LEX, REX, A DISPUTE FOR CONTAINING AND OF THEIR OF ENGLAND; ENTITULED, SACRO-SANCTA REGUM MA JEST AS," THE SACRED AND ROYAL PREROGATIVE OF CHRISTIAN KINGS; UNDER THE NAME OF J. A., BUT PENNED BT IN FORTY-FOUR QUESTIONS. • ' BY THE ** But if yon shall still do wickedly, ye shall be consumed, both ye and your king." — I Sam. xii. 25. EDINBURGH: ROBERT OGLE AND OLIVER & BOYD. M. OGLE & SON AND WILLIAM COLLINS, GLASGOW. HAMILTON, ADAMS & CO., AND JAMES NISBET & CO., LONDON. MDCCCXLIIL [London: Printed for John Field, and are to be sold at his house upon Addle-hill,

EDINBURGH;

PREFACE.

In issuing a new edition of Lex^ Bex^ it has been considered advisable to print along with it Buchanan's De Jure Hegni aptid Scotos. This work, on its first appearance, gave great oifence to ihe government of the time, as containing principles which were opposed to the established monarchy; and was consequently condemned by the parliament of ifi, 1^4. In 1664 there was a proclamation issued against any translation of it being in the possession of any person. " This proclamation," says Wodrow, " is every way singular; for any thing Ihat appears, this translation of that known piece of the celebrated Buchanan was not printed, but only, it seems, handed about in manuscript; while, in the meantime, thousands of copies of it in the Latin original were in everybody's hands. It had been more just to have ordered an answer to have been formed to the solid arguments in that dialogue against tyranny and arbitrary government." Again, in 1688, another proclamation was published by the Council, prohibiting every person from selling, dispersing, or* lending such books as Buchanan's " De Jure Regni apud Scotos" " Lex, J^eaj," " Jtis Populi Naphtali" along with some others which were considered as having a treasonable tendency. The same principles are advocated in Lex, Hex, that are held by Buchanan: both works are equally opposed to that absolute and passive obedience • required from the subject to a royal prerogative. A modem writer* well remarks, " That resistance to lawful authority — even when that authority so called has, in point of fact, set at nought all law — is in no instance to be vindicated, will be held by those only who are the devotees of arbitrary power and passive obedience. The principles of Mr Kutherford's Lex, ReXy however obnoxious they may be to such men, are substantially the principles on which all government is founded, and without which the civil magistrate would become a curse rather than a blessing to a country. They are the very principles which lie at the basis of the British constitution, and by whose tenure the house of Brunswick does at this very moment hold possession of the throne of these realms."

* Rev. Robert Bums, D.D., in his Preliminary Dissertation to Wodrow's Chureli History.

CONTENTS.

Sketch of the Life ot Rutherford, Author's Preface,

Page

zxi.

QUESTION I. "Whether government be by a divine law, ..... 1

How government is from God. — Civil power, in the root, immediately from God.

QUESTION II. Whether or no government be warranted by the law of nature, ... 1

Civil society natural in radic€, in the root, voluntary in modOj in the manner. — Power of government, and power of government by such and such magistrates, different. — Civil subjection not formally from nature's laws. — Our consent to laws penal, not antecedently natural. — Government by such rulers, a secondary law of nature. — Family government and politic different. — Government by rulers a secondary law of nature; family government and civU different. — Civil government, by consequent, natural.

QUESTION III. Whether royal power and definite forms of government be from God, . . 3

That kings are from God, understood in a fourfold sense. — The royal power hath warrant from divine institution. — The three forms of government not different in specie and nature. — How every form is from God. — How government is an ordinance of man, 1 Pet. ii. 13.

QUESTION IV.

Whether or no the king be only and immediately from Grod, and not from the people, 6

How the king is from God, how from the people. — Royal power three ways in the people. — How royal power is radically in the people. — The people maketh the king. — How any form of government is from God. — How government is a human ordinance, 1 Pet. ii. 3. — The people create the king. — Mf^ng a king, and choosing a king, not to be distinguished. — David not a king formally, because anointed by God.

QUESTION V.

Whether or no the P. Prelate proveth that sovereignty is immediately from God, not from, the people, .....••

Kings made by the people, though the office, in abatraetOf were immediately from God. — The people ^^ have a r^ action, more than approbation, in making a king. — Ringing of a person ascribed to the people. — Kings in a special manner are from God, but it tbllowcth not; therefore, not from the people.^ — The place, Prov. viii. 15, proveth not but kings are made by the people. — Nebuchadnezzar, and other heathen kings, had no just title before God to the kingdom of Judah, and divers other sabdued kingdoms.

CONTENTS.

Page

QUESTION IX.

Whether or no sovereignty is so in and from the people, that they may resmne their power in time of extreme necessity, . * . . .

How the people is the subject of sovereignty. — No tyrannical power is from God. — People cannot alienate the natural power of selfnlefence. — The power of parliaments. — The Parliament hath more power than the king. — Judges and kings differ. — People may resume their power, not because they are infallible, but because they cannot so readily destroy themselves as one man may do. — That the sanhedrim punished not David, Bathsheba, Joab, is but a fact, not a law^ — There is a subordination of creatures natural, government must be natural; and yet this or that form is voluntary.

QUESTION VI.

Whether or no the king be so allenarly from both, in regard of sovereignty and designation of his person, as he is noway from the people, but only by mere approbation, ...•■.,.

The forms of government not from God by an act of naked providence, but by his approving will. — Sovereignty not from the people by sole approbation. — Though Gk)d have peculiar acts of providence in creating kings, it followeth not hence that the people maketh not kings. — The P. Prelate exponeth prophecies true only of David, Solomon, and Jesus Christ, as true of pro&ne heathen kings. — The P. Prelate maketh all the heathen kings to be princes, anointed idth the holy oil of saving grace.

QUESTION VII.

Whether the P. Prelate conclude that neither constitution nor designation of kings is from the people, ........

The excellency of kings maketh them not of God*s only constitution and designation. — How sovereignty is in the people, how not. — ^A community doth not surrender their right and liberty to their rulers, so much as their power active to do, and passive to suffer, violence.— God's loosing of the bonds of kings, by the mediation of the people's despising him, proveth against the P. Prelate that the Lord taketh away, and giveth royal majesty mediately, not immediately. — The subordination of people to kings and rulers, both natural and voluntary; the subordination of beasts and creatures to man merely natural. — The place, Gen. ix. 5, " He that sheddeth man's blood," &o. discussed.

QUESTION VIII.

Whether or no the P. Prelate proveth, by force of reason, that the people cannot be

capable of any power of government, .... ^ 28

In any community there is an active and passive power to government. — Popular government is not that wherein the whole people are governors. — People by nature are equally indifferent to all the three governments, and are not under any one by nature. — The P. Prelate denieth the Pope his father to be the antichrist. — The bad success of kings chosen by people proveth nothing against us, because kings chosen by God had bad success through their own wickedness. — The P. Prelate condemneth king Charles' ratifying (Pari. 2, an. 1641) the whole proceedings of Scotland in this present reformation. — That there be any supreme judges is an eminent act of divine providence, which hindereth not but that the king is made by the people. — The people not patients in making a king, as is water in the sacrament of baptism, in the act of production of grace.

QUESTION X.

Whether or not royal birth be equivalent to divine unction,

Impunged by eight arguments. — Royalty not transmitted from father to son. — ^A family may be chosen to a crown as a single person is chosen, but the tie is conditional in both. — The throne, by special promise, made to David and his seed, by Gk>d, (Psal. Izxxix.,) no ground to make birth, in foro Dei, a just title to the crown. — ^A title by conquest to a throne must be unlawful, if birth be God's lawful title. — Royalists who hold conquest to be a just title to the crown, teach manifest treason against king Charles and his royal heirs. — Only, b<mafortunm, not honour or royalty, pro-

CONTENTS.

Page perly transmitable from father to son. — Violent cooqaest cannot regulate the consciences of people to submit to a conqueror as their lairfnl king. — Naked birth is inferior to that yery diyine unction, that made no man a king without the people's election. — If a kingdom were by birth the king might sell it. — The crown is the patrimony of the kingdom, not of him who is king, or of his father. — Birth a typical designment to the crown in Israel. — The choice of a family to the crown, resoWeth upon the nree election of the people aa on the fonntaln cause. — ^Eketion of a laonily to the crown lawful.

QUESTION XI.

Whether or no he be more principally a king who is a king by birth, or he who is a

The elective king cometh nearer to the first king. (Deut. xtU.) — If the people may limit the king, they give him the power. — A community have not power formally to punish themselves. — The hereditary and the electiye prince In divers considerations, better or worse, each one than another.

QUESTION XII. Whether or no a kingdom may lawfully be purchased by the sole title of conquest, 48

A Twofold right of conquest. — Conquest turned in an after-consent of the people, becometh a just title. — Conquest not a signification to us of God's approving will. — Mere violent domineering contrary to the acts of governing. — Violence hath nothing in it of a king. — A bloody conqueror not a blessing, joer se, as a king is. — Strength as prevailing is not law or reason. — Fathers cannot dispose of the liberty of posterity not born. — A father, as a father, hath not power of life and death. Israel and David's conquests of the Canaanites, Edomites, Ammonites not lawful, because conqaest, but upon a divine title of God's promise.

QUESTION XIII.

Whether or no royal dignity have its spring from nature, and how it is true " Every

man is bom free," and how servitude is contrary to nature, . . 50

Seven sorts of superiority and inferiority. — Power of life and death from a positive law. — A dominion antecedent and consequent. — Kings and subjects no natural order. — A man is born, consequenter, in politic relation. — Slavery not natural from four reasons. — Every man bom free in regard of civil subjection Cnot in regard of natural, such as of children and wife, to parents and husband) proved by seven arguments. — Politic government how necessary, how natural. — That parents should enslave their children not natural.

QUESTION XIV.

Whether or no the people make a person their king conditionally or absolutely; and whether the king be tyed by any such covenant,- ....

The king under a natural, but no civil obligation to the people, as royalists teach. — The covenant civilly tyeth the king proved by Scriptures and reasons, by eight arguments. — If the condition, without which one of the parties would never have entered into covenant, be not performed, that party is loosed from the covenant. — The people and princes are obUged in their places for justice and religion, no less than the king. — In so far as the king pressetb a false religion on the people, eotCMiu, in so far they are understood not to have a king. — The covenant giveth a mutual coiactive power to king and people to compel each other, though there be not one on earth higher than both to compel each of them. — The covenant bindeth the king as king, not as he is a man only.-^ One or two tyrannous acts deprive not the king of his royal right — Though there were no positive written covenant (which yet we grant not) yet there is a natural, tacit, implicit covenant tying the king, by the nature of his office. — If the king be made king absolutely, it is contrary to Scripture and the nature of his office. — The people given to the king as a pledge, not as if they became his own to dispose of at his absolute will. — The king could not buy, sell, borrow, if no covenant should tie him to men. — The covenant sworn by Judah (2 Chron. xv.) t^^ed the king.

QUESTION XV.

Whether the king be univocally, or only analogically and by proportion, a father,

Adam not king of the whole earth because a father. — The king a father metaphorically and impro> perly, proved by eight arguments.

QUESTION XVI.

Page Whether or no a despotical or masterly dominion agree to the king, because he is king, 64

The king hath no masterly dominion over the subjects as if they were his servants, proved by four arguments. — The king not over men as reasonable creatures to domineer. — The king cannot give avay his kingdom or his people as if they were his proper goods.— rA violent surrender of liberty tyeth not. — ^A surrender of ignorance is in so far involantarily as it oblige not. — The goods of the subjects not the king's, proved by eight arguments. — All the goods of the subjects are the king's in a fourfold sense.

QUESTION XVII.

Whether or no the prince have properly the fiduciary or ministerial power of a tutor,

husband, patron, minister, nead, master of a family, not of a lora or dominator, 69

The king a tutor rather than a father as these are distinguished. — ^A free community not properly and in all respects a minor and pupil. — The king's power not properly marital and husbandly. — The king a patron and servant. — The royal power only from God, imfMdiatione nmplieU eontti- UttiontBf et tolum soUtudine catuoB primoB, but not immediatione appUcationu dignitatis ad penO' nam. — The king the servant of the people both objectively and subjectively. — The Lord and the people by one and the same act according to the physical relation maketh the king. — The king head of the people metaphorically only, not essentially, not univocally, by six arguments. — His power fiduciary only.

QUESTION XVIII.

What is the law or manner of the king (1 Sam. viii. 9, 11) discussed fully,

The power and the office

the king, by the harmony

out (1 Sam. viii.) not necessarily a remedy of tyranny, nor a praying with faith and patience. — Resisting of kings that are tyrannous, and patience, not inconsistent. — The law of the king not a permissive law, as was the law of divorcement. — The law of the king (1 Sam. xil. 23, 24) not a law of tyranny.

QUESTION XIX.

Whether or no the king be in dignity and power above the people, . . 77

In what consideration the king is above the people, and the people above the king. — A mean, as a mean, inferior to the end, how it is true- — The king inferior to the people. — The church, because the church, is of more excellency than the king, because king. — The people being those to whom the king is given, worthier than the gift. — And the people immortal, the king mortal. — The king a mean only,not both the efficient, or author of the kingdom, and a mean; two necessary distinctions of a mean. — If sin had never been, there should have been no king. — The king is to give his life for his people. — The consistent cause more excellent than the effect — The people than the king. — Impossible people can limit royal power, but they must give royal power also. — The people have an action in making a king, proved by four arguments. — Though it were granted that God immediately made kings, yet it is no consequent, God only, and not the people, can unmake him. — The people appointing a king over themselves, retain the fountain-power of making a king. — The mean inferior to the end, and the king, as a king, is a mean. — The king, as a mean, and also as a man, inferior to the people. — To swear non-self-preservation, and to swear self-murder, all one. — The people cannot make away their power, 1. Their whole power, nor 2. Irrevocably to the king. — The people may resume the power they give to the commissioners of parliament, when it is abused. — The tables in Scotland lawful, when the ordinary judicatures are corrupt. — Qaod eficit tale id ipntm magia tale discussed, the fountain-power in the people derived only in the king. — The king is a fiduciary, a life-renter, not a lord or heritor. — How sovereignty is in the people. — Power of life and death, how in a community. — A community void of rulers, is yet, and may be a politic body. — Judges gods analogically.

QUESTION XX.

Whether inferior judges be essentially the immediate vicegerents of Grod, as kings, not

differing in essence and nature trom kings, .... 88

Inferior judges the immediate vicars of God, no less than the king. — The consciences of inferior judges, immediately subordinate to God, not to the king, either mediately or immediately. — How

CONTBNTS. IX

Pa0B the inferior judge is the deputy of the king. — ^He may pnt to death murderers, as having GkKi's sword committed to him, no less than the king, eyen though the king command the contrary; for he is not to execute judgment, and to relieve the oppressed conditionally, if a mortal king give him leave; but whether the king will or no, he is to obey the King of kings. — Inferior judges are ministri rtgni^ non fwinUtri regis, — The king doth not make judges as he is a man, by an act of private good-will; but as he is. a king by an act of royal justice, and by a power that he hath ftx>m the people, who made himself a supreme judge. — The king's making inferior judges hindereth not, but they are as essentially judges as the Ung who maketh them, not by fountain-power, but power borrowed fh>m the people. — The judges in Israel and the kings diifer not essentially. Aristocracy as natural as monarchy, and as warrantable* — Inferior judges depend some way on the king injleri, but not in faeto e$M. — The parliament not judges by derivation from the king. — The king cannot make or unmake judges* — ^No heritable judges. — Inferior judges more necessary than aUng.

QUESTION XXI.

What power the people and states of parliament hath over the king and in the state, 96

The elders appointed by God to be judges* — Parliaments may convene and judge without the king. — ^Parliaments are essentially judges, and so their consciences neither dependeth on the king, quoad vpeeifieaition&my that is, that they should give out this sentence, not that, nee quoad exerd' tiuMf that they, should not in the morning execute judgment. — Unjust judging, and no judging at all, are sins in the states. — The parliament co-ordinate judges with the king, not advisers only; by eleven arguments. — Inferior judges not the king's messengers or legates, but public governors. — The Jews' monarchy mixed. — ^A power executive of laws more in the king, a power legislative more in the parliament.

QUESTION XXII.

Whether the power of the king, as king, be absolute, or dependent and limited by

God's first mould and pattern of a king, ..... 99

The royalists make the king as absolute as the great Turk. — The king not absolute in his power, proved by nine arguments. — ^Why the king is a living law. — Power to do ill not from God. — Royalists say power to do ill is not from God, but power to do ill, as punishable by man, is from God. — ^A king, aetuprimo, is a plague, and the people slaves, if the king, by God*s institution, be absolute. — ^Absoluteness of royalty against justice, peace, reason, and law. — Against the king's relation of a brother. — A damsel forced may resist the king. — The goodness of an absolute prince hindereth not but he is oAtuprimo a tyrant.

QUESTION XXIIL Whether the king hath a prerogative royal above law, . . . 106

Prerogative taken two ways. — Prerogative above laws a garland proper to infinite majesty. — ^A threefold dispensation, 1. Of power; 2. Of justice; 3. Of grace. — Acts of mere grace may be acts of blood. — ^An oath to the king of Babylon tyed not the people of Judah to all that absolute power could command. — The absolute prince is as absolute in acts of cruelty, as in acts of grace. — Servants are not (1 Pet. ii. 18, 19) interdicted of self-defence. — The parliament materially only, not formally, hath the king for their lord. — Reason not a sufficient restraint to keep a prince from acts of tyranny. — Princes have sufficient power to do good, though they have not absolute to do eviL — ^A power to shed innocent blood can be no part of any royal power given of God. — The king, because he is a public person, wanteth many privileges that subjects have.

QUESTION XXIV. What relation the king hath to the law, . . . . . 113

Human laws considered as reasonable, or as penal.^ — The king alone hath not a nemothetic power.— Whether the king be above parliaments as their judge. — Subordination of the king to the parliament and co-ordination both consistent. — ^Each one of the three governments hath somewhat from each other, and they cannot any one of them be in its prevalency conveniently without the mixture of the other two. — The king as a king cannot err, as he erreth in so far, he is not the remedy of oppression intended by God and nature. — In the court of necessity the people may judge the king. — Human laws not so obscure as tyranny is visible and discernible. — It is more requisite that the whole people, church, and religion be secured than one man. — If there be any restraint by law on the king it must be physical, for a moral restraint is upon all men. — To swear to an ab- ■otnte prince as absolute, is an oath eot^ntw, in so far unlawful, and not obligatory. • b

QUESTION XXV.

Whether the supreme law, the safety of the people, be above the king,

Page 119

The safety of the people to be preferred to the king, for the king is not to seek himself, bnt the good of the people. — Royalists make no kings but tyrants. — ^How the safety of the king is the safety of the people. — ^A king, for the safety of the people, may break through the letter and paper of the law. — The king's prerogatiye above law and reason, not comparable to the blood that has been shed in Irehmd and England. — The power of dictators prove not a prerogattve abOYe law.

QXJESTION XXVI.

Whether the king be above the law, ......

The law abOYC the king in four things, 1. in constitution; 2. direction; 3. limitation; 4. co-action. — In what sense the king may do all things. — The king under the morality of laws; under fnndamentiEd laws, not under punishment to be inflicted by himself, nor because of the eminency of his place, but for tiie physical incongruity thereof. — ^If, and how, the king may punish himself. — ^That the Ung transgressing in a heinous manner, is under the co-action of law, proved by seven arguments. — The coronation of a king, who is supposed to be a just prince, yet proveth aiter a tyrant, is conditional and from ignorance, and so involuntary, and in so far not obligatory in law. — Royalists confess a tyrant bi exercise may be dethroned. — ^How the people is the seat of the power of sovereignty. — The place, Fsal. li., " Against thee only have I sinned," &c. discussed. — Israel's not risbig in arms against Pharaoh examined. — ^And Judah's not working their own deliverance under Gyms.— A covenant without the king's concurrence lawful.

QUESTION XXVII. Wliether or no the king be the sole, supreme, and final interpreter of the law, .

He is not the supreme and peremptory interpreter. — ^Nor is his will the sense of the law. — Nor is he the sole and oi^y judidal interpreter of the law.

Whether or no wars raised by the estates and subjects for their own just defence

against the king's bloody emissaries be lawful, . . . .139

The state of the question. — If kings be absolute, a superior judge may punish an inferior judge, not as a judge but an erring man. — By divine institution all covenants to restrain their power must be unlawful. — Resistance in some cases lawful. — Six arguments for the lawfulness of defensive wars. — ^Many others follow.

QUESTION XXIX.

Whether, in the case of defensive wars, the distinction of the jjerson of the king as a man, who may and can commit hostile acts of tyranny agamst his subjects, and of the office and royal power that he hath from Grod and the people, can haye place, 143

The king's person in eonoreto, and his ofElce in ahstraeto, or, which is all one, the king using his power lawfully to be distinguished (Rom. xiu). — To command unjustly maketh not a higher power. — The person may be resisted and yet the office cannot be resisted, proved by fourteen arguments. — Contrary objections of royalists and of the P. Prelate answered. — ^What we mean by the person and office in ahstraeto in this dispute; we do not exclude the person in eonereto altogether, but only the person as abusing his power; we may kUl a person as a man, and love him as a son, father, wife, according to Scripture. — ^We obey the king for the law, and not the law for the king. — The losing of habitual and actual royalty different.--John xix. 10, Pilate's power of crucifying Christ no law-power given to him of Giod, is proved against royalists, by six arguments.

QUESTION XXX.

Whether or no passive obedience be a mean to which we are subjected in conscience by virtue of a divine commandment; and what a mean resistance is. That fiying is resistance, ......... 152

The place, 1 Pet. ii. 18, discussed. — ^Patient bearing of injuries and resistance of injuries compatible in one and the same subject. — Christ's non-resistance hath many things rare and extraordinary,

Paob and is no leading rnle to ns.— Suffering ii either eommanded to ns comparatiTely only, that we rather choose to suffer than deny the truth; or the manner only is commanded, that we suffer with patience. — The physical act of taking away the life, or of offending when commanded by the law of self-defence, is no murder.— We haTS a greater dominion oyer gtwds and members, (except in case of mutilatioti, which is a little death,) than over our life. — To kill is not of the nature of self-defence, but accidental thereunto. — DefensiTe war cannot be without offending. — The nature of defensiTe and offenslTo wan^— Flying is resistanoe.

QUESTION XXXL

'Whether self-defence, by opponng violence to unjust violence, be lawful, by the law of God and nature, ........ 159

Self-defence in man natural, but moclitf, the way, must be rational and just. — The method of selfdefence. — ^Violent re-offending In self-defence the last remedy. — It is physically impossible for a nation to fly in the case of persecution for religion, and so they may resist in their own self-defence. — Tviela viUBprogrima and rwnoUi, — In a remote posture of self-defence, we are not to take us to re-offending, as DaTid was not to kiU Saul when he was sleeping, or ia. the ca^e, for the same cause.— DaTid would not kill Saul because he was the Lord's anointed. — The king not lord of chastity, name, conscience, and so may be resisted. — By universal and particular nature, selfdefence lawful, proTcd by divers arguments. — ^And made good by the tosUmony of jurists. — The love of ourselves, the measure of the love of our neighbours, and enforceth self-defence. — Nature maketh a private man Us own judge and magistrate, when tiie magistrate is absent, and violence is offered to his life, as the law saith. — Self-defence, how lawful it is. — ^MThat presumption is from the king's carriage to the two kingdoms, are in law sufficient grounds of defensive wars. — Offensive and defensive wars differ in tiie event and intentions of men, but not in nature and specie, nor physically. — Bavid's case in not killing Saul nor his men, no rule to us, not in our lawful defence, to Idll tiie king's emissaries, the cases far different

Whether or no the lawfulness of defensive wars can be proved from the Scripture, from the examples of David, the people's rescuing Jonathan, Elisha, and the eighty valiant priests who resulted Uzziah, ..... 166

David warrantably raised an army of men to defend himself against the unjust violence of his prince SauL — ^David's not invading Saul and his men, who did not aim at arbitrary government, at subversion of laws, religion, and extirpation of those that worshipped the God of Israel and opposed idolatry, but on)y pursuing one single person, far unlike to our case in Scotland and England BOW. — ^David's example not extraordinary. — ^EUsha's resistance proveth defensive wars to be warrantable. — ^Besistance made to Ung Uzziah by eighty valiant priests proveth the same. — The people's rescuing Jonathan proveth &e same.— liibnah's revolt proveth this. — The city of Abel defended themselves against Joab, Ung David's general, when he came to destroy a city for one wicked conspirator, Sheba's sake.

Whether or no Eom. xiii. 1 make any thing against the lawfulness of defensive wars, 172 The king not only understood, Bom. ziiL— And the place, Rom. ziiL, discussed.

QUESTION XXXIV.

Whether royalists prove, by cogent reasons, the unlawfulness of defensive wars, 175

Objections of royaUsts answered. — The place, Exod. xxii. 28, ** Thou shalt not revile the gods," &e. answered. — And Eccles. x. 20. — The place, Eccles. viii. 3, 4, *' Where the word of a king is," &c. answered. — The place. Job. xxxiv. 18, answered^ — ^And Acts xxiiL 3, ** God shall smite thee, thou whited wall," &c. — The emperors in Paul's time not absolute by their law. — That objection, that we have no practice for defensive resistance, and that the prophets never complain of the omission of the resistance of princes, answered. — The prophets cry against the sin of non-resistance, when they cry against the judges, because they execute not judgment for the oppressed — Judah's subjection to Nebuchadnessar, a conquering tyrant, no warrant to ns to subject ourselves to tyrannous acts. — Christ's subjection to Caesar nothing against defensive wars.

CONTENTS.

QUESTION XXXV.

Paoe

Whether the sufferings of the martyrs in the primitive church militant be against the lawiiihiess of delusive wars, ...... 182

QUESTION XXXVI.

Whether the king have the power of war only, .....

Inferior judges have the power of the svord no less than the king. — The people tyed to acts of cha> rity, and to defend themselyes, the church, and their posterity against a foreign enemy, though the king forbid. — Flying unlawful to the states of Scotland and England now, God's law tying them to defend their country.— Parliamentary power a fountain-power above the king.

Whether the estates of Scotland are to help their brethren, the protestants of England,

Helping of neighbour nations lawful, diyers opinions concerning the point. — The law of Egypt a^inst those that helped not the oppressed.

Whether monarchy be the best of governments, ....

Whether monarchy be the best of governments hath divers considerations, in which each one may be less or more convenient. — ^Absolute fnonarchy is the worst of governments. Better want power to do ill as have it. — ^A mixture sweetest of all governments — Neither king nor parliament have a voice against law and reason.

QUESTION XXXIX.

Whether or no any prerogative at all above the law be due to the king. Or if jura

A threefold supreme power. — ^What he jura regdUa, — ^Kings confer not honours from their plenitude of absolute power, but according to the strait line and rule of law, justice, and good observing. — The law of the king, 1 Sam. viii. 9, 11. — ^Difference of kings and judges. — The law of the king, (1 Sam. vilL 9, 11,) no permissive law, such as the law of divorce.— What dominion the king hath over the goods of the subjects.

QUESTION XL.

Whether or no the people have any power over the king, either by his oath, covenant, or any other TOy/ . . . .. . -. .198

The people have power over the king by reason of his covenant and promise. — Covenants and promises violated, infer co-action, dejure, by law, though not de /octo.-r-Mutual punishments may be where there is no relation of superiority and inferiority. — Three covenants made by Arnisssus. — The king not king while he swear the oath and be accepted as king by the people. — The oath of the kings of France. — ^Hugo Grotius setteth down seven cases in which the people may accuse, punish, or dethrone the king. — The prince a noble vassal of the kingdom upon four grounds. — The covenant had an oath annexed to it. — The prince is but a private man in a contract. — ^How the royal power is immediately from God, and yet conferred upon the king by the people.

QUESTION XLI.

Whether doth the P. Prelate with reason ascribe to us doctrine of Jesuits in the

question of lawful defence, ....... 204

The sovereignty is originally and radically in the people, as in the fountain, was taught by fothers, ancient doctors, sound divines, lawyers, before there was a Jesuit or a prelate whelped, in rerum

Paoi fuOura. — Tbtt P. Prelate holdeth the Pope to be the iricar of CbrUt.— JesnitB* tenets concernixig kings. — The king not the people's deputy by onr doctrine, it is only the oalnmny of the P. Prelate. — The P. Prelate will ha^e power to act the bloodiest tyrannies on earth upon the chnrch of Christ, the essential power of a Ung.

QUESTION XLIL

Why Qod, as €k>d, hath a man a Tieegerent under him, but not as mediator^ — The king not headof the church. — The king a sub-mediator, and an nnder-redeemer, and a sub-priest to oner sacrifices to God for us if he l^ a Tieegerent. — The king no mixed person. — Prelates deny kings to be subject to the gospel. — By no prerogatiTe royal may the king prescribe religious obseryances and human ceremonies in God's worship. — The P. Prelate gireth to the king a power arbitrary, supreme, and independent, to gOTcm the church. — ^Reciprocation of subjections of the king to the church, and of the church to the king, in diyers kinds, to wit, of ecclesiastical and dTU subjection, are no more absurd than for Aaron's priest to teach, instruct and rebuke Moses, if he turn a tyrannous Acl&ab, and Moses to punish Aaron if he turn an obstinate idolator.

QUESTION XLIIL

Whether the king of Scotland be an absolute prince, having a prerogative above laws and parliaments, ,•••••• 216

The king of Scotland subject to parliaments by the fundamental laws, acts, and constant practices of parliaments, ancient and late in Scotland.— The king of Scotland's oath at his coronation. — ^A pretended absolute power giren to James Y I. upon respect of personal endowments, no ground of absoluteness to the king of Scotland. — ^By laws and constant practices the kings of Scotland subject to laws and parliaments, proved by tiie fundamental law of electiTe princes, and out of the most partial historians, and our acts of parliament of Scotland. — Corona^on oath. — ^And again at the coronation of James YI. that oath sworn; and again, 1 Pari. James YI. ibid and seq^ — How the king is supreme judge in all causes. — The power of the parliaments of Scotland. — The Confession of the ftdth of the church of Scotland, authorised by divers acts of parliament, doth ctIdently hold forth to all the reformed churches the lawfulness of defensiYe wars, when the supreme magistrate is misled by wicked counsel. — The same proved from the confrasions of faith in other reformed churches. — The place, Bom. xiii., en>oned in our Confession of fsith. — The confession, not only Saxonic, exhibited to the Council of Trent, but also of Helvetia, France, England, Bohemia, prove the same. — ^William Laud and other prelates, enemies to parliaments, to states, and to the fundamental laws of the three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland. — The parliament of Scotland doth regulate, Umit, and set bounds to the king's power. — Fergus the first king not a conqueror. — The k&ig of Scotland below parliaments, con^derable by them, hath no negative voice.

QUESTION XLIV.

General results of the former doctrine in some few corollaries, in twenty-two questions, ......... 227

Concerning monarchy, compared with other forms — How royalty Is an issue of nature. — ^And how magistrates, as magistrates, be natural. — How absoluteness is not a ray of God's majesty. — ^And reidstance not unlawful, because Christ and his apostles used it not in some cases^^-Coronation is no ceremony. — ^Men may limit the power that they gave not. — The commonwealth not a pupil or minor properly. — Subjects not more obnoxious to a king than clients, vassals, children, to their superiors.^ — If subjection passive be natural. — ^Whether king Uzziah was dethroned. — Idiots and chUdren not complete kings, children are kings in destination only. — ^Denial of passive subjection in things unlawful, not dishonourable to the king, more than doiial of active obedience in the same things. — The king may not make away or sell any part of his dominions. — People may in some cases convene without the king. — ^How,and in what meaning subjects are to pay tiie king's debts. — Subsidies the kingdom's due, rather than the king's. — How the seas, ports, forts, castles, ndlitia, magwlne, are the king's, and how they are the kingdom's.

The more prominent features of a man's public life are generally characterised by the spirit of the tunes in which he lived. If the period has been peaceM and undisturbed by party controversy and the disputes of opposing factions, then all iSows smoothly and quietly on; the minds of the people repose unharassed and unexcited by public contentions and quarrels; there is opportunity for the cultivation of the useful oris; a taste is displayed in the pursuit of learning and literature^ and improvements and discoveries, in every branch of science and art, advance with rapid strides. Such a state of things men of civilized nations in general desire. Yet a pericMl like this, when there has been " peace in the land," looked back upon irom a succeeding age, or resA as a chapter of history, appears tame and monotonous. There is nothing to arouse the attention or awaken the feelings, when the only record we have of a man is, that he lived, died, and was buried. But it is otherwise when the times have been the scene of anarchy, civil war, or persecution. Then the calmness and repose of the community is broken up; men are excited and roused by the spirit-stirring events that are passing around them; each must take their side; — ^it is then that their characters are drawn out and shown in a true light; the weak, the timid and undecided, keep the back ground, while men of courage and daring stand forward in bold relief.

There has been in the history of mankind, in all ages, two great contending principles at issue — ^the contest of error against truth, and the struggle of truth with error. On the one side— error, with the violence of oppression, doing aUthat persecution can accomplish, in endeavouring to exterminate virtue &om the moral universe; and on the other — truth, with noble courage and exalted firmness, maintaining the purity of her principles in opposition to ignorance and persecution. For upwards of four thousand years she has grappled with superstition, idolatry, and bigotry, and, with moral weapons, she has vindicated the justice of her principles, which her enemies have found easier to answer with the sword than by argument. In every age error has had the majority, for truth has bad few followers; but, in the end, she has been triumphant even at the stake, or on the scaffold. Tet the faggot will bum with a fiercer flame, and the guillotine will be deeper dyed with the martyr's blood than it has ever yet been, ere the world assent to the truth of her doctrines. On looking back, and reviewing the civil and religious history of our own land, we observe the mighty contest between Popery and the Reformed Doctrine — ^we see the fearful conflict of right and wrong — ^and we see truth, with a gigantic effort, burst the fetters which had so long held the people in mental bondage and ignorance. Again, we observe the struggles between Presbytery and Episcopacy, during most of the mter half of the seventeentli century; one party urged on by a spirit of opposition and bigotry, to trample on the religious rights and privileges of the people, and doing all in their power to bnng them again under the iron sway of the Church of Kome; the other, with moral

courage and firmness, standing boldly forward, in the front of persecution, tyranny, and oppression, for the cause and promotion of true religion ; and from the martyrdom of Hamilton, Scotland's first martyr, many a noble spirit has been immolated and set free, for the cause, and at the shrine of Truth ; —

Samuel Rutherfokd was bom in the parish of Kisbet, in Itoxburghshire, in the year 1600. Of the sphere in life occupied by his parents, we have no means of correctly ascertaining. He is mentioned by Reid " to have been bom of respectable parents,"* and Wodrow states that he came of " mean, but honest parents." It is probable, however, that his father was engaged in agricultui^ pursuits; at all events, he must have held a respectable rank in society, as he otherwise could not have given his son so superior an education. At an early period of his life he discovered a precocious talent, and nis parents consequently destined him for the ministry.

In 1617 he was sent to Edinburgh, and entered the University as a student, where he appears to have excelled in the studies in which he was engaged, for, in four years, he took his degree of Master of Arts; and in 1623, after a severe contest with three competitors, he was elected one of the Regents of the College. The acquirements he displayed at this early period were justly appreciated by his contemporaries. We are told that " the whole E^gents, out of their particular knowledge of Mr Samuel Rutherford, demonstrated to them [the Judges] his eminent abilities of mind and virtuous dispositions, wherewith the Judges, being satisfied, declared him successor in the Professor of Humanity."t He, however, only acted in the capacity of Regent about two years, and, on leaving his charge, he devoted himself to the study of Theology, imder Mr Andrew Ramsay.

The Church of Scotland was at this period almost entirely under the jurisdiction of Episcopal bishops. The establishment of Episcopacy had been gradually going on since the accession of James to the throne of England, who lent all his aid and authority to the furtherance of that end. The Presbyterians who would not conform to the discipline of church government which had been obtmded upon them, were cruelly oppressed. Many were imprisoned, and their goods confiscated; others were banished from their native land; and not a few were dragged to the scaffold or the stake. At the death of King James, in 1625, his son Charles succeeded to the throne, and the people hoped that their grievances would now be listened to, and their wrongs redressed; but they were disappointed. *' The &ther's madness," says Stevenson, '^ laid the foundation for his successor's woes, and the son exactly followed the father's steps." | James held the principles of a royal prerogative, and required absolute and implicit obedience in too strict a manner. These he instilled into the mind of his son, and was, unhappily, too successM; for, on Charles' succession, he carried out the same principles to a most intolerant degree, which was the cause of so much anarchy and confusion in the nation, and entailed upon himself those misfortunes which rendered his reign so unhappy, and his end so miserable.

In 1627, Rutherford was licensed as a preacher of the Gospel, and through the influence of John Grordon of Kenmure, (afterwards Viscount Kenmure,) appointea to a church in the parish of Anwoth, in Kirkcuabright. There is sufficient authority to show that he was not inducted by Episcopal ordination. Being firmly attached to the Presbyterian form of Grovemment from his youth, he manifested great dislike to Prelacy, and could never be induced to stoop to the authority of the bishops, which, at that time, was a very difficult matter to evade. We are told by Stevenson, that " imtil the beginning of the year 1628, some few preachers, by influence, were suffered to enter the ministry without conformity, and in this number we suppose Mr Rutherford may be reckoned, because he was ordained before the doors came to be more closely shut upon honest preachers." Other authorities might be quoted to the same effect. Here he discharged the duties of

* Lires of the Westminster Divines. t Crawford's History of the University.

J Stevenson's Church History, Vol. I.

his BBcred calling with great dili^nce; and, no doubt, with suooess. He was aocnstomed to rise so early as three o'clock m the morning, and devoted his whole time to the sroritoal wants of his flock and his own private rel^ous duties. His laboors were not confined to his own parishioners, many persons resorted to him from surrounding parishes. " He was," says Livingston, " a great strengthener of all the Christians in that country, who had been the fruits of the ministry of Mr John Welsh, the time he had been at Kirkeudbrkht."

In 1630, Rutherford experienced a severe affliction by the death of his wife, after a painful and protracted illness of thirteen months, scarcely five years after their marriage. Her death seems to have been the source of much sorrow to mm, as he frequently takes notice of it in his letters with much feeling, long after his painfiil bereavement. To add to his distress, he was himself afflicted with a fever, which lasted upwards of three months, by which he was so much reduced, that it was long ere he was able to perform his sacred duties.

John Gordon, Viscount Kenmure, who had long been the friend and patron of Rutherford, for whom he entertained the greatest respect and esteem, was in August 1634, seized with a disease which caused his death on September following, to the deep sorrow of Rutherford, who was with him at his last moments. Kenmure was a nobleman of an amiable and pious disposition; and, as may be supposed, experienced much pleasure in his intercourse with Kutherford. To Lady Kenmure, Rutherford wrote many of his famous " Letters."

About this time, the doctrines of Arminius began to spread to an alarming extent amongst the Episcopalians. His tenets were espoused by Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, and a&) by many of the Scottish prelates, headed by Maxwell, Bishop of Ross, as those only who held the same principles had any chance of preferment in the Church. Rutherford viewed the promulgation of these dangerous tenets with great anxiety, and did all in his power to controvert and oppose them. In 1636, appeared his learned treatise, entitled, '* JExercitationes Apologeticce pro Divina Gratia^ which was dedicated to Viscount Kenmure, but was not published till eighteen months after his death. This work gave great offence to the government: he was in consequence summoned to appear before a Hi^ Commission Court, which had been constituted by Thomas Sydseri^ Bishop of Galloway, a man of Arminian principles, which met at Wigton in June, and there deprived of his office. Sydseni, who had imbibed an inveterate hatred against him, was not satisfied with this, but had him again summoned before the High Commission Court at Edinburgh, which met in July followmg, and he was there accused " of non-conformity, for preadiing against the Perth Articles, and for writing a book, entitled, Exerdtatumedi ApohgiticcB pro Divina Grcntiay which they alleged did reflect upon the Church of Scotland; but the truth was, the arguments in that book did cut the sinews of Arminianism, and galled the Episcopal clergy to the quick, and therefore Bishop Lydserff could no longer abide him." Here many other false, frivolous, and extravagant charges were brought against him, but being firm in his innocence, he repelled them all. Lord Lorn (bromer to Lady Kenmure), and many others, endeavoured to befriend him; but such was the malevolence of Sydserff, that he swore an oath, if they did not agree to his wishes, he would write to the king. After three days' trial, sentence was passed upon him, that he be deprived of his pastoral office, and discharged from preaching in any part of Scotland, under pain of rebellion, and to be confined ^fore the 20th oi August 1636, within the town of Aberdeen during the king's pleasure. This sentence he obeyed, but severe and unjust as it was, it did not discourage him, for in one of his letters, he says, '* I go to my ki^'s palace at Aberdeen; tongue, pen, nor wit, cannot express my joy."

Burmg his confinement in Aberdeen, he wrote many oi his well-lmown '* Letters," which have been so popular. Lideed, there are few cottage libraries in Scotland in which they do not find a place among the scanty but select collection. Episcopacy and Arminianism at this time held the sole sway in Aberdeen, and it was with no gracious feeling that the learned doctors beheld the arrival of Rutherford. They had all imbibed the principles of their great patron, Laud, and manifested great hostility to Fresbyterianism, which was the principal cause of his being sent to that town. He met at first with a cold reception, and nis opponents did all in their power to operate on the minds of the people against him.

He says himself, that " the people thought him a strange man, and his cause not good." His innocencj, however, and the truth of his cause, began at last to be known, and his popularity was spreading daily; — ^which so much alarmed the doctors, that they wished he might be banished from the kingdom. They entered into several disputations with him, but he appears to have proved himself a match for them. " I am here troubled," says he, '^ with tne disputes of the great doctors, (especially with Dr Barron, on ceremonial and Arminian controversies — for all are corrupt here,) but, I thank Grod, with no detriment to the truth, or discredit to my profession."

About this period, great confusion and commotion reigned in Scotland. It had long been the wish of King Charles to introduce the Church of England Service-book and Canons into the worship of the Presbyterians of Scotland. He accordingly, in April 1636, with ai-judged poUc7, commenced arrangements for its accomplishment, and cave commands to Archbishop Laud, Bishops Juxon and Wren, to compile a liturgy for the special use of the Church of Scotland. Consequently, one was soon framed, which was nearly similar to that used in the Church of England, excepting a few alterations; and, wherever these occurred, the language was almost synonimous with the Eoman Missal. In 1637, a proclamation was issued, commanding the people's strict observance of this new form of worship, and a day was accordingly fixed for its introduction into Edinburgh, — on which it was presumed that compliance would follow throughout all the land. The feeUngs of the people, as may be supposed, were roused to a high pitch; — they stood boldly forward in opposition to such a tyrannical encroachment on their religious liberty, and manifested such a firm and determined spirit of resistance, that Charles soon began to see, when too late, that he had drawn the reins too tight. They would accept of no measure short of an entirely fi:ee and unfettered Presbyterian form of worship, and a chain of events followed which led to a renewal of the National Covenant and the abohtion of Episcopacy.

During these tumults, Rutherford ventured to leave the place of his, confinement in Aberdeen, and returned to his parishioners in Anwoth about February 1638, after an absence of more than eighteen months. They did not, however, long enjoy his ministrations, as we find him, in the same year, actively engaged in Glasgow in forwarding the great covenanted work of reformation. Rutherford was deputed one of the commissioners from the Presbytery of Kirkcudbright to the famous General Assembly of 1638, which was convened at Glasgow on the 21st ol November. He was called upon to give an account of the accusations which had been preferred against him by the high commission court. After deliberation, a sentence was passed in his favour, and he, along with some others who were in the same circumstances, were recognised as members of the Assembly. Soon after this, an application was made to the Assembly's commission to have him transferred to Glasgow, and another by the University of St. Andrews, that he might be elected professor of divinity in the New College there. The commission appointed him to the professorship in St. Andrews, as his learning and talents fiilly qusdified him for that important situation. He manifested, however, great reluctance to leave Anwoth, and pleaded, in a petition, his " bodily weakness and mental incapacity." There were several other petitions presented from the county of Galloway against his leaving Anwoth, but to no eifect; the Court sustained his appointment. In October 1639, he removed to the scene of his future labours, and was appointed colleague to Mr Robert Blair, one of the ministers of St. Andrews.

Rutherford was nominated one of the commissioners to the General Assembly of divines held at Westminster in 1643. His colleagues were — Alexander Henderson, Robert Baillie, George Gillespie, and Robert Doug£s, ministers; — ^the Earl of Cassilis, Lord Maitland, (afterwards Ihike of Lauderdale^ and Sir Archibald Johnston, of Warriston, elders. He took a prominent part in all the discussions in that famous council, and published several works of a controversial and practical nature. About this time, he wrote liis celebrated work entitled Lex Hex, in answer to a treatise by John Maxwell, the excommunicated Bishop of Ross, entitled " Sacro-Sancta Begum Majestas, or the sacred and royal prerogative of Christian kings, wherein soveraigntie is, by Holy Scripture, reverend antiquitie, and sound reason asserted," 4to., Oxford, 1644. This work endeavours to prove, that the royal prerogative of kingly authority is derived alone from God; and it

demandB an absolute and passive obedience of the sabject to the will of the sovereign. The arguments in Lex Rex completely refute all the wild and absurd notions which Maxwell*8 work contains, although some of the sentiments would be thought rather democratical in modem times. The author displays an intimate knowledge of the classics and the writings of the ancient fathers and schoolmen. The work caused great sensation on its appearance. Bishop Guthrie mentions, that every member of the assembly *' had in his hand that book lately published by Mr Samuel Rutherford, which was so idolized, that whereas Buchanan's treatise {de jure Regni apud Scotos) was looked upon as an oracle, this coming forth, it was slighted as not anti-monarchical enough, and Kutherford's Lex Rex only thought authentic."

Rutherford, who was anxious to return to Scotland, on account of bad health, had made an application to the Assembly for permission to leave; but it was not granted till their business was finished, as his services were very valuable to them; and it was not till 1647 that he was permitted to revisit his native land. On his return to Scotland, he resumed his labours in St. Andrews, and was in December of the same year appointed Principal of the New College, in room of Dr Howie, who had resigned on account of old age. In 1651 he was elected Rector of the University, and was now placed in situations of the hid^est eminence to which a clergyman of the Church of Scotland can be raised. The fame of Rutherford as a scholar and divine, had now spread both at home and abroad. In the Assembly of 1649, a motion was made, that he would be removed to Edinburgh as Professor of Divinity in the University; and about the same time he received a special invitation to occupy the chair of Divinity and Hebrew in the University of Harderwyck; and also another from the University of Utrecht, both of which he respectfully declined. He had too much regard for the interests of the Church of Scotland to leave the kingdom, considering the critical position in which it was at that time placed.

During the period which followed the death of Charles I. to the restoration, Rutherford took an active part in the struggles of the church in asserting her rights. Cromwell had in the meantime usurped the throne, and independency held the sway in England. On the death of Cromwell in 1658, measures were taken for the restoration of Charles II. to the throne. The Scottish Parliament met in 1651, when the national covenant was recalled — Presbyterianism abolished — and all the decrees of Parliament, since 1638, which sanctioned the Presbyterian system, were rescinded. The rights of the people were thus torn from them — ^their liberties trampled upon — and the whole period which followed, till the martyrdom of Renwick in 1688, was a scene of intolerant persecution and bloodshed. Rutherford, as may be supposed, did not escape persecution in such a state of things. His work, Lex, Rex, was considered by the government as " inveighing against monarchie and laying ground for rebellion;" and ordered to be burned by the hand of the common hangman at Edinburgh. It met with similar treatment at St Andrews, and also at London; and a proclamation was issued, that every person in poss3ssion of a copy, who did not deliver it up to the king's solicitor, should be treated as an enemy to the government. Rutherford himself was deprived of his offices both in the University and the Church, and his stipend confiscated; he was ordered to confine himself within his own house, and was summoned to appear before the Parliament at Edinburgh, to answer a charge of high treason. It may be easily imagined what his fate would have been had he lived to obey the mandate; but ere the time arrived he was summoned to a far higher than an earthly tribunal. Not having a strong constitution, and being possessed of an active mind, he had evidently overworked himself in the share he took in the struggles and controversies of the time. Although not an old man, his health had been gradually decHning for several years. His approaching dissolution he viewed with Christian calmness and fortitude. A few weeks before his death, he gave ample evidence of his faith and hope in the Gospel, by the Testimony which he left behind nim.* On his death-bed he was cheered by the consolations of several Christian friends, and on the 20th of March 1661, in the sixty-first year of his age, he breathed his last, in the full assui*ance and hope of eternal life. His last words were, ** Glory, glory, dwelleth in Emmanuel's land."

On April 28th, 1842, the foundation-stone of a colossal monument, called the " Rutherfurd Monument," was laid to his memory; it is erected on the ferm of Boreland, in the parish of Anwolli, about half-a-mile from where he used to preach. The monument is of granite; height, from the surface to the apex, sixty feet; square of the pedestal, seven leet, with throe rows of steps.

Of the character of Butherford — ^as to his talents and piety, nothing need be here said. AU who know his writings, will be at a loss whether most to admire his learning and depth of reasoning, or his Ghnstian graces. We give the following list of his wo^, which is appended to a memoir* by a talented gentleman of this city; a work compiled with great research and discrimination, and which will amply repay a perusal by all who feel an interest in the remembrance of an individual so mstinguished for learning, uprightness, and piety, as was Samuel Rutherfobd. — Exerdtationes ApologeticcB pro JDxwmx, Crratia: Amst., 12mo., 1636. A Pecuseable and Temperate Plea for PauVs Preshyterie in Scotland: Lend., 4to., 1642. A Sermon preached to the Honourable House of Commons^ JantMry 31, 1643. Daniel vi. 26 ; Lond., 4to., 1644. A Sermon preached h^ore the Honourable House of Lords ^ the 26th day of June 1645. Luke vii. 22 — 25. mark iv. 88 — 40. Matt. viii. 26 .• Lond., 4to., 1646. Lex^ Rex; or the Law and the Prince; a discourse for the just prerogative of king and people: Lond., 4to., 1644. The Due Right of Presbyteries, or a 'Peaceable Plea for the government of the Church of Scotland: Lond., 4to., 1644. The Tryal and Triumph of Faith: Lond., 4to., 1645. The Divine Right of Church Govenmient and Excommunication: Lond., 4to., 1646. Christ Dying and Drawing to Himself: Lond., 4to., 1647. A Survey of the Spiritual Antichrist, opening the secrets of Familisme and Antinomianisme: Lond., 1648. A Free Disputation against Pretended Liberty of Conscience: Lond., 4to, 1649. The Last arid. Heavenly Speeches^ and Glorious Departure of John Grordoun, Viscount Kenmuir: Edin., 4to., 1649. Disputatio Scholastiea de iHvina Providentia: Edin., 4to, 1651. The Covenant of Life opened: Edin., 4to., 1655. A Survey of the Survey of that Summe of Church Discipline penned by Mr Thomas Hooker: Lond., 4to., 1658. Influences of the Life of Chrace: Lond., 4to., 1659. Joshua Redivimts, or Mr Rutherford^s Letters, in three parts: 12mo., 1664. Examen Arminianismi, conscriptum et discipulis dictatum a doetissimo clarissimoque viro, D. Samuele Rhetorforte, SS, TheoL in Aeademia Scotiae Sanetandreana Doctore et Professore: Ultraj., 12mo., 1668.

* Life of Samnel Kntherford, by Thomas Murray, L.L.I). Edin., 1827.

Who donbteth (Christian Reader^ but innocency must be under the courtesy and mercy of malice, and tliat it is a real martyrdom to be brought under the lawless inquisition of the bloody tongue. Christ, the prophets, and apostles of our Lord, -vent to heayen with the note of traitors, seditious men, and such as turned the world upside down: calumnies of treason to Csssar were an ingredient in Christ's cup, and therefore the author is the more willing to drink of that cup that touched his lip, who is our glorious Forerunner: what, if conscience toward God, and credit with men, cannot both go to heaTen with the saints, the author is satisfied with the former companion, and is willing to dismiss the other. Truth to Christ cannot be treason to Caesar, and for his choice he judgeth truth to have a nearer relation to Christ Jesus, than the transcendent and boundless power of a mortal prince.

He considered that popery and defection had made a large step in Britain, and that arbitrary govemment had over-swelled all banks of law, that it was now at the highest float, and that this sea approaching the farthest border of fancied absoluteness, was at the score of ebbing: and the naked truth is, prelates, a wild and pushing cattle to the lambs and flock of Christ, had made a hideous noise, the wheels of their chariot did run an equal pace with the blood-thirsty mind of the daughter of Babel. Prelacy, the daughter planted in her mother's blood, must verify that word, As is the mother, so is the daughter: why, but do not the prelates now suffer? True, but their sufferings are not of blood, or kindred, to the calamities of these of whom Lactantius saith, (1. 6, e. 19,) qwun honetta vohmtaU miseri trant. The causes of their suffering are, 1. Hope of gain and glory, steering their hehn to a shore they much affect; even to a church of gold, of purple, yet really of clay and earth. 2. The lie is more active npon the spirits of men, not because of its own weidcness, but because men are more passive in receiving the impressions of error than truth; and opinions lying in the world's &t womb, or of a conquering nature, whatever notions side with the world, to prelates and men of their make are very efficacious.

There is another cause of the sickness of our time, God plagued heresy to beget Atheism and security, as atheism and security had begotten heresy, even as clouds through reciprocation of causes engender nun, rain begat vapours, vapours clouds, and clouds rain, so do sins overspread our sad times in a drcnlar generation.

And now judgment presseth the kingdoms, and of afl the heaviest judgments the sword, and of swords the civil sword, threateneth vastation, yet

not, I hope, like the Roman civil sword, of which it was said,

Bella geri placuit nullos habitura triumphos.

I hope this war shall be Christ's triumph, Babylon's ruin.

That which moved the author, was not (as my excommunicate adversary, like a Thraso, saith) the escapes of some pens, which necessitated him to write, for many before me hath learnedly trodden in this path, but that I might add a new testimony to the times.

I have not time to examine the P. Prelate's preface, only, I give a taste of his gall in this preface, and of a virulent piece, of his agnosco stylwn et genitun Thr€uoniSy in which he laboureth to prove how inconsistent presbyterial government is with monarchy, or any other government.

1. He denieth that the crown and sceptre is under any co-active power of pope or presbytery, or censurable, or dethroneable ; to which we say, presbyteries profess that kings are under the co-active power of Christ's keys of discipline, and that prophets and pastors, as ambassadors of Christ, have the keys of the kingdom of God, to open and let in believing princes, and also to shut them out, if they rebel against Christ; the law of Christ excepteth none, (Mat. xvi. 19; xviii. 16, 16; 2 Cor. x. 6; Jer. i. 9,) if the king's sins may be remitted in a ministerial way, (as Job xx. 23, 24,) as prelates and their priests absolve kings ; we think they may be bound by the hand that loosed; presbyteries never dethroned kings, never usurped that power. Your fother, P. Prelate, hath dethroned many kings ; I mean the Pope, whose power, by your own confession, (c. 6, p. 58,) differeth from yours by divine right only in extent.

2. When sacred hierarchy, the order instituted by Christ, is overthrown, what is the condition of sovereignty ? — Ant, — Surer than before, when prelates deposed kings. 2. I fear Christ shall never own this order.

3. The mitre cannot suffer, and the diadem be secured. — Ana, — Have kings no pillars to their thrones but antichristian prelates. Prelates have trampled diadem and sceptre under their feet, as histories teach us.

4. Do they not (puritans) magisterially determine that kings are not of God's creation by authoritative commission ; but only by permission, extorted by importunity, and way given, that they may be a scourge to a sinful people? — Am. — ^Any unclean spirit from hell, could not speak a blacker lie ; we hold that the king, by ofl&ce, is the church's nurse father, a sacred ordinance, the deputed power of

MMH.

xxii

PREFACE.

God; but by the Prelate's way, all inferior judges, and God's deputies on earth, who are also our fathers in the fifth commandment style, are to be obeyed by no diyine law; the king, misled by p. prelates, shall forbid to obey them, who is in downright truth, a mortal ciTil pope, may loose and liberate subjects from the tie of a divine law.

6. His iuTeighing against ruling elders, and the rooting out of antichristian prelacy, without any word of Scripture on the contrary, I pass as the extravagancy of a malcontent, because he is deservedly excommunicated for perjury, popery, Socinianism, tyranny over men's conscience, and invading places of civil dignity, and deserting his calling, and the camp of Christ, &c.

6. None were of old anointed but kings, priests, and prophets ; who, then, more obliged, to maintain the Lord's anointed, than priests and prophets? The church hath never more beauty and plenty under any government than monarchy, which is most countenanced by God, and magnified by Scripture. — An$, Pastors are to maintain the rights of people, and a true church, no less than the right of kings ; but prelates, the court parasites, and creatures of the king, that are born for the glory of their king, can do no less than profess this in words, yet it is true that Tacitus writeth of such, (Hist. 1. 1,) Libentitis cum fortuna principia, quam cumprineipe loquuntvr : and it is true, that the church hath had plenty under kings, not so much, because they were kings, as because they were godly and zealous : except the P. P. say, that the oppressing kings of Israel and Judah, and the bloody horns that made war with the lamb, are not kings. In the rest of the epistle he extols the Marquis of Ormond with base flattery, from his loyalty to the king, and his more than admirable prudence in the treaty of cessation with the rebels ; a woe is due to this false prophet, ^ho calleth darkness light, for the former was abominable and perfidious apostacy from the Lord's cause and people of God, whom he once defended, and the cessation was a selling of the blood of many hundred thousand protestants, men, women, and sucking children.

This cursed P. hath written of late a treatise against the presbyterial government of Scotland, in which there is a bundle of lies, hellish calumnies, and gross errors.

1. The first lie is, that we have lay elders, whereas, they are such as rule, but labour not in the word and doctrine (1 Tim. v. 7, p. 8).

2. The second lie, that deacons, who only attend tables, are joint rulers with pastors (p. 3).

3. That we never, or little use the lesser excommunication, that is, debarring from the Lord's Supper (p. 4;.

4. That any church judicature in Scotland exacteth pecuniary mulcts, and threaten excommunication to the non-payers, and refuseth to accept the repentance of any who are not able to pay : the civil magistrate only fineth for drunkenness, and adultery, blaspheming of God, which are frequent sins in prelates.

6, A calumny it is to say that ruling elders are of equal authority to preach the woid as pastors (p. 7).

6. That laymen are members of presbyteries or general assemblies. Buchanan and Mr Melvin were doctors of divinity ; and could have taught such an ass as John Maxwell.

7. That expectants are intruders upon the sacred function, because, as sons of the prophets, they exercise their gifts for trial in preaching.

8. That the presbytery of Edinburgh hath a superintending power, because they communicate the affairs of the church, and write to the churches, what

they hear prelates and hell devise against Christ and his church.

9. That the king must submit his sceptre to the presbytery; the king's scepti*e is his royal office, which is not subject to any judicature, no more than any lawful ordinance of Christ ; but if the king, as a man, blaspheme God, murder the innocent, advance belly-gods, (such as our prelates, for the most part, were,) above the Lord's inheritance, the ministers of Christ are to say, " The king troubleth Israel, and they have the keys to open and shut heaven to, and upon the king, if he can offend."

10. That king James said, a Scottish presbytery and a monarchy agreeth as well as God and the devil, is true, but king James meant of a wicked king ; else he spake as a man.

11. That the presbytery, out of pride, refused to ans\^er king James's honourable messengers, is a lie ; they could not, in business of high concernment, return a present answer to a prince, seeking still to abolish presbyteries.

12. Its a lie, that all sins, even all civil business, come under the cognizance of the church, for only sins, as publicly scandalous, fall under their power. (Matt, xviii. 16—17, &c. ; 2 Thess. iii. 11 ; 1 Tim. v. 20.) It is a calumny that they search out secret crimes, or that they ever disgraced the innocent, or divided families ; where there be flagrant scandals, and pregnant suspicions, of scandalous crimes, they search out these, as the incest of Spotswood, P. Prelate of St Andrews, with his own daughter ; the adulteries of Whiteford, P. Prelate of Brichen, whose bastard came weeping to the assembly of Glasgow in the arms of the prostitute : these they searched out, but not with the damnable oath, ex OjfficiOf that the high commission put upon innocents, to cause them accuse themselves against the law of nature. >

13. The presbytery hinder not lawful merchandise; scandalous exhortation, unjust suits of law, they may forbid ; and so doth the Scripture, as scandalous to Christians, 2 Cor. vi.

14. They repeal no civil laws ; they preach against unjust and grievous laws, as, Isaiah (x. 1) doth, and censure the violation of God's holy day, which prelates profaned.

15. We know no parochial popes, we turn out no holy ministers, but only dumb dogs, non-residents, scandalous, wretched, and apostate prelates.

16. Our moderator hath no dominion, the P. Prelate absolveth him, while he saith, " All is done in our church by common consent" (p. 7).

17. It is true, we have no popish consecration, such as P. Prelate contendeth for in the mass, but we have such as Christ and his apostles used, in consecrating the elements.

18. If any sell the patrimony of the church, the presbytery censures him ; if any take buds of malt, meal, beef, it is no law with us, no more than the bishop's five hundred marks, or a year's stipend that the entrant gave to the Lord Bishop for a church. And whoever took buds in these days, (ai king James by the earl of Dunbar, did buy episcopacy at a pretended assembly, by foul budding,) they were either men for the episcopal way, or perfidiously against their oath became bishops, all personal faults of this kind imputed to presbyteries, agree to them under the reduplication of episcopal men.

19. The leading men that covered the sins of the dying man, and bo lost his soul, were episcopal men ; and though some men were presbyterians, the faults of men cannot prejudice the truth of God; but the prelates always cry out against the rigour of presbyteries in censuring scandals ; because they themselves do ill, they hate the light ; now here

PREFACE.

XXIU

20. Satan, a liar from the beginning, saith, The presbytery was a seminary and nursery of fiends, contentions, and bloods, because they ezcommunicated murderers against king James' will ; which is all one to say, prophecying is a nurse of bloods, because the prophets cryed out against king Achab, and the munierers of innocent Naboth : the men of God must be either on the one side or the other, or then preach against reciprocation of injuries.

2L It is false that presbyteries usurp both Bwords ; because they censure sins, which the civil magistrate should censure and punish. Elias might be said then to mix himself with the ciyil business of the kingdom, because be prophecied against idolaters' killing of the Lord's prophets ; which crime the civil magistrate was to punish. But the truth is, the assembly of Glasgow, 1637, condemned the prelates, because they, being pastors, would be also lords of parliament, of session, of secret council, of exchequer, judges, barons, and in their lawless high commission, would fine, imprison, and use the svord.

22. It is his ignorance that he saith, a provincial synod is an associate body chosen out of all judicial presbyteries ; for all pastors and doctors, without delegation, by virtue of their place and office, repair to the provincial synods, and without any choice at all, consult and voice there.

23. It is a lie that some leading men rule all here; indeed, episcopal men made factions to rent the synods ; and though men abuse their power to factions, this cannot prove that presbyteries are inconsistent with monaixby ; for then the Prelate, the monarch of his diocesan rout, should be anti-monarchical in a higher manner, for he ruleth all at his vilK

24. The prime men, as Mr R. Bruce, the faithful servant of Christ, was honoured and attended by all, because of his suffering, zeal, holiness, his fruitful ministry in gaining many thousand souls to Christ. So, though king James cast him off, and did swear, by 6od*s name, he intended to be king, (the Prelate maketh blasphemy a virtue in the king,) yet king James swore he could not find an honest minister in Scotland to be a bishop, and therefore he was necessitated to promote false knaves ; but he said sometimes, and wrote it under his hand, that Mr R. Bruce was worthy of the half of his kingdom ; but will this prove presbyteries inconsistent with monarchies ? I should rather think that knave bishops, by king James' judgment, were inconsistent with monarchies.

25. His lies of Mr R. Bruce, excerpted out of the lying manuscripts of apostate Spotswood, in that he would not but preach against the king's recalling from exile some bloody popish lords to undo all, are nothing comparable to the incests, adulteries, blasphemies, perjuries. Sabbath-breaches, drunkenness, profanity, &c., committed by prelates before the sun.

26. Our General Assemby is no other than Christ's court, (Acts XV.) made up of pastors, doctors, and brethren, or elders.

27. They ought to have no negative vote to impede the conclusions of Christ in his servants.

28. It is a lie that the king hath no power to appoint time and place for the General Assembly ; but his power is not privative to destroy the free courts of Christ, but accumulative to aid and assist them.

29. It is a lie that our General Assembly may repeal laws ; command and expect performance of the king, or then excommunicate, subject to them, force and compel king, judges, and all, to submit to them. They may not force the conscience of the poorest beggar, nor is any Assembly infallible, nor can it lay bounds upon the souls of judges, which they are to

obey with blind obedience — ^their power is ministerial, subordinate to Christ's law; and what civil lawB parliaments make against God's word, they may authoritatively declare them to be unlawful, as though the emperor (Acts xv.^ had commanded fornication and eating of blood. Might not the Assembly forbid these in the synod? I conceive the prelates, if they had power, would repeal the act of parliament made, anno 1641, in Scotland, by his majesty personally present, and the three estates concerning the annulling of these acts of parliament and laws which estabUshed bishops in Scotland; therefore bishops set themselves as independent monarchs above kings and laws; and what they damn in presbyteries and assemblies, that they practise themselves.

30. Commissioners from burghs, and two from Edinburgh, because of the largeness of that church, not for cathedral supereminence, sit in la^semblies, not as sent from burghs, but as sent and' authorised by the church session of the burgh, and so they sit there in a church capacity.

31. Doctors both in academies and in parishes, we desire, and our book of discipline holdeth forth such.

32. They hold, (I believe with warrant of God's word,) if the king refuse to reform religion, the inferior judges, and assembly of godly pastors, and other church-officers may reform ; if the king will not kiss the Son, and do his duty in purging the House of the Lord, may not Eliah and the people do their duty, and cast out Baal's priests. Reformation of religion is a personal act that belongeth to all, even to any one private person according to his place.

33. They may swear a covenant without the king, if he refuse ; and build the Lord's house (2 Chron. XV. 9) themselves ; and relieve and defend one another, when they are oppressed. For my acts and duties of defending myself and the oppressed, do not tye my conscience conditionally, so the king consent, but absolutely, as all duties of the law of nature do. (Jer. xxii. 3 ; Prov. xxiv. 11 ; Isa. Iviii. 6 ; i. 17.)

34. The P. Prelate condemneth our reformation, because it was done against the will of our popish queen. This showeth what estimation he hath of popery, and how he abhorreth protestant religion.

36. They deposed the queen for her tyranny, but crowned her son; all this is vindicated in the following treatise.

36. The killing of the monstrous and prodigious wicked cardinal in the Castle of St Andrews, and the violence done to the prelates, who against all law of God and man, obtruded a mass service upon their own private motion, in Edinburgh anno 1637, can conclude nothing against presbytcrial government except our doctrine commend these acts as lawful.

37. What was preached by the servant of Christ, whom (p. 46) he calleth the Scottish Pope, is printed, and the P. Prelate durst not, could not, cite any thing thereof as popish or unsound, he knoweth that the man whom he so slandereth, knocked down the Pope and the prelates.

38. The making away the fat abbacies and bishoprics is a bloody heresy to the earthly-minded Prelate ; the Confession of Faith commended by all the protestant churches, as a strong bar against popery, and the book of discipline, in which the servants of God laboured twenty years with fasting and praying, and frequent advice and counsel from the whole reformed churches, are to the P. Prelate a negative faith and devout imaginations; it is a lie that episcopacy, by both sides, was ever agreed on by law in Scotland.

XXIV

PBSFACE.

39. And it vaa a heresy that Mr MelTin taught, that presbyter and bishop are one function in Scripture, and that abbots and priors were not in God's books, die t^ legit; and is this a proof of inconsistency of presbyteries with a monarchy ?

40. It is a heresy to the P. Prelate that the church appoint a fast, when king James appointed an unseasonable feast, when God's wrath was upon the land, contrary to God's word (Isa. xxii. 12 — ^14) ; and what ! will this prove presbyteries to be inconsistent with monarchies ?

41. This Assembly is to judge what doctrine is treasonable. What then ? Surely the secret council and king, in a constitute church, is not synodically to determine what is true or false doctrine, more than the Roman emperor could make the church canon, Acts xt.

42 Mr Gibson, Mr Black, preached against king James' niaintaining the tyranny of bishops, his sympathizing with papists, and other crying sins, and were absolved in a general Assembly ; sba^ this make presbyteries inconsistent with monarchy ? Nay, but it proveth only that they are inconsistent with the wickedness of some monarchies ; and that prelates have been like the four hundred false prophets that flattered king Achab, and those men that preached against the sins of the king and court, by prelates in both kingdoms, have been imprisoned, banished, their noses ript, their cheeks burnt, their ears cut.

43. The godly men that kept the Assembly of Aberdeen, anno 1603, did stand for Christ's Prerogative, when king James took away all General Assemblies, as the event proved ; and the king may, with as good warrant, inhibit all Assemblies for word and sacrament, as for church discipline.

44. They excommunicate not for light faults and trifles, as the liar saith : our discipline saith the contrary.

45. This assembly never took on them to choose the king's counsellors ; but those who were in authority took king James, when he was a child, out of the company of a corrupt and seducing papist.

Esme Duke of Lennox, whom the P. Prelate nameth noble, worthy, of eminent endowments.

46. It is true Glasgow Assembly, 1637, voted down the high commission, because it was not consented unto by the church, and yet was a church judicature, which took upon them to judge of the doctrine of ministers, and deprive them, and did encroach upon the liberties of the established lawful church judicatures.

47. This Assembly might well forbid Mr John Graham, minister, to make use of an unjust decree, it being scandalous in a minister to oppress.

48. Though nobles, barons, and burgesses, that profess the truth, be elders, and so members of the general Assembly, this is not to make the church the house, and the commonwealth the hanging; for the constituent members, we are content to be examined by the pattern of synods. Acts xv. 22, 23. Is this inconsistent with monarchy ?

46. The commissioners of the General Assembly, are, 1. A mere occasional judicature. 2. Appointed by, and subordinate to the General Assembly. 3. They have the same warrant of God's word, that messengers of the synod (Acts. xv. 22—27) hath.

