on this point
too remained faithful to Augustine. With appeal to 1 Timothy 2:4 the
Semipelagians said that God embraces all human beings with equal
love and assigns to all an equal measure of grace. To that Prosper answered,
that omnium cura est Deo, et nemo est, quem non aut evangelica
praedicatio aut legis testificatio aut ipsa etiam natura conveniat; sed
infidelitatem hominum ipsis adscribimus hominibus; fidem autem hominum
donum Dei esse fatemur, sine cujus gratia nemo currit ad gratiam. And as
regards the particularity of the satisfaction, Christ indeed is pro totius
mundi redemptione crucifixus, propter veram humanae naturae
susceptionem et propter communem in primo homine omnium perditionem;
potest tamen dici pro his tantum crucifixus, quibus mors profuit, Resp. ad
cap. cal. Gall. 8. 9. However moderately this may be expressed, all
followers of Augustine, Prosper, Lucidus, Fulgentius etc., nevertheless
agreed in this, that, however much God cares for all human beings and
bestows on them all kinds of benefits, he nevertheless does not in the same
way will the salvation of all; that he does not grant all the same measure of
grace; and that Christ, though in a certain sense having died for all, yet
efficaciter has died only for those to whom his death actually benefits. But
the synod of Arles 475 compelled Lucidus to retract his doctrine that Christ
had died only for those who actually are saved. And the synod of Orange
529 said only that omnes baptizati can fulfill what is necessary for
salvation, cf. Petavius, de incarn. XIII c. 5-7. Schwane, D. G. II2 571-582.
In the 9th century the question came up again; Gottschalk taught that Christ
baptismi sacramento (reprobos) luit, non tamen pro eis crucem subiit neque
mortem tulit neque sanguinem fudit. Lupus said that Christ did not die for
all human beings, but indeed for all believers, also for those who later lose
the faith again. Remigius made a similar distinction. And the synod of
Valence 855 spoke in the same spirit; it rejected that Christ had poured out
his blood etiam pro illis impiis, qui a mundi exordio usque ad passionem
Domini in sua impietate mortui aeterna damnatione puniti sunt, and
confessed that that price was paid only for those, de quibus ipse Dominus
noster dicit: sicut Moyses exaltavit serpentem in deserto, ita exaltari oportet
Filium hominis, ut omnis qui credit in ipso non pereat sed habeat vitam
aeternam, can. 4. Scholasticism too in the main remained faithful to
Augustine; 1 Tim. [393] 2:4 must not be understood as if God indeed willed
what does not happen, as if he willed that those also be saved who in fact
are not, but this text means, nullum hominum fieri salvum nisi quem
salvum fieri ipse voluerit, or that all kinds of people from all peoples and
estates will be saved, or also, more in the sense of Damascenus, that God
wills the salvation of all, namely voluntate antecedente, conditional, i.e. if
they themselves will and come to him, but then this will was magis velleitas
quam absoluta voluntas, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 46, 2 and also on 1 Timothy 2:4. Bonaventura, ib. art. 1 qu. 1. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 19 art. 7 qu. 23
art. 4 ad 3. And as regards the satisfaction, scholasticism did indeed teach
that it was superabundans and occurred pro peccato humani generis, totius
humanae naturae etc., Thomas, S. Th. III qu. 46 art 1, but it argued the
possibility of the satisfaction especially with this, that Christ was the head
and the believers the members of his body, and therefore connected the
satisfaction time and again only with the believers; thus Thomas says, caput
et menbra sunt quasi una persona mystica et ideo satisfactio Christi ad
ommes fideles pertinet sicut ad membra, III qu. 48 art. 2; quia ipse est caput
nostrum, per passionem suam liberavit nos tanquam membra sua a peccatis,
quasi per pretium suae passionis, sicut si homo per aliquod opus meritorium
quod manu exerceret, redimeret se a peccato quod pedibus commisisset, III
qu. 49 art. 1. And in III qu. 79 art. 7. he says: passio Christi prodest quidem
omnibus quantum ad sufficientiam, sed effectum non habet nisi in illis qui
Christi conjunguntur per fidem et charitatem. That this efficacitas does not
depend on man’s free will, but on God’s election and Christ’s offering itself,
appears in general from Thomas’ doctrine of gratia and in particular also
from this, that he says in III qu. 48 art. 6: passio Christi efficienter causat
salutem humanam; cf. also Lombardus: Christus electos tantum sicut se
dilexit eorumque salutem optavit, Sent. III dist. 31, 4. Christus se trinitati
obtulit pro omnibus, quantum ad pretii sufficientiam, sed pro electis tantum
quantum ad efficaciam, quia praedestinatis tantum salutem effecit, ib. III
dist. 20, 3. Later this same view was still defended in the Roman church by
Bajus, Jansenius, Quesnel. and even also by Tapper, Estius, Sonnius and
others, cf. Rivetus, Op. III 438. M. Vitringa VI 155-159. But [394]
semipelagianism penetrated ever more deeply into Rome’s church, and
thereby it became especially after Trent the almost general doctrine that
God voluntate antecedente wills the salvation of all, that Christ has made
satisfaction for all, and that the voluntas consequens takes account of the
good or bad use that human beings make of their freedom and of grace, part
II 325, and further Trid. VI c. 2 and 3. Cat. Rom. I 3, 7. Innoc. X in damn. 5
propos. Jans. Bellarminus, de sacrif. missae I 25. de poenit. I 2. de amiss.
gr. IV 4. Becanus, Manuale Controv. III 1 qu. 1. Petavius, de incarn. XIII c.
14. Theol. Wirceb. IV 322. Scheeben, Dogm. III 356. Jansen, Prael. theol. II
748 etc. And with this in the essence of the matter are in agreement the
Greek church, Damascemus, de fide orthod. II c. 29. Conf. orthod. qu. 34.
47; the Lutherans, Symb. ed. Müller p. 781. Gerhard, Loc. VII c. 6.
Quenstedt, III 311-324. Hollaz, Ex. 745. Buddeus, Inst. theol. 824; the
Remonstrants, Conf. en Apol. conf. VIII 10. Arminius, Op. 153. Episcopius
on 1 John 2:2. Limborch, Theol. Christ. IV c. 3-5; and further the
Mennonites, Quakers, Herrnhutters, Methodists etc.
The Reformed therefore stand almost alone with their doctrine of
particular satisfaction. And in addition to that, it then also comes about that
among themselves they were absolutely not unanimous and gradually
diverged ever further from one another. Various confessions speak
moderately and generally, e.g. the conf. Anhalt., in Niemeyer p. 635. 639,
March., ib. 650. 651, Lips., ib. 662, Thorun., ib. p. 674; the Anglicana is
silent about it; the Cat. Heid. also does not express it directly, although qu.
37 has wrongly been cited as a proof for the general satisfaction, cf. M.
Vitringa VI 136; the French, Dutch, Scottish confession teach it only per
consequentiam. In the canons of Dordrecht it is clearly taught, but at the
same time it is said that the offering of Christ was infiniti valoris et pretii,
abunde sufficiens ad totius mundi peccata expianda, II 3, and furthermore it
also occurs in the Westm. conf. VIII 1. 5. 8. Cat. major et minor Cons. Helv.
13. Walch. art. 1693. Also among the theologians there was no unanimity.
Some thought that it was indeed good to say that Christ’s offering would
have been sufficient for all men, if God had wanted to make it efficax for
all; but one could nevertheless actually not say that it was sufficient
for all; for if Christ had not died efficaciter for all, then He had also not
done so sufficienter; and if one nevertheless began to speak in that way, one
gave occasion for misunderstanding and prepared the dangerous distinction
of voluntas antecedens and consequens, of gratia sufficiens and efficax,
Beza, Piscator, Twissus, Voetius, Disp. II 251 sq. Others, however, spoke
with Augustine and the scholastics in such a way that Christ had died
sufficienter for all, efficaciter only for the elect, Calvin on 1 John 2:2. H.