50. The historical calumny of the 17th day of December, is known to all : 1. That the ministers had any purpose to dethrone king James, and that they wrote to John L. Marquis of Hamilton, to be king, because king James had made defection from the true religion : Satan devised, Spotswood and this P. Prelate vented this ; I hope the true history of this is known to all. The holiest pastors, and professors in the kingdom, asserted this government, suffered for it, contended with authority only for sin, never for the power and office. These on the contrary side were men of another stamp, who minded earthly things, whose God was the world. 2. All the forged inconsistency betwixt presbyteries and monarchies, is an opposition with absolute monarchy and concluded with a like strength against parliaments, and all synods of either side, against the law and gospel preached, to which kings and kingdoms are subordinate. Lord establish peace and truth.

LEX, REX.

;

QUESTION I.

I REDUCE all that I am to speak of the power of kingg, to the author or efficient, — the matter or subject,— the form or power, — ^the end and fruit of their government, — and to some cases of resistance. Hence,

The question is either of government in general, or of particular species of government, such as g*ovemment by one only, called monarchy, the government by some chief leading men, named aristocracy, the government by the people, going under the name of democracy. We cannot but put difference betwixt the institution of the office, viz, government, and the designation of person or persons to the office. Wliat is warranted by the direction of nature's light is warranted by the law of nature, and consequently by a divine law; for who can deny the law of nature to be a divine law?

That power of government in general must be from God, I make good, 1st, Because (Rom. xiii. 1) *' there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God." 2d, God commandeth obedience, and so subjection of conscience to powers; Rom. xiii, 6, " Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, (or civil punishment) but also for conscience sake;" I Pet, ii. 13, ** Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the king as supreme," &c, Now God only by a divine law can lay a band of subjection on the conscience, tying men to guilt mi punishment if they tranfgpess,

Conclus. All civil power is immediately from God in its root; in that, 1st, God hath made man a social creature, and one who inclineth to be governed by man, then certainly he must have put tliis power in man's nature: so are we, by good reason, taught by Aristotle.^ 2d, God and nature intendeth the policy and peace of mankind, then must God and nature liave given to mankind a power to compass this end; and this must be a power of government. I see not, then, why John Prelate, Mr Maxwell, the excommunicated prelate of Ross, who speaketh in the name of J. Armagh,? had reason to say. That he feared that we fancied that the government of superiors was only for the more perfect, but had no authority over or above the perfect, nee rejpj nee leXf justo posita. He might have im^ puted this to the Brazillians, who teach, that every single man hath the power of the sword to revenge his own injuries, as Molina saith.^

QUESTION II.

As domestic society is by nature's instinct, so is civil society natural in radice, in the root, and voluntary in modo, in the manner of coalescipg, PoUtic power of government agreeth not to man, singly as one man, except in tbftt root of reasonable iia-

1 Aristot. Polit. lib.l, c.2.

9 Sacro Sane, Reg. Majestas, c. 1, p< \%

3 Molina, torn, 1, de justit disp. 23.

LEX, REX ; OR,

ture; but supposing that men be combined in societies, or that one family cannot contain a society, it is natural that they join in a civil society, though the manner of union in a poHtic body, |as Bodine saith,^ be voluntary, Gren. X. 10; xv. 7; and Suarez saith," That a power of making laws is given by God as a property flowing from nature. Qui dat fonnaniy dot consequentia adfov' not by any special action or grant,

mam

different from creation, nor will he have it to result from nature, while men be united into one politic body: which union being made, that power followeth without any new action of the will.

We are to distinguish betwixt a power of government, and a power of government by magistracy. That we defend ourselves from violence by violence is a consequent of unbroken and sinless nature; but that we defend ourselves by devolving our power over in the hands of one or more rulers seemeth rather positively moral than natural, except that it is natural for the child to exjpect help against violence from his father: for which cause I judge that learned senator Ferdinandus Vasquius said well,* That princedom, empire, kingdom, or jurisdiction hath its rise from a positive and secondary law of nations, and not from the law of pure nature. 1st, The lav saith* there is no law of nature agreeing to all living creatures for superiority; for by no reason m nature hath a boar dominion over a boar, a lion over a Hon, a dragon over a dragon, a bull over a bull: and if all men be bom equally free, as I hope to prove, there is no reason in nature why one man should be king and lord over another; therefore while I be otherwise taught by the aforesaid Prelate Maxwell, I conceive all jurisdiction of man over man to be as it were artificial and positive, and that it inferreth some servitude whereof nature from the womb hath freed us, if you except that subjection of children to parents, and the wife to the husband; and the law saith,* De jure gentium secundarius est omnia principatus. 2d, This also the Scripture proveth, while as the exalting of Saul or David above their brethren to be

J Bodin. de rep. lib. 1, c. 6.

* 8uarez, torn. 1, de legib. lib. 3, c. 3.

4 1b. lib. 2, in princ. F. de inst. et jur. et in princ. Int. Cod. tit. c. jus. nat. 1. disp.

^ Dominium est jus qnoddam. lib. fin. ad med. C. de long. temp, prest. 1, qui usum fert.

kings and captains of the Lord's people, is ascribed not to nature (for king and beggar spring of one clay), but to an act of divme bounty and grace above nature, 1 Sam. xiii. 13 ; Ps. Ixxviii. 70, 71.

1. There is no cause why royalists should deny government to be natural, but to be altogether from Grod, and that the kingly power is immediately and only from Grod, because it is not natural to us to be subject to government, but against nature for us to resign our liberty to a king, or any ruler or rulers; for this is much for us, and proveth not but government is natural ; it concludeth that a power of government tali modoj by magistracy, is not natural ; but this is but a sophism, a * r< ad illud quod est dictum iTkHs^ this special of government, by resiguation of our Hberty, IS not natural, therefore, power of government is not natural ; it followeth not, a negations speciei non sequitv/r negatio generis^ non est homo, ergo non est animal. And by the same reason I may, by an antecedent will, agree to a magistrate and a law, that I may be ruled in a politic society, and by a consequent will only, yea, and conditionally only, agree to the penalty and punishment of the law ; and it is most true no man, by the instinct of nature, giveth consent to penal laws as penal, for nature doth not teach a man, nor incline his spirit to yield that his life shall be taken away by the sword, and his blood shed, except on this remote ground : a man hath a disposition that a vein be cut by the physician, or a member of his body cut off, rather than the whole body and life perish by some contagious disease ; but here reason in cold blood, not a natural disposition, is the nearest prevalent cause and disposer of the business. When, therefore, a community, by the instinct and guidance of nature, incline to government, and to defend themselves from violence, they do not, by that instinct, formally agree to government by magistrates ; and when a natural conscience giveth a deliberate consent to good laws, as to this, " Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed," Gen. ix. 6, he doth tacitly consent that his own blood shall be shed ; but this he consenteth unto consequently, tacitly, and conditionally, — if he snail do violence to the life of his brother : yet so as this consent proceedeth not from a disposition every way purely natural. I grant reason may be necessitated to assent

to the conclusion, being, as it were, forced by the prevalent power of the evidence of an insuperable and invincible light in the premises, yet, from natiiral affections, there resulteth an act of self-love for self-preservation. So David shall condenm another rich man, who hath many lambs, and robbeth his poor brother of his one lamb, and yet not condemn himself, though he be most deep in that fault, 1 Sam. xii. 5, 6 ; yet all this doth not hinder, but government, even by rulers, hath its ffround in a secondary law of nature, which lawyers call secun' dario jits naturale, or jus gentium secundarium; a secondary law of nature, which is granted by Plato, and denied by none of sound judgment in a sound sense, and that is this, Licet vim virepellerej It is lawful to repel violence by violence; and this is a special act of the magistrate.

2. But there is no reason why we may not defend by good reasons that political societies, rulers, cities, and incorporations, have their rise, and spring from the secondary law of nature. 1st, Because by nature's law family-government hath its warrant ; and Adam, though there had never been any positive law, had a power of governing his own family, and punishing mal^actors ; but as Tannerus saith well,^ and as I shall prove, God willing, this was not properly a royal or monarchical power ; and I judge by the reasoning of Sotus,* Molina,^ and Victoria.^ By what reason a family hath a power of government, and of pimishing malefactors, that same power must be in a society of men, supposing that society were not made up of families, but of single persons ; for the power of punishing ill-doers doth not reside in one single man of a family, or in them all, as they are single private persons, but as they are in a family. But this argument holdeth not but by proportion ; for paternal government, or a fatherly power of parents over their families, and a politic power of a magistrate over many famihes, are powers different in nature, — ^the one being warranted by nature's law even in its species, the other being, in its specie and Kind, warranted by a positive law, and, in the general only, warranted by a law of nature. 2d, If we once lay the supposition,

1 Ad Tannerus, m. 12, torn. 2, disp. 5. de peccatis, q. 5, dub. 1, num. 22. ^ Sotus, 4. de juBtit. q. 4, art. 1. 3 Lod. Molina, torn. 1, de just. disp. 22. * Victoria in relect. de potest civil, q. 4, art, 1.

that God hath immediately by the law of nature appointed there should be a government, and mediately defined by the dictate of natural light in a community, that there shall be one or many rulers to govern a community, then the Scripture's arguments may well be drawn out of the school of nature: as, (1,) The powers that be, are of God (Rom. xii), therefore nature's Hght teacheth that we should be subject to these powers. (2.) It is against nature's light to resist the ordinance of Grod. (3.) Not to fear him to whom God hath committed the sword for tlie terror of evil-doers. (4.) Not to honour the public rewarder of well-doing. (5.) Not to pay tribute to him for his work. Therefore I see not but Govarruvias,^ Soto,* and Suarez,* have rightly said, that power of government is immediately from God, and this or that definite power is mediately from Grod, proceeding from God by the mediation of the consent of a community, which resigneth their power to one or more rulers; and to me, Barclaius saith the same,^ Quamvis populus potentice largitor videatuvy &c.

QUESTION III.

The king may be said to be from God and his word in these several notions : —

1. By way of permission, Jer. xhii. 10, " Say to them, Thus saith the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, Behold I will send and take Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon, my servant, and will set his throne upon these stones tliat I have hid, and he shall spread his royal pavilion over them." And thus God made him a catholic king, and gave him all nations to serve him, Jer. xxvii. 6 — 8, though he was but an unjust tyrant, and his sword the best title to those crowns.

2. The king is said to be from Grod by way of naked approbation ; God giving to a people power to appoint what government they shall think good, but instituting none in special in his word. This way some make kingly power to be from God in the

8 Soto, loc. ett.

general, but in the particular to be an invention of men, negatively lawful, and not repugnant to the word, as the wretched popiSi ceremonies are from God. But we teach no such thing: let Maxwell^ free his master Bellarmine,* and other Jesuites with whom he sideth in Romish doctrine: we are free of this. Bellarmine saith thiat" politic power in general is warranted by a divine law; but the particular forms of politic power, (he meaneth monarchyj with the nrst,) is not by divine right, but de jure gentium^ by the law of nations^ and floweth immediately from human election^ as all thingSj saith he, that appertain to the law of nations* So monarchy to Bellarmine is but an human invention, as Mr Maxwell's surplice is; and Dr Feme, sect* 3, p. 13j saitn with Bellarmine.

3. A king is said to be from God, by particular designation, as he appointed Saul by name for the crown of Israel. Of this hereafter.

4. The kingly or royal office is from God by divine institution, and not by naked approbation ; for, 1st, we may well prove Aaron's priesthood to be of divine institution, because God doth appoint the priest's qualification from his family, bodily perfections, and his charge. 2d, We take the pastor to be by divine law and God's institution, because the Holy Ghost (1 Tim* iii. 1 — 4) describeth his qualifications ; so may we say that the royal power is by divine institution, because God mouldeth him : Deut. xvii. 16) " Thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom the Lord thy Grod shall choose, one from amongst thy brethren," &c. ; Rom. xiii. 1, " There is no power but of God, the powers that be are ordained of God." 3d) That power must be ordained of God as his own ordinance, to which we owe subjection for conscience^ and not for fear of punishment ; but every power is such) Rom. xiii. 4th, To resist the kingly power is to resist God. Sth, He is the minister of God for our good. 6th) He beareth the sword of God to take vengeance upon ill-doers. 7th, The Lord expressly saith, 1 Pet. ii. 17, " Fear God, honour the king ;" ver. 13^ 14, " Submit yourselves to every oi-dinance of man for the Lord's sake, whe*-

2 Bellarm. de locis, lib. 5, c. 6, not. 5. Politica universe considerata est de jure divino, in particulari considek'ata est de jure gentium.

ther it be to the king as supreme, or unto govemorSj as those wiat are sent by him/' &c. ; Titi iiii 1, '* Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers;" and so the fifth commandment layeth obedience to the king on us no less than to our parents; whence, I conceive that power to be of God, to which, by the moral mw of God, we owe perpetual subjection and obedience. 8th, Khigs and magistrates are God's, and God's deputies and lieutenants upon earth, (Psalm Ixxxii. 1, 6, 7 ; Exod. xxii* 8 ; iv. 16,) and therefore their office must be a lawfiil ordinance of God. 9th, By their office they are feeders of the Lord's people. Psalm Ixxviii. 70-^72, the shields of the earth, Psal. xlvii. 9, nursing fathers of the church, Psal. xlix* 23, captains over the Lord's people, 1 Sam^ ix. 19i 10th, It is a great judgment of God when a land wanteth the benefit of such ordinances of God, Isa* iii. 1- — 3, 6) 7, 11. The execution of their office is an act of the just Lord of heaven and earth, not only by permission, but according to God's revealed will in his word; their judgment is not the judgment of meU) but of the Lord, 2 Chron. xix. 6, and their throne is the throne of God, 1 Chron* xxii. 10* Jerome saith,^ to punish murderers and sacrilegious persons is not bloodshed) but the ministry and service of good laws* So, if the king be a living law by office, and the law put in execution which God hath commanded, then, as the moral law is by divine institution, so must the officer of God be, who is custos et vin^ dex legis divinvb, the keeper, preserver, and avenger of God's law. Basilius saith,* this is the prince's office, Ut opem ferat virtuti, malitiam vera im/pugneU When Paulinus Treverensis, Lucifer Metropolitane of Sardinia, Dionysius MediolanensiS) and other bishops, were commanded by Constantino to write against Athanasius, they answered, Regnum non ipsitts esse, sed dei, a quo acceperit, — ^the kmgdom was God's, not his; as Athanasius saith,® Optatus Milevitanus* helpeth us in the cause, where he saith with Paul, " We are to pray for heathen kings." The genuine end of the magistrate, saith Epiphanius,* is ut ad honum ordinem universitatis mundi omnia ex deo bene disponantur atque administren*-

1 Jerome in 1. 4, Comment, in Jerem.

s Basilius, epist. 125.

3 Athanasius, epist. ad solita.

* Optat. Melevitanns, lib. 3.

tur. But some object, If the kingly powei* be of divine institution, then shall any other government be unlawfiil, and contrary to a divine institution, and so we condemn aris-> tocracy and democracy as unlawful. Ans, This consequence were good, if aristocracy and democracy were not also of divine institution, as all my arguments prove; for I judge they are not governments diflFerent in nature, ii we speak morally and theologically, only they differ politically and positively; nor is aristocracy any thing but diffused and enlarged monarcny, and monarchy is nothing but contracted aristocracy, even as it is the same hand when the thumb and the four fingers are folded together and when all the five fingers are dilated and stretched out; and wherever God appointed a king he never appointed him absolute, and a sole independent angel, but joined always with him judges, who were no less to judge according to the law of God (2 Chron. xix. 6,) than the king, Deut. xvii. 16. And in a moral obligation of judging righteously) the conscience of the monarch and the conscience of the inferior judges are equally under immediate subjection to the King of kings; for there is here a co-ordination of consciences) and no subordination, for it is not in the power of the inferior judge to judge, quoad speci/lcationem, as the xing commandeth him, beca.use the judgment is neither the king's, nor any mortal man's, but the Lord's, 2 Chron* xix. 6, 7.

Hence all the three forms are from Grod; but let no man say, if they be all indifferent, and equally of God, societies and kingdoms are left in the dark, and know not which of the three they shall pitch upon, because Grod hath given to them no special direction for one rather than for another. But this is easily answered. 1st, That a repubHc appoint rulers to govern them is not an indifferent, but a moral action, because to set no rulers over themselves I conceive were a breach of the fifth commandment, which commandeth government to be one or other. 2d, It is not in men's free will that they have government or no government, because it is not in their free will to obey or not to obey the acts of the court of nature, which is God's court; and this court enacteth that societies suffer not mankind to perish, which must necessarily follow if they appoint no government; also it is proved elsewhere, that no moral acts, in their exercises and use, are left indifferent

to us; so then, the aptitude and temper of every commonwealth to monarchy, rather than to democracy or aristocracy, is God's warrant and nearest call to determine the wills and liberty of people to pitch upon a monarchy, hie et nunc, rather than any other form of government, though all the three be from 6od, even as single life and marriage are both the lawful ordinances of God, and the constitution and temper of the body is a calling to either of the two; nor are we to think: that aristocracy and democracy are either unlawfiil ordinances, or men's inventions, or that those societies which want monarchy do therefore five in sins.

But some say that Peter calleth any form of government an human ordinance, 1 Pet. ii. 13, MftM'tfn tW, therefore monarchy can be no ordinance of God. Ans, Rivetus saith,^ — " It is called an ordinance of man, not because it is an invention of man, and not an ordinance of God, but respectu subjecti;" Piscator,^ — " Not because man is the efficient cause of magistracy, but because they are men who are magistrates;" Diodatus,* — " Obey princes and magistrates, or governors made by men, or amongst men;" Oecumenius,* — " An human constitution, because it is made by an human disposition, and created by human suffrages;" I^dimus, — Because over it " presides presidents made by men;" Cajetanus,* Estius,^ — " Every creature of God (as, preach the gospel to every creature) in authority." But I take the wopd, " every creature of man," to be put emphatically, to commend the worth of obedience to magistrates, though but men, when we do it for the Lord's sake; therefore Betrandus Cardinalis Ednensis saith,® " He speaketh so for the more necessity of merit;" and Glossa Ordinaria saith, " Be subject to all powers, etiam ex infidelihus et incredulisj even of infidels and unbelievers." Lyranus, — " For though they be men, the image of God shineth m them;" and the Syriac, as Lorinus saith,^ leadeth us

1 Rivetus in decal. Hand, 5, p. 194. 8 Piscator in loc. ^ Diodatus, annot.

* Oecumenius qnod hominum dispositione consistit, et hnmanis siiffragiis crcatur.

5 Cajetanus, officiuiu regiminis, quia hnmania snfifragiis creatur.

6 Estius in loc. 7 Betrandus, torn* 4, Bib. 8 Lorin. in. lo.

LEX, REX ; OR,

men that are in authority. It is an ordinance of men, not effectively, as if it were an invention and a dream of men; but subjectively, because exercised by man. Objectively, and riXijftAJf, for the good of men, and for tne external man's peace and safety especially; whereas church-officers are for the spiritual good of men's souls. And Durandus saith well,^ " Civil power according to its institution is of God, and according to its acquisition and way of use is of man." And we may thus far call the forms of magistrates a human ordinance, — that some magistrates are ordained to care for men's lives and matters criminal, of life and death, and some for men's lands and estates; some for commodities by sea, and some by land; and are thus called magistrates according to these determinations or numan ordinances.

QUESTION IV.

That this question may be the clearer we are to set down these considerations : —

1. The question is, Whether the kingly office itself come from God. I conceive it is, and floweth from the people, not by formal institution, as if the people had by an act of reason devised and excogitated such a power : God ordained the power. It is from the people only by a virtual emana^ tion, in respect that a community having no government at aU may ordain a king or appoint an aristocracy. But the question is concerning the designation of the person : Whence is it that this man rather than that man is crowned king ? and whence is it — from God immediately and only — that this man rather than that man, and this race or family rather than that race and family, is chosen for the crown ? Or is it from the people also, and their free choice ? For the pastor's and the doctor's office is from Christ only ; but that John rather than Thomas be the doctor or the pastor is from the will and choice of men — ^the presbyters and people.

2. The royal power is three ways in the people : 1st, Radically and virtually, as in

1 Durandus lib. de orig. juris.

the first subject. 2d, Collative vel communicative, by way of free donation, they giving it to this. man, not to that man, that he may rule over them. 3d, Limitate, — they giving it so as these three acts remain with the people. (1.) That they may measure out, by ounce weights, so much royal power, and no more and no less. (2.) So as they may limit, moderate, and set banks and marches *to the exercise. (3.) That they give it out, conditionate, upon this and that condition, that they may take again to themselves what they gave ovii, upon condition if the condition be violated. The first I conceive is clear, 1st, Because if all living creatures have radically in them a power of self-preservation, to defend themselves firom violence, — as we see lions have paws, some beasts have horns, some claws, — men being reasonable creatures, united in society, must have power in a more reasonable and honourable way to put this power of warding off violence in the hands of one or more rulers, to defend themselves by magistrates. 2d, If all men be bom, as concerning civil power, alike, — for no man cometh out of the womb with a diadem on his head or a sceptre in his hand, and yet men united in a society may give crown and sceptre to this man and not to that man, — then this power was in this united society, but it was not in them formally, for they should then all have been one king, and so both above and superior, and below and inferior to themselves, which we cannot say; therefore this power must have been virtually in them, because neither man nor community of men can give that which they neither have formally nor virtually in them. 3d, Boyalists cannot deny but cities have power to choose and create inferior magistrates; therefore many cities united have power to create a higher ruler; for royal power is but tlie united and superlative power of inferior judges in one greater judge whom they call a king.

Conclus, The power of creating a man a king is i'rom the people.

1. Because those who may create this man a king rather than that man have power to appoint a king ; for a comparative action doth positively infer an action. If a man have power to marry this woman and not that woman, we may strongly conclude that he hath power to marry ; now, 1 Kings xvi. the people made Omri king and not Zimri, and his son Achab rather than Tibiii the

son of Sinath. Nor can it be replied that this was no lawful power that the people used, for that cannot elude the argument; for (1 Kings i.) the people made Solomon king and. not Adonijah, though Adonijah was the elder brother. They say, Grod did extraordinarily both make the office, and design Solomon to be king, — the people had no hand in it, but approved Grod's act. Aiis. This is what we say, God by the people, by Nathan the prophet, and by the servants of David and the states crying, " God save king Solomon! " made Solomon king; and here is a real action of the people. God is the first agent in all acts of the creature. Where a people maketh choice of a man to be their king, the states do no other thing, under God, but create this man rather than another; and we cannot here find two actions, one of God, another of the people; but in one and the same action, God, by the people's free suffrages and voices, createth such a man king, passing by many thousands; and the people are not passive in the action, because by the authoritative choice of the states the man is made of a private man and no king, a public person and a crowned king: 2 Sam. xvi. 18, " Hushai said to Absalom, Nay, but whom the Lord and the people, and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide;" Judg. viii. 22, " The men of Israel said to Gideon, Rule thou over us;" Judsf. ix. 6, " The men of Sechem made Abimelech king;" Judg. xi. 8, 11 ; 2 Kings xiv. 21, " The people made Azariah king;" 1 Sam.'xii. 1 ; 2 Chron. xxiii. 3.

2. If God doth regulate his people in making this man king, not that man, then he thereby insinuatetn that the people have a power to make this man king, and not that man. But God doth regulate his people in making a king ; therefore the people have a power to make this man king, not that man king. The proposition is clear, because Grod's law doth not regulate a non-enSy a mere nothing, or an unlawftil power ; nor can Grod's holy law regulate an unlawful power, or an unlawful action, but quite aboHsh and interdict it. The Lord setteth not down rules and ways how men should not commit treason, but the Lord commandeth loyalty, and simply interdicteth treason. If people have then more power to create a long over themselves than they had to make prophets, then Grod forbidding them to choose such a man for

their king should say as much to his people as if he would say, " I command you to make Isaiah and Jeremiah prophets over you, but not these and those men." This, cei-tainly, should prove that not Grod only, but the people also, with Grod, made prophets. I leave this to the consideration of the godly. The prophets were immediately called of God to be prophets, whether the people consented that they should be prophets or not; therefore Grod immediately and only sent the prophets, not the people; but though Grod extraordinarily designed some men to be kings, and anointed uiem by his prophets, yet were they never actually installed kings till the people made Uiem kings. I prove the assumption, Deut. xvii. 14, 15, " When thou shalt say, I will set a king over me, like as all the nations that are about me, thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee whom the Lord thy God shall choose; one from amongst thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee: thou mayest not set a stranger over thee, which is not thy brother." Snould not this be an unjust charge to the people, if God only, without any action of the people, should immediately set a king over them? Might not the people reply. We have no power at all to set a king over ourselves, more than we have power to make Isaiah a prophet, who saw the visions of God. To what end then should Grod mock us, and say, " Make a brother and not a stranger king over you?" 3. Expressly Scripture saitn, that the people made the king, though under God: Judg. ix. 6, " The men of Sechem made Abimelech king;" 1 Sam. xi. 15, " And all the people went to Gilgal, and there they made Saul king before the Lord;" 2 King. X. 5, "We will not make any king." This had been an irrational speech to Jehu if both Jehu and the people held the royalists* tenet, that the people had no power to make a king, nor any active or causative influence therein, but that God immediately made the king: 1 Chron. xii. 38, " All these came with a perfect heart to make David king in Hebron;" and all the rest were of one heart to make David king. On these words Lavater saith,^ The same way are magistrates now to be chosen; now this day God, by an immediate oracle

^ Lavater com. in part 12, 38. Hodie qnoque in liberis urbibus, et gentibus, magistratas secundum dei yerbum, £xo<l. xTiii, Deut. L, eligendi sunt, non ex affectibns.

LEX, REX ; OR,

j&x>m heaven, appointeth the office of a king, but I am sure he doth not immediately design the man, but doth only mark him out to the people as one who hath the most royal endowments, and the due qualifications required in a lawM magistrate by the word of God: Exod. xviii. 21, "Men of truth, hating covetousness," &c. ; Deut. i, 16, 17, Men who will judge causes betwixt their brethren righteously, without respect of persons; 1 Sam. x. 21, Saul was chosen out of the tribes according to the law of Grod; Deut. xvii., They might not choose a stranger; and Abulensis, Serrarius, Comehus a Lapide, Sancheiz, and other popish writers, think that Saul was not only anointed with oil first privately by Samuel, (1 Saiy. X. 1, 2,) but also at two other times before the people, — once at Mizpeh, and another time at Gilgal, by a parliament and a convention of the states. And Samuel judged the voices of the people so essential to make a king that Samuel doth not acknowledge him as formal king, (1 Sam. x. 7, 8, 17, 18, 19,) though he honoured him because he was to be king, (1 Sam. ix. 23, 24,) while the tribes of Israel and parliament were gathered together to make him king according to God's law, (Deut. xvii.) as is evident. 1st, For Samuel (1 Sam. v. 20,) caused all the tribes of Israel to stand before the Lord, and the tribe of Benjamin was taken. The law provided one of their own, not a stranger to reign over them; and, because some of the states of parliament did not choose him, but, being children of Belial, despised him in their hearts, (v. 27,) therefore after king Saul, by that victory over the Ammonites, had conquered the affections of all the people fully, (v. 10, 11,) Samuel would have his coronation and election by the estates of parliament renewed at Gilgal by all the people, (v. 14, 15,) to establi^ him king. 2d, The Lord by lots found out the tribe of Benjamin. 3d, The Lord found out the man, by name, Saul the son of Kish, when he did hide himself amongst the stuff, that the people might do their part in the creating of the king, whereas Samuel had anointed him before. But the text saith expressly that the people made 6aul king; and Calvin, Martyr, Lavater, and popi^ writers, as Serrarius, Mendoza, Sancheiz, Cornelius a Lapide, Lyranus, Hugo Cardinalis, Carthusius, Sanctius, do all hence conclude that the people, under God, make the king.

I see no reason why Barclaius should here distinguish a power of choosing a king, which he granteth the people hath, and a power of making a king, which he saith is only proper to God.^ Ans, Choosing of a king is either — a comparative crowning of this man, not that man; and if the people have this it is a creating of a king under God, who principally disposeth of kings and kingdoms; and this is enough for us. The want of this made Zimri no king, and those whom the rulers of Jezreel at Samaria (2 King. X.) refused *to make kings, no kings. This election of the people made Athaliah a pi^ncess; the removal oi it, and translation 01 the crown by the people to Joash made her no princess; for, I ask you, what other calling of God hath a race of a family, and a person to the crown, but only the election of the states? There is now no voice from heaven, no immediately inspired prophets such as Samuel and Elisha, to anomt David, not Eliab, — Solomon, not Adonijah. The ^^Wpf or the heroic spirit of a royal faculty of governing, is, I gi-ant, from God only, not from the people; but I suppose that maketh not a king, for then many sitting on the throne this day should be no kings, and many private persons should be kings. If they mean by the people's choosing nothing but the people's approbative consent, posterior to Grod's act of creating a king, let them show us an act of Grod making xings, and establishing royal power in this family ];ather than m that family, which is prior to the people's consent,-~distinct from the people's consent I believe there is none at ail.

Hence I argue: If there be no caUing or title on earth to tie the crown to such a family and person but the suffrages of the people, then have the line of such a family, and the persons now, no calling of God, no right to tne crown, but only by the suffrages of the people, except we say that there be no lawful kings on earth now when prophetical unction and designation to crowns are ceased, contrary to express scripture; Rom. xiii. 1— 3; 1 Pet. ii. 13^17.

But there is no title on earth now to tie crowns to families, to pei'sons, but only the suffrages of the people; for, 1st, Conquest without the consent of the people is but royal irobbery, as we shslll see. 2d, There is no prophetical and immediate calling to

kingdoms now. 3d, The Lord's giving of re^ parts is somewhat; but I hope roy alists will not deny but a child, young m yean and judgment, may be a lawnil king. 4th, Mr Maxwell's appointing of the kingfy office doth no more make one man a lAwml king than another; for this were a wide consequence. Grod hath appointed that kin^ should be; llierefore John k Stiles is a kmg; yea, therefore David is a king. It followedi not. Therefore it remaineth only that the suffrages of the people of God is that just title and divine caihng that kings have now to their crowns. I presuppose they have gifts to govern firom God.

If the Lord's munediate dedgnation of David, and his anointing by the divine au thority of Samuel, had been that which alone, without the election of the people, made David formally king of Israel, then there were two kings in I^iel at one time; for Samuel anoint^ David, and so he was formally king upon the ground laid by royalists, that tiie king ha^ no royal power &om the people; and David, aft;er he him* self was anomted by Samuel, divers times calleth Saul the Lord's anointed, and that by the inspiration of God's Spirit, as we and royalists do both agree. Now two law- M supreme monarchs in one kingdom I conceive to be most repugnant to God's truth and sound reason; for they are as repugnant as two most highs or as two infinites. It shall follow that David all the while betwixt his anointing by Samuel and his coronation by the suffrages of all Israel at Hebron, was in-lacking in discharging and acquitting himself or his roval duty, God having made him formally a Ung, and so laying upon him a charge to execute justice and ludgment, and defend religion, which he did not discharge. All David's suffering, upon David's part, must be unjust, for, as king, he should have cut off the murderer Saul, who killed the priests of the Lord; especially, seeing Saul, by this ground, must be a private murderer, and David the only lawml king. David, if he was formally xing, deserted his calling in flying to the FhiSstines; for a king should not rorsake his calling upon any hazard, even of his life, no more than a pUot should give over the helm in an extreme storm; but certainly God's dispensation in this warranteth us to say, no man can be formally a lawM king vrithout the suffrages of the people: for Saul, after Samuel from the

Lord anointed him, remained a private man, and no king, till the people made him king, and elected him; and David, anointed by tliat same divine authoritv, remained formally a subject, and not a khig, till all Israel made him king at Hebron; and Solomon, though by God designed and ordained to be king, yet was never king until the people made him so, {1 Kings i.) ; therefore there floweth something from the power of the people, by which he who is no King now beoometh a k^g formally, and by Grod's lawAil call; whereas before the man was no king, but, as touching all royal power, a mere private man. And I am sure birth must be less than God's desig* nation to a crown, as is clear,^~-Adonijali was older than Solomon, yet God will have Solomon, the younger by birth, to be king, and not Adonijah. And so Mr Symons, and other court prophets, must prevaricate, who wiU have birth, without the people's election, to make a king, and the people's voices but a ceremony,

I think royalists cannot denv but a peo pie ruled by aristocratic magistrates may elect a king, and a king so elected is formally made a lawM king by the people's election; for of six willing and giftied to reign, what maketh one a king and not the other five? Certainly by wi's disposing the people to choose this man, and not another man. It cannot be said but God giveth the kindy power immediately; and by him kitiKS jli^fthat i8 true. The office U im. meaiately from God, but the question now is, What is that which formally appUeth the office and royal power to this person rather than to the other five as meet? Nothing can here be dreamed of but God's inclining the hearts of the states to choose this man and not that man.

QUESTION V.

WHBTHEB OB NO THE POPISH PRELATE, THE AUTHOR O? "SAC. SAN. REGXJM MAJESTAS," CALLED THE SACRED AND ROTAL PRERO- GATIVE OF KJNGS, PROVETH THAT GOD IS THE IMMEDIATE AUTHOR OP SOVEREIGNTY, AND THAT THE KING IS NO CREATURE OF

' THE people's making.

Consider, 1. That the excommunicated prelate saith, (c. 2, p. 19,) <^ Eongs are not

LEX, REX ; OB,

immediatidly firom €rod as by any (special ordinance sent from heaven by the ministry of angels and prophets; there were but some few such; as Moses, Saul, David, &c. ; yet something may immediately proceed fix)m God, ana be his special work, without a revelation or manifestation extraordinary from heaven; so the designation to a sacred function is from the church and from man, yet the power of word, sacraments, binding and loosing, is immediately, from Jesus Cnrist. The apostle Matthias was from Christ's immediate constitution, and yet he was designed by men, Acts i. The soul is by creation and infusion, without any special ordinance from heaven, though nature begetteth the body, and disposeth the matter, and prepareth it as fit to be conjpined with the soul, so as the father is said to beget the son." Ans, 1st, The unchurched Prelate striveth to make us hateful by the title of the chapter, — That God is, by his title, the immediate author of sovereignty; and who denieth that? Not those who teach that the person who is king is created king by the people, no more Sban those who deny that men are now called to be pastors and deacons immediately, and by a voice from heaven, or by the ministry of angels and prophets, because the office of pastors and deacons is immediately from Grod. 2d, "When he hath proved that God is the immediate author of sovereignty, what then? Shall it follow that the sovereign in concreto may not be resisted, and that he is above all law, and that there is no armour against his violence but prayers and tears? Because God is the immediate author of the pastor and of the apostle's office, does it therefore follow that it is unlawfiil to resist a pastor though he turn robber? If so, then the pastor is above ajl the king's laws. This is the Jesuit and all made, and there is no armour against the robbing prelate but prayer and tears.

2. He saith in his title, that '' the king is no creature of the people's making." If he mean the king in the abstract, tnat is, the royal dignity, whom speaketh he against? Not against us, but against his own father, Bellarmine, who saith,^ that "sovereignty hath no warrant by any divine law." IF he mean that the man who is king is not created and elected king by the people, he contradicteth himself and idl the court doctors.

1 Bellarmine, lib. 5, c. 6, not 5, de Laicis.

3. It is false that Saul and David's call to royalty was only from God, " by a special ordinance sent from heaven," for their office is (Deut. xvii. 14) from the written word of Grod, as the killing of idolaters, (ver. 3, 7)) and as the office of the priests and Levites, (ver. 8 — 10,^ and this is no extraordinary office from neaven, more than that is from heaven which is warranted by the word of God. If he mean that these men, Saul and David, were created kinss only by the extraordinary revelation of God iom heaven, it is a He ; for besides the prophetical anointing of them, they were made kings by the people, as the Word saith expressly ; except we say that David sinned in not setting himself doWli on the throne, when Samuel first anointed him king ; and so he should have made away with his master, king Saul, out of the world ; and there were not a few called to the throne by the people, but many, yea, all the kings of Israel and of Judah.

4. The prelate contendeth that a king is designed to his royal dignity '* immediately from Grod, without an extraordinary revelation from heaven," as the man is '^ designed to be a pastor by men, and yet the power of

E reaching is immediately from Grod," &c. ; ut he proveth nothing, except he prove that all pastors are called to be pastors immediately J and that God calleth and designeth to the office such a person immediately as he hath immediately instituted by the power of preaching and the apostleship, and hath immediately infiised the soul in the body by an act of creation; and we cannot conceive how God in our days, when there are no extraordinary revelations, doth immediately create this man a king, and immediately tie the crown to this family rather than to that. This he doth by the people now, without any prophetical unction, and by this medium, viz., the free choice of the people. He need not bring the example of Matthias more than of any ordinary pastor; and yet an ordinary pastor is not immediately called of God, because the office is from Grod immediately, and also the man is made pastor by the church.

The P. Prelate saith, (c. 2, p. 20—23,) A thing is immediately from God three ways. 1st, When it is solely from Grod, and presupposeth nothing ordinary or human antecedent to the ob&ning of it. Such was the power of Moses, Saul and David; such were the apostles. 2d, When the collation

of the power to each a person is immediatelj from 6od, thot^h 8(Hne act of man be antecedent, as Mattnias was an aposde. A baptised man obtaineth remission and regeneration, jet aspersion of water cannot produce these excellent effects. A king givetn power to a £i.yourite to make a lord or a baron, jet who is so stupid as to aver, that the honour of a lord cometh immediatelj from the &- vourite and not frx>m the king. 3d, When a man hath, bj some ordinary human right, a full and just right, and tne approbation and oonfrrmation of this right is immediate'^ ly from Grod.

The first waj, sovereigntj is not from God. The second waj, sovereientj is conferred on kings immediatelj: mough some created act of election, succession or conquest intervene, .the int^posed act containeth not in it power to confer sovereigntj; as in baptism, regeneration) if there be nothing repugnant ia the recipient, is con ferr3, not bj water, but immeduitelj bj God. In sacred orders, deeognation is from men, power to supernatural acts from Gh)d. Election, succession, conquests^ remotelj and improperlj constitute a King. To saj in the third sense, that sovereiffn^ is immediatelj from God bj approbation or confirmation onlj, is against Scripture, Proy. yiii. 16 ; Psal. Ixxxviii. 8 ; John xix. ; then the people saj. You are God's, jour power is from below* And Paul's " ordained of God," is " approved and confiimed onlj of Grod;" the power of designation, or application of the person to rojaltj, is from man; the power of conferring royal power, or of applying the person to rojal power, is from God. A man's hand may apply a &ggot to the fire, the fire onlj mskketn tne faggot to bum.

Answer, 1st, Apostles, both according to their ofiice and the designation of their person to the office, were immediately and onlj from God, without anj act of the people, and therefore are badlj coupled with the rojal power of David and kmg Saul, who were not formallj made kings but bj the people at Mizpeh and Hebron. 2d, The second waj Go<i giveth rojal power, bj moving the people's nearts to confer rojal power, and this is virtually in the people, formallj from Grod. Water nath no influence to produce grace, God's institution and promise doth it; except jou dream with jour Jesuits, of omw operatumy that water sprinkled, bj the domg of the deed, conferreth grace, nisi pondtur obex, what can the child

do, or one baptised child more than another, to hinder the flux of remission of sins, if jou mean not that baptism worketh as phjsic on a sick man, except strength of humours hindei:? and therefore this comparison is not alike. The people cannot produce so noble an effect as rojaltj, — a beam from God. True, formally thej cannot, but virtually it is in a societj of reasonable men, in whom are left beams of authoritative maj est j, which bj a divine institution thej can give (Deut. xvii. 14) to this man, to IJavid, not to Eliab. And I could well saj the fitvourite made the lord, and placed honour in the man whom he made lord, bj a borrowed power firom his prince; and jet the honour of a lord is principallj frx)m the king. 3. It is true the election of the people containeth not formallj rojal dignitj, but the Word saith, thej made Saul, thej made David king; so virtuallj election must. contain it. Samuel's oil maketh not David king, he is a subject afrer he is anointed; the people's election at Hebron maketh him king, differeth him from his brethren, and putteth him in royal state; jet God is the prmcipal agent. "V^^at immediate action God hath nere, is said and dreamed of, no man can divine, except Prophet P. Prelate. The l5w/, rojal authoritj, is given organicallj bj that act bj which he is made kmg: another act is a nightdream, but bj uie act of election, David is of no king, a xing. The collation of itrmfus^ rojal gimi, is immediatelj from God, but that formallj maketh not a king, if Solomon saw right, ^' servants riding on horses, princes going on foot." 4th, Judge of the rrelate's subtiltj, — I dare saj not nis own; he stealeth from Spalato, but telleth it not, — " The appljing of the person to rojal authoritj is from the people; but the appljing of rojal authorit J to the person of the king, is immediatelj and onlj from Grod; as the hand putteth the faggot to the fire, but the fire maketh it bum." To applj the subject to the accident, is it anj thing else but to applj the accident to the subject? Eojal authoritj is an accident, the person of the king the subject. The appljing of the faggot to the fire, and the appljing of the fire to the faggot, are all one, to anj one not forsaken of common sense. When the people appljeth the person to the royal authoritj, tnej but put the person in tne state of rojsJ authoritj; this is to make an union betwixt the man and rojal authoritj, and this is to applj rojal authoritj to the per-

LSX, REX ; OR,

son. 5th, The third sense is the Prelate's dream, not a tenet of ours. We never said that sovereignty in the king is immediately from Qod By approbation or confirmation only, as if the people first made the king, and G<h1 did only by a posterior and latter act say Amen to the deed done^ and subscribe, as recorder, to what the people doth: so the people should deal cro¥ms and kingdoms at their pleasure, and Grod behoove to ratify and make good their act. When Qod doth apply the person to royal power, is this a different action from the people's applying the person to royal dimiity? It is not ima ginable But the people, by creating a king, applyeth the person to royal disnlty; and God, by the people's act of oonstS^uting the man king, doth by the mediation of tins act convey royal authority to the man, as the church by sending a man and ordaining him to be a pastor) doth not by that) as God's instruments, infuse supernatural powers of preaching; these supernatural powers may be, and often are in nim before ne be in orders. And sometimes God infiiseth a supernatural power of government in a man when he is not yet a ling, as the Lord turned Saul intQ another man, (1 Sam. x. 5, 6,) neither at that point of time when Samuel anointed him, but afterwards: *' After that thou shalt come to the hill of God, the Spirit of the Lord shall come upon thee, and thou shalt prophesy with them, and shalt be turned into another man;" nor yet at that time when he is formally made king by the people; for Saul was not king formally because of Saitiuel's anointing, nor yet was he king because another spirit was infused into him, (v. 6, 6) for he was yet a private man till the states of Israel chose hun king at Mizpeh. And the word of God used words of action to express the people's power: Judg. ix. 6, And all the men of oechem gathered together^ and all the men of Millo^

O* Son regna/re fecerunty they caused him to be king. The same is said 1 Sam. x* 15, They caused Saul to reign; 2 Kings x. 15,

2^*K'^^)33 t*^ We shall not king any

man ; 1 Chron. xii. 38, They came to He-

•

over all Israel; Deut. xvii. three times the

making of a king is given to the people.

be imposed on them not to make a stranger their Idngi 1 Kings xii. 20, All the congregation kinged ieroboam, or made him king over all Israel; 2 Kings xi. 12, They kinged Joash) or made Joatti to reign. 6, the people are to say. You are God's, and your power is below, saith the Prelate: What then? therefore their power is not from God also? It followeth not subordi'- ndta rum pugnant* The Scripture saith both, the Lord exalted David to be king, and) all power is from Qod^ and so the power of a lord mayor of a city! the people made David king) and the people maketh such a man lord mayor. It is the Anabaptists' argument,-^God writeth his law in our heart, and teacheth his own children \ therefore books and the ministry of men are needless. So all sciences and lawfiil arts are from God; therefore sciences applied to men are not from men's free will, industry and studies. The prelate extolleth the king when he will have his royalty from God, the way that John Stiles is the husband of such a woman.

P. Pretoe.-^Kings are of (Jod, they are God's, children of the Most High, his ser* vants, public ministerS)^-their sword and judgment are Grod's. This he hath said of their royalty in abstracto and in concreto; their power, person, charge, are all of divine extract, and so their authority and person are both sacred and inviolable.^

Ans. — So are all the congregation of the

~ res; Fsal* Ixxxii. 1, 6, All of them are I's; for he speaketh not there of a congregation of kings. So are apostles, their office and persons of Grod; and so the prelates (as they think), the successors of the apostles, are God's servants; their ministry, word, rod of discipline, not theirS) but of Grod. The judgment of judgeS) inferior to the king) is the Lord's judgment) not men's. Deut* i% 17 ; 2 Chron. xix. 6, Hence by the Prelate's logic, the persons of ^relateS) mayors) bailiff) constables, pastors, are sacred and inviolable above all lawS) as are kings. Is this an extolling of kings? But where are kings' persons, as men, said to be of God, as the royalty in abstracto is? The Prelate seeth beside his book, (Psal. Ixxxii. 7,) " But ye shall die like men."

P, Prelate.-— We begin with the law, in which, as Grod by himseu prescribed the essentials, substantials, and ceremonies of his piety and worship, gave order for piety and

justice; Deut. xviu 14^ 15, the king is here originallj and immediately from God, and independent from all othfers* " Set over ihem^^-^thenH is collective) that is, all and every one. Scripture knoweth not this state principle,— Aea) est singulis major, univefsis rMnor^ The person is expressed in concretOy " Whom tne Lord thy Grod shall choose." This peremptory precept dischargeth the people, all and every one, diffiisively) representatively, or in any Imaginable capacity to attempt the appointing of a kingi but to leave it entirely and totally to Grod Almighty^

-4n.*--Begin with the laW) but end not with traditions. If God by himself prescribed the essentials of piety and worsnip, the other part of your distinction is, that God, not by himself^ but by his prelates, appointed the whole Romish rites, as accidentals of piety. This is the Jesuits' doctrine. This place is so far from proving the king to be independent, and that it totally is God's to appoint a king, that it expressly giveth the people power to appoint a king ; K>r the settmg of a king over themselves, this one and not that one, makes the people to appoint the king, and the king to be less and dependent on the people, seeing God intendeth the king for the people's good, and not the peome for the king's good. This text shametn the Prelate, who also confessed, (p% 22,) that remotely and improperly, succession, election, and conquest maketh the king, and so it is lawM for men remotely and improperly to invade God's chair^

P. Prelate,-^ em\t& and puritans say, it was a privilege of the Jews that God chose their king. So Suarez, Soto, Navarra.

Ans, — The Jesuits are the Prelate^s brethren, they are under one banner, — ^we are in contrary camps to Jesuits* ^ The Prelate said himself, (p* 19,) Moses, Saul, and David, were by extraordinary revelation from Grod. Sure I am kings are not so now. The Jews had this privuege that no nation had. God named some mngs to them, as Saul, David,-->he doth not so now* God did tie royalty to David's house by a covenant till Christ should come, — ^he doth not so now; yet we stand to Deut. xvii.

P. Prelate^ — Prov. 8. 16, " By me kin^ reign." If the people had right to constitute a king, it had not been king Solomon, but king Adonijah. Solomon saith not of himself, but indefinitely, " By me," as by

the Author, Efficient, and Constituent, kings reign. Pef is by Chri$t, not by the people, not by the high priest, state or presbytery, — not per me tratum, by me in my anger, as some sectaries say. Paul's hmrm^ i i^5, an ordinance by high authority not revocable. Sinesius so useth the word, Aristotle, Lucilius, Appian, Plutarch, ••3 in me and by me, and also Doctor Andrews. Kin^ indefinitely, aU kings: none may distinguish where the law distinguisheth not,-^they reign in concreto. That same power that ms^eth kings must unmake them.

Ans, — 1. The prelate eannot restrict this to kings only; it extendeth to parliaments

also. Solomon addeth, tD*3ni and consuls, t3**ltfi^ all the sirs, and princes, tD^i^njI 2und magnificents, and nobles, and more V"iK *D2B^ ^3 and aU the judges of the earth, they reign, rule, and decree justice by Christ. Here, then, mayors, sheriffs, provosts, constables, are by the Prelate extolled as persons sacred, irresistible* Then, (1.) the judges of England rule not by the king of Britain, as their author, efficient, constituent, but by Jesus Christ immediately; nor doth the commissary rule by the prelate. (2.) All these, and their power, and persons, rule independently, and immediately by Jesus Christ. (3.) All inferior judges are &ye) rw Si*S, the ordinances of Grod not revocable. Therefore the king cannot deprive any judge under him; he cannot declare the parliament no parliament I once a judge, and always and irrevocably a judge. This Prelate's poor pleading for kings deserves no wages. Lavater intelligit superiores et infertores magistratus, non est potestas nisi a deo, Vatablus consiliarios, 2. If the people had absolute right to choose kings by the law of Israel, they might have chosen another than either Adonyah or Solomon; but the Lord expressly put an express law on them, that they should make no king but him whom the Lord should choose, Deut. xvii. 4. Now the Lord did either by his immediately inspired prophet anoint the man, as he anointed David, Saul, Jehu, &c., or then he restricted, by a revealed promise, the royal power to a family, and to the eldest by birth; and, therefore, the Lord first chose the man and then the people made him king. Birth was not their rule, as is clear, in mat they tnade Solomon their king, not

•b^i^a^MMI^

Adonijah, the elder; and this proveth that Grod tud both ordain kingly government to the kingdom of Israel, and chose the man, either in his person, or tied it to the firstbom of the Ime. Now we have no Scripture nor law of Grod to tie royal dignity to one man or to one &mily; produce a warrant for it in the Word, for that must be a privilege of the Jews for which we have iio word ( Grod. We have no immediately in^ spired Samuels to say^ "Make David, or this man king;" and no word of Grod to say, " Let the first-bom of this &mily rather than another £unily sit upon the throne;" therefore the peojde must make such a man king, following the rule of God's word, (Deut. xvii. 14,) and other rules showing what sort of men judges must be, as Deut. i. 16—18 ; 2 Chron. xix. 6, 7. 3. It is true, kings in a special manner reign by Christ; merefore not by the peopled free election? The P. Prelate argueth like himself: by this text a mayor of a city by the Lord decreeth justice; therefore he is not made a mayor of a city by the people of the city. It followeth not. None of us teach that kings reign by God's anger. We judge a king a great mercy of Grod to church or state; but the text saith not. By the Lord kings and judges do not only reign and decree ji^ice, but also murder protestants^ by raising against them an army of papists. And the word Jit>), powers, doth m no Greek author signify irrevocable powers; for Uzziah was a lawful king, and yet (2 Chron xxvi.) lawfully put from the throne, and " cut off from the house of the Lord." And interpreters of this passage deny that it is to be understood of tyrante. So the Chaldee paraphrase turns it well, Potentes virga justttioR:^ so Lavater and Diodatus saiui, this place doth prove, *' That all kings, judges and laws, derivari a lege cetema^ are derived from the Eternal Law." The prelate, eating his tongue for anger, striveth to prove that all power, and so royal power, is of God; but what can he make of it? We believe it, though he say (p. 30,) secta* ries prove, by i*" ^* " That a man is justified by faith only;" so there is no power but of Grod only: but feel the smeU ot a Jesuits It is the sectaries' doctrine^ that we are justified by faith only, but the prelates and the Jesuits go another way, — not by faith only, but by works also. And all power is from

Grod only, as the first Author, and from no man. What then? Therefore men and people interpose no human act in making this man a kmg and not that man. It followeth not. Let us with the Prelate join Paul and Solomon together, and say, *' That sovereignty is from Gkni, of Grod, by Grod, as Grod's appointment irrevocable." Then shall it never follow i it is inseparable from the person unless you make the king a man immortal. As God only can remove the crown, it is true Grod only can put an unworthy and an excommunicated prelate from office and benefice; but how? Doth that prove that men and the church may not also in their place remove an unworthy churchman, when the church, following God's word, delivereth to Satan? Christ only, as head of the church, excommunicateth scandalous men; therefore the church cannot do it. And yet the argument is as good the one way as the other; for all the cnurches on earth cannot make a minister properly, — ^they but design him to the minisUy whom GKkL hath gifted and called. But shall we conclude that no church on earth, but Q(A only, hj an immediate action from heaven, can deprive a minister? How, then, dare prelates excommunicate, unmake, and imprison so many ministers in the three kingdoms? But the truth is, take this one arguinent from the Prelate, and all that is in his book &lleth to the ground, — ^to wit. Sovereignty is firom Grod only. A king is a creature of God's making only; and what then? Therefore sovereignty cannot be taken from him: so Grod only made Aaron's house priests. Solomon had no law to depose Abiathar from the priesthood. Possibly tlie Prelate will grant all. The passage, Rom. xiii., which he saith hath torturod us, I refer to a fitter place -—it will be found to torture court parasites.

I go* on with the Prelate, (<5. 3,) " Sacred sovereignty is to be preserved, and kings are to be prayed for, that we may lead a godly life," 1 Tim. iii. What then? AU m authority are to be prayed for,— even parliaments; by that text pastors are to be prayed for, and without them sound religion cannot well subsist. Is this questioned, that kings should be prayed for; or are we wanting in this duty? but it followeth not that all dignities to be prayed for are immediately from Grod, not worn men.

P. Prelate. — Prov. viii., Solomon speaketh first of the establishment of government before he speaks of the works of creation;

therefore better not be at all as be without eovemment. And Grod fixed government in the person of Adam before Eve, or any one else, came into the world; and how shall government be, and we enjoy the fruits of it, except we preserve the king's sacred authority inviolable?

Ans. — 1. Moses (Gen. i,) speaketh of creation before he speaketh of xin^, and he speaketh (Gren. iii.) of Adam's sms before ne speaks of redemption through the blessed Seed; therefore better never be redeemed at all as to be without sm. 2. If Grod made Adam a governor before he made Eve, and any of mankind, he was made a father and a husband before he had either son or wife. Is this the Prelate's logic? He may prove that two eggs on his father's table are three this way. 3. There is no government where sovereignty is not kept mviolable. It is true, ^ere there is a king, sovereignty must be inviolable. What then? Arbitrary government is not sovereignty. 4. He intimateth aristocracy, and democracy, and the power of parliaments, which ms^eth kings, to be nothing but anarchy, for he speaketh here of no government but monarchy.

P. Prelate, — There is need of grace to obey the king, Psal. xviii. 43 ; cxliv, 2. It is God who subdueth the people under David. Rebellion gainst the kmg is rebellion gainst Grod. 1 Pet. ii. 17 ; Prov. xxiv. 12. Tnerefore kings have a near alliance with God.

Ans. — 1. There is much grace in papists and prelates then, who use to write and preacn against grace. 2. Lorinus your brother Jesuit wiU, with good warrant of the texts infer, that the king may make a conquest of his own kingdoms of Scotland and England by the swora, as David subdued the heathen. 3J Arbitrary governing hath no alliance with Qod; a rebel to Gk^ and his country, and an apostate, hath no reason to term lawful defence against cut-throat Irish rebellion. 4. There is need of much grace to obey pe£tors, inferior judges, masters, fCol. iii. 22, 23,^ therefore their power is m>m God immediately, and no more from men than the king is created king by the people, according to the way of roysQists.

P. Prelate. — God saith of Pharaoh, (Ex. ix. 17,) I have raised thee up. Elisha, directed by Grod, constituted the king of Syria, 2 Kings viii. 13. Pharaoh, Abimelech, Hiram, Hazael, Hadad, are no less ^

honoured with the appellation of kings, than David, Saul, &c., Jer. xxix. 9. * Nebuchadnezzar is honoured to be called, by way of excellency, Grod's servant, which Grod givetih to David, a king according to his own neart. And Isa. xlv. 1, " Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, Gyrus;" and Grod nameth him near a hundred years before he was bom; Isa. xliv. 28, " He is my ^epherd;" Dan. V. 21, Grod giveth kingdoms to whom he will; Dan. v. 21, empires, kingdoms, royalties, are not disposed of by tlie composed contracts of men, but by the immediate hand and work of God; Hos, xiii. 11, ** I gave thee a king in my anger, I took him away in my wrath;" Job, He places kings in the throne, &c.

Ans. — ^Here is a whole chapter of seven pages for one raw argument ten times before repeated. 1. Exod. ix. 7, I have raised up Pharaoh; Paul expoundeth it, (Bom. ix.) to prove that king Pharaoh was a vessel of wrath fitted for. destruction by Grod's absolute will; and the Prelate foUovring Arminius, with treasonable charity, applieth this to our king. Can this man pray for the king? 2. Elisha anointed, but did not constitute, Hazael king; he foretold he should be king; and n he be a king of Grod's making, who slew his sick prince and invaded the mrone by innocent blood, judge you, I would not take kings of the Prelate's making. 3. If Grod give to Nebuchadnezzar tne same title or the servant of God, which is given to Daniel, (Psal. xviii. 1, and cxvi. 16 ;) and to Moses, (Jos. i. 2,) all kings, because kings, are men according to God's heart. Why is not royalty then founded on grace? Nebuchadnezzar was not otherwise his servant, than he was the hammer of the earth, and a tyrannous conqueror of the Lord's people. All the heatnen kings are called kmss. But how came they to their thrones for the most part? As David and Hezekiah? But Grod anointed them not by his prophets; they came to their kingdoms by tne people's election, or by blood and rapine; tne latter way is no ground to you to deny Athaliah to be a lawnil princess — she and Abimelech were lawfiil princes, and their sovereignty, as immediately and independently from God, as the sovereignty of many heathen kings. See then how justly Athaliah was kiUed as a bloody usurper of the throne; and this would licence your brethren, the Jesuits, to stab heathen kings, whom you will have as

well kings, as the Lord's anointed, though Nebuchadnezzar and many of them made their way to the throne, against all law of God and man, through a bloody pitent. 4. Gyros is God's anointed and his shepherd too, therefore his arbitrary government is a sovereignty immediately depending on Grod, and above all law; it is a wicked consequence. 5. God named Gyrus near a hundred years ere he was bom; God named and desired Judas very individually, and named the ass that Christ should ride on to Jerusalem, (Zach. ix. 9,) some more hundred years than one. What, will the Prelate make them independent kings for that? 6. God giveth kingdoms to whom he will. What then? This will prove kingdoms to be as independent and immediately from God as kings are; for as God givetn kings to kingdoms, so he giveth kingdoms to kings, and no doubt he giveth kingdoms to whom he will. So he giveth prophets, apostles, pastors, to whom he will; and he giveth tyrannous conquests to whom he will; and it is Nebuchadnezzar to whom Daniel speaketh that from the Lord, and he had no just title to many kingdoms, especially to the kingdom of Judah, which yet God, the King of kings, gave to him because it was his good pleasure; and if God had not commanded tnem by the mouth of his prophet Jeremiah, might they not have risen, and, with the swora, have vindicated themselves and their own liberty, no less than they lawfully, by the sword, vindicated themselves from under Moab, (Judges iii.,) and from under Jabin, king of Canaan, who, twenty years, mightily oppressed the children of Israel, Judges iv. Now this P. Prelate, by all these instances, making heathen kings to be kings by as good a title as David and Hezekiah, condemneth the people of Grod as rebels, if, being subdued and conquered by the Turk and Spanish king, they should, by the sword, recover their own liberty; and that Israel, and the saviours which God raised to them, had not warrant from the law of nature to vindicate themselves to liberty, which was taken from them violently and unjustly by the sword. From all this it shall well follow that the tyranny of bloody conquerors is immediately and only dependent firom God, no less than lawM sovereignty; for Nebuchadnezzar's sovereignty over the people of God, and many other kingdoms also, was revenged of (}od as tyranny, Jer. 1. 6, 7 ; and therefore

the vengeance of the Lord, and the venfeance of his temple, came upon him and is land, Jer. 1. 16, &c. It is true the people of God were commanded of €rod to submit to the king of Babylon, to serve him, and to pray for nim, and to do the contrary was rebellion; but this was not because the king of Babylon was their king, and because the King of Babylon had a command of Grod so to bring under his yoke the people of God. So Christ had a commandment to suffer the death of the cross, (John x, 18,) but had Herod and Pilate any warrant to crucify him? None at all. 7. He saith. Royalties, even of heathen kings, are not disposed of by the composed contracts of men, but by the immediate hand and work of Gk)d. But the contracts of men to give a kingdom to a person, which a heathen community may lawfully do, and so by contract dispose of a kingdom, is not opposite to the immediate hand of God, appointing royalty and monarchy at his own blessed liberty. Lastly he saith, God took away Saul in his wrath; but I pray you, did God only do it? Then had Saul, because a king, a patent royal from God to kill himself^ for so God took him away; and we are rebels by this, if we suffer not the king to kill himself. Well pleaded.

QUESTION VI.

WHETHER THE KING BE SO FROM GOD ONLY, BOTH IN REGARD OF HIS SOVEREIGNTY AND OF THE DESIGNATION OF HIS PERSON TO THE CROWN, AS THAT HE IS NO WAY FROM THE PEOPLE, BUT BY MERE APPROBATION.

Dr Feme, a man much for monarchy, saith, Though monarchy hath its excellency, being first set up of God, in Moses, yet neither monarchy, aristocracy, nor any other form, is jure divino^ but " we say (saith heV- the power itself, or that sufficiency of authority to govern that is in a monarchy or aristocracy, abstractly considered from the qualification of other forms, is a flux and constitution subordinate to that providence; an ordinance of that dixi or silent word by which the world was made, and shall be governed under God." This is a great debasing of the Lord's anointed, 1 1 II ^^^^^ . "

for sa sovereignty hath no warrant in God's word, formalfy as it is sach a government, hut is in the world bj providence, as sin is, and as the falling of a sparrow to the ground: whereas God's word hath not only commanded that ffovemment should be, but that fa* thers ana mothers should be; and not only that politic rulers should be, but tiso kings by name, and other judges aristocratic^ should be. Bom. xiii. 3 ; Dent, xvii. 14 ; 1 Pet. ii, xvii, ; Prov. xxiv, 21 ; Prov. xv. 16, If the power of monarchy and aristocracy, abstracted from the forms, be firom Grod, then it is no more lawful to resist aristocratical government and our lords of parliament or judges, than it is lawful to resist kings.

nut hear the Prelate's reasons to prove that the king is from the people by approbation only, *' The people (Deut, xvii.) are said to set a king over them only as (1 Cor. vi.) the saints are said to judge the world, that is, by consenting to Cmist s judgment: 80 the people do not make a king by transferring on him sovereignty, but by accepting, acknowledging, and reverencing him as king, whom G^ nath both constituted and designed king."

Ans.^^h This is said, but not a word proved, fer the Queen of Sheba and Hiram acknowledged, reverenced and obeyed Solo* mon as kmg, and yet they made him not king, BS the princes of Israel did. 2, Beverence and obedience of the people is relative to the king's laws, but the people's making of a king is not relative to the laws of a king; for then he should be a king giving laws and commanding the people as king, before the people m^e him king, 3, If the people's approving and oonsenting that an elected kin^ be their king, presupposeth that he is a kmg, designed and constituted by God, before the people approve him as kdnff, let the P, Prelate give us an act of Gol now designing a man king, for there is no immediate voice hxm heaven saying to a peor4e. This is your king, before the people elect one of six to be their king. And this in&llibly proveth that Grod designeth one of six to be a king, to a people wno had no king before, by no other act but by determining the hearts of the states to elect and des^ this man king, and pass any of the other five, 4, When Gk)d (Deut, xvii.) forbiddeth them to choose a stranger, he presupposeth they may choose a stranger; for God's tew now given to man in the

state of sin, presupposeth he hath corruption of nature to do contrary to Grod's kw. Now if God did hold forth that their setting a king over them was but the people's approving the man whom God shall both constitute and design to be king, then he should presuppose that God was to design a stranger to be the tew^ king of Israel, and the people should be interdicted to approve and consent that the man should be kmg whom God should choose; for it was impossible that the people should make a stranger king (God is the only immediate king-creator), the people should only approve and consent that a stranger should be Jdng; yet, upon supposition uiat Grod first constituted and designed the stranger king, it was not in the people's power that the kmg should be a brother rather than a stranger, for if the people have no power to make a king, but do onlv approve him or consent to him, when he is both made and designed of Grod to be king, it is not in their power that he be either brother or stranger, and so Grod commandeth what is simp^ impossible. Consider the sense of the command by the Prelate's vain logic: I Jehovah, as I only create the world ofnothing, so I only constitute and design a man, whether a Jew or Nebuchadnezzar, a stranger, to be your king; yet I inhibit you, under the pain of my curse, that you set any king over yourselves, but only a brother. What is this, but I inhibit you to be creators by omnipotent power? 5. To these add the reasons I produced before, that the people, by no shaclow of reason, can be commanded to make this man king, not that man, if they only consent to the man niade king, but have no action in the making of the Jdng.

P. Prelate. — All the acts, real and imaginable, which are necessary for the making of kings, are ascribed to God. Take the first kmg as a ruling case, 1 Sam. xii. 13, ^' Behold the king whom ye have chosen, and whom ye have desired; and, behold, the Lord hath set a king over you!" This election of the people can be no other but their admittance or acceptance of the king whom Grod hath chosen and constituted, as the words, " whom ye have chosen," imply. 1 Sam. ix. 17 ; 1 Sam. x, 1, You have Saul's election and constitution, where Samuel, as priest and prophet, anointeth him, doing reverence and obeisance to him,, and ascribing to God, that he did appoint him supreme and sovereign over his iimerltance.

LEX, REX ; OR,

And the same expression is, (1 Sam. xii. 18,) ** The Lord hath set a king over you;" which is, Psal. ii. 6, " I have set my king upon my holy hill of Zion." Neither man nor angel hath any share in any act of constituting Christ king. Deut. xvii. the Lord vindicateth, as proper and peculiar to himself, the designation of the person. It was not arbitrary to the people to admit or reject Saul so designed. It pleased God to consummate the work by the acceptation, con^ sent and approbation of the people, ut sua-* more modo, that by a smoother way he might encourage Saul to undergo the hard charge, and make his people the more heartily, with-> out grumbling and scruple, reverence and obey him. The people's admittance possibly added something to the solemnity and to the pomp, but nothing to the essential and real constitution or necessity; it only puts the subjects in mala Jide, if they should contravene, as the intimation of a law, the coronation of an hereditary king, the enthronement of a bishop. And 1 Kings, iii. 7, " Thou hast made thy servant king;" 1 Sam. xvi. 1, " I have provided me a king;" Psal. xviii. 60, He is God's king; Ps. Ixxxix. 19, " I have exalted one chosen out of the

eople ;" (ver. 20,) He anointeth them ;

ver. 27,) adopteth them: " I will make him my first-bom." The first-bom is above every brother severally, and above all, though a thousand jointly.

Ans, — 1. By this reason, inferior judges are no less immediate deputies of God, and so irresistible, than the xing, because God took off the spirit that was on Moses, and immediately poured it on the seventy elders, who were judges inferior to Moses, Num. ii. 14 — 16. 2. This P. Prelate cannot make a syllogism. If all the acts necessary to make a king be ascribed to God, none to the people, then God both constituteth and designeth the king — ^but the former the Scripture saith; merefore, if all the acts be ascribed to God, as to the prime king-maker and disposer of kings and kingdoms, and none to the people, in that notion, then God both constituteth and designeth a king. Both major and minor are false. The major is as false ajs the very P. Prelate himself. All the acts necessary for war-mak^ ing are, in an eminent manner, ascribed to God, as (1.) The Lord fighteth for his own people. (2.) The Lord scattered the enemies. (3.) The Lord slew Og, king of Bashan. (4.) The battle is the Lord's. (6.)

The victory the Lord's; therefore Israel never fought a battle. So Deut. xxxii.. The Lord alone led his people — the Lord led them in the wilderness — their bow and their sword gave them not the land. God wrought all Sieir works for them, (Isa. xxvi. 12 ;) therefore Moses led them not; therefore the people went not on their own legs through the wilderness; therefore the people never shot an arrow, never drew a sword. It followeth not. God did all ttiese as the first, eminent, principal, and efficacious pre^eter'- minator of the creature (though this Arminian and popish prelate mind not so to honour God). The assumption is also false, for the people made Saul and David kings; and it were ridiculous that God should command them to make a brother, not a stranger, king, if it was not in their power whether ne should be a Jew, a Scythian, an Ethiopian, who was their king, if God did only, without t^em, both choose, constitute, design the person, and perform all acts essential to make a king; and the people had no more in them but only to admit and consent, and that for the solemnity and pomp, not for the essential constitution of the king. 1 Sam. ix. 17; 1 Sam. x. 1, we have not Saul elected and constituted king. Samuel did obeisance to him and kissed him, for the honour royal which God was to put upon him; for, before this proj)hetical unction, (1 Sam. ix, 22,) he made him sit in the chief place, and honoured him as king, when as yet Samuel was materially king and the Lord's vicegerent in Israel. If, then, the Prelate con^ elude any thing from Samuel's doing reverence and obeisance to him as king, it shall follow that Saul was formally king, before Samuel (1 Sam. x. 1) anointed him and kissed him, and tl^at must be before he was formally Mng, otherwise he was in God's appointment king, before ever he saw Samuel's face; and it is true he ascribeth honour to him, as to one appointed by God to be supreme sovereign, for that which he should be, not for that which he was, as (1 Sam. ix. 22) he set him in the chief

Elace; and, therefore, it is false ^at we ave Saul's election and constitution to be king, (1 Sam. x.,) for after that time the people are rebuked for seeking a king, and that with a purpose to dissuade them fi:om it as a sinful desire: and he is chosen by lots after that and made king, and after Samuel's anointing of him he was a private man, and did hide himself amongst the stuff.

ver. 22. 3. The Prelate, from ignorance or vdlfuUy, I know not, saith, The expreaiion and phrase is the same, 1 Sam. xii. 13, and Psal. ii. 6, which is false; for 1 Sam. xii, 13,

Behold the Lord hath given you a king, such is the expression; Hos. xiii. 11, 1 gave them a king in my wrath, hut that is not the

expression in Psalm ii, 6, hut this, O /D *nDD3 ONI "But I have estabhshed him my king;" and though it were the same expression, it followeth not that the people Imve no hand any other way in appointing Christ their head, (though that phrase also be in the Word, Hos. i. 11,) than by consenting and believing in him as king; but this proveth not that the people, in appointing a king, hath no hand but naked approbation, for the same phrase doth not express the same action; nay, the judges are to kiss Christ, (Psal. ii. 12,) the same way, and by the same action, that Samuel kissed Saul, (1 Sam. x. 1,) and the idolaters kissed the calves, (Hos. xiii. 2 ;) for the same Hebrew word is used in all the three places, and yet it it certain the first kissing is spiritual, the second a kiss of honour, and the third an idolatrous kissing. 4. The anointing of Saul cannot be a leading rule to the making of all kings to the wond's end; for the P. Prelate, forgetting himself, said, that only some few, as Moses, Saul, and David, &c., by extraordinary manifestation from heaven, were made kings, (p. 19.) 5. He saith it was not arbitrary for the people to admit or reject Saul so designed. What meaneth he. It was not morally arbitrary, because they were under a law (Deut. xvii. 14, 15) to make him king whom the Lord should choose. That is true. But was it not arbitrary to them to break a law physically? I think he, who is a professed Arminian, will not so side with Manicheans and fatalists. But the P. Prelate must prove it was not arbitrary, either morally or physically, to them not to accept Saul as their king, because they had no action at all in the making of a king. God did it all, both by constituting and designing the king. Why then did God (Deut. xvii!) give a law to them to make this man king, not that man, if it was not in their free wiU to have any action or hand in the making of a king at all? But that some sons of Belial would not accept him as their king, is expressly said, (1 Sam. x. 27 ;) and how did Israel

conspire with Absalom to unking and dethrone David, whom the Lord nad made king? If the Prelate mean it was not arbitrary to them physically to reject Saul, he speaketh wonders; the sons of iBelial did reject him, therefore they had physical power to do it. If he mean it was not arbitrary, that is, it was not lawful to them to reject him, that is true; but doth it follow they had no hand nor action in making Saul king, because it was not lawful for them to make a king in a sinful way, and to re^e him whom God choose to be king? Then see what I infer. (1.) That they had no hand in obeying him as king, because they sinned in obeymg unlawful commandments against God's law, and so they had no hand in approving and consenting he should be king; the contrary whereof the P. Prelate saith. (2.) So might the P. Prelate prove men are passive, and have no action in violating all the commandments of Grod, because it is not lawful to them to violate any one commandment. 6. The Lord (Deut. xvii.) vindicates this, as proper and peculiar to himself, to choose the person, and to choose Saul. What then? Therefore now the people, choosing a king, have no power to choose or name a man, because God anointed Saul and David by immediate manifestation of his will to Samuel; this consequence is nothing, and also it followeth in nowise, that therefore the people made not Saul king. 7. That the people's approbation of a kmg is not necessary, is the saying of Bellarmine and the papists, and that tne people choose their ministers in the apostolic church, not by a necessity of a divine commandment, but to conciliate love betwixt pastor and people. Papists hold that if tne Pope msike a popish king the head and king of Britain, agsunst the people's will, yet is he their king. 8. David was then kmg all the time Saul persecuted him. He sinned, truly, in not discharging the duty of a king, only because he wanted a ceremony, the people's approbation, which the Prelate saith is required to the solemnity and pomp, not to the necessity, and truth, and essence, of a formal king. So the king's coronation oath, and the people's oath, must.be ceremonies; and because the Prelate is perjured himself, therefore perjury is but a ceremony also. 9. The. enthronement of bishops is Uke the kinging of the Pope. The apostles must spare thrones when they come to heaven, (Luke xxii. 29, 30 ;) the popish

LEX, REX ; OR)

prelates, with theii* head the Pope, must be enthroned. 10. The hereditary king he niaketh a king before his coronation^ and his acts are as valid before as after his coro* nation. It might cost him his head to say that the Prince of Wales is now king of Britain, and his acts acts of kingly royalty^ no less than our sovereign is king of Britain, if laws and parliaments nad their own vigour from royal authority. 1 1 . I allow that kings be as high as God hath placed them, but that Grod said of all kings, ** I will make him my first-born/' &c., Pral. Ixzzix. 26, 27,' — which is true of Solomon as the type, 2 Sam. vii. ; 1 Chron. xvii. 22; 2 Sam. vu, 12 ; and fiilfilled of Christ) and by the Holy Ghost spoken of him, (Heb. i. 6, 6,)— is blasphemous; for God said not to Nero, Julian^ tHo* clesian, Belshazzar, £vil-merodach, who were lawful kings, " I will mi^e him my first* bom;" and that any of these blasphemous idolatrous princes should cry to God, " He is my fadier, my Grod," &c., is divinity well* beseeming an excommunicated prelate. Of the king°s dignity above the kingdom I speak not now } the Prelate pulled it in by the hair, but hereafter we shall hear of it.

P. Prelate (p. 43, 44). — God only anointed David, (1 Sam. xvi. 4,) the men of Bethlehem, yea, Samuel knew it not before. God saith, " With mine holy oil have I anointed him," Psal. Ixxxix. 91 . 1 . He is the Lord's anointed^ 2. The oil is Grod's, not from the apothecary's shop, nor the priest's viaJ^ — ^this on descended frota the Holy Ghost, who is no less the true olive than Girist is the true vine; yet not the oil of saving grax^e, as some fantastics say, but holy. (1.) From the author, God. (2.) From influence in the person, it maketli the person of the king sacred. (3.) From influence on his charge^ his fimction and power is sacred.

Ans. — 1. The Prelate said before, David's anointing was extraordinary; here he draweth this anointing to all kings. 2. Let David be formally both constituted and designed king divers years before the states made him king at Hebron, and then (1.) Saul was not king, — the Prelate wiU term that treason, (2.) This was a dry oil. David's person was not made sacred, nor his authority sacred by it, for he remained a private man, and called Saul his king, his master, and himself a subject. (3.) This oil was, no doubt, Grod's oil, and the Prelate will have it the Holy Ghost's, yet he denieth that saving grace, yea, (p. 2. c. i.) he denieth

that any supernatural gift should be the foundation of royal di?mty, and that it is a pernicious tenet, do to me he would have the oil from heaven, and yet not from heaven. (4.) This hcAj oil, wherewith David was anointed, (Psal* Ixxxix. 20,) is the oil of saving grace;^ his own dear brethren, the papists, say so, and especially Lyranus,* Glossa ordinaria, Hugo C^rdinalis,' his beloved Beilarmine, and Lorinus, Galvin, Musculus, Marl(*atus. If these be fanatics, if as I think they are to the Prelate,) yet tke text is evident that this oil of God was the oil of saving grace, bestowed on David as on a spedal t3rpe of Christ, who received the Spirit above measure, and Ivas the anointed of God, (Psal. xlv, 7,) whereby all his "garments smell of myrrh, aloes and cassia," (ver. 6,) and '* his name Messiah is as ointment poured out, (Song, i.) This anointed shall be head of his enemies. " His dominion shall be fiK>m the sea to the rivers,^' ver. 25. He is in the covenant of grace, ver. 26. He is *^ higher than the kings of the earth." The grace of perseverance is promised to his seed, ver. 28'^80. His kingdom is eternal " as the days of heaven," ver. 85, 86. If the Prelate will look under himself to Dio- <[atus and Ainsworth,^ this holy oil was poured on David by Samuel, and on Ghrist was poured the Holy Ghost, and that by warrant of Scripture, (1 Sam. xvi. 1 ; xiii. 14 ; Luke iv. 18, 21 ; John iii. 84,) and Junius^ and MoUerus* saith with them. Now the Prelate taketh the court way, to pour this oil of grace on many dry princes, who, without all doubt, are kings essentially no less than David. He must see bett^ than the man who, finding Pontius Pilate in the Creed, said, he behooved to be a good man; so, because he hath found Kero the tyrant, Julian the apostate, Nebuchadnezzar, £vil-merodach, Hazael, Hagag, all the kings of Spain, and, I doubt not, the Great Tuft, in rsal. Ixxxix. 19, 20, so all tkese kings are anointed with the oil of grace, and all these must make their enemies' necks their footstool. All these be higher than the kings of the earth, and are nard and fast in the covenant of grace, &c.

1 Aug. in locnm, nnki maniim forteni, serrum obedientexn ideo in eo posni ftdjntorinm.

9 Lyranns Gratia 68t habitnalis, quia Btat pngil contra diabolnm.

s Hngo Cardinalis, Oleo latitiae quo pras oonsortibns nnctns fnit Christns, Pa, llr.

* Ains worth, Annot.

THB LAW AXD THE PRINCE.

P. Prelate. — All the royal ensigns and acts of kings are ascribed to God. The crown is ot Grod, Isa. bdi. 3 ; Fsal. xxi. 3. In the em^^eron^ coin was a hand patting a erown on their head. The heathen said they were ^Mmfuf, as holding their crowns &om God. Fsal. xviii. 39, Thou hast ^rt me with strength (the sword is the emblem of strength) unto battle. See Judff. vii. 17, Their sceptre God's sceptre. £xod. iv. 20 ; Tm. 9, We read of two rods, Moses' and Aaron's; Aaron's rod budded: G^ made both the rods. Their judgment is the Lord's, 2 C^iroB. xix. 6 ; their throne is God's, 1 Giron. xix. 21. The fathers called them, sacra vestigia^ sacra majestas, — ^their oommandment, divalis jussto* The law saith, all their goods are res sacras. Therefore our new statists disgrace kings, if they biaspheme not God, in makmg them the derivativeB of the people, — the basest extract (^ the basest of irrational creatures, the multitude, the commonalty.

Aiujs, — This is all one argument from the Prelate's beginning of his book to the end: In a most special and eminent act of God's pravidence xings are from God; but, therefore, they are not from men and men's con* sent. It foUoweth not. From a most special and eminent act of God's providence Christ came into the world, and took on him our nature, therefore he came not of David's loins. It is a vain consequence. Th^re could not be a more eminent act than this, (Fsal. xl.) " A body thou hast given me;" therefore he came not of David's house, and from Adam by natural generation, and was not a man like us in all things except sin. It is tyrannical and domineering logic. Many (imigB are ascribed to God only, by reascm c a special and admirable act of providence,-'-<a8 the saving of the world by Christ, the giving of Caiman to Israel, the bringing his people out from Egypt and from Chaldee, the sending of the gospel to both Jew and G-entile, &c. ; but, mm we say that Grod did none of these things by tiie ministry of men, and weak and trail men? 1, How proveth the Prelate that all royal ensigns are ascribed to God, because (Isa. Ixii.) the church universal shall be as a crown of glory and a royal; diadem in the hand of the Lord; therefore, bcBcultis in angulo, the church shall be as a seal on the heart of Christ. What then? Jerome, Procopius, Cyrillus, with ^od reason, render the meaning thus: Thou,

Zion and church, shalt be to me a royal priesthood, and a holv people. For that he speaketh of his own kingdom and church is most evident, (ver. 1, 2,) " For Zion's sake I will not hold my peace," &c. 2. Grod put a crovm of pure gold on David's head, (Psal. xxi. 3,) therefore Julian, Nero, and no elective kings, are made and designed to be kings by the people. He shaU never prove this consequence* The Chaldee paraphrase applietn it to the reign of Kmg Messiah; Diodatus speaketh of we kingdom of Christ; Ainsworth noaketh this crown a sign of CSirist's victory; Athanasius, £usebius, Origen, Augustine, Dydimus, expound it of Cluist and his kingdom. The rrekte extendeth it to all kmgs, as the blasphemous rabbins, especially Rabbin Salomon, deny that he speaketh of Christ here. But what more reason is there to expound this of the crowns of all kings given by God, (which I deny not,) to Nero, Julian, &c., than to expound the foregoing and following verses as appUed to all kmgs? Did Julian rejoice in God's salvation? did God grant Nero his heart's desire? did Grod grant (as it is, ver. 4,) life eternal to heathen kings as kings? which words all interpreters expound of me etemitv of David's throne, tiU Christ come, and of victory and life eternal purchased by Christ, as Ainsworth, with good reason, expounds it. And what though Grod gave David a crown, was it not by second causes, and by bowing all Israel's heart to come in sincerity to Hebron to make David king? 1 Kings xii. 38. God gave com and wine to Israel, (Hos. ii.) and shall the prelate and the anabaptist infer, therefore, he giveth it not by plou^ng, sowing, and the art of the husbandman? 3. The heathen acknowledgeth a divinity in kings, but he is blind who readeth them and seeth not in thmr writings that they teach that the people maketh kings. 4. God girt David with strength, while he was a private man, and persecuted bv Saul, and fought with Golian, as the title of the same beareth; and he made him a valiant man of war, to break bows of steel; therefore he ^veth the sword to kings as kings, and they receive no sword from me people. This is poor logic. 5. The P. Prelate sendeth us (Judg. vii. 17,) to the singular and extraordinary power of God with Gideon; and, I say, that same power behooved to be in Oreb and Zeeb, (ver. 27,) for they were ♦njj^ princes, and such as the Prelate, from Prov, vii. 15,

saith have no power from the people. 6* Moses' and Aaron's rods were miraculous. This will prove that priests are also God's, and their persons sacred. I see not (except the Prelate would he at worshipping of re-^ lies) what more royal divinity is in Moses' rod, because he wrought miracles by his rod, than there is in Eujah's staff, in Peter's napkin, in Paul's shadow* This is like the strong symbolical theology of his fathers the Jesuits, which is not argumentative, except he say that Moses, as king of Jeshurun, wrought miracles; and why should not Negro's, Caligula's, Pharaoh's, and all kings' rods then dry up the Red Sea, and work miracles? 7. We give all the styles to kings that the fathers gave, and yet we think not when David commandeth to kill Uriah, and a king commandeth to murder his innocent subjects in England and Scotland, that that is divalis jussio, the com* mand of a god; and that this is a good consequence — -Whatever the king Commandeth, though it were to kill his most loyal subjects, is the commandment of Grod; therefoi-e the king is not made king by the people. 8. Therefore, saith he, these new statists disgrace the king. If a new statist, sprung out of a poor pursuivant of Crail — from Sie dunghill to the court — could have made himself an old statist, and more expert in state affairs than all the nobles and soundest lawyers in Scotland and England, this might have more weight* 9 Thei'efbre the king (saith P. P.) is not "the extract of the basest of rational creatures*" He meanethj fex populiy his dwn house and lineage; but God calleth them his own people, '* a royal priesthood j a chosen generation;" and Psal. Ixxviii. 71, will warrant us to say, the people is much worthier before God than one man, seeing God chose David for " Jacob his people, and Israel his inheritance," that he might feed them. John Pi P*'s father's suffrage in making a king will never be sought. We make not the multitude) but the three estates, includ>- ing the nobles and gentry, to be as rational creatures as any apostate prelate in the three kingdoms*

QUESTION VII.

WHETHER Oft NO THE POPISH PRELATE, THE AFORESAID AUTHOR, DOTH BY FORCE OP REASON EVINCE THAT NEITHER CONSTITU- TION NOR DESIGNATION OF THE KING IS FROM THE PEOPLE*

The P. Prelate aimeth (but it is an empty aim) to prove that the people are wholly excluded. I answer* only arguments not pitched on before, as the Prelate saith.

Jr. Prelate, — 1. To whom can it be more proper to give the rule over men than to Him who is the only king truly and properly of the whole world? 2. God is the immediate author of all rule and power that is amongst all his creatures, above of below* 3. Man before the fall received dominion and empire over all the creatures below immediately, as Gen. i. 28 ; Gen. ix. 2 ; therefore we cannot deny that the most noble government (to wit monarchy) must be immediately from Grod, without any contract ot compact of men.

AnSi — 1. The first reason ooncltideth not what is in question; for God only giveth rule. and power to one man over another; therefore he giveth it immediately. It followeth not. 2. It shall as well prove that God doth immediately constitute all judges, and therefore it shall be unlawful for a city to appoint a mayor, or a diire a justice of peace* 3. The second argument is inconsequent also, because God in creation is the immediate author of all things, and, therefore, without consent of the creatures, or any act of the creature^ created an angel a nobler creature than man, and a man than a woman, and men above beasts; because those that are not can exercise no act at all. But it followeth not that all the works of providence, such as is the government of kingdoms, are done immediately by God; for m the works of providence, for the most part in ordinaryj God worketh by means. It is then as good a consequence as this: Grod immediately created man, therefore he keepeth his Hfe immediately also without food and sleep; Grod immediately created the sun, therefore God immediately, without the mediation of the sun, giveth light to the world. The making of a king is an act of reason, and God hath given a man reason to rule himself; and therefore hath given to a society an instinct of reason to appoint a

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

governor over theinselves; but no act of reason goeth before man be created, therefore it is not in his power whether he be created a creature of greater power than a beast or no. 4. Grod by creation gave power to a man over the creatures, and so immediately; but I hope men cannot say, God by creation hath made a man king over men. 5. The excellency of monarchy (if it be more excels lent than any other government, of which hereafler) is no ground why it should be im^* mediately from Uod as well as man's domi* nion over the creature; for then the work of man's redemption, being more excellent than the raising of Lazarus, should have been done immediately without the incar^ nation, death and satiaaction of Christ, (for no act of Grod without himself is comparable to the work of redemption, 1 Pet. i. 11, 12 ; GoL i. 18 — 22,) and God's less excellent works, as his creating of beasts ^nd worms, should have been done mediately, and his creating of man immediately.

P. Prelate, — They who execute the judg-* ment of God must needs have the power to judge from God; but kings are deputies in the exercise of the judgments of God, therefore the proposition is proved. How is it imaginable that Grod reconcileth the world by ministers, and saveth man by them, (1 Cor. V. ; 1 Tim. iv, 16,) except they receive a power so to do from Grod? The assumption is, (Deut. i. 17 ; 1 Chron, xix. 6,) Let none say Moses ai^d Jehosaphat spake of inferior judges; for that which the king doth to others he doth by himself. Also, the execution of the kingly power is from Grod; for the king is the servant, angel, legate, minister of God, Bom. xiii. 6, 7. God properly and primarily is King, and King of kings, and Lord of lords (1 Tim. vi. 16 ; Eev. i. 6) ; all kings, related to him, are kin^ equivocally, and in resemblance, and he me only King,

An8,'—r\^ That which is in question is never concluded, to wit, that " the king is both immediately constituted and designed king by God only, and not by the mediation of the people;" for when God reconcileth and saveth men by pastors, he saveth them by the 'intervening action of men; so he scourgeth his people by men as by his sword, (Psal, xvii. 14,) hand, staff, rod, (Isa. x, 5,) and his hammer. Doth it follow that Goa only dpth immediately scourge his people, and that wicked men hav^ no more hand and action in scourging his people than the

Prelate saith the people hath a hand in making a king? and that is no hand at all by the Prelate's way. 2. We may borrow the Prelate's argument: — Inferior judges execute the judgment of the Lord, ^nd not the judgment of the king; therefore, by the Prelate's argument, C^ doth only by immediate power execute judgment in them, and the mferior judges are not God's ministers, executing the judgment of the Lord. But the conclusion is against all truth, and so must the Prelate's argument be; and that inferior judges are the immediate substitutes and deputies of Grod, is hence proved, and shall be hereafter made good, if God will. 3. God is properly King of kings, so is Grod properly causa causarumj Sie Cause of causes, the Life of lifes, the Joy of joys. What! shall it then follow that he worketh nothing in the creatures by their mediation aa causes? Because God is Light of lights, doth he not enlighten the earth and air by the mediation of the sun? Then God communicateth not life mediately by generation, he causeth not his saints to rejoice, with joy unspeakable and glorious, by the intervening mediation of the Word. These ar^ vain consequences. Sovereignty, and all power and virtue is in God infinitely; and what virtue and power of 'action is in the creatures, as they are compared with Grod, are in the creatures equivocally and in resemblance, and * iciiin in opinion rather than really. Hence it must follow that second causes work none at all, — ^no more than the people hath a hand or action in makingthe xing, and that is no hand at all, as the Prelate saith. And God only and immediately worketh all works in the creatures, because both the power of working and actual working Cometh irom God, and the creatures, in all their working, are God's instruments. And if the Prelate argue so frequently fropi power given of Grod, to prove that actual reigning is from Grod immediately,'^^Deut. viii. 18, The Lord ** giveth the power to get wealth,"-^wiU it foUpw that Isr3l getteth no riches at all, or that God doth not mediately by them and their industry get them? I think not.

P. Prelate,^^To whom can it be due to give the kingly office but to Him only who IS able to give the endowment and ability for th^ office? Now God only and immediately giveth ability to be a king, as the sacramental anointing proveth, Josh. iii. 10.

-rrsf

LEX, REX ; OR,

Othniel is the first judge after Joshua; and it is said, " And the Spirit of the Lord came upon him, and he judged Israel:" the like is said of Saul and Dayid.

Ans, — 1. God gare royal endowments immediately, therefore he immediately now maketh the king. It foUoweth not, for the species of government is not that which formally constituteth a king, for then Nero, Caligula, Julian, should not have heen kings; and those who come to the crown by conquest and blood, are essentially kings, as the Prelate saith. But be all these Othniels upon whom the Spirit of the Lord cometh? Then they are not essentially kings who are babes and children, and foolish sum. destitute of the royal endowments; but it is one thing to have a royal gift, and another thing to be formally called to the kingdom. I)avid had royal gifts aftier Samuel anointed him, but if you make him king, before Saul's death, Saul was both a traitor all the time that he persecuted David, and so no king, and also king and God's anointed, as Davia acknowledgetn him; and, therefore, that spirit that came on David and Saul, maketh nothing against the people's election of a king, as the Spirit of God is given to pastws under the New Testament, as Christ promised; but it will not follow that the designation of the man who is to be pastor shomd not be from the church and from men, as the Prelate denieth that either the constitution or designation of the king is ftom the people, but trom God only. 2. I beHeve the inftision of the Spirit of God upon the judges will not prove that kings are now both constituted and designed of God solely, only, and immediately; for the judges were indeed immediately, and for the most part extraordinarily, raised up of Grod; and God indeed, in the time of the Jews, was the king of Israel in another manner than he was me king of all the nations, and is the king of Christian realms now, and, therefore, the people's despising of Samuel was a refusing that G^ shouQ reign over them, because God, in the ^judges, revealed himself even in matters oi poBcy, as what should be done to the man that gathered sti<^ on the Sabbath-day, and me like, as he doth not now to kings.

' P. Prelate. — Sovereignty is a ray of divine glory and maiesty, but this cannot be found in people, whether you consider them jointly or singly; if you consider them singly, it cannot be in every individual man, for sectaries say, That all are bom equal, with

a like freedom; and if it be not in the people singly, it cannot be in them jointly, for all the contribution in this compact and contract, which they &ney to be human c(Hnposition and voluntary constitution, is only by a surrender of the native right that every one had in himself. From whence, then, can this majesty and authority be derived? Again, where me obligation amongst equals is by contract and compact, violation oi the ^th plighted in the contract, cannot in proper terms be called disobedience or contempt of authority. It is no more but a receding from, and a violation of, that which was promised, as it may be in states or countries con^erate. Nature, reason, conscience. Scripture, teach, that disobedience to sovereign power is not only a violation of truth and breach of covenant, but also high disobedience and contempt, as is clear, 1 Sam. X. 26. So when Saul (chap, xi.) sent a yoke of oxen, hewed in pieces, to all the tribes, the fear of the Lord fell on the people, and they came out with one consent, 1 Sam. xi. 7 ; also, (Job xi. 18,) He looseth the bonds of kings, that is, he looseth their authority, and bringeth them into contempt; and he girdeth tneir loins with a girdle, that is, he strengtheneth their authority, and maketh the people to reverence them. Heathens observe that there is ^r W, some divine thing in kings. Profane histories say, that this was so eminent in Alexander the Great, that it was a terror to his enemies, and a powerful loadstone to draw men to compose the most seditious councils, and cause his most experienced commanders embrace and obey his counsd and command. Some stories write that, upon some great exigency, there i/ras some resplendent majesty m the eyes of Scipio. This kept Pharaoh flrom liftii^ his hand against Moses, who charged him so boldly with his sins. When Moses did speak with God, face to face, in the mount, this resplendent glory of majesty so awed the people, that they durst not behold his glory, iixod. xxxiv. ; this repressed the fiiry of the |)eople, enraged against Gideon from destroying their idd, Judg. vi.; and the fear of man is naturally upon all living creatures below, Cren, ix. So what can this reverence, which is innate in the hearts of all subjects toward their sovereigns, be, but the ordinance unrepealable of God, and the natural effect of that majesty of princes with which they are endowed from above?

Ans.-^l. I never heard any shadow of reason till now, and yet (because the lie hath a latitude) here is but a shadow, which the Prelate stole from M. 'Anton, de Dom. Archienisc. Spalatensis;^ and I may say, confidently, this Plasiarius hath not one line in his book which is not stolen; and, for the present, Spalato's argument is but spilt, and the nerves cut from it, while it is botn bleeding and lamed. Let the reader compare them, and I pawn my credit he hath ignorantly clipped Spalato. But I answer, ** Soyereigntv is a beam and ray (as Spalato saith) ot divine majesty, and is not either formally or virtually in the people." It is false t£at it is not virtually in the people; for there be two things in the judge, either inferior or supreme, for the argument hold* eth in the majesty of a parliament, as we shall hear. (1.) The gift or grace of goyeming (the Arminian Prelate will be offended at this). (2.) The authority of governing. The gift is supernatural, and is not in man naturaUy, and so not in the king; for he is physically but a mortal man, and this is a ^ft received, for Solomon asked it by prayer from Grod. There is a capacity passive in all individual men for it. As for the official authority itself, it is virtually in all in whom any of Grod's image is remaining since the fall, as is clear, as may be gatheml from Gren. i. 28 ; yea, the &ther, the master, the judge, have it by Grod's institution, in some measure, over son, servant, and subject, though it be more m the supreme ruler; and, for our purpose, it is not requisite that authoritative majesty should be in all, (what is in the father and husband I hope to clear,) I mean, it needeth not to be formally in all, and so all are bom alike and equal. But he who is a Papist, a Socinian, an Arminian, and therefore delivered to Satan by his mother church, must be the sectary, for we are where this Prelate left us, maintainors of the Protestant religion, contained in the Confession of Faith and National Covenant of Scotland, when this Demas forsook us and embraced the world. 2. Though not one single man in Israel be a judge or king by nature, nor have in them formally any ray of royalty or magistratical authority, yet it followeth not that Israel, parliamentarily convened, hath no such authority as to name Saul king in Mizpeh, and David king in Hebron,

1 Afftonin. de pomiois Archiepis. de dom. lib. 6, c. 2, n. ff, 6, seq.

1 Sam. X. 24, 25 ; 1 Chron. xi. 12 ; xii. 38, 39, One man alone hath not the keys of the kingdom of heaven; (as the Prelate dreameth) but it followeth not that many, convened in a church way, hath not this power. Matt, xviii. 17 ; 1 Cor. v^ 1 — 4, One man hath not strength to fight against an army of ten thousand ; doth it follow, therefore, that an army of twenty thousand hatJi not strength to fight against these ten thousand? Though one Paul cannot synodically determine the question, (Acts XV,) it followeth not that the apostles, and elders, and brethren, convened from divers churches, hath not power to determine it in a lawful synod ; and, therefore, from a disjoined and scattered power, no man can aigue to a united power, do not any one man is an inferior ruler, or hath the rays and beams of a number of aristocratical rulers ; but it followeth not that all these men, combined in a city or society, have not power, in a joint political body, to choose inferior or aristocratical rulers. 3. The P, Prelate's reason is nothing. All the contribution (saith he) in the compact body to make a king, is only by a surrender of tiie native right of every single man (the whole being only a voluntary contribution). How, then, can there be any majesty derived from them ? I answer. Very weU ; for the surrender is so voluntary, that it is also natural, and founded on the law of nature, that men must have governors, either many, or one supreme ruler. And it is voluntary, and dependeth on a positive institution of Grod, whether the government be by one supreme ruler, as in a monarchy, or in many, as in an aristocracy, according as the necessity and temper of the commonwealth do most require. This constitution is so voluntary, as it hath below it the law of nature for its general foundation, and above it, the supervenient institution of God, ordaining that there should be such magistrates, both kings and other judges, because without such, all human societies should be dissolved, 4, Individual persons, in creating a magistrate, doth not properly surrender their right, which can be called a right ; for thev do but surrender their power of doing violence to those of their fellows in that feame community, so as they shall not now have moral power to do injuries without punishment ; and this is not right or Hberty properly, but servitude, for a power to do violence and injuries is not liberty, but ser-

LEX, REX ; OR,

vitude and bondage. But the Prelate talketh of royalty as of mere tyranny, as if it were a proper dominion and servile empire that the pnnce hath over his people, and not more paternal and fatherly, than lordly or masterly. 6. He saith, " Violation of faith, pHghted in a contract amongst equals, cannot be called disobedience; but disobedience to the authority of the sovereign is not only breach of covenant, but high disobedience and contempt." But violation of faith amongst equals, as equals, is not properly disobedience; for disobedience is betwixt a superior and an inferior: but violation of faith amongst equals, when they make one of their equals their judge and ruler, is not only violation of truth, but also disobedience. All Israel, and Saul, while he is a private man seeking his father's asses, are equals by covenant, obliged one to another; and. so any injury done by Israel to Saul, in that case, is not disobedience, but only violation of faith. But when all Israel maketh Saul their king, and sweareth to him obedience, he is not now their equal; and an injury done to him now, is both a violation oi their faith, and high disobedience also. Suppose a city of aldermen, all equal amongst themselves in dignity and place, take one of their number and make him their mayor and provost — a wrong done to him now, is not only against the rules of fraternity, but disobedience to one placed by God over them. 6. 1 Sam. xi^ 7, " The fear of the Lord fell on the people, and they came out with one consent to obey Saul;" therefore God hath placed authority in kings, which is not in people. It is true; because G^d hath transferred the scattered authorities that are in all the people, in one mass; and, by virtue of his own ordinance, hath placed them in one man, who is kiijg. What foUoweth? That God conferretb this authority immediately upon the king, without the mediation of any action of the people? Yea, the contrary rather followeth. 7. God looseth the bond of kings; that is, when God is to cast off kings, he causeth them to loose iall authority, and maketh them come into contempt with the people.. But what doth this prove? That God taketh away the majesty and authority of kings immediately; and therefore God gave to kings this authority immediately, without the people's conveyance? Yea, I take the Prelate's weapon from him. God doth not take the authority of the king from him immediately, but mediately, by the

people's hating and despising him, when they see his wickedness, as the people see Nero a monster — a prodigious blood-sucker. Upon this, all the people contemn him and despise him, and so the majesty is taken from Nero and all his mandates and laws, when they see him trample upon all laws, divine and human, and that mediately by the people's heart despising of his majesty; and so they repeat, and take again, that awesome authority that they once gave him. And this proveth that God gave him the authority mediately, by the consent of man, 8. Nor speaketh he of kings only, but (ver. per munijicos, Pineda, Aria, Mont, super PrincipeSy upon nobles and great men; and this place may prove that no judges of the earth are made by men. 9, The heathen say. That there is some divinity in princes, as in Alexander the Great and Scipio, toward their enemies; but this will prove that princes and kings have a superiority over those who are not their native subjects, for something of God is in them, in relation to all men mat are not their subjects. If this be a ground strong and good, because God only, and independently from men, taketh away this majesty, as God only and independently giveth it, then a king is sacred to all men, subjects or not subjects. Then it is unlawful to make war against any foreign king and prince, for in invading him or resistmg him, you resist that divine majesty of God that is in him; then you may not law^ fully flee from a tyrant, no more than you may lawfiilly flee from God, 10. Scipio was not a king, therefore this divine majesty is in all judges of the earth, in a more or less measure; — ^therefore God, only and immediately, may take this spark of divine ma<- jesty from inferior judges. It followeth not. And kingS) certainly, cannot infuse any spark of a divme majesty on any inferior judges, for God only immediately infuseth it in men; therefore it is unlawful for kings to take this divinity from judges, for they resist God who resist parliaments, no less than those who resist kings. Scipio hath divinity in him as well as Csesar, and that immediately from God, and not from any king, 11. Moses was not a king when he went to Pharaoh, for he had not, as yet, a people. Pharaoh was the king, and because Pharaoh was a king, the divines of Oxford must say. His majesty must not, in words of rebuke, be resisted more than by deeds. 12. Moses' face

THB LAW AND THB PRINCE.

did shine as a prophet receiving the law from Grod — not as a king. And is this sunshine from heaven upon the face of Nero and Julian? It must be, if it be a beam of royal majesty, if this pratler say right, but (2 Cor. iii. 7) this was a majesty typical, which did adumbrate the glory of the law of €rod, and is far from being a royalty due to all heathen kings. 13. I would our king would evidence such a majesty in breaking the images and idols of his queen, and of papists about him. 14. The iear of Noah, and the regenerated who are in covenant with the beasts of the field, (Job v. 23,) is upon the beasts of the earth, not by approbation only, as the people maketh kings by the Prelate's way; nor yet by free consent, as the people freely transfer their power to him who is king. The creatures inferior to man, have, by no act of free will, chosen man to be their ruler, and transferred their power to him, because they are, by nature, inferior to man; and God, by nature, hath subjected the creatures to man, (Gen. i. 28,) and so this proveth not that the king, by nature, is above the people^I mean the man who is king; and, therefore, though God had planted in the hearts of all subjects a fear and reverence toward the king, ujpon supposition that they have made him king, it foUoweth not that this authority and majesty is immediately given by Grod to the man who is king, wiuiout the intervening consent of the people, for there is a native fear in the scholar to stand in awe of his teacher, and yet the scholar may willingly give himself to be a disciple to his teacher, and so give his teacher power over him. Citizens naturally fear their supreme governor of ttie city, yet they give to the man who is their supreme governor, that power and authority which is the ground of awe and reverence. A servant naturally feareth his master, yet often he giveth his liberty, and resigneth it up voluntarily to his master; and this was not extraordinary amongst the Jews, where the servant did entirely love the master, and is now most ordinary when servants do, for hire, tie themselves to such a master. Soldiers naturally fear their commanders, yet they may, and often do, by voluntary consent, make such men their commanders; and, therefore, from this, it followeth in no way that the governor of a city, the teacher, the master, the commander in war, have not their power and autho- .; rity only and immediately from God, but

from their inferiors, who, by their free consent, appointed them for such places.

P. Trelate (Ai^. 7, p. 61, 62).— This seemeth, or rather is, an unanswerable argument, — ^No man hath power of Hfe and death but the Sovereign Power of life and death, to wit, God, G^n. ix. 6. God saith thrice he will require the blood of man at the hands of man, and this power God hath committed to God's deputy: whoso sheddeth man's blood mS{3 by man shall die, — by the king, for the world knew not any kind of government at this time but monarchical, and this monarch was Noah; and if this power be from God, why not all sovereign power? seeing it is homogeneous, and, as jurists say, in indivisibili positay a thing in its nature indivisible, and that cannot be distracted or impaired, and if every man had the power of life and death, God should not be the God of order.

The P. Prelate taketh the pains to prove out of the text that a magistracy is established in the text. Ans. 1. Let us consider this unanswerable argument. (1.) It is grounded upon a lie, and a conjecture never taught by any but himself, to wit, that DHNS by, or in, or through man, must signify a magistrate, and a king only. This kmg was Noah. Never interpreter, nay, not common sense can say, that no magistrate is here understood but a king. The consequence is vain: His blood snail be shed by man; therefore by a magistrate? it followeth not; therefore by a kmg? it followeth not. There was not a king in the world as yet. Some make Belus, the father of Ninus, the first king, and the builder of Babylon. This Ninus is thought the first builder of the city ailber called Nineveh, and the first king of the Assyrians. So saith Quintus Curtms^ and others; but grave authors believe that Nimrod was no other than Belus the father of Ninus. So saith Augustine,^ Eusebius, Hieronym. ;^ and Eusebius^ maketh him the first founder of Babylon: so saith Clemens,^ Pirerius,^ and Josephus saith the same. Their times, their cruel natures are the same. Calvin saith,^ Noah

1 Quintias Curtius, lib. 5.

' Aug. de civ. Dei, lib. 16, c. 17.

s Hieron. in Hos. ii.

* Euseb. lib. 9, de prepar. Evan. c. 3.

^ Clemens recog. lib. 4.

^ Pirerius in Gen. x. 8, 9, disp. 3, n. 67. Illnd qnoqae mihi fit percredible, Nimrod fuisse eundem, atqne enim qnem alii appellant Belum patrem Nini.

7 Calvin Com. in Gen. ix.

LEX, REX ; OR,

'

yet lived while Nimrod lived; and the Scripture saith, "Nimrod began to reign, and be powerful on the earth." And Babel

?^^ ^inD^DD n^ti^al the beginning of his kingdom. No writer, Moses nor any other, can ^ow us a king before Nimrod. So Eusebius,^ Paul Orosius,' Hieronym.,^ Josephus,^ say that he was the first king; and Tostatus Abulens.,' and our own Gal* vin, Luther,® Musculus on the place, and Ainsworth, make him the first king and the founder of Babylon How Noah was a king, or there waiS any monarchical government in the world then, the Prelate nath alone dreamed it. There was but lamily'^vemment before this. 2. And if there oe magistracy here established by Gk)d, there is no warrant to say it is only a monarchy; for if the Holy Ghost intendeth a policy, it i^ a policy to be established to the world's end, and not to be limited fas the Prelate doth) to Noah's days* All interpreters,, upon good ground, establish the same policy that our Saviour speaketh of, when he saith, ** He shall perish by the sword who taketh the sword,'^Matt. xxvi. 52. So the Netherlands have no lawM magistrate who hath power of Hfe and death, l^cause their government is aristocratical, and they have no king. So all acts of taking away the lives of ill-^loers shall be acts of homicide in Holland. How absurd I 3. Nor do I see how the place, in the native scope, doth establish a magistracy. Calvin saith not so;^ and interpreters deduce, by consequence, the power of the magistrate worn this place. But the text is general, — He who killeth man shall be killed by man: either he shall fall into the magistrate's hand, or into the hand of some murderer; so Calvin,® Marlorat, &c. He speaketh, saith Pirerius, not of the fact and event itself, but of the deserving of murderers; and it is certain all murderers

1 Euseb. prolog. 1 Chron.

> Paul Orosias, lib. 1, do Ormeeta mundi.

s Hieron. in traditio Hebrei in Gen.

* Tostat. Abnlens. in Gen. x. 9. 9 Josephus in Gen. x.

* Lath. Com. ib.

B Calvin in lect.

9 Pirerius in Gen. ix. 3^ 4, n. 37. Vatablns hath divers interpretations : In homine, i. e. in conspectn omnium et publice, ant in homine, i. e. hominibns testificantibus ; alii, in homirie^ i. e. propter hominem, quia occidit hominem, jussa magistratns. Cajetan expoundeth Q^tC^ contra hominem, in despite of man.

fall not into the magistrate's hands; but he saith, by Crod and man's laws they ought to die, though somethne one murderer Slleth another. 4. The sovereign power is given to the king, therefore, it is given to him immediately without the consent of the people. It followeth not. 6. Power of life and death is not given to the king only, but also to other magistrates, yea, and to a single private man in the just defence of his own life. Other arguments are but what the Prelate hath said already.

QUESTION VIII.

P. Prelate, — God and nature giveth no power in vain, and which may not be reduced into action; but an active power, or a power of actual governing, was never acted by the community; therefore this power cannot be seated in the community as in the prime and proper subject, and it cannot be m every individual person of a community, because government intrinsically and essentially includeth a special distinction of governors, and some to be governed; and, to speak properly, there can no other power be conceived in the community, naturally and properly, but only potestas pcusiva regiminisj a capacity or susceptibility to be governed, by one or by more, just as the first matter desireth a form. This obligeth all, by the dictate of nature's law, to submit to actual government; and as it is in every individual person, it is not merely and* properly voluntary, b^use, howsoever nature dictates that government is necessary for the safety of the society, yet every singular person, by corruption and self-love, Lath a natural aversion and repugnance to submit to any: every man would be a king himself. This universal desire, appetitue universalia aut natU' ralis, or universal propension to government, is like the act of the understanding assenting to the first principles of truth, and to the will's general propension to happiness in general, which propension is not a free act, except our new statists, as they have changed their faith, so they overturn true reason. It will puzzle them infinitely to make anything, in its kind passive, really active and coUative

of positive acts and effects. All know no man can give what he hath not. An old philosopher would laugh at him who would say, that a matter perfected and actuated by union with a form, could at pleasure shake off its form, and marry itself to an* other. They may as well say, every wife hath power to resume her freedom and marry another, as that any such power active is in the community, or any power to cast off monarchy.

An8, — 1. The P. Prelate might have thanked Spalato for this ar^^ument, but he doth not so much as cite mm, for fear his theft be apprehended; but Spalato hath it set down with stronger nerves than the Prelate's head was able to copy out of him. But Jac. de Almain,^ and iNavarrus,' with the Parisiaii doctors, said in the Council of Paris, " that politic power is inmiediately from God, but first from the community;" but so that the community apply their power to this or that government — ^not of liberty, but by natural necessity — ^but Spalato and the plagiary Prelate do both look beside the book. The question is not now ccmceming the vis rectvoa^ the power of governing in the people, but concerning the power otjgovemment; for these two differ much. Tne former is a power of ruling and monarchical commanding of themselves. This power is not formally in the people, but only virtually; and no reason can say that a virtual power is idle because it cannot be actuated by that same subject that it is in; for then it should not be a virtual, but a formal power. Do not philosophers say such an ' herb virtually maleth hot? and can the sottish Prelate say this virtual power is idle, and in vain given of Grod, because it doth not formally Seat your hand when you touch it. 2. The P. Prelate, who is excommunicated for Popery, Socinianism, Arminianism, and is now turned apostate to Christ and his church, must have changed his faith, not we, and be unreasonably ignorant, to press that axiom, ^' That the power is idle that cannot be reduced to acts; for a generative power is given to living and sensitive creatures,

^ M. Anto. de domini. Arch. SpalatenSk lib. % c. 2, n. 6, 6. Plebs potins habet a natura, non tarn vim active rectiyam ant gabernativam, qnam inclinationem passive regibUem (nt ita loquar) et gabernabilem, qua volens et Ubeas sese submittit rectoribus, &c.

' Nem. don jad. not. 3, n. 85.

— ^this power is not idle though it be not reduced in act by all and every individual sensitive creature. A power of seeing is given to all who naturally do, or ought to see, yet it is not an idle power because divers are blind, seeing it is put forth in action in divers of the kind; so this power in the community is not idle because it is not put forth in acts in the people in which it is virtually, but is put forth in action in some of them whom they choose to be their governors; nor is it reasonable to sav that it should be put forth in action by all the people, as if all should be kings and governors. But the c[uestion is not of the power of governing m the people, but of Uie power of government, that is, of the power of making

fovemors and kings; and the community oth put forth in u^^ this power, (is a free, voluntary, and active power; for (1.) a community transplanted to India, or any place of the world not before inhabited, have a perfect liberty to choose either a ^lonarchy, or a democracy, or an aristocracy; for though nature incline them to government in general, yet are they not naturally determinated to any one of those three more than another. (2.) Israel did of their own free will choose the change of government, and would have a king as the nations had; therefore they had free will, and so an active power so to do, and not a passive inclination only to be governed, such as Spalato saith agreeth to the first matter. (3.) Royalists teach that a pe(>le under democracy or aristocracy have liberty to choose a king; and the Romans did this, therefore they had an active power to do it, — therefore the Prelate's simile crooks: the matter at its pleasure cannot shake off its form, nor the wife cast off her husband being once married; but Barclaius, Grotius, Amissens, Blackwood, and all the royalists, teach that the people under any of these two forms of democracy or aristocracy may resume their power, and cast off these forms and choose a monarch; and if monarchy be the best government, as royalists say, they may choose the best. And is this but a passive capacity to be governed? (4.) Of ten men fit for a kingdom they may design one, and put the crown on his head, and refuse the other nine, as Israel crowned Solomon and refiised Adonijah. Is this not a voluntary action, proceeding from a free, active, elective power? It will puzzle the pretended Prelate to deny this, — that which the

■*aw4Mp*>*a

lull inn

community doth freely, they do not from such a passive capacity as is in the first matter in regard of the form. 3. It is true that people, through corruption of nature, are averse to submit to governors " for con science sake, as unto the Lord," because the natural man, remaining in the state of na^ ture, can do nothing that is truly good, but it is false that men have no active moral power to submit to superiors, but only a passive capacity to be governed. He quite contradicteth himself; for he said before, (c. 4j p. 49,) that there is an " innate fear ana reverence in the hearts of all men naturally, even in heathens, toward their sovereign 5" yea, as we have a natural moral active power to loVe our parents and superiors, (though it be not evangehcally, or legally in God's court, good) and so to obey their commandments, only we are averse to penal laws of superiors. But this proveth no way that we have only by nature a passive capacity to government; for heathens have, by instinct of nature, both made laws morally good, submitted to them, and set kings and judges over them, which clearly proveth that men have an active power of government by nature. Yea, what difference maketh the Prelate betwixt men and beasts? for beasts have a capacity to be governed, even lions and tigers; but here is the matter, if men have any natural power of government, the P. Prelate would have it, with his brethren the Jesuits and Arminians, to be not natural, but done by the help of universal grace; for so do they confound nature and grace. But it is certain our power to submit to rulers and kings, as to rectors, and guides, and fathers, is natural; to submit to tyrants in doing ills of sin is natural, but in suffering ills 01 punishment is not natural. " No man can give that which he hath not," is true, but that people have no power to make their governors is that which is in question, ana denied by us. This argument doth prove that people hath no power to appoint aristocratical rulers more than kings, and so the aristocratical and democratical rulers are all inviolable and sacred as the king. By this the people may not resume their freedom if they turn tyrants and oppressors. This the Prelate shall deny, for he averreth, (p. 96,) out of Augustine, that the people may, without sin, change a corrupt democracy into a monarchy.

P. Prelate (pp. 95, 96). — If sovereignty be originally innerent in the people, then

democracy, or government by the people, were the best government, because it cometh nearest to the fountain and stream of the first and radical power in the people, yea, and all other forms of government were unlawful; and if sovereignty be natively inherent in the multitude it must be proper to every individual of the community, which is against that false maxim of theirs, Quisque nascitur liber. Every one by nature is bom a free man, and the posterity of those who first contracted with their elected king are not bound to that covenant, but, upon their native right and Hberty, may appoint another king without breach of covenant. The posterity of Joshua, and the elders in their time, who contracted with the Gibeonites to incorporate them, though in a serving condition, might have tnme their fathers' government nothing.

Ans,-^1, The P. Prelate might thank Spalato for this argument also,^ for it is stolen; but he never once named him, lest his theft should be apprehended. So are his other arguments stolen from Spalato; but the Pirelate weakeneth them, and it is seen stolen goods are not blessed. Spalato saith, then, by the law of nature every commonwealth should be governed by the people, and by the law of nature the people should be under the worst government; but this consequence is nothing; for a community of many families is formally and of themselves under no government, but may choose any of the three; for popular government is not that wherein all the people are rulers, for this is confiision and not government, because all are rulers, and none are governed and ruled. But in popular government many are chosen out of the people to rule; and that this is the worst government is said gratis, without warrant; and if monarchy be the best of itself, yet, when men are in the state of sin, in some other respects it hath many inconveniences. 2* I see not how democracy is best because nearest to the multitude's power of making a king; for if all the three depend upon the free will of the people, all are alike afar off, and ahke near hand, to the people's free choice, according as they see most conducive to the safety and protection of the commonwealth, seeing the forms of government are not more natural than politic incorporations of cities, yea, than of shires; but from a po-

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

sitive institution of God, who erecteth this rather than that, not immediately now, but mediately, by the free will of men; .no one Cometh ibrmally, and ex natur o, ret, nearer to the fountain than another, except that materially democracy may come nearer to the people's power than monarchy, but the excellency of it above monarchy is not hence concluded; for by this reason the number of four should be more excellent than the number of five, of ten, of a hundred, of a thousand, or of millions, because four cometh near to the number of three, which Aristotle calleth the first perfect number, cui additur ri ir9 of which yet formally all do alike share in the nature and essence of number. 2. It is denied that it followeth from this antecedent, that the people have power to choose their own governors; therefore all governments except democracy, or government by the people, must be sinful and unlawful, (1.) jBecause government by kings is of divine institution, and of other judges also, as is evident from Grod's word. Bom. xiii. 1' — 3 ; Deut. xvii, 14 ; Prov. viii. 15, 16; 1 Pet. ii. 13. 14; Psal. ii. 10, 11, &c. (2,) Power of choosing any form of government is in the people; therefore there is no government lawful but popular government. It followeth no ways; but presupposeth that power to choose any form of government must he formally actual government; which is most feJse, yea, they be contrary, as the prevalency or power and the act are contrary; so these two are contrary., or opposite. Neither is sovereignty, nor any government, formally inherent in either the community by nature, nor in any one particular man by nature; md that every man is bom free, so as no man, rather than his brother, is bom a king and a ruler, I hope, God willing, to make good, so as the Prelate shall never answer on the contrary. 3. It followeth not that the posterity living, when their fathers made a covenant with their first elected king, may without any breach of covenant on the king's part, make void and null their fathers' election of a king, and choose another king, because the lawful covenant of the fathers, in point of government, if it be not broken, tyeth the children, but it cannot deprive them of their lawful liberty naturally inherent in them to choose the fittest man to be king; but of this hereafter more fiilly. 4. Spdato addeth, (the Prelate is not a faithftil thief,) " If the community by the law of

nature have power of all forms of government, and so should be, by nature, under popular government, and yet should refuse a monarchy and an aristocracy," yet, Augustine addeth,* ** If the people should prefer their own private gain to the pubUc good, and sell the commonwealth, then some good man might take their liberty from them, and, against their will, erect a monarchy or an aristocracy." But the Prelate (p. 97) and Augustine supposeth the people to be under popular government. This is not our case; for Spalato and the Prelate presupr poseth by our grounds that the people by nature must be under popular government, Augustine dreameth no such thing, and we deny that by nature they are under any form of government. Augustine, in a case most considerable thinketh one good and potent man may take the corrupt people's power of giving honours, and making rulers from them, ana give it to some good men, few or many, or to one; then Augustine layeth down as a ground that which Spalato and the Prelate denieth, — that the people hath power to appoint their own rulers; otherwise, how could one man take that power from them? The Prelate's fifth ar^ gument is but a branch of the fourth argument, and is answered already.

P. Prelate (chap. 11 J. — He would prove that kings of the people's making are not blessed of Grod, The first creature of the people's making was Abimelech (Judg. ix. 22), who reigned only three years, well near Antichrist's time of endurance. He came to it by blood, and an evil spirit rose betwixt him and the men of Sechem, and he made a miserable end. The next was Jeroboam, who had this motto. He made Israel to sin. The people made him king, and he made the same pretence of a glorious reformation that our reformers now make: new calves, new altars, new feasts are erected; they banish the Levites and take in the scum and dross of the vulgar, &c. Every actipn of Christ is our in-;- struction. Christ was truly bom a king, not*- withstanding, when the people would make

3 An^st. de lib. arb., lib. 1, c. 6. Si depravatns popnlus rem privatum Reipub. preferat. atque habeat venale 8uffragi^m cor ruptueque ab iis qui honorea am9,nt, regnum in sefactiosis consecleratisque committat ; non ne item recte, si quia tunc extilerit Tir bonus qui plurimum possit, adimat huic populo potestatem dandi hpnores, e% in paveomm bouorum, ▼el etiam unjus redregat arbitrium ?

him a king, he disclaimed it — he would not be an arbiter betwixt two brethren differing.

Ans, — I am not to follow the Prelate's order every way, though, God willing, I shall reach him in the forthcoming chapters. Nor purpose I to answer his treasonable railing against his onm nation, and the judges of the land, whom €rod hath set over this seditious excommunicated apostate. He layeth to us frequently the Jesuit's tenets, when as he is known himself to be a papist. In this argument he saith, Abimelech did reign only three years, well near Antichrist's reicrn. Is not this the basis and the mother principle of popery. That the Pope is not the Antichrist, for the Pope hath continued many ages? He is not an individual man, but a race of men; but the Antichrist, saith Belarmine, Stapleton, Becanus, and the nation of Jesuits and poplings, shall be one individual man — a bom Jew, and shall reign only three years and a haJf. But, 1. The argument from success provetti nothing, except the Prelate prove their bad success to be from this, because they were chosen of the people. When as Saul chosen of God, and most of the kings of Israel and Judah, who, undeniably, had God's calling to the crown, were not blessed of God; and their government was a ruin to both people and religion, as the people were removed to all the Kingdoms of the earth, for the sins of Manassen, Jer. xv. 4. Was therefore Manasseh not kwAiUy [called to the crown? 2. For his instance of kings unlawfully called to the throne, he brinffeth us whole two, and telleth us that he doubteth, as many learned men do, whether Jeroboam was a king by permission only, or by a commission from God. 3. Abimelech was cursed, because he wanted God's calling to the throne; for then Israel had no £ng, but judges, extraordinarily raised up by Godi; and Grod did not raise him at all, only he came to the throne by blood, and carnal reasons moving the men of Sechem to advance him. The argument presupposeth that the whole lawful c^ling of a king is the voices of the people. This we never taught, though the Prelate make conquest a jiut title to a crown, and it is but a title of blood and rapine. 4. Abimelech was not the first king, but only a judge. All our divines, with the word of Grod, m^- eth Saul the first king. 5. For Jeroboam had God's word and promise to be king,

1 Kings xi. 34 — 38. But, in my weak judgment, he waited not God's time and way of coming to the crown ; but that his coming to the throne was unlawful, because he came by the people's election, is in question. 6. That the people's reformation, and their making a new king, was like the kingdom of Scouand's reformation, and the parliament of England's way now, is a traitorous calumny. For, 1. It condemneth the king, who hath, in parliament, declared all theu" proceedings to be legal. Rehoboam never declared Jeroboam's coronation to be lawful, but, contrary to Grod's word, made war against Israel. 2. It is false tiiat Israel pretended religion in that change. The cause was the rough answer given to the supplication of the estates, complaining of the oppression they were under m &lomon's reign. 3. Religion is still subjected to policy by prelates and cavaliers, not by us m Scotland, who sought nothing but reformation of religion, and of laws so far as they serve religion, as our supplications, declarations, and the event proveth. 4, We have no new calves, new lutars, new feasts, but profess, and really do hazard, life and estate, to put away the Prelate's calves, images, tree-worship, altar-worship, saints, feast-days, idolatry, masses ; and nothing is said here but Jesuits, and Canaanites, and Baalites, might say, (though falsely) against the reformation of Josiah. Truth and purity of worship this year is new in relation to idolatry last year, but it is simpliciter older. 5. We have not put away the Lord's priests and Levites, and taken in the scum of the vulgar, but have' put away Baal's priests, sucn as excommunicated Prelate Maxwell and other apostates, and resumed the faithful servants of Grod, who were deprived and banished for standing to the Protestant faith, sworn to by the prelates themselves. 6. Every action of Christ, such as his walking on the sea, is not our mstruction in that sense, that Christ's refusing a kingdom is directly our instruction. And did Christ refuse to be a king, because the people would have made him a king ? That IS, non causa pro causae he refused it, because his kingdom was not in this world, and he came to suffer for men, not to reign over man. 7. The Prelate, and others who were lords of session, and would be judges of men's inheritances, and would usurp the sword by being lords of council and parliament, have refused to be instructed by eveiy action of

Christ, who would not judge betwixt brother and brother.

P. Preia<.— ^ephthah came to be jud^e by covenant betwixt him and the Gileadites. Here you have an interposed act of man, yet the Lord himself, in authorising him as Judge, vindioateth it no leas to himself, than when extraordinarily he authorised Gideon and Samuel, 1 Sam. xii. 11 ; therefore, whatsoever act of man intervene eth, it contributeth nothing to royal autho< rit — ^it cannot weaken or repeal it.

Ans, — 'It was as extraordmary that Jephthah, a bastard and the son of an harlot, should be judge, as that Gideon should be judge. Cm. vindicateth to himself, that he giveth his people favour in the eyes of their enemies. But doth it follow that the enemies are not agents, and to be commended for their humanity in favouring the people of God? So Psal. Ixv. 9, 10, God maketh com to grow, therefore clouds, and earth, and sun, and summer, and husbandry, contributeth nothing to the growing of com. But this is but that which he said before. We grant that this is an eminent and singular act of God's special providence, that he moveth and boweth the wills of a great multitude to promote such a man, wno, by na ture, Cometh no more out of the womb a crowned king, than the poorest shepherd in the land; and it is an act of grace to endue him with heroic and royal parts for the govemment. But what is all this? Doth it exclude the people's consent? In no ways. So the works of supematural grace, as to love Christ i^bove all things, to believe in Christ in a singular manner, are ascribed to the rich grace of God. But can the Prelate say uiat the understanding and will, in these acts, are merely passive, and contri-* buteth no more thaa the people contributeth to royal authority in the king? and that is just nothing by the Prelate s way. And we utterly deny, that as water in baptism hath no action at all in the working of remission of sins, so the people hath no in-* fluence in making a king; for the people are worthier and more excellent than the king, and they have an active power of ruling and directing themselves toward the intrinsical end of human policy, which is the external safety and peace of a society, in so far as there are moral principles of the second table, for this effect, written in their heart; and, therefore, that royal authority which, by God's special providence, is united in one

king, and, as it were, over-gilded and lustred with princely grace ana roval endowments, is diffused in the people, for the people hath an after-<approbative consent in making a king, as royalists confess water bath no such action in producing grace.

QUESTION IX.

The Prelate will have it Babylonish confusion, that we are divided in opinion. Jesuits (saith he) nlace all sovereignty in the community. Of the sectaries, some warrant aqy one subject to make away his king, and such a work is no less to be rewarded than when one killeth a wolf. Some say this power is in the whole community; some wiU have it in the collective body, not con* vened by warrant or writ of sovereignty; but when necessity (which is often fancied) of reforming state and church, calleth them together; some in the nobles and peers; some in the three estates assembled by the king's writ; some in the inferior judges,

I answer, If the Prelate were not a Je* suit himself, he would not bid his brethren take the mote out of their eye; but there is nothing here said but what Barclaius^ said better before this plagiarius. To which I answer. We teach that any private man may kill a tyrant, void of all title; and that great RoyaHst saith so also. And if he have not the consent of the people, he is an usurper, for we know no external lawful calling that kings have now, or their family, to the crown, but only the call of the people. All other calls to us are now invisible and unknown; and Grod would not command us to obey kings, and leave us in the dark, that we shall not know who is the king. The Prelate placeth his lawful calling to the crown, in such an immediate, invisible, and subtle act of omnipotency, as that whereby Grod conferreth remission of sins, by sp ink ling with water in baptism, and that where-

1 Barclaias contr. Monarch, lib. 4, c. 10, p. 268, at hostes publicos non solum ab universo populo, sed a singulis etiam impeti osdique jure optimo posse tota Antiquitas censuit.

LEX, REX ; OR,

by God directed Samuel to anoint Saul and David, not Eliab, nor any other brother. It is the devil in the P. P,, not any of us, who teach that any private man may kill a lawM king, though tyrannous in his government. For the subject of royal power, we affirm, the first, and ultimate, and native subject of all power, is the community, as reasonable men naturally inclining to a society; but the ethical and politid subject, or the legal and positive receptacle of this power, is various, according to the various constitutions of the policy. In Scotland and England, it is the three estates of parliament; in other nations, some other judges or peers of the land. The Prelate had no more common s^ise for him to object a confiision of opinion to us, for this, than to all the commonwealths on earth, because all have not parliaments, as Scotland hath. All have not constables, and officials, and churchmen, and barons, lords of council, parliaments, &c., as England had: but the truth is, the community, orderly convened, as it includeth all the estates civil, have hand, and are to act in choosing their rulers. I see not what privilege nobles have, above commons, in a court of parliament, by God's law; but as they are judges, all are equally judges, and sul make up one congregation of God's. But the question now is, If all power of governing (tne Prelate, to make all the people kings, saith, if all sovereignty) be so in the people that they retain power to jguard themselves against tyranny; and if they retain some of it, habitu, in habit, and in their power. I am not now unseasonably, according to the Prelate's order, to dispute of the power of lawful defence against tyranny; but, I lay down this maxim ot divinity: Tyranny being a work of Satan, is not from God, because sm, either habitual or actual, is not from God: the power that is, must be from Grod; the magistrate, as magistrate, is good in nature of office, and the intrinsic end of his office, (Rom. xiii. 4) for he is the minister of God for thy good; and, therefore, a power ethical, politic, or moral, to oppress, is not fbm God, and is not a power, but a licentious deviation of a power; and is no more from God, but from sinful nature and the old serpent, than a license to sin. God in Christ giveth pardons of sin, but the Pope, not Grod, giveth dispensations to sin. To this add, if for nature to defend itself be lawful, no community, without sin, hath power to alienate

and give away this power; for as no power OTven to man to murder his brother is of Sod, so no power to suffer his brother to be murdered is of (xod; and no power to suffer himself, a fortiori^ fer less can be from God. Here I speak not of physical power, for if free will be the creature of God, a physical power to acts which, in relation to Grod's law, are sinfiil, must be from God.

But I now follow the P. Prelate (c. ix., p. 101, 102). — Some of the adversaries, as Buchanan, say that ^e parliament hath no power to make a law, out only w^tUvUvfut without the approbation of the community. Otliers, as the Observator, say, that the right of the gentry and commonalty is entirely in the kmghts and burgesses of the House of Commons, and will nave their orders irrevocable. If, then, the common people cannot resume their power and oppose the parliament, how can tables and parliaments resume their power and resist tne king?

Ans, — Tne ignorant man should have thanked Barclaius for this argument, and vet Barclaius need not thank him, for it hath not the nerves that Barclaius gave it. But I answer, 1. If the parliament should have been corrupted by feir hopes (as in our age we have seen the like) the people did well to resist the Prelate's obtruding the Mass Book, when the lords of the council pressed it, against all law of God and man, upon the Bngdom of Scotland; and, therefore, it is denied that the acts of parliament are irrevocable. The observator said they were irrevocable by the king, he being but one man; the P. Prelate wrongeth him, for he said only, they have the power of a law, and the king is obliged to consent, by his royal office, to all good laws, and neither king nor people may oppose them. Buchanan said, Acts of parliament are not laws, obliging the people, till they be promulgated; and the people's silence, when they are promulgated, is their approbation, and maketh them obligatory laws to them; but if the people speak against unjust laws, they are not laws at all: and Buchanan knew the power of the Scottish parHament better than this ignorant statist. 2. There is not like reason to grant so much to the king, as to parliaments, because, certainly, parliaments who make kings under Grod, or above any one man, and they must have more authority and wisdom than any one king, except Solomon (as base flatterers say) ^ould return to the tarones of the earth. And as

THK LAW AND THE PRINCE.

the power to make just laws is all in the parliament, only the people have power to resist tyraimical laws. The power of all the parliament was never given to the king hy God. The parliament are as essentially judges as the king, and, therefore, the king's deed may well be revoked, because he acteth nothing as king, but united with his great or lesser council, no more than the eye can see, being separated from the body. The peers and members of parliament have more than the king, because they have both their own power, being parts and special members of the people, and, also, they have their high places in parliament, either from the people's express or tacit consent. 3. We allow no arbitrary power to the parliament, because their just laws are irrevocable; for the irrevocable power of making just laws doth argue a legal, not an irrevocable, arbitrary power; nor is there any arbitrary power in the people, or in any mortal man. But of the covenant betwixt king and people hereafter.

P. Prelate (c 10, p. 105). — If sovereign power be habitually m the community, so as they may resume it at their pleasure, then nothing is given to the king but an empty title; for, at the same instant, he receiveth empire and sovereignty, and layeth down the power to rule or determine in matters whidn concern either private or public good, and so he is both a kmg and a subject.

Ans, — This naked consequence the Prelate saith and proveth not, and we deny it, and give this reason, The king receiveth royal power with the states to make good laws, and power by his royalty to execute those laws, and this power the community hath devolved in the bands of the king and states of parliament; but the community keepeth to themselves a power to resist tyranny, and to coerce it, and eatenus in so far is Saul subject, that David is not to compear before him, nor to lay down Goliah's sword, nor disband his army of defence, though the king should command him so to do.

X P. Prelate (c. xvi. pp. 105— 107).— By aU poUticians, kings anilnferior magjstnttes are differenced by their different specific entity, but by this they are not differenced; nay, a magistrate is in a better condition than a king, for the mamstrate is to judge by a known statute and law, and cannot be censured and punished but by law. But the

king is censurable, yea, disabled by the multitude; yea, the basest of subjects may cite and convent the king, before the underived m^esty of the community, and he may be judged by the arbitrary law that is in the closet of their hearts, not only for real misdemeanour, but for fancied jealousies. It will be said, good kings are in danger; the contrary appeareth uas day, and ordinarily the best are in greatest danger. No government, except Plato's republic, wantetli incommodities: subtle spirits may make them apprehend them. The poor people, bewitched, follow Absalom in his treason; they strike not at royalty at first, but labour to make the prince naked of the good council of great statesmen, &c.

Ans, — Whether the king and the under madstrate differ essentially, we shall see. 1. The P. Prelate saith all politicians grant it, but he saith untruth. lie bringeth the power of Moses and the judges to prove the power of kings; and so either the judges of Israel and the kings differ not essentially, or then the Pre&te must correct the spirit of.God, terming one book of Scripture DO /D ^I'^gSj and another £3*1331 B^ Judges, and make the book of Kings the book of Judges. 2. The magistrate's condition is not better than the king's, because the magistrate is to judge by a known statute and law, and the ^iug not so. God moulded the first king, (Ceut. xvii. 18,) when he sitteth judging on his throne, to look to a written copy of the law of God, as his rule. Now, a power to follow Grod's law is better than a power to follow man's sinfiil will; so the Prelate putteth the king in a worse condition than the magistrate, not we, who will have the king to judge according to just statutes and laws. 3. Whether the king be censurable and deposable by the mimitude, he cannot determine out of our writings. 4. The community's law is the law 01 nature — not their arbitrary lust. 5. The Prelate's treasonable railings I cannot follow. He sajth that we agree not ten of us to a positive faith, and that our faith is negative; but his faith is Privative, Popish, Socinian, Arminian, Pelagian, and worse, for he was one of that same faith that we are of. Our Confession of Faith is positive, as the confession of all the relbrmed churches; but I judge he thinketh the Protestant faith of all the reformed churches but negative. The inoommodities of government, before our reformation, were not fancied, but prin-

LEX, REX ; OR,

ted by authority. All the bady of popery was printed and avowed as the doctrine of the Church of Scotland and England, as the learned author, and my much Respected brother, evidenceth in his Ltzdensium, *'* %ttvax^i^ the Canterburian Selfconviction. The parliament of England was never yet found guilty of treason. The good counsellors of great statesmen, that parliaments of both kmgdoms would take from the king's majesty, are a faction of pexjured Papists, Prelates, Jesuits, Irish cut-*throats, Strafords, and Apostates; subverters of all laws, divine^ human, of Grod, of church, of state.

P. Prelate (c. 16, pp. 147, 148).— In whomsoever this power of government be it is the only remedy to supply all defects, and to set right whatever is disjointed in church and state, and the subject of this superin* tending power must be free fi^m all error in judgment and practice, and so we have a pope %n temporalibusi and if the parlia^ ment err the people must take order with them, else Grod hath left church and state remediless.

Ans, — 1. This is stolen from Barclaius also, who saith,^ Si Bex regnum suum ali" ence ditioni manciparit, regno cadit: " If the king shall sell his kingdom, or enslave it to a foreign power, he faUeth from all right to his kingdom." But who shall execute any such law against him?-*-not the people, not the peers, not the parliament; ^r this nttavrnfium, ventris et aulce, this slave saith, (p. 149,) " I know no power in any to punish or curb sovereignty but in Almighty Grod." 2 We see no superintending power on earth, in king or people, which Is infallible, nor is the last power of taking order with a prince who enslaveth his kin^om to a foreign power, placed by us in the people because thev cannot err C!ourt flatterers, who teach that the will of the prince is the measure of all right and vrrong, of law and no law, and above all law, must hold that the king is a temporal pope, both in eccle** siastical and civil matters ) but because they cannot so readily destroy themselves (the law of nature having given to them a contrary internal principle of self-preservation) as a tyrant who doth care for nimself, and. not for the people. 3. And because Eostremis morhis extrema remedia, in an extraordinary exigent, when Ahab and Jeze-

1 Barclaius contra Monarchum. lib. 5, c. 12, idem, lib. 3, c. ult. p. 2, a

bel did undo the church of Grod, and tyrannise over both the bodies and consciences of priest, prophet and people, Elijah procured the convention of the states, and Elijah, with the people*s help, killed all Baal's priests, the kmg looking on, without question, against his neart. In tliis case I think it is more than evident that the people resumed their powen 4, We teach not that people should supply all defects in government, nor that they should use their power when anything is done. amiss by the king, no more than we king is to cut off the whole people of Grod when they refuse an idolatrous service, obtruded upon them against all law. The people are to suffer much before they resume their power; but this court slave will have the people to do what he did not himself; for when king and parliament summoned him, was he not obliged to appear? Non*compearance when lawtiil, royal, and parliamentary power Bummoneth, no less resistance than taking of ports and castles.

P. Prelate,-— Then this superintending power in people may call a king to account, and puni^ him for any misdemeanour or act of iniustice. Why might not the people of Israel's peers, or sanhedrim, have convented David before them, judged and punished him for his adultery with Bethsheba, and his murder of Uriah. But it is held by all that tyranny should be an intended universal, total, manifest destruction of the whole commonwealth, which cannot fall in the thoughts of any but a madman* Wbat is recorded in the story of Nero's wish in this kind, may be rather judged the expression of transported passion than a fixed resolution,

^*w.*— The P. Prelate, contrary to the scope of his bo<^, which is all for the subject and seat of sovereign power, against all order, hath plunged himself in the deep of defensive arms, and yet hath no new thing. 1, Our law of ScoUand will warrant any subject, if the king take from him his heritage, or invade his possession against law, to resist the invaders, and to summon the king's intruders before ihe lords of session for that act of injustice* Is this against God's word, or conscience? 2. The sionhedrim did not punish David, therefore, it is not lawful to challenge a king for any one act of injustice: from the practice of the Sanhedrim to conclude a thing lawful or unlawful, is logic we may resist. 3. By the P. Prelate's doctrine, the law might not put Bathsheba to death.

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

nor yet Joab, the nearest agent of the. murdering of innocent Uriah, because Bathsheba's adultery was the king's adultery — she did it in obedience to king David; Joab's murder was royal murder^ as the murder of all the cayaliers, for he had the king's handwriting for it. Murder is murder, and the murderer is to die, though the king by a secret letHiloney a private and illegal warrant, command it; therefore the Sanhedrim might have taken Bathsheba's life and Joab's head also; and, consequently, the parliament of England, if they be judges, (as I conceive Goa and the law oi tlmt ancient and renowned kingdom maketh them,) may take the head ot many Joabs and Jermines for murder; for the conunand of a king cannot legitimate murden 4 David himself, as kmg, speaketh more for us than for the Prdate,— 2 Sam, xii. 7, " And David's anger was greatly kindled against the man, (the man was himself, ver. 7> * Thou art the man,') and he said to Nathan, as the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this thing shall surely die." 5. Every act of injustice doth not imking a prince before God, as every act of uncleanness doth not make a wife no wife before God. 6. The Prelate excuseth Nero, and would not have him resisted, if *' all Bome were one neck that he midit cut it off with one stroke (I read it of ualigula; if the Prelate see more in history than I do, I yield)> 7. He saith, the thoughts of total eversion of a kingdom must onfy ML on a madman. The king of Britain was not mad when he declared the Scots traitors (because they resisted the service of the mass) and raised an army of prelatical cut-throats to destroy them, if all the kingdom should resist idomtry (as all are obliged). The king slept upon this prelatical resolution many monthiB: passions in fervour have not a day's reign upon a man; and this was not so clear aa the sun, but it was as clear as written, printed proclamations, and the pressing ot soldiers, and the visible marching of cut-throats^ and the blocking up of Scotland by sea and land, could be visible to men having five senses.