Alting, Probl. theol. 174. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIV qu. 14. Mastricht, V
18, 21. 39. Moor III 1035-1075 etc. At the Synod of Dordrecht the foreign
delegates spoke about the dignitas and sufficientia of Christ’s offering as
broadly as possible; the English divines even said that Christ in a certain
sense had died for all; sic Christus pro omnibus mortuus est, ut omnes et
singuli, mediante fide, possint virtute ἀ ντιλυτρου hujus remissionem
peccatorum et vitam aeternam consequi, thesis 3. In England, over against
the strictly Reformed school of Twissus, Rutherford et al., there was a more
moderate direction, represented by Davenant, Calamy, Reynolds,
Arrowsmith, Seaman etc., and especially by Richard Baxter. Their view
corresponded in substance entirely with that of the French theologians,
Camero, Testardus, Amyraldus etc.; there was a preceding decree,
according to which Christ had made satisfaction for all conditionally, under
the condition of faith, and another subsequent particular decree, according
to which He had made satisfaction for the elect in such a way that He in due
time also grants them faith and infallibly leads them to salvation, part II
341. In the Scottish church the doctrine of particular satisfaction in
connection with the general offer of grace repeatedly came up; it was even
also one of the causes for the separation of the Erskines in 1733. In order to
avoid the neonomian direction, which made faith into a legal condition and
therefore let the gospel be intended only for certain, qualified persons, the
so-called Marrowmen (James Hog, Thomas Boston, Ralph and Ebenezer
Erskine, Alexander Moncrieff etc., cf. part I 128) taught that Christ’s
offering possessed a legal, federal sufficiency for all men and grounded
upon that the general offer of grace. Some went still further, made a
distinction between a general and special grace, an external and internal
covenant (Thomas Mair 1754), or taught a general satisfaction (James
Fraser, †1698, but his treatise on justifying faith was first published in two
parts 1722 and 1749), or even denied satisfaction entirely (Dr. M. Gill,
Practical essay on the death of Christ, 1786). In this century the particular
satisfaction in Scotland again became the subject of a prolonged struggle. In
1820 the United Associate Synod of the Secession Church issued a
declaration, by which it did indeed condemn the general satisfaction, but
nevertheless taught that Christ’s offering was sufficient for all and had
brought all into a salvable state. Both on the right and on the left this
declaration met with objection; some denied that all had a right to Christ,
and contested the general satisfaction in every sense, Palaemon in his
Letters upon Theron and Aspasio, Symington, Haldane, and especially Dr.
Marshall; others decidedly taught the general satisfaction, William Pringle,
John Mc Leod Campbell, James Morison, Robert Morison, A. C.
Rutherford, John Guthrie; the two professors Balmer † 1844 and Brown
were even accused by Marshall, but nevertheless were acquitted by the
synod in 1845, cf. Andrew Robertson, History of the atonement controversy
in connexion with the Secession Church from its origin to the present time,
Edinb. 1846. Likewise in other countries the doctrine of the special
satisfaction was weakened in the spirit of Grotius or of Amyraldus or also
decidedly rejected, in England by Daniel Whitby, against whom Jonathan
Edwards came forward; in America by the Edwardean or New-England
theologians, Emmons, Taylor, Park, Fiske etc.; in Germany by P.
Volckmann et al.; in this country especially by Venema, cf. Ypey, Gesch. der
chr. kerk in de 18e eeuw VII 133v. At present the doctrine of the special
satisfaction has almost generally been abandoned, also by Van Oosterzee, §
111, 6. Leer der Zal. n. 66. Heid. Cat, p. 176. Ebrard, Dogm. § 430. On the
other hand it is still defended by Ch. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 544-562. A. A.
Hodge, The atonement p. 347-429. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 464-480. W.
Cunningham, Historical Theology, 2 ed. Edinb. Clark 1864 II 323-370.
Robert S. Candlish, The atonement, its reality, completeness and extent,
London 1861. Hugh Martin, The atonement, Edinb. Hunter z. j. Kuyper,
That the grace is particular. And in recent times it again found support
with Ritschl, according to whom the correlate of Christ’s offering is not the
individual man nor also all men but specifically the congregation; it alone is
in possession of justification and full of forgiveness of sins, it is in Scripture
always presented as the object of the operations which proceed from Christ,
Rechtf. u. Vers. I2 47-67. 205 f. 305 f. II2 216 f. III2 103 f.
20. In this important dispute over the value of Christ’s sacrifice there is
complete agreement, on the one hand, on this, that not all but only some
human beings actually become partakers of the benefits of Christ, and on
the other hand on this, that the sacrifice of Christ in itself would be
perfectly sufficient, to cause not only some but all human beings to share in
the forgiveness of sins and eternal life. The universalists are therefore in
practice all devoted to the particularity of grace; and the particularists all
without exception confess the universality of the sacrifice of Christ, as
regards its intrinsic value. Even those who have objections to the words,
that Christ has died sufficienter for all and efficaciter for the elect,
nevertheless readily acknowledge that the materia meriti of Christ is
perfectly sufficient for the reconciliation of the sins of all human beings,
and what they want is only this, that the forma meriti, i.e. the merit of
Christ, considered not in itself but in ordine ad reprobos, can be called not
only not efficax but also not sufficiens, Voetius, Disp. II 254. The difference
therefore concerns only the question, whether it was the will and the
intention of God that Christ brought his sacrifice for the sins of all human
beings without exception, or only for the sins of those who have been given
to him by the Father. So stated, the question seems hardly susceptible of a
twofold answer. For in the first place, Scripture throughout connects the
sacrifice of Christ only with the church, whether this is indicated by many,
people, Matthew 1:21, Titus 2:14, Hebr. 2:17, 7:27, 13:12, by his sheep, John 10:11, 15, 25v., Hebr. 13:20, by his brethren, Hebr. 2:11, by children of
God, John 11:52, Hebr. 2:31-45; by those given to him by the Father,
body, Ef. 5:23, or also by us as believers, Romans 5:9, 8:32, 1 Corinthians 5:7, Ef.
again drawn attention to this; for, even if it is also the case that he came to
this through entirely different considerations, the fact itself nevertheless
stands firm: in Scripture it is not all human beings head for head, but the
church is das Correlat aller an den Opfertod Christi geknüpften Wirkungen,
Rechtf. u. Vers. II2 216. The considerations in Ritschl, however, are
different from those in the Reformed; the latter said: not all but the church
of the elect. Ritschl says: not the individual but the church and thus
attempts to remove the unio mystica, the communion of believers
individually with Christ, from Scripture. But in the matter itself there is
nevertheless agreement. Over against this clear, continuous teaching of
Scripture, the few texts on which the universalists appeal have little weight.
The expression all in Jes. 53:6, Romans 5:18, 1 Corinthians 15:22, 2 Corinthians 5:15, Hebr.
2:9, cf. 10 proves nothing, or it proves much more than the universalists
assert and would come to the benefit of the doctrine of Origen concerning
the restoration of all things. The universalists are therefore themselves
compelled to restrict the word all in these places. Of more weight are texts
sacrifice of Christ is brought into connection with the salvation of all or of
the world. But none of these texts is in conflict with the above-mentioned
statements, which restrict Christ’s benefits to the church. For the N. Test. is
an entirely different dispensation than the O. Covenant; the gospel is not
limited to one people but must be preached to all creatures, Matthew 28:19; there
is no respect of persons with God, there is no longer any distinction of
Gentile and Jew, Hd. 10:34, 35, Romans 3:29, 10:11-13. Yes even, when in
mention of many, for whom Christ has died, then underlying that is not the
contrast which has later often been smuggled in, that not all but only
many will be saved. But the thought from which this speaking of many
arises is an entirely different one, namely: Christ has not died for a few, but
for many, for very many. He gives his life for many, he pours out his blood
for many, he will make many righteous; it is not few, but many, who by the
obedience of one are constituted righteous. Scripture is not afraid that too
many will be saved. And therefore, from that same consideration, it says
that God has no pleasure in the death of the ungodly, that he wills that all
come to repentance and be saved, that Christ is a reconciliation and has
given his life for the world and that the gospel must be preached to all
creatures. If the universalists infer from this that the satisfaction is wholly
general, then they come into conflict both with Scripture and with reality;
for these both teach, as it were in competition, that not all but only many
become acquainted with the gospel and come to true repentance. In all those
places there is therefore mention, not of the voluntas beneplaciti which is
unknown to us and cannot or may not be a rule of our conduct; nor also of a
voluntas antecedens, which precedes our decision of will and then directs
itself according to it; but of the voluntas signi, which tells us how we are to
conduct ourselves in the N. Covenant. It gives us the right and imposes on
us the duty to bring the gospel to all human beings without exception. We
have no need of any other ground than this clearly revealed will of God for
the general offer of grace. For whom Christ has specifically died, we have
no more need to know beforehand than who are chosen by God unto eternal
life. The calling does indeed rest on a particular basis, for it belongs to and
proceeds from the covenant, yet it is directed, in accordance with God’s
revealed will and with the in itself all-sufficient value of Christ’s sacrifice,
also to those who are outside the covenant, in order that they too may be
incorporated into that covenant and in their faith itself receive the proof of
their election, cf. deel II 216-222. In the second place Scripture maintains
that the sacrifice and the intercession of Christ, and thus also the acquisition
and the application of salvation, hang together inseparably. The sacrifice is
the ground of Christ’s intercession; the latter therefore extends as far
as the former. Limborch, Theol. Chr. III 19. 11 accordingly also
acknowledges, intercessionem non esse actum reipsa ab oblatione, quatenus
in coelo peragitur, distinctum. If the intercession is therefore particular, as it
also. Limborch IV 4, 7 does indeed appeal against this to Luke 23:34, but
here Jesus prays not for the salvation of his enemies but only for the nonimputation of that dreadful crime, of which in their ignorance they made
themselves guilty, when they crucified the Messiah. And likewise there is
an indissoluble connection between the acquisition and the application of
salvation. All benefits of the covenant of grace hang together, Romans 8:28-
34, and find their ground in the death of Christ, Romans 5:8-11. The
reconciliation in Christ brings preservation and salvation with it. For Christ
is the head and the believers are his body, which receives its growth from
him, Ef. 4:16, Colossians 2:19; he is the cornerstone and they are the building, Ef.