Covarruvias, a great lawyer, saith,^ that all civil power is penes remp. in the hands of the commonwealth; because nature hath given to man to be a social creature, and unpos^ble he can preserve himself in a society except he, being in community, transform his power to an head. He saith: Hujus vero civilis societatis et resp, rector ab alio quam ab ipsamet repuh. constitui non potest juste et absq. tyrannide. Siquidem ab ipso Deo constitatits non est^ nee electus cuiltbet civili societati immediate Hex aut Princeps. Arist. (polit. 3, c. 10) saith, " It is better that kings be got by election than by birth; because kingdoms by succession are vere regia, truly kingly: these by birth are more tyrannical, masterly, and proper to barbarous nations. And Covarruv. ^tom. 2, pract. quest, de jurisd. Castellan. Beip. c. 1, n. 4,) saith, " Hereditary kings are also niade hereditary by the tacit consent. of the people, and so by law and consuetude.*'

Dpalato saith, " Let us grant that a society shall refuse to have a governor over them, shall they be for that iree? In no sort. But there be many ways by which a people may be compelled to admit a governor; for then no man might rule over a community against their will% But nature hath otherwise disposed, ut qvod singuli nollenty universi vellentj that which every one will not have, a community naturally desirethk" And the Prelate saith, *' God is no less the author of order than he is the author of being; for the Lord who createth all conserveth all; and without government all human societies should be dissolved and go to ruin: then government must be natural, and not depend upon a voluntary and arbitrary constitution of men. In nature the creatures inferior give a tacit consent and silent obedience to their superior, and the superior hath a powerful influence on the interior. In the subordination of creatures we ascend from one superior to another, till at last we come to one supreme, which, by the way, pleadeth for the excellency of monarchy. Amongst angels there is an order; how can it then be supposed that Grod hath left it to the simple consent of man to establish a heraldry of sub et su^ pra^ of one above another, which neither nature nor the gospel doth warrant? To leave it thus arbitraiy, that upon this supposed principle mankind may be without government at all, is vain; which paradox cannot be maintained. In nature God hath established a superiority inherent in superior creatures, which is no ways derived from the inferior by communication in what proportion it will, and resumeable upon such

1 Spalato de rep. ecclcs. lib. 6, c. 2, n. 32.

>.Mi>M.i>a— MIM

exigents as the inferior listeth; therefore neitner hath Gkxl left to the multitude, the community, the collective, the representative or virtual hodjj to derive from itself and communicate sovereignty, whether in one or few, or more, in what measure and proportion pleaseth them, which they re* sume at pleasure."

Ans.—^To answer Spalato: No society hath liberty to be without all government, for " Grod hath given to every societyj" saith Covatruvias, " a faculty of preserving themselves, and warding off violence and injuries; and this they could not do except they gave their power to one or many rulers."^ But all that the Prelate buildeth on this false supposition, which is his fiction and calumny^ not oUr doctrine, to wit, " that it is voluntary to man to be without all government, because it is voluntary to them to give away their power to one or more rulers," is a mere non*conBequence. 1. We teach that government is natural, not voluntary; but 3ie way and manner of government is voluntary. All societies should be quickly ruined if there were no government; but it followeth not, therefore, God hath made some kings, and that immediately, without the intervening consent of the people, and) therefore^ it is not arbitrary to the people to choose one supreme ruler, and to erect a monarchy, or to choose more rulers, and to erect an aristocracy. It followeth no way. It is natural to men to express their mind by human voices. Is not speaking of this or that language^ Greek rather than Latin, (as Aristotle saith,) r fvf6tM,h by human institution? It is natural for men to eat, therefore election of this or that meat is not in their choice. What reason is in this consequence? And so it is a poor consequence also, Power of sovereignty is in the people naturally, therefore it is not in their power to give it out in that measure that pleaseth them, and to resume it at pleasure. It followeth no way. Because the inherency of sovereignty is natural and not arbitrary, therefore, the alienation and giving out of the power to one> not to three, thus much, not thus much^ conditionally, not absolutely and irrevocably, must be also arbitrary. It is as if you should say, a father having six children, naturally loveth them all, therefore he hath not freedom of will in expressing his affection, to give so

1 Covarr. torn. 4, pract. quest, c. 1, n. 2.

much of his goods to this son, and that conditionally, if Tie use these goods well; and not more or less of his goods at his pleasure. 2* There is a natural subordination in nature in creatures superior and inferior, without any freedom of election. The earth made not the heavens more excellent than the earth, and the eart^ by no freedom of will made the heavens superior in excellency to itself. Man gave no superiority of excellency to angels above himself. The Creator of aU beings did both immediately, without freedom of election in the creature, create the being of all the creatures, and their essential degrees of superiority and inferiority, but God created not Saul by nature king over Israel; nor is David by the act of ere*- ation by which he is made a man, created also king over Israel; for then David should from the womb and by nature be a king, and not by God's free gift. Here both the free gift of God, and the free consent of the people intervene. Indeed God made the office and royalty of a king above the dignity of the people, but he, by the intervening consent of the people, maketh David a king, not Eliab; and the people maketh a covenant at David's inauguration, that David shall have so much power, to wit, power to be a father, not power to be a tyrant, — power to fight for the people, not power to waste and destroy them. The inferior creatures in nature give no power to the superior, and therefore 3iey cannot give in such a proportion power. The denial of the positive degree is a denial of the comparative and superlative, and so they cannot resume any power; but the designing of these men or those men to be kings or rulers is a rational, voluntary action, not an action of nature, — such as is Grod's act of creating an angel a nobler creature than man, and the creating of man a more excellent creature than a beast; and, for this cause, the argument is Vain and foolish; for inferior creatures are inferior to the more noble and superior by nature, not by voluntary designation, or, as royahsts say, by naked approbation, which yet must be an arbitrary and voluntary action. 3. The P. Prelate commendeth order while we come to the most supreme; hence he commendeth monarchy above all governments because it is Grod's government. I am not against it, that monarchy well-tempered is the best government, though the question to me is most problematic; but because God is a monarch who cannot err or

THE LAW AND THE PRIXCE.

deny himself, therefore that siniiil mim be a monarch is miserable logic; and he must argue solidly, forsooth, by this, because there is order, as he saith, amongst angels, will he make a monarch and a King'-angel? His argument, if it have any weight at all in it, dnveth at that, even that there be crowned kings amongst the angels.

QUESTION X.

WHETHER OR NOT ROTAL BIRTH BE EQUIVA- LENT TO DIVINE UNCTION.

Symmons holdeth that birth is as good a title to the crown, as any given of €rod. How this question can be cleared, I see not, except we dispute that, Whether or not kingdoms be proper patrimonies derived &om the father to the son. I take there is a large difference betwixt a thing transmitable by birth from the father to the son, and a thing not transmitable. I conceive, as a person is chosen to be a king over a people, so a family or house may be chosen; and a kingdom at first choosing a person to be their lung, may also tie tnemselves to choose the first-bom of his body, but as they transfer their power to the father, for their own safety and peace, (not if he use the power they give nim to their destruction,) the same way thev tie themselves to his first-born, as to their king. As they choose the father not as a man, but a man gifled with royal grace and a princely faculty for government, so they can out tie themselves to his first-born, as to one graced with a faculty of governing; and if^his first-bom shall be bom an idiot and a fool, they are not obliged to make him king; for the obligation to the son can be no greater than the obligation to the father, which first obligation is the ground, measure, and cause, of all posterior obligations. If tutors be appointed to govern such an one, the tutors nave the royal power, not the idiot; nor can he govern others who cannot govern himself. That kings go not as heritage from the father to the son, I prove,

1. God (Pent, xvii.) could not command them to choose such an one for the king, and such an one who, sitting on his throne, shall

1 Edward Symmons, in hia Loyal Subjects Beleefe, sect. 3, p.X6.

follow the direction of God, speaking in his word, if birth were that which gave him Grod's title and right to the crown; for that were as much as such a man should be heir to his father's inheritance, and the son not heir to his father's crown, except he were such a man. But Grod, in all the law moral or judicial, never required the heir should be thus and thus qualified, else he should not be heir; but he requireth that a man, and so that a family, should be thus and thus qualified, else they should not be kings. And I confirm it thus: — The first king of divine institution must be the rule, pattern, and measure, of all the rest of tne kings, as Christ maketh the first marriage (Matt. xix. 8,^ a pattern to all others; and Paul reducetn the right administration of the Supper to Christ's first institution, 1 Cor. ^xi. 23. Now, the first king (Deut. xvii. 14, 16) is not a man qualined by naked birth, for then the Lord, in describing the manner of the king and his due qualifications, should seek no other but this, You shall choose only the first-bom, or the lawful son of the for^ mer king. But seeing the king of Grod's first moulding is a king by election, and what Grod did after, by promises and free grace, give to David and his seed, even a tnrone till the Messiah should come, and did promise to some kings, if they would walk m his commandments, that their sons, and sons' sons, should sit upon the throne, in my judgment, is not an obliging law that sole birth should be as just a title, in foro D^i^ (for now I dispute the question in point of conscience,) as royal unction.

2. If, by divine institution, Grod hath imipawned in the people's hand a subordinate power to the Most High, who giveth kingdoms to whom he will, to make and create kings, then is not sole birth a just title to the crown. But the former is true. By pror cent (Deut. xvii. 15) Grod expressly saith, " Thou shalt choose him king, whom the Lord shall choose." And if it had not been the people's power to create their own kings, how doth Qodj after he had designed Saul their king, yet expressly (1 Sam. x.) inspire Samuel to call the people before the Lord at Mizpeh to make Saul king? And how doth the Lord (ver. 22) expressly shew to Samuel and the people, the man that they might make him king? And because all consented not that SaS should be king, Grod will have his coronation renewed. Ver. 14, " Then said Samuel to the people, come and

LEX, EEX; OR,

t go to Gilgal, and renew the kingdom;" ver. 15, " And all the people went

let us

there

to Gilgal, and there they made Saul king

before the Lprd in Gilgal." And how is it

that David, anointed hj Grod, is yet no king,

but a private subject, while all Israel make

him king at Hebron ?

3. If royal birth be equivalent to royal unction and the best title ; if birth speak and declare to us the Lord's will and appointment, that the first-bom of a king should be king, as M. Symmons and others say, then is wl title by conquest, where the former king standeth in title to the crown and hath an heir, unlawful. But the latter is against all the nation of the royalists, for Amisseus, Barclay, Grotius, Jo. Rossensis Episco., the Bishop of Spalato, Dr Feme, M. Symmons, the excommunicate Prelate, if his poor learning may bring him in the roll, teach that conquest is a lawful title to a crown. I prove the proposition, (1.) because if birth speak God's revealed will, that the heir of a king is the lawM king, then conquest cannot speak contrary to the will of God, that he is no lawful king, but the conqueror is the lawM king. Gted's revealed will should be contradictory to himself, and birth should speak, it is God's will that the heir of the former king be king, and the conquest being also God's revealed will, should also speak that that heir should not be king. (2!) If birth speak and reveal Grod's win that the heir be king, it is unlawAil for a conquered people to give their consent that a conqueror be their king ; for their consent being contrary to God's revealed will, (which is, that birth is the just title,) must be an unlawful consept. If royalists say, God, the ELing of kings, who immediately maketh kings, may and doth transfer kingdoms to whom he will; and when he putteth the sword in Nebuchadnezzar's hand to conquer the king and kingdom of Judah, then Zedekiah or his son is not king of Judah, but Nebuchadnezzar is king, and Grod, being above his law, speaketh in that case his will by conquests, as before he spake his will by birth. This is all can be said. Ans, They answer black treason in saying so, for if Jeremiah, from the Lord, had not commanded expressly, that both the king and kingdom of Judah should submit to the king of Babylon, and serve him, and pray for him, as their lawful king, it had been as lawfiil for them to rebel against that tyrant, as it was for them to fight against the Philistines and the king of Ammon ; but if birth be the just and lawfiil title, in foro Dei, in Grod's court, and the only thing that evidenceth God's will, without any election of the people, that the first-bom of such a king is their lawful king, then conquests can* not now speak a contradictory will of God ; for the question is not, whether or not God giveth power to tyrants to oonquer kingdoms from the just heirs of kings, which did reign lawfully before their sword made an empty throne, but whether conquest now, when Jeremiahs are not sent immetfately from Grod to command, for example, Britain to submit to a violent intruder, who hath expelled the lawful heirs of the royal line of the king of Britain, whether, I say, doth conquest, in a such a violent way, speak that it is God's revealed will, called Voluntas signi, the will that is to rule us in all our moral duties, to cast off the just heirs of the blood royal, and to swear nomage to a conqueror, and so as that conqueror now hatn as just right as the king of Britain had by birth. This cannot be taken off by the wit of any who maintain that conquest is a lawful title to a crown, and that royal birth, without the people's election, speaketh God's regulating will in his word, tnat the first-bora of a kmg is a lawful king bv birth, for Grod now-a-days doth not say the contrary of what he revealed in his word. If birth be God's regulating will, that the heir of the king is in Grod's court a king, no act of the conqueror <5an annul that word of God to us, and the people may not lawfully, though they were ten times subdued, swear homage and allegiance to a conqueror against the due right ot birth, which by royalists' doctrine revealeth to us the plain contradictory will of God, It is, I grant, often Grod's decree revealed by the event, that a conqueror be on the throne, but this will is not our rule, and the people are to swear no oath of allegiance contrary to God's Voluntcts signi, which is his revealed will in his word regulating us.

4. Things transferable and communicable by birth from father to son, are only, in law, those which heathens call honafortunce riches, as lands, houses, monies and heritages; and so saith the law also. These thmgs which essentially include gifts of the mind, and honour properly so called — I mean honour founded on virtue^~as Aristotle, with good reason, maketh honour prcBminum virtutis^ cannot be communicated by

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

m^^rrnm^-f

birth from the fikther to the son; for royal dignitj indadeth these three constituent parts essentially, of which none can be communicable by birth, (1,) The royal faculty of governing, which is a special gift of Grod above nature, is from Goa. Solomon asked it from God, and had it not by generation from his &ther David, {%) The royal hon<<- our to be set above the people because of this royal virtue is not from the womb, for then Grod's Spirit would not have said, <* Blessed art Ibou, O land, when thy king h the son of nobles," £ool. x. 17 ; this bon* our, springing from virtue, is not bom with any man, nor is any man bom with either the gift or honour to be a judge, God makef^ high and low, not birth, pTobles are bom to great estates. If judging be heri* tage to anv, it is a municipal p<tive law, I now speak in point of conscience, (3.) The external lawfrd title, before men come to a crown, must be God's will, revealed by such an external sign as, by God's aopointment and warrant, is to regulate our wul; but according to Scripture, nothing regulateth our will, and leadeth the people now that they cannot err following God's rule in making a king, but the free suffrages of the states choosLOg a man whom they conceive Grod hath endued with these roytd dfts required in the king whom €rod holdeth tbrth to them in his word, (Deut. xvii.) Now there be but these to regulate the people, or to be a rule to any man to ascend tEbimdly, in foro Dei^ in God's court to the throne, (1.) GM's immediate designation of a man by prophetical and divinely-inspired unction, as Samuel anointed Saul and David; this we are not to expect now, nor can royalists say it, (2,) Conquest, seeing it is an act of violence, and Goers revenging justice for the sins of a people, caimat ffive m Qod's court such a jugt title to the t&one as the people are to sabnut their consciences unto, except Crod reveal bis regulating will by some immediate voice from heaven, aa he conimanded Judah to submit to Ndbuchadn^zar as to their king by the mouth of Jerenuah. Now this is not a rule to us; for then, if the Spanish king should invade this Iand| and, as Kebuchaonezzar did, deface the t^ple, and in strumentfl and means of God's worship, and aboHs^ the true worship of God, it should be unlawfrii to resist him, after he had once conquered the land; neither God's word, nor the law of nature could permit this, I suppose, even by grant of adversaries, now no

act of violence done to a people, though in Grod's court they have deserved it, can be a testin^ony to us of Grod's regulating will; ex cept it have some warrant from the law and testimony, it is no rule to our conscience to acknowledge him a lawful magistrate, whose sole law to the th^ne is an act of the bloody instrument of divine wrath, I mean the sword. That, therefore, Judah was to sub* mit, according to God's word, to Nebuchad* nezzar, whose conscience and best warranted calling to the kingdom of Judah was his bloody sword, even if we suppose Jeremiah bad not commanded them to submit to the king of Babylon, I think cannot be said. (3) Naked birth cannot be this external signification of God's regulating will to war* rant the conscience of any to ascend to the throne, for the authors of this opinion make royal birth equivalent to divine unction; for David anointed by Samuel, and so anointed by God, is not king, — Saul remained the Lord's anointed many years, not David, tl^ though anointed by Grod; the people's mak ing him king at Sebron, founded upon di* vine unction, was not the only external law-r M calling that we read of that David had to the throne; then royal birth, because it is but equivalent only to divine unction, not superior to divine unction, it cannot have more force to make a king than divine unc tion. And if birth was equivalent to divine unction, what needed Joasn, who had royal birth, be made king by the people? and what needed Saul and David, who bad more than royal birth, even divine unc tion, be made kings by the people? and Saul, having the vocal and infallible testimony of a prophet, needed not the people's election-^the one at Mizpeb and Gilgal, and the o^er at Hebron,

5, K roj^al birth be as just a title to tb? crown as divine unction, and so as the peoi*

Ele's election is no title at all, then is it pnr kw&l that there should be a king by elec? tion in the world now; but the latter is absurd,-^^so is the former. X prove the proposition, because where conquerors are wanting, and there is no king for the pre? sent, but the people governing, and so much confusion aboundeth, they cannot lawftiUy appoint a king, for his fftwftd title before God must either be conquest — ^which to n^e is no title — (and here, and in this case, there is no conquest) or the title must be ^VVO^ phetical w(rd immediately inspired of God, tNit this IS now ceased; or the title i^ust be

royal birth, but here there is no royal birth, because the government is popular; except you imagine that the society is obliged m conscience to go and seek the son of a foreign king to be their king. But I hope that such a royal birth should not be a just title before (xod to make him- king of that society to which he had no relation at all, but is a mere stranger. Hence in this case no title could be given to any man to make him king, but only the people's electioui which is that which we say. And it is most unreasonable that a people under popular government cannot lawfully choose aiding to uiemselves, seeing a kinj^ is a lawful magistrate, and warranted by Grod's word, he* cause they have not a king of royal birth to sit upon tne throne.

Mr Symmons saith^ that birth is the best title to the crown, because after the first of the &mily had been anointed unction was no more used in that family, (unless there arose a strife about the kingdom, as betwixt Solomon and Adonijah, Joam and Athaliah) the eldest son of the predecessor was afterward the chosen of the Lord, his birthright spake the Lord's appointment as plainly as ms father's unction. — Ans, 1. It is a conjecture that unction was not used in the family, afler the first unction, except the contest was betwixt two brethren: that is said, not proved; for 2 Kings xxiii. 30, when good Josiah was kiUed, and there was no contest concerning the throne of that beloved prince, the people of the land took Jehoahaz his 8(i, and anointed him, and made him king in his father's stead; and the priests were anointed, (Lev. vi. 22,) yea, all the priests were anointed, (Numb. iii. 3,) yet read we not in the history, where this or that man was anointed. 2. In that Adonijah, Sobmon's elder brother, was not king, it is cbar that Grod's anointing and the people's electing made the right to the crown, and not births 3, Birth de facto did design the man, because of God's special promises to David's hpuse; but how doth a typical descent made to David, and some others by Grod's promise^ prove, that birth is the birthright and lawful call of God to a crown in all after ages? For as df^s to reign goeth not by birth, ^o neither doth God's title to a crown go.

M. Symmons. — A prince opce possessed of a kingdom coming to him by inheritance,

1 Symmons' Loyal Subjects Beleefe,. sect^ 3, p, 16. >

can never, by any, upon any occasion be dispossessed thereof, without horrible impiety and injustice. Boyal unction was an mdelible character of old: Saul remained the Lord's anointed till the last gasp. David durst not take the right of government actually unto him, although he had it in reversion, being already anointed thereunto, and had received the spirit thereof.

Ans. — 1. This is the question^ J£ a prince, once a prince by inheritance, cannot be dispossessed thereof without injustice; for if a kingdom be his by birth, as an inheritance transmitted from the faUier to the son, I see not but any man upon necessary occasions may sell his inheritance; but if a prince seU his kingdom, a very Barclay and a Grotius with reason will say, he may be dispossessed and dethroned, and take up his indelible character then. (2.) A kingdom is not the prince's own, so as it is injustice to take it from him, as to take a man's purse from him; the Lord's church, in a Christian kingdom, is Grod's heritage, and the king only a shepherd, and the sheep, in the court of conscience, are not his. (3.) Boyal unction is not an indelible character; for neither Saul nor David were all their days kings thereby, but lived many days private men afler divine unction, while the people anointed them kings, except you say that there were two kings at once in Israel; and that Saul, killing I^vid, should have killed his own lord, and his anointed. (4.) If David duiHt not take the right of government actually on him, then divine unction made him not king, but only designed him to be king: the people's election must make the

king.

M. Syntmons addeth, " He that is bom

a king and a prince can never be unborn. Sem^T Augustus semper Auaustus; yea, X believe the eldest son t)f such a king is, in respect of birth, the Lord's anointed in his Other's life-time, — even as David was before Saul's death, and to deprive him of his right of reversion is as true injustice as to dispossess him of it."

Ans. — It is proper only to Jesus Christ to be bom a king. Sure I am no man bringeth out of the womb with him a sceptre, and a crown on his head. Divine unction giveth right infallibly to.a crown, but birth doth not so; for one may be bom heir to a crown, as w^s hopeful prince Henry,

THB LAW AND THE PRINCE.

and yet never live to be king. The eldest son of a king, if he attempt to kill his father, as Absalom did, and raise forces against the lawful prince, I conceive he may be killed in battle without any imustice. If in his fatherms time he be the Lord's anointed, there be two kings; and the heir may have a son, and so there shall be three kmgs, possibly four, — all kings by divine right.

The Prelate of Rochester saith,! " The people and nobles give no right to hinx who 18 bom a king, they only dedare his right."

Ans, — This is said, not proved. A man bom for an inheritance is by birth an heir, because he is not bom for these lands as a mean for the end, but by the contrary, these lands are for the heir as the mean for the end; but the king is for his kingdom as a mean for the end, as the watchman for the city, the living law for peace and safety to God's people; and, therefore, is not heres hominumf an heir of men, but men are rather heredes regis, heirs of the king.

Amisseus saith,' ''Many kingdoms are purchased by just war, and transmitted by the law of heritage from the father to the son, beside the consent of the people, because the son receiveth right to the crown not from the people, but from his parents; nor doth he possess the kingdom as the patri* mony of the people keeping only to himself the burden ot protectmg and goveramg the people,- but as a propriety given to him lege regniy by his parents, wmch he is obliged to defend and rule, as a father looketh to the good and welfare of the family, yet so also as he may look to his own good.

Ans. — We read in the word of God that the people made Solomon king, not that David, or any king, can leave in his testament a kingdom to his son. He saith, the son hath not the right of reigning as the patrimony of the people, but as a propriety, given by the law of the kingdom by his parents. Now this is all one as if he said the son hath not the right of the kingdom as the patrimony of the people, but as the patrimony of the people — ^which is good nonsense; for the propriety of reignmg given from &ther to son by the law of the kingdom, is nothing but a right to reign given by the law of me people, and the very gift and patrimony of the people; for lex regni, this law of the kingdom is the law of the

people, tying the crown to such a royal &- mily; and this law of the people is prior and more ancient than the kmg, or the right of reigning in the king, or which the king is supposed to have from his royal &- ther, because it tnade the first &ther the first king of the royal line. For I demand, how dom the son succeed to his father's crown and throne? Not by any promise of a divine covenant that the Lord maketh to the father, as he promised that David's seed should sit on his throne till the Messiah should come. This, as I conceive, is vanished with the commonwealth of the Jews; nor can we now find any inunediate divine constitution, tying the crown now to such a race,— nor can we say this cometh from the will of the &,iher-king making his son king. For, 1. There is no Scripture can warrant us to say the king maketh a king, but the Scripture holdeth forth that the people made Saul and David kings. 2. This may prove that the father is some way a cause why this son succeedeth king; but he is not the cause of the royalty conferred upon the whole line, because the question is. Who made the first father a king? Not himself; nor doth God now immediately by prophets anomt men to be kings, — then must the people choose the first man, then must the people's election of a king be prior and more ancient than the birth-law to a crown; and election must be a better right than birth. The question is. Whence cometh it that not only tne first father should be chosen king; but also whence is it, that whereas it is m the people's free will to make the succession of kmgs go by free election, as it is in Denmark and Poland, yet the people doth fireely choose, not only the first man to be king, but also the whole race of the first-bom of this man's famQy to be kings. All here must be resolved in the free nvSl of the community. Now, since we have no immediate and prophetical enthroning of men, it is evident that the Hneal deduction of the crown from father to son, through the whole line, is from the people, not from the parent.

6. Hence, ladd this as my sixth argument. That which taketh away that natural aptitude and nature's birthright in a community, given to them by G^ and nature, to provide the most efficacious and prevalent mean for their own preservation and peace in the fittest govemment, that is not to be holden ; but to make bir^ the- best title to the crown, and better than free election,

LEX, BEX ; OR,

taketh AYmj and impedeth that natural aptitude and nature's birthtight of choosing^ not simpiy a governor, but the best, the justest) the more righteous^ and tjeth and fettereth their choSe to one of a house, whether he be a wise man, and just, or a fool and an unjust man ; therefore to make birth the best title to the crown, is not to be holden

tt is objected, That parents may bind their after generations to choose one of such a line, but by this argument, their natural birth'- right of a free choice to elect the best and fittest, is abridged and clipped, and so the posterity shall not be tjed to a king of the royal line to which the ancestors did swear. See for this the learned author of " Scrips ture and Beasons pleaded for Defensive Arms." .

An$, — Frequent elections of a king, at the death of every prince, may have, by ac^ cident, and through the corruption of our nature, bloody and tragical sequels; and to eschew these, people may tie and oblige their children to choose one of the first-born, male or female, as in Scotland and England, of such a line; but I have i^ken of the excellency of the title by election above that of birdi, as comparmg things according to their own nature together, but give me leave to say, that the posterity are tied to that line, — 1. Conditionally t so the firstborn, ceteris pcMribus^ be qualified, and have an head to sit at the heliUk 2. Elections of governors would be performed as in the sidit of Qod, and, in my weak apprehension, the person coming nearest to God's judge, fearins God) htthng covetousness; and to Mo*- se? king, (Deut. xvii.) one who shall read in the booK of the law; and it would seem now that gracious tnovals are to us inistead of God's immediate designation. 3. The genuine and intrinscal ^d of making Mngs is not simply govemifig, but govemmg the best way, in peace, honesty, and godhness, (1 Tim iiv) therefore, these are to be made kings who may most expeditely procure this eno. Neither is it my purpose to make him no king who is not a gracious man, only here I compare title with title>

Arg^ 7* Where God hath not bound the conscience, men may not bind themselves, or the consciences of the posterity. But God hath not bound any nation irrevocably and unalterably to a royal line^ or to one kmd of • ■ ■ • ■ ■■ —

government; therefore, no nation can bind their conscience, and the conscience of the posterity, either to one royal line, or irrevocably and unalterably to monarchy. The proposition is clear. 1. No nation is tyed, jure divino, by the tie of a divine law, to a monarchy, ramer than to another eovemment. the Parimn doctors prove, £at the precept of having a pope is amrmative, and so tyeth not the 3iurch, ad semper ^ for ever; and so the church is the body of Christ, without the Pope t and all oaths to things of their nature mdifferent, and to things tSe contrary whereof is lawfiil and may l^ expedient and necessary, lav on a tie only conditionally, in so &r as they conduce to the end If the Gibeonites had risen in Joshua's days to cut off the people of Grod, I think no wise man can think that Joshua and the people were tyed, by the oath of Crod, not to cut off the Gibeonites in that case; for to preserve them alive, as enemies, was against the intent of the oath, which was to preserve them alive, as Mends demanding and supplicating peace, and sub" mittingt The assumption is clear. If a na* tion seeth that aristocratical government is better than monarchy, hie et nunc, that the sequels of such a monarchy is bloody, destruc* tive, tyrannous; that the monarchy compelleth the free subjects to Mahomedanism, to gross idolatry, tney cannot, by the divine bond of any oath, captive their natural fireedom, which is to choose a government and govemoi8 for their safety, and for a peaceable and godly life; or fetter and cham the wisdom (? the posterity unalterably to a government or a royal line, which, Ate et ntenc, contrary to the mtention of their oath, proveth destructive and bloody. And in this case, even the king, though tyed by an oath to govern, is obliged to the practices of the Emperor Otho; and as Speed saith of Richard the second,^ to resign the crown for the eschewing of the efi^sion of blood And who doubteth but the second wits of the experienced posterity may correct the first wits of their fathers; nor shall I ever believe that the fathers can leave in legacy by oath^ any chains of the best gold to fetter the after wits of post^ty, to a choice destructive to peace and true godliness*

jirg. 8t An hentor may defraud his first'* bom of his heritage, because of his dominion he hath over his heritage: a king cannot de-

1 Speed, Histt p. 757.

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

fraud his first-bom of the crown. An heritor maj divide his heritage equally amongst his twelve sons: a king cannot divide his royal donunions in twelve parts^ and give a part to every son; for so he mi^ht turn a monarchy into an aristocracy, ana put twelve men in the place of one king. Any heritor taken captive may lawfully oppignerate, yea^ and

give all his inheritance as a ransom for his berty ; for a man is better than his inheritance : but no king may give his 8al(jectB as a price or ransomk

1 et I shall not be against the succession of kings by birth with good limitations ; and shall agree) that through the corruption of man's naturCi it may be in so far profitable^ as it is peaceabloi and preventeth bloody tumultSy which are the bane of human societies* Consider fiirther for this, ^^* Bomanus, lib. 3 de reg. princi. cap. 5, aurrec* remat. and Joant de teme Beubese, 1 tract, contr. Bebelles, ar 1> con. 4. Yet Aristotle, the flower of nature's wit, (lib. 3. poUt. c. 10,) preferreth election to succession. He preferreth Carthage to Sparta, though their kings came of Herenles. r lutarch in ScyUa, saiw, he would have kinss as dogs, that is, best hunters, not those who are bom of best dogs. Tacitus, lib. 1, Nad et generari a PrindpibuSf fartuitum^ nee uUra ce^timan' tur.

QUESTION XL

Assert. 1. — ^Without detaining the reader, I desire liberty to assert that, where God establisheth a kingdom by birth, that government, hie et nunCf is best; and because Grod principally distributeth crowns, when Crod establisheth the royal line of I>ftvid to rei^, he is not principally a king who cometh nearest and most immediately to the fountain of royalty, which is Grod's immediate will; but God ^tabliidied, Ate et nuno, for typical rea^ sons (with reverence of the learned) a king by birth*

AsserU 2% — But to speak of them, ex notur a reiy and according to the first mould and pattern of a kins by law, a king by election is more prindp^y king (magxs univoce

etperse^ ihan an hereditary prince. (1.) Because m hereditary crowns, the first family being chosen by uie free suffrages of the people, for that cause ultitnate, the hereditary prince cometh to the throne, because his first father, and in him the whole line of the family, was chosen to the crown, and propter quod unumquodq'ue tale^ id ipsum magis tale, (2.) The first king ordained bv God's positive law, must be the measure of all kincs, and more principally ^e king than he I'mo is such by aerivation. But the first king is a kinff by election, not by birth, Deut. xvii. 16, Thou shalt in any wise set him kins over thee, whom the Lord thy God shau choose; one from amoi^st thy brethren shalt thou set over thee. (3.) The law saith, Surrogatum fruitier privilegiis ejue^ in cujxM locum swrrogatur^ he who is substituted in the place of another, enjoy- 6th the privileges of him in whose place ne succeedethk But the hereditary king hath royal privileges firom him who is chosen king. Solomon ham the royal privileges of David his &ther, and is therefore king by birth, because his &ther David was kmg by election; and this I say, not because I think sole birth is a just title to the crown, but because it detdgneth him who indeed virtually was chosen, when the first king of the race was chosen. (4.) Because there is no dominion of ^either royalty, or any other way by nature, no more than an eagle is bom king of eagles, a lion king of hons; neither is a man by natnr bom kina rf men; and, Uierefore, he who is made king by sufi&ages of the people, must be more principally king tnan he who hath no title but the womb of his mother.

Dr Feme is so far with us, to fiither royalty upon the people's free election as on the fermal cause, that he saith. If to design the person and to procure limitation of the power, in the exercise of it, be to give the power, we grant the power is from the people; but (saith he) you will have the power originally from themselves, in another sense, for you say, they reserve power to depose and displace the magistrate; sometimes they make the monarchy supreme, and then they divest th^nselves of ail power, and keep none to themselves; but, before established govemment, they have no politic power whereby they may lay a command on others, but only a natural power of private resistance, which thej cannot use against the magistrate.

Ans.—^But to take off those by the way. 1. If the king may choose A. B. an ambassador, and limit him in his power, and say, Do this, and say this to the foreign state you

fo to, but no more, half a wit will say the ing createth the ambassador, and the ambassador's power is originally from the king; and we pi*ove the power of the lion is originally from God, and of the sea and the fire is originally from Gk)d, because Grod limiteth the lion in the exercises of its power, that it shall not detour Daniel, and limiteth the sea^ as Jeremiah saith, when as he will have its proud waves to come thither and no far* ther, and will have the fire to bum those who threw the three children into the fiery furtiacej and yet not to bum the three children; for this is as if Dr Feme said, The Eower of the king of six degrees, rather than is power of five, is from the people, therefore the powei^ of the king is not from the people; yea, the contrary is true. 2. That the people can make a kmg supreme, that is, ahsoiiJLte, and so resign nature's birthright, that is, a power to defend themselves, is not lawfiil, for if the people have not absolute power to destroy themselves, they cannot resign such a power to their prince. 3. It is fsdse that a community, before they be established with formal mlers, have no politic power; for consider them as men only, and not 3i& associated, they have indeed no politic power: but before magistrates be estabushed, they may convene and associate themselves in a body, and appoint magistrates; and this they cannot do u they had no politic power at all. 4. They have virtually a power to lay on commandments, in tl]^t they have power to appoint to themselves rulers, who may lay commandments on others^ 6. A community hath not formally power to punish themselves, for to punish, is to inflict ma>^ lum disconveniens naturce, an evil contrary to nature; but, in appointing rulers and in agreeing to laws, they consent they shall be punished by another, upon supposition of transgression, as the child willingly going to school submitteth himself in that to school discipline, if he shall fail against anv school law; and by all this it is clear, a iing by election is pnncipally a king. Barclay then faileth, who saith,^ No man denieth but suecession to a crown by birth is agreeable to

^ Barcla. cont. Monafcham. c. 2, p. 56.

nature. It is not against nature, but it is no more natural than for a lion to be bom a king of lions.

Obj. — ^Most of the best divines approve an hereditary monarch, rather than a monarch by election.

Ans. — So do I in some cases. In respect of empire simply, it is not better; in respect of empire now, under man's fall in sin, I grant it to be better in some respects. DO Salust in Jugurth. Natura mortalium imperii avida, Tacitus^ Hist 2. Minore dtacnmine princeps swmtur, quam queritUy there is less danger to accept of a prince at hand, than to seek one afar off. In a kingdom to be constituted, election is better; in a constituted kingdom, birth seemeth less evil. In respect of liberty, election is more convenient; in respect of safety and peace, birth is safer and the nearest way to the well. See Bodin. de Hep. lib. 6, c, iv. ; Thol. de Rep. lib. 7, c iv.

QUESTION XIL

The Prelate averreth confidently (c. 17i p. 58) that a title to a kingdom by conquest, without the consent of a people, is so just and evident by Scripture, that it cannot be denied; but the man bringeth no Scripture to prove it. Mr Marshall saith, (Let. p. 7,) a con^ quered kingdom is but continuata injuria, a continuea robbery. A right of conquest is twofold. 1. When there is no just cause. 2. AVhen there is just reason and ground of the war. In this latter case, if a prince subdue a whole land which justly deserveth to die, yet, by his grace, who is so mild a conqueror, they may be all preserved alive; now, amongst those who have thus injurdd the conqueror, as they deserve death, we are to difference the persons offending, and the wives, children — especially those not bom — and such as have not offended. The former sort may resign their personal liberty to the conqueror, that the sweet life may be saved. He cannot be their king properly; but I conceive that they are obliged to Consent that he be their king, upon this condition, that the conqueror put not upon them violent and tyrannical conditions that are harder than

THB LA.W AND THB PRINCS.

death. Now, in reason, we cannot think that a tjrannous and unjust domineering can be Gfod's lawful mean of translating kingdoms; and, for the other part, the conqueror camiot domineer as king over the innocent, and especiallj the chil<&en not jet bom.

Assert. 1. — A people may be, by God's special commandment, subject to a conquering Nebuchadnezzar and a Caesar, as to their king, as was Judah commanded by the prophet Jeremiah to submit unto the yoke of the king of Babylon, and to pray for him, and the people ol the Jews were to give to CsBsar the things of Ce^sar; and yet both those were unjust conquerors; for those tyrants had no command of God to oppress and reign over the Lord's people, yet were they to obey thoM kings, so the passive subjection was just and commanded of God, and the active, unjust and tyrannous, and forbidden of Grod.

Assert. 2. — This title by conquest, through the people's afber consent, may be turned mto a just title, as in the case of the Jews in Gasttur's time, for which cause our Saviour commanded to obey Ceesar, and to pay tri* bute unto him, al X)r Feme confesseth, (sec. vii. p. 30). But two things are to be condemned in the Doctor. 1. That God manifesteth his will to us in this work of providence, . whereby he translateth kingdoms. 2. That this is an over-awed consent. Now to tke former I reply, — 1. If the act of conquering be violent and unjust, it is no manifestation joi God's regulating and approving will, and can no more prove a just title to a crown, because it ill an act of divine providence, than Pilate And Herod's cmcifying of the Lord of glory, which was an act of divine providence, flowing from the will and decree of divine providence, (Acts ii. 23 ; iv. 28,) is a manifestation that it was God's approving w^ that they should kill Jesus Oirist. 2^ Though the consent be some way over-^wed, yet is it a sort of contract and covenant of loyal subjection made to the conqueror, and therefore jsufficient to make the title just; otherwiso, if the people never dve their consent, the conqueror, domineering over them by violence, nath no just title to the crown.

Ajseert. 3. — Merid conquest by the sword, without the consent of the pieople, is no just title to the crown.

crown, is the peope's election, Deut. xvii. 15, all that bad any lawful calling to the crown in God's word, as Saul, David, Solomon, &c., were called by the people; and the first law* ful calling is to us a rule and pattern to all lawful caOings.

Arg, 2. — A king, as a king, and by virtue of his royal office, is the father of the king<p dom, a tutor, a defender, protector, a shield, a leader, a shepherd, a husband, a patron, a watchman, a keeper of the people over which he is king, and 90 the office essentially in*- cludeth acts of fatherly affection, care, love and kindness, to those over whom he is set, so as he, who is clothed with all these rela-^ tions of love to the people, cannot exercise those official acts on a people against their vriil, and by mere violence. Can he be a father, a guide and a patron to us against our will, and by the sole power of the bloody sword? A benefit conferred on any against their will is no benefit. Will he by the awesome dominion of the sword be our farther, and we unwilling to be his sons — an head over such as wiU not be members? Will he guide me as a father, a husband, against my will? He cannot come by mere violence to be a patron, a shield, and a de^ fender of me through violence.

Ara, 3. — It is not to be thought that that IS Grod's just title to a crown which hath nothing in it of the essence of a king, but a violent and bloody purchase, which is in its prevalency in an oppressing Nimrod, and the crudest tyrant that is hath nothing essential to that which constituteth a king; for it hath nothing of heroic and royal wisdom and gifts to govern, and nothing of God's approving and regulating will, which must be manifested to any who would be a king, but by the contrary, cmelty hath rather baseness and witless fiiry, and a plain reluctancy with God's revealed will, which forbiddem murder. Grod's law should say, " Murder thou, and prosper and reign;" and by the act of violating the sixth commandment, God should declare his approving will, to wit, his lawful call to a throne.

Arg, 4. — 'There be none under a law of God who may resist a lawful call to a lawful office, but men may resist any impulsion of God stirring them up to murder the most numerous and strongest, and chief men of a kingdom, that they may reign over the fewest, the Weakest, and the young, and lowest of the people, against their wul; therefore this call by the sword is not lawful. If it

LEX, REX ; OB,

be said that the divine impulsion, stirring op a man to make a bloody oonquest, that the ire and just indignation of God in justice may be declared on a wicked nation, is an extraordinary impulsion of Grod, who is above a law, and therefore no man may resist it; then all bloody conquerors must have some extraordinary revelation from heaven to war* rant their yielding of obedience to such an extraordinary impulsion. And if it be so, they must show a lawful and immediate ex* traordinary impulsion now, but, it is certain, the sins of the people conquered, and their most equal and just demerit bef(e Grod, cannot be a iust plea to legitimate,the con* quest; f(Nr tnousii the people of God de served devastation and captivity by the heathen, in regard of their sins, before the throne of divine justice, yet &e heathen grievously siimed in oonquring them, Zech. 1. 15, "And I am very sore displeased with the heathen that are at ease; for I was but a little displeased, and they helped forward the affliction." So thougn Judah deserved to be made captives, and a conquered people, because of their idolatry and other sins, as Jeremiah had prophecied, yet God was highly displeased at babylon for their unjust and bloody conquest, Jer. 1. 17, 18, 33, 34 ; li. 35, '' The vidence done to me and to my flesh be upon Babylon, shall the inhabitants of Zion say; and my blood upon the inhabitants of Ghaldea, shaa Jerusalem say." And that any other extra^T dinary impulsion to be as lawM a call to the throne as the people's free election, we know not from Grod's word; and we have but the naked word of our adversaries, that William the Conqueror, vdthout the people's consent, made himself, by blood, the lawful king of Endand, and also of all their posterity; and ^t king Fergus conquered Scotland^

Arg, 5.— A king is a special gifl; from Grod, nven to feed and defend the people of G<3, that they may lead a godly and peaceable life under him, (Psal. Ixxviii. 71, 72 ; 1 Tim. ii. 2 ;^ as it is a judgment of Grod that Laael is without a king many days, (Hos. iii. 4,) and that there is no judge, no king, to put evil-doers to shame. fJudg. xix. l!) But if a king be giten of God as a king, by the acts of a bloody conquest, to be avenged on the sinM land over which he is made a kin^, he cannot be given, €tctu primo^ as a speciiu gift and blessmg of Grod to feed, but to murder and to destroy;

for the genuine end of a conqueror, as a conqueror, is not peace, but fire and sword. K Uod change his heart, to be of a bloody devastator, a father, prince, and feeder of the people, e oMdo^ now he is not a violent conqueror, and he came to that meekness by contraries, which Is the proper wori^ of the omnipotent Crod, and not proper to man, who, as he cannot work miracles, so neither can he lawfiilly work bv ocHitraries, And so if conquest be a lawftil title to a crown, and an ordinasy calling, as the opponents presume, every bloody conqueror must be changed into a loving father, prince and feeder; and if Crod call him, none should oppose him, but the whole land should dethrone their own native sovereign' (whom they are obliged be* fore the Lord to defend) and submit to the bloody invadon of a strange lord, presumed to be a just conqueror, as if he were lawfully called to the throne both by birth and the voices (rf the people. And truly they de serve no wages who thus defend the king's prerogative royal; for if the sword be a law ful tiue to the crown, suppose the two gene* rals of both kingdoms should conquer the most and the ohiefest of the kingdom now, when they have so many forces in the field, by this wicked reason the one should have a lawful call of Grod to be king of England and the other to be king <^ Scotland; mich is absurd.

Arg. 6. — Either conquest, as conquest, is a just title to the crown, or as a just conquest. If aa a conquest, then aU conquests are just titles to a crown; then the Ammo* nites, Zidonians, Ganaanites, Edomites, &g., subduing God's people for a time, have just title' to reign over them; and if Absalom had been stronger than David, he had then had the just title to be the Lord's anointed and king of larael, not David; and so strength actually prevailing should be God's lawfiu call to a crown. But strength, as strength victorious, is not law nor reason: it were then reason that Herod b^ead John Baptist, and the Boman Emperors kill the witnesses of Christ Jesus. If conquest, as just, be the title and lawfid claim before Grod's court to a crown, then, certainly, a stronger king, for pregnant national injuries, may htwfully subdue and reign over an innocent posterity not yet boni. But what word of God can warrant a posterity not bom, and so accessory to no offence against the conqueror, (but only sin original,) to be under a conqueror against their will, and

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

who hath no right to reign over them but the bloody swora. ? For so conquest, as eonquest, not as just, maketh him king over tne posterity. If it be said. The fathers may engage the posterity by an oath to sui^- render themselves as loyal subjects to the man who justly and deservedly made the fathers vassals by the title of the sword of justice; I answer, The fathers may indeed dispose of the inheritance of their children, because that inheritance belongeth to the father as well as to the son; but because the liberty of the son being bom with the son, (all men being bom &ee from all civil subjection,) the ^ther hath no more power to resign the liberty of his chUdren than their lives; and the father, as a father, hath not power of the life of his child; as a magistrate he may have power, and, as something more than a father, he may have power of life and death, I hear not what Grotius saith,^ '• Those who are not bom have no accidents, and sp no rights, Non entis nulla sunt accidentia; then children not bom have neither right nor liberty." And so no injury (may some say) can be done to children not bom, though the Others should give away their liberty to the oon^uerors, — those who are not oapable of law are not capable of injury contrary to law.— r^jw. There is a virtual alienation of rights and lives of children not bom unlawful, because the childrai are not bom. To say that children not bom are not capable of law and injuries virtual, which become real in time, might say, Adam did not any injury to his posterity by his first sin, which is contrary to Grod's word: so those who vowed yearly to give seven innocent children to the Minotaur to be devoured, and to kill their children not bom to bloody Molech, did no acts of bloody injury to their children; nor can any say, then, that fathers cannot tie themselves and their posterity to a king by succession. But I say, to be tyed to a lawful king is no making away of liberty, but a resigning of a power to be justly governed, protected and awed from active and passive violence.

Arg. 7. — No la,wful king may be dethroned, nor lawful kingdom dissolved; but law and reason both saitn, Qtuxi vi partum est imperium^ vi dissolm potest. Every conquest made by violence may be dissolved

^ Hugo Grotiiu de jnre belli et pads, lib. 2, e. 4, n. IOl

by violence: Censetur enim ipsa natura jus dare ad id omne, sine quo obtineri non potest quod ipsa imperat.

Obj, — It is objected, that the people of Grod, by their sword, conquered seven nations of the Canaanites; David conquered the Ammonites for the disgrace done to his ambassadors; so Grod gave Egypt to Nebuchadnezzar for his hire in his service done against Judah. Had David no right over the Ammonites and Moabites but by expecting their consent? Ye will say, A right to their lands, goods and lives, but not to challenge their moral subjeotion. Well, we doiibt not but such conquerors will challenge and obtain their moral consent. But if tne people refuse their consent, is there no way, for providence giveth no right? So Dr Feme,^ so Amisaeus.*

Ans, — A facto ad jus non vales conse^ quentia, God, to whom belongeth the world and the fulness thereof, disponed to Abraham and his seed the land of Canaan for their inheritance, and ordained that they should use their bow and their sword, for the actual possession thereof; and the like divine right had David to the Edomites and AmmoniteEi, though the occasion of David's taking possession of these kingdoms by his sword, did arise from particumr and occasional exigencies and injuries; but it foUoweth in no sort that, therefore, kings now wanting any word of promise, and so of divine right to any lands, may ascend to the thrones of other kingdoms ^an their own, by no other title than the bloody sword. That God's will was the chief patent here is clear, in that God forbade his people to conquer Edom, or Esau's possession, when as he gave them command to conquer the Amorites. I doubt not to say, if Joshua and David had no better title than their bloody sword, though provoked by injuries, they could have had no right to any kingly po4^er over these kingdoms; and if only success by the sword be a right of providence, it is no right of precept. God's providence, as pror vidence without precept or promise, can oour elude a thing is done, or may be done, but cannot conclude a thing is lawfully and warrantably done, else you might say the selling of Joseph, the cracifying of Christ, the spoiling of Job, were lawfully done. Though conquerors extort consent and oath of loyS-

1 Dr Feme part S, seet. 3, p. 2Q.

3 Arnia89a8 de authoritat princip. c. 1, n. 12L

LBX, BSX; OR,

tjj yet that maketh not over a royal li^t to the ocmqueror to be king over their posterity without thdr consent. Though the children o£ Ammon did a high injury to David, yet no injury can be recompensed in justice with the pressore of the constrained subjection of loyalty to a violent lord. I£ David had not had an hi^ier warrant from God than an injury done to his mesaen^rs, he could not nave conquered them. J3ut the Ammonites were the declared enemies of the church of God, and raised forces against David when they themselves were the injurers and offenders. And if David's conquest will prove a lawM titie bv the sword to all conquerors, then may all conquerors lawfiQly do to the conquered people as David did; that is, they may " put them under saws, and under harrows of iron, and under axes of iron, and cause them pass throu^ the brick-kihie." But, I beseech you, will royalists say, that conquerors, who make themselves kin£ by their sword, and so make themselves fathers, heads, defenders, and feeders of the people, may use the most extreme tyranny in the world, such as David used against the children of Ammon, which he oouM not have done by the naked title of sword-conquest, if Grod had not laid a commandment of an higher nature on him to serve Giod's enemies so? I shall then say, if a conquering king be a lawfid king, because a conqueror, then hath God made such a lawM xing both a father, because a king, and a tyrant, and cruel and honheaurted oppressor of those whom he hath conquered; for God hath given him royal power by this example, (2 &un. xii. 30, 31,) to put these, to whom he is a &ther and defender by office, to torment, and also to be a torturer of them by office, by bringing their backs under such instruments of cruelty as '* saws, and harrows of iron, and axes of iron."

QUESTION XIII.

WHSTHER OR NO BOTAL DIGNITY HAVE ITS SPRING FROM NATURE, AND HOW THAT IS TRUE, " EVERT MAN IS BORN FREE," AND HOW SERVITUDE IS CONTRART TO NATURE.

I conceive it to be evident that royal dignity is not immediately, and without the intervention of the people's consent, given by

Giod to any one person, and that conquest and violence is no just title to a crown. Now the question is. If royalty flow from nature, if royalty be not a thing merely natural, neither can subjection to royal power be merely natural; but the form^ is rather civil than natural: and the question of the same nature is. Whether subjection or servitude be natural.

I conceive that there be divers subjections to these that are above us some way natural, and therefore I rank them in order, thus: — 1. There is a subjection in respect of natural being, as the effect to the cause; so, though Adun had never sinned, this morality of the fifth command should have stood in vigour, that the son bv nature, without any positive law, should have been subject to the &Uier, because from him he hath his being, as from a second cause. But I doubt if the relation of a fidher, as a &ther, doth necessarily infer a royal or kingly authority of the &ther over the son; or by nature's law, that the father hath a power of life and death over, or above, his children, and the reasons I give are, (1.) Because power of life and death is by a positive law, presupposing sin and the rail of man; and if Adam, standmg in innocency, could lawfrdly kill his son, though the son ^ould be a malefactor, without any positive law of Crod, I mudi doubt. (2.J I judge that the power royal, and the fatherly power of a father over his children, shall be found to be different; and the one is founded on the law of nature, the other, to wit, royal power, on a mere positive law. 2. The degree or order of subjection natural is a suQection in respect of gifts or age. So Aristotle (1 polit. cap. 3) saith, '' that some are by nature servants." His meaning is good, — that some gifts of nature, as wisdom natural, or aptitude to govern, hath made some men of gold, fitter to command, and some of iron and day, fitter to be servants and slaves. But I judge this titie to make a king by birtii, seeing Saul, whom God by supervenient gifts made a king, seemeth to owe small thanks to the womb, or nature, that he was a king, for his cruelty to the Lord's priests spealKeth nothing but natural baseness. It is possible Plato had a good meamng, (dialog. 3, de legib.) who made six orders here. '^ 1. That Stthers command their sons; 2. The noble the ignoble; 3. The elder the younger; 4. The masters the servants; 5. The stronger the weaker; 6. The wise the ignorant."

THS LAW AND THE PIUNCB.

Aquinas (22, q. 57, art. 3), Driedo (de libert. Christ. Kb. 1, p. 8), fcllowing Aristotle, (polit. lib. 7, c. 14,) hold, though man had never sinned there should have been a sort of dominion of the more gifted and wiser above the less wise and weaker; not antecedent fix)m nature properly, but consequent, for the utility and good of the weaker, in so far as it is good for the weaker to be guided by the stronger, which cannot be denied to have some ground in nature. But there is no ground for kings by nature here.

1. Because even those who plead that the mother's womb must be the best title for a crown, and make it equivalent to royal unction, are to be corrected in memory thus, — That it is merely accidental, and not natural, for such a son to be bom a king, because the free consent of the people makmg choice of the first father of toat line to be their king, and in him making choice of the firstbom of the family, is merely accidental to father and son, and so cannot be natural.

2. Because royal gifts to reign are not held by either us or our adversaries to be the specific essence of a kin? ; for if the people crown a person their kmg, say we, — ^if the womb bnng him forth to be a king, say the opponents, — ^he is essentially a kin?, and to be obeyed as the Lord's anointed, mough nature be very pareey sparing, and a niggard in bestowing royal gifts ; yea, though he be an idiot, say some, if he be the fii^-bom of a king, he is by iust title a king, but must have curators and tutors to gmde him in the exercise of that royal right that he hath from the womb. But Buchanan saith well,^ " He who cannot govern himself shall never govern others."

Assert. 1. — As a man cometh into the world a member of a politic society, he is, by consequence, bom subject to the laws of that society; but this maceth him not, from the womb and by nature, subject to a king, as by nature he is subject to his father who begat him, no more than by nature a lion is bom subject to another king-lion; for it is by accident that he is bom of parents under subjection to a monarch, or to either democratical or aristocratical governors, for Cain and Abel were bom under none of these forms of govemmeht. properly; and if he had been bom in a new planted colony in a wildemess, where no government were yet established, he should be under no such government.

1 Bncban. de jare Regni apad Scotos.

Assert, 2. — Slavery of servants to lords or masters, such as were of old amongst the Jews, is not natural, but against nature. 1. Because slavery is malum naturce, a penal evil and contrary to nature, and a

Eunishment of sin. 2. Slavery should not ave been in the world, if man had never sinned, no more than there could have been buying and selling of men, which is a miserable consequent of sin and a sort of death, when men are put to the toiling pains of the hireling, who longeth for the shadow, and under iron harrows and saws, and to hew wood, and draw water continually. 3. The original of servitude was, when men were taken in war, to eschew a greater evil, even death, the captives were willing to undergo a less evil, slavery, (8. Servitus, 1 de jure. Fers.) 4. A man being created according to God's image, he is res sacra^ a sacred thing, and can no more, by nature's law, be soM and bought, than a religious and sacred thing dedicated to God. S. 1. Instit, de inutiL scrupL L inter Stipulantem. jS. Sacram, F de verher, Obligat,

Assert, 3. — Every man by nature is a freeman bom, that is, by nature no man cometh out of the womb under any civil subjection to king, prince, or judge, to master, captain, conqueror, teacher, &c.

Arg, 1. — ^Because freedom is natural to all, except freedom from subjection to parents; and subjection politic is merely accidental, coming from some positive laws of men, as they are in a politic society; whereas they might have been bom with all concomitants of nature, though bom in a single &mily, the only natursu and first society in the world.

Arg. 2. — ^Man is bom by nature fi*ee fii^m all subjection, except of that which is most kindly and natural, and that is fatherly or filial subjection, or matrimonial subjection of the wife to the husband; and especially hO' is free of subjection to a prince by nature; because to be under jurisdiction to a judge or king, hath a sort of jurisdiction, (argument, X. Si quis sit fugitivus. F, de edil. edict, in S. penult, vel fin,) especially to be under penal laws now in the state of sin. The learned senator Ferdinandus Vasquez saith, flib. 2. c. 82. n. 15,) Every subject is to lay clown his life for the prince. Isow no man is bom under subjection to penal laws or dying for his prince.

Arg, 3. — Man by nature is bom free, and as free as beasts; but by nature no beast, no

LEX, REX ; OR,

lion is bom king of lions; no horse, no bullock, no eagle^ king of horses^ bullocks, or eagles. Nor is there any subjecticm here, except that the young Hbn is sul^ect te the old, every foal to its d^m i and by th^t same law of nature^ no man is hoirn kmg of men, nor any man subject to man in a civil subjection by nature^ (I speak not of natural subjection of children to parents,) and therefore Ferdi. Vasquez (illustr. quest, lib* 2^ c. 82, n. 6,) said, that kingdoms and empires were brought in^ not by nature's law, but by the law ofnationSk He expoundeth himself elsewhere to speak of the law of nature secondary> otherwise the primary law of nations is indeed the law of nature^ as appropriated to maui if any reply. That the freedom natural of beasts and birds, who never sinned, cannot be one with the natural freedom of man who is now under sin, and so under bondage for sin, my answer is. That the subjection of the misery of man by nature, because of sin, is more than the subjection of beasts, comparing species and kinds of beasts and birds with mankind) but comparing individuals of the same kind am(Hig6t themselves; as lion vrith lion, eagle with eagle, and so man with man; in which respect, because he who is supposed to be the man bom free from subjection politic, even the king bom a king, is imder the same state of sin, and so by reason of siu) of which he hath a share equally with all other men by nature, he must be, by nature^ bom under as great subjection penal for sin (except the king be bom void of sin) as other men; therefore he is not bom freer by nature than other men, except he come out of the womb with a king's crSwn on his head. ^

Arg. 4. — To be a king is a free gift of Grod) which God bestoiveth on some men above others-, as is evident, (2 Sam^ xii. 7, 8; Psal. Ixxv. 6 ; Daai. rv-, 32 ;) and therefore aJl must be bom kings^ if any one man be by nature a king bom, and another a bom subject. But ii some be by Grod's grace made kings above others, they are not so by nature; for things which agree to man by nature, agree to all men equally s but all men equally are not bom kmgs, as is evident; and aU men are not equally bom by nature under politic subjection to kings^ as the adversaries grant, because those wno are by nature kings^ cannot be also by nature subjects.

Arg. br — If men \)e not by nature free from politic sulgection, then must some, by the law of relation, by nature be kings. But

none are by nature kings, because none have by nature these things which essentially constitute kings, for th^ have neither by nature the calling of Uod, nor gifts for the throne^ nor the free election of the people, nor conquest; and if there be none a long by nature, there can be none a subject by nature. And the law saith, Omnes sumtis natwa liberi, nullirts ditioni svhfecH, lib, Manumiss, F. dejust, etjur. S,ju8 antem gentium^ Jus, de jur, naU We are by nature free, and D. L, ex hoc jure cum simiL

Arg, ^.-^Politicians agree to this as an undeniable truth) that as domestic society is natural, being grounded upcm nature's instinct, so politic society is voluntary, being grounded on the consent of men; and so politic society is natural, in radice, in the root, and voluntary and free, in modo^ in the manner of their union; and the Scripture cleareth to us, that a king is made by the free consent of the people, (Deut xvii. 15,) and so not by nature*

Arg, 7. — What is from the womb, and so natural, is eternal, and agreeth to all societies of men; but a monarchy agreeth not to all societies of men; for many hundred years, de facto, there was not a king till Nimrod'i^ time, the world being governed by famihes, and till Moses' time we find no institution for kings, (Gen. vii.) and the numerous multiplication of mankind did occasion 'monarchies^ othervnse, fatherly government being the first and measure of the rest, must be the best; for it is better that my father govern me, than that a stranger govern me, andj therefore, the Lord forbade his people to set a stranger over themselves to be their king. The F. Prelate contendeth for the contrary, (Ck 12, p* 126,) " Every man (saith he) is bom subject to his father, of whom immediately he hath his existence in nature; and if his father be the subject of another, he is bom the subject of his father's superior. "-^-4w. But the consequence is weak* Every man is bom under natural subjection to his father, therefore he is born naturally under civil suljection to his father's superior or king. It fblloweth notw Yea, because his father was bom only by nature sul^ject to his own father, therefore he was subject to a prince or king only by accident, and by the fr^e constitution of men^ who freely choose politic government, whereas there is no government natural, but fatherly or marital, and therefore the contradictory consequence is tme.

THE LAW AND THS PRINCE.

P. Prelate, — Evei*y man by nature hath immitnity and liberty firom despotical and hierarchial empire, and so may dispose of his own at will, ana cannot endave himself with^* out hig own free will; but God hath laid a necessity on all men to be under goyem-^ ment, and nature also laid this necessity on him, therefore this sovereignty cannot protect us in righteousness and honesty, except it be entirdy endowed with sovereign power to preserve itself, and protect us^

jins.-^l. The Prelate here deserteth his own consequence^ which is strong against himself, for if a man be naturally subject to his father's superior^ as he said before, why is not the son of a slave naturally subject to his father's superior and master? 2. As a man may not make away his liberty without his own consent, so can he not^ without his own consent, give his liberty to be subiect to penal laws under a prince, without his own consent, either in his father's or in the representative society in which he liveth. 3. God and nature hath laid a necessity on all men to be under government, a natural necessity from the womb to be under some government, to wit, a paternal government, uiat is true; but under this government politic, and namely under sovereignty, it is false; and that is but said: for why is he naturally under sovereignty rather than aristocracy? I believe any of the three forms are freely chosen by any society. 4. It is false that one cannot defend the people, except hd have entire power, that is to say, he cannot do good except he have a vast power to do both good and ill.

P. Prelate. — It is accidental to any to render himself a slave, being occasioned by force or extreme indigence, but to submit to government congruous to the condition of man, and is necessary for his happy being, and natural, and necessary^ by the inviolable ordinance of God and nature.

Ans, 1. — If the father be a slave, it is natural and not accidental, by the Prelate's logic, to be a slave. 2. It is also accidental to be under sovereignty, and sure not natural; for then aristocracy and democracy must be unnatural, and so unlaw^l governments. 3. If to be congruous to the condition of man be all one with natural man, (which he must say if he speak sense) to believe in God, to be an excellent mathematician ^ to swim in deep waters, being congruous to the nature of man, must be natursJ. 4. Man by na> ture is under government paternal, not politic properly^ but by the free consent of his will.

P. Prelate (p. 126). — Luke xi. 6, Christ himself was ^ru^0fi\nt subject to his parents, (the word which is used, Rom. xiii.) therefore none are exempted from subjection to lawfrl government.

Ans. — We never said that any were exempted from lawful government. The Prelate and his fellow Jesuits teach that the dei^ are exempted from the laws of the dvif magistrate, not we; but because Qirist was subject to his parents, and the same word is used, Luke xit, which is in Bom. xiii.) it will not follow, therefore^ men are by nature subject to kings^ because they are by nature subject to parents*

P Prelate.-^The &ther had power over the children, by the law of God and nature^ to redeem himself from debt, or any distressed condition^ by enslaving his children begotten of his own body; if mis power was not by the ri^t of nature and by the warrant of God, I can see no other, mr it could not be by mutual and voluntary contract of children and fathers.

Ans. — 1. Show a law of nature, that the father might enslave his children; by a divine positive law, presupposing sin, the father might do that; and yet I thmk that may be questioned, whether it was not a permission rather than a law, as was the bill of divorce; but a law of nature it was not. 2. The P. Prelate can see no law but the law of nature here; but it is because he is blind or will not see. His reason is. It was not by mutual and voluntary contract of children and fatherS) therefore it was by the law of nature; so he that cursed his father was to die by God's law. This law was not made by mutual consent betwixt the father and the son, therefore it was a law of nature: the Prelate will see no. better. Nature will teach a man to enslave himself to redeem himself from death^ but that it is' a dictate of nature that a man should enslave his son, I conceive not* 3. What can this prove, but that if the son may, by the law of nature, be enslaved for the father, but that the son of a slave is by nature under subjection to slavery, and that by nature's law; the contr^ whereof heUe in d^ep^eprec^- mg, and m this same page.

As for the argument of the Prelate to answer Suarez, who laboureth to prove monarchy not to be natural, but of free consent, because it is various in sundry nations, it

obia

LEX, REX ; OR,

is the Jesuits' argument, not ours. I own it not. Let Jesuits plead for Jesuits.

QUESTION XIV.

whether or no the people make a person their kino conditionally, or ab solutelt; and whether there be such a thing as a covenant tying the king no less than his st7bjects.

There is a covenant natural, and & covenant politic and civil. There is no politic or civil covenant betwixt the king and his subjects, because there be no such equaUtj (say royaUsts) betwixt the king and nis people, as that uie king can be brought under any civil or legal obligation in man's court, to either necessitate tne king civilly to keep an oath to his people, or to tie him to any punishment, if he fail, yet (say they) he is under natural obligation in Qod.^ court to keep his oath, but he is accountable only to Grod if he violate his oath.

Assert, 1 — There is an oath betwixt the

king and his people, laying on, by reciprocation of bands, mutual civil obligation upon

the king to the people, and the people to

the king; 2 Sam. v. 3, '*,So all the elders of

Israel came to the king to Hebron, and

king David made a covenant with them in

Hebron before the Lord, and they anointed

David king over Israel." 1 Clin)n. xi. 3,

" And David made a covenant with them

before the Lord, and they anointed David

king over Israel, according to the word of

the Lord by Samuel." 2 Giron. xxiii. 2, 3,

" And they went about in Judah, and gathered the Levites out of all the cities of

Judah, and the chief of the fathers of Israel,

and they came to Jerusalem. And all the

congregation made a covenant with the king

[Joasl^ in the house of God." 2 Kings xi.

17) '' Jehoiada made a covenant between the

Lord and the king and the people, that

they should be the Lord's people ; between

the king also and the people." Eccl. viii. 2,

" 1 counsel thee to xeep the king's commandment, and that in regard of the oath

o£ God." Then it is evident there was a

covenant betwixt the king and the people.

That was not a covenant that did tie the

king to Grod wily, and not to the people, —

1. Because the covenant betwixt the king

and the people is clearly differenced from

the king's covenant with the Lord, 2 KitigB xi. 17. 2. There was no necessity that this covenant should be made publicly before the people, if the king did not in the covenant tie and oblige himself to the people; nor needed it be made solemnly before the Lord in the house of God. 3. It is expressly a covenant that was between Joash the king and his people; and David made a covenant at his coronation with the princes and elders of Israel, therefore the people gave the crown to David covenant-wise, and upon condition that he should perform such and such duties to them. And this is dear by all covenants in the word of God: even the covenant between Grod and man is in like manner mutual, — ^** I will be your God, and ye shall be my people." The covenant is so mutual, that if the people break the covenant, God is loosed from his part of the covenant, Zech. xi. 10. The covenant giveth to the believer a sort of action of mw, and jus quoddamy to plead with God in respect of his fidelity to stand to that covenant that bindeth lum by reason of his fidelity, Isa. xliiL 26 ; Ixiii. 16; Dan. ix. 4, 6; and far more a covenant giveth ground of a civil action and claim to a people and the fie estates against a king, seduced by wicked counsel to msu^e war against the land, whereas he did swear by the most high God, that he should be a &ther and protector of the church of Grod.

Assert, 2. All covenants and contracts between man and man, yea, all solemn promises, bring the covenanters under a law and a claim before men, if the oath of Grod be broken, as the covenant betwixt Abraham and Abimelech, (Gen. xxi. 27,) Jonathan and David. (1 Sam. xviii. 3.) The spies profess to Bahab in the covenant that they made with her, (Josh. ii. 20,) " And if thou utter this our business, we will be quit of thine oath which thou hast made us to swear." There be no mutual contract made upon certain conditions, but if the conditions be not fidfiUed, the party injured is loosed from the contract. Barclay saith, ^' That this covenant obligeth the king to Grod, but not the king to the people."*^— ^n^. It is a vain thing to say that the people and the king make a covenant, and that David made a covenant with the elders and princes of Israel; for if he be obliged to God only, and not to the people, by a covenant made with the people, it is not made with the people at all, nay, it is no more made with the people

of Israel than with the Chaldeans, for it bindeth David no more to Israel than to Chahlea, aa a covenant made with men. AmissBus saith/ " When two parties contract, if one perform the duty, the other is acquitted." Sect, Oex hujus mod u6t vult just, de duob, reis, lib. 3. Dr Feme saith, " Because every one of them are obliged folly (Sect. 1) Jtist. eod, to God, to whom the oath is made (for that is his meaning^, and if either the people per&rm what is sworn to the Lord or the king, yet (me of ike parties remaineth still under obligation; and neither doth the people's obedience exempt the king from punishment, if he fail, nor the king's ob^ence exempt the people, if they fail, but every one beareth the punishment of his own sin; and there is no mutual power in the parties to compel one another to perform the promised duty, because that belongeth to the pretor or magistrate, before whom the contract is made. The king hath jurisdiction over the people, if they violate their oath; but the people hath no power over the prince; and the ground that AmissBus layeth down is this, — 1. The king is not a party contracting with the people, as if there were mutual obli^tions betwixt the king and Uie people, and a mutual oo-active power on either side. 2. That the care of religion belongeth not to the people, for that haw no warrant in the Word (saith he). 3. We read not that the people was to command and compel the priests and the king to reform relijzion and abolish idolatry, as it must follow, if the covenant be mutual.

4. Jehoiada (2 Kings xi.) obHgeth himself, and the king, and the people, by a hke law, to serve God ; and here be not two parties but three — ^the high priest, tho king, and the people, if this example prove any thing.

5. Bodi king and people shall find the revenging hand of God against them, if they fail in the breach of their oath ; every one, king and people, by the oath stand obliged to Uod, the kmg for himself, and the people for themselves, but with this difference, the king oweth to God proper and due obedience as any of the subjects, and also to sovem the people according to God's true region, (Beut. xvii. ; 2 Chi^n. xxix. ;) and in this the king's obligation differeth from the people's OMigation ; the people, as they would be saved, must serve God and the king, for the same cause. (1 Sam. xii.) But, besides

^ Amis, de anthorit. prin. c. 1. n. 6, 7.

this, the king is obliged to rule and govern the people, and keep them in obedience to God ; but the people is not obhgied to govern the king, and keep him in obedience to Grody for then the people should have as great power and jurisdiction over the kinff, as the king hath over the people, which is aoainst the word of God, and the examples of the kings of Judah ; ' but this cometh not from any promise or covenant that the king hath made with the people, but from a peculiar obligation wherebv he is obliged to Grod as a man, not as a kmg :-—

Arg, 1. — This is the mystery of the business which I oppose in these assertions.