2:20, 21. He is the firstborn and they are his brethren, Romans 8:29. The
believers are therefore also objectively with and in him dead, crucified,
buried, raised, set in heaven. That is: the church is not an accidental
arbitrary aggregate of individuals, which can just as well be smaller as
larger, but it forms with Christ an organic whole, which is enclosed in him
as second Adam, just as the whole of humanity proceeds from the first
Adam, cf. Rothe, Theol. Ethik I S. 501. The application must therefore
extend as far as the acquisition of salvation; it is included in this and is its
necessary effect. Moreover, that also lies in the nature of the case. If Jesus is
truly Saviour, then he must also truly save his people, not in possibility but
in reality. The universalists, however, are compelled to conceive salvation
itself in a wholly different way and to do injustice to the name of Jesus. In
logic the rule holds: quo major extensio, minor comprehensio. And this rule
is also applicable on many another terrain, it is also applicable here. Under
the appearance of honouring the work of Christ, it is weakened and limited
by the doctrine of general satisfaction. For if Christ has satisfied for all, the
acquisition does not necessarily include the application of salvation. The
latter is then something that perhaps accidentally is added, but that is
not of itself given along with it and does not naturally flow from it. The
application of salvation is then not and cannot be the work of Christ, but in
the end always depends on the will of man. This must supplement the work
of Christ, apply it, cause it to pass over into reality. That is, for Christ there
remains only the acquisition, not of the reality but only of the possibility of
salvation, not of the actual reconciliatio but of the potential
reconciliabilitas. Christ acquired for God only the possibility to enter into a
covenant of grace with us, to grant us the forgiveness of sins and eternal
life, if we, namely, believe. The principal part of the work of salvation, that
which truly makes us saved, remains for us still to do. Christ did not make
the covenant of grace itself firm in his blood, he did not make it that the sins
of his people are forgiven, but he only declared that from God’s side there is
no objection to entering into a covenant with us and forgiving us sins, if we
and after we on our side believe. For us Christ has therefore actually
acquired nothing, but only for God the possibility to forgive us, if we fulfil
the commands of the gospel. The universalists therefore all come to
diminish the value and power of Christ’s work. What they, and then only
seemingly, gain in quantity, they lose in quality. Rome teaches that the sins
committed before baptism, i.e. as a rule original sin, are forgiven in
baptism. But after baptism the concupiscentia remains, which indeed is
itself no sin but becomes an occasion for sinning. The sins then committed
are indeed forgiven in the sacrament of penance, as regards guilt and eternal
punishment; but the temporal punishment must be borne by the human
being himself here or in purgatory, Trid. VI 30. XIV c. 8. 9. can. 12-14 etc.
The Remonstrants said that God in the death of Christ has reconciled all
sinners with himself in such a way, ut per et propter hoc ipsum λυτρον ac
sacrificium in gratiam cum iis redire et ostium salutis aeternae viamque
immortalitatis pandere ipsis voluerit, Conf. VIII 9. The Quakers let Christ’s
work consist in this, that he has offered reconciliation to us and has made
God inclined to forgiveness, Barclay, Verantwoording 1757 bl. 153. And to
the same conclusion must all come who teach a general satisfaction.
The centre of gravity is shifted out of Christ into the Christian; faith is the
true reconciliation with God, cf. Kübel, Unterschied 135 f. The Reformed,
however, were of a different mind. The satisfactio vicaria is no fertige
Grösse, but in principle includes the whole re-creation in itself. The work of
Christ is only then finished, when he delivers the kingdom to the Father. He
did not open the possibility of becoming saved, but always saves through,
on the ground of his sacrifice accomplished on the cross. Saviour is he who
not only died for our sins but therefore also was raised and ascended into
heaven and now as the exalted Saviour prays for his church. He sanctified
himself, in order that his own also may be sanctified in truth, John 17:19, he
gave himself over for the church, in order that he might sanctify it and
present it to himself glorious, Ef. 5:25-27. Both are out of one, namely God,
Hebr. 2:11, and are as it were one Christ, 1 Corinthians 12:12. In and with Christ
God grants to believers everything that they need, Romans 8:32v., Ef. 1:3, 4, 2
Petr. 1:3; election in Christ brings with it all blessings in Christ, adoption as
children, redemption through his blood, Ef. 1:3v., the gift of the H. Spirit, 1
heart and a new spirit, Jeremiah 31:33, 34, Ezech. 36:25-27, Hebr. 8:8-12, 10:16.
Cf. Can. Dordr. II 8v. Prof. Leidenses in Censura Conf. Rem. VIII 9.
Trigland, Antapologia c. 16. Mastricht, V 18, 42. Voetius, Disp. II 9. 269 V
270. Witsius, Oec. foed. II 7. Misc. Sacra II 781. Vitringa VI 126. Moor III
1086 sq. Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. II 26. In the third place it is still to
be added to this, that universalism leads to all kinds of false propositions. It
brings separation between the three persons of the Divine being, for the
Father wills the salvation of all, the Son satisfies for all, but the H. Spirit
restricts the gift of faith and of salvation to few. It brings conflict between
the intention of God, who wishes the preservation of all, and the will or the
power of God, who in fact does not will or cannot make salvation partaken
of by all. It lets the person and the work of Christ precede election and the
covenant, so that Christ comes to stand wholly outside it and cannot satisfy
vicariously, because there is no communion between him and us. It does
injustice to the righteousness of God, which lets forgiveness and life be
acquired for all and yet does not distribute them. It sets up free will, which
has the power to believe, can make the work of Christ undone or not, and
has the decision, indeed the whole result of world history, in its hands. It
leads to the doctrine, as the Quakers rightly observed, Barclay, Verantw. van
de Ware Christ. Godg. bl. 92, that if Christ has died for all, then all here or
hereafter must be placed in the opportunity to accept or reject him; for it
would be wholly unjust to condemn and punish those whose sins are all
reconciled, only because they were outside the opportunity to accept Christ
by faith. And it comes to the proposition, in clear contradiction with the
whole of Holy Scripture, that the only sin for which someone can be lost
and punished is unbelief; all other sins are after all reconciled; even those of
the man of sin, the antichrist, included.
21. Although, therefore, the satisfactio vicaria as acquisition of perfect
salvation cannot be extended to all men head for head, it is not thereby
asserted that it has not the least significance for those who perish. There is
here between the church and the world not merely separation and antithesis.