Assert, 1. — As the king is obliged to Grod for the maintenance of true religion, so are the people and princes no less in their place obliged to maintain true reli^n; for the people are rebuked, because uiey bum ineense in all high places, 2 Kings xvii. II; 2 Ghron. xxxiii. 17 ; Hos. iv. lo. And the reason why the high places are not taken away, is given in 2 Ghron, xx. 33, for as yet the people " had not prepared their heart unto the God of their rathers;" but you will reply, elicit acts of maintenance of true religion are commanded to the people, and i£&t the places prove; but the question is de (ictibus imperatisy of commanded acts of religion, sure none but the magistrate is to command others to worship God aooording to his word. I answer, in ordinary only, magistrates (not the king only but all the princes of the land) and judges are to maintain religiim by their commandments, (Deut. i. 16 ; 2 Chron. i. 2 ; Deut. xvi. 19 ; Eccles. V. 8 ; Hab. i. 4 ; Mic, iii, 9 ; Zech. vii, 9 ; Hos. V. 10, 11,) and to take care of religion; but when the judges decline from God's way and corrupt the law, we find the people punished and rebuked for it: Jer. xv. 4, *^ And I will cause them to be removed to all kingdoms of the earth, because of Manasseh, the son of Hezekiah king of Judah, for that which he did in Jerusalem;" 1 Sam. xii. 24,' 26, " Only fear the Lord; but if ye shall still do wickedly, ye shall be consumed, both ye and your king." And this case, I grant, is extraordinaiy; yet so, as Junius Brutus proveth well and strongly, that religion is not given only to the xmg, that he only should Keep it, but to all the inferior judges and people also in their kind; but because the estates never gave the king power to corrupt religion, and press a false and idolatrous worship upon them, therefore

LSX, REX ; OR,

when the king defendeth not true religion, but preaseth upon the people 4 false and idolatrous religion, in that thej are not under the king, but are presumed to have no ^ng^lcatentUy so £Gir, and are presumed to have the power in themselves, as if thej had not appointed anj king at all; as if we presume tne body had given to the right hand a power to ward off strokes and to defend the body; if the right hand should by a palsy, or some other disease, become impotent, and be withered up, when ill is ooinmg on the body, it is presumed that the power of defence is recurred to the lefb hand, and to the rest of the body to defend itself in this case as if the body had no right hand, and had never communicated any power to the right hand. So if an incorporation accused of treason, and in danger of the sentence of death, shall appoint a lawyer to advocate their cause, and to give in their just defences to the judge, if their advocate be stricken with dumbness, because they have lost their legal and representative tongue, none can say that this incorporation hath lost the tongues that nature hath given them, so as by nature's law they may not plead in their own just and lawml defence, as if they had never appointed the foresaid lawyer to plead for them. The king, as a man, is not more obliged to the pubfic and regal defence of the true relimon than any other man of the land; but he is made by God and the people king, for the church and people of God's sake, va&t he may defend true religion for the behalf and salvation of all. If therefore he defend not religion for the salvation of the souls of all in his public and royal way, it is presumed as undeniable that the people of God, who by the law of nature are to care for their own souls, are to defend in their wav true religion, which so nearly concemeth them and their eternal happiness.

Assert. 2. — ^When the covenant is betwixt God, on fhe one part, and the king, priests and people, on the other; it is true, if the one perform for his part to God the whole duty, the other is acquitted: as if two men be indebted to one man ton thousand pounds, if the one pay the whole sum the other is acquitted. But the king and people are not so contracting parties m covenant with God as that they are both indebted to God for one and the same sum of complete obedience, so as if the king pay the whole sum of obedience to God, the people are acquitted; and

if the people pay the whole sum, the king is acquitted 2 for eyerj one standeth obliged to Grod for himself; tor the people must do all that is their part in acquitting the king firom his royal duty, that they may free him and themselves both from punishment, if he dis^ obey the King of kings; nor doth the king's obedience acquit the people from their duty. Amiseeus dreamed if he believed that we make king and people this way party-con^ tractors in covenant with Qod. Nor can two copartners in covenant with God so mu-!- tually compel one another to do their duty; for we hold that the covenant is made b&r twixt the king and the people, betwixt mor^^ tal men; but they both bind themselves be*f fore God to each other. But saith Ami> saeus, " It belongeth to a pretor or ruler, who is above both king and people, to compel each of them, — >the king to perform his part of the covenant to the people, and the people to perform their part of the covenant to the ki^g. Now thwe is no ruler but Grod, above both king and people." But let me answer. The consequence is not needful, no more than when the king of Judah and the king of Israel make a covenant to perform mutual duties one to another, -1- no more than it is necessary that there should be a king and superior ruler above the king of Israel and tne king of Judah, who should compel each one to do a duty to his fellowking; for the king and people are each of them above ai^d below others in divers re-^ spects: the people, because they create the man king, they are so above the king, and have a virtual power to compel him to do his duty; and the king, as king, hath an authoritative power above the people, be? cause royalty is formally in him, and origi-;' nally and virtually only in the people, therefore may he compel them to their duty, as we shall hear anon; and therefore there is no need of an earthly ruler higher than both, to compel both.

Assert. 3.-^We shall hereafter yrove th& power of the people above the king, Grod willing; and so it is false that there is not mutu^ Goaotive power on each side.

Assert. 4. — The obligation of the king in this covenant floweth from the peouliar nation^ obligation betwixt the kmg and the estates, and it bindeth the king as king, and not tdmply as he is a man. 1. Because it is a covenant betwixt the people and David, not as he is the son of Jesse, for then it should oblige Eliab, or any other of David's

-i-nr

brethr^n; yea, it should qbligp any man if it oblige Dayid as a man; but it obligetb [Qavid as a king* or as he is to l^e their king, because it if) the specific act of a king that he is obliged unto, to yrit, tQ goyer^ the people in righteousness and religion with his roj^ power. And so it is f;^ that Amiv S8BUS saith, that ^' the kipg, as s^ m^n, is oh-* liged to God by this covenant, not as a kii^g." 2, He saith, by coyena,nt the king^is boupd to Grod as a mani not as 4 king, £lut so the man will have the Jd^gy as k^ng* under no law of Grod; and ^ he must either be abov^ God, as kii^g, or cQ-e^ua) with Grod; which are manifest blasphemies. For I thQughf ever the royalists had nqt denied that t|ie kin?, as king, had been obliged to keep hi^ oath to his subjects, in relation to God, and in regard of natural obligation,— so as, he sinneth before God if he break his ooven^t with his people,— r-though they deny that he is obligea to\eep his covenant i|i relation to his ^ufnects, and in regard of politic or ciyjl obligation to pien. Sure J am tl^is the royalists const^tly teach, 3, If e would have this covenant sq made with men as it obligr eth Qot tbjB king to ipen, but to God, 3ut the contrary is true. Besides the ki^g and the people's covenant with the Lord, kmg Joasn made another cpvenant with the people, and Jehgiad^ the priest was only a witness, or pne who, in Grod's name, performed the rite of anointing; otherwise ne was a subject Qn the people's side, obliged to keep allegia4ce to 7^oash, as to his sovereign and master^ But, certainly, whoever maketh a Goven^t with the people, promising to gor?em then^ accprdmg to G<k1's word, and upon tl^t condition and these tern^s receiveth a throne and crown fron^ tl^e people, he is obliged to what he pronpseth to the people, Omnis promitte^s, fadt aZtefi, ctti pron^issio facta est^ jus in prqnhitt^ntern, THioever maketh ^ promiso to another, giveth to that otjier a sort of right or jurisdiction tp phallenge the promise. The covenant betwixt Pavid and Israel were a shadow^ if it tie th^ people to allegiance to Dayi4 as their king, and jf it tie not i)ayi4 ^ kirjg to govern them ip righteousness; bpt leavQ Sayid loose to th^ people, aQd oply tie him to God, thep it is a covenant betwixt David and God only; but the text saith, it is a covepant betwixp the king and the people, 2 Kings xi. 17 ; ? Sam. v. 3. Ara, 2.— Hence our second argument. He who is made a minister of God, not simply, but for the good of the subject, and so ne take heed to Qod's law as a king, and goverp according to God's will, he is in so fer oply made kmg by Gfod a^ he fulfilleth the condition; and in so far as he is a minister for evii to the subject, and ruleth not according to that which the book of the law compiandeth hiip ap king, in so far he is not by God appointed king and ruler, and so n^ust be maqe a king by Qod conditionally: but so hath Grod made kings and rulers, Rom. xiii. 4 ; ^ Chron. vi. 16 ; Psal. Ixxxix, 30, 31 1 2 Sam. vii. 12 ; 1 Chron. xxviii. 7 — r9. This argupiept is not brought to prove that Jeroboam or Saul leave off to be kings when they fail in pome part of the concGtiop; or as if they were not God's vicegerents, tp be obeyed in things lawful, after they have gope on in wicked courses; for the people consenting to make Saul king, they give him the crown, prQ hoc viccy at his eptry absolutely. There is no condition required in hiip before they make him king, but only th^t he coyenant with them to rule according to God's law. The conditions to be performed are consequent, and posterior to his actual coronation and his sitting on the throne. But the argument presupposeth that which the Lord's word teacheth, to wit, that the Lord and t)^e people givetli a crown by one and the same action; tor God formally maketh David a king ])j the princes and elaers of Israel choosing of hipi to be their kii^g at Jlebron; and, therefore, seeing the people maketh hini a kipg poyepaptwise apd conditionally, so he rule according to Qod's law, and the people resigping their power to lam for their safety, and for a peaceable and godly life under hin^, and not to destroy them, and tyrannise oyer them. It is certiaip GrO(l giyetb a king th^t same way by that very sapie act pf the people; and if the king tyranpise, I canpot say it is beside the intention of God makipg a kipg, nor yet beside his iptention as a just punisher of their transgressiops; for to me, as I conceive, nothipg ^itjxer good or evil fallpth out beside th^ intention of ijipi who " do^th all things accor4ing to the pleasure of his will," If, then, t^e people make a king, as a king, coniiitionally, for their safety, and not for tpeir destrpption, (for as a king he sayeth, as a man }ie destroyeth, and not as a king apd father,) apd if God, by the peopje's free election, make a king, God p^aketp hini a king copditionaliy, and so by povppant; and, therefore, when God propiis^tb (2 Sam. vii.

LEX, REX ; OR,

12 ; 1 Chron. xxviii. 7 — 9) to David's seed, and to Solomon, a throne, he promiseth not a throne to tJiem immediately, as he raised up prophets and apostles without any me^ diate action and consent of the people, but he promiseth a throne to them by the mediate consent, election, and covenant of the people; which condition and covenant he expresseth in the very words of the people's covenant with the king, " So they wait as kings in the law of the Lord, and take heed to God's commandment and statutes to do them."

Obj. 1. — But then Solomon, falling in love with many outlandish women, and so hot walking according to God's law, loseth all royal dignity and Tdngly power, and the people is not to acknowledge him as king, since the kingly power was conferred upon him rather than Adonijah, upon such a condition, which condition not being performed by him, it is presumed that neither God, nor the people under God, as God's instruments in making king, conferred any royal power on him.

Ans. — It doth not follow that Solomon, falling in love with strange women, doth lose royal dignity, either in the court of heaven or before men; because the conditions of the covenant upon which God, by the people, made him kins must be exponed by the law, Deut. xvii Now that cannot bear that any one act, contrary to the royal office; yea, that any one or two acts of tyranny doth denude a man of the royal dignity that God and the people gave him; for so David, committing two acts of tyranny: one of taking his own faithfiil sul^ect's wife from, and another in killing himself, should denude himself of aU uie kingly power that he had; and that, therefore, me people, after his adultery and murder, were not to acknowledge David as their king, — which is most absurd; for as one single act of unchastity is indeed against the matrimonial covenant, and yet doth not make the woman no wife at all, so it must be such a breach of the royal covenant as maketh the king no king, that annuUeth the royal covenantj and denudeth the prince of nis royal authority and power, that must be inter^ preted a breach of the oath of God, because it must be such a breach upon supposition whereof the people would not have given the crown, but upon supposition of his destructiveness to the commonwealth, they would never have given to him the crown.

Ob). 2.— Yet at least it will folloi*; that Saul, after he is rejected of God for disobe-* dience in not destroying the Amalekites, as Samuel speaketh to him, (1 Sam. xv.) is ho longer to oe acknowledged king by the people, at least after he committetn such acts of tyranny, as are 1 Sam. xyiii. 12 — 15, &c. ; and after he had killed the priests of the Lord and persecuted innocent David, without cause, he was no longer, either in the court of heaven or the court of men, to be acknowledged as king, seeing he had manifestly violated the royal covenant made with the people; (1 Sam. xi. 14, 15,) and yet, after those breaches, David acknowledgeth him to be his prince and the Lorcrs anointed

Ans. 1. — The prophet Samuel's threatening, (1 Sam. xvii.) IS not exponed of acmngi present; £r after that, Samuel both hontual unxinging and rejecting of Saul at the

oured him as king before the people and prayed for him, and mourned to God on his behalf as king, (1 Sam. xvi. 1, 2,) but the threatening was to have effect in God's time, when he should bring David to the throne, as was prophesied, upon occasion of less sin, even his sacrificing and not waiting the time appointed, as Grod had commanded, 1 Sam. xiii. 13, 14. 2. The people and David's acknowledgment of Saul to be the Lord's anointed and a king, after he had committed such acts of tyranny as seem destructive of the royal covenant, and inconsistent therewith, cannot prove that Saul was not made king by the Lord and the people conditionally, and that for the people's good and saiety, and not for their destruction; and it doth well prove, — (1.) That those acts of blood and tyrantiy committed by Saul, were not done by him as king, or from the principle of royal power given to him by God and the people. (2!) That in these acts they were not to acxnowledge him as king. (3.) That these acts of blo(3 were contrary to the covenant that Saul did swear at his inaugeration, and contrary to the conditions that Saul, in the covenant, took on him to perform at the making of the royal covenant. (4.) They prove not but the states who made Saul king might lawfully dethrone him, and anomt David their king. But David had reason to hold him for his prince and the Lord's anointed, so long as the people recalled not their grant of royal dignity, as David, or any man, is obliged to honour him as king whom the people mak-

THE LAW AND THE PBINGE.

eth king, though he were a bloodier and more tyrannous man than Saul. Any tyrant stanaeth in tituloy so long as the people and estates who made him king nave not recalled their grant; so as neither David, nor any single man, though six Hundred widi him, may unking him or detrapt obedience from him as king; so many acts of disloyalty and breaches of laws in the subjects, though they be contrary to this covenant that me states make with their prince, doth not make them to be no subjects — and the covenant mutual standeth thus,

Arg. 3. — 1. If the people, as God's instruments, bestow the benefit of a crown on their king, upon condition that he will rule them accordmg to Grod's word, then is the king made king by the people conditionally; but the former is true, therefore so is the latter. The assumption is proved thus: — Because to be a king, is to be an adopted father, tutor, a pohtic servant and royal watchman of the state; and the royal honour and royal maintenance given to him, is a reward of his labours and a kingly hire. And this is the apostle's argument, Rom. xiii. 6, " For this cause pay you tribute also, [there is the wages] for they are Grod's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing." There is the work. Qui non implet conaitianem asepromMsam^caditheneJlcio. It is confirmed thus.: — The people either maketh the man their prince conoitionally; — (1.) that he rule according to law or absolutely; — (2.) so that he rule according to will or lust; — or, (3.) without any vocal transactions at all, but only hrevi manu, say, " Beign thou over us, and, God save the king;'' and so there be no conditions spoken on either side;— or, (4.) the king is obliged to God for the condition which he promiseth by oath to perform toward the people; but he is to make no reckoning to the people, whether he perform his promise or no; lor the people bemg inferior to him, and he, solo Deo minoTj only next and immediate to God, the people can have no jus, no law over hun by virtue of any covenant. But the first standing, we have what we seek; the second is contrary to Scripture. He is not (Deut. xvii. 16, 16) made absolutely a a king to rule according to his will and lust; for " reign thou over us," should have this meaning — ^** Come thou and play the tyrant over us, and let thy lust and will be a law to us," — which is against natural sense; nor can the sense and meaning be according to

the third. That ihe people, without any express,, vocal, and positive covenant, give a throne to their king to rule as he pleaseth; because it is a vam thing for the Prelate and other Mandpia Aulce, court-bellies, to jsay Scotland and England must produce a written authentic covenant betwixt the first king and their people, because, say they, it is the law's word. Do non apparentibiLS et non eodstentibus ectdem lex, that covenant which appeareth not, it is not; for in positive covenants that is true, and in such contracts as are made according to the civil or municipal laws, or the secondary law of nature. But the general covenant of nature is presupposed in making a king, where there is no vocal or written covenant. If there be no conditions betwixt a Christian king and his people, then those things which are just and right according to the law of God, and the nue of God in moulding the first king, are understood to rule both king and people, as if they had been written; and here we produce our written covenant, Deut. xvii. 15 ; Josh. i. 8, 9 ; 2 Chron. xxxi. 32. Because this is as much against the king as the people, and more; wr if the first king cannot bring forth his written and authentic tables to prove that the crown was given to him ana his heirs, and his. successors, absolutely and without any conditions, so as his will shall be a law, cadit causa, he loseth his cause (say they). The king is in possession of the royal power absolutely, without any condition, and you must put him from his possession by a law. I answer, This is most false. (1.) Though he were in inala fde, and in unjust possession, the law of nature will warrant the people to repeal their right and plead for it, in a matter which concemeth their heads, hves, and souls. (2.) The parliaments of both kingdoms standing in

Possession of a nomothetic power to make iws, proveth clearly that the king is in no possession of any royal dignity conferred absolutely, and without any condition, upon him; and, therefore, it is the king's part by law to put the estates out of possession; and though there were no written covenant, the standing law and practice of inany hundred acts of parliament, is eijuivaleiit to a written covenant.

2. When the people appointed any to be their king, the voice of nature exponeth their deed, though there be no vocal or written covenant ; foj that fact — of making a king — is a moral lawful act warranted by the

LEX, REX ; OR,

word of God (Deut. xvii. 16, 16; Rom. xiii. 1, 2) and tn6 law of nature; and, therefore, they having made such a man their kin^r, they have given him pOwdr to be their father, feeder, healer, and protector ^ and so must only have made him king dbnditionally. so he be a father, a feeder, and tutor. Inow, if this deed of nlaking a king must be exponed to be an investing with an absolute, and ndt a (Conditional power, this fact shall be contrary to Scripture and to the law of nature J for if they have given him ro^al powet* absolutely, and Without any condition, they must have given to him power to be a father, protector, tutor, and to be a tyrant, a murderer, a bloody lion, to waste and destrov the people of God.

3. The law permitteth the bestoWei^ of A benefit to interpret his own mind in the bestowing of a benefit, even as a king and state must expone their own commission given to their ambassador, so must the estates expone whether they bestowed the crown upon the first king conditionally or absolutely.

4. If it stand, then mu^t the people give to their first elected king a power to waste and destroy themsdves, sO as they m^ never control it, but only leave it to Grod and the king to reckon togethei^, but so the condi^- tion is a chimera. " W© give you a throne, upon condition you swear by Him who made heaven and earth, that you wiU goverh us according to God's law ; and you shall be answerable to God only, hot to tis, whether yOu keep iiie co^enaht you make with us, or violatie it." But how a covenant can be made ^vith the people^ aiid the king obliged to God^ n'6t to tb^ people, I conceive not. This p^supposeth that the king, as king, cannot d6 any sin, or <!iommit ahy act of ty^- ranny against the people, but against G^ only ; because if he be obliged to God only as a king, by virtue of his Covenant, how can he fail against an obligation where there is no obligation ? But, as a king, he oWeth no obligation of duty to the people ; and indeed so do our good men expound Psal. li., " Against thee, thee only have I sinned," not against Uriah ; for if he sinned not as king aga&hst Uriah, whose life he was obliged to preserve as a king, he wafe not obliged as a king by any royal duty to preserve his lifew Where there is no sin, there is no obHgation not to sin ; and where there is no obligation tiot to sin, tliere is no sin. By this the king, as king, is loosed from all duties of the se<^ond table, being once made

a king, he is above all obligation to love his neighbour as himself; for ne is above all his neighbours, and above ail mankind, and only less than God.

Arg, 4. — If the people be so given to the king, that they are cotnmitted to him as a ' pledge, oppignerated in his hand as a pupil to a tutor, as ^ distressed man to a patron, aa a flock to a shepheH; and so they remain the Lord^s church, hi^ people, his flock, his

Sortion, his inheritance, his viney^, his reeemed onesj then they cannot be giVen to the king as oxen and sheep, that are &eely gifted to a man; or as a gift or sum of gold or silver that the Inan to vdiom they are given may use, so that he liiannot commit a &ult against the oxeuj sheep, gold, or tnoney that is given to him, however he shall dispose of them. But the people are given to the king to be tutoi^ and protebted of him, so as they remain the people of Grod, and in covenant with him; and if the people Were the goods of fortune (as heathens 6ay), he could no more sin against the pleople than a man can sin against his gold; now, though a ihan by adoring gold, or by lavish profusion Und wasting of gold, may sin against God, yet not against gold; nor can he be in any covenant with gold, or under any obligation of either duty or sin to gold, or to hfeless and reasonless ci'eatures properly, therefore he may sin in the UBe of them, and yet not sin against them, but against God. Hence, of necessity, the king must be under obligation to the Lord's people in another manner than that he should only answer to God for the loss of men, as if men were worldly goods under his hand, and as if being a king ne were now by this royal authority privileged fix)m the best half of the law of nature, to wit, from acts of mercy and truth, and covenant-keeping vrith his brethren.

Arg. 5. — If a king, because a king, were privileged from all Covenant obligation to his Bulyecte, then could no law of hieii lawfully reach him for any contract violated by him; then he could not be a debtor to his slUbjects if he bolTowed money from them; ai5i it were utterly, unlawful either to crave Mm monev, or to sue him at law fot debts; yet our civil laWs of Scotland tyeth the king to pay his debts, as any other hian: yea, and king Solomon traificing, and buying, and tellmg betwixt him and his own subjects, Would seem unlawfiil; for how can a king buy and sell with his subjects, if he be under no covenant obligation to men, but to God

THE LAW AND THE PBIKCE.

only. Tea^ then, a king could not marry a wife, foi* he coUld not come under a cove** nant to keep his body to her only, nor if he committed adultery, could he sin a^nst his wife, because being immediate unto God, and above all Obligation to men, he could sin against no covenant made with men, but only against God.

Atg. 6. — If that Was a lawful covenant made by Asa, and the states of Judah, 2 Chron. 15, 18, " That whosoever would not seek the Lord €rod of their fathers, should be put to death) whether i^mall or great, whether man or woman," thi& obligetn the king, for ought I see, and thb princes, and the people, but it wb6 a lawml covenant; therefore the king is under a covenant to the princes a)ld judges, as they are to him; it IS replied by Barclaius: " If a master of a school should tnake a law, Whosoever shall go out at the school doors without liberty obtained of thia master, shall be whipped, it will not oblige the schoolmaster that he shall be whipped if he go out at the school doors without liberty; so neither doth this law oblige the king, the supreme lawgiver."

Am, 1. -^Suppose that the scholars have no less hand luld authority magisterial in making thd laW than the schoomiaster, as the prmces of Judah had a collateral power with king A^ about that law, it would follow, that the schoolmaster is under the same law. 2. Suppose going out at school doors, were that way d. nl6r^ neglect of studying in the master, as it is in the scholars, as the not seeking of €rOd is as heinotls a sin m king Asa, ana no less deserving death, than it is in the pe6pl6, then should the law oblige schoolmaster and scholar both without exception. 3. The schoolmajster is clearly above ail laws of discipline which he imposeth on his scholars; but none can SaV that king Asa was clearly above that law of seeking of the Lord God of his fathers. Diodorus Siculujs (1. 17), saith, the kings of Persia were under an oath, and that they might not change the laws; and so wete the kings of Egypt ajid Ethiopia. The kings of Sparta, w&en Aristotle calleth just khigs, renew their oath every month. RomulUs so covenanted with the senate and people. GarolUs V. Austriacus sweaf eth he shall not change the laws without the consent of the electors, nor make new laws, vLdt dispose or pledge any thing that belongeth to the empire. So read we Spec. Saxon, lib. 3, act. 54, and Xenophon (Cyroped. lib. d^) saith there was a coi^enant

between Cyrus and the Persians. The nobles are crowned when they crown their king, and exact a special oath of the king; So doth England, Poland, Spain, Arragonia, &c. Alberi Gentllis,^ and Grotius,* prove that kings are really bound to perform oaths and contracts to their people; but " notwithstanding thet'e be such a covenant, it followeth not from this, ^saith Amisseus)' that if the prince brekk his covenant and rule tyranmcally, the people shall be free, and tne contract tyt covenant nothing; "^-Jlw*. The covenant may be materially broken, while the king remaineth king, and the subjects remain subjects; but when it is both materially and iormally declared by the states to be broken, the people must be free from their allegiance; but ot this more hei'eaftef.

Arg\ 7. — If a master bind himself by an oath to his servant, he shall not receive such a benefit of such a point of service; if he violate the oath, his oath must give his servant law and right both to challenge his master, and to be free from that point of service; an army appointeth such a one their leadet and captain, but they revise to do it except he swear he shall not betray them to the enemy. If he doth betray them, then must the soldiers be loosed from that contract. If one be appointed pilate of a ship, and not but by an oatn, if he sell the passengers to the Turks, they may challenge the puate of his oath; and it is clear that (1.) the estates should refuse the Crown to him who would refuse to govern them according to God's law, but uiould profess that he would make his own will a laW) therefore the intention of the oath is clearly conditional. (2.) When the king sweareth the oath, he is but king injieriy ana so not as king above the states of kingdoms. Now his being king doth not put him in a case above all civil obligation -of a king to his subjects, because the matter of the oath is, that he shall be under them so far in regard of the oath of Grod;

Arg. 8. — If the oath of God made to the people do not bind him to the people to go- ^m according to law, and not ac^rding to his will and lust, it should be unlawful for any to swear such an oath, for if a power above law agree essentiaUv to a king as a king, as royalists hold, he who sweareth such an oath

s Hugo Grotias de jure belli et poc. lib. 2, c. 11—13.

SEz:

J.EX, RBx ; oa,

should both swear to be a king to such a people, and should swear to be no king, in repect by his oath he should renounce that which is essential to a king,

AmissBUS objecteth: £39 particularibtis non potest colligi eoncliL8ix> universalis, some few of the kings, as David and Joash, made a covenant with the people; it followeth not that this was an universal law* — Ans, Yea, the covenant is fDeut. 17.) and must be a rule to all; if so just a man as David was limited hj a covenant, then all the rest also.

QUESTION XV.

WHETHER OR NO THE KING 9B UNIVOCALLT, OR ONLY AXALOGIGALLT, AND BX PROPOR- TION, A FATHER.

It is true Aristotle (Polit. L 3, c.ll) saith, that the kinglv power is a fatherly power; and Justin, (XH0velll2, c. 2^)Paterquamvis legum contemptovy quamvis impius sit^ tamen pater est. But I do not believe that, as rojalista saj, the kinglj power is essentially and univocally that same with a paternal or fatherly power; or that Adam, as a father, was as a father and king; and that suppose Adam should live in I^loah's days, that by divine institution and without consent of the kingdoms and communities on earth, Adam hoc ipso^ and for no other reason but because he was a father, should also be the universal king, and monarch of the whole world;*or suppose Adam was living to this day, that all kings that hath been smce, and now are, held their crowns of him, and had no more kingly power than inferior judges in Scotland have, under our sovereign kmg Charles, for so all that hath been, and now are, lawtiil kings, should be unjust usurpers; for if fatherly power be the first and native power of commanding, it is against nature that a monarch who is not my father by generation, should take that power from me, and be a king over me and my children.

1. But I assert, first, that though the Word warrant us to esteem kings fathers, Isa xlix. 23 ; Jud. V. 7 ; Gen. xx. 2, yet are not they essentially and formally fathers by generation; Num. xi. 12, " Slave I conceived all this people ? have I begotten them ?" and yet are they but fathers metaphorically — by office, because they should care for them as fathers do for children, and so come under

the name of &thersin the fifth commandment, and therefore rigorous and cruel rulers ai*e leopards, and lions, and wolves, £zek. xxii. 27 ; Zeph. iii. 3. If, then, tyrannous judges be not essentially and formally leopards and lions, but only metaphorically, neither can kings be formally fathers. 2. Not only kings but all judges are fathers, in defending their subjects from violence and the swora, and fighting the Lord's battles for them, and counsemng them. If, therefore, royaHsts argue right^, a king is essentially a father, and, rather^ power and royal power are of the same essence and nature. As, therefore, he who is once a father is ever a father, and his children cannot take up arms against him to resist him, for that is unnatural and repugnant to the fifth commandment; so he who is once a king is evennore a king, and it is repugnant to me fifth commandment to resist nim ¥rith arms. It is answered, — ^that the argument presupposeth that royal power and fauierly power is one and the same in nature, whereas they differ in nature, and are only one by analogy and proportion; for j90 pastors of the Word are called fadiers, 1 Cor. iv. 15, it will not follow, that once a pastor, evermore a pastor; and that if therefore pastors turn wolves, and by heretical doctrine corrupt the flock, they cannot be cast out of the church. 3. A father, as a father, hath not power of life and death over his sons, because, Eom, xiii., by divine institution the sword is given by Grod to kings and judges; and if Adam had had any such power to kill his son Cain for the killing of his brother Abel, it had been given to him by God as a power politic, different from a &therly power; for a fatherly power is such as formally to preserve the life of the children, and not to take away the life; yea, and Adajn, though he had never sinned, nor any of his posterity, Adam should have been a perfect father, as he is now indued with all fatherly power that any father now hath; yea God should not have given the sword or power of punishing ill-doers, since that power should have been in vain, if there had been no violence, nor bloodshed, or sin on the earth; for the power of the sword and of lawful war, is given to men now in the state of sin. 4. Fatherly government and power is from the bosom and marrow of that fountain law of nature; but royal power is not from the law of nature, more than is aristocratical or democratical

Sower. Dr. Feme saith, (part 1, sec. 3, p. 8,) lonarchy is not jure divino, (I am not of

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

his mind,) nor yet from the law of nature, but duetu naturaSy bj the guidance of nature. Sure it is from a supervenient commandment of Crod, added to the first law of natufe, establishing fatherly power. 5. Children having theur life ana first breathings of nature from their parents, must be in a more entire relation from their father than from their prince. Subjects have not their being natural, but their dvil, politic and peaceable well-being from their prince. 6. A father is a fatner by generation, and giving the being of nature to children, and IS a natural head and root, without the fred consent and suffrages of his children, and is essentially a father to one child, as Adam was to one Cain; but a prince is a prince by the free sufiPrages of a community, and cannot be a king to one only, and he is the politic head of a civil corporation. 7. A father, so long as his children liveth, can never leave off to be a father, though he were mad and fiurious — ^though he be me most wicked man on earth. Qui genuit filium non po^ test non genuisse Jtlium, what is once past cannot, by any power, be not past; a fa* ther is a father for ever. But by confession of royalists, as Barclaius, Hugo Grotius, and Amisseus, and others, grant, If a king sell his subjects' by sea or land to other nations, — ^if he turn a furious Nero, he may be dethroned; and the power that created the king under such express conditions, as if the king violate them by his own consent he shall be put frora the throne — ^may cease to hold him king; and if a stronger king conquer a king and his subjects, royalists say the oonqueror is a lawful king; and so the conquered king must also lawfully come down mm his throne, and turn a lawful captive sitting in the dust. 8. Learned politicians, as Bartholomeus Romulus, {Defens. part 1, n. 153,) and Joannes de Anama (in c. fin, de his qui fit. ocdd.) teach that " the fatner IS not oWiged to reveal the conspiracy of his son against his prince; nor is he more to accuse his son, than to accuse himself, because the father loveth the son better than himself," (D. Listi quidem. Sect, Fin, qUod, met, caus, et D, L,.fin, c, de ciMra furiosi,) and certainly a father had rather die in his own person; as choose to die in his son's, in whom he affecteth a sort of immortality, in spede, quando non potest in individuo; but a king doth not loVe his subjects with a natural or fatherly love thus; and if the affections differ, the power which secondeth

the affection, for the conservation either of being, or well-being, must also differ proportionally.

The P. Prelate (c. 7, p. 87,) objecteth against us thus, stealmg word by word from AmissBus.^ 1. When a king is elected soverei^ to a multitude, he is surrogated in the place of a common father, Exod. xx. 12, " Honour thy father." Then, as a natural father receiveth not paternal right, power, or authority, from his sons, but hath this from Grod ana the ordinance of nature, nor can the king have his right firom the community. 2. The maxim of the law is, Surrogatus gaudet privilegus ejus cui surrogatur, et qui succedit in locumy succedit in jus. The person surrogated hath all the privileges that he hath in whose place he succeedeth; he who succeedeth to tne place succeedeth to the rights; the adopted son, Or the bastard who is legitimated and cometh in the place of the lawful bom son, cometh also in the privileges of the lawM bom son. A prince elected cometh to the fuU possession of the majesty of a natural prince and father, for Modus acquirendi non toU lit naturale jus possidendi (saith AmissBus, more fully than the poor PlagiariusJ, the manner of acquiring any thing, taketn not away the natural possession, for however flings be acquired, if the title be just, possession is the law of nations. Then wnen the king is chosen in place of the father, as the fkther hath a divine right by nature, (so must the king have that same;) and seeing the right proprietor (saith the pamphleting Prelate) had his right by God!, by nature, how can it be but nowsoever the designation of the person is from the disordered community, yet the collatioii of the power is from Gk)d immediately, and from his sacred and inviolable ordinance? And what can be said against the way by which any one elected obtained his right, for seeing Grod doth not now send Samuels or Eli^ias to anoint or defclare kings, we are, in his ordinary providence, to conceive the designation of the person is the manifestation of Grod's will, called voluntas signi, as the schools speak, just so aJa when tne church designeth one to sacred orders.

Ans, 1. — He that is surrogated in the place of another, due to him by a positive law of mart, he hath law to all the privileges that he hath in whose place he is surrrogated, that k true, He who is made assignee to an ohligation for a sum of money, hath all the rignts that the principal partj to whom the bond or Qb^igation was made. He who cometh in the place of a ma^or of a city, of a captain in an anpj, of a pilot in a ship, or of a pope, hath all the privileges ana rights that his predecessors had by law. Jus succedit juri, persona jure predita per^ soncB jure preditcBf So the law, so far as my reading can reach,^-who profess myself a divine; — ^but that h© whp succeedeth to the place of a father by nature, should enjoy all the natural rights and privileges of the person to whom be succeedeth, I believe the law never dreamed it; for then the adopted son, coming in place of the natural son, hath right to the natpral affection of the father. If any should gdopt Maxwell the prelate, should he love him as the pursuivant of Crail (Maxwell's father) loved him, I conceive not. Hath the adopted son his life, his being, the figure bodily, the manners <of the son in whose place he is adop-. ted; or doth he naturally resemble the lather as th^B natural son doth? The Prelate did not read this law in any approved jurist, though he did steal the argument from Arnisseiis, and stole the citations of Homer and Arjustotle out of him, with a little metathesis, A natural spn is not mad^ a son by the coiisent of pareijits, but he is a son by generation: so musjb the adopted son he adopted without the free consent and grace otthe father adoptmg: so here the king cometh in the place of a natural father. But I conceive the law saith not that the elected king is a king without consent of the objects, as a natur^ father is a father withoiat the consent of his sons. Nor is it a law true, as " once a father always a father," sp once an electe4 ]^ng always a king, though he sell his subjects, hejng induced theireunto by wicked counsellors. If the king h^ve no privileges but what the natural father hath, m whose place he cometh^ then, as jthp natural father, in a free lapgcjom, hath not power of life and death oyer nis sons, neither nath the king power of life and death over his subjects. This is no law. This maxim should prove good if the king were essjentially a father by generation and natural propagation; but he is only a Mher metaphorically, and hy ft borrowed speech. A father non geneTCLTpdOf sed pplitice alendo^ tuendo^ regendOy therefore an elected prince cometh not in the full possession of all the natural

power mid rights of ^ natural father, % The F, Prelate speaketh disgracefully pf the church of God!, callin&r it a disorderly commumtj, as if he himJlf were bom oY kings, whereas God calleth the king their shepherd, and the people, " God's flock, uit henta^ce and people; and they are not a disorderly bpdy by natu^re, but by sin; in which sense the Prelate may call king, priest ^d people, a co^ipany of heirs of God's YH^th, except he be an Armini^ still, as once he w^. If we ^re in ordinary providence nowi because lye have npt l^a? muels ^d prophets to anqint kings, to hpld the designation of a person to he &ing to he the mapifestation ot God's will, eddied voU untas sigviiy is t^ason, for if Scotland and England should design Maxwell in the plftce of xing Charles o\ir native sovereigp^ (an odious oomparison,) Mpxwell should be lawful king; tor what is done by Grod's will, called by our divines (they have it not from schoolmen, as the Prelate ignorantly saith) his signijled will^ which is our rule, is done lawfuUy. There c^ be w greater trea^n put in print than this,

QUESTION XVL

I may here dispute whethpr the ki|ig be lord, having a masterly dominion both ove^ men and things. But I first discuss shortly his dominipn oyer his subjects.

It is agreed pn by divines, that servitudp is a penal fruit of sin, and against nature. Znstitutt. de jure personarumy Sect. 1, and F^ de statu hominum. I, libertas; because all men are bom by nature of equal condition,

Assert. 1 , — The king hath no proper, ihasr terly, or lordly dopiinion over his subjects; his dominion is rather fiduciary and ministerial, than piasterly,

1. Because royal empire is essentially to feed, rule, defend, and to goveyn in peace and godliness, (1 Tim, ii. 2^ as the father doth his children; Psal. Ixxviii. 71, " He brought him to feed Japob his pepple, and Israel his inheritance ;" Is?,. Iv, 4, " I gave him for a leader and cpmmauder to the people ;" 2 Sam. v, % *< Thou sh^t feed my people Israel ;" 2 Sam. y, 2 ; I Chron. xi.

2 ; 1 Ghron. xvii. 6.) And so it is for the good of the people, and to bring those over whom he is a feeder and ruler, to such a happy end ; and, as saith Althusius, (polit, c. 1, n, 13,) and Marius Salomonius, (de princ, c. 2,) it is to take care of the good of those over whom the ruler is set, and, conservare est, rem illcesam servare^ to keep a thing safe. But to be a n!iaster, and to have a masterly and lordly power over slaves and servants, is to make use of servants for the owner's bene* fit, not for the good of the slave, {I, 2, de leg, I, ServtLs de servit. expert. Dance po^ lit, L 1, Tolosaan. de Hep, I. 1, c. 1, n. 15, 16,) therefore are servants bought and sold as goods, (jure belli. F, de statu hominum L et servorum,)

2. Not to be under governors and magistrates is a judgment of God, (Isa. iii. 6, 7 ; iii, 1 ; Hos. iii. 4; Judg, xix. 1, 2,) but not to be under a ma£^r as slaves are, is a blessing, seeing freedom is a blessing of Grod, (John viii. 33 ; Exod. xxi. 2, 26, 27 ; Deut. XV, 12 ;) so he that killeth Goliath, (1 Sam, xvii. 25,) his father's house shall be free in Israel. ( Jer. xxxiv, 9 ; Acts xxii. 28 ; 1 Cor. ix. 19; Gal. iv. 26, 31.^ Therefore the power of a king cannot be a lordly and masterly power; ror then to be under a kingly power should both be a blessing and a curse, and just punishment of sin.

3. Subjects are called the servants of the

but they are not slaves, because (Deut, xvii,

20) they are his brethren : " That the king's

heart be not lifted up against his brethren ;"

and his sons; (Isa. 3uix, 23 ;) and the Lord

gave his people a king as a blessing, (1 Kings

" and brought them out of the house of bondage," (Exod, XX. 2,) as out of a place of

misery. And therefore to be the king's servants in the place cited, is some other thing

than to be the king's slaves,

4. The master might in some oases sell the servant for money, yea for his own gain he might do it, (Nehem. v. 8 ; Eccles, u, 7 ; 1 Kings ii. 32 ; Gen. ix. 25 ; G^n. xxvi, 14 ; 2 Kmgs iv. 1 ; Gn. xx. 14, and might give away his servants ; and tlie servants were the proper goods and riches of the master ; (Eccles. ii. 7 ; Gen. xxx, 43 ; Gen, xx, 14 ; Job i. 3, 15) ; but the king may not sell his kingdom or subjects, or give them away for money, or any other way ; for royalists grant that king to be a tyrant, and worthy to be

dethroned, who shall sell his people; for the king may not dilapidate the rents of the crown and give them away to the hurt and prejudice of his successors, (Z. uU, Sect, sed nostr, c. Comment, de lege, I, peto, 69, Sect, fratrem de lege, 2, I, 32, ultimo, D. T.\ and far less can he lawMly sell men, and give away a whole kingdom to the hurt of his successors, for that were to make merchandise of the living temples of the Holy Ghost; and Amiseeus, (de authorit. prindp, c, 3, n. 7,) saith, servitude is prmter naturam, beside nature; he might have said, contrary to nature (l, 5, de Stat, homin. Sect, 2, Inst, de jur. perso, c, 3, et Novel, 89) ; but the subjection of subjects is so consonant to nature, that it is seen m bees and cranes. Therefore a dominion is defined, a faculty of using of things to what uses you will. Now a man hath not this way an absolute dominion over his beasts, to dispose of them at his will; for a good man hath mercy on the life of his beast, JProv, xii. 10,) nor hath he dominion over bis goods to use them as he will, because he may not use them to the damage of the commonwealth, he may not use them to the dishonour of God; and so God and the magistrate hath laid some bound on his dominion. And because the king being made a king leaveth not off to be a reasonable creature, he must be under a law, and so his will and lust cannot be the rule of his pow^r and dominion, but law and reason must regulate him, Now.if God had given to the king a dominion over men as. reasonable creatures, his power and dominion which by royalists is conceived to be above law, should be a rule to men as reasonable men, which would make men under kings no better than brute beasts, for then should subjects exercise acts of reason, not because good and honest, but because their prince commandeth them so to do; and if this cannot be said, none can be at the disposing of kings in politic acts liable to royal government, tnat way that the slave is in his actions under the dominion of his master,

Obj, 1. — The Prelate objecteth out of Spalato, Amiseeus, and Hugo Grotius, (for in his book there is not one line which is his own, except his railings;) " All government and supenority in rufers is not primely and only for the subjects* good; for some are by Grod and nature appointed for the mutual and inseparable good of the superior and inferior, as in the government of husband and wife, or father and son; and in herili domi" nio, in the government of a lord and his ser

LEX, REX ; OB,

vant, the good and benefit of the servant is but secon<mry and oonsecutiyely intended, it is not the principal end, but the external and adventitious, as the gain that cometh to a physician is not the proper and internal end of his art, but followeth only from his practice of medicine.

Ans, 1. — The Prelate's logic tendeth to this; some government tendeth to the mutual good (n the superior and inferior, but royal government is some government, therefore, nothing followeth from a major proposition, Ex particulari afftrmomte^ in 'prima figura; or of two particular propositions. 2. If it be thus formed, every mantal government, and every government of the lord and servant is for the mutual good of the superior and inferior; but royal government is such, therefore the assumption is false, and cannot be proved, as I shall anon clear.

Oy. 2. — Solomon disposed of Cabul and

fave it to Hiram, therefore a conquered kingom is for the good of the conqueror especially.

Ans, — Solomon's special giving away some titles to the king of Tyre, being a special act of a prophet as well as a king, cannot warrant the king of England to sell England to a foreign prince,^ because William made England his own by conquest, which also is a most false supposition ; and this he stole from Hugo Grotius, who condemneth selling of kingdoms,

Ohj. 3. — A man may render himself totally under the power of a master without any conditions; and why may not the body of a people do the like? even to have peace and safety, surrender themselves fully to the power of a king? A lord of great manors may admit no man to live in his lands but upon a condition of a ^11 surrender of him and his posterity to that lord. Tacitus sheweth us it was so anciently amongst the Germans: those engaged in the campaigns surrendered themselves fully to the Komans.

Ans, — What compelled people may do to redeem their lives, with loss of liberty, is nothing to the point; such a violent conqueror who will be a father and a husband to a people, against their will, is not their lawful king; and that they may sell the liberty of their posterity, not yet bom, is utterly denied as unlawful; yea, a violentated father to me is a father, and not a father, and the posterity may vindicate their own liberty given away unjustly, before they were bom, Qua omne regnum vi partum potest vi dissolvi.

Ohj, 4. — But (saith Dr Feme) these which are ours, and given away to another, in which there redoundeth to (rod by donation a special interest, as in things devoted to holy uses, though after they he abused, yet we cannot rec^ them; therefore, if the people be once forced to give away their liberty, they cannot recal it, far less if they willingly resign it to their prince.

Ans, — 1 . This is not true, when the power is given for the conservation of the kingdom, • and is abused for the destruction thereof; for a power to destructi(m was never given, nor can it, by rational nature, be given. Mortifications given to religious uses by a positive law, may be recalled by a more divine and stronger law of nature, such as this, — " I will have mercy and not sacrifice." Suppose David, of his own proper heritage, had given the shew-bread to the priests; yet, when David and his men are mmishing, he may take it back from them against their will. Suppose Christ had bought the ears of com, and dedicated them to trie altar, yet might he and his disciples eat them in their hunger. The vessels of silver, dedicated to the church, may be taken and bestowed on wounded soldiers. 2. A people free may not, and ought not, totally surrender their liberty to a prince, confiding on his goodness. (1.) Because liberty is a condition of nature that all men are bom with, and they are not to give it away — no, not to a king, except in part and for the better, that they may nave peace and justice for it, which is better for them, hie et nunc. (2.) If a people, trusting in the goodness of their prince, enslave themselves to him, and he shall after turn tyrant, a rash and temerarious surrender obligeth not, Et ignorantia facit factum quasi involuntarium. Ignorance maketh tlie fact some way involuntanr; for if the people had believed that a meek king would nave turned a roaring lion, they should not have resigned their liberty into his hand; and, therefore, the surrender was tacitly ooqditional to the king as meek, or whom they believed to be meek, and not to a tyrannous lord; and, therefore, when the contract is made for the utility of the one party, the law saith, their place is for after wits, that men may change their mind and resume their liberty, though, if they had given away their liberty for money, they cannot recal it; and if violence made the surrender of liberty, here is slavery; and slaves taken in war, so soon as they can escape and return

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

to their own, they are free. (D. Sect, item. ea justit. de rerum divin. L nihil. F, de capt Z. 3.) So the learned Ferdin. Vasquez (iliust. 1. 2. c. 82. n. 16.) saith, ** The bird that was taken, and hath escaped, is free." Nature in a forced people, so soon as they can escape from a Solent conqueror, maketh them a firee people; and si solo tempore (saith Ferd. Vasquez, 1. 2. c. 82, n. 6,) j'twtijicatur subjectio, solo tempore facdius justificahitur libercttio.

Assert. 2.^^ All the goods of the sabjects belongeth not to the ling. I presuppose that the division of goods doth not necessa* rily flow from the htw of nature, for Grod made man, before the fall, lord of the creatures indefinitely; but what goods be Peter's, and not Paul's, we know not. But supposing man's sin, though the light of the sun and air be common to all, and religious places be proper to none, yet it is morally impossible that there should not be a distinction of msum et tuum^ mine and thine; and the decalogue forbidding theft, and coveting the wife of another man, (yet is she the wife of Peter, not of Thomas, by free election, not by an act of nature's law,) doth evidence to us> that the division of things is so far f<Mrth (men now being in the state of sin) of the law of nature, that it hath evident ground in the law of nations; and thus far natural, that the heat that I have from my own coat and doak, and the nourishment from my own meat, are physically inconununicable to any.^ But I hasten to prove the proposition: — If, 1. I have leave to permit that, in' time of necessity, all things are common by Grod's law — -ja man traveUing might eat grapes in his neighbour's vineyard, though he was not licensed to carry any way. I doubt if David, wanting money, was necessitated to jpay money for the shew-bread, or for Groliath's sword, supposing these to be the very goods of private men, and ordinarily to be bought and sold. Nature's law in extremity, for self-preservation, hath rather a prerogative royal above all laws of nations and all civil laws, than any mortal king; and, therefore, by the civil law, all are the king's, in case of extreme necessity. In this meaning, any one man is obliged to give all he hath for the good of the commonwealth, and so far the good of the king, in as far as

he is head and father of the commonwealth.^ 2. All things are the king's, in regard of his public power to defend all men and their goods from unjust violence. 3. All are the king's, in regard of his act of conservation of gocMs, for the use of the lust owner. 4. All PTthe king's in regard k a legal limitotion, in case of a damage offered to the commonwealth. Justice requireth confiscation of goods for a fault; but confiscated goods are to help the interested commonwealth, and the king, not as a man (to bestow them on his children) but as a king. To this we may refer these called bona caduca et mventa, things lost by shipwreck or any other providence, Ulpian, tit. 19, t. c. de bonis vacantibus. C. de Thesauro.

Arq. 1. — And the reasons why private men <^ iu8t lords and proprietors o^ their own gooos, are, — 1. Because, by order of nature, division of goods cometh nearer to nature's law and necessity than any king or magistrate in the world; and because it is acrreeable to nature that every man be wmed by his own fleece-noshed by his own meat, therefore, to conserve every man's goods to the just owner, and to preserve a community from the violence of rapine and theft, a magistrate and king was devised. So it is clear, men are just owners of their own goods, by all good order, both of nature and time, before there be any such thing as a king or magistrate. Now, if it be good that every man enjcnr his own goods, as lUst proprietor thereof, mr his own use, berore there be a king, who can be proprietor of his goods? And a king being given of God for a blessing, not for any man's hurt and loss, the king cometh in to preserve a man's goods, but not to be lord and owner thereof himself, nor to take from any man Grod's right to his own goods.

Arg. 2. — ^When Grod created man at the beginning, he made all the creatures for man, and made them by the law of nature the proper possession of man, but then there was not any king formally as king; for certainly Adam was a father before he was a king, and no man being either bom or created a king over another man, no more than the first lion and the first eagle that God created, were, by the birthrignt and first start of creation, by nature the king of all lions and all eagles to be after created, — no

1 L. item si verberatum. F. de rei yindicat. Jas. plene. m. lib. Barbarius. F. de offici. prietor.

LSX, REX ; OR,

man can, b? nature's law, be the owner of all goods of particular men. And because the law of nations^ founded upon the law of nature, hath brought in meum et twam^ mine and thine, as proper to every particular man, and the introduction of kings cannot overturn nature's foundation; neither civility nor grace destroy eth but peifecteth nature; and if a man be not bom a king, because he is a man, he cannot be bom the possessor of my goods.

Arg. 8* — What is a character and note of a tyrant, and an oppressing king as a tyrant, is not the just due of a' king as a king; but to take the proper goods of subjects, and use them as his own, is a proper character and note of a tyrant and oppressor; therefore the proposition is evident: A king and a tyrant are, by way of contradiction, contrary one to another. The assumption is proved thus:- — Ezek. xlv. 9, 10, " Thus saith the Lord, Let it suffice you, princes of Israel: remove violence and spoil, and execute judg^ ment and justice; take away your exactions from my people, saith the Lord. Ye shall have just balances, and a just ephah, and a just bath." If all be the king's, he is not capable of extortion and rapine. God complaineth of the J^iolence of kings, Micah iii. 1,3," Is it not for you to know judgment? who also eat the flesh of my people, and fiav their skins from off them; and they break their bones and chop them in pieces, as for the pot, and as fiesn within the chaldron." (Isa. iii. 14 ; Zeph. iii. 3.) Was it not an act of tyranny in king Adiab to take the vineyard of Naboth? and in king Saul (1 Sam. viii. 14) to take the people of Grod's " fields and vineyards, and oliveyards, and give them to his servants?" Was it a just fault that Hybreas objected to Antonius, exacting two tributes in one year, that he said, " If thou must have two tributes in one year, then make for us two summers and two harvests in one year?" This cannot be just. If all be the king's, the king taketh but his own.

Arg^ 4. — Subjects under a monarch could not give alms, nor exercise works of charity;^ for charity must be my own, Isa. Iviii. 7, " Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry," &c.; Ecclesxi. 1, " Cast thy bread upon the waters;" and the law saith, " It is theft to

1 Species enim fnrti est de alieno largiri, et beneficii debitorcm sibi acqnirore, L. si pignoro, sect. de fart.

rive of another man's to the poor;" yea, uie distinction of poor and rich should nave no place under a monarchy, he only should be rich.

Arg, 5. — ^When Paul commandeth us to pay tnbute to princes (Bom. xiii. 6) because they are the ministers of Grod, he layeth this ground, that the king hath not all, but that the subjects are to give to him of their goods.

Arg, 6. — It is the king's place, by justice, to preserve every man in nis own right, and under his own fig-tree; therefore, it is not the king's house.

Arg. 7.-^-Even Pharaoh could not make all the victual of the land his own, while he had bought it with money; and every thing is presumed to be firee (aUodialis^ free land,) except the king prove that it is bought or purchased. X. octtW, C de servit, et aqua, et Joan, And, m, C. F. de ind, et hosti, in C* minuts de jur*

Arg, 8. — If the subjects had no propriety in their own goods, but all were the prince's due, then ihe subject should not be able to make any contract of buying and selling without tne king, and every subject were in the case of a slave. Now the law saith, (L, 2. F, de Noxali, act, I, 2. F. ad legem aquil.) When he roaketh any covenant, he is not obliged civilly to keep it, because the c(idition of a servant, he not being sui juris, is compared to the state of a beast, though he be obliged by a natural obligation, being a ratiomd creature, in regard of the law of nature, L, naturaliter^ L, si id quod, L, interdum, F. de cond, indebit, cum aliis. The subject could not, by Solomon, be forbidden to be surety for his friend, as kmg Solomon doth counsel, (Prov. vi. 1 ' — ^3 ;) ne could not be condenmed to bring on himself poverty by sluggishness, (as Prov. vi. 6 — 10 ;) nor were he U> honour the Lord with his riches, (as Prov. iii 9 ;) nor to keep his covenant) liiough to his loss, (Psal. xv. 14 ;) nor could he be merciful and lend, (Psal. xxxvii. 26 ;) nor had he pdwer to borrow; nor could ne be guilty in not paying all again. (Psal. xxxvu. 21.) For subjects, under a monarchy, can neither perform a duty, nor fail in a duty, in the matter of goods. If all be the king's, what power or dominion hath the subject in disposing of his prince's goods? See more in jPetr, Rehufus, tract, congruoe portionis, n. 226, p, 109, 110. Sed quoad dominium rerum, 8fc,

QUESTION XVII.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCE HAVE PROPER- LY A FIDUCUkRY AND MINISTERL/kL POWER OF A TUTOR, HUSBAND, PATRON, MINISTER, HEAD, FATHER OF A FAMILY, NOT OF A LORD OR DOMINATOR.

That the power of the king is fiduciary, that is, given to him iinme£ately by God in trust, j^yalists deny not; but we hold that the Ixiist is put upon the king by the people. We deny that the people rive themselves to the kins as a gin, for liniat is freely given cannot oe taken again; but they gave themselves to the king as a pawn, and if the pawn be abused, or not used in that manner as it was conditioned to be used, the party in whose hand the pawn is intrusted, faileth in his trust.

Assert. 1. — The king is more properly a tutor than a &ther. 1. Indigency is the original of tutors— the parents die; what then shall become of the orphan and his inheritance? He cannot guide it himself, therefore nature devised a tutor to supply the place of a father, and to govern the tutor; but, with this consideration, the father ^is lord of the inheritance, and if he be distressed, may sell it, that it shall never come to the son, and the father, for the - bad deserving of his son, may disinherit him; but the tutor, being but a borrowed father, cannot sell the inheritance of the pupil, nor can he, for the pupil's bad deserving, by any dominion of justice over the pupil, take away the inheritance &om him, and give it to his own son. So a community of itself, because of sin, is a naked society that can but destroy itself, and every one eat the flesh of his brother; therefore God hath appointed a king or governor, who shall take care of that commumty, rule them in peace, and save all from reciprocation of mutual acts of violence, yet so as, because a trust is put on the ruler of a community which is not his heritage, he cannot dispose of it as he pleaseth, because he is not the proper owner of the inheritance. 2. The pupil, when he cometh to age, may call his tutor to an account for his administration. I do not acknowledge that as a truth, which Amis8Bus salth, (de authoritate prin. c. 3, n. 6,J " The commonwealth is always minor ana under tutory, because it alway hath need of a curator and governor, and can never put away its governor; but the pupil may grow to age and wisdom, so as he may be without all tutors and can guide himself, and so may call in question on his tutor; and the pupil cannot be his judge, but must stand to the sentence of a superior judge, and so the people cannot judge or punish their prince — God must be judge betwixt them both."

JDut this is besging^the question; every comparison haltetST There is no community but IS major in this, that it can appoint its own tutors; and tiiough it cannot be without all rulers, yet it may well be without this or that prince and ruler, and, therefore, may resume its power, which it gave conditionally to the ruler for its own safety and good; and in so far as this condition is vio&ted, and power turned to the destruction of the commonwealth, it is to be esteemed as not given; and though the people be not a politic judge in their own cause, yet in case of msoiifest oppression, nature can teach them to oppose defensive violence against oifensive. A community in its politic body is also above any ruler, and may judge what is manifestly destructive to itself'.

Obj, — The pupil hath not power to appoint his own tutor, nor doth he give power to him; so neither doth the people give it to the king.

-4w.-*The pupil hath not indeed a formal power to make a tutor, but he hath virtually a legal power in his father, who appointeth a tutor for his son ; and the people hath virtually all royal power in them, as in a sort of immortal and eternal fountain, and may create to themselves many kings.

Assert. 2. — The king's power is not properly and univocally a marital and husbandlt power, but only analogically. 1. The wife by nature is the weaker vessel, and inferior to the man, but l^e kingdom, as shall be demonstrated, is superior to tbe king. 2. The vrife is given as an help to the man, but by the contrair, the father here is given as an help and rather to the commonwealth, which IS presumed to be the wife. 3. Marital and husbandly power is natural, though it be not natural but from free election that Peter is Ana's husband, and should have been, though man had never sinned; but royal power is a politic constitution, and the world might have subsisted though aristocracy or democracy had been the only and perpetual governments. So let the Prelate glory in his borrowed logic; he had it from

LEX, BEX ; OR,

Barclajt " It is not in the power of the wife to repudiate her husband, though never so wiokedi She is tyed to him for ever, and may not give to him a bill of divorcement, as by law the husband might give to her If therefore the people swear loyalty to him, they keep it, thougn to their hurt." Psal* XV. — Ans. There is nothing here said, except Barclay and the Plagiary prove that the king's power is properly a husband's power, which they cannot prove but from a simile that crooketh. But a king, elected upon conditions, that if he sell his people he snail lose his crown, is as essentially a long as Adam was Eve's husband, and yet, by grant of parties, the people may never divorce from such a king, and dethrone him, if he sell his people; but a wife may divorce from her husband, as the argument saith. And this poor argument the Prelate stole from Dr Feme (part 2, sect. 3, n. 10, 11). The keeping of covenant, though to our hurt, is a penal hurt, and loss oi goods, not a moral hurt, and loss of religiao.

Assert. 3.---The Bng is more properly a sort of patron, to defend the people, (and therefore hath no power given either by God or man to hurt the people,) and a minister, or public and honourable servant, (Rom. xiii. 4,) for he is the minister of Uod to thee for good. 1. He is the commonwealth's servant objectively, because all the king's service, as he is king, is for the good, safety, peace and salvation of the people, and in this he is a servant. 2. He is the servant of the people representatively ^ in that the people hath impawned in his hand all their power to do royal service.

Obj. 1. — ^He is the servant of God, lliereibre he is not the people's servant, but their sovereign lord.

Ans^-^lt followeth not; because all the services the kin^, as king, performelli to God, are acts oi royalty, and acts of royal service, as terminated on the people, or acts of their sovereign lord; and this proveth, that to be their sovereign is to be their servant and watchman.

Obj 2.^-^God maketh a king only, and the xingly power is in him only, not in the people.

Ans, 1 — The royal power is only from God immediately, — immediatione simplicie constitutionis, et solum a Deo solitudme primcB causce, — by the immediation of simple constitution, none but God appointed there should be kmgs. But, 2. Royal power

is not in God, nor only from God, immediatione afplicationis regide digmtatis ad personam^ nee a Deo solum^ solitudine causcB appUcantis dignitatemy huicy non illif in respect of the applying of royal dignity to this person, not to that.

Obj. 3. — ^Though royal power were given to the people, it is not given to the people as if it were the royal power of the people, and not the royal power of Grod, neither is it any otherwise bestowed on the people but as on a beam, a channel, an instrument by which it is derived to others, imd so the king is not the minister or servant of the people.

Ans, — It is not in the people as in the principal cause; sure all royal power that way IS only in God; but it is in the people as in the instrument) and when the people maketh David their khig at Hebron, in that same very act, Grod, by the people using their free suffrages and consent, maketh David king at Hebron; so God only giveth rain, and none of the vanities and supposed gods of the Gentiles can give rain, (Jen xiv. 22,) and yet the clouds also give rain, as nature, as an organ and vessel out of which God poureth down rain upon the dry earth; (Amos ix. 6 ;) and every instrument under God that is properly an instrument, is a sort of vicarious cause in God's room, and so the people as in God's room applieth royal power to David, not to any of Saul's sons, and appointeth I>avid to be their royal servant to govern, and in that to serve Grod, and to do that which a community now in the state of sin cannot formally do themselves; and so I see not how it is a service to the people, not only objectively, because the king's royal service tendeth to the good, and peace, and safety of the

ale, but also subjectively, in regard he his power and royal authority which he exerciseth as king from the people under God, as Grod's instruments; and, therefore, the king and parliament give out laws and statutes in the name of the whole people of the land; and they are but flatterers, and belie the Holy Ghost, who teach that the people do not make the king; for Israel made Saul king^ at Mizpeh, and £rael made David king at Hebron.

Obj. 4. — Israel made David king, that is, Israel designed David's person to be king, and Israel consented to Grcd's act of making David king, but they did not make David king.

Ans, — I say not that Israel made the royal dignity of kings: God (Deut. xvii.) insti-

THS LAW AND THE PRINCE.

tnted that himself; but the rojaligt must give us an act of Grod going before an aet of the people's making j^vid king at Hebron, by which David of no king is made formally a king; and then another act of the people, approving only and consenting to that act of God, whereby David is made formally of no king to be a Wg. This royalists shall never instruct, for there be only two acts of Grod here; 1. God's act of anointing David by the hand of Samuel; and 2. Grod's act of making David king at Hebron; and a third they shall never give. But the former is not that by which David was essentially and formally changed from the state of a private subject and no king, into the state of a public judge and supreme lord and king; for (as I have proved) after this act of anointing of David king, he was designed only and set apart to be king in the Lord's fit time; and after this anointing, he was no more formally a king than Doeg or Nabal were kings, but a subject who called Saul the Lord's anointed and king, and obeyed him as another subject doth hislmg; but it is certain God by no other act made David king at Hebron, than by Israel's act of free electing him to be king and leader of the Lord's people, as God by no other act sendeth down rain on the eardi, but by his melting the clouds, and causing rain to fall on the earth; and therefore to say Israel made David king at Hebron, that is, Israel approv'- ed only and consented to a prior act of^ God's making David king, is just to say Saul propheciea, that is, Saul consented to a prior act of the Spirit of God who prophecied; and Peter preached, (Acts ii.) that is, Peter approved and consented to the Holy Ghost's act of preaching, which to say, is childish.

Assert, 4.— -The kmg is an head of the commonwealth only metaphorically, by a borrowed speech in a politic sense, because he mleth, commandeth, directeth the whole politic body in all their operations and functions. But he is not univocally and essentiaUy the head of the commonwealth. 1. The very same life in number that is in the head, is in the members; there be divers distinct souls and lives in the king and in his subjects. 2. The head natural is not made an head by the free election and consent of arms, shoulders, legs, toes, fingers, &c. The king is made king only by the free election of his people. 3. The natural head, so long as the person liveth, is ever the head, and cannot cease to be a head while it is seated on the shoulders; the king, if he sell his

people's persons and souls, may leave off to be a king and head. 4. The head and members live together and die together, the king and the people are not so; me king may die and tiie people live. 6. The natural head cannot destroy the members and preserve it-^ self; but king Nero may waste and destroy his people. Dr Feme, M. Symmons, ^e P. Prelate, when they draw arguments from the head, do but dream, as the members should not resist the head. Natural members should not or cannot resist the head, though the hand may pull a tooth out of the head, which is no smaQ violence to the head; but the members of ajpolitic body may resist the politic head. Tnis or that king is not the adequate and total politic head of the oommonwealth; and therefore though you cut off a politic head, there is nothing done against nature. If you cut off all kings of the royal line, and all governors aristocratical, both king and parliament, this were against na^ ture; and a commonwealth which would cut off all governors and all heads, should go against nature and run to ruin quickly. J conceive a society of reasonable men cannot want governors. 6. The natural head communicateth life, sense, and motion to the members, and is the seat of external and internal senses; the king is not so.

Assert, 5. — Hence the king is not properly the head of a family, for, as Tholossa saith well, (de Rep. 1. 5, c, 6,) Nature hath one intention in making the thumb, another intention in making the whole hand, another in forming the Ixxly; so there is one intention of the God of nature in governing of one man, another in governing a family, another in governing a city; nor is the thumb king of ail the members; so domestic government is not monarchical properly. 1. The mother hath a jparental power as the father hath, (Prov. IV. 5 ; X. 3 ; xxxi. 17,) so the fifth commandment saith, ^' Honour thy father and thy mother." 2. Domestic government is natural, monarchical politic. 3. Domestic is necessary, monarchical is not necessary; other government may be as well as it. 4. IX)- mestic is imiversal, monarchical not so. 5. Domestic hath its rise from natural instinct without any farther instruction; a monarchical government is not but from election, choosmg one government, not another. Hence that is a fiduciary power, or a power of trust, wherein the thing put in trust is not either his own proper heritage or gif^, so as he may dispose of it as he pleaseth, as men dispose of

their goods or heritage. But the king may not dispose of men as men, as he pleaseth; nor of laws as he pleaseth; nor of governing men, killing or keeping alive, punishing and rewarding, as he pleaseth. My life and religion, and so my soul, in some cases, are committed to the king as to a public watchman, even as the flock to the feeder, the city to the watchmen; and he may betray it to the enemy. Therefore, he hatii the trust of life and religion, and hath both tables of the law in his custody, ex oficio, to see that other men than himself keep the law. But the law is not the king's own, but dven to him in trust. He who receiveth a Kingdom conditionally, and may be dethroned if he sell it or put it away to any other, is a fiduciary patron, and hath it only in trust. So Hottoman, (quest, ill, 1.) Ferdinand. Vasquez, {illiist. quest. I. 1, c. 4.) Althusius, {polit. c. 24, n. 36,) so saith the law of every &ctor or deputy, (Z. 40, 1. 63, procwr. 1. 16, C. diet. 1.) Antigonus dixit regnum esse fiohUem servitutem. Tyberius CeBsar called the senate, dominum suum^ his lord. (JSuetOfdus in vita Tiberii, c. 29.)

QUESTION XVIII.