It is not so, that Christ has acquired everything for the former, nothing for
the latter. In rejecting universalism it must not be forgotten that the merit of
Christ also has its limits with respect to the former and its value and
significance with respect to the latter. In the first place, it must indeed be
borne in mind that Christ as such is indeed the Re-Creator but not the
Creator of all things. Just as the Son follows upon the Father, so creation is
presupposed by re-creation, nature by grace, birth by rebirth. Under the
merits of Christ, therefore, it is not included in the strict sense that the elect
are born and live, that they receive food, covering, clothing and all kinds of
natural benefits. It can indeed be said that God would no longer have let
world and humanity continue to exist after the fall, if He had not had
another higher purpose with it. There is indeed the gratia communis
for the gratia specialis; and God also grants to the elect with salvation in
Christ also many other natural blessings, Matthew 6:33, Romans 8:28, 32, 1 Timothy 4:8, 2 Petr. 1:3. But nevertheless it is wrong, with Herrnhuters and Pietists,
to erase the boundaries between nature and grace, creation and redemption,
and to set Christ in the Father’s place upon the throne of the universe. Even
election and the covenant of grace, which both presuppose the objects and
participants, have not been acquired by Christ but precede his merits. The
Father prepares with his creation the work of re-creation and leads toward
it; the Son, with his labor, goes deep, as far as sin reaches, back into the
work of creation. But nevertheless both works are distinct and not to be
mixed, Voetius, Disp. II 271-273. In the second place, Christ has not
acquired the same for each of his own. There is distinction among believers,
before they come to faith, in sex, age, station, rank, character, gift, etc.,
distinction also in measure and degree of wickedness and corruption. And
when they come to faith, there is distinction in the grace that is bestowed
upon them; to each one grace is given according to the measure of the gift
of Christ, Romans 12:3, 1 Corinthians 12:11, Ef. 3:7, 4:7. The natural distinction
among men is indeed purified by grace but not erased; it is even increased
by distinction of spiritual gifts, for the body of Christ consists of many
members, in order that it may be one organism, a creation and a work of art
of God. Third, the church is not of, but nevertheless in the world; it lives
and moves in the midst of that world and is connected with it in all kinds of
ways. Believers are brought in from the human race, and conversely there is
much chaff among the wheat, there are branches on the vine that bear no
fruit and are cut out. If Christ therefore took the place of his own, he had to
assume the flesh and blood in which all men share. By his incarnation he
has honored the whole human race; according to the flesh he is brother of
all men. And even his work has value for all, also for those who never
believe in him. For although it is the case that Christ has not, in the proper
sense, acquired natural life by his suffering and death, the human race
is nevertheless spared because Christ would come to save it. Christ is not
the head of all men, not the prophet, priest, and king of all, for he is head of
the church and as king he is anointed over Zion. But all men do indeed have
much to thank Christ for. The light shines in the darkness and enlightens
every man coming into the world; the world was made through him and
remains so, although it has not known him; also as Christ he grants to
unbelievers many benefits, calling through the gospel, admonition to
repentance, historical faith, an honorable life, all kinds of gifts and powers,
offices and ministries in the midst of the church, such as e.g. even the
apostolic office to a Judas. Sans Jésus-Christ le monde ne subsisterait pas,
car il faudrait, ou qu’il fut détruit ou qu’il fut comme un enfer (Pascal).
Even when he hangs on the cross, he still prays for forgiveness for that
dreadful sin of which the Jews at that moment make themselves guilty. Cf.
Voetius, Disp. II 275. 276. Fourth, the work extends to the irrational
creatures. One cannot, with Origen, say that he suffered something for them
and merited something for them. But when Christ was made sin and bore
the sin of the world, then he also nullified sin with all its consequences. The
liberation of the creature from the bondage of corruption, the glorification
of creation, the renewal of heaven and earth is a fruit of the cross of Christ,
Romans 8:19v. Voetius, Disp. II 264. 265. Fifth, the angels in heaven also have
use and benefit from the work of Christ. There is no sufficient ground for
the assertion that Christ acquired for them perseverance and glory, although
many have thus taught with appeal to Job 4:18, 15:15, Ef. 1:10, Colossians 1:20, 1
Tim. 5:21, Hebr. 12:22, 23, Augustinus, de cons. evang. 35. Cyvillus, de
ador. 9. Gregorius, Bernardus, Diez, Valentia, Suarez and also Calvin on Ef.
1:10 and Colossians 1:20. Polanus, Synt. Theol. VI 27. Zanchius, Op. III 159-164.
Bucanus, Inst. theol. VI qu. 30. Davenantius on Colossians 1:20. Walaeus,
Synopsis pur. theol. XII 33 and Loci Comm. Op. I 195 etc. For angels do
not need Christ for themselves as Reconciler or Savior; they are essentially
distinct from men, who alone are made after God’s image. If Christ
had to acquire gratia and gloria for them, this would lead to the thought that
the Son of God nevertheless would have had to assume human nature, or,
better still, the nature of the angels, even if man had not fallen, cf. part II
444, and further Lombardus, Thomas, Bonaventura, Scotus on Sent. II dist.
5. III dist. 13. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 62 III qu. 8 art. 4. Petavius, de incarn.
XII 10. Becanus, Theol. schol. I p. 305. Quenstedt, Theol. I 476. Gerhard,
Loc. XXXI § 42. Gomarus on Colossians 1:20. Voetius, Disp. II 263. Alting,
Theol. probl. nova XII 24. Turretinus, Theol. El. XIV qu. 3. Moor II 353.
Vitringa III 26 VI 178. Yet simple denial that Christ has merited anything
for the angels does not do justice to Ef. 1:10 and Colossians 1:20. For it is stated
clearly that God all things, τα παντα, i.e. not men or angels only but in
general all that is created, the whole creation, the world, the universe,
has reconciled that whole creation through Christ, not mutually but to
himself, ε ἰ ς α ὐ τον, and in him again brings together and into unity for
himself. The doctrine of the restoration of all things finds no support in
these texts; it is rejected by the whole of Scripture and has found in the
Christian church only now and then a defense. If this is thus excluded, then
these two texts can be understood in no other way than that, according to
Paul’s conception, the devils and the ungodly will one day be consigned to
hell and that then in the new heaven and the new earth with its inhabitants
the whole creation will be restored. This creation now, thought of in an
organic sense, had as a whole been set in enmity against God by sin and
shattered and destroyed among itself. It does not lie herein that the good
angels personally and individually needed reconciliation, nor also that
Christ had to suffer and die for the irrational creatures. But there does lie at
its foundation the presupposition that sin has altered and disturbed the
relation of all creatures both to God and to one another. And that is indeed
also so. Sin has made the world of men an object of God’s wrath and has
divided and destroyed it within itself. The relation of the angels to God has
been altered, not only insofar as many have become apostate, but also [407]
because the good angels formed only a part of the whole of the spirits that
had served God. Augustinus, Enchir. 61. 62 and others were of the opinion
that this breach struck in the angelic world was healed by the elect from
humanity and that therein the significance of Christ’s reconciliation for
humanity consisted. This opinion is not acceptable; men are specifically
different from the angels and an equation of the number of the elect men
with that of the fallen angels lacks all ground in Scripture. But nevertheless
it is true that the fall of so many angels must have disturbed the whole
organism of the angelic world; just as an army is wholly thrown into
disorder, and made unfit for battle, if many officers and soldiers go over
from the ranks to the enemy. So also the angelic world as God’s army for
his service has been shattered. It has lost its head, its organization. And this
it now receives back in the Son, and indeed in the Son not only according to
his divine nature but also according to his human nature. For not only the
relation to God, also that to the world of men was disturbed by sin. And
now it is Christ, who as Lord of the angels and as Head of the church places
angels and men both in the right relation to God and likewise to one
another. By his cross he restores the organism of creation, in heaven and on
earth, and these two also again together. The inanimate and irrational in
creation, i.e. heaven and earth themselves, are not thereby excluded. That
cannot be, for the relation of the angels to heaven and that of men to earth is
not mechanical but organic. Heaven and earth themselves have, with the fall
of the angels and of men, sunk below their original state; the whole
creation, πασα ἡ κτισις, groans together and is together in labor pains. Die
gesammte Creatur führt gleichsam eine grosze Seufzersymphonie aus
(Philippi); all members of that creation groan and have pain, in common, in
connection with one another, Romans 8:22. Just as also in the old covenant the
tabernacle and all implements for the service were sprinkled with blood, Exodus 24:3-8, Hebr. 9:21, so also Christ by his cross has reconciled all things and
acquired a new heaven and a new earth. The whole creation, as it will once
stand perfect, without spot and wrinkle, before God’s face, is the
work of Christ, the Lord of lords and the King of kings, Hebr. 12:22-28.