WHAT IS THE LAW OF THE KING, AND HIS

*

This^lace, (1 Sam. viii. 11,) the law or manner of the king is alleged to prove both the absolute power of kings, and the unlawfulness of resistance; therefore I crave leave here to vindicate the place, and to make it evident to all that the place speaketh for no such matter. Grotius argueth thus:^ " that by this place, the people oppressed with injuries of a tyrannous king liave nothing left them but prayers and cries to God; and therefore there is no ground for violent reinsdng." Barclay^ willhave us to distinguish inter oficium regis, et potestatem, between the king's office and the king's power; and he will nave the Lord here speaking, not of

I Grofias de jure belli et pacis, lib. 1, c. 4, n. 3.

s Barclains oontra Monarcbom. lib. 2, p. 64. Potestatem intelligit non earn quas competit ex pnecepto, neqne etiam quae ex permissn eat, quatenus liberat a peccato, sed qnatenns psenis legallbus eximit operantem.

the king's office, what he ought to do before Grod, but what power a king nath beside and above the power of judges, to tyrannise over the people, so as the people hath no power to resist it. He will have the office of the king spoken of Deut, xvii., and the power of the Ung, 1 Sam. viii., and that power which the people was to obey and submit unto without resisting. But I answer, 1. It is a vain thing to distinguish betwixt the office and the power; for the power is either a power to rule according to God's law, as he is commanded, (Deut. xvii.) and this is the very office or official power which the Bang of kings hath given to all kings under him, and this is a power of the royal office of a king, to govern for the Lord his Maker; or this is a power to do ill and tyrannise over God's people; but this is accidental to a king and the character of a tyrant, and is not from God, and so the law of the king in this place must be the tyranny of the king, which is our very mind. 2. '^ lieges sine dominatione ne concipi quidem posstmt; — judices dominationem in populum nUnime habebant"^ Hence it is clear that Barclay saith, that the judges of Israel and the kings are different in essence and nature; so that domination is so essential to a king, that you cannot conceive a king but he must have domination, whereas uie judges of Israel had no domination over the people. Hence I argue, that whereby a king is essentially distinguished from a judge that must be from God; but by domination, which is a power to oppress uie subject, a king is essentially distinguished from a judge of Israel; therefore, domination and a power to do acts of tyranny, as they are expressed,

iyer. 11 — 13,) and to oppress a subject, is rom God, and so must be a lawM power. But the conclusion is absurd; the assumption is the doctrine of Barclay. The major proposition I prove. 1. Because both the judge and the king was from God; for God. gave Moses a lawM calling to be a judge, so did he to Eli and to Samuel, and hence (Deut. xvii. 15) ihe king is a lawM ordinance of God. If then the judge and the king be both lawfiil ordinances, and if they difiSr essentially, as Barclay saith, then that specific form which distinguisheth the one from the other, to wit, domination and a power to destroy the subject, must be from God; which is blasphemous: for God

s Barclains contra Monarcbo. lib. 2. p. 56, 57.

can give no moral power to do wickedly; for that is licence, and a power to sin against a law of God, which is absolutely inconsistent with the holiness of God; for so the Lord might deny himself, and dispense with sin. God avert such blasphemies! 2. Now if the kingly power be from God, that which essentially and specifically constituteth a king mnst^be from Grod, as the office itself is from God. Barclay saith^ expressly that the kingly power is from God, and that same, which is the Specific form that constituteth a king, must be that which essentially separatetn the king from the judge, if they be essentially different, as Barclay dreameth. Hence have we this jus regis, this manner or law of the king to tyrannise and oppress, to- be a power from God, and so a lawful power, by which you shall have this result of Barday's interpretation,-^that Grod made a tyrant as well as a king. 3. By this difference that Barclay putteth betwixt the king and the judge, the judge might be resisted; for he had not this power of domination that Saul hath, contrary to Bom. xiii. 2 ; Exod. xxii, 28 ; xx, 12. ,

But let us try the text first, •l7Dn JOBBED the word cannot enforce us to expone DSK^D ft ^^9 <>u^ English rendereth, Show them the manner of tne king. Arri. Montanus tumeth it ratio regis.^ I grant the LXX* render it, r ^nmttfMt rw /3^/Xf#.' The Chaldee Paraphrase saith,^ Stututum regis. Hieronimus translateth it jus regis^ and also Calvin; but I am sure the Hebrew, both in words and sense, beareth a consuetude; yea, and the word QDB^O signifieth not always a law, as, (Josh. vi. 14,) " They compassed the city tOSE^DD seven

times;" the LXX. jutrk W99 x^lfim, * rvri; 2

Kings xvii, 26, They " know not the manner of the God of the land; (ver. 83) they served their own gods, after the manner of the heathen," DVtn DDC^DD cannot be according to the law or right of the heathen, except JDBtJ^D, be taken in an evil part: the LXX. wrm rh ffut rSv l/yr, ver. 34, " Until this dav they do after these manners;" 1 Kings xviii. 28, Baal's priests "cut themselves with knives DtDBB^OD after their manner:" the LXX. nar^ rn ift^puf; Gen. xl. 13, Thou shalt give the cup to Pharaoh, according as thou wast

* Arr. Mon. Hsbc erit ratio Regis. ,

3 Chald. Para, {{n^ KDD3 ND^DT

wont to do; t3DB^3> Exod. xxi. 9, " He shall deal with her after the manner of daughters;" 1 Sam. xxvii. 11, *<And David saved neither man nor woman alive, to bring tidings to Gath, saying. So did David, and so will his manner be," ItOflB^D- It cannot be they meant that it was David's law, right, or privilege, to spare none alive; 1 Sam, ii. 13, "And the priests' custom with the people was," &c. CD^jnDn OQK^DV This was a wicked custom, not a law; and the LXX, tumeth it, xm! rn ^ixeu. rnfim rS It^iui; and therefore ttxuuifi* is not always taken in a good meaning: so P. Martjnr,^ " He meaneth here of an usurped law;" Calvin,^ Non jus a deo prescriptum, sed tyranidem, — " He speaketh not of God's law here, but of tyranny;" and Rivetus,^ OStt^D signifieth not ever jus, law. Sed aliquando morerri sive modum et rationem agendiy — " The custom and manner of doing:" so Junius* and Tremellius. Diodatus* exponeth jus, — This law, *< namely, (saith he,) that which is now grown to a common custom, by the consent of nations and God's toleration." Glossa,* (to speak of psmists,) Exactionem et dominationem, — " The extortion and domination of king Saul is here meant;" Lyra^ exponeth it tyranny; Tostatus Abulens.,® " He meaneth here of kings indefinitely who oppressed the people with taxes and tributes, as Solomon and others;" Cornelius a Lapide,® " This was an unjust law;" Gajetanus*^ calleth it tyranny; Hugo Carainal. nameth them, eocactiones et servitutes, — ** exactions and slaveries;" and Serrarius speaketh not here, Quid Reges jure possint, — " What they may do by right and law;" Sed quid audeant, — " What they will be bold to do, and what they tyranically decern against all laws of nature and -humanity;" and so speaketh Thom. Aquinas;^l so also Menl P. Martyr, comment. 1 Sam. yiii., Temm jus reginm describit in Dent, apnd Samuelnm antem nsurpatom.

> Calvin, cone. 1 Sam. viii,

' Andr. Rivetua in decal., Exod. xx. in 5, mnndat., p. 165.

^ Jnnius annot., in 1 Sam. ii. 13.

B Diodatus annot., 1 Sam. yiii. 3,

7 Lyra in locum. Uc accipitnr jns large snmptum quod repntatnr jus propter malum abusum. Nam ilia quas dicuntur liic de jure Regis, magis contingunt per tyranidem.

s Tostatus Abulens. in 1 Reg. 8, q. 17, de q. 21,

9 Cornelius a Lapide, in locum.

n Thom. Aquinas, 1. 3, de Regni Princlp. c. 11,

LEX, BEX ; OR,

doza^ speaketh of the ^*law of tyrantB;" and, amonrnt the fathers, Clemens Alexaadrinus 8ai& on this place, Non humanum poUieetur donUnum^ sed insolewtem datt^ rum minatur tyrannum^ — '^ He promiseth not a humane prince, but threateneth to give them an insolent tyrant;'* and the like also saith Bede;' and an excellent lawyer. Pet* BebufiFus saith,^ Etiam loquitur de tyrafino qui non erat a Deo eUetus^ and tioat he speaketh of Saul's tyrannical usurpation, and not of the law prescribed by God, Deut. xvii., I prove,-^!. He apeaketh of such a power as is answerable to the acts here spoken of; but the acts here spoken of are acts of mere tyranny; ver. lit ^' ^'^ ^^ will be the manner of your king that shall reign over you: he will take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and to be his horsemen; and some shall run before his chariots." Now, to make slaves of their sons was an act of tyranny. 2. To take their fields, and vineyards, and oliveyards from them, and give them to his servants, was no better than Ahab's taking Naboth's vineyard from him, which by Grod's law he might not lawAiUy sell, except in the case of extreme poverty, and then, in the year of jubilee, ne might redeem his own uUieritance. 3. (Ver. 16f 16,^ To put the people of Grod to bonda^, ana make them servants, was to deal with them as the tyrant Pharaoh did. 4. He speaketh of such a law, the execution whereof should ^' make them cry out to the Lord because of their kinff;" but the execution of the just law of the King (Deut, xvii.) is a blessing, and not a bondage which should make the people cry out of the bitterness of their spirit. 6. It is clear here that God is, by his prophet, not instructing the king in bis duty, but, as Rabbi Leyi Ben. G^rsom. saith,^ ^' Terniy* ing them from their purpose of seeking a king, and foretelling the evil of punishment that they should differ under a tyrannous king;" but he speaketh not one word of these necessary and comfortable acts of favour that a good king, by his good govem-

1 Mendoza, jus T jrannonim.

s Clemens Alezand. p. 26.

s 3ed, 1. %, expo, in Samuel.

4 Pet. Rebnfus tract de incongma. prert. p.. 1X0.

Ben. Gerapm^ ia 1 Sam. yiii., Pezelius '}jx ezp. leg. Mosai. 1. 4, c. 8. Tossan. in not. Bibl. BoBsens de Rep. Christ, potest;, snpra r^em, c.. % p 103. Bodin. de Rep. 1. 1, c. 19. Brentins, homi). 27, in 1 Sam. Tiii., Mos regis non de jure, sed de Vnlgatam eoBsnetsdiae.

ment, was to do for his people. Deut. xvii. 15, 16. But he speaketh of contrary fiEusts here; and that he is dissuading them firom suiting a king is clear from the text. (1.) Because he saiih. Give them their will; but yet protest against their onlawM course. (2.) He bid&th the prophet lay before them the tyranny and oppression of their king; which tyranny Saiu exercised in his time, as the story showeth. (3.) Because how ineffectual Samuel's exhortation was is set down, ver. 19, *^ Nevertheless they would not obey the voice of Samuel, but said. Nay, but we will have a king over us." If Samuel bad not been dejiorting them from a king, how could they be said in iJiis to refuse to hear the voice of Samuel? 6, The ground of Bardav and royalists here is weak; for they say. That the people sought a king like the nations, and the kmgs of the nations were all absolute, and so tyrants; and God granted their unlawM desire, and gave them a tyrant to reign over them such as the nations had.^ The plain contrary is true. They sought not a tyrant; but one of the spe^ reasons why they sought a king was to be freed of tyranny; for 1 Sam. viii. 3, ** Because Samuel's sons turned aside after lucre, and took bribes, and perverted judgment; therefore all the elders of Israel gathered tJiemselves together, and came to Samuel, to Bamah, apd there they sought a king." 7. One could not more clearly

r\ with the mouth of a felse prophet the author of " Active and J^assive Obedience^* doth, while he will have Samuel here to describe a king, and to say, ^' Ye have formerly committed one error in shaking off the yoke of Grod, and seeking a king; so now beware you fall not in the next error, in casting off the yoke of a king, which God, at your own desire, hath laid on you; for Grpd onlv hath power to make and unmake kings; therefore prepare yourselves patiently to suffer and bear.

An8. 1. — For if he were exhorting to ^iti^nt suffering of the yoke of a king, he should presume it were God's revealed and regulating will that th^y should have a king. But the scope of Sapuiel's sermon is to dis- Efuad^e them fropi a king, and they by the contrary, (ver, 19,) sav, ^* Nay, but we will have a king;" and there is not one word in the text that may intimatepatience undei^jbhe yoke of a king. 2, There is here

THS LAW AND THS PRINCE.

the description of a tyrant, not of a king. 3. Here is a threateninff and a prediction, not anything that smellew of an exhortation,

Otj. — ^But it is evident that God, teaching the people how to hehave themselyes under the unjust oppressions of their king, set down no reme<fy but tears, crying to Gfod, and patience; therefore resistance is not kwfuL^

^Mt-^Though this be not the place due to the doctrine of redstance, yet, to vindi* cate the place, — 1. I say, there is not one word of any lawful remedy in the toxt; only it is said, K^HH DVl Dnpyt^

DD3yD ^JBSDj -E"* damoitis in ilia die afiidebus regis vestri. It is not necessarily to be exponed of praying to Grod; Job XXXV, 9, " By reason of the multitude of oppressions, they make the oppressed to cry," Ip^yn clamare faciunt\ Isa. xv. 4, " And Heshbon shall cry: py tni the armed soldiers of Moab shall cry out." There is no other word here than doth express the idolatrous prayers of Moab; Isa. xviL 12 ; Hab. ii. 11, " The stone shall cir out of the wall pyTfl f I>eut. xxii; 24, "You shall stone the nuud ^N7 IBfJ* in^^y, because she cried not HpySf;" but she is not to be stoned because she prayed not to God; Psal. xviii. 4, " David's enemies cried, and there vras none to save, even to the Lord, and he heard not." 2. Though it were the prophet's meaning, " they cried to the Lord," yet it is not the crying of a people humbledi and, in faith, speaking to God in their troubles; Zech. yii. 13, " Thej cried, and I would not hear;" therefore royalists must make ciying to God out of the bitterness of affliction, without humiliation and faith, and such prayers of sinners as God heareth not, (Psal. xviii. 41 ; John *ix, 31 ; Isa. xvii^ 12,) to be the only remedy of a people oppressed by a tyrannous King. Kow, it IS certain God prescribeth no unlawful means to an oppressed people under their affliction; therefore it is clear here that God speaketh only of evils of punishment, such as is to cry m trouble

^ Learned antbors teach that Gkxi's law, (Dent. xr]i.) and the {3Qt{^Q a manner of the king, (1 Sam. yiii. 9,) are opposite one to another, so Gersom. in trinprino. sac. adn. lat. par. 4, Alp. 06, lit. I. cons. 8, Bnehan. de jnre r^gni apud Soot. Chaason. cat. glo. mnndi cons, 24, n. 16^, cons. 35. Tholo88. 1. 9, e. 1. Rossen. de polus. Rep. c. 2, n. 10. Magdebnrg. in trac. de off. ma.

and not be heard of God, and that he prescribeth here no duty at all, nor any remedjTb 3. All protestant divines say, Ex partictdari non valet ctrawnentum nega^ itie, — ^** From one particular place, a negative argument is not good." This remedy is not written in this jrticular place, therefore it is not written at all in other places of Scripture; so 1 Tim. i. 19, the end of excommunication is, that the party excommunicated may learn not to blaspheme; therefore the end is not also that the church be not infected. It followeth not. The contrary is clear (1 Cor. v. 6). Dr Feme, and other royalists, teach us that we may supplicate and make prayers to a tyrannous king. We may fly from a tyrannous king; but neither BUpplicating the king, nor flying from his fiiry, snail be law^l means left by this argument; because these means are no more in this text (where royalists say the Spirit of Grod speaiketh of purpose of the means to be used against tyranny) than violent resistance is in this text.

Barclay, Feme, Grotius, Amisseus, the P. Prelate following them, saith, ** An ill king is a punishment of Grod for the sins of the pe^Ie, and there b no remedy but patient sufroring."

Am. — Truljr it is a silly argument. The Assyrians commg against the people of Grod for their sins, is a punishment of Grod. (In. X. 5 ; xii. 13.) But doth it foUow that it is unlawM for Israel to fight and resist ttie Assyrians, and that they had warrant to do no other thing but lay down arms and pray to Grod, and fight none at all? Is mere no lawful resisting of ills of punishment, but mere prayers and patience? The Amalekites came out against Israel for ^eir sins, Sennacherib against Hezekiah for the sins of the people; Asa's enemies foadbt againsthim for his sins, and the people's sms. Shall Moses and the people, Hezekiah and Asa, do then nothing but pray and suffer? Is it unlawfiil with the swora to resist them? I believe not. Famine is oftm a punishment of Grod in a hmd, (Amos iv. 7, 8,) is it therefore in &- mine unlawful to tall the earth, and seek bread by our industry, and are we to do nothing but to pray for daily bread? It is a vain argument.

Observe, therefore, the wickedness of Barclay, (contra monarch. 1. 2, p. 56,) for he would prove, that ** a power of doing ill, and that without any punishment to be inflicted by man, is from God; because our laws pu-

LEX, REX ; OR,

nish not perjury, but leateth it to be punished of God (Z. 2, 1, de Ileb, cred^ CujaciiLSj L 2, obs, c,19); and the husband in the law of Moses had power to give a bill of divorce to his wife and send her away, and the husband was not to be punished. And also stews and work-'houses for harlots, and to take usury, are tolerated in many Christian common* wealths, and yet these are all sorts of murders by the confession of heathen; therefore, (saith Barclay,) God may give a powej* of tyrannous acts to kings, so as they shall be under no punishment to be inflicted by men. Ans^ — All this is an argument from fact. 1. A wicked magistracy may permit perjury and lymg m the commonwealth, and that without punishment; and some Christian commonwealths, he meaneth his own synagogue of Rome, spiritual Sodom, a cage of unclean birds, suffereth harlots by law, and the whores pay so many thousands yearly to the Pope, and are free of all punishment by law, to eschew homicides, adulteries of Komish priests, an^ other greater sins; therefore God hath given power to a king to play the tyrant without any fear of punishment to" be inflicted by man. But if this be a good argument, the magistrate to whom God hath committed the sword to take vengeance on evil doers, (E-om. xiii. 3—6,) such as are perjured persons, professed whores and harlots, nath a lawful power from God to connive at sins and gross scandals in the commonwealth, as they dream that the king hath power given from God to exercise afi acts of tyranny without any resistance* But, 1. This was a grievous sin in Eli, that he being a father and a judge, punished not his sons for their uncleanness, and his house, in God's heavy displeasure, was cut of£ from the priesthood therefor. Then God hath given no such power to the judge. 2. The contrary duty is lying on the judge, to execute judgment for the oppressed, (Job xxix. 12-^17 ; Jer. xxii* 15, 16,) and perverting of judgment, and conniving at the heinous sins of the wicked, is condemned, (Num. v. 31, 32 ; 1 Sam. XV. 23 ; 1 Kings xx. 42, 43 ; Isa. i- 17 ; x. 1 ; V. 23,) and therefore Grod hath given no power to a judge to permit wicked men to commit grievous crimes, without any punishment. As for the law of divorce, it was indeed a permissive law, whereby thei husband might give the wife a bill of divorce, and be free of punishment before men, but not free of sin and guiltiness before God, for it was contrary to God's institution of marriage at

the beginning, as Christ saith; and the prophet saith, (Mai* 2,) that the Lord hateth putting away; but that Grod hath given any such permissive power to the king, that he may do what he pleasetl), and cannot be resisted, this is in question. 3. The law spoken of in the text is by royalists called, not a consuetude of tyranny, but the divine law of Grod, whereby the king is formally and ess^itially distinguished from the judge in Israel; now if so, a power to sin and a power to commit acts of tyranny, yea, and a power in the king's sergeants and bloody emisBaries to waste and destroy the people of Grod, must be a lawflil power given oi God; for It lawful power it must be if it cometh from Grod, whether it be from the king in his own person, or from his servants at his commandment, and by either put forth in acts, as the power of a bill of divorce was a power from God, exempting either the husband from punishment before men, or freeing the servant, who at the husband's command should write it and put it in the hands of the woman. I cannot believe that God hath given a power, and that by law, to one man to command twenty thousand cut-throats to kill and destroy all the children of God, and that he h^th commanded his children to give their necks and heads to Babel's sons without resistance. This I am sure is another matter than a law for a bill of divorce to one woman married by free election of a changeable and unconstant man. But sure I am, God gave no permissive law from heaven like the law of divorce, for the hardness of the heart, not of the Jews only, but also of the whole Christian and heathen kingdoms under a monarch, that one eniperor may, by such a law of God as the law of divorce. Kill) by bloody cutthroats, such as the Irish rebels are, aU the nations that call on Grod's name, men, women, and sucking infants. And if rrovidence impede the catholic issue, and dry up the seas of blood, it is good; but Grod hath given a law, such as the kw of divorce, to the king, whereby he, and all his, may, without resistance, by a legal power given of God, who giveth kings to be fathers, nurses, protectors, guides, yea the breath of nostrils of his church, as special mercies and blessings to his people, he may, I say, by a law of Grod, as it IS 1 Sam. viii. 9, 11, cut off nations, as that lion of the world, Nebuchadnezzar, did. So royalists teach us.

Barclay saith (1. 2. contra Monarch, p. 69) — The Lord spake to Samuel the law of

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

the king, and wrote it in a book, and laid it up before the Lord* But what law? That same law which he proposed to the people when they first sought a king. But that was the law contemning precepts, rather for the people's obeying uian for the king's commanding; for the people was to be instructed with those precepts, not the king. Those things that concerned the king's duty (Deut. xvii.) Moses commanded to he put into the ark; but so if Samuel had commanded the king that wbici Moses (Deut. xvii.) commanded, he had done no new thing, but had done again what was onoe done actum egis* set; but there was nothing before command* ed the people concerning their obedience and

Ans, 1. — It was not that same law, for though this law was written to the people, yet it was the law of the king; and, I pray you, did Samuel write in a book all the rules of tyranny, and teach Saul, and all the kings after him, (for this book was put in the a^ of the covenant, where also was the book of the law) how to play the tyrant? And what instruction was it to king or people to write to them a book of the i^i^ed ways of a king, which nature teacheth without a doctor? Sanctius saith on the place, These things which, by men's fraud and to the hurt of the public, may be corrupted, were kept in the tabernacle, and the book of the law was kept in the ark. Cornelius a Lapide saith, It was the law common to king and people, which was commonly kept witli the book of the law in the ark of the covenant. Lyra contradicteth Barclay. He exponeth Legem^ legem regni non secundum, usurpationem siipra positamy sed secundum ordinationem Dei positam, (Deut. xvii.) Theodatius excellently exponeth it, The fimdameivtal laws of the kingdom, inspired by God to temper monarchy with a liberty befitting God's people, and with equity toward a nation — to withJstand the abuse of an absolute power. 2. Can any believe Samuel would have written a law of tyranny, and put that book in the ark of the covenant before the Lord, to be kept to the posterity, seeing he was to teach both king and people the good and the right way, 1 Sam. xii. 23 — 25. 3. Where is the law of the kingdom called a law of punishing innocent people? 4. To write the duty of the king in a book, and apply it to the king, is no more superfluous

than to teach the people the good and the right way out of the law, and apply general laws to particular persons. 6. There is nothing in the law (1 Sam. viii. 9 — 12) of the people's patience, but rather of their impatient crying out, God not hearing nor helping; and nothing of that in this book, for any thmg that we know, and Josephus Bpeaketh of the law in 1 Sam. viii., not of this law, 1 Sam. xii.

QUESTION XIX.

WHETHER OR NO THE KING BE IN DIGNITY AND POWER ABOVE THE PEOPLE.

In this grave question, divers considera* tions are to be pondered. 1. There is ^ dignity material m the people scattered — they being many representations of God and his image, which is in the king also, and formally more as king, he being endued with formal magistratical and pubhc royal authority* In the former regard, this or that man is inferior to the xing, because the king hath that same remainder of the image of God that any private man hath, and something more — ^he hath a politic resemblance ofthe King c£ heavens, being a little god, and so is above any one man.

2.' All these of the people taken collectively having more of God, as being representations, are, according to this material dignity, more excellent than the king, because many are more excellent than one ; and the king, according to the magistratical and royal authority he hath, is more excellent than they are, because he partaketh formally of royalty, which they have not formally.

3. A mean or medium, as it is such, is less than the end, though the thing materially that is a mean may be more excellent. Every mean, as a mean, under that reduplication, hath all its goodness and excellency in relation to the end ; yet an angel that is a mean (or medium) and a ministering spirit, ordained of God for an heir of life eternal, (Heb. i. 13, J considered materially, is more excellent tnan a man. (Psal. viii. 6; Heb. ii. 6—8.)

4. A king and leader, in a military consideration, and as a governor and conserver of the whole army, is more worth than ten thousand of the people, 2 Sam. xviii. 13.

LEX, REX ; 0R

6. But sithply and absolutely the people is above, and moi*e excellent, than the king, and the king m dignity inferior to the people; and thAt updn these redsons :-^

Arg. l.-^Bedal3se he is the mean ordained ht the peoj^le, as iot the end) that he may save theth, (2 Sam. xix. 9 ;) a public shepherd to feed them, (Psal. bcxViii. 70 — 73 \) the captain and leader of the Lord's inheritance to defend them, (1 Sam. x. 1 ;) the minister of God for their good. (B<mi. xiii. 4.)

Arq. 2. — The pilot is less than the whole pe4e; thb general 1 ttum the whole army; the tutor less than all the children; the phVsiclan less than all the living men whose health he careth for; the master or teacher less than all the scholars, because the pa)^ is less than the whole; the king is but a part and member (though I grant a very eminent and noble member) of the kingdom.

Arg, 3. — A Christian people, especially, is the portion of the Lord's inheritance, (Deut. xxxii. 9) the sheep of his pasture — his redeemed one^or wW od gave his blood, Acts xXi. 284 And the kilhng of a man is te violate the image of God, (Gren. ix. 6,) and therefore the cbath and destruction of a churchy and of thousand thousands of men, is ia sadder and a more heavy matter than the death of a king^ who is but one

maxiv

Atg, 4i,>-^A king as a ^^> 01* because a king, is not the inheritance of God, nor the chosen and called of Grod^ nor the dbeep or flock of the Lord's pasture, no)^ the redeemed of Christ) for those excellencies agree not te kings becatise they we kings; for then all kings uiotdd be ^dued with those excellencies, and God should be an acceptor of persons, if he put those excellencies of grace upon men for extetmal respects of highness and kingly power^ and worldly glory and splendour ; for many living images and representations of Grod, as he is hdy, or more excellent than a politic representation of Grod's greatness and majesty, such ad the king is \ because that which is the fruit of a love of God, which cometh nearer te Gh)d's most special love, is more excellent than that which Is farther remote from his special love* Now, though royalty be a beam of the ma^ jesty of tiie greatness of the King of kings and Lord of lords, yet is it such a fruit and beam of Grod^s greatness^ as may consist with the eternal reprobation of the party loved ;

so now GM's love, from whence he communicateth his image representing his own holinesSj Cometh nearer te his most special love of election of men te glory.

Arg. 6.--If GrOd give kincs to be a ransom for his churchy and if he uay great kings for their sake, as Pharaoh^ king of Egypt, (Isa. xliii. 9,) and Sihon king ^ the KtAo* rites, and Og king ofBashan \ (Psal. cxxxvi. 18 — ^20 ;) ifne plead with princes and kings for destroying his people; (Isa* iii. I2'^l4;) if he make Babylon and her king a threshing-floor j for the ** violence done to the inhabitants of Zion," (Jer. li. 33-^5,) then his people, as his people, must be so much dearer and more precious in the Lord's eyes than kings, because they are kings; by how nmch more his justice is active to destroy the one, and his mercy to save tiie other. Neither is the argument taken off by saying the king must, in this question, be compared with his owli people ^ not a foreign king, with other foreign people, over whom he doth not reign, for the argument proveth that the people of GNmI are of mere worth than kings as kings; and Nebuchadnezzar and Pharaoh) for the time, were kings to the people of God, and foreign kings are no less essentially kings, than kmgs native are.

Ara, 6.— Those who are given of Grod as giAs ror the preservation of tne people, to be nurse-fathers to them, those must be of less worth before Gk>d) than those to whom they are given^ mnoe the gift, as the gift^ is less than the party on whom the gift is bestowed* But the king is a gift for the good and preservation of we people, as is clear, L. 1. 26 ; and from this, that Grod gave his people a king In his wrath^ we may conduae, that a king of himself, except Grod be angry with his people, must be a gift.

Arg, 7. — That which is eternal, and can* not politically die, yea, which must continue as tne days of heaven, because of Gkni's promise, is more excellent than that which IS both accidental^ temporary^ and mortal. But the people are both eternal as people, because (Eccles. i. 4) '' one generation passeth awayj and another generation cometh," and as a people in covenant with God, (Jer. xxxiii 40, 41,) in respect that a people and church) though mortal in the individuals, yet the churdi) remaining the church, cannot die; but the king, as king, may and doth die. It is truO) where a ungdom goeth by slicbession) the politicians say, tne man who is king dieth^ but the king never

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE,

diethy because some other, either by birth or free election, succeedeth in his room. But I answer,-^!. People, bj a sort of necessity of nature, succeedeth to people, generation to generation^ except Grod's judgment, contrary to nature, intervene to ma£e Babylon no people, and a land that shall never be inhabited (whi(^ I both believe and hope for, according jto God's word of prophesy). But a king, by a sort of contingency, succeedeth to kings; for nature doth not ascertain us there must be kings to the world's end, because the essence of governors is kept safe in aristocracy and democracy, though there were no kings; and that kings shomd necessarily have be^n in the worii, if man had never &llen in sin, I am not, by any cogent argument, induced to believe, I conceive there should have be^n no government but those of &thers isnd children, husband and wife, and (which is improperly government) some more gifted with supervenient additions to nature, as gifls ana ez^Uencies of engines. Now on this point Althusius (pdit. c. 38. n. 114) saithy the king, in respect of office, is worthier than the people, (but this is but an accidental respect,) but as the king is a man^ he is inferior to the peo^e.

Arg. 8,' — ^He who^ by ofiSce, is obliged to expend hixoself^ and to give lus life lor the sa&tf x>{ the peopki, must be inferior to the people^ So tSaist saith, ihe life is more than raiment or food, because both these give themselves to corruption for man's life; 80 the beasts, are infenor to man, because they die for our life, that ibffj may sustain our life. And Caiaphas prophesied right, that it was bettor that one man die than the whole nation perifiih (John:^, 50) ; and in nature, elements, against their p^cular indination, defraud ^pmselves of their private and particular endi^ that the commonwealth of nature may stand; as heavy elements ascend, light aespend, lest nature should perish by a yacuity. And th9 good Shepherd (John z;.) giveth his life for his sheep; so both Saul and David were made kings to fight the lord's battles, and to expose their lives to hazaid for the safi^ty of tne church and people of God. jBut the king, by office, is obliged to expand his life for the safety of the people of Uod; h^ is obliged to fight the Lord's battles for them; to go betwixt the flock and death, as Paul was willing to be ^nt for the church. It may be objected, Jesus Christ gave himself a ransom for his

church, and his life for the life of the world, and was a gift ^ven to the world, (John iii. 16 ; iv, 10|) and he was a mean to save us; and BO, what arguments we have before pror duced to prove that the king must be mfe rior to the people, because he is a ransom, a mean, a ^ift, are not conclusive, I answer, — 1. Consider a moan reduplicatively, and formaliter^ as a mean; and secondly, as a mean materially, that is, the thing which is a mean, 2. Gonsidar that which is only a mean, and ransom, and gift, and no more; and that which, beside that it is a mean, is of a higher nature also. So Christ formally as a mean, ^ving his temporal life for a time, accordmg to the flesh, for the eter nal life of all the catholic church, to be

glorified eterhally — (not his blessed godead and glory, which, as God, he had with the Father team eternity) — ^in that respect Christ hath the relation of a servant, ran^ som, gift, and some inferiority in compari^ son otthe churdi of Grod; and his Father's glory, as a mean, is inferior to the end, but Christ materially, in conoreto, idhrist is is not only a mean to save his church, but, as God (in which consideration he waa the immortal Lord of life) he was more than a mean, — even the Author, Efficient and Creator of heaven and earth; and so there is no ground to say that he is inferior to the church, but the absolute head, king,^*^ the chief of ten thousand; — more in ex-> cellency and worth than ten thousand mil-^ lions of possible worlds of men and angels. But such a consideration cannot befikU any mortal king; because, consider the king man terially as a mortal man, he must be infe rior to the whole church, for he is but one, and so of l^ss worth than the whole church; as the tJmmb, though the strongest of the fingers, yet it is inferior to the hand, and fiir moro to the whole body, as any psurt is inferior to the whole. Consider the king reduplicative and formally as king, and by the official relation he hath^ he is no more then but a royal servant, an official mean tending* ex qfim^ to this end, to preserve the people, to rule and govern them $ and a gift of God, siven by vurtue of his office, to rule liio peopi? of God, and ao any way inferior to the peppl^*

Ar^f 9.--Those who az)e before the people, and may be a people without a king, must be of more worth than that which is poster rior and icannot be a king without them. For thus, God's self-sufficiency is proved, in

LEX, REX ; OR,

that he mi^ht be, and eternally iiras, bleeBed for ever, without his creature; but his creature cannot subsist in being without him. Now, the people were a people many years before there was a government, (save domestic,) and are a people where there is no king, but only an aristocracy or a democra* cy; but the king can be no king without a people. It is vam that some say, the king and kingdoms are relatives, and not one is before another, for it is true in the naked relation; so are father and son, master and servant, Relata simul natura; but sure there is a priority of worth and independency, for ail that, in the father above the son, and in the master above the servant, and so in the people above the king; take away the people, and Dionysius is but a poor schoolmaster.

Arg. lO.-^—The people in power Are superior to the king, because every efficient and constituent cause is more excellent than the effect. Every mean is inferior in power to the end; (Sa Jun. Brutus^ g? 31. Bucher ^. 1. c 16. Author Lib. de ofie, Magistr, q 6. Hencenius disp, 2, n. 6. Joan Rof- ^ensis Epist, de potest, pap, 1, 2, c. 6. jSpalato deJRepu^ JEoclesiast. h 6, c. 2, n. 3;J but the people is the efficient and constituent cause, the king is the effbot; the people is the end; both intended 6f Grod to save the people, to be a healer and a j^ysician to them (Isau iii. 7) ;• and the people appoint and create the king out of their indigence, to preserve themselves from mutual violence. Many things are objected against this. That the efficient and constituent cause is Grod, and the people are only the instrumental cause; and Spalato saith, that the people doth indirectly only give kingly power, because God, at their act of election, ordinarily giveth it.

Ans. — 1. The Scripture saith plainly, aa we heard before, the people made kings; and if they do, as other second causes produce their effects, it is all one that God, as the principal cause, maketibi kings, else we should npt argue from the cause to the effect amongst the creatures. 2. God, by that same action that the people createth a king, doth also, by them, as by his instruments, create a king; and that God doth not immediately, at the naked presence of the act of popular election, confer royal dignity on the man, without any action of the people, as they say, by the church's act of conterriiig orders, God doth immediately.

without any act of the church, in^se from heaven supernatural liabilities on the man, without any active influence of the church, is evident by this. 1. The royal power to make laws with the king, unid so a power eminent in their states representative to govern themselves, is in the people; for if tne most high acts of royality be in them, why not the power also? And so, what need to fetch a royal power from heaven to be immediately infused in him, seeing the people hath such a power in themselves at hand? 2. The people can, and doth, limit and bind royal power in elected kings, therefore they have in them royal power to give to the king. Those who limit power, can take away so many degrees of royal power; and those who can take away p6wer, can give power; and it is inconceiveable to say that people can put restraint upon a power immec^tely coming from Gfoa.; If Christ immediately infused an apostoHc spirit into Paul, mortal men cannot tAke from him any degrees of that infrised spirit; if Christ infuse a spirit of nine- degrees, the church cannot limit it to six' degrees only. But royalists consent that the people may choose a king upon such conditions to reign, as he hath royal power of ten degrees, whereas his ancestor had by birth a power of fourteen degrees. 8, It is not intelligible that the Holy Ghost should give commandment unto the people to make this man king, (Deut. xvii. 16, 16,) and forbid them to make that man king, if the people had no active influence in making a king at all; but G^, solely and immediatefy from heaven, did infuse royalty in the king without any action of the people, save a naked consent only; and that after God had made the king, they should approve only with an after-act of. naked approbation, 4. If the people by other governors, as by heads of families and other choice men, govern themselves and produce these same formal effects of peace, justice, religion, on themselves, which the king doth produce, then is there a power of the same kin^, and as excellent as the royal power, in the people; and there is no reason but this power should be held to come immediately from Grod, as the royal power; for it is every way of the same nature and kind, as I shall prove. Kings and judges differ not in nature and specie, but it is experienced that people do, by aristocratical guides, govern themselves, &c. ; so then, it God imme-

THS LAW AND THB BBDTCB,

diat0l7 infuse rojalt j when the people ohoock eth a )dng, without an^ m^on of the people, than mu^ God iinmediately infuse a b^un of goyeminff on a provo^ apd bailie, when tbe people dioose miob, apd that without any action 0? the pepple, because all powers are, in abs^raeU>i trom God, CRom. ziii. 2.) And God as immedijtely maketh inferior judges as superior, (ProT^ yiii, 16 ;) and all promo^ tion (ey0n to be a proyost or nmyor) oom? eth fron^ Qod only, a^ to be a Jung; exoept FQyaJIsts 81^, all proinoticm oon^^th from the east and fr^ the west, and not ^m Grod, 6;(opp4i promotion io the roysd throne; the contrary whereof is sai4, Psal, Izxy. 6, 7 ; 1 Sf|ip iif 7* 3- ^ot only kings, but all judges are godsi (Psal. Ixyyii. 1, 2,) and th^refore all must be tb^ same wny created ^4 moulded of God, except by Scripture royalist can show us a aifference. An English prelate^ ffiy^th reasons why peor ple, who are said to make kings as effi* cients 4ad authors, cannot unmake them: the on9 is, becaiise Qod, as phief and sole 8^preme moderator, maketh kings; ^but I m, Christ, as the ^ef moderator and head of th^ church, dotb imm^&lely confer abilities qpon a man to be a preacher; and though, by indus^, tha man acquire abi lities, yet in regfffd the diurch doth not so much as {n^trumentally confer those abir Uties^ they may be said to come from God imiqediately, in relation to the church who Q>l}etli the man to the ministry, Yea, royalists, as our exconmuinic^ted Prelate learned from Spalato, s^, that God, at the naked presence o£ the church's call, doth immediately infuse that from heayen by which the man is now in holy orders and a pastor, whereas he was not so before; and yet prelates cannot deny but they can un^ make ministers, and haye practised this in their ^nhallpwed oo)irta; and, therefore, though Qod inunediately, without any aoy tioQ of the people, make kings, this is a weak re^^u to p}X>?e they cannot unmake th^m? As for their indeUible character, that prelates cai^iot take from a minister; it is nothing, if the church may unmake a minister, though bis character go tp prison with \am^ We seek nq more hat to annul thQ reason, G[qd imm0diately maketji kinss and pasters, therefore no power on eartn can unmake them. This consequence is as weak as ^yater^ 2, The o1;her cause i^,

because God hath erected no tribunal on earth higher than the king's tribunal, therefore no power on earth can unmake a king. The antecedent and oonsequence is bom denied, and is a begging of the question; for the tribunal that made the king is aboye the king. Thoush there be no tribunal formally regal and kmgly aboye the king, yet is there a tribuiml yirtual eminentfy aboye him in the case of tyranny; for the states and princes haye a tribu* pal aboye him.

Aasert.-r-To this the constituent cause is of more power and dignity than the effect, and so the people are aboye the king. The P. Prelate borrowed an answer from Amisffius, and Barclay, and other royalists, and saith, Jf we knew anything in law, or were ruled hj reason, ** eyery constituent, (saith Armsseus^ and Barclay, more accurately than the P. Prelate had a head to transcribe their words,) where the constituent hath resigned' all his power in the hand of the prince wnom be constitutes, is of more worth and power than he in whose hand he resigns the power: so the proposition is fiilse. The seryant who hath constituted his master lord of his Uberty, is not more worthy than his master whom he hath made his lord, and to whom he hath given himself as a slaye, (for afler he hath resigned his liberty he cannot repent, he must keep coyenant though to his hurt,) y^ such a senrant is not omy not aboye his master, but he cannot moye his foot without his master." *' This goyemor of Britain (saith AmissBus) being despised by king Philip, resigned himseff as yassaj to king Edward of lElngland; but did not for that make himself superior to king Edward. Indeed, he who constituteth another under him as a legate is superior; but the people do constitute a king aboye themselyes, hot a kiqg under themselyes; and, therefore, the people are not by this made the king's superior, but his inferior."

Ans. l.-^It is &lse that the people doth, or can by the law of nature, resign their wft>le liberty in the hand d a kmg. 1. They cannot reagn to others that which they haye not in themselyes. Nemo potest dare quod nofi hahet; but the people hath not an absolute power in themselyes to destroy themselyes, or to exercise thos^ tyraur nous acts ppoken of, 1 Sam. yiii^ 11—15, &c. ; for neither God nor nature's law hath

LEX, REX ; OR,

given any such pow^r. 2, He who constituteth himself a slave is supposed to be compelled to that unnatural act of alienation of that liberty which he hath from his Maker from the womb, by violence, constraint, or extreme necessity, and so is inferior to all free men; but the people doth not make themselves slaves when they constitute a king over themselves; because Grod, giving to a people a king, the best and most excellent governor on earth, giveth a blessing and special favour, (Isa. i. 26 ; Hos. i. 11 ; Isa. iii. 6, 7 ; ■ Psal. Ixxix. 70—72 ;) but to lay upon his people the state of slavery, in which they renounce their whole liberty, is a curse of God. (Gen. ix, 25 ; xxvii. 29; Deut. xxviii. 32, 36.) But the people, having their liberty to make any often, or twenty, their king, and to advance one from a private state to an honourable throne, whereas it was in their liberty to advance another, and to give him royal power of ten degrees, whereas they might give him power of twelve degrees, ot eight, or six, must be in excellency and worth above the man whom they consitute king, and invest with such honour; as honour in the fountain, and honos participans et originanSj must be more excellent and pure than the derived honour in the king, which is honos participatus et originatus. If the servant give his Hberty to his master, therefore he nad that liberty in him, and in that act, liberty must be in a more excellent way in the servant, as in the fountain, than it is in the master; and so this hberty must be purer in the people than in the King; and therefore, in that both the servant is above the master, and the people worthier than the king. And when the people give themselves conditionally and covenant-wise to the king, as to a public servant, and patron, and tutor, — as the governor of BritaiD, out of his humour, gave nimself to king Edward — ^there \& even here a note of superiority, Every giver of a benefit, as a giver, is superior to him to whom the gift is given; though after tjie servant hath given away his S. of fiberty, by which he was superior, he cannot be a superior, because by his gift he hath made himself inferior. The people constituteth a king above themselves, I distinguish supra se, above themselves; according to the fountam-power of royalty, — ^that is false; for the fountain-power remaineth most eminently in the people, 1. Because they give it to the king, ad modum redpi^

entU^ and with limitations; therefore it is unlimited in the people, and bounded and limited in the king, and so less in the king than in the people. 2. If the king turn distracted, and an ill spirit from the Lord come upon Saul, so as reason be taken &om a Nebuchadnezzar, it is certain the people may put curators and tutors over him who hath the royal power. 3. If the king be absent and taken captive, the people may give the royal power to me, or to some few, to exercise it as custodes regni. And, 4. If he die, and the crown go by election, they may create another, with more or less power. All which e?inceth, that they never constituted over themselves a king, in regard of fountain-power; for if they give away the fountain, as a slave selleth his liberty, they could not make use of it. Indeed they set a king above them, quoad poteHatem legum execuiivam, in re^urd of a power of executing laws and actual government for their good and safety; but this proveth only that the king is above the people, umrk r), in somo rospoct. But the mos^ eminent and fountain-power of royalty remaineth in the people as in an immortal spring, which they communicate by succession to this or that mortal man, in the manner and measure that they think good. Ulpian^ and Bartolus,* cited by our Prelate out of Barclaius, are only to be understood of the derived, secondary, and borrowed power of executing laws, and not of the fountainpower, whicn the people cannot give away, no more than they can give away their rational nature; for it is a power natural to conserve themselves, essentially adhering to every created being. For if the people give all their power away, what shall they reserve to make a new king, if this man die? What if the royal line should cease? there be no prophets immediately sent of €rod to make kmgs. What if he turn tyrant, and destroy nis subjects with the sword? The royalists sav, they may fly; but, when they made him xing, they resigned all their power to him, even their power of flying; for they bound themselves by an oath (say royalists) to all passive and lawful active obedience; and, I suppose, to stand at his tribunal, if he summoned the three estates, upon treason, to come before him, is con-

1 Ulpian 1. 1, ad Sc. Tnbil. Populus omne snain ixnperium et potestatem confert in Regem. 9 Bartolai ad L hostos 2^, f. de capt. et host.

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

tamed in the oath, that royalists say, bindeth all, and is contradictory to flying.

Amisseus, a more learned jurist and divine than the P. Prelate, answereth the other maxim, '* The end is worthier than the mean leading to the end, because it is ordained for the end. These means, (saith he,j which refer their whole nature to the end, and have all their excellency from the end, and have excellency from no other thing but from the end, are less excellent than the end. That is true, such an end as medicine is for health." And Hugo Grotius, (1. 1, c. 3, n. 8,) " Those means which are only for the end, and for the good of the end, and are not for their own good, also are of less excellency, and infenor to the end; but so the assumption is false. But these means which, beside their relation to the end, have an excellency of nature in themselves, are not always inferior to the end. The disciple, as he is instituted, is inferior to the master; but as he is the son of a prince, he is above the master. But hy this reason the shepherd should be inferior to brute beasts, to sheep; and the master of the family is for the family, and referreth ail that he hath for the entertaining of the family; but it followeth not therefore the family is above him. The form is for the action, is therefore the action more excellent than the form, and an accident than the subject or substance 1" And Grotius saith, " Every government is not for the good of another, but some for its own good, as the government of a master over the servant, and the husband over the wife.

Ans, — I take the answer thus: Those who are mere means, and only means referred to the end, they are inferior to the end; but the king, as king, hath all his official and relative goodness in the world, as relative to the end. All that you can imagine to be in a king, as a king, is all relative to the safety and ^^od of the people, (Epm. xiii. 4,) " He is a minister for thy good." He should not, as king, make himself, or his own gain and honour, his end. I grant, the king, as a man, shall die as another man, sum so he may secondarily intend his own good; and what excellency he hath as a man, is the excellency of one mortal man, and cannot make him amount in dignity, and in the absolute consideration of the excellency of a man, to be above many men and a whole kingdom; for the more good things there be, the better they are, so the

good things be multiplicable, as a hundred men are better than one; otherwise, if the good be such as cannot be multiplied, as one God, the multiplication maketh them worse, as many gods are inferior to one God. Now if royaHste can show us any more in the king than these two, we shall be obliged to them; and in both he is inferior to the whole.

The Prelate and his followers would have the maxim to lose credit; for then (say they) the shepherd should be inferior to the sheep; but m this the maxim ^eth indeed, because the shepherd is a reasonable man, and the sheep brute beasts, and so must be more excellent than all the flocks of the world. Now, as he is a reasonable man, he is not a shepherd, nor in that relation referred to the sheep and their preservation as a mean to the end; but he is a shepherd by accident, for the unruliness of the creatures, for man's sin, withdrawing themselves from that natural dominion that man had over the creatures before the &11 ; in that relation of a mean to the end, and so by accident, is this official relation put on him; and according to that official relation, and by accident, man is put to be a servant to the brutish creature, and a mean to so base an end. But aU this proveth him, through man's sin and by accident, to be under the official relation of a mean to baser creatures than himself, as to the end, but not a reasonable man. But the king, as kin?, is an official and roval mean to this end, that the people may lead a godly and peaceable life under him; and this official relation being an accident, is of less worth than the whole people, as they are to be governed. And I grant the king's son, in relation to blood and birth, is more excellent than his teachers; but as he is taught, he is inferior to his teacher. But in ]^th considerations the king is inferior to the people; or though he command the people, a^d so have an executive power of law above them, yet have they a fountain-power above him, because they made him king, and in God's intention he is given as king for their good, according to this, " Thou shalt feed my people Israel," and that, " I gave him for a leader of my people."

The P. Prelate saitn: " The constituent cause is more excellent than the effect constituted, where the constitution is voluntary, and dependeth upon the free act of the will, as when the king maketh a viceroy or a judge, durante henepladto, during his free

will, but not when a man maketh oyer his right to Another ; for then there should be neither fidth nor truth in covenants^ if pe<>> pie might make oyer theur power to tneir king, and retract and take back what they have once giveni

^tt.-^Tiiis is a begging of the question; for it is denied that the people can abso^ lutely make away their whole power to the king. It dependeth on the people that the j b^not destroyed^ They give to the king a politic power for their own safety^ and they keep a natural power to themskyee which they must oonserye, but cannot giye away; and Uiey do not break l^eir ooyenant when they put in action that natural vcfwet to conserve themselves; for though the pei^le should fflve away that power, and swear thou^ the king should kill them all, they shouH not resist^ nor defend their own lives, yet that being against the sixth commandment, which ei^ineth natural sel^preservation, it should not oblige the oonsGience, for it should be intrinaca% sinM; for it is all one to swear to non^self-preaervation as to swear to self-murder.

'' If the. people^ (saith the Prelate^ beg* ging the answer irom Barclay,^) the oonsti tuent, be more excellent than the effect, and so the people above the kii^^ because they constitute him king^ then the counties and corporati(3S may make void all the commis> sionssiven to the knights and burgesses of the House of Commons^ and send others in their place, and repeal their orders; there<> fore Buchanan saith, that orders and laws in parliament were but #^C^xl^rii prepa>> ratory consultations, and had not the force ofalaw^ till the people give their consent and have their influence authoritative^ upwi the statutes and acts of parliament; but the observator holdeth that the ledslative power is whole and entire in the paimment. But when the Scote were preferring petitions and declaraticms they put all power in the collective bodyi and kept theur distinct tables.

Ans. — 1. There is no consequence here! the counties and incorporations that send commissioners to parliament, may make void their commissions and annul their acts^ because they constitute them commissioners. If they be unjust acts, they may disobey them, and so disannul tiiem; but, it is pre-

1 Sac Sane. Maji t\ ^, p> 1S9> stot'ea from Barcla.> Ub. 6, c. 12.

sumed, Grod hath given no moral power to do ill, nor can the counties and corporations give any such power to evil, for they have not any such from Grod If they be just acts, they are to obey them) and cannot retract commissions to make just orders. Illwi tantwn possUTttus quod jure poiswnuSf and therefore, as power to ffotem justiy is irre* vocably committed by the three estates who made the king to the king, so is that same power committed by the shires and corporations to their oommissioDers, to decree* in parliament what is just and good irrevocably; and to take atiy just power from the king which is his due^ is a great sin But when he abuseth his power to the destruction ci his subjects) it is lawful to throw a sword out of a madman's hand, though it be his own proper sword^ and though he have due right td it^ and a just power to use it for good; for all fiduciary power abused may be repealed. And if the knights and burcresses of the House of Commons abuse their fiduciary power to the destrtietion of these shires and corporations who piit the trust on them, the observator did nev6r say that parliamentary power was so entire and irrevocably in them, as that the people may not resut them, annul their commissions and rescind their fu;ts, and denude them of fidudaiT power> even as the king may be denuded of that same power by the three estates $ for particular corporations are no more to be denuded of that fountain-pow^ of making commisffloners^ and of the sdtfpreservation^ than the thtee estates are. 2. The P. Prelate cometh not home to the mind of Buch^man^ who kheW the fimda^ mental laws of Sootiand, and the power of

Parliaments; for his meaning was not to eny a ledslative power in the parUatoent; but when ne calletn their paJfliamentary declarations A'^dCftfXfb/Mrtf, his meanin? is Ohljr that which lawyers and schoolmen both sayi Leges non promulgatds non Jiabent vim l&- gis actu completo obUaatoricBy'^^^^ Laws not promulgated do not oblige the subject while they be promulgated |" but he fulfils Buchanan^ when he saith, *' Parliamentary laws must have the authoritative influence o£ the people) before they can be formal laws, or any more than ^^Cxi0^(ttr* or preparatory notions^ And it was no wonder wiien the king denied a parliament, and the supreme senate of the secret council was corrupted, that the people did then set up t&bleS) and extraordinary judicatunes of we three es^

Hm.UWMN^^MH_^H

Barclay^ answereth to this! " The mean is inferknr to the end, it holdeth not; the tutor and corator is for the minor^ as for the end, and given for his ffood; but it followeth not that, therefore, uie tator^ in the administration of the minor or pupil's inhe ritance, is not superior to the min<*,"

An, — It foUoweth well that the minor virtually, and in the intention of the law^ is more excellent than the tutor^ though the tutor can exercise more excellent acts than the pupil, by accident, for defect of age in the minor, yet he doth exercise those acts with sabordinatioQ to the minor^ and with correction, beeause he is to render an ac count of his d(xng8 to the pupil oomine to age; so the tutor is only more exoeuent and superior in some respect, %mk ^ but not amply, and so is the kmg in some respect above the people.

The P. Prelate beggeth from the roya^ lists another 6f our arguments, Qaod ejltit tale, est magia toje,' — ** That which maxeth another such, is&r more such itself." If the people give royal power to the king, then mr more is ihe royal power in the people. By this (saith the Prelate) it shall follow, if the observatcMT give all his goods to me, to make me rich, the observator is more rich: if the people give most part of their goods to foment the rebellion, then the people are more rich, having given all they nave upon the public £uthv

Ans. — 1. This greedy Prelate was made richer than ten poor pursuiVantSj by a bishopric; it will i^ow well,*— therefore, the bishopric is richer than the bishop, whose goods the curse of God blasteth. 8. It holdeth in efficient cauBes*, so working in other things as the virtue of the effect remaineth in uke cause, even after the production of the effect. As the sun maketh all thinss light, the fire all things hot, therefore the sun is more light, the fire more hot; but where the canse doth alienate and tnake over, in a corporal manner^ that which it hath to another, as the hungry Prelate would have the observator^s goods, it holdeth not; for the effect may exhaUst the virtue of ihe cause, but the people doUi, as the feuntiain) derive a stream of royalty to Saul^ and

^ Bftrcla., lib. 4, cone. Monarcho., Ck ll> p. 27. I Sttcr. Sane. Mai., c. 13, p. 190, stolen oat of Arnisaens de jnre Majest. c. 3, n. 1, p. 34.

make him king, and yet so as they keep fountain-power of makinsr kings in themselves; yea, when Saul is dead to mtike David king at Hebron, and when he is dead to make Solomon king, and after him to make Behoboam king; and, therefore, in the people there is more fountain-power of making Kings than in Darid, in Saul, in any long of the world. As for the Prelate's scoff about the people's giving of their goods to the good cause, I hope it shall) by the blessmg of God, enrich them more; whereas prelates, by the rebellion in Ireland^ (to whioi they assent, when they council his Majesty to sell the blood of some hundred thousands of innocents killed in Ireland^) are broughti from thousands a year, to beg a morsel of bread.

The P. Prelate (p. 131]) answereth that maxim^ Quodeftdt tdU^ id ipsum ttt nuh </w taUi — " l!hat which miULeth another such, it is itself more 8udi" It is true, de prindpio farmaU efectivo, (as I leanied in the university)) of such an agent as is formally such in itself as is the effect produced. Next^ it is such as is effective ana productive of itself j as when fire heateth oold water, so the quality must be f<rmally inherent in the agent; as wine maketh drunk, it Moweth not^ wine is more drunk^ because drunkenness is not inherent in the wine, nor is it capable of drunkenness; and, therefore, Aristotle qualifieth the maxim with this, Quod e^t tale est tnaaia tale, modo utrique tnsit,"^*^ and it holdeth not in agents, who operate by donation, if the ri^t of the king be transferred from the people to the king." The donation divesteth the people totally of it, except the king have it by way of loan^ which, to my thinung, never yet any spoke< Sovereignty never was, never can be^ in the oommunityh Sovereignty hath power of life and death, which none hath over himself, and the community conceived without government, all as equal, endowed with nature's and native liberty, of that community no one can have power over the life of another. And so the aimiment may be turned home, if the people be not tales, such bv nature, (as nam formally royal power, ne should say,) they cannot give the king royal power; abo, none hath power of life and death, either more eminently <v formally, the people, either smgly or collectively, have not power over their own life, much less over their neighbours'*

Ans, — 1. The Prelate would make the maxim true of a formal cause, and this he

learned in the Umvendty of St. Andrews. He wrongeth the umversitT, he rather learned it while he kept the calves of Grail. The wall is white from whiteness; therefore, whiteness is more white by the Prelate's learning. Never such thing was taught in that learned university. 2. Prinoipium formale efecHvum is as good logic as pnnotpium effedivum mcUertalej formale, Jlnale. The Prelate is in his accuracy of logic now. He yet maketh the causality of the formal cause all one with the causaiity of the efficient; but he is weak in his logic. 3. He confoundeth a cause equivocal and a cause univocal, and in that case the maxim holdeth not. Nor is it necessary to make true the maxim, that the quali^ be inherent in the cause the same way; for a city maketh a mayor, but to be a mayor is one way in the city, and another way in him who is created mayor. The Prelate's maxim would help him, if we reasoned thus: The people maketh the kinir, therefore the people is more a king, and more fomally a >yereign than the king. But that is no more our argument than the simile that Maxwell used, as near heart and mouth both. Wine makelii drunk the Prelate, therefore wine is more drunk. But we reason thus: The fountainpower of making six kings is in the people, therefore there is more fountain-power of.royalty in the people than in any one king. For we read that Israel made Saul king, and made David king, and made Abimelem king; but never that king Saul made another king, or that an earthly king made another absolute king. 4. The Prelate will have the maxim i^se, where the agent worketh by donation, which yet holdeth true by his own grant (c. 9, p. 98). The king giveth power to a deputy, therefore there is more power in the king. 5. He supposeth that which is the basis and foundatictti of all the question, that people divesteth themselves totally of their foimtain-power, which is most false. 6. Either they must divest themselves totallv (saith he) of their power, or the king ham power from the people, by way of loan, which, to my thinking, never any yet spake. But the P. Prelate's thinking is short, and no rule to divines and lawyers; for, to the thinking of the learned jurists, this power of the king is but fiduciary, and that is (whether the Prelate think it or think it not) a sort of power by trust, pawn or loan. Hex director Regni, hon proprietarius, (MolincB. in consuet. Parisi,

Tie. 1, 9 ; 1 Gloss. 7, n. 9,)—" The king is a life-renter, not a lord, or proprietor of nis kingdom." So Novel. 85, tn prineip^ et c. 18, Quod magistratus sit nudus dispensator et defensor jurium regnif non pro^ prietarius, const(xt^ ex eo guod non posset alienare tmpertum, oppida^ urhes^ recfiones vey vet res suhditorwm^ bonave regm. So Gregory, I. 3, c. 8, de Repuh. per c. 1, Sect* prcBtereay de propo. fevd., Hottoman, quest, illust. 1 ; Ferdinan. Vasquez, I. 1, c. 4; Bossius, deprincip. et privileg. illiuSy n. 290, — ** The king is only a steward, and a defender of the laws of the kingdom, not a proprietor, because he hath not power to make away the empire, cities, towns, countries, and goods of the subjects;" and, bona commissa magistratuif stmt suhjeda restitutioniy et in prejudicium suecessorum aliendri non possunt, {per I. idt. Sect, sed nost. C. Comment, de leg. I. peto 69, fratrem de leg. 2, I. 32, ult. d, t.) — " All the soods committed to any magistrate are under restitution; for he hath not power to make them away, to the prejudice of his succest^or^." The Prelate's thoughts reach not the secrets of jurists, and therefore he speaketh with a warrant; he will say no more than his short-travelled thoughts can reach, and that is but at the door. 7. Sovereignty is not in the oonununity, (saith the P. Prelate). Truly it neither is, nor can be, more tlian ten, or a thousand, or a thousand thousands, or a whole kingdom, can be one man; for sovereignty is the a1:^tract,the sovereign is the concrete. Many cannot be one king or one soverign: a sovereign must be essentially one; and a multitude cannot be one. But what then? May not the sovereign power be eminently, fontaliter^ originally and radically in the people? I thmk it may, and must be. A king is not an under judge: he is not a lord of council and session formally, because he is more. The people are not king formally, because the people are eminently more than the king; for they make David king, and Saul king; and the power to make a lord of council and session, is in the king (say royalists). 8. A community hath not power of life and death; a king hath power of life and death (saith the Prelate). What then? Therefore a community is not king. I grant all. The power of making a king, who hath power of life and death, is not in the people. Poor man! It is like prelates' logic. Samuel

THE LAW AXO THE PRINCE.

is not a king, therefore he cannot make David a king. It followeth not bj the Prelate's ground. So the king is not an inferior judge. What! Therefore he cannot make an inferior judge? 9. The power of life and death is eminently and viitually in the people, ooUectiyely taken, though not formally. And though no man can take away hjs own life, or hath power over his own life fonnally, yet a man, and a body of men, hath power over their own lives, radically and vu-tually, in respect they may render themselves to a magistrate, and to laws which, if they violate, mey must be in hazard of their lives; and so they virtually have power of their own lives, by putting them under the power of good laws, for the peace and safety of the whole. 10. This is a weak conseouence. None hath power of his own life, therefore, far less of his neighbour's (saith the Prelate). I shall deny the consequence. The king hath not power of his own Ufe, that is, according to the Prelate's mind, he can neither, by the law of nature, nor by any civil law, kill himself; therefore, the king hath far less power to kill another; it followeth not: for the judge hath more power over his neighbour's life than over his own. 11. But, saith the P. Prelate, the community conceived without government, all as equal, endowed with nature's and native liberty, hath no power of life and death, because all are bom free; and so none is bom with dominion and power over his neighbour's life. Yea, but so, Mr P. Prelate, a king considered without government, and as bom a free man, hath not power of any man's life more than a community hath; for king and beggar are bom both alike free. But a Gommumty, in this consideration, as they come from the womb, have no politic consideration at all. If you consider them as without all policy, you cannot consider them as invested with policy; yea, if you consider them so as they are by nature, void of all policy, they cannot so much as add their after-consent and approbation to such a man to be their king, whom Grod immediately from heaven imiketh a king; for to ada such an after-consent, is an act of government. Now, as they are conceived to want all government, they cannot perform any act of government. And this is as much against himself as agamst us.

2. The power c^ a part and the power of the whole is not alike. Royalty never advanceth the king above the place of a member ; and lawyers say, the kmg is above the subjects, in sensu diviso, in a divisive sense, he IS above this or that subject ; but he is inferior to all the subjects collectively taken, because he is for the whole kingdom, as a mean for the end.

Obj. — If this be a good reason, that he is a mean for the whole kingdom as for the end; that he is therefore inferior to the whole kingdom, then is he also inferior to any one subject; for he is a mean for the safety of every subject, as for the whole kingdom.

Aim. — Every mean is inferior to its complete, adeauate, and whole end; and such an end is tne whole kingdom in relation to the king; but every mean is not always inferior to its incomplete, inadequate, and partial end. This or that subject is not adequate, but the inadeauate and incomplete end in relation to the King,

The Prelate saith. Kings are Dii Elohim, gods; and the manner of their propagation is by filiation, by adoption, sons of me Most High, and God's nrst-bom. Now, the first-bom is not above every brother severally; but if there were tiiousands, millions, numberless numbers, he is above all in precedency and power.

Ans, — Not only kmgs but all inferior judges are gods. Psal. Ixxxii., God standeth in the congregation of the gods, that is not a congregation of kings. So (Exod. xxii. 8) the master of the house shall be brought

judges. And that there were more judges than one, is clear by ver. 9; and if they shall condemn HytJ^*!* jarshignur^ condemnarinty (John x. 85,) M SfPf He called them gods; Exod. iv. 16, "Thou shalt be to Aaron CS^hSkS ^ * god." They are gods analogically only. Grod is infinite, not so the king. God's will is a law, not so the king's, wd is an end to himself, not so the king. The judge is but God by office, and representation, and conservation of the people. It is denied that the firstbom is in power before all his brethren, though there were millions. That is but said, one, as one, is inferior to a multitude. As the first-bom was a politic ruler to his brethren, he was inferior to them politically, Obj. — The collective imiversity of a kingdom are subjects, sons, and the king their &ther, no less than this or that subject is the king's suliject. For the university of

•^^^mvn.w'mjwmi'w

LBX, BBX ; OB,

subjects are either the king, or the king's subjects; for all the kingdom must be one of these two; but they are not the kii%, therefore they are his subjects.

Afu, — All the kingdom, in any consideration, is not either king or subjects. I give a third: The kingdom collective is neitiber

06;. — ^The university is ruled by laws, therefore they aro inferior to the kmg who ruleth all It^ law.

Arts, — Tiie university, properly, is no otherwise ruled by Ifiws than the king is ruled by laws, Tne university, formally, is the complete politic body, endued with a nomothetic faculty, which cannot use vior lenpe against itself, and SQ is oot properly wdter l^w.

QUESTION XX.

WHSTHER OR NQ IN|XRIQR JITPGSS BB ITNIr VOCALLY AND ESSBNTDO^LY JUDGES, AND THE IMMEDIATE YigABS 07 GOD, NQ LESS THAN THE KING, OR IF THBT BE ONLY THE DEPUTIES AND VICARS OB TIfE mNQ,

It is certain that, in one and the same kingdom, the power of the king is more in extension than th^ power of any inferior judg^ ; but if these powers of the king and the inferior judges differ intensive and in spece, and nature is the qu^stiop, though it hip Dot all the question,

AM8ert,-^Jj;$enor judges ar^ no less essentially judges, and the immediate vicars of Qod, than tho king, Those whg judge in the room of God, and exercise the judg^ ment of Qod, are essentially judges and deputies of God, 9B well as the king; but in^ ferior judges are such, therefore the propOi' sition is clear. Tbo formal reasoq, why the king is univocally aixd essentiaDy a judge, is, because the kjng's throne is the Loin's throne; 1 Chron. zxixp 23, '^ Then Solomon fil^t on the throne of the Lord, 9fi king, instead of David his father." 1 Kings 1. 13, It is called David's throne, because me king i^ the deputy of Jehovah; and the judgment is the lord's. I prove the assumption. Inferior jiidges appomted by king Jehoshaphat have this pl^ce, 2 Chron. xix. 6, " The king

said to the judges, Take heed what .ye do,

ior ye judge not for man, but for the Lerd^'' Then, they were deputies in the place of the Lord, and not the king's 4eputies in the formal and official acts of judging. Ver. 7i <* Wherefore, now, let the fear 3 the Lord be upon you, take heed and do it; for there is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor resMK^ of persons, or takmg of sifts.

Hence I argue, 1. If the Holy Ghost, in this good king, forbid inferior judges, wrests ing of judgment, respectbg of persons, and taking of gifts, because tne ludgment is the Lord's, and if the Lord himself were on the bench, he would not respect persons, nor take gifts, then he presumeth, that inferior juc^es are in the stead and plaoe of Jehovah, and that when these mferior judges should take gifts, they make, as it were, the Lord, whose place they r^esent, to take gifts, and to do iniquity, and to respect persons; but that the Hc4y Lord cannot do. 2. If the inferior judges, in the act of judging, were the vicars and deputies of king Jehoshaphat, he would have said, judge righteous judgment. Why? For the judgment is mine, and if I, the king, were on the bench, I would not respect persons, nor take gifts; and you judge for me, the Supreme Judge, as my deputies. But the king saith. They judge not &p man, but for the Lord. 3. If, by this, they were not God's immediate vicars, but the vicars and deputies of the king, then, b^g mere servants, the king might command them to pronounce such a sentence, and not such a sentence as I may command my servant and deputy, in so &r as he 'is a servant and deputy, to say this, and say not that; but the king cannot limit the conscience of the inferior judge, because the judgment is not the kirk's, but the Lord's, 4, The king cannot command any other to do that as King, for the doing whereof he hath no power from God himself | but the king hatn no power from Grod to pronoiince what sentence he pleaseth, beeause the judgment is not his own but God's. And though inferior judges be sent of the king, and appointed by him to be judges, and so have their external call from God's deputy the ^S} 7^9 bwecause judging is an act of conscience,, as one man's, conscience cannot properly be a deputy for another man's conscience, so neither can an inferior judge, as a judge, be a deputy for a king. There-

THE LAW AJSTD THB PRINCE,

fore, the inferior judges iiare designation to their office £rx)m the idng; but if they have from the king that they are judges, and be not God's deputies, nut the Ung's, they oould not be oommanded to execute judff* ment for Grod, but for the king; (Deut, i. 17,) Moses appohted judges, but not as his deputies to judge and give sentence, as sub* ordinate to him; for the judgment fsaith he) is die Lord's, not mine, 5, If au the interior iudgas in Israel were but the depi^ ties of the kin^, and not immediately subor dioate to God as his deputieSi then oould nsither inferior judges be admonished nor ecmdmmied in God's word for unjust judg menty because their sentence should be neither r^hteons nor unrighteous judgment, but in so &r as the king should approve it or disapprofve it; and, indeed, that royalist, Hugo Grotius^ saith so,— that an inferior judge can do nothing against the will of the suproQue magistrate if it be so. Whenever God eommandeth inferior judges to execute riditeous judgment, it must have this sense, *' Bespect not persons in judgment, except the kmg oonmiand you; crush not the poor, oppress not the fiitnerless, except the xing comnuQid you." I understand not such ^ licy. Sore I am the Lord's commandments, rebukes and threats,-oblige, in conscience, the inferior judge as the superior, as is manifest in these scriptures, Jer. v. 1 ; Isa, i, 17} 21 ; T. 7; X. 2; lix, 14; Jer. xxii. 8; Ezek, f viii. 8 ; Amos v. 7 1 Mio, iii. 9 ; Hab. i, i; Lev. xix, 15; Deut, xrii. U; i, 17; £xod, xxiiu 2.

Grottus saith,* <' It is here as in a cate* goiy* the mid<tie spede is, in respect of the superior, a specie ^-^ refi^>ect of the inferior, a genus; so in^or magistrates in relation to those who ai^ inferior to them and un<* der them, are msgistrates or public per* sons; but in relation to supenor magistrates^ especially the king, they are private persons, and not magistrates.

^ii^.-^i-Jehoshaphat esteemed not judges, appointed by himself, private men, 2 Ghron,

^ Grotias de jure belli et pac lib, 1, c. 4, Nam omnia fiwnltas gubernandi in magtstratibas, sumnuB potesteti ita subjioitur nt <{Hiequi4 contra tdluntatem ramini imperantU fMsiant, id defeotmn sii ea facilitate, ac pro&de de pro acta priyato haben-p drnn.

' ' Grotins ib. species intermedia, si genus respi^ cias, est species, si speciem infra positam, est genus i ita magistratns illi, inferiormn quidem ratione ba* bjta sunt pnbllcsB, persona, at snperiores si considereotnr, sunt prirati.

xix. 6, 7, " Ye judge not for men, but for Ae Lord." We shall prove that underjudges are powers ordamed of God; in Scotland the king can take no man's inherilnoe from him because he is the king; but if any man ^KMKess lands beknging to the* orown, the king, by his advocate, must stand before the lora-judges of the session, and submit the matter to the kws of the land; and if the king, for property of goods, were not under a law, and were not to acknowlodse judges as judges, I see not how the subjects in either kingdoms have any property I iud^ it blasphemy to say, that a sentence of an inferior judge must be no sentaace, though never so legal nor just, if it be contrary to the king's will, as Grrotius saith.

He citeth that of Augustine: "If the oonsul command one thing, and the emperor another thing, you contemn not the power, but you choose to obey the highest." Peter saith, He will have us one way to be subject to the king, as to the supreme, sine uU. la eauception^f without anv exception; but to those who are sent by the king, as having their power from the (ing.

Arg, 1,— When the consul eommandeth a thing lawfiil, and the king that same thing lawful, or a thing not umawful, we are to obey the king rather than the oonsul. So I expone Augustine, We are not to obey the kins and the oonsul the same way, that is, with the same degree of reverence and submission; for we owe more submission of spirit to tbe king than to the consul; but fnoais l mifM8 non voficmi speciem^ more or less vwrieth not the nature of things. But if the meaning be that we are not to obey the inferior judge, commanding things lawful, if the kmg oom^iand the contrary, this is utterly denied. But saith Grotius, <^The inferior judge is but the deputy of the kiiig, and hath all his power from him; therefore we are to obey nim for the king." — Ans. The inferior judge may be called 3ie deputy of the king, (where it is the king's place to make judges^ because he hath his external call from uie fciiig, and is judge infoTO soli, in the name and authority of the king; but being once made a judge, m foro poli^ before God, he is as ess0ntially a judge, and in bis officii^ acts, no less immediately subjected to God than tlie king himself.

Ara. 2.-^These powers to whom we are to yield obedience, because they are ordained of God, these are as essentially judges as

LBX, REX ; OR,

the supreme magistrate the king; but inferior judges are such, therefore inferior judges are as essentially judges as the supreme magistrate. The proposition is, Bom. xiiL 1, for that is the apostle's arguments; whence we proTO kings are to be obeyed, because they are powers from Grod. I prove the assumption: inferior magistrates are powers from God, Deut. i. 17; xix. 6, 7; Exod. xxiL 7 ; Jer. t. i. ; and the apostle saith, " The powers that be are ordamed of God."

Arg, 3. — Christ testified that Pilate had power from Grod as a judge (say royalists) no less than Caesar the emperor. (John xix. 11 ; 1 Pet. ii. 12.) We are commanded to obey the king and those that are sent by him, and that for the Lord's sake, and for conscience to God; and (Bom. xiii 5) we must be subject to all powers that are of God, not only for wrath, but for conscience.

Arg. 4. Those who are rebuked because they execute not just judgment, as well as the king, are supposed to be essentially judges, as well as the king; but inferior judges are rebuked because of this, Jer. xxu. 16—17; EzeL xlv. 9—12; Zeph. iii. 3 ; Amos t. 6, 7 ; Eccles. iii. 16 ; Mic. iii. 2—4 ; Jer. v. 1, 31.

Arg. 6. — ^He is the minister of Grod for good, and hath the sword not in vain, but to execute vengeance on the evil-doers, no less than the kmg. (Bom. xiii. 2 — 4.) He to whom agreeth, by an ordinance of God, the specific acts of a magistrate, is essentially a magistrate.

Arg 6. — The resistmer of the inferior magktrate in his lawM commandments is the resisting of Grod's ordinance, and a breach of the fifm commandment, as is disobedience to parents; and not to give him tribute, and fear, aqd honour, is the same transgression, Bom. xiii, 1 — 1,

Arg, 7.-^These styles, of gods, of heads of the people, of fathers, of physiciaiis and healers of the sons of the Most High, of such as reign and decree by the wisdom of God, &c, that are given to kings, for the which royalists make kings only judges, and all inferior judges but deputed, and judges by participation, and at the second hand, or

flven to mferior judgeSr (Exod, xxii. 8, .9 ; ohn X. 35.) Those who are appointed judges under Moses (D^t. i. 16) are called, in Hebrew or Chaldee, (1 Kings viii. 1, 2 ; V. 2 ; Mic. iii. 1 ; Josh, xxiii. 2 ; Num. i. 16,) ^tt^NT rasce, ^BftT fathers, (Acts vii, 2 ; Josh, xiv, 1 ; xix. 16; 1 Cbron, viii. 28,)

healers, (Isa. iii. 7,) gods, and sons of the Most High. (Psal. Imii. 1, 2, 6, 7 ; Prov. viii. 16, 17.) I much doubt if kings can infiise godheads in their subjects. I conceive they nave, from the God of gods, these gifts whereby diey are enabled to be judges; and that kmgs may appoint them judges, but can do no more: tney are no less essentially judges than themselves.

Arg. 8, — If inferior judges be deputies of the king, not of Grod, and have all their au^^ thority from the king, then may the king limit the practice of these inferior judges. Say that an inferior judge hath condemned to death a paridde, ana he be conveying him to the place of execution, the king cometh with a force to rescue him out of his hand; if this inferior magistrate bear God's sword for the terror of ill-doers, and to execute God's vengeance on murderers, he cannot but resist the king in this, which I judge to be his office; for tne inferior judge is to take vengeance on ill-doers, and to use the co-active force of the sword, by virtue of his office, to take away this paricide. Now, if he be the deputy of the xing, he is not to break the jaws of the wicked (Job xxix 17); not to take vengeance on evil-doers (Bom.- xiii. 4) ; nor to execute judgment on the wicked, Psal. cxHx. 9) ; nor to execute judgment for the fatherless (Deut. x. 18) ; except a mortal man's creator, the king, say Amen. Now, truly then, Grod, in all £rael, was to rebuke no inferior judge for perverting judgment, — as he doth, Exod. xxiii. 26; Mic. iii. 2 — 4; Zech. iii, 3; Num. XXV. 5 ; Deut. i. 16 ; for the king only is lord of the conscience of the infenor judge who is to give sentence, and execute sentence righteously, upon condition that the king, the only univocal and proper judge, first decree the same, as royalists teach.

Hear our Prelate (c. 4, p. 46). — ^How is it imaginable that kings can be said to judge in Grod's place, and not receive the power from God? But kings judge in Grod's place. (Deut. i. i.7; 2 Chron. xix. 6.) Let no man stunible (this is his prolepsis) at this, that Moses in the one place, and Jehoshaphat in the other, apake to subordinate judges under them. This weakeneth nowise our argument; for it is a ruled case in law, Qtiod quia facit per alium, fadt per se^ all judgments of interior judgeis are in the name, authority, and by the power of the supreme, and ^r^ but commumcatively and derivatively from the sovereign power.'

Ans, — How is it possible that inferior judges (Deut. i. 17 ; 2 Chron. xix. 6) can be said to judge in God's place, and not receive the power from God immediately, without anj consent or covenant of men? So saith the P. Prelate. But inferior judges judge in the place of Grod, as both the P. Prelate and Scripture teach. (Deut. i. 17 ; 2 Chron. xix. 6.) Let the Prelate see to the stumbling conclusion, for so he feareth it proves toms bad cause. He saith the places, Deut. i. 17 ; 2 Chron. xix. 6, prove that the king judseth in the room of God, because his deputies judge in the place of Grod. The Prelate may know we would deny this stumbling and lame consequence; for 1. Moses and Jehoshaphat are not speaking to themselves, but to other inferior judges, and doth publicly exhort them. Moses and Jehoshaphat are persuading the regulation of the personal actions of other men who might pervert judgment. 2. The Prelate is much upon his law, after he had foresworn the gospel and religion of the church where he was baptized. " What the kins doth by another, that he doth by himseff." But wero Moses and Jehoshaphat afraid that they should pervert judgment in the unjust sentence pronounced by under judges, of which sentence they could not know any thing? And do inferior judges so judge in the name, auliiority, and power of the king, as not in the name, authority, and power of the Lord of lords and Kins of kings? or is the judgment the king's? l^o; the Spirit of God saith no such matter. The judgment executed by those inferior judges is the Lord's, not a mortal king's; therefore, a mortal king may not hinder them to execute judgment.

Ohj, — ^He cannot suggest an unjust sentence, and command an inferior judge to give out a sentence absolvatory on cut-throats, but he may hinder the execution of any sentence against Irish cut-throats.

Ans. — It is all one to hinder, the execution of a just sentence, and to suggest or command the inferior judge to pronounce an unjust one; for inferior judges, by conscience of their office, are botn to judge righteously, and by force and power of the sword given to them of God (Rom. xiii. 1—4) to execute the sentence; and so God hath commanded inferior judges to execute judgment, and hath forbidden them to wrest judgment, to take gifts, except the king command them so to do.

The king is by the grace of Grod, the inferior judge is judge by the grace of the kins; even as the man is the image of God, and the woman the man's image.^

Ans. 1. — This distinction is neither true in law nor conscience. Not in law, for it distinguisheth not betwixt ministros regis, et ministros regni. The servants of the kilig are his domestics, the judges are ministri regni, non regis; the ministers and judges of the kingdom, not of the king. The king doth not snow grace, as he is a man, in making such a man a judge; but justice as a kmg, by a royal power received from the people, and by an act of justice, he makes judges of deserving men; he should neither for fisivour nor bribes mskke any one judge in the land. 2. It is by the grace of Gfod that men are to be advanced from a private condition to be inferior judges, as royal dignity is a free gift of God; 1 Sam. ii. 7, " The Lord bringeth low and lifteth up;" Psal. Ixxv. 7, " God putteth dovm one and setteth up another." Court flatterers take from G<xi and give to Jdngs; but to be a judge inferior is no less an immediate favour of God than to be king, though the one be a greater favour than the other. Mcbgis honos and Majoc konos are to be considered.

Arg 9. — Those powers which differ gradually, and per magis et minus, by more and less only, differ not in nature and species, and constitute not kings and inferior judges different univocally. But the power of kmgs and inferior judges are such; therefore kmgs and inferior judges differ not univocally. That the powers are the same in nature, I prove, 1. by the specific acts and formal object of the'power of both; for both are powers ordamed of God. (Eom. xiii. 1.) To resist. either, is to resist the ordinance of God. 2. Both are by office a terror to evil workers, ver. 3. 3. Both are the ministers of God for good. Though the king send and give a caU to the inferior judge, that doth no more make the inferior judge's powers in nature and specie different than ministers of the Word, called by ministers of the Word, have offices different in nature. Timothy's office to be preacher of the Word differeth not in specie from the office of the presbytery which laid hands on him, though their office by extension be more than Timothy's office. The people's power is put

1 Symmon's Loyal Sobjccts* Belief, sect 1, p. 8.

forth in those same acts, when thej choose. one to be their king and sapreme governor, and when thej set up an aristocratical government, and choose many, or more than one, to be their governors; for the formal object of one or many governors is justice and religion, as thej are to be advanced. The form and manner of their operation is, hraehio secularly by a co*active power, and by the sword. The formal acts of king and many judges in aristocracy are these same, the defending of the poor and needy from violence, the conservation of a community in a peaceable and a godly h'fe. (1 Tim. ii. 2 ; Job xxixk 12, 13 ; l8a% i. 170 ^h^se same laws of God that regulateth me king in all his acts of royal government, and tyeth and obligeth his conscience, as the Lord's deputy, to execute judgment for Grod, and not m the stead of men, in God's court of heaven, doth in like manner tie> and oblige the conscience of aristocratical judges, and all inferior judges, as is clear and evident by these places, 1 Tim. ii. 2, not only kings, but all in authority udfnt Si U vn^x ^*^*9 ^^^ obliged to procure that their subjects lead a quiet and peaceable life, in all godliness and h(mesty AU in conscience are obliged (Deut* i. 16) to judge righteoivly between every man and his brother, and the stran^ ger that is with them% Neither are they k> respect persons in judgment, but are to heai: the small as well as the great, nor to be afraid of the face of men,^the judgment administered by all, is God's. (2 Chron. 3dx 6.) All are obliged to fear God, (Deut. xvii. 19, 20,) to keep the words of the law; not to be lifted up in heart above their brethren. (Isa. i. 17 ; Jer. xxii. 2, 3.) Let any man uiow me a difference, according to God's word, but in the extension, that wnat die king is to do as a king, in all the kingdom and whole dominions, (if God give to him many, as he save to David, ana Solo<^ mon, and Joshua^ that the inferior judges are to do in such and such circuits, and limited places, and Z quit the cause; so as the inferior judges ajre Ktde kings, and the king a great and delated judge, — ^as a compressed hand or fist, and the nand stretched out in fingers and thumb, are one hand; so herov 4. Gk>d owneth inferior judges as a congregation of gods; (Fsal. Ixxxii. 1, 2;) for that Grod sitteth in a congregation or senate of kings or m(uu'chs, J. meS. not believe till I see royalists show to me a commonwealth of monarchs convening in one

judicature. All aire equally called gods, (John X. 35; Exod. xxii. 8,) if for any cause, but because all judges, even inferior, are the immediate deputies of the King of kings, and their senteilee in judgment as the sentence of the Judge of ul £e earth, I shall be informed by the P. Prelate, when he shall answer my reasons, if his interdicted lordship may cast an eye to a poor presbyter below; and as wisdom is that by which kings reign, (Prov. viii. 15, so also ten 16,) by which princes rule, and nobles, even all the judges of the earth; all that is said against this is, that the king hath a prerogative royal, by which he is differenced from all judges in Israel, called jus regis fltOtS^Dj for, (saith Barclay,^) the king, as ^g, essentially hath a domination anapower above all, so as none can censure him, or punish him, but Grod, because there be no tnrones above his but the throne of Grod. The judges of Israel, as Samuel, Gideon, &c. had no domination,^— the dominion was in G^'s hand. *' We may resist an inferior judge, (saith Amissus,') otherwise there were no appeal from him, and the wrong we suffer were irreparable" as saith Marantius.' " And all the judges of the earth (saith Edward Symmons^) are from God more remotely; namely, mediante rege^ by the mediation of the Supreme, even as the lesser stars have their light from God by the mediation of the siin. To the first I answer:— There was a difference betwixt the kings of Israel and their judges, no question; but if it be an essential difference, it is a question. • For, 1. The judges were raised up in an extraordinary manner, out of any tribe, to defend the people, and vindicate their liberty, God remaining their king; the king, by the Lord's appointment, was tyed, e&er Saul, to the royal tribe of Judah, till the Messiah's coming. God took his own blessed liberty to set up a succession in the ten tribes% 2. . The judges were not by succession from father to son: the kings were, as I conceive, for the typical eternity of the Messiah's throne, presignified to stand from

1 Inferfotes Jndices sunt im{>roprie Yicarii Regis, quod missionem exteimam ad offlcittm, sed immediati Dei vicarii, quoad offidum in qnod missi sunt. Barclaius contr. Monaireh. 1. 2, p. 6^ §7.

> Marant. diip. 1, Zoatt. tract. 3> de defens. Mynsing, obs, 18, cent. 5,

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

generation to generation. 3. Whether the judges were appointed by the election of the people, or no, some doubt; because Jephthah was so niade. judffe: but I think it was not a law in Israel uiat it should be so. But the first mould of a king (Deut. xvii.) is bj election* But that Grod gave power of domineering, that is, of tyrannising, to a king, so as he cannot be resisted, which he gave not to a judge, I think no scripture can make good. For by what scripture can royalists warrant to us that the people might rise in arms to defend themselves against Moses, Gideon, Eli, Samuel, and oSier judges, if they should have tyrannised over the people; and that it is unlawful to resist the mot tyrannous king in Israel and Judah? Yet Barclay and others must say this, if they be true to that principle of tyranny, that the jus regis^ the law or manner of the king (1 Sam. viii. 9, 11 ; and 1 Sam. X. 25) doth essentially differ betwixt the kings of Israel and the judges of Israel. But we think Grod ffave never any power of tyranny to either judge or king of Israel; and domination in that sense was by Grod dven to none of them. Amisseus hath as uttle for him, to say the inferior magistrate may be resisted, because we may appeal &om him; but the king cannot be reosted, quia sanctUas majestatis id non permittitj the sanctity of royal majesty will not permit us to resist the king.

Ang, — That is not Paul's argument to prove it unlawful to resist kings, as kings, and doing their office, because of the sanctity of their majesty; that is, as the man intendeth, because of the supreme, absolute, and unlimited power that God hath given him. But this is a begging of the question, and all one as, to say, the king may not be resisted, because he may not be resisted; for sanctity of majesty, if we believe royalists, indudeth essentially an absolute supremacy of power, whereby they are above the reach of all thrones, laws, powers, or resistance on earth. But the argument is, resist not, because the power is of Grod. But the inferior magistrate's power is of God. Ilesist not, because you resist God's ordinance in resisting the judge; but the inferior judge is Grod's ordinance. (Bom. xiii. 1 ; Deut. i. 17 ; 2 Chron. xix. 6.) Mr Spnmons saith, ^' All judges on earth are mm the king, as stars have their Ught from the sun." I answer, 1. Then aristocracy were unlawful, for it hath not its power ^m monarchy. Had the lords of the Philistines, have the states of Holland, no power but from a monarchy? Name the monarch. Have the Venetians any power from a king? Indeed, our Prelate saith from Augustine, (Confess, lib. 3, cap. 8,) Generate pactum estsocietatis humanas, ohedire Regibus suisy it is an universal covenant of human society, and a dic^te of nature, that men obey their kings. " I beg the &vour of sectaries (saith he) to show as much for aristocracy and democracy." Now all other governments, to those bom at court, are the mventions of men. But I can show that same warrant for the one as for the other; because it is as well the dictate of nature that people obey their judges and rulers as it is that they obey their kings. And Augustine speaketh of all judges in that place, tnough he Aame kings; for kingly government is no more of the law of nature than aristocracy or democracy; nor are any bom iudges or subjects at all. There is a natural aptitude in all to- either of these, for the conservation of nature, and that is all. Let us see that men, naturally inclining to government, incline rather to royal government than to any other. That the r. Prelate shall not be able to show; for fatherly government, being in two, is not kingly, but nearer to aristocracy; and when many families were on earth, every one independent within themselves, if a common enemy should invade a tract of land governed by families, I conceive, by nature's Hght, they should incline to defend themselves, and to join in one politic body for their own safety, as is most natural. But, in that case they, having no king, and there were no reason of many fathers all alike loving their own families and self-preservation, wny one should be king over all, rather than another, except by voluntary compact. So it is clear that nature is nearer to aristocracy before this contract than a monarchy. And let him show us in multitudes of ^unilies dwelling together, before there was a king, as clear a warrant for monarchy as here is for aristocracy; though to me both be laudable and lawful ordinances of Gh)d, and the difference merely accidental, being one and the same power from the Lord, (Kom. xiii. 1,) which is in divers subjects; in one as a monarchy, in many as in aristocracy; and the one is as natural as the other, and the subjects are accidental to the nature of the power. 2. The stars have no light at all

but in actual aspect toward the sun; and they are not lightsome bodies by the free will of the sun, and have no immediate light from Crod formally) but from the siln; so as if there were no sun, there idiould be no stars. 3. Foi* actual shining and sending out of beams of light actu secundo, they depend upon the presence of the sun; but for mferior judges, though they have their call from the king, yet have they gifts to govern from no king on earth, but only from the King of kings. 4. When the king is dead, the judges are judges, and they depend not on the king for their second acts of judging; and for the actual emission and puttmg forth their beams and rays of justice upon the poor and needy, they depend on no voluntary aspect, information or commandment of the Eing, but on that immediate subjection of their conscience to the King of kings. And their judgment which they execute is the Lord's immediately, and not the king's; and so the comparison halteth*

Arg^ 10. — If the king dying, the judges inferior remain powers from God, the deputies of the Lord of Hosts, having their powei^ from GM, then are they essentially judges; yea, and if the estates, in their prime representators and leaders, have power in the death of the king to choose and make another king, then are they not judges and rulers by derivation and participation, or improperly; but the king is rather the ruler by deritation and participation than those who are called inferior judges. Now, if these judges depend in their sentences upon the immediate will of him who is supposed to be. the only judge, when this only judge dieth, they should cease to be judges: for Etopirante mandatore exmrat mandatum; be* cause the fountain-judge drying up, the streams must dry up. Now, when Saul died, the princes of the tribes remain by God's institution princes, and they by God's law and warrant (Deut. xvii.) choose David their king.

Arg, 11 .--^K the king, through absolute power, do not send inferior judges, and constitute them, but only by a power from the people; and if the Lord have no less immediate influence in making inferior judges than in making kings, men there is no ground that the king should be sole judge, and the inferior judge only judge by derivation from him, and essentially nis deputy, and not the immediate deputy of God. If the former is true, therefore, so is the latter And, 1. That the king's absolute will maketh not inferior judges, is clear, from Deut. i. 15. Moses might not follow his own will in making inferior judges whom he pleased: God tyed him to a law, (ver. 13,) that he should take wise, men, known amongst the people, and fearing Gk)d, and hating covetousness. And these qualifica-' tions were not from Moses, but from Grod; and no less immediately from God than the inward qualification of a king (Deut. xvii.) ; and therefore, it is not G^d s law that the king may make inferior judges only, Durante beneplacito^ during his absolute will; for if these divine qualifications remain in the seventy elders, Moses, at his will, could not remove them from their places. 2. That the king can make heritable judges more than he can communicate faculties and parts of' judging, I doubt. Riches are of fathers, but not promotion, which is from God, and neither from the east nor the west: that our nobles are bom lords of parliament, and judges by blood, is a positive law. 3. It seemeth to me, from Isa. iii. 1—4, that the inferior judge is made by consent of the people; nor can it be called a wronging of the king, that all cities and burghs of Scotland and England have power to %oose their own provosts, rulers, and mayors. 4. If it be warranted by God, that the lawful call of God to the throne be the election of the people, the call of inferior judges must also be from the people, mediately or immediately. So I see no ground to say, that the inferior judge is the king's vicegerent, or that he is in respect of the king, or in relation to supreme authority, only a private man.

Arg, 12. These judges cannot but be univoodly and essentiaUy judges no less than the king, without which in a kingdom justice IS physically impossible; and anarchy, and violence, and confusion, must follow, if they be wanting in the kingdom. But without inferior judges, though there be a king, justice is physically impossible; and anarchy and confiision, &c. must follow.

Now this argument is more considerable, that without inferior judges, though there be a king in a kingdom, justice and safety are impossible ; and if there be inferior judges, though there be no king, as in aristocracy, and when the king is dead, and another not crowned, or the king is minor, or absent, or a captive in the enemy's land, yet justice is possible, and the kingdom

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

preserved; the medium of the argument is grounded upon God's word, Num. xi. 14, 15, when Moses is unable alone to judge the people, seventy elders are joined with him (ver. 16, 17) ; so were the elders adjoined to help him (£xod. xxiv. 1 ; Deut. V. 23 ; xxii. 16 ; Josh, xxiii. 2 ; Judg. viii. 14 ; xi. 5, 11 ; 1 Sam. xi. 3 ; 1 Kings xx. 7; 2 Kings vi. 32; 2 Chron. xxxiv. 29; Ruth iv. 4; Deut. xix. 12; Ezek. viii. 1 ; Lam. i. 19); then were the elders of Moab thought to nave a king. . The natural ^nd of judges hath been mdigence and weakness, because men could not in a society defend themselves irom violence; therefore, by the light of nature they gave their power to one or more, and made a judge or judges to obtain the end of self-preservation. But nature useth the most efficacious means to obtain its end; but in a great society and kingdom, the end is more easily attained by many governors than by one only; for where there is but one, he cannot minister justice to all; and the farther that the children are removed from their father and tutor, they are the nearer to violence and injustice. Justice should be at as easy a rate to the poor as a draught of water. Samuel went yearly through the land to Bethel, Gilgal, Mizpeh, (1 Sam. vii. 16,) and brought justice to the doors of the poor. So were our kings of Scotland obliged to do of old; but now justice is as dear as gold. It is not a good argument to prove mferior judges to be only vicars and deputies of the xing, because the king may censure and punish them when they pervert judgment. 1. Because the king, in that punisheth them not as judges, out as men. 2. That might prove all the subjects to be vicars and deputies of the king, because he can punish them all, iu the case of their breach of laws.

QUESTION XXI,

WHAT POWER TEDE PEOPLE AND STATES OP PARLIAMENT HAVE OVER THE KING, AJ^D IN THE STATE.

It is true the king is the head of the kingdom; but the states of the kingdom are as the temples of the head, and so, as 'essentially parts of the head as the king is the crown of the head.^

^ Principes sunt capitis tempon^ rex vertex.

Assert. 1. — These ordines regni, the states, have been in famous nations: so there were fathers of &milies, and princes of tribes amongst the Jews: the Ephori amongst the Lacedemonians, (Folyb. hist. 1. 6 ;) the senate amongst the Bomans; the forum superhiense amongst the Arragonians; the parliaments in Scotland, England, France, Spain. Abner commun^ with the elders of Israel to bring the king home; (2 Sam. iii. 17 ;) and mere were elders in Israel, both in the time of the judges, and in tiie time of the kings, who did not only give advice and counsd to the

i'udges and kmgs, but also were judges no ess than the kings and judges, which I shall make good by these places: Deut. xxi. 19, the rebellious son is brought to the elders of the city, who had power of life and death, and caused to stone him; Deut. xxii. 18, " The elders of the city shall take that man and chastise him;" Josh. xx. 4, but beside the elders of every city, there were the elders of Israel and the princes, who had also judicial power of life and death, as the judges and king had; Josh. xxii. 30, even when J'oshua was judge in Israel, the princes of the congregation and heads of the thousands of Israel did judicially cognosce whether the children of Eeuben, of (SaA, and of half the tribe of Manasseh, were apostates irom Grod, and the religion of Israel; 2 Sam. v. 3, all the elders of Israel made David king at Hebron; and Num. xii., they are appointed by God not to be the advisers only and helpers of Moses; but (ver. 14-^-17) to bear a part of the burden of ruling and governing the people, that Moses might be eased. Jetremiah is accused, (xxvi. lO,) upon his life, before the princes; Josh. vii. 4, the princes sit in judgment with Joshua; Josh. ix. 15, Joshua and the princes of the congregation sware to the Gibeonites that they would not kill them. The princes of the house of Israel could not be rebuked for oppression in judgment (Mic. iii. 1-^3) if they had not had power of judgment. So (Zeph. iii. 3 ; Deut. i. 17 ; 2 CSron. xix. 6, 7) they are expressly made judges in the place of God; and (1 Sam. viii. 2) without advice or knowledge of Samuel, the supreme judge, they convene and ask a king; and without any head or superior, when there is no king, they convene a parliament, and made David king at Hebron; and when David is banished, they convene to bring him home again; when tyrannous Athalia reigneth, they con-

LBX, rex; or,

yene and make Joash king, and that without any king; and (Josh, xxii.) there is a parliament convened, and, for any thing we con x^sA, without Joshua, to take cognisance of a new altar. It had been good that the parliaments both of Scotland and of £ngumd had convened, though the king had not indicted and summoned a parliament, without the king, to take order with the wicked clergy, who had made many idolatrous^altars; and the P. Prelate should have brought an argument to prove it unlawful, in foro Dei, to set up the tables and conventions in our kingdom, when the prelates Were bringing in the grossest idolatory into the church — a service for adoring of altars, of bread, the work of the hand of the baker — a god more corruptible than any god of silver and gold.

And against Achab's will and mind, (1 Kings xviii. 19,) Elias causeth to kill the

Jmests of Baal, according to God's express aw. It is true it was extraordinary; but no otherwise extraordinary than it is at this day. When the supreme madstrate will not execute the judgment of the Xord, thosQ who.made hiin supreme magistrate, under God, who have, under Grod, sovereign liberty to dispose of crowns and kin^oms, are to execute the judgment of the Lord, when wicked men make thb law of God of none effect. 1 Sam. xv. 32, so Samuel killed Agag, whom the Lord expressly commanded to be killed) because Saul disobeyed the voice of the Lo^l. I deny not but there is necessity of a clear warrant that the magistrate neglect his duty, either in not c<mv'ening the states, or not executing the judgment of the Lord. I s^e not how the convening of a parliament is extraordinary to the states; tor none hath power ordinary when the king is dead, or when he is distracted, or captive in another land, to convene the estates and parliament, but they only; and in their defect, by the law of nature, the people may convene. But, if they be essentially judges no less than the king, as. I have demonstrated to the impartial reader, in the former chapter, I conceive, though the state make a positive law, for order's cause, that the king ordinarily convene parliaments; yet, if we dispute the matter m the court of conscience, the estates have intrinsically (becatise they |u?e the estates, and essentially judges of the land) ordinary power to convene themselves. Because, when Moses, by Grod's rule, hath appointed

seventy men to be catholio judges in the land, Moses, upon his sole pleasure and will, hath not power to restrain them in the exercise of ji}dgment given them of God; for, as God hath given to any one judge power to judge righteous judgment, though the king command the contrary, so hath he given to him power to sit down in the gat^ or the bench, when and where the necessity of the oppressed people calleth for it. For the express commandment of God, which saith to all judges, execute judgment in the morning, involveth essenlaaUv a precept to all the physical actions, without which H is impossible to execute judgment; — as, namely, if, by a divine precept, the judge must execute judgment; therdfore he must come to some public place, and he must cause party and witnesses come before him, and he must consider, cognosce, examine, in the place of judgment, things, peraons, circumstances: and so God, who commandeth positive acts of judging, commandeth the judge's loco* motive power, and his natural actions of compelling, by the sword, the parties to come before him, even as Christ, who commandeth his servants to preach, commandeth that the preacher and the people go to church, and that he stand mr sit in a place where all may hear, and that he give liimself to reading and meditating before he come to preach. And if God command one judge to come to the place of judgment, so doth he command seventy, and so all estates to convene in the place of judgment. It is objected, '' That the estates are not judges, ordinary and habitually, but only judges at some certain occasions, when the king, for cogent and weighty causes, calleth them, and c^eth them not to judge, but to give him advice and counsel how to judge."

Ara, 1. — -They are no less judges hs^itually tnan the king, when the common affairs of the whole kmgdom necessitateth these public watchmen to come together; for even the king judgeth not actuaSy, but upon occasion. This is to beg the question, to say that the estates are not judges but when the king calleth them at such and such occasions; for the elders, princes, and heads of fiunilies and tribes,' were judges ordinary, because they made the king.

Ara.2. — The kingdom, by Gk)d, yea, and church, justice and religion, so far as they' concern the whole kingdom, are committed not to the keeping of the Ising cmly, but to all the judges, emers, apd princes of the

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE,

land: and they are rebuked as evening wolves, lioHB, oppressors, (£zek. xxii. 27 ; Zee. ill. 3 ; Isa. liL 14, 15 ; Mic. iii, 1—3,) when they oppress the people in judgment, so are they (Deut. i. 16-— 17 ; 9 Chron. xix, 6, 7) niade judges, and therefore they are no more to be restrained not to convene by the king's power, (which is in this accumulative and auxiliary, not privative,) than they can be restrained in judgment, and in pronouncing such a sentence, as the king pleased, and not such a sentence; because, as they are to answer to Grod.ibp unjust sentences, so also for no just sentences, and for not convening to judge, when rehgion and justice, whicn are falkn in the struts, calleui for them.

Arg, 3. — As Grodin a law of nature hath given to every man the keeping and selfpreservation of himself and of Qs brother, Cain ought in his place to be the keeper of Abel his brother; so hath God conmiitted the keeping of the commonwealth, by a posi-> tive law, not to the king alone, because that is imposaable.* (Num xi, 14, 17 ; 2 Chron. xix. 1 — 6 ; 1 Qiron. xxvii,)

Arg, 4. — If the king had such a power as king, and so from wd, he should have power to break up the meeting of all courts of parliament, secret councils, and all inferior judicatures; and when the congregation of gods, as Psd, Ixxxii., in the midst of which the Lord standeth, were about to pronounce just judgment for the oppressed and poor, they might be hindered by the kins ^ and so they should be as lust as the king maketh them, and might pel^ert judgment, and take awar the rigWusn^s of the righteous from him, (Isa, v, 23,) because tne king commandeth; and the cause of the poor should not come before the judge, when the king so commandeth. And ahaU it excuse the estates, to say, we could not judge the cause of the poor, nor crush the priests of Baal, and the idolatrous mass-prelates, because the king forbade us? So might the king break up the meeting of the lords of session, when they were to decern that Naboth's vineyard should be restored to him, and hinder the states to repress tyranny; and this were as much as if the states should say, We made this mqn our king, and with our good-wiU we a^e he shall be a tyrant. For if God gave S to

^ Jnnias Brat* q. 2, p. 51, tlnd. contr. Tyran.

him as a king, we are to consent that- he enjov it,

Arg, 5. — If Barclay and other flatterers have leave to make the parliament but counsellors and advisers of the king, and the king to be the only and sole judge, the king is, by that same reason, the sole judge, in relation to all judges; the contrary whereof is dear. (Num, xi. 16 ; Deut, i. 16 — 17; Chron, xix. 8; Rom, xiii, 1, 2; 1 Pet, ii. 13, 14.) Yea, but (say they) the king, when he sendeth an ambassador, he may tie him to a written commission; and in so far as he exceedeth that ^ he is not an ambassador; and dear it is, that all inferior judges ^1 Pet. ii, 13, 14) are but sent by the kmg; therefore, they are so judges as they are but messengers, and are to adhere to uie royal pleasure of the prince that sent them, A'os, (l.)-*-The amoassa* dor is not to accept an unjust ambassage, that flghteth with the law of nature, (2.) The ambassador and the judge differ, the ambassador is the king and states' deputy, both in his call to the ambassy, and also in the matter of the ambassy; for which cause he is not to transgress what is given to him in writ as a rule; but the inferior judges, and the high court of pariiainent, though they were the king's deputies, (as the parliament is in no sort his deputy, but he tneir deputy royal) yet it is only in respect of their call, not in respect of the matter of their commission, for the king may send the judge to judge in gener^ according to the law, justice, and religion, but he cannot depute the sentence, and command the consdence of the judge to pronounce such a sentence, not such. The inferior judge in the act of judging is as independent, and his consdence as immediately subject to God as the king; therefore, the king owes to every sentence his approbative suffrage as king, but not either his directive suffrage, or lus imper^^tive suffrage of absolute pleasure,

Arg, 6. — If the king should sell his country, and bring in a foreign army, the estates are to convene, to take course ifor the safety of the kingdom.

Arg. 7. — If Savid exhort the princes of Israel to help king Solomon in governing the kingdom, and in building the temple (2 Chron. x3^xii,3);-^ifHezekiah took counsel with his princes, and his mighty men in the matter of holding off the Assyrians, who were to invade the land: if David (1 Chron.

LEX) REX ; OB,

xiii. 1 — 4) oonsult with the captains of thousands and hundreds, to bring tne ark of God to Kirjath-jearim: if Solomon (1 EJngs viii. 1) " assemble the elders of Israel, and all the heads of the tribes, and the chief of the fathers, to bring the ark of the tabernacle to the congregation of the Lord:" if Achab gathered together the states of Israel, in a matter that nearly concerned religion: if the elders and people (1 Kings XX. 8) counsel and decree tnat king Achab should hearken to Ben-hadad king of Syria, and if Ahasuerus make no decrees, but with consent of his princes, (Esth, i. 21,) nor Darius any act without his nobles and princes: if Hamor and Shechem (Gen. xxxiv. 20) would not make a covenant with Jacob's sons, without the consent of the men of the city, and Ephron the Hittite would not sell Abraham a burial place in his land without the cdnsent of the children of Heth (Gren. xxiii. 10) : — then must the estates have a power oi judging with the king or prince m matters or religion, justice, and

fovemment, which concern the whole kingom. But the former is true by the records of Scripture; therefore, so is the latter.

Arg. 8. — The men of Ephraim complain that Jephthah had gone to war against the children of Ammon without them, and hence rose war betwixt the men of Ephraim and the men of Gilead, (Judges xii. 1 — 3,) and the men of Israel fiercely contended with the men of Judah, because they brought king David home again without them, pleading that they were uierein despised, (2. Sam^ xix. 41 — 43,) which evinceth that the whole states have hand in matters of public government, that concern all the kingdom; and when there is no king, (Judg. xx.) the chief of the people, and ot all the tribes, go out in battle agaiast the children of Benjamin.

Arg. 9. — Those who make the king, and so have power to unmake him in the case of tyranny, must be above the king in power of government; but the elders and princes made both David and Saul kings.

Arg 10. — There is not any who say that the princes and people, (1 Sam. xiv.) did not right in rescuing innocent Jonathan from death, against the king's will and his law.

Arg. 11. — The special ground of royalists is, to make the king the absolute supreme, giving all life and power to the parliament and states, and of mere grace convening

them. So saith Feme, the author of Ossorianum, (p. 69,) but this ground is Mse, because me king's power is fiduciary, and put in his hand upon trust, and must be ministerial, and borrowed fix)m those who ut him in trust, and so his power must be ess, and derived firom the parliament. But the parliament hath no power in trust from the King, because the time was when the man who is the king had no power, and the parliament had the same power that they now have; and now, when the king hath received power firom them, they nave the whole power that they had before — that is, to make laws; and resigned no power to the king, but to execute laws; and ms convening of uiem is an act of royal duty, which he oweth to the parliament by virtue of his office, and is not an act of grace; for an act of grace is an sact of free wiS; and what the king doth of &ee will, he may not do, and so he may never convene a parliament. But, when David, Solomon, Asa, Hezekiah, Jehoshaphat, Ahaz, convened parliaments, they convened parliaments as kmss, and so ex debito et virtute ofidi^ out oi debt and royal obligation, and If the king as the king, be lex ammata, a breathing and living law, the king, as king, must do by obligation of law what he doth as king, and not from i^ontaneous and arbitrary grace. If the Scripture holds forth to us a king in Israel, and two princes and -elders who made the king, and had power of life and death, as we have seen; then is there in Israel monarchy tempered with aristocracy; and if there were elders and rulers in every city, as the Scripture saith, here was also aristocracy and oemocracy; and for the warrant of the power of the estates, I appeal to jurists, and to approved authors: Arg L aliud, 160, sect. 1 ; De Jur, Beg^ I, 22 ; Mortuo de fidd. L 11, 14, ad Mum, L 3, 1, 4 ; Sigemus De Bep. Judceor. l. 6, c. 7; Comelitis Bertramo, c. 12/ Junius Brutus, Vindk. contra, Tyran. sect, 2; Author Libelli de jur Magistral, in suhd. q, 6; Althus, Politic, c, 18; Calvin Institut, I, 4, c, 20 ; Pareus Coment. in Bom. xiii. ; Pet, Martyr in Lib, Judic. c, 3; Joan Marianus de rege lib. 1, c. 7 ; Hottoman de jure Antiq, Megni Gallici I, 1, c. 12; Buchanan de jure Begni a/pud Scotos.

Obj. — The king after a more noble way representeth the people than the estates doth; for the princes and commissioners of parliament have all their power from the

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

people, and the people's power is concentrated in the king.

An8. — The estates taken collectively do represent the people both in respect of office, and of persons, because they stand judges for them; for many represent many, ratione numeri et oficiiy better than one doth. The king doth improperly represent the people, though the power tor actual execution of laws he more in the king, yet a legislative power is more in the estates. Neither will it follow, that if the estates of a kingdom do any thing but counsel a king, they must then command him, for a legal and judicial advice hath influence in the effect to make it a law, not on the king's will, to cause him give the being of a law to that, which without his will is no law, for this supposeth that he is only judge.

Obj, — ^What power the people reserveth, they reserve it to themselves in unitate, as united in a parliament; and therefore what they do out of a parliament is tumultuous.

Ans. — I deny the consequence; they reserve the power of self-preservation out of a parliament, and a power of convening in parliament for that effect, that they may by common counsel defend themselves.

QUESTION XXII.

Dr Feme (sect. 3, p. 12) showeth us it was never his purpose to plead for absoluteness of an arbitrary commandment, free from all moral restraint laid on the power by God's law; but only he striveth for a power in the king that cannot be resisted by the subject. But truly we never disputed with royalists of any absolute power in the king, free from moral subjection to Grod's law. 1, Because any bond that God's law imposeth on the king, cometh wholly from God, and the nature of a divine law, and not from any voluntary contract or covenant, either express or tacitOf betwixt the king and the people who made him king; tor, if he fail against such a covenant, though he should exceed the cruelty of a king or a man, and become a lion, a iTero, and a mother-killer,

he should in all his inhumanity and breach of covenant be accountable to God, not to any man on earth. 2. To dispute with royalists if Grod's law lay any moral restraint upon the king, were to dispute whi?ther the kmg be a rational man or no, and whether he can sin agamst Grod, and shall cry in the day of God's wrath, (if he be a wicked prince) Hills fall on us and cover us, as it is Rev. vi. 15, 16 ; and whether Tophet be prepared for all workers of iniquity; and certainly I justify the schoolmen in that question: Whether or no God could have created a rational creature, such a one as by nature is impeccable, and not naturally capable of sin before Grod? If royalists dispute this question of their absolute monarch, they are wicked divines.

We plead not at this time, (saith the Prelate, c. 14, p. 163, stealing from Grotius, Barclay, Arnisfieus, who spake it with more sinews of reason;) for a masterly or despotical, or rather for a slavish sovereignty, which is dominium Iierile, an absolute power, such as the great Turk this day exerciseth over his subiects, and the king of Spain hath over and m his territories without Europe: we maintain only regiam potestatem, quce fundatur in paternal such royal, fatherly sovereignty, as we live under, blessed be Grod, and our predecessors. This, (saith he,) as it hath its royal prerogative inherent to the crown naturally, and inseparable irom it, so it trencheth not upon the liberty of the person, or the property of the goods of the subject, but in and by the lawml and just acts of jurisdiction.

Ans. — 1. Here is another absolute power disclaimed to be in the king; he hatn not such a masterly and absolute liberty as the Turk hath. Why? John P. P., in such a tender and high point as concemeth soul and body of subjects in three Christian kingdoms, you should have taught us. What bonds and fetters any covenant or paction betwixt the king and people layeth upon the king, — ^whyhe hath not, as king, the power of the great Turk, I will tell you. The great Turk may command any of his subjects to leap into a mountain of iire, and bum himself quick, in conscience of obedience to his law. And what if the sulnect disobey the great Turk? if the great Turk be a lawful prince, as you will not deny; — and if the King of Spain should command foreign conquered slaves to do the like. By your doctrine, neither the one nor the other

were obliged to resist by violence, but to pray, or ny; which both were to speak to stones/ and were like the man who, in case of shipvn:eck, made his devotion of praying to the waves of the sea, not to enter the place of his bed and drown him. But a Christian king hath not this power; why? and a Christian king (by royaust's doctrine) hath a greater power tluui the Turk (if greater can be) : he hath power to command his subjects to cast themselves into hell-fire; that ^is, to press on them a service wherein it is written,— Adore the work of men's hands in the place of the living Grod; and this is worse than the Turk's commandment of bodily burning quicks And what is left to the Christian subjects in this case is the very same, and no other than is left to the Turkish and foreign Spanish subjects Either fly, or make prayers. There is no more left to us.

2k Many royalists maintain that England is a conquered nation^ Why, theU) see what power^ by law of conquest^ the king of Spain hath over his slaves ; the same must the king of England have over his subjects. For, to royalists, a title by conquest to a crown is as lawful as a title by birth or election \ for lawftdness, in relation to Gk^d's law> is placed in an indiviable point, if we regard the essence of lawftdness ; and therefore there is nothing left to England, but that all protestants who take the oath of a protestant king^ to defend the true protestant religion, should, after prayers conveyed to the king through the fingers of prelates and papists, leave the kmgdom mpty to papists, prelates, and atheists^

3. AU power restrained that it cannot

arise firom ten degrees to fourteen, — fix)m

the kingly power of Saul {1 Sam. viil. 9,

11) to the kuigly power of tnd great Turk,

to fourteen,-*-must either be restrained by

God's law, or by man's law, or by the innate goodness and grace of the prince, or

by the providence of God. A restraint from

God's law is vain ; for it is no question between us and royalists but God hath laid a

moral restraint on kings, and all men, that

they have not moral power to sin against

God Is the restraint laid on by man's

law ? What law of man ? The royalist saith,

the king, as king, is above all law of man.

Then (say I) no law of man can hinder

the king's power of ten, to arise to the Turkish power of fourteen. All law of man, as

it is man's law, is seconded either with ecclesiastic^ and spiritual co-action, such as excommunication, or with civil and temporal Co-4otion, such as is the sword, if it be violated. But royalists deny that either the sword of the church in excommunication, or the civil sword, should be drawn against the king. This law of man should be produced by this profound jurist, the P. Prelate, who mocketh at all the statists and lawyers of Scotland. It is not a covenant betwixt the king and people at his coronation; for though there were any such covenant, yet the breach of it doth bind before Grod, but not before man* Nor can I see, or any man else, how a law of man can lay a restraint on the king's power of two degreeS) to cancel it withm a law, more than on a power of ten or fourteen degrees. If the king of Spain, the lawful sovereign of those over-European people, (as royalists say,) have a power of ibuiiieen degrees over those conquered subjects, as a kmg, I see not how he hath not the Hke power over his own subjects of Spain, to wit, even of fourteen; for what agreeth to a king, as a king, (and kingly power firom Grod ne hath as king,) he hath it in relation to all subjects, except it be taken ft'om him in relation to some subjects, and given by some law of God^ or m relation to some other subjects. Now no man can produce any such law. The nature of the goodness and grace of the prince cannot lay bonds on the king to cancel his power, that be should not usurp the power of the king of Spain toward his over^EuropeanSk 1. RoyaHsts plead for a power due to the king, as king, and that from Grod, such as Sam had; (1 Sam. viii. 9, 11 1 X. 25 ;) but this power should be a power of grace and goodness in the king as a good man; not in the king as a king, and due to him by law: and so the king should have his legal power from Grod to be a tyrant. But ii he were not a tyrant, but should lay limits on his own power, through the goodness of his own nature, no thanks to royalists that he is not a tyrant; for, actu primo^ and as he is a king, (as they say) he is a tyrant, having from Grod a tyrannous power of ten degrees, as Saul had; (1 Sam. viii. ;) and why not of fourteen degrees as well as the great Turk, or the king of Spain? If he use it not, it is his own personal goodness, not his official and royal power. The restraint of providence laid by God upon any power to do ill, hindereth only the exercise of the power

not to break forth in aa tyrannous acts as ever the king of Spain or the great Turk can exercise toward any. Yea, providence lajeth physical restraint, and possibly moral, sometimes, upon the exercise of that power that devils and the most wicked men of the world hath. But royalists must show us that providence hath laid bounds on the king's power, and made it &therly and not masterfy; so that if it, the power, exceed bounds of fatherly power, and pass over to the despotical and masterly power, it may be resisted by the subjects; but that they will not say.

4. This paternal and fatherly power that God hath given to kings, as royalists teach, trencheth not upon the liberty of the subjects and the property of their eoods, but in and by lawM and just acts of jurisdiction (saith the P. Prelate). W^U ; then it may trench upon the hberty of soul and body of the subjects but in and by lawful and just acts of jurisdiction. But none are to judge of these acts of jurisdiction, whether they be just or not just, but the king, the only judge of supreme and absolute authority and power. And if the king command the idolatrous service in the obtruded servicebook, it is a lawM and a iust act of jurisdiction. For to royalists, who make the kind's power absolute, all acts are so just to the subject, though he command idolatry and Mahommedanism, that we are to suffer only, and not to resist.

5. The Prelate presumeth that&therly power is absolute ; but so, if a father murder his child, he is not accountable to the magistrate therefor, but, being absolute over his children, only the Judge of the world, not any power on earth, can punish him.

6. We have proved that the king's power is paternal or fatherly only by analogy, and improperly.

7. What is this prerogative royal, we shall hear by and by.

8. There is no restraint on earth laid upon this fatherly power of the king but God's law, which is a moral restraint. If then, the king challenge as great a power as the Turk hath, he only sinneth against Grod, but no mortal man on earth may control him, as royalists teach. And who can know wbttt power it is that royalists plead for, whether a despotical power of loraly power, or a fatherly power ? If it be a power above law, such as none on earth may resist it, it is no matter whether it be above law of two

degrees, or of twenty, even to the great Turk's power.

These go for oracles at court: Tacitus, — Principi gummun rerum arbitrium Dii dederunty subditis obsequii gloria relicta est; Seneca, — Indigna digna habenda sunt^ Rex quafadt; Salust, — Impune quidvis facerey Id esty Hegem esse. As if to be a king and to be a god who cannot err were all one. But certainly these authors are taxing the Hcense of kings, and not commanding their power.

But that God hath given no absolute and unlimited power to a king above the law, is evident by this : —

Arg. 1. — He who, in his first institution, is appointed of Grod by office, even when he sitteth on the throne, to take heed to read on a written copy of God's law, that he may " learn to fear the Lord his Gk)d, and keep all the words of this law," &c., he is not of absolute power above law. But (Deut. xvii. 18, 19) the kii^ as kins, while he sitteth on the throne, is to do uiis; therefore the assumption is clear, for this is the law of the king as king, and not of a man as a man. But as he sitteth on the throne, he is to read on the book of the law; and (ver. 20) because he is king) " his heui^ is not to be lifted up above his brethren;" and as king, (ver. 16,) ^*he is not to multiply horses," &c. So politicians make this argument good: — they say, Bex est lex vtva, animata^ et loquens lex^ the king as king, is a livingi breathing, and speaking law. And there be three reasons of this, — 1. If all were innocent persons, and could do no violence one to another, the law would rule all, and all men would put the law in execution^ Cigendo sponte^ by doing right of their own accord; and there should be no need of a king to compel men to do right. But now, because men are by nature averse to good laws, therefore there was need of a ruler, who, by office, should reduce the law into practice; and so is the king the law reduced in practice. 2. The law is ratio sive menSy the reason or mind, free from all perturbations of anger, lust, hatred, and cannot be tempted to iU; and the king, as a man, may be tempted by his own passions, and therefore, as lung, he cometh by office out of himself to reason and law; and so much as he hath of law, so much of a king; and in his remotest distance from law and reason he is a tyrant. 3. Abstra,cta eon." cretis sunt puriora et perfectiora. Justice

is more perfect than a just man, whiteness more perfect than the white wall; so the nearer the king comes to a law, for the which he is a king, the nearer to a king, Propter quod unumqit6dq%te tale, id ipsum magis tale. Therefore, kings throwing laws to themselves as men, whereas they should have conformed themselves to the law^ have erred. Cambyses, the son of Cyrus, because he loved his own sister, would have " the marriage of the brother with the sister lawful." Anaxarchus said to Alexander, (grieved in mind that he had killed Glytus,) Megi ac Joti themin atqvie institiam cissidere: — Judgment and righteousness did alway accompany Grod and the king in all they do; but some, to this purpose, say better: — The law, rather than the king, hath power of life and death.

Arg. 2. — The power that the king hath (I speak not of his gifts) he hath it from the people who maketh him king, as I proved before; but the people have neither formally nor virtually any power absolute to give the king. All the power they have is a legal and natural power to guide themselves in peace and godliness, and save themselves from unjust violence by the benefit of rulers. Now, an absolute power above a law is a power to do ill and to destroy the people, and this the people have not themselves, it being repugnant to nature that any should have a natund power in themselves to destroy themselves, or to inflict upon themselves an evil of punishment to destruction. Though therefore it were given, which yet is not granted, that the people had resigned all power that they have into their king, yet if ne use a tyrannical power against the people for their hurt and destruction, he useth a power that the peojple never gave him, and against the intention of nature; for they invested a man with power to be their father and defender for their good; and he faileth against the people's intention in usurping an over-power to himself, which they never gave, never had, never could give; for they cannot give what they never nad, and power to destroy themselves they never had.

Arg. 3. — All royal power, whereby a king IS a king and differenced from a private man, armed with no power of the sword, is from Grod. But absolute power to tyrannise over the people and to destroy them is not a power from Grod; therefore there is not any such royal power absolute.

The proposition is evident, because that God who maketh kings and disposeth of crowns, (Prov. viii. 15, 16 ; 2 Sam. xii. 7 ; Dan. iv. 32,) must also create and give that royal and official power by which a king is a king. 1. Because Grod created man, he must be the author of his reasonable soul. If Grod be the aulJior of things, he must be the author of their forms by which they are that which they are. 2. All power is God's, (1 Chron. xxix. 11 ; Matt. vi 13 ; Psal. Ixii. 11 ; Ixviii. 35 ; Dan. ii. 37)) and that absolute power to tyrannise, is not from God. 1. Because, if this moral power to sin be from Grod, it being formally wickedness, Grod must be the author of sin* 2. Whatever moral power is from Grod, the exercises of that power, and the acts thereof, must be from God, and so these acts must be morally good and just; for if the moral power be of God, as the author, so must the acts be. Now, the acts of a tyrannical power are acts of sinful injustice and oppression, and cannot be from Grod. 3. Politicians say, there is no power in rulers to do ill, but to help and defend the people, — as the power of a physician to destroy, of a pilot to cast away the ship on the rock, the power of a tutor to waste the inheritance of the orphan, and the power of father and mother to kill their children, and of the mighty to defraud and oppress, are not powers from Grod. S6 Ferdinand, Vasquez illustr. quest, l.l, c. 26, c. 45; Prickman d, c. 3, sect, Soluta potestas; Althus, pol. cap. 9, n. 25.

BarclaiuB,! Grotius, Dr Feme, (The P. Prelate's wit could come up to it,) say, " That absolute power to do ill, so as no mortal man can lawfiilly resist it, is &om Grod; and the king hath this way power from God as no subject can resist it, but he must resist the ordjnance of God, and yet the power of tyranny is not simply from God."

Ana. — The law saith, Ulud possumus quod jure possumus, Pa/pinus F, Jllius, D, de cond. Just, It is no power which is not lawful power. The royalists say, power of tyranny, in so far as it may be resisted, and is punishable by men, is not from Grod. But what is the other part of the distinction? It must be, that tyrannical power is simpliciter from God, or in itself it is from God; bift afi it is punishable or restrainable by subjects, it is not from Grod. Now, to be puniimable

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

by subjects is but an sccident, and tyrannical power is tbe subject; yea, and it is a separ* able accident; for many tyrants are never punished, and their power is never restrained: such a tyrant was Saul, and many persecuting emperors. Now, if the tyrannical power itself was from God, the argument is yet valid, and remaineth unanswered. And shall not this fall to the ground as &lse, which Amisseus saith, (de autho, princ, c. 2, n, 10,) Dum contra qfidum facit, magistratus non est magiiftratuSy quippe a quo non injuria^ sed jus noLSci debeaty L meminerinU 6. (7. unde vi. dtn, in C, quod quis, 24, n. 4, 6. — Et de hoc neminem dubitare aut dissentire scribity Marant. disp. 1, num, 14. When the magistrate doth anything by violence, and without law, in so far doing against his office, he is not a magistrate. Then, say I, that power bv which he doth, is not of God. None doth, then, resist the ordinance of God who resist the king in tyrannous acts. If the power, as it cannot be punished by the subject nor restrained, be from God, therefore the tyrannical power itself, and without this accident — ^that it can be punished by men — it must be from God also. But the conclusion is absurd, and denied by royalists. I prove the connection: If the king have sucn a power above all restraint, the power itself, to wit, king David's power to kill innocent Uriah, and deflower Bathsheba, without the accident of being restrained or punished by men, it is either from God or not from God. If it be from God, it must be a power against the sixth and seventh commandments, which God gave to David, and not to any subject; and so David lied when he confessed this sin, and this sin cannot be pardoned because it was no sin: and kinas, necause kings, are under no tie of duties of mercy, and truth, and justice to their subjects, contrary to that which God's law requireth of alljudges (Deut. i. 16—17; xvii. 16—20 ; 2 Chron. xix. 6, 7 ; Bom. xiii. 3, 4) : if this power be from God, as it is unrestrmable and unpunishable by the subject^ it is not from God at all; for how can God give a power to do ill, that is unpunishable by men, and not give that power to do ill? It is inconceivable; for in this very thing that God giveth to David — ^a power to murder the innocent — with this respect, that it shall be punishable by God only, and not by men, God must give it as a sinfiil power to do ill, which must be a

power of dispensation to sin, and so not to be punished by either God or man, which is contrary to ms revealed will in his word. If such a power as not restrainable by man be from God by way of permission, as a power to sin in devils and men is, then it is no royal power, nor any ordinance of God; and to resist this power, is not to resist the ordinance of God.

Arg. 4. — That power which maketh the benefit of a king to be no benefit, but a judgment of God, as a making all the people slaves, such as were slaves amongst the Romans and Jews, is not to be asserted by any Christian; but an absolute power to do ill, and to tyrannise, which is supposed to be an essential and constitutive of kings, to difference them from all judges, makem the benefit of a king no benefit, but a judgment of God, as m^ng all the people slaves. That the major may be clear, it is evident, 1. To have a king is a blessing of God, because to have no king is a judgment; Judg. xvii. 6, " Every man doth what seemeth good in his own eyes." (Judg, xviii. 1 ; xix. 1 ; xxi. 26,) 2. So it is a part of God's good providence to provide a xing for his people, (1 Sam, xvi, 1 ; so 2 Sam. v. 12.) And David perceived that the Lord had established him king over Israel, and that he had exalted his kingdom for his people Israel's sake, 2 Sam, xv. 2, 3, 6 ; xviii. 3 ; Bom. xiii. 2r — 4. If the king be a thing good in itself, then can he not, actu primoy be a curse and a judgment, and essentially a bondage and slavery to the people; also the genuine and intrinsical end of a kkig is the good, (Bom. xiii. 4,) and the good of a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty (1. Tim. ii. 2); and he is by office, custos utriusque tdbulce^ whose genuine end is to preserve the law from violence, and to defend the subject;-^he is the people's debtor for all happiness possible to be procured by God's sword, either in peace or war, at home or abroad. For the assumption is evident. An absolute and arbitrary power is a king-law, such as royalists say Grod gave to Saul (1 Sam. viii. 9, 11 ; X. 26) to play the tyrant; and this

Eower, arbitrary and unlimited, above all iws, is^that which, (1.) Is given to God; (2.) Distinguisheth essentially the kings of Israel from the judge, saith Barclary, Grotius, AmissBus; (3.) A constitutive form of a king, therefore it must be actu primo^ a benefit, and a blessing of Grod; but if (}od

hath gben my such power absolute to a king: as, 1. His will must be a law, either to do or suffer all the tyranny and cruelty of a tiger, a leopard, a Nero, or a Julian; then hath Grod given, <ietu prima, a power to a king, as smg, to enslaTe the people and flock of God, redeemed by the blood of God, as the slaves among the Romans and Jews, who were so under their masters, as their bondage was a plague of Grod, and the lives of the people oi Gsd under Pharaoh, who compelled them to work in brick and day. 2. Though he cut the throats of the people of Grod, as the lioness Queen Mary did, and command an army of soldiers to come and bum the cities of the land, and kill man, wife, and children; yet in so doing, he doth the part of a king, so as you cannot resist him as a man, and obey him as a king, but must give your necks to him, upon this ground, because this absolute power of his is ordained of Grod; and there IS no power even to kill and destroy the innocent, but it is of Grod. So saith Paul, Bom. xiii,, if we believe court-prophets, or rather lying-spirits, who persuade the king of Britain to make war against his three dominions. Now, it is clear that the distinction of bound and free continued in Israel even under the most tyrannous kings; (2 Kings iv. 1 ;) yea, even when the Jews were captives under Ahasuerus. (Esth. vii. 4.) And what diiference should there be between the people of Grod under their own kings, and when they were captives under tyrants, serving wood and stone, and false gods, as was threatened as a curse in the law? (Deut. xxviii. 25, 36, 64, 68.) If their own kings, by God's appointment, have the same absolute power over them, and if he be a tyrant, aatu primo, that is, if he be indued with absolute power, and so have power to play the tyrant, then must the people of God be actu primo^ slaves, and under absolute subjection; for they are relatives, as lord and servant, conqueror and captive. It is true, they say, kings by office are fathers, they cannot put forth in action their power to destroy. I answer, it is their goodness of nature that they put not forth m action all their absolute power to destroy, which God hath given them as kings, and therefore, thanks are due to their goodness, for that they do not, actu secundo^ play the tyrant; for royalists teach, that by virtue of their office Grod hath given to them a royal power to destroy; therefore, the Lord's

nle are slaves under them, though they not with them as slaves, but that hindereth not but the people by condition are slaves. So many conquerors of old did deal kindly with their slaves whom they took in war, and dealt with them as sons; but as conquerors they had power to sell them, to kill them, to put them to work in brick and clay. So say I here, royal power and a king cannot be a blessing, and cujtu prima a favour of Grod to the people, for the which they are to pray when tney want a kin? that they may have one, or to praise God when they have one. But a king must be a curse and a judgment, if he be such a creature as essentiaUy, and in the intention and nature of the thing itself, hath by office a royal power to destroy, and that from God; for then the people praying — " Lord give us a king," snould pray, " Make us uaves. Lord; take our liberty and power from us, and give a power unlimited and absokte to one man, by which he may, if he please, waste and destroy us, as all the bloody emperors did the people of God." Surely, I see not but they should pray for a temptation, and to be led into temptation when they pray God to give them a king; and, therefore, such a power is a vain thing.

Arg, 6, — A power contrary to justice, to peace and the good of the people, that looketh to no law as a rule, and so is unreasonable, and forbidden by the law of Grod and the civil law, (L. 15. Jllius de condit. Instit,) cannot be lawffil power, and cannot constitute a lawful judge; but an absolute and unlimited power is such. How can the judge be the minister of Grod for good to the people (Bom. xiii. 4) if he have such a power as a king, given him of Grod, to destroy and waste the people?

Arg, 6, An absolute power is contrary to nature, and so unlawful; for it maketh the people give away the natural power of defending their life against illegal and cruel violence, and maketh a man mio hath need to be ruled and lawed bv nature above all rule and law, and one who, by nature, can sin against his brethren such a one as cannot sm against any but God only, and maketh him a lion and an unsocial man. What a man is Nero, whose life is poetry and painting I Domitian, only an archer; Valentinian, only a painter; Charles IX. of France, only a hunter; Alphonsus Dux Ferrariensis, only an astronomer; Philip of Macedonia, a musican; £md all because

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

they are kings. This our king deinieth, irhen he saith, (art. 13,) *^ There is power legally placed in the parliament more than sufficteat to prevent and restrain the power of tyranny.'* Sut if they had not power to play the lions, it is not much that kings are musicians, hxmterBy &c,

Ara, .7. — God, in making a king to preserre his people, should give liberty without all poUtic restrain,. lor one man i/> destroy many, whidi is contrary to God's end in the fifth commandment, if one have absolute power to destroy souls and bodies of many thousands.

Arg, 8. — If the kings of Israel and Judah were under censures and rebukes of the prophets, and eintied against God and the people in rejecting these rebukes, and in persecuting we prophets, and were under this law not to take their neighbour's wife, or his vineyard from him against his will; and the inferior judges were to accept the persons of none in judgment, small or great; and if the king yet remain a brother, notwithstanding he be a king, then is his power not above any law, nor absolute. For what reason? — 1. He should be under one law of Grod to be executed by men, and not under another law? Boyalists are to show a diiferrence from Grod's word. 2. His neighbours, brother, or subjects, may by violence keep back ^eir vineyards, and chastity from the king. Naboth may by force keep his own vineyard from Achab. By the laws of Scotland, if a subject obtain a decree of the king, of violent possession of the heritages of a subject, he nath by law power to cast out, force, apprehend, and deliver to prison those who are tenants, brooking these lands by the king's personal commandment. If a king shoiud force a damsel, she may violently resist, and by violence, and bodily opposing of violence to violence, defend her own dbastity. Now, that the prophets have rebuked kings is evident: Samuel rebuked Saul, Natlm David, Elias king Achab; Jer^uiah is commanded to prophecy against the kings of Judah, (Jer. L 18,) and the prophets practised it. (Jer. zix. 3; xxi. 2; xxii. 13—16; Hos. V. 1.) Kings are guilty before God because they submitted not their royal power and greatness to the rebukes of the prophets, but persecuted them.

Deut. xvii. 20, The kin^ on the throne remaiheth a brother;^ Fsal. xxii. 22, and so the judges or three estates are not to accept of the person of the king for his greatness in judgment; Deut. i. 16, 17, and the judge is to give out such a sentence in judgment as the Lord, with whom there is no iniquity, would give out if the Lord himself were sitting in judgment; because the judge is in the very stead of God, as his lieutenant; (2 Chron. xix. 6, 7; PsaL Ixxxii. 1, 2; j[>eut. i. 17 ;) and with God there is no ressj^ect of persons. (2 Chron. xix. 7 ; 1 Pet. i. 17 ; Acts X. 34.) I do not intend that any inferior judge sent by the king is to judge the king; but those who gave him the throne, and made him kin?, are truly above him, and to judge him witnout respect of persons, as God himself would judge if he were sitting on the bench.

Grod is the author ^of civil laws and government, and his intention is therein me external peace, and quiet life, and godliness of his church and people, and that aU judges, according to their places, be nurse-&thers to the (Siurch. (Isa. xlix. 23.) Now God must have appointed sufficient means for this end; but there is no sufficient means at all, but a mere anarchy and confusion, if to one man an absolute and unlimited power be given of God, whereby, at his pleasure, he may obstruct the fountains of justice, and command lawyers and laws to speak not Grod's mind, that is justice, righteousness, safety, true religion, but the sole lust and pleasure of ene man. And this one having absduto and irresistible influence on aU the infericnr instruments of justice, may, by this power, turn aU into anarchy, and put the people in a worse condition than it there were no judge at aU in the land. For that of politicians, that tyranny is better than anarchy, is to be taken cum grano acdis; but I shall never believe that absolute power of one man, which is actu prima tyranny, is God's sufficient way of peaceable govemm^it. Therefore, Barclaius^ saith nothing for the contrary, when he saith, *' The Athenians made Draco and Solon absolute law-givers, for, a facto ad jus non valet consequential** What if a roving people, trusting Draco and Solon to be kings above mortal men, and to be gods, gave them power to make laws, written not with ink, but with blood, shall other kings have from God the like tyrannical and bloo^ power from that to make bloody laws? Chytreus (Ub. 2) and Sleidan citeth it, (1.

s Barclaius contra Monarch, lib. 2, p. 76, 77*

LEX, BEX ; OR,

1 ;) Sueron^ Sub pc^na periurii ncn tenen' tur fdem sevare regi degeneri.

Arg, 9.-=-He who is regulated by law, and sweareth to the three estates to be regulated by law, and accepteth the crown corenant-wise, and so as the estates would refuse to make him their king^ if either he should refuse to swear, or if they did believe certainly that he would break his oath, hath no unlimited and absolute power from GrOd or the people; for, fcedus conditioner turn, aut promissio conditionalis mutua, faeit jus alteri in alterum, a mutual conditional covenant giyeth law and power over one to another^ But, from that which hath been said, the king sweareth to the three estates to be regulated by law — ^he accepteth the crown upon the tenor of a mutual covenant, &c. ; for if he should ^ as king, swear to be king, that is, one who hath absolute power above a law, and also to be regulated by a law, he should swear things contradictory, that is, that he should be their king, having absolute power over them, and according to that power to rule them; and he shouM swear not to be their king, atid to rule them, not according to absolute power, but according to laww If) therefore, this absolute power be essential to a king, as a king, no king can lawfully take the oath to govern according to law, for then he should swear not to reign as king, and not be their king; for how could he biB their king, wanting that which God hath made essential to a king as a king?

QUESTION XXIII.

WHETHER THE KING HATH ANY ROYAL PRERO-^ GATIVE, OR A POWER TO DISPENSE WITH LAWS ; AND SOME OTHER GROUNDS AGAINST ABSOLUTE MONARCHY.

A prerogative royal I take two ways: either to be an act of mere will and plea^ sure above or beside reason or law, or an act of dispensiation beside or against the letter of the law-.

Assert. 1. — That which royalists call the prerogative royal of princes is the salt of absolute power; and it is a supreme and highest power of a king, as a king, to do above, without or contrary to a law or reason^ which is unreasonable. 1. When God's word speaketh of the power of kings and judges, l)eut. xvii. 15 — 17 ; i. 15 — 17, and elsewhere there is not any footstep or any ground for such a power; and, therefore, (if we speak according to conscience,) there is no such thing in the world; and because royalists cannot give us any warrant, it is to be rejected. 2. A prerogative royal must be a power of doing good to the people, and grounded upon some reason or law; but this is but a branch of an ordinary limited power, and no prerogative above or beside law; yea, any power not mounded on a reason different from mere mJl or absolute pleasure is an irrational and brutish power I and, therefore, it may well be jus persowBy the power of the man who is king; it cannot be jus coronoB, any power annexed to the crown; for this holdetn true of all the actions of the king^ as a king, illud potest reXy et illud tantum quod jure potest. The king, as king, can do no more than that which upon right and law he may do. 3. To dispute this question, whether such a prerogative s^ee to any king, as king, is to dispute whether God hath made all under a monarch slaves by their own consent; which is a vain question. Those who hold such a prerogative, must say the king is so absolute and unlimited a god on earth, that either by law, or his sole pleasure beside law, he may regularly and rationally move all wheels in p^cy \ and his uncontrolled will shall be tne coletree on which all the wheels are turned^ 4. That which is the garland and proper flower of the King of kings, as he is absolute above his creatures, and not tied to any law, without himself, that regulateth his will, that mu&t be given to no mortal man or king, except we would communicate that which is God's proper due to a sinful man, which must be sdolatory^ But to do royal acts out of an absolute power above law and reason-, is such a power as agreeth to God, as is evident in positive laws and in acts of Grod's mere pleasure, where we see no reason without the Almighty for the one side rather than for the ouier-, as Grod's forbidding the eating of the tree of knowledge maketh the eating sin and contrary to reason; but there is no reason in the object: for if God should boknmand eating of that tree, not to eat should also be sin. So God's choosing Peter to glory and his refusing Judas, is a good and a wise act, but not good or wise

froip the object of the act, but from the lole wise pleasure of God; because, if God had chosen Judas to glory and rejected Peter, that ^ct had been no less a good and a wise act than the former. For when there is m law in the object but only God's will, the act is good and wise, seeing infinite wisdom cannot be separated from the perfect will of God; but no act of a morts^ king, having sole and only will, and neither law nor reason in it, can be a lawful, a wise, or a good act.

Assert, 2, — There is somethii^g which may be called a prerogative bv way of dispensation, There is a threerold dispensation, — one of power, another of justice, and a third of grace, 1. A dispensation of power is wheii ^e will of the law-giver maketh that act to be no sin, which without that will would have been sin, — ^aa if God's commanding will had not intervened, the Israelites borrowing the ear-rings ai,d jewels of the Egyptians, and not restoring them, had been a breach of the eighth commyidment; and ip this sense no king hath a prerogative to dispense with a law, 2. There is a dispensation of law and justice not Rowing from aiiy pre^rogative, but from the true intent of the law; and thus the king, yea, the inferior judge, is not to take the life of a man whom the letter of the h^w would condemn, because the justice of the law is the intent and life of the law; and where nothing is done against the intent of the law, there is no breach of any law, 3. The third is not unlike unto the second, when the king expon- @th the law by grace, a;id this is twon)ld: (1,) Either wnen he exponeth it of his wisdom aiid merci^ pature, inclined to mercy and justice, yet, according to the just intent, n^^tive sense, and scope of the law, considering the occasion, circumstances of the fact, apd comparing both with the law,^-^ and this dispensation of grace I grant to the king, as when the tribute is great and the man poor, the king may dispense with the custom.^ (2,) Tne law saith, in a doubtful case the prince may dispense, because it is presumed the law can have no sense against the principal sense and intent of the mw.

But there is another dispensation that royalists do plead for, and tu^t is, a power

in the king, ex mera grcttia absolutoB po^ testatis regalis, out of mere grace of absolute royal power to pardon crimes which God's law saith should be punished bydeaUi. Now, this they call a power of grace; — ^but it is not a power of mere grace,

1. Though princes may dp some things of grace, yet not qf mere grace; because what kin^ do as kings, and by virtue of their roy^l office, that they do c dehito oMciiy by debt 8wi4 right of their office; and that they cannot but do, it not being artfitrary to them to do the debtfiil acts of their office : hut what they do of mere grace, that they do as good men, and pot aaldngs, and that they may pot do. As, for example,

. some kings, out of their pretended prero^- tive, have given four pardons to one man for four murders. Now this the king might have left undone without sin, but of mere ^race he pardoned the murderer who killed tour men. But the truth is, the king killed the three last, because he hath no power in point of conscience to dispense with blood, Num. XXXV, 31 ; Gen, ix. 6. These pardons are acts of mere grace to one man, but acts of blood, to the oommumty,

2, Because the prinee is ^e minister of God for the good oi the subject; and therefore the law saith, '< He cannot pardon and free the guilty of the punishment due to him ; (Contra I, quodfavore, F, de leg, I. non ideo minus^ F. deproc, I, legata ifiwtiliter^ F. de lega, 1 ;) and the reason is clear : He is but the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon hun that doth evil. And if the judgment be the Lord's, not man's, not the kmg's, as it is indeed, (Deut, i, 17 ; 2 Chron, xix. 6,) he cannot draw the sword against the innocent, nor absolve the guilty, except he would take on himself to qarve and dispose of that which is proper to his master. Now certain it is, God only, univocally and easentiaUy as Grod is tlie judge, (Psal. Ixxv. 7,) and God only and essentially king, (Psal, xcvii, 1 ; xdx. 1,) and aU men m relation to him are mere ministers, servants, legates, deputies; and in relation tq Imn, equivocally and improperly, judges or kings, and mere created and breathnig shadows of the power of the King of kings. And look, as the scribe following his own device, and writing what sentence he plee^th, is not an officer of the court in that point, nor the pen and servant of the judge, so are kings and all judges hut forged intruders and bastard kings and

LEX, REX ; OR,

judges, in 80 far as they give out the sentenoBB of men, and are not the very months rf the King of kin^ to pronounoe such a sentence as the Abm^htj himself wouM do, if he were sitting on ttie throne or hench.