22. If this now is the great work, entrusted by the Father to Christ,
namely, to be Savior in the full sense and to bring the entire re-creation to
realization, then it at once becomes evident that the state of exaltation is for
that just as necessary as the state of humiliation. They must indeed have a
poor conception of Christ’s person and work, who think they can relinquish
the resurrection, the ascension, and the session at the right hand of God
without harm to faith and life, and have enough with the historical image of
Jesus, which in the same way as that of other great men lives on in history
and exerts influence. Conversely, it is understandable that whoever sees in
Jesus no more than a particularly pious man and in his work nothing other
than a religious-ethical reformation, deems the entire state of exaltation
worthless for the Christian life and denies and combats the facts of the
resurrection and of the ascension. Scripture, however, proceeds from an
altogether different thought. It is the crucified but also the risen and exalted
Christ whom the apostles proclaim. From that standpoint of exaltation they
view and describe his earthly life, his suffering and dying. In the work that
he now carries out as the exalted mediator, he has laid the foundations in his
cross. The cross has been his only weapon in the struggle against sin, world,
Satan. Through the cross he has triumphed in the sphere of justice over
every power hostile to God. But for that very reason he has in the state of
exaltation also received the divine right, the divine appointment, the royal
power and authority, to carry out the work of re-creation in full, to
overcome all his enemies, to save all those given to him, and to complete
the entire kingdom of God. On the basis of the one, perfect offering,
accomplished on the cross, he, in accordance with the will of the Father,
distributes all his benefits. Those benefits are no physical or magical aftereffect of his earthly life and dying; the history of the kingdom of God is no
evolutionistic process. It is the living Christ, exalted at the right hand of
God, who with consciousness, with freedom, distributes all these
benefits, gathers his elect, conquers his enemies, and guides world history
toward the day of his parousia. He is still active in heaven as mediator; he
was not only but is still our highest prophet, our only high priest, and our
eternal king. Yesterday and today he is the same unto eternity. In the state of
humiliation he by his life and dying fulfilled the condition, in order now in
the state of exaltation, on the basis of his perfect offering, to set God’s
creation free from the bondage of sin and of corruption, and to gather all
things together under himself as the head. The re-creation is the continuing
act of the mediator. Christ is the one exalted at God’s right hand, but yet
always on earth, in his church, in office, word, sacrament, in forgiveness,
regeneration, faith, etc., present and active Lord from heaven. In this light
the state of exaltation receives a significance, indeed often misunderstood
but yet of the highest importance for doctrine and life; resurrection and
ascension are for the work of re-creation just as necessary as incarnation
and death on the cross. In Scripture these facts are therefore not only
mentioned but repeatedly placed in the foreground and explained in their
rich significance. The resurrection of Christ, according to the whole N. T.,
took place on the third day; in Matthew 12:40, Mark 8:31 etc., for the sake of the
comparison with Jonah the parts of the days and nights are counted as
whole, M. Vitringa V 597, or are intended only as a general description of a
very short time, Kähler, Zur Lehre v. d. Versöhnung 207 f. It consisted in
the rising again of that same body that had been taken down from the cross
and buried in the garden of Joseph of Arimathea; it was indeed changed and
glorified, so that it became no σωμα ψυχικον but a σωμα πνευματικον, Luk.
Hd. 1:11, 1 Corinthians 15:37v., Op. 1:7. The various attempts to explain this
resurrection in another way (Reimarus), as apparent death (Rationalists,
Schleiermacher, Hase, Herder, Gfrörer), vision, whether then entirely
subjective (Strauss, Lang, Holsten, Hausrath, Renan), or as objective,
effected by God (Keim, Schweizer, Schenkel) have to the present day
proved vain, Steude, Stud. u. Krit. 1887 S. 203-294. Nösgen, Neut.
Offenbarung I 637 f. Loofs, Die Auferstehungsberichte und ihr Wert,
Christl. Welt 33, Leipzig Mohr 1898. After the resurrection Christ remained
for some time longer on earth, both in order by various appearances to
convince his disciples of the truth of his resurrection, and also to prepare
them for their office and to furnish them the proof that he, although he
would no longer open the former intercourse with them, because after the
resurrection he no longer belonged to the earth but to heaven, John 20:17,
would nevertheless remain unchangeably the same in love toward them,
13:1, and would be with them eternally until the consummation of the
world, Matthew 28:20. The appearances took place the first eight days at
Jerusalem, John 20:26, where the disciples still had to remain for the
Passover feast, and ended with this, that Jesus gave his disciples the H.
Spirit and granted the apostolic authority, John 20:22, 23. Later followed his
appearances in Galilee, whither the disciples returned and where most
followers of Jesus lived, Joh. 21, Matthew 28:16, 1 Corinthians 15:6. Matthew and John
conclude their gospel with these appearances of Jesus in Galilee and do not
mention the ascension. According to Luke 24:49, Hd. 1:4 the disciples had
to remain in Jerusalem until they were clothed with power from on high;
Luk. 24 speaks of no appearances in Galilee, Hd. 1:3 presupposes them.
Certainly Jesus at one of the appearances in Galilee also again commanded
his disciples to go to Jerusalem and there to await the promise of the Father.
When he then in Jerusalem again appears to them for the last time, he says
that they must remain in Jerusalem until that promise is fulfilled. Then he
leads them out as far as Bethany, Luke 24:50, to the Mount of Olives, Hd.
1:12. And there he parted from them, διεστη, and was taken up from them
into heaven, ἀ νεφερετο ε ἰ ς τον ο ὐ ρανον, wrongly omitted by Tischendorf
Though not mentioned by Joh. Mt. and Mk., whose gospel according to
many ends with 16:8, the ascension nevertheless stands firm on the basis of
many clear testimonies of Scripture. John presupposes it, 6:62, 14:2, 20:17,
Paul points to it, Romans 10:6, Ef. 2:6, 4:9, 10, Colossians 3:1 and mentions it in 1
Tim. 3:16. Peter makes mention of it, 1 Petr. 3:22, cf. Hd. 2:33, 3:21,
7:56; the epistle to the Hebrews knows it, 6:20, 9:24. Furthermore, it lies at
the foundation of the N. T. doctrine of Jesus’ session at the right hand of
12:2, 1 Petr. 3:21, of his intercession in heaven, Romans 8:34, Hebr. 7:25,
9:24-28, 1 John 1:1, 2, of all the activities that he performs from heaven on
earth, chiefly, in his congregation, and of the expectation of his return, Matthew 24:3 etc.
This exaltation has, in the first place, the greatest significance for Christ
himself. Formerly, in dogmatics, the question was usually also discussed
whether Christ, by his perfect obedience, had also merited something for
himself. Anselm said that Christ had indeed merited a reward for his nonobligatory death but had transferred it to his own, Cur Deus homo II 19.
Most scholastics, Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 18. Thomas, S. Theol. III qu. 19
art. 3 qu. 48 art. 1 qu. 49 art. 6. Bonaventura, Brevil. IV c. 7; furthermore
most Roman Catholics, Bellarminus, de Christo V c. 9. 10, Becanus, Theol.
schol. III tr. 1 c. 14 qu. 5. Id., Manuale Controv. III 2 qu. 4; and very many
Reformed theologians, Zanchius, Op. VI 121, VIII 477, 502. Piscator on
Philippians 2:9. Gomarus on Phil. 2, Op. I 530 sq., Cloppenburg, Op. I 305. 888,
Rivetus, Op. II 836. Voetius, Disp. II 265-267. Mastricht, Theol. V 14, 7.
Heidegger, Corp. Theol. XVIII 39. Moor III 600 e. a., gave an affirmative
answer to the above-mentioned question, and then judged that the hearing
of prayer, John 11:42, Hebr. 5:7 and especially the whole state of exaltation,
the resurrection, ascension, session at the right hand of God and return for
judgment, had to be regarded as reward for his merits, Jes. 53:11, Luk.
Christ merited nothing for himself but everything for us, John 17:19, 1 Corinthians 1:30, 1 Timothy 1:15 etc., and that therefore the exaltation was indeed a
consequence but not a reward for his humiliation, Calvijn, Inst. II 17, 6.
Comm. on Philippians 2:9. Polanus, Syst. VI 26. Junius, Theses theol. 29, 11.
Chamier, Panstr. Cath. II 7, 8, Maresius, Syst. Theol. 45. Kantt. Stat. V. at
Philippians 2:9 etc., and likewise the Lutheran theologians, Gerhard Loc. IV 329.
Quenstedt, Theol. III 324. Buddeus, Inst. p. 787. Hollaz, Examen p.
748 etc. With Scripture in hand, however, the above question can be
answered only affirmatively. For it repeatedly presents the state of
humiliation as the way and the means for Christ to obtain the state of
exaltation, Jes. 53:10-12, Matthew 23:12, Luke 24:26, John 10:17. The διο in Philippians 2:9 indicates not merely the ordo and consequentia but specifically the
causa meritoria; because Christ humbled himself so deeply, vv. 5-8,
therefore God also exalted him so exceedingly. The Epistle to the Hebrews
in particular repeatedly lays strong emphasis on this meritorious connection
12:2; Christ himself has been sanctified through suffering, i.e. not dedicated
to God or made morally perfect, but completed, brought to full growth and
maturity, become τελειος, consisting in this, that he is now crowned with
honor and glory, 2:9, and has become an ἀ ρχηγος, a cause of eternal
salvation, 2:10, 5:9. The reason why many had objections to speaking of a
merit of Christ for himself lay in the opposition to the Socinians, who let
Christ attain the rank of divinity only in the state of exaltation. But even if
this representation is also incorrect, Scripture clearly says that the exaltation
has also been of great significance for Christ and stands in a meritorious
connection with his state of humiliation. Reformed theology has precisely
the advantage that it can do much better justice to this doctrine of Scripture
than the Lutheran. For, on the Lutheran standpoint, there remains no place
open for a merit of Christ for himself and even for a state of exaltation. The
Logos, after all, in the first moment of the incarnation, by assuming the
human nature, made it capable of the indwelling of the fullness of the
Godhead and of the communication of the divine attributes. Even if the
God-man, in a second moment, again laid aside these attributes, with
respect to the use or at least to the public use, he nevertheless retained them,
above p. 245. And the state of exaltation can therefore, among the
Lutherans, be nothing other than a taking up again into use or into public
use of the divine attributes laid aside in that sense. Christ therefore received
in his exaltation nothing that he did not already have; non data est [413]
Christo in exaltatione nova potentia, virtus aut majestas, quam antea non
habuit, sed collata ei tantum fuit plena facultas administrandi ejus regni,
quod per ipsam unionem acceperat, Quenstedt III 368, cf. Gerhard Loc. IV
kirchl. Christol. 93-114. According to the Lutherans, this resumption of the
use of the divine attributes took place in the moment of the reviviscentia or
vivificatio, and this is thus actually the first step of the exaltation. Indeed,
by Gerhard, Quenstedt e. a., the descensus ad inferos is called the first step;
but because this descensus has taken place specifically according to the
human nature of Christ, according to soul and body both, the vivificatio
must precede it; and Buddeus, Inst. p. 789 and others, cf. Vitringa V 573,
therefore rightly give it the first place in the state of exaltation. Concerning
this vivificatio the Lutherans further teach that it took place not only
through Christ’s divine but also through his human nature; this indeed did
not have the power for that of itself, but it nevertheless possessed from the
moment of the incarnation the divine attributes, specifically also the vis
vivificans; and thus anima Christi, virtute divinitatis personaliter sibi
communicata, corpus utpote proprium suum templum vivificavit, Quenstedt
III 435. Furthermore, Christ, according to his human nature, in that same
moment of vivification again took into use all those divine attributes which
it had received in the incarnation but in the exinanitio, at least as far as the
use or the public use is concerned, had laid aside; i.e. it had at that same
moment again the use of the omniscientia, omnipotentia, omnipraesentia
and vis vivificans, Quenstedt III 154-198. From that it follows that the
gradus exaltationis among the Lutherans actually cannot be different,
successive steps in the exaltation. In the moment of vivification the human
nature of Christ was immediately, through its union with the Logos,
almighty, all-knowing, omnipresent. The descensus ad inferos, which is
reckoned by the Lutherans to the exaltation, is a manifestation of Christ’s
majestas divina in hell; the resurrectio is only a resurrectionis manifestatio
for men, Buddeus p. 789; both therefore also took place clauso sepulcro,
just as the appearance of Jesus to the disciples, John 20:19, took place
occlusis foribus, Quenstedt III [414] 441; the ascension is indeed called a
vera et realis loci mutatio, insofar as Christ visibly before the eyes of his
disciples ascended, but is nevertheless only a visibilis and localis, by no
means an invisibilis absentia corporis Christi in terris, for also according to
his human nature Christ is and remains omnipresent, even if in an invisible
Buddeus, Inst. 796. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV2 1 S. 185, cf. Vitringa V 601.
Moor IV 246; and the sessio ad dextram Dei finally consists in this, that
Christ, specifically according to his human nature, shares in the divina,
infinita ac immensa virtus et majestas Dei, especially also in his
omnipresence, and exercises this in his kingdom of grace and of power,
If one now considers that all these attributes have already been
communicated to the human nature of Christ in the moment of the
incarnation and that he indeed laid aside the use but never the possession of
them; then it appears that according to the Lutheran representation nothing
has been communicated to Christ in the state of exaltation that he did not
already possess from his conception onward. Christ is immediately at his
incarnation that which he can become; he is at once also according to his
human nature completed, τελειος; no development is possible in him; the
exaltation was already there at his conception and therefore cannot be
conceived as a reward. The Lutheran doctrine is on this point akin to the
Roman, which lets Christ already on earth be comprehensor and lets all
gifts for which the human nature is capable be communicated to Christ
already at the incarnation; and it serves in defense of the same religious
interest, namely the bodily presence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper.
Reformed theology, however, had a different view. While it maintains
against the Socinians and also against many more recent theologians, that
Christ did not first become prophet, priest, and king through his resurrection
and was elevated to the rank of divinity. For Scripture testifies repeatedly
that He was in the beginning with God and Himself was God, John 1:1,
was already from eternity anointed by the Father as prophet, priest, and
king and as such was active in the days of the O. T. and during his
therefore received for Himself in the state of exaltation cannot have
consisted in the divine nature or the rank of divinity, nor also in the office of
prophet, priest, and king, which rests on divine election and appointment;
but it consisted in the exaltation itself, in the resurrection, ascension,
session at the right hand of God and return for judgment, in the mediatorial
glory, to which He was exalted according to both natures, Jes. 53:10-12,
According to Romans 1:3 Christ is κατα σαρκα, i.e. in the way of the flesh, by
birth from a woman, Galatians 4:4, become from David; but κατα πνευμα
ἀ γιωσυνης, by virtue of the Spirit of holiness, who dwelt in Him and had
guided Him throughout his whole life, He was, from and through the
resurrection, ordained and appointed by God, ὁ ρισθεις, cf. Hd. 17:31, as
Son of God in power. Birth and resurrection stand here over against each
other. Through birth Christ became the seed of David, Romans 9:5, He
assumed ὁ μοιωμα σαρκος ἁ μαρτιας, Romans 8:3, He became weak, 2 Corinthians 13:4; but through the resurrection He was publicly appointed as Son of
God. That does not mean and cannot mean that He then first received the
divine nature or the rank and the name of God, for the contrary appears
from Romans 1:3, 8:3, 32, Galatians 4:4, etc.; but while at his incarnation He
exchanged the μορφη θεου for the μορφη δουλου, Philippians 2:9, He now at the
resurrection receives back the glory which He previously had with the
Father, John 17:2, He now becomes κυριος της δοξης, 1 Corinthians 2:8, θεου
δυναμις, 1 Corinthians 1:24, He receives a name above every name, i.e. the name
of κυριος, John 20:28, Hd. 2:36, 1 Corinthians 12:3, Philippians 2:9, 10, and therein the
κυριοτης, the right, the competence and the power, to rule as mediator, as
prophet, priest, and king over all creatures, to subject his enemies, to gather
his people and to recover the fallen creation for God, Ps. 2, 72, 110, Mt.
Op. 1:5 etc. In the resurrection God publicly appointed Him as Son of God,
Lord, King, Mediator and said to Him: You are my Son, today I have
generated you, Hd. [416] 2:36, 13:33, 17:31, Hebr. 1:5. Indeed Christ by his
resurrection entered into a new state; as mediator He has been exalted
above all creatures at God’s right hand. In that exaltation, in a certain sense,
his divine nature also shares. Just as not merely the human nature of Christ
but the person of the Son was the subject of the humiliation, so also that
same person according to both natures is the subject of the exaltation. For
He had laid aside his μορφη θεου and had hidden his divine nature behind
the garment of a weak human nature; no one saw in Him or could see in
Him the Only-begotten of the Father, unless with the eye of faith, John 1:14.
But now, in the state of exaltation, his divine glory shines into everyone’s
eyes; whoever now sees Him must confess that Christ is the Lord to the
glory of God the Father. But further, in that exaltation his human nature also
shares. The πνευμα ἁ γιωσυνης already dwelt in Christ before his
resurrection, from his conception onward, for He was conceived of the H.
Spirit, Luke 1:35, was full of the H. Spirit, Luke 4:1, received Him without
10:38. But this glory, which Christ possessed inwardly, could nevertheless
not reveal itself outwardly; He was flesh, and by virtue of the weakness of
the flesh was also put to death on the cross, 2 Corinthians 13:4. But in death He
laid aside that weakness, and He broke all connection with sin and death.
God, who gave his own Son for us in death and therein carried out the
judgment over sin, raised Him from the dead by his Spirit, who as πνευμα
ἁ γιωσυνης dwells in Christ Himself and also in all believers, Romans 8:11, so
that He would now live no longer in weakness of the flesh but in power of
the Spirit. Put to death, therefore, He was indeed in flesh, but He was made
alive in Spirit, 1 Petr. 3:18. For the Spirit of God has dwelt in Christ, even
when He was flesh, as the governing power of his life, as πνευμα
ἀ γωσυνης, so that Christ always allowed Himself to be led by that Spirit
and remained obedient to the Father even unto death; and therefore that
Spirit must now also reveal itself in Christ at the resurrection as πνευμα
ζωης, which completely overcomes death in Christ and also one day in the
believers, Romans 8:11. So far has Christ now been exalted above all [417]
weakness of the flesh, that through the resurrection He has become a
πνευμα ζωοποιουν, 1 Corinthians 15:45; He also after the resurrection still has a
σωμα, He is the same Jesus, Hd. 9:5, Romans 4:24, 8:11, 1 Corinthians 12:3, 2 Corinthians 1:14, 4:5v. He is the second and last Adam, 1 Corinthians 15:45; He has that same
σωμα with which He rose, but it is a σωμα πνευματικον, instead of the
φθορα, ἀ τιμια and ἀ σθενεια, which are proper to the σωμα ψυχικον, the
σαρξ, it partakes of wholly other properties, namely the ἀ ρθαρσια, δοξα,
δυναμις, 1 Corinthians 15:42v., Philippians 3:21. Yes, in 2 Corinthians 3:17 Paul says: ὁ δε κυριος
το πνευμα ἐ στιν; the apostle does not thereby wish to give a description of
the substantial being of Christ; but he comes to this statement because he
wishes to argue that Christians are free from the law. For that freedom finds
its ground in this, that the Lord, i.e. the exalted Christ, is the Spirit, i.e. that
the Spirit of God now dwells in Christ so absolutely and is so most
intimately one with Him, that thereby an end is made to all unfreedom, ὁ υ
δε το πνευμα κυριου, ἐ λευθερια. The expression πνευμα κυριου proves that
Paul at the beginning of the verse is not thinking of an identification of
Christ and the H. Spirit; the H. Spirit is the Spirit of Christ, because He
dwells in Christ Himself and because Christ communicates Himself to his
own through Him, vs. 18. And thus Christ is now the one in whom παν το
πληρωμα της θεοτητος σωματικως dwells, Colossians 2:9, cf. 1:19. He is the
visible ε ἰ κων του ἀ ορατου θεου, Colossians 1:19. Divine glory becomes manifest
in his human nature and shines forth from his face, 2 Corinthians 3:18, 4:4, 6.
23. But just as in the state of humiliation, so Christ is all that He has
become in the state of exaltation, for the good of His church. What He
received for Himself and for His own as a reward for His labor is not to be
separated. He is παντα και ἐ ν πασιν, Colossians 3:11. The pleroma, which dwells
in Christ, must also dwell in the church; it is filled ε ἰ ς παν το πληρωμα του
θεου, Ef. 3:19, Colossians 2:2, 10. God is He who fills Christ, Colossians 1:19, Christ is
He who fills the church, Ef. 1:23. The church is therefore His pleroma,
which, what He perfectly and from Himself (πληρουμενος), gradually, Ef.
4:10, fills with Himself, and which therefore little by little becomes
full and filled and thus in its turn fills Christ, Ef. 1:23; the completum
becomes a complementum. For the church is not there without Christ, but
Christ is also not there without the church; He is her κεφαλη ὑ περ παντα,
Ef. 1:22, Colossians 1:18, and she is His σωμα, which is formed out of Him and
obtains its growth, Ef. 4:16, Colossians 2:19 and thus grows up ε ἰ ς μετρον ἡ λικιας
του πληρωματος του Χριστου, Ef. 4:13. The union between Christ and the
church is as close as between vine and branches, bridegroom and bride,
man and wife, cornerstone and building. She can with Him be called the
one Christ, 1 Corinthians 12:12. In order to perfect her, He has been exalted at the
Father's right hand and continues His prophetic, priestly, and kingly activity
in heaven.
Just as in the days of the O. T. and of his walk on earth, Christ is also now
still the only prophet and teacher of his church. There is no other master,
Matthew 23:8, 10; there is, alongside, above, or in the place of Christ for the
church, no need of any soothsaying, any oracle, any enthusiasm, any
spiritism, any infallible papacy. For Christ is the wisdom, all the treasures
of wisdom and of knowledge are hidden in Him, 1 Corinthians 1:24, 30, Colossians 2:3;
and it is Christ himself, who by his Word and Spirit instructs his church, in
order that they all, taught of God, would be prophets and would proclaim
the great deeds of God, Numbers 11:29, Jeremiah 31:33, 34, Matthew 11:25-27, John 6:45.
Hebrews 8:10, 11, 1 John 2:20. And thus He also remains, in the state of
exaltation, still active as priest. After He on Golgotha has accomplished his
offering, He, as high priest, not with the blood of goats and calves but with
his own blood, Hebr. 9:12-14, through the tabernacle of his body, 9:11 and
through the veil of his flesh, 10:20, entered into the heavenly sanctuary,
which in the holy of holies on Zion had its pattern, 6:20, 9:12, 24, in order
there to make intercession for his own and to appear before God’s face,
7:25, 9:24. The Socinians tried to infer from this, that Christ was not yet in
the proper sense priest on earth, that his offering on the cross was not the
true sacrifice but only its introduction and preparation; just as under the O.
Test. the act of atonement did not consist in the slaughtering of the
sacrificial animal but in the sprinkling of the blood on the altar or on
the mercy seat, Leviticus 16:11-16, so Christ brings the atonement to completion
not on earth but in heaven, cf. Socinus de J. Christo Servatore, Bibl. Fr. Pol.
II 164. Volkelius, de verit. relig. III 37. Fock, Der Socin. 635. 646 f., and
now still W. Milligan, The ascension and heavenly priesthood of our Lord,
London 1892, Doedes, Jaarb. v. Wet Theol. 1846 bl. 293v. 313 f. Seeberg,
Der Tod Christi in s. Bedeutung für die Erlösung 1895 S. 14. 16 f. etc. This
has rightly been contested by others, for in the O. T. sacrifice the different
atoning acts are indeed temporally separated but they nevertheless form one
whole; it is the blood of a slaughtered animal, which by its pouring out and
sprinkling restored the offerer to God’s favor and delivered him from sin
and its punishment. In the epistle to the Hebr. therefore, just as in the whole
N. T., the atoning power is also ascribed to the offering once brought by
thereby all benefits, forgiveness, cleansing, sanctification, perfection have
been acquired. Because Christ has now once sacrificed himself on the cross
and has died, He cannot even do it for the second time, for every human
being dies only once, his offering in death is not susceptible of repetition,
9:26-28. The entering of Christ with his blood into the heavenly sanctuary
therefore cannot, in the opinion of the epistle to the Hebrews, be conceived
as an offering. It is indeed said once, in 9:7, that the high priest offered the
blood with which he entered into the most holy place, προσφερει, for
himself and for the people’s transgressions; but this offering of the blood is
then nevertheless essentially distinguished from that which took place
outside, in the court; and thus also only the bringing of the blood is so
called in the O. Test. But of Christ’s entering with his blood into heaven it is
nowhere said that it is an offering; it is not that and it cannot be; by the one
offering He has accomplished everything, 9:26-28, 10:12, 14. The entering
of Christ with his blood into the inner sanctuary therefore has only the
purpose, to cause the salvation acquired by his death to count for our
benefit before God’s face. Precisely because by the shedding of blood, i.e.
by the offering on the cross, the atonement has been accomplished, Christ
as high priest can enter into heaven with his blood and appear before [420]
God’s face, 9:12-14, 26. His priestly activity in heaven therefore also
consists not in any offering, but in his intercession and appearance before
God’s face for the benefit of his people, 7:25, 9:24, cf. Romans 8:34, 1 John 2:2. Yet there lies truth in the representation derived by Thalhofer,
Handbuch der kath. Liturgik I2 1894 S. 223-236 from Hebr. 8:1-4, that
Christ, although having accomplished everything with one offering,
nevertheless in heaven continues that offering in a heavenly manner and
continually renews his act of obedience on Golgotha at the right hand of the
Father. For the offering of Christ, once done on the cross, lives on not
merely in the memory, but in the disposition from which it proceeded.
There is in heaven no repetition, no renewal, no reproduction of the offering
on the cross; but that offering, once accomplished, continues to work in the
appearance before God’s face and in the intercession for us, 7:25, 9:24.
Therefore it can on the one hand be said, that Christ by one offering has
perfected all, 10:24, and on the other hand, that He will make completely
blessed all who through Him go to God, inasmuch as He always lives, to
pray for them, 7:25. Cf. Cloppenburg, Op. II 889-902. Nic. Arnoldus,
Religio Socin. Fran. 1654 p. 678-706. de Witte, Wederl. der Soc. dwal. II
152v. Mastricht, Theol. V 7, 15 sq. Maccovius, Coll. theol. I 240 sq. Jaarb.
v. Wet. Theol. IV 18v. Weiss, Bibl. Theol. d. N. T. § 121. Scheeben, Dogm.
III 443 f. Martin, Atonement 115. Therefore also, because Christ was and is
priest and remains so eternally, the church on earth has no priest any longer
needed; all believers are priests, Romans 12:1, 1 Petr. 2:5, Op. 1:6. No offering
for sin needs any longer to be brought, also no unbloody one in the mass,
for from the one offering, accomplished on the cross, there proceeds in the
intercession of Christ a continual speaking to God, not for vengeance, as
from the blood of Abel, but for grace and forgiveness, Hebr. 12:24. The
intercession of Christ is no longer a supplication as in the days of his flesh,
Calvin, Inst. III 20, 20, but is the steadfast and gracious will of Christ, John 17:24, on the ground of his offering to lead all his people to the heavenly
blessedness. Thus Christ is our only priest, who according to the order of
Melchizedek remains forever, with his offering continually covers our sins,
always appears with the Father as our Paraclete, over against all
accusations of Satan, world and one’s own heart takes up our cause, makes
our prayers and thanksgivings acceptable to the Father, continually assures
us a bold access to the throne of grace, and causes all blessings of grace out
of his fullness to come to us, Luke 22:32, John 14:16, 17:9v., Romans 1:7,
And so Christ also is and remains our eternal king. Although also anointed
to this office from eternity, He nevertheless, according to His human nature,
first appeared as king at His exaltation. Then He received the name of Lord,
was ordained Son of God, and received all power in heaven and on earth.
Christ is king in the first place over His people, in the regnum gratiae, Ps.
He manifests this kingship in that He gathers, protects, governs, and leads
His church to eternal salvation, Matthew 16:18, 28:20, John 10:28. But because
His kingship bears an entirely different character than that of the princes of
the earth, in the N. T. He is much more called the head of the church, 1 Cor.
but by right and righteousness, by grace and love, by Word and Spirit. Then
in the N. T. He is also described especially as king, when there is mention
of the victory over His enemies. For in order that He may truly gather,
protect, and lead His church to eternal salvation, He must also as mediator
have power over all creatures, Psalms 2:9, 72:8, 110:1-3, Matthew 28:18, 1 Cor.
lie herein that the world is positively governed by Christ, but indeed that it
stands under His power, is subject to Him, and once, even if unwillingly,
will acknowledge and pay homage to Him as Lord. Specifically there also
belongs here His power over the kingdom of Satan. The representation of
many church fathers, that Christ brought His offering to Satan and by
cunning took his spoil from him, is unscriptural. But nevertheless Christ by
His cross has also achieved the triumph over the world of the fallen spirits.
He came to earth, to break the works of the devil, 1 John [422] 3:8, and
fought against him His whole life, Luke 4:13, especially in the last time,
when it was the hour and the power of darkness, Luke 22:53. He was the
stronger, Luke 11:22, and the devil had nothing in Him, John 14:30. He
already saw him fall like lightning from heaven and took from him his
armor, Luke 10:18, 11:22. Especially by the cross He triumphed over the
principalities and powers, Colossians 2:15, took from him the weapons of sin,
cast him outside the domain of his kingdom, John 12:31. And His triumph
He celebrated over the evil spirits specifically in the resurrection. In 1 Petr.
3:19-22 this is clearly taught. There is there no mention of a descent of
Christ into hell, in order to proclaim the gospel to the lost. For it says that
Christ was first made alive i.e. had risen and then went to preach. All
ground is lacking to make, with the Lutherans, a temporal distinction
between the vivificatio and the resurrectio and then in that intervening time
to place the descent into hell. Nor is there anywhere in Scripture any
indication that Christ after His resurrection, before He ascended into
heaven, first still went to hell. On the other hand, the exegesis is also
untenable, that Christ in the Spirit went to the contemporaries of Noah and
preached to them; ἐ ν ᾡ clearly refers to the Christ made alive; πορευθεις,
cf. v. 22 allows no other interpretation; the preaching of Christ in the Spirit
to Noah’s contemporaries many centuries before is here irrelevant. The
pericope therefore contains something quite different. Peter exhorts the
believers to suffer while doing good and therein to follow Christ. For He
suffered while doing good, because He suffered for sins, as a righteous one
for the unrighteous, and indeed with this purpose, that He would bring us,
the unrighteous, to God. That is suffering while doing good! And now
Christ was indeed killed in the flesh, but He was made alive and rose in
Spirit, i.e. because the πνευμα ἁ γιωσυνης was the principle of His whole
life, as Spirit. And as such, as made alive, risen Spirit, as Lord and King,
going, πορευθεις, i.e. not to hell, but according to v. 22 going to heaven, He
preached to the spirits in prison. That is: His going to heaven as risen Lord,
Acts 2:36, was a κηρυγμα to the spirits in the prison. What the
content of that κηρυγμα was, is not said and need not be said. The rising
and ascending into heaven was itself the rich, mighty, triumphant κηρυγμα
of Christ to the spirits in prison. That Peter now specifically has Christ
bring that κηρυγμα by His ascension to those spirits in prison, who in
Noah’s days, in spite of God’s longsuffering and notwithstanding that they
saw the building of the ark, were disobedient, has a double reason. First,
those contemporaries of Noah in Scripture have always been the most
godless of all men; and second, they perished and Noah with his own were
saved by one and the same water. Likewise the water of baptism, by the
resurrection of Christ, is the destruction for the godless and the salvation for
the believers. For Christ who has risen and instituted that baptism and
imparts power to it, sits at God’s right hand, after by the ascension all
angels and forces and powers have been made subject to Him. Christ
suffered while doing good and overcame; let the believers press His
footsteps! And just as over all fallen spirits, so Christ as mediator also has
power in His regnum potentiae over all His enemies. And He will not rest,
before they all have been laid under His feet.
When Christ at the end of days will have overcome his church and all his
enemies, then he will deliver the βασιλεια, the kingship, the royal office, to
the Father. His mediatorial work is then completed. The work which the
Father assigned to him is perfectly accomplished. God himself is then king
eternally and always. Concerning the nature of this subjection of Christ to
the Father, a difference already arose early. Marcellus of Ancyra wrote a
treatise on the subjection of the Lord Christ, and was accused of the
doctrine that the kingdom of Christ and also the union of the human nature
with the Logos would come to an end, Schwane, D. G. II 136. 148.
Marcellus was opposed by Eusebius and later by Basilius; the Nicaeno-
Constantinopolitanum added to the confession that Christ would return to
judge the living and the dead, the words: ο ὗ της βασιλειας ο ὐ κ ἐ σται τελος,
cujus regni non erit finis, Hahn, Bibl. d. Symbole u. s. w. 164-166, cf.
Petavius, de incarn. XII 18. Pesch, Prael. IV 84. Later the Socinians taught
that Christ, whom the Father had temporarily appointed as
stadtholder, would one day step down, just as a field commander, after
having achieved the victory, gives back his power and dominion to the
prince, and from that they inferred that the Son of God, because he would
one day be subjected to the Father, could not be the highest God, cf. against
that Petavius, de trin. III 5. Bisterfeldius, de uno Deo, Patre, Filio ac Spiritu
So I 2, 26. Vitringa V 443-446. Among the Reformed there was also
difference; some said that the kingship of Christ was oeconomic and
Theol. probl. nova XII 36. Pareus on 1 Cor. 15, Kuyper, Enc. II 321; others
were of the opinion that there indeed comes a change in the manner of
governing but that his kingship is nevertheless eternal, Mastricht, V 8, 9.
Moor III 1129. Vitringa V 443. The difference is easily resolved in this
sense, that the mediatorship of reconciliation, and thus insofar also the
prophetic, priestly, and kingly office of Christ, comes to an end; God will be
king and all in all; but what remains is the mediatorship of union, Christ
remains prophet, priest, and king, as this, with the human nature, is of itself
given, enclosed in the image of God, and in the highest and richest manner
realized in Christ as Image of God. Christ is and remains the head of the
church, from whom all life and salvation eternally flow to her. Whoever
would want to deny this, would also have to come to the doctrine that the
Son would one day lay aside and destroy his human nature; and for that all
ground is lacking in Scripture.