3. If the king, from any supposed prerogative royal, may do acts of mere ffcace without any warrant of law, because ne is above law by office, then also may he do acts of mere rigorous justice, and kill and destrc^ the innocent, out of the same supposed prerogative ; for God's word equally tyeth him to the place of a mere minister in doin&r good, u in executing wrath on evil-doers, ilom. x&i. 8, 4. Aim reason would say, he must be as absolute in the one as in the other, seeing God tyeth him to the one as to the other, by his office and place ; yea, by this, acts of justice to ill-doers, and acts of reward to well-doers, shall be arbitrary morally, and by virtue of office to the king, and the word prerogative royal fiaith this ; for the word prerogative is a supreme power absolute that is loosed from all law, and so from all reason of law, and depending m the king's mere and naked pleasure and will ; and the word royal or Kingly is an epithet of office and of a judge, — a created and limited judge, and so it must tie this supposed prerogative to law, reason, and to that which is dehitum hgcde c^cii and a legal duty of an office; and by this our masters, the royalists, make Grod to frame a rational creature, which ihej call a king, to frame acts of royalty, good and lawful, upon his own mere pleasure and the super-dominion of his will above a law and reason. And from this it is that deluded oounsellcms made king James (a man not of edis^ow understanding) and king Charles to give par^ dons to sucn bloody murderers as James a Grant ; and to go so &r on, by this 8ni^K)6ed prerogative royal, that king Charles m parliament at E<&iburgh, 1633, did command an high point of religion: — ^that ministers skoula use, in officiatmg ki God's service, such habits and garm^its as he pleaseth, that is, all the atture and habits of the idolatrous mass-priests that the Bomish priests of Baal useth in the oddest point of idolaixj (the adoring <^ bread) tktit the eardi has ; and by this prerogative the king commanded the Servioe Bock in Scotland, anno 1637, without or above law and reason. And I desire any man to satisfy me in lliis, if the king's prerogative royal may overles^ law and reascm in two degrees, and if

he may as king, by a prerogative royal, command the wdj of popery in a popish book; — ^if he may not, 1^ the same reason, over-leap law and reason by the elevation of twenty aegrees; — ^and if you make the kins a Julian, (God avert, and give the spirit m revelation to our king,) may he not command all the Alkoran and the religion of the heathen and Indians? Boyalists say the prerogative of royalty excludeth not reason, and maketh not the Ismg to do as a brute beast, without all reason, but it giveth a power to a king to do by his royal

Eleasure, not fettered to the dictates of a Lw; for in things which the king doth by his prerogative royal he is to follow the advice and counsel of his wise council, though their counsel and advice doth not bind the royal will of the king.

Ans, 1. — I answer, it is to me, and I am sure to many more learned, a great -question, — ^if the will of any reasonable creature, even of the damned angels, can will or choose anything which "uieir reason, corrupted as it is, doth not dictate kic et nunc to be good? For the object of the will of all men is good, either truly, or apparently good to the doer; for the devil could not suit in marriage souls except he war in the clothes of an angel of light; sin, as sin, cannot seU, or obtnide itself upon any, but under the notion of good. I tnink it seemeth good to the great Turk to command innocent men to cast themselves over a precipice two hundred fathoms high into the sea, and drown themselves to pleasure him; so the Turk's reason (for he is rationsJ, if he be a man) dictateth, to his vast pleasure, that that is good which he commandeth.

2. Counsellors to the king, who wfll (^eak what will please the queen, are but naked empty titles, for they speak que plcbcentf non que prosunt, what may please the king whom they make glad with their lies, not what law and reason dictateth.

3. Absoluteness <^ an unreasonable prerogative doth not deny counsel and law also, for none more absolute, de facto, I cannot say dejure, than the kings of Babylon and Persia ; for Daniel saith of one of them, (Dan. v. 19,) " Whom he would he slew, and whom he would he kept alive, and whom lie would he set up, and whom he would he put down ;" and yet these same kings did nothing but by advice of thMr princes and counsellors; yea, so as they oould

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

not alter a decree and law, aa is clear; (Esth. i. 14 — 17, 21) yea, Darius, defacto^ an absolute prince, was not able to deliyer Daniel, because the kw was passed; that he should be cast into the lions' den. (Dan. vi. 14—16.)

4. That which the Spirit of God condemneth as a point of tyranny in Nebuchadnezzar, is no lawful jprerogatiTe royal ; but the Spirit of Grod oondemneth this as tyranny in Nebuchadnezzar, — that he slew whom he would, he kept alire whom he would, he set up whom he would, he put down whom he would. This is too God-like. (Deut. xxxii. 39.) So Pohmus^ and RoUocus' on the place say, he did these thin^, (ver 19,) Ex abusn legitimm potestatisf tor Nebuchadnezzar's wiU, in matters of death and life, was his law, and he did what pleased himself, aboye aU law, beside ana contrary to it. And our flatterers of kings draw the king's prerogatiye out of Ulpian^ words, who saitn, *' That is a law which seemeth good to the prince;" but Ulpian was far from making the prince's will a rule of good and ill; for he saith the contrary, " That the law ruleth the just, prince."

5. It is considerable here, that Sanches^ defineth the absolute power of kings to be a plenitude and fiilness of power, subject to no necessity, and bounded with rules of no public law; and so did Baldus^ before him. But all politicians condemn that of Caligula, (as Suetonius saith,'^) which he spake to Alexander the Great, ** Remember that thou must do all things, and that thou hast a power to do to all men what thou pleasest." Aud lawyers say, that this is tyranny. Chilon, one of the seven wise of Greece, (as Rodigi,*) saith better, " Princes are like gods, because they only can do that which is just ; and this power,^ being merely tyrannical, can be no ground of a royal prerogative. Tliere is another power (saith Sanches) absolute, by which a prince dispenseth without a cause in a human law ; and this power, saith he, may be defended. But he saith, what the king doth by this absolute power he doth it

^ Baldus, lib. 2, n. 40, C. de senrit. et aqna.

> Gaelias Rodigi, lib. 8, Lect. Antiq. e. 1.

valide^ validly, but not jure, by law; but by valid acts the Jesuit must mean royal acts. But no acts void of law and reason (say we) can be royal acts; for royal acts are acts performed by a king, as a king, and by a law, and so cannot be acts above or beside a law. It is true a king may dispense with the breach of a human law, as a human law, that is, if the law be death to any who goeth upon the walls of the city, the king may pardon any, who, going up, diseoveretn the enemies approach, and saveth the city. But, 1. The mferior judge according to the hnmtsm that benign interpretation that the soul and intent of the law requireth, may do this as well as the king. 2. All acts of independent prerogative are above a law, and acts of free will having no causfe or ground in the. law, otherwise it is not founded upon absolute power, but on power ruled by law and reason. But to pardon a breach of the letter of the law of man by exponing it according to the true intent of the law, and benignly, is an act of legal obligation, and so of the ordinary power of ail judges; and if either king or judge kill a man for the violation of the letter of the law, when the intent of the law contradicteth the rigid sentence, he is guilty of innocent blo^. If that learned Ferdinandus Vasquez be consulted, he is against this distinction of a power ordinary and extraordinary in men; and certainly, if you give to a king a prerogative above a law, it is a power to do evil as well as good; but there IS no lawAil power to do evil; and Dr Feme is plunged in a contradiction by this, for he saith, (sect. 9, p. 68,) " I ask when these emperors took away lives and goods at pleasure? Was that power ordained by God? No; but an illegal will and tyranny; but (p. 61) the power, though abused to execute such a wicked commandment, is an ordinance of Grod."

Obj. 1. — For the lawfulness of an absolute monarchy, — ^the Eastern, Persian, and Turkish monarchy maketh absolute monarchy lawful, for it is an oath to a lawful obligatoiy thing; and judgment fEzek. xvii. 16, 18) is denounced against Juaah for breaking the oath of the kmg of Babylon, and it is called the oath of God, and doubtless was an oath t>f absolute subjection; and the power (Rom. xiii.) was absolute, and yet the apostle calleth it an ordinance of <xod. The so-

1 Vasqnez, illnst. qnest. lib. 1, c. 26, n. 2.

LSX, REX ; OS,

yereignty of masters over servante yras absolute, and the apostle exhorteth not to renounce thaib title as too rigid, but exhorteth to moderation in the use of it.

Ans, 1, — That the Persian monarchy was absolute is but a facto ad jus^ and no rule of a lawful monarchy; but ths^t it was absolute, I believe not. Darius, who was an absolute prince, as many think, but I think not, would gladly ho-ve delivered Daniel from the power of a law, (Dan. vi. 14,) "And he set his heart on Daniel to deliver him, and he laboured till the going down of the sun to deliver him," and was so sorrowful that he could not break through a law, that he interdicted himself of all pleasures of musicians; and if ever he had used the absoluteness of a prerogative royal, I conceive he would have done it in this, yet he could not prevail. But in things not established by law I conceive Darius was absolute, as to me is clear, (Dan vi, 24,) but absolute not by a divine law, but de facto, quod transierat ir^ jus humanum, by fact, which was now become a law.

2, It was Grod's oath, and God tied Judah to absolute subjection, therefore, people may tie themselves. It foUoweth not, except you could make good this inference : 1, God is absolute, therefore the king of Babylon may lawfully be absolute. This is a blasphemous consequence, 2- That Judah was to swear the oath of absolute subjection in the latitude of the absoluteness of the kings of Chgldea, I would see proved. Their absoluteness by the Chaldean laws was to command murder, idolatry, (pan. iii. 4, 5,) and to make wicked la^s. (Dap. vi. 7, 8.) I believe Jeremiah pommanded not absolute subjection in this sense, but the contrary. ^Jer. X. 11.) They were to swear the oath m the point of suffering ; but what if the kiQg of Chaldea had commanded them all, the whole holy seed, men, women and children, out of his royaj power, to give their necks all in one day to his sword, were they obliged by this oath to prayers and tears, and only to suffer? pnd was it against the oath of God to defend themselves by arms? I believe the oath did not oblige to such absolute subjection, and though they had taken arms in their own lawful defence, according to the law of nature, they had not broken the oath of God. The oath was not a tie to an absolute subjection of all and every one, either to worship idols, or then to fly or suffer death. Now,

the Service Boq& oommanded, in the king's absolute authority, . all Scotland to commit grosser idolatry, in the intention of the work, if not in the intention of the commander, than was in Babylon, We read not that the king of Babylon pressed the consciences of Grod's people to idolatry, or that all should either fly the kingdom, and leave their inheritances to papists and prelates, or then come under the mercy of the sword of papists and atheists by sea or land. 3. God may command against the law of nature, and God's commandment maketh subjection lawful, so as men may not now, being under that law of Grod, defend themselves. What then? Therefore we owe subjection to absolute princes, and their power must be a lawful power, it nowise is consequent. God's commandment by Jeremia*h. made the subjection of Judah lawful, and without that commandment they might have taken arms against the king of Babylon, as they did against the Philistines; and God's commandment maketh the oath liawfliL As suppose Ireland would all rise in arms, and conae and destroy Scotland, the king of Spain leading, then we were by this argument not to resist. 4. It is denied, that the power, (Eom. xiii.,) as absolute, is God's ordinance. And J deny utterly that Christ and his apostles did swear nonrresistance absolute to the Eoman emperor.

Obj. 2,--It seemeth, (1 Pet. ii, 18, 19,) if weU-doing be mistaken by the reason and judgment of an absolute monarch for illdoing, and we punished, yet the magistrate's will is the command of a reasonable will, and so to be &;ubmitted unto; because such a one suffereth by law, where the monarch's will is a law, and in this case some power must judge. Now in an absolute monarchy all judgment resolveth in the will of the monarch, as the supreme law; and if ancestors have submitted themselves by oath, there is no repeal or redressment.

-4w.-:— Whoever was the author of this treatise he is a bad defender of the defensive wars in England, for all the lawflilness of wars then must depend on this : 1. Whether England be a conquered nation at the beginning? 2. If the law-will of an absolute monarch, or a Nero, be a reasonable will, to ifhich we must submit in suffering ill, I see not but we must submit to a reasonable will, if it be reasonable will in doing ill, no less than in suffering iU. 3. Absolute will -in absolute monarchies is no

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

judge dejure, but an unlawful and a usurping judge. (1 Pet. ii. 18, 19i) Servants are not commanded simply to sufifen (I can prove suffering formally not to fall under any law of Grod> but ordy patient suffering. I except Christ, who was under a peculiar commandment to suffer^) But servants, upon supposition that they are servants, and buffeted unjustly by their masters, are, by the apostle Peter, commanded (ven 20) to suffer patiently. But it doth not bind up a servant's hand to defend his own life with weapons if his master invade hiin, without cause, to kill him; otherwise, if God call him to suffer, he is to suffer in the manner and way as Christ did, not reviling, not threa*- tening. 4. To be a king and an absolute master to me are contradictory, A king essentially is a living law; an absolute man is a creature that they call a tyrant, and no lawful king* Yet do I not mean that any that is a ^ing^ and usurpeth absoluteness, leaveth off to be a king; but in so far as he is absolute he is no more a king than in so far as he is a tyrant. But further, the king of England saith in a declaration, 1. The law is the measure of the king's powers 2. Parliaments are essentiallv lord-judges, to make laws essentially, as the king is, therefore, the king is not above the law. 3. Magna ChaHa, saith the king, can do nothmg but by laws, and no obedience is due to him but by law. 4. Prescriptions taketh away the title of conquests.

Ohj. 3k — The king, not the parliament^ is the anointed of God.

^n^.^-The pajrliament is as good, even a congregation of gods. (Ps. Ixxxii. 6.)

Obj, 4. — The parliament in the court, in their acta, they say, with consent of our sovereign lord.

Ans%~£hej say not at the commandment and absolute pleasure of our sovereign lord. He is their lord materially, not as they are formally a parliament, for the king made them not a parliament; but sure I am the parliament had power before he was king, and made him king. (1 Sam. x. 17, 18.J

06;. 5. — 111 an absolute monarchy there is not a resignation of men to any will as will, but to the reasonable will of the monarch, which, having the law of reason to direct it, is kept from injurious acts.

Am. — If reason be a sufficient restraint, and if God hath laid no other restraint upon some lawful king, then is magistracy a lame,

a needless ordinance of God; for all mankind hath reason to keep themselves from injuries, and so there is no need of judges or kin^ to defend them from either domg or suffering injuries. But certainly this must be admirable, — ^if God, as autnor of nature, should make the lion king of all beasts, the lion remaining a devouring beast, and should ordain by nature all the sheep and lambs to come and submit their bodies to him, by instinct of nature, and to be eaten at his will, and then say, the nature of a beast in a lion is a sufficient restraint to keep the lion horn devouring lambs. Certainly, a king being a sinM man, and having no restraint on his power but reason, he may think it reason to allow rebels to kill, drown, hang, torture to death, an hundred thousand protestants, men, women, infants in the womb, and sucking babes^ as is clear in Pharaoh, Manasseh, and other princes.

Obj, 6* — There is no court or judge above the long, therefore he is absolutely supreme.

Ans, — The antecedent is false. 1. The court that made the king of a private man is above him; and here are Hmitations laid on him at his coronation. 2. The states of parliament are above him, to censure him. 3. In case of open tyranny, though the states had not time to convene in pariiiament, if he bring on his people an host of Spaniards or foreign rebels, nis own conscience is above him, and the conscience of the people far more, called conscientia terra, may judge him in so &r as they may rise up and defend themselves.

Obj, 7. — Here the Prelate, (c. 14, p. 144,^ borrowing from Grotius, Barclay, Amis8Bus> (or it is possible he be not so mr traveUed, for Dr Feme hath the same,) " Sovereignty weakened in aristocracy cannot do its work, and is in the next place to anarchy and confusion. When Zedekiah was overlorded by his nobles, he could neither save himself nor the people, nor the prophet, the servant of Godj Jeremiah; nor could David punish Joab when he was overawed by that power he himself had put in his head. To weaken the hand is to distemper the Whole body; if any good prince, or his royal ancestors, be cheated of their sacred right by fraud or force, he may, at his fittest opportunity, resume it. What a sin it is to rob God or the king of their due!"

-4w.— Aristocracy is no less an ordinance

of God than royalty, for (Bom. xiiL 1, and 1 Tim. ii.) — 1. All in authority are to be admowledged as Grod's vice>reffent8^ the senate, the consuls, as well as me emperor; and so one ordinance of God cannot weaken another, nor can any but a lawless animal say, aristocracy boidereth with confusion; but he must say, order and light are sister-germans to concision and dwrkness. 2. Th(mgh Zedekiah, a man void of God, was 0¥er-awed by his nobles, and so could not help Jeremiah, it followeth not that because kings may not do this and this cood, therefore they are to be invested wim power to do all ill: if they do all the good that diey have power to do, they will find way to help the oppressed Jeremiahs, And, because power to do both good and evil is given by the devil to our Scottish witches, it is a poor consequent that the states should give to the king power absolute to be a tyrant. 3. A state must give a king more power than ordinary, especially to execute laws, which requireth singular wisdom, when a prince cannot always have his great eoun^ about with him to advise him. 1. That is power borrowed, and bv loan, and not properly his own; ami there&re it is no sacnlese in the states to. resume what the king hath by a fiduciary title, and borroiwed from them. 2. This power waa given to do good, not evil. David had power over Joab to punish him for his murder, but he executed it not upon carnal fears, and abused his power to xill innocent Uriah, which power neither Grod nor the states gave him. But how proveth he the states took power from David, or that Joab took power firom David to put to death a murderer? That I see not. 3, If princes' power to do good be taken firom them, they may resume it when God giveth opportunity; but this is to the Prelate per* jury, that the people l^ oath give away their power to their kmg and resume it when he abuseth it to tyranny. But it is no perjury in the king to resume a taken-away power, which, if it be his own, is yet lis sub judice, a great controversy. Quod in Oajo Ucety in Nemo non licet. So he teacheth the king that perjury and sacrilege is lawful to him. If princes' power to do ill and cut the whole land off as one neck, (which was the wicked desire of Caligula,) be taken fi:om them by the states, I am sure this power was never theirs, and never the people's; and you cannot take the prince's power from him which was never his power, I

am also sure the prince should never resume an unjust power, though he were dieated of it.

P. Prelate, — It is a poor shift to acknowledge no more for the royal prerogative than the municipal law hath determined, as some smatterers in the law say. They cannot distinguish betwixt a statute declarative and a statute constitutive; but the statutes of a kingdom do declare only what is the prerogative royal, but do not constitute or make it. God Almighty hath by himself constituted it. It is laughter to say the decalogue was not a law tiU God wrote it.

Ans, — Here a profound lawyer calleth all smatterers in the law, who cannot say that non ens, a prerogative royal, that is, a power contrary to God and man's law to kill and destroy the innocent, came not immediately down from heaven. But I profess myself no lawyer; but do maintain against the Prelate that no municipal law can constitute a power to do ill, nor can any law either justly constitute or declare such a fancy as a prerogative royal. . So far is it from being like the decalogue, that is, a law before it be written, that liiis prerogative is neither law heiore it be written, nor after court-hunters, have written for it; for it must be eternal as the decalc^ue if it have any blood from so noble a house. In what scripture hath God Almighty spoken of a fancied prerogative royal?

P. Prelate (p. 145). — Prerogative resteih not in its natural seat, but m the king. Grod saith, Beddite, not DcUe, render to kings that which is kings, not give to kings; it mail never be well with us if his anointed and his church be wronged.

Ans. — The Prelate may remember a country proverb: he and his prelates (called the church, — the scum of men, not the church,) are like the tinker's dogs, — ^they Hke good company — ^they must be ranked with the king. And hear a false prophet: It shall never be well with the land while arlntrary power and popery be erected, saith he, in ^od sense.

P. Prelate (c. 16, p. 170, 171).— The king hath his right from God, ana cannot make it away to tne people. Bender to Caesar the things that are Caesar's. Kings' persons, their charge, their right, their authority, their prerogative, are by Scriptures, fathers, juriste, sacred, inseparable (-dinances inherent in their crowns, — ^they cannot be made away; and when they are

given to inferior judges, it is not ad minu* mdam majestatem, ded aolidtudinem, to lessen sovereign niajesty, but to ease them.

Ans, — 'The king hath his right from Grod. What, then not m>m the people? I read in Scripture, the people made the king, never that the king made the people. All these are inseparably in the crown, but he stealeth in prerogative royal, in the clause which is now in question, ** Render to Ceesar all Osesar's;" and therefore, saith he, render to him a prerogative, that is, an absolute power to pardon and sell the blood of thousands. Is power of blood either the the king's, or mherent inseparably in his crown? Alas I I fear prelates have made blood an inseparable accident of his throne. When kings, by that public power given to them at weir ooronation, maketh inferior judges, they give them power to judge for theXord, not for men. (Deut. H7; 2 Chron, xix. 6,) Now, they cannot both make away a power and keep it also; for the inferior judge's conscience hangeth not at the king's irdle. He hath no less power to judge in is sphere than the king hath in his sphere, though the orb and circle of motion be larger in compass in the one than in the other; and if the king cannot give himself royal power, but God and the people must do it, how can be communicate any part of that power to inferior judges except by trust? Yea, he hath not that power that other men have in many respects: —

I. He may not marry whom he pleaseth; for he might give his body to a leper woman, and so hurt the kingdom.-^2. He may not do as Solomon and Ahab, marry the daughter of a strange ^od, to make her the mother of the heir of 9ie crown. He must in this follow his great senate. He may not expose his person to hazard of wars. — ^3, He may not go over sea and leave bis watch-tower, without consent. — 4. Many acts of parliament of both kingdoms discharge papists to con^e within ten miles of the king, — 5. Some pemidoos counsellors have been discharged his company by laws. — 6. He may not eat what meats he pleaseth. — 7. He may not make wasters his treasurers. — 8. Nor dilapidate the rents of the crown. — 9. He may not disinherit his eldest son of the crown at his own pleasure.-*- 10. He is sworn to follow no Mae gods and false religions, nor is it in his power to go to mass. — 11, If a priest say mass to the kuig, by the law he is hanged, drawn and quartered. — 12. He may not

write letters to the Pope, by law. — 13. He may not, by law, pardon seducing priests and Jesuits.— 14, He may not take pnysic for his health but from physicians, sworn to be true to him. — 15. He may not educate his heir as he pleaseth. — '16. He hath not power of his children, nor hath he that power that other fathers have, to marry his eldest son as he pleaseth.— 17. He may not befriend a traitor. — -18. It is high treason for any woman to give her body to the king, except she be his married wife. — 19. He ought not to build sumptuous houses without advice of bis council.-— 20, He may not dwell constantly where he pleaseth, — =21. Nor may he go to the country to hunt, far less to kill nis subjects and desert the parliament. * —22. He may not confer honours and high places without his council,--^23. He may not deprive judges at his will. — 24. Nor is it in nis power to be buried where he pleaseth, but amongst the kings. Now, in most of these twenty-four points, private persons have their own liberty fer less restricted than the king.

QUESTION XXIV,

Mr Symmons saith, (sect. 6, p. 19,) that authority is rooted rather in the prince than in the law; for as the king giveth being to the inferior judge, so he doth to the law itself, making it authorisable; for propter quod utium^quodque tale, id ipsum magis tale, and therefore the king is greater than the law? others say, that the Bng is the fountain of the law, and the sole and only lawgiver.

Assertion First. — 1. The law hath a twofold consideration, — (1.) Secundum esse pee* nale, in relation to the punishment to be inflicted by man.l (2.) Secundum esse legis, as it is a thing legally good in itself. In the former notion it is this way true, — ^human laws take life and being, so as to be pun<r ished or rewarded by men, from the will of princes and law-givers V *nd so Symmons saith true, because men cannot punish or reward laws but where they are made; and

LEX, rex; OB,

the will of rulers putteth a sort of stamp on a law, that it bnngeth the oommonw^dth under goiltinesB it thej break this law. But this maketh not the king greater than the law, for therefore do rulers put the stamp of relation to punishment on the law, because there is intnnsical worth in the law prior to the act of the ¥dll of lawgivers for which it meriteth to be enacted; and, therefore, because it is authorisable as good and just, the king putteth on it this stamp of a politic law. God formeth being and moral aptitude to the end in all laws, to wit, the safety of the people, and the lang's will is neither the measure nor the cause of the goodness of kings.

2. If the kmg be he who makelli the law good and just, because he is more such himself, then as liie law cannot crook, and err, nor sin, neither can the king sin, nor break a law. This is blasphemy; every man is a liar : a law which deserveth the name of a law cannot lie.

3. His ground is, that there is such majesty in kings, that their will must be done either in us or on us. A great untruth. Ahab's will must neither be done of Elias, for he oommandeth things unjust, nor yet on Elias, for Elias fled, and lawfully we may fly tyrants ; and so Ahab's will in killing Elias was not done on him.

Assertion Second, — 1. Nor can it be made good, that the king only hath power of makmg laws, because his power were then absolute to inflict penalties on subjects, without any consent of theirs; and that were a dominion of masters, who command what they please, and under what pain they please. And the people consenting to be niled by such a man, they tacitly consent to penalty of laws, beouise natural reason saith, an illdoer should be punished / (Fhrianus in I, inde. Vasquez, I, 2, c. 55, n. 3, ) therefore they must have some power in making these laws.

2. Jer. xxvi., It is clear the princes judge with the people. A nomothetic power differeth gnuiually only from a judicial power, both being collateral means to the end of government, the people's safety. But parliaments judge, therefore they have a nomothetic power with, the king.

3. The parliament giveth all supremacy to the king, therefore to prevent tyranny, it must keep a co-ordinate power with the king in the highest acts.

4. K the kingly line be interrupted, if

the king be a child or a captive, they make laws who make kings; therefore, this nomothetic power recuireth into the states, as to the first subject.

06;. — The king is the fountain of the law, and subjects cannot make laws to themselves more than they can punish themselves. He is only the supreme.^

Ans. — The people being the fountain of the king must rather be the fountain of laws, fii is &]se that no man maketh laws to himself. Those who teach others teach themselves also, (1 Tim. ii. 12 ; 1 Cor. xiv. 34,) though teaching be an act of authority. But they agree to the penalty of the law seoondanly only; and so doth tiie kins who, as a fiither, dotn not will evil of puni^ment to his children, but by a consequent will. The king is the only supreme in the power ministerial of executing laws; but this is a derived power, so as no one man is above him; but in liie fountain-power of royalty the states are above him.

5. The civil law is dear, that the laws of the emperor have force only finom this fountain, because the people have transferred their power to the king. Lib. 1, digest, tit. 4, de constit. Princip. leg. 1, sic Ulpian. Quod fyrindpi placuitf (loquitur de prindpe formaliter, qua princeps est, non qua est homo,) legis habet vigorem, utpote cum legi regia, quce de imperio ejus lata est. populus ei, et in cum, omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat. Yea, the emperof himself may be convened before the prince elector. (Aurea BuUa Carol. 4, Imper. c. d.) The king of France may be convened before the senate of Paris. The states may resist a tyrant, as Bossius saith, (de principe, et privUeg. ejus, n. 65. Pa^ ris de puteo, in tract, syno. tit. de excess, reg. c. 3.) Divines acknowledge that Elias rebuked ^e halting of Israel betwixt God and Baal, that their princes permitted Baal's priests to converse with the king. And is not this the sin of the land, that they suffer their king to worship idols? And, therefore, the land is pimished for the sins of Manasseh, as Knox observeth in his dispute with Lethington, where he proveth that the states of Scotland should not permit the queen of Scotland to have her abominable mass. (Hist, of Scotland.) Surely the power, or sea prerogative, of a deepy or mad pilot, to split the ship on a rock, as I conceive, is

1 Symmons' Loyal Subject, sect. 5, p. 8.

limited by the passenfirera. Suppose a father inadistlper^/set his pWhoiue on fire, and bom himself and his ten sons, I conceiye his fiitherlj prerogative, which neither God nor nature gave, should not be looked to in this, but mej may bind him. Yea, Althusius (polit. c. 39), answering this, " That in democracy the people cannot both command and obey," saith, It is true, aecua^ dum idem^ ad idemy et eodem tempore. But the people may (saith he) choose magistrates by succession. Yea, I say, 1. They may change rulers yearly to remove envy: a yearly king were more dangerous, the king being almost above envy. Men incline more to flatter than to envy kings. 2. Aristotle saith, (polit. 1. 4, c 4, 1. 6, c. 2,| The people may give their judgment of tne wisest.

Obj. 1. — ^WiUiams, bishop of Ossory, in Vinddc Beg. (a looking-glass for rebels,) saith, " To say the king is better than any one, doth not prove him to be better than two; and if his supremacy be no more, then any other may challenge as much, for the prince is singulis major, A lord is above ail knights; a knight above all esquires; and so the people have placed a king under tliem, not above them.

Ans^ — The reason is not alike: 1. For all the knights united cannot make one lord; and all the esquires united cannot make one knight; but all the people united made David king at Hebron. 2. The king is above the peope, by eminence of derived authority as a watchman, and in actual supremacy; and he is inferior to them in fountain-power, as the effect to the cause.

06;. 2. — The parliament (saith Williams) " may not command the king ; why, then, make they supplication to him, if their vote be a law?

Ans. — They supplicate, ex decentia, of decency and oonveniency for his place, as a city supplicate a lord naayor; but they supplicate not ex debitOy of obligation, as bemrs seek alms, then should they be cyders. When a subject oppressed snpphcateth his sovereign tor justice, the king is obliged, by office, to give justice; and to hear the oppressed is not an act of grace and mercy, as to give alms, though it should proceed from mercy in the prmce, (Fsal. Ixxii. 13,) but an act of royal debt.

Ohj. 3.— The P. Prekte (c. 9, pp. 103, 104) objecteth: The most you clium to parliament is a co-ordinate power, which, in law and reason, run in equal terms. In

law, par in parem wm habet imperium; an equal cannot judge an equal, much less may an inferior usurp to;ud^e a superior. Our Lord knew, gratia visiomSy the woman taken in adultery to be guilty, but he would not sentence her; to teach us, not improbably, not to be both judge and witness. The parliament are judges, accusers, and witnesses against the kmg in their own cause, against the imperial laws.

Ans, 1. — The parliament is co-ordinate ordinarilv with the king in the power of making laws; but the co-ordination on the king's part is by derivation, on the parHa^ ment's part, oriatnaltter et/ontaliter, as in the fountain. 2. In ordinary there is coordination; but if the king turn tyrant, the estates are to use their fountain-power. And that of the law, par in parem, &c. is no better from his pen, that stealeth all he hath, than from Barclaius, Grotius, Amiseeus, Blackwood, &c.: it is cold and sour. We hold the parliament that made the king at Hebron to be above their own creature, the king. Barclaius saith more accurately, (1. 6, cent. Monarch, p. 129,) " It is absurd that the people should both be subject to the king, and command the king also. — Ans. 1. It is not absurd that a father natural, as a private man, should be subject to his son; even that Jesse, and his elder brother, the lord of all the rest, be subject to David their king. Boyalists say, Our late queen, being supreme magistrate, might by law have put to death her own husband, tor adultery or murder. 2. The parliament should not be both accuser, judge, and witness in their own cause. 1. It is the cause of religion, of God, of protestants, and of the mole people. 2. The oppressed accuse; there is no need of witnesses in raismg arms against the subjects. 3. The P. Prelate could not object this, if against the imperial laws the king were both party and judge in his own cause; and in these acts of arbitrary power, which he hath done through bad counsel, in wronging fondmental laws, raising arms against his subjects, bringing in foreign enemies into botn his kingdoms, &c. Now this is properly the cause of the king, as he is a man, and his own cause, not the cause of Gt)d; and by no law of nature, reason, or imperial statutes, can he be both judge

judge without any fellow sharers m power, (1.) He is not obliged by law to follow counsel or hold parliaments; for counsel is not

command. (2.) It is impossible to limit him even in the exercises of his power, which yet Dr Feme saith cannot be said; for if any of his power be retrenched, God is robbedi saith Maxwell. (3) He may by law play the tyrant gratis.

Feme objecteth, (sect* 7, p. 26,) — The king IS a fundamental ydth. the estates; now foundations are not to be stirred or removed*

Avis, — The king, as king, inspired with law, is a fundamental, and his power is not to be stirred; but as a man wasting his people, he is a destruction to the house and community, and not a fundamental in that notion.

Some object: The three estates, as men, and looking to their own ends, not to law and the public good, are not jBandamentals, and are to be judged by the king*

Ans.^Bj the people, and the conscience of the people, they are to be judged^

Obj^-^oxxi the people also do judge as cormpt men, and not as the people, and a politic body providing for their own safety*

Ans, — -I grant all; when Grod will bring a vengeance on Jerusalem, prince and peo> pie both are hardened to their ovra destruction* Now, God hath made all the three. In every government where there is democracy, there is some chosen ones resembling an aristocracy, and some one for order, presiding in democratical courts, re* sembling a king* In aristocracy, as in Hol*- land, there is somewhat of democracy,— the people have th^ir commtssi(^ers, and one duke or general, as the prince of Orange is some umbrage of royalty; and in monarchy there are the three estates of parliament, and these contain the three estates, and so somewhat of the three forms of government; and there is no one government just that hath not some of all three* Power and ab* solute monarchy is tyranny; unmixed democracy is comusion; untehipered aristocracy is factious dominion; and a limited monarchy hath from democracy respect to public good, without confusion. From aristocracy safety in multitude of counsels without factious emulation, and so a bar laid on tyranny by the joint powers of many; and from sovereignty union of many children in one &ther; and all the three thus contempered have their own sweet fmits through God's blessing, and their own diseases by accid^it, and through men's cormption; and neither reason nor Scripture shall warrant any one in its rigid purity without mixture. And God havmg chosen the best government to bring men fallen in sin to happiness, must warrant in any one a mixture of all three, as in mixed bodies the four elements are reduced to a fit temper resulting of all the four, where the acrimony of all the four first qualities is broken, and the good of all combined in one.

1. The king, as the king, is an unerrin? and living law, and by grant of Barclay,^ of old, was one of excellent parts, and noble through virtue and goodness ; and the goodness of a &ther as a &ther, of a tutor as a tutor, of a head as a head, of a husband as a husband, do agree to the king as a king ; so, as king, he is the law itself, commanding, governing, saving* 2* His will as king, or his royal will, is reason, conscience, law* 3. This will is politicly present (when his person is absent) in all parliaments, courts, and inferior judicatures. 4. The kmg, as king, cannot do wrong or violence to any* 5* Amongst the Bomans the name king and tyrant were common to one thing* (1.) Because, de facto^ some of their kings were tyrants, in respect of their dominion, rather than kings. (2.) Because he who was a tyrant, de facto ^ should have been, and was a king too, de jure, 6. It is not lawful either to disobey or resist a king as a king, no more than it is lawful to disobey a good law. '" What violence, what injustice and excess of passion the king mixeth in with his a/cts of government, are merely accidental to a king as king ; for, because men by their own innate goodness will not, yea, morally cannot do tibat which is lawful and just one to another, and do naturally, since the fall of man, violence one to another ; therefore, if there had not been sin, there should not have been need of a king, more than there should have been need of a tutor to defend the child whose father is not dead, or of a physician to cure sic^ess where there is healtli ; f<*, remove sin, and there is neither death nor sickness; but because sin is entered into the world, God devised, as a remedy of violence and injustice, a living, rational, breathing law, called a king> a judge, a father. Now the aberrations, violence, and oppression of this thing which is the Hving, rational, breathing law, is no medium, no mean intended by God and nature to remove violence. How shall violence re-

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

move yiolence? Therefort ka unjust king, as unjust, is not that genuine ordinance of God, appointed to remove injustice, but accidental to a king. So we may resist the injustice of the king, and not resist the king. 8. If, then, any cast off the nature of a king, and become habitually a tyrant, in so iar^e is not from Grod, nor any ordinance which Grod doth own. If the office of a tyrant f to speak so) be contrary to a king's offices, it is not from God, and so neither is the power from Grod. 9. Yea, lawd, (which are no less from God than the king's are,) when they begin to be hurtful, cessant mar teriaUter^ they leave off to be laws \ because they oblige non secundwn vim verborum^ sed in vtm sensua^ not according to the force of words, but according to sense, — I. non figura literarum F, de actione et o&- ligatione, L ita stipulattts. But who (saith the royalists) shall be judge betwixt the king and the people, when the people allege that the king is a tyrant.

Ans. — There is a court of necessity no less than a court of justice; and the fundamental laws must then speak, and it is with the people, in this extremity, as if they had no ruler.

Obj, 1. — But if the law be doubtful, as all human, all civil, all municipal laws may endure great dispute, — ^the peremptory person exponing the law must be the supreme judge. This cannot be the people, theretore it must be the king.

Ans. 1. — As the Scriptures in all fundamentals are clear, .and expone themselves, and (zctu primo condemn heresies, so all laws of men in their fundamentals, which are the law of nature and of nations, are clear; and, 2. Tyranny is more visible and intelligible than heresy, and is soon decerned. If a king bring in upon his native subjects twenty thousand Turks armed, and the xing lead them, it is evident they come not to make a friendly visit to salute the kingdom, aad depart in peace. The people mve a natural throne of policy in tlieir conscience to give warning, and materially sentence against the king as a tyrant, and so by nature are to defend themselves. Where tyranny is more obscure^ and the thread small, that it escape the eye of men, the king keepeth possession; but I deny that tyranny can be obscure long.

Obj. 2.-— Dr Feme (p. 3, sect. 6, p. 39).— A king may not, or cannot easily alter the irame of fundamental laws, he may make

some actual invasion in some transient and unfixed acts; and it is safer to bear these, than to raise a civil war of the body against the head.

Ans, 1. — If the king, as king, may alter any one wholesome law, by that same reason he may alter all. 2. You give short wings to an arbitrary prince, if he cannot overfly all laws to the subversion of the frmdamentals of a state, if you make him, as you dp, (1.) One who hath the sole legislative power,

who allenarly by himself maketh laws, and his parliament and council are only to give him advice, which by law he may as easily reject as they can speak words to him, he may in one transient act (and it is but one) cancel all laws made agaiiist idolatry and popery, and command, through bad counsel, in all his dominions, the Pope to be acknowledged as Christ's vicar, and idl his doctrine to be established as the catholic true religion. It is but one transient act to seal a {^xdon to the shedding of the blood of two hundred thousand killed by papists. (2.) If you make him a king, who may not be resisted in any case, and though he subvert all fundamental laws, he is accountable to God only: his people have no remedy, but prayers or flight.

Obj. 3.— Feme (p. 3. sect. 6, p. 39). — Limitations and mixtures in monarchies do not imply a forcible restraining power in subjects, for the preventing of the dOssolution of the state, but only a legal restraining power; and if such a restraming power be m the subjects by reservation, then it must be expressed in the constitution of the government, and in the covenant betwixt ttxe monarch and his people. But such a condition is unlawful, which will not have the sovereign power secured, — is unprofitable for king and people, — ^a seminary for seditions and jealousies.

Avis, L — I understand not a difference betwixt forcible restraining and le^ restraining: for he must mean by "legal," man's law, because he saith it is a law in the covenant betwixt the monarch and his people. Now, if this be not forcible and physical, it is only moral in the conscience of the king, and a cypher and a mere vanity; for God, not the people, putteth a restraint of conscience on the King, that he may not oppress his poor subjects; but he shall sin against Grod — ^that is a poor restraint: the goodness of the king, a sinful man, inclined from the womb to all sin, and so to tyranny, is no restraint.

LEX, BBX ; OR,

2. There is no necessity that the reserve be expressed in the covenant between king and people^ more than in contract of marriage between a husband and a wife; beside her jointure, you should set down this clause in the contract, that if the husband attempt to kill the wife, or the wife the husband, in that case it shall be lawful to either of them to part oompanv. For Dr Feme saith, " That personal defence is lawful in the people, if the king's assault be sudden, without colour of law, or inevitable." Yet the reserve of this power of defence is not necessarily to be expressed in the contract betwixt king and people. Exigencies of the law of nature cannot be set down in positive covenants, they are presupposed. 3. He saith, " A reservation of power whereby sovereignty is not secured, is unlawful." Lend me this argument : the riving awajr of a power of defence, and a making the king absolute, isunlawM, because by it the people is not secured ; but one man hath thereby the sword of God put in his hand, whereby ex oMcio he may, as king, cut the throats of thousastds, and be accoiintable to none therefor, but to God only. Now, if the non-securing of the king make a condition unlawful, the non-securing of a kingdom and church, yea, of the true region, (which are infinitely in worth above one single man,) may £sur more make the condition unlawful. 4. A legal restraint on a king is no more unprofitable, and a seminary of jealousies between king and people, than a legal restraint upon people; for the king, out of a non-restraint, as out of seed, may more easily educe tyranny and subversion of religion. If outlandish women tempt even a Solomon to idolatry, as people may educe sedition out of a legal restraint laid upon a king, to say nothing that tyranny is a more (mngerous sin than sedition, by how much more the lives of many, and true religion, are to be preferred to the safety of one, and a false peace.

Obj. 4. — An absolute monarch is firee from all forcible restraint, and so far as he is absolute from all legal restraints of positive laws. Now, in a limited monarch, there is only sought a legal restraint; and limitation cannot infer a forcible restraint, for an absolute monarch is limited also, not by dvil compact, but by the law of nature and nations, which he cannot justly transgress. If therefore an absolate monarch, being exorbitant, may not be resisted because he transgresseth the law of nature, how shall we thmk a limited monarch may be resisted for transgressing the bounds set by dvU agreement.

Ana. 1. — ^A legal restraint on the people is a forcible restraint; for if law be not backed with force, it is only a law of rewarding well-doing, which is no restraint, but an encouragement to do evil. K, then, there be a le^ restraint upon the king, without any force, it is no restraint, but only such a reouest as this: be a just prince, and we will give your maiesty two subsidies in one year. 2. I utterly denv that God ever ordained such an irrational creature as an absolute monarch. If a people unjustly, and against nature's dictates, make away irrevocably their own liberty, and the liberty of their posterity, which is not their's to dispose off, and set over themselves as base slaves, a sinning creature, with absolute power, he is their king, but not as he is absolute, and that he may not be forcibly resisted, notwithstanding the subjects did swear to his absolute power, (which oath in the point of absoluteness is unlawful, and so not obligatory,) I utterly deny. 3. An absolute monarch (saith he) is limited, but by law of nature. That is, Master Doctor, he is not limited as a monarch, not as an absolute monarch, but as a son of Adam; he is under the limits of the law of nature, which he should have been under though he had never been a king all his days, but a slave. But what then? Therefore, he cannot be resisted. Yes, Doctor, by your own grant he can be resisted: if he invade an innocent subject (say you) suddenly, without colour of law, or inevitably; and that because he transgresseth the law of nature. You say a Umited monarch can less be resisted for transgressing the bounds set by civil agreement. But what if the thus limited monarch transgress the law of nature, and subvert fundamental laws? He is then, you seem to say, to be resisted. It is not for simple transgression of a civil agreement that he is to be resisted. The linuted monarch is as essentially the Lord's anointed, and the power ordained of God, as the absolute monarch. Now resistance by all your grounds is unlawful, because of God's power and place conferred upon him, not because of men's positive covenant made with him.

To find out the essential difference betwixt a king and a tyrant, we are to observe, that it is one thing to sin against a man, another thing against a state. David, kUIing Uriah, committed an act of murder. Bat upon this supposition, that David is not punished for tnat murder, he did not so sin against the state, and catholic good of the state, that he tumeth tyrant and ceaseth to be a lawful king. A tyrant is he who habitually sinneth against the catholic good of the subjects and state, and subverteth law. Such a one should not be, as Jason, of whom it is said by ^neas Silvius, Graviterferehaty si non regnaret, qucui nesciret ease pri" vatus. mien such as are monstrous tyrants are not taken away by the estates, God pur* sueth them in wrath. Domitian was killed by his own family, his wife knowing of it; Aurelionus was killed with a thunderbolt; Darius was drowned in a river; Dioclesian, fearing death, poisoned himself; Salerius died eaten with worms, — ^the end also of Herod and Antiochus; Maxentius was swallowed up in a standing river; Julian died, being stricken through with a dart thrown at mm by a man or an angel, it is not known; Valens, the Arian, was burnt with fire in a litttle village by the Grothes; Anastasius, the Eutychian emperor, was stricken by Grod with thunder; Gundericus Vandalus, when he rose against the church of God, being apprehended by the devil, died. Sometime the state have taken order with tyrants: the empire was taken from Vitellius, Heliogabalus, Maximinus, Didius, Julianus; so was the two Childerici of France served; 80 were also Sigebertus, Dasabertus, and Luodovic II. or France: Cnristiemus of Denmark, Mary of Scotland, who killed her husband and raised forces against the kingdom; so was Henricus Valesius of Poland, for flying the kingdom; Sigismundus of Poland, ror violating his faith to the states.

. QUESTION XXV.

WHAT FORCE THE SI7FREHE LAW HATH OYER THE KINO, EVEN THAT LAW OF THE PEO- PLE'S SAFETY, CALLED " SALUS POPULI,"

The law of the twelve tables is, salus populi, suprema lex. The safety of the people is the supreme and cardinal law to which all laws are to stoop. And that from reasons: —

1. Originally: Because if the people be the first author, fountain and efiicient under Grod, of law and king, then their own safety must be principally sought, and their safety must be far above the Bug, as the safety of a cause, especially of an umversal cause, such as is the people, must be more than the safety of one, as Aristotle saith, (1. 3. polit., alias

I. 5,) 0u ft4n rt^awi ri /H^r itnfix,*'* ^*^ wr^r

— ^^ The part cannot be more excellent than the whole;" nor the effect above the cause.

2. Fincditer. This supreme law must stand ; for if all law, policy, maffbtrates and power be referred to the peoj^e's good as the end, (Rom. xiii. 4,) and to their quiet and peaceable life in godliness and honesty, then must this law stand, as of more worth than the king, as the end is of more worth than the means leading to the end, for the end is the measure and rule of the goodness of the mean ; and, finis ulHmus in infiuxu est potentissimusy the kins is good, because he conduceth much for ike safety of the people ; therefore, the safety of the people must be better.

3. By way of limitation : because no law in its letter hath force where the safety of the subject is in hazard ; and if law or idng be destructive to the people they are to be abolished. This is dear in a tyrant or a wicked man.

4. In the desires of the most holy : Moses, a prince, desired for the safety of God's people, and rather than Grod should destroy Ids people, that his name should be rased out of the book of life ; and David saith, (1 Chron. xxi. 17,) " Let thine hand, I pray thee, Lord my God, be on me, and on my father's house ; but not on thy people, that they should be plagued." This being a holy desire of these two public spirits, the object must be in itself true, and the sifety of GrOd's people and their happiness must be of more worth than the salvation of Moses and the life of David and his Other's house.

The Prelate (c. 16, p. 169) borroweth an answer to thi&--for he hatn none of his own — ^from Dr Feme (sect. 7, p. 28) : The safety of the subjects is the prime end of the constitution of government; but it is not the sole and adequate end of government in monarchy; for that is the safety of both king and people. And it beseemeth the king to proportion his laws for tlieir good; and it becometh the people to proportion all their obedience, actions, and en-

LEX, REX ; OR,

deayours for the safety, honour, and happiness of the king. It is impossible the people can have safety when sovereignty is weakened.

Ans, — ^The Prelate would have the other half of the end, why a king is set over a people, to be the safety and happiness of the kiag, as well as the safety ot the people. This is new logic indeed, that one and the same thing should be ihe mean and the end. The question is, For what end is a king made so happy as to be exalted king? The Prelate answereth, He is made happy that he may be happy, and made a king that he may be made a king. Now, is the king, as king, to intend this half end? that is, whether or no accepteth he the burden of setting his head and shoulders under the crown, for this end, that he may not only make the people happy, but also that he may make himself rich and honourable above his brethren, and enrich himself? I believe not; but that he feed the people of God; for if he intend himself, and his own honour, it is the intention of the man who is king, and intentio operands^ but it is not the intention of the king, as the king, or intentio operis. The king, as a king, is formally and essentially the " minister of God for our good," (Bom. xiii. 4 ; 1 Tim. ii. 2,) and cannot come under any notion as a long, but as a mean, not as an end, nor as that which he is, to seek himself. I conceive Grod did forbid this in the moulding of the first king. (Deut. xvii. 18, 19, 26.) He is a minister by office, and one who receiveth honour and wages for this work, that, ex qficioy he may feed nis people. But the Prelate saith, the people are to intend his riches and honour. 1 cannot say but the people may intend to honour the king; but the question is not, whether the people be to refer the king and his

fvemment as a mean to honour the king? conceive not. But that end which me people, in obeying the king, in being ruled by nim, may intend, is, (1 Tim. ii. 2,) '' That under him they may lead a quiet and peaceable life, in all godliness and honesty." And Grod's end in giving a king is the good and safety of his people.

P. I^relate (c. 16, p. 160). — To reason from the one part and end of monarchical government — the safety of the subjects, to the destruction and weiakemng of the other part of the end— the power of sovereignty and the royal prerogative, is a caption a divisis. If the king be not happy, and invested with the full power of a head, the body cannot be well. By anti-monarchists, the people at the beginning were necessitated to commit themselves, lives and fortunes, to the government of a king, because of themselves they had not wiSom and power enough to do it; and therefore, they enabled him with honour and power, without which he could not do this, being assured that he oould not choose, but most eamestlv and carefully endeavour this end, to wit, his own and the people's happiness; therefore, the safety of the people issueth from the safety of the king, as the life of the natural boay from the souL Weak government is near to anarchy. Puritans will not say, Q^otn8 modo essCf etiam pcenakj is better than non esse: the Scripture saith the contrary; it were better for some never to have been bom than to be. Tyranny is better than no government.

Ans, 1. — He knows not sophisms of logic who calleth this argument a divisis; for we king's honour is not the end of the king's government. He should seek the safety of state and church, not himself; himself is a private end, and a step to tyranny.

2. The Prelate lieth when he maketh us to reason from the safety of the subject to the destruction of the king. Feme, Barday, Grotius, taught the hungry scholar to reason so. Where read he uds ? The people must be saved, that is the supreme law, therefore, destroy the king. The devil and the Prelate both shall not fasten this on us. But thus we reason : when the man who is the king endeavoureth not the end of his royal place, but, through bad counsel, the subversion of laws, religion, and bondage of the kingdom, the free elites are to join with him for that end of safety, accordmg as God hath made them heads of tribes and princes of the people ; and if the king rehise to join with them, and will not do nis duty, I see not how they are in conscience liberated before God from doing their part,

3. If the P. Prelate call resisting the king by lawM defensive wars, the destruction of the head, he speaketh with the mouth of one excommunicated and delivered up to Satan.

4. We endeavour nothing more than the safety and happiness of the king, as king ; but his happmess is not to suSer him to destroy his subjects, subvert religion, arm papists who have slaughtered above two

THE LAW AND TUB PRISCE.

hundred thousand innocent protestants, only for the profession of that true religion which the king hath sworn to maintain. Not to rise in arms to help the Idns a&fainst these were to gratify him as a manf but to be accessory to his soul's destruction as a king.

5. That the royal prerogative is the end of a monarchy ordamed by Grod, neither Scripture, law, nor reason can admit.

6. The people are to intend the safety of other judges as well as the king's. If parliaments be destroyed, whose it is to make laws and kings, the people can neither be safe, free to serve Chnst, nor happy.

7. It is a lie that people were necessitated at the beginning to commit themselves to a king ; for we read of no king while Nimrod arose: fathers of families (who were not kii^), and others, did govern till then.

8. It was not want of wisdom, (for in many, and in the people, there must be more wisdom than in one man,) but rather corruption of nature and reciprocation of injunes that created kings and other judges.

9. The king shall oetter compass his end, to wit, the safety of the people, with Umited power, (vlacent mediocna,) and wth other judges added to help him, (Num. xi. 14, lo; I)eut. i. 12 — 15,) than to put in one man's hand absolute power ; for a sinful man's head cannot bear so much new wine, such as exorbitant power is.

10. He is a base flatterer who saith. The king cannot choose, but earnestly and carefiilly endeavour his own and the people's happiness ; that is, the king is an angel, and cannot sin and decline from the duties of a king. Of the many kings of Judah and Israel, how many chose this ? All the good kings that liave been may be written in a gold ring.

11. The people's safety dependeth indeed on the king, as a king and a happy gover* nor ; but me people smJl never be fattened to eat the wind of an imaginary prerogative royal.

12. Weak government, that is, a king with a limited power, who hath more power about his head than within his head, is a strong king, and far &om anarchy.

13. I blow not what he meaneth, but his master Arminius's way and words are here, for Arminians say,^ " That being in the damned, eternally tormented, is no benefit; it were better they never had being than to be eternally tormented ;" and this they say to the defiance of the doctrine of eternal reprobation, in which we teach, that though by accident, and because of the damned's abuse of being and life, it were to them better not to be, as is said of Judas, yet simpliciter comparing being with nonbeing, and considering the eternity of miserable being in relation to the absolute liberty of the Former of all things, who maketh use of the sinful being of clay-vessels for the illustration of the glory of his justice and

Sower, (Kom. ix. 17, 22 ; 1 ret. ii. 8 ; ude V. 4,) it is a censuring of God and his unsearcnable wisdom, and a condemning of the Almighty of cruelty, (Grod avert blasphemy of the unspotted and holy Majesty,) who, by Armiman grounds, keepeth ^e damned in life and being, to be fuel eternally for Tophet, to declare the glory of his justice. But the Prelate behoved to go out of his way to salute and gratify a proclaimed enemy of free grace, Arminius, and hence he would infer that the king, wanting his prerogative royal and fulness of absolute power to do wickedly, is in a penal and miserable condition, and tliat it were better for the king to be a tyrant, with absolute liberty to destroy and save alive at his pleasure, as is said of a tyrant, (Dan. v. 19,) than to be no king at all. And here consider a principle of royalists' court faith: — 1. The xing i& no kuig, but a lame and miserable judge, if he have not irresistible power to waste and destroy. 2. The king cannot be happy, nor the people safe, nor can the king do good in saving the needy, except he have the uncontrollable and unUmited power of a tyrant to crush the poor and needy, and lay waste the mountain of the Lord's inheritance. Such court-ravens who feed upon the souls of living kings, are more cruel than ravens and vultures, who are but dead carcases.

Williams, bishop of Ossory, answereth to the maxim, Salits populi^ &c. " No wise king but will carefully provide for the people's safety, because his safety and honour is included in theirs, his destruction in theirs." And it is, saith Lipsius, egri animi propria um nihil diu pati, Absalom was persuaded there was no justice in the land when he intendeth rebellion; and the poor Prelate, following him, spendeth pages to prove that goods, hfe, chastity, and fame, dependeth on the safety of the king, as the breath of

LEX, BEX ; OB,

our nostrils, our nur8e-&ther, our head, corner-stone, and judge (c. IT, 6, 18, 1). The reason why all disorder was in ohuxxdi and state was not hecause there was no judge, no government; none can be so stupid as to imagine that. But because, 1. They wanted the most exoellent of goyernments. 2. Because aristocracy was weakened so as there was no right. No doubt priests there were, but (Hos. iv.) either they would not serve, or were over-awed. No doubt in those days they had judges, but priests and judges were stoned by a rasctuly multitude, and they were not able to rule; therefore it is most consonant to Scripture to say. Solus tegis suprema poptdi aZtM, the safety of the king and ms prerogative royal is the safest sanctuary for the people. So Hos. iii. 4 ; Lament. iL 9.

Ans. 1. — ^The question is not of the wisdom, but of the power of the king, if it should be bounded by no law.

2. The flatterer may know, there be more foolish kings in the world than wise, and that kings misled with idolatrous queens, and by name Ahab ruined himself, and his posteritv and kin^om.

3. The salvation and happiness of men standing in the exalting of Christ's throne and the gospel, therefore every king and every man will exalt the throne ; and so let them have an uncontrollable power, without constraint of law, to do what they list, and let no bounds be set to kings over subjects. By this argument their own wisdom is a law to lead uiem to heaven.

4. It is not Absalom's mad malcontents in Britain, but there were really no justice to protestants, — ^all indulgence to papists, popery, Arminianism, — idolatry printed, preached, professed, rewarded by authority, parliaments and church assemblies; the bulwarks of justice and religion were de-^ nied, dissolved, crushed, &c.

5. That by a kin^ he understandeth a monarch, ( Judg. xvii!) and that such a one as Saul, of abs^ute power, and not a judge, cannot be proved, for there were no kings in Israel in the judges' days, — ^the government not being dianged till near the end of Samuel's government.

6. And that they had no judges, he saith, it is not imaginable. But I rather believe God than the Prelate. Every one did what was right in his own eyes, because there was none to put ill-doers to shame. Possibly the estates of Israel governed some

way for mere necessity, but wantmg a supreme judge, which they should have, they were loose; but this was not because where there is no king, as P. P. would insinuate, there was no government, as is dear.

7. Of tempered and limited monarchy I think as honourably as the Prelate, but uiat absolute and unlimited monarchy is more excellent than aristocracy, I shall then believe when royalists shall prove such a government, in so £: as it is absolute, to be of God.

8. That aristocracy was now weakened I believe not, seeing Grod so highly commendeth it, and calleth it his own reigning over his people. (1 Sam. viii. ?•) The weakening of it through abuse is not to a purpose, more than the abuse of monarchy.

0. No doubt, saith he, (Hos. iv.) they were priests and judges, but they were over-awed, as they are now. I think he would say, (Hos. iii. 4,) otherwise he citeth Scripture sleeping, that the priests of Antichrist be not only over-awed, but out of the earth. I yield tnat the king be limited, not over-Awed, I think God's law and man's law alloweth.

10. The safety of the king, as king, is not only safety, but a blessing to church and state, and therefore this P. Prelate and bis fellows deserve to be hanged before the sun, who have led him on a war to destroy him and his protestant subjects. But the safety and flourishing of a king, in the exercises of an arbitrary unlimited power against law and religion, and to the destruction of his subjects, is not the safety of the people, nor the safety of the king's soul, which tnese men, if they be the priests of the Lord, should care for.

The Prelate cometh to refute the learned and worthy Observator. The safetv of the people is the supreme law, therefore the king is bound in duty to promote aU and every one of his subjects to all happiness. The Observator hath no such inference, the king is bound to promote some of his subjects, even as king, to a gallows, especially Irish rebels, and many bloody mahgnants. But the Prdate will needs have Qoa rigorous (hallowed be his name) if it be so; for it is impossible to the tenderest-hearted &ther to do so. Actual promotion of all is impossible. That the king intend it of aU his subjects, as good subjects, by a throne established on righteousness and judgment is that which the worthy Observator meaneth. Other things here are answered.

THE LAW AND THB PRINCE.

The sum of his second answer is a repetition of what he hath said. I gire my word, in a pamphlet of one hundred and ninetyfour pa^, I never saw more idle repetitions 01 one thing twenty times before said; bat (p. 168) he saith, " The safelr of the king and his subjects, in the moral notion, may be esteemed mondly the same, no less tluui the soul and the body make one personal subsistence."

^t.^-Thi8 is strange logic. The king and his sabjects are ens per aggregationem, and the king, as king, hath one moral subsistence, and the people anotho*. Hath the father and the son, the master and the servant, one moral subsistence? But the man speaketh of their well-being, and then he must mean that our king's government — that was not long ago, and is yet, to wit, tlie popery, Arminianism, idolatry, cutting off men's ears and noses, banishing, impnsonment for speaking against popery, arming of papists to slay protestants, pardoning the blcxNl of Ireland, that I fear, shall not be soon taken away, &c., — is identically the same with the life, safety, and happiness of protestants. Then life and deatn, justice and injustice, idolatry and sincere worship, are identically one, as the soul oi the Pre late'and his body are one.

The third is but a repetition. The acts of royalty (saith the Observator) are acts of duty ana obligation, therefore, not acts of grace properly so called; therefore we may not tiumk the king for a courtesy. This is no consequence. What fothers do to children are acts of natural duty and of natural grace, and yet children owe gratitude to parents, and subjects to good kings, in a le^ sense. No, but in way of courtesy oi3y. The observator said, the king is not a father to the whole collective body, and it is well said he is son to tliem, and they his maker. Who made the king? Policy answereth, The state made him, and divinity, Grod made him.

The Observator said well, the peoj^'s weakness is not the king's slarength. The Prelate saith. Amen. He said. That that perii^eth not to the king, which is granted to the people. The Prelate (p. 170) denieth, because, what the king hath in trust from God, the king cannot mSke away to another, nor can any take it finom him without sacrilege,

Ans — True indeed, if the king had royalty by immediate trust and infusion by God,

as EHas had the spirit of prophecy, that he cannot make away. Royalists dream that God, immediately from heaven, now infusetili foculty. and right to crowns without any word of God. It is enough to mske an enUmsiast leap up to the throne and kill kin^. Judge if these fknalios be favourers of kmgs. But if the king have royalty mediately, by the people's Tree consent, from Grod, there is no reason but people give as much power, even by ounce weights, (for power IS strong wine and a great mocker,) as they know a weak man's head will bear, and no more. Power is not an immediate inheritance from heaven, but a birthright of the |>eople b<Towed from them; they may let it out for their good, and resume it when a man is drunk with it. The man will have it conscience on the king to fight and destroy his three kingdoms for a dream, his prerogative above law. But the truth is, prelates do engage the king, his house, honour, subjects, church, for their cursed mil^es.

The Prelate (p. 172) vexeth the reader with repetitions, and saith, The kmgmust proportion his government to the siSety of the people on the one hand, and to his own safety and power on the other hand.

Ans. — What the king doth as king, he doeth it for the happiness of his people. The king is a relative; yea, even his own happiness that he seeketh, he is to refer to the good of Grod's people. He saith farther. The safety of the people indudeth the safety of the king:, because the word populus is so taken; which he proveth by a raw, sickly rabble of words, stolen out of Passerat's dictionary. His &,ther, the schoolmaster, may whip him for frivolous etymologies.

This supreme law, saith the Prelate, (p. 175,^ is not above the law of prerogative royw, the highest law, nor is rex above lex. The democracy of Rome had a supremacy above laws, to make and unmake laws; and will they force this power on a monarch, to the destruction of sovereignty?

Ans, — This, which is stolen from Spalato, Barclay, Grotius, and others, is easuy answered. The supremacy of people is a law of nature's self-preservation, above all positive laws, and above the king, and is to regulate sovereignty, not to destroy it. If this supremacy of majesty was in people before they have a king, then, 1. They lose it not by a voluntary choice of a king; for a king is chosen for good, and not for the

people's loss, therefore, they must retain this power, in habit and potency, even when they have a king. 2. Then supremacy of majesty is not a beam of divinity proper to a king only. 3. Then the people, having royal sovereignty virtually in them, make, and so unmade a king, — all which the Prelate denieth.

This supreme law (saith the Prelate, p. 176, begging it from Spalato, Amisseus, Grotius) advances the king, not the people; and the sense is, the kingoom is really some time in such a case that the sovereign must exercise an arbitrary power, and not stand upon private men's interests, or transgressing ot laws made for the private good of individuals, but for the preservation of itself, and the public, may break through all laws. This he may, in the case when sudden foreign invasion threateneth ruin inevitably to king and kingdom: a physician may rather cut a gangrened member than suffer the whole body to perish. The dictator, in case of extreme dangers, (as Livy and Dion. Halicamast show us,) had power according to his own arbitrament, had a sovereign commission in peace and war, of life, deam, persons, &c., not co-ordinate, not subordinate to any.

Ans, 1. — It is not an arbitrary power, but naturally tied and fettered to this same supreme law, salus populiy the safety of the people, that a king break: through not the law, but the letter of the law, tor the safety of the people; as the chirurgeon, not by any prerogative that he hath above the art of chirurgery, but by necessity, cutteth off a gangrened member. Thus it is not arbitrary to the king to save his people from ruin, but by the strong and imperious law of the people's safety he doth it; for if he did it not, he were a murderer of his people. 2. He is to stand upon transgression of laws according to their genuine sense of the people's safety; for good laws are not contrary one to another, though, when he breaketh through the letter of the law, yet he breaketh not the law; for if twenty thousand rebels invade Scotland, he is to command all to rise, though the formality of a parliament eannot be had to indict the war, as our law provideth; but the king doth not command all to rise and defend themselves by prerogative royal, proper to him as king, and incommunicable to any but to himself.

1. There is no such din and noise to be

made for a king and his incommunicable prerogative; for though the king were not at all, yea, though he command the contrary, (as he did when he came against Scotland with an English army,) the law of nature teacheth all to rise, without the king.

2. That the king command this, as king, is not a particular positive law ; but he doth it as a man and a member of the kingdom. The law of nature (which knoweth no oream of such a prerogative) forceth him to it, as every member is, by nature's indictment, to care for the whole.

3. It is poor hungry skill in this new statist, (for so he nameth all Scotland,) to say that any laws are made for private interests, and the good of some individuals. Laws are not £kws if they be not made for the safety of the people.

4. It is iaLse that the king, in a public danger, is to care for himself as a man, with the ruin and loss of any ; yea, in a public calamity, a good king, as Diivid, is to desire he may die that the public may be saved, 2 Sam. xxiv. 17 ; Exod. xxxii. 32. It is commended of all, that the emperor Otho, yea, and Richard II. of England, as M. Speed saith, (Hist, of Engird, p. 757,) resigned their sdi^oms to eschew the e&- sion of blood. The Prelate adviseth the king to pass over all laws of nature, and slay thousands of innocents, and destroy church and state of three kingdoms, for a straw, and supposed prerogative royal.

1. Now, certainly, prerogative and absoluteness to do good and ill, must be inferior to a law, the end whereof is the safety of the people. For David willeth the pestilence may take him away, and so his prerogative, that the people may be saved (2. Sam. xxiv. 17) ; for prerogative is cumulatiye to do good, not privative to do ill ; and so is but a mean to defend both the law and the people.

2. Prerogative is either a power to do good or ill, or both. If the first be said, it must be limited by the end and law for which it is ordained. A mean is no farther a mean, but in so far as it conduceth to the end, the safety of all. If the second be admitted, it is licence and tyranny, not power from God. If the third be said, both reasons plead against this, that prerogative should be the king's end in the present wars.

3. Prerogative being a power given by

the mediation of the people; yea, suppose (which is false) that it were given immediately of God, yet it is not a thmg for which the king should raise war against his subjects; tor Grod will ask no more of the king than he giveth to him. The Lord reapeth not where he soweth not. J£ the militia, and other things, be ordered hitherto for the holding off Iriah and Spanish invasion by sea, and so for the good of the land, seeing the king in his own person cannot make use of the militia, he is to rejoice that his subjects are defended. The king cannot answer to Grod for the justice of war on his part. It is not a case of conscience that the king should shed blood for, to wit, because the under-officers are such men, and not others of his choosing, seeing the kingdom is defended sufficiency except where cavaliers destroy it. And to me this is an unanswerable argument, that the cavaliers destroy not the kingdoms for this prerogative royaJ, as the prmcipal ground, but for a deeper design, even for that which was working by prelates and malignants before the late troubles in both kin&fdoms.

4. The king is to intend the safety of his people, and the safetv of the king as a governor ; but not as uiis king, and this man Charles, — ^that is a selfish end. A king David is not to look to that ; for when the peofile was seeking his life and crown, he saith, Psal. iii. 8,) " Thy blessing upon thy people." He may care for, and intend that the king and government be safe ; for if the kingdom be destroyed, there cannot be a new kingdom and church on earth again to serve Grod in that generation, (Fsal. Ixxxix. 47,) but they may easily have a new king again ; and so the safety of the one cannot in reason be intended as a collateral end with the safety of the other ; for there is no imaginable comparison betwixt one man, with all his accidents of prerogative and absoluteness, and three national churches and kindgoms. Better the king weep for a childish trifle of a prerogative than that popery be erected, and three kingdoms be destroyed by cavaliers for their own ends.

6. The dictator's power is, 1. A &ct, and proveth not a point of conscience. 2. His power was in an exigence of extreme , danger of the commonwealth. The P. Fre- I late pleadeth for a constant absoluteness above laws to the king at all times, and that jure divino. 3. The dictator was the people's creature ; therefore the creator.

the people, had that sovereignty over him. 4. The dictator was not above a king; but the Komans ejected kings. 5. The dictator's power was not to destroy a state: he i^ight be, and was resisted; he might be deposed.

P. Prelate (p. 177).— The safety of the people is pretended as a law, that the Jews must put Christ to death, and that Saul spared Agag.

Ans, 1. — No shadow for either in the word of Grod. Caiaphas prophecied, and knew not what he said; but that the Jews intended the salvation of the elect, in killing Christ, or that Saul intended a public good in sparing Agag, shall be the Prelate's divinity, not mme. 2. What, howbeit many should abuse this law of the people's safety, to wrong good kings, it ceaseth not therefore to be a law, and licenceth not ill kings to place a tyrannical prerogative above a just dictate of nature.

In the last chapter (c. 16] the Prelate hath no reasons, only he would have kings holy, and this he proveth from Apocrypha books, because he is ebb in Holy Scripture; but it is Romish holiness, as is clear, — 1. He must preach something to himself, that the king adore a tree-altar. Thus kings must be most reverend in their gestures (p. 182). 2. The king must hazard his sacred life and three kingaoms, his crown, royal posterity, to preserve sacred things, that is, antichristian Romish idols, images, altars, ceremonies, idolatry, popery. 4. He must, upon the same pam, maintain sacred persons, that is, greasy apostate prelates. The rest, I am weary to trouble the reader withall, but know ex ungue leonem.

QUESTION XXVI.

WHETHER THE KING BE ABOVE THE LAW

We may consider the question of the law's supremacy over the king, either in the supremacy of constitution of the king, or of direction, or of limitation, or of co-action and punishing. Those who maintain this, " The king is not subject to the law," if their meaning be, " The kmg as king is not subject to the law's direction," they say nothing; for the king, as the king, is a living law; then they say, " The law is not subject to the

law's direction:" a very improper speedi; or, the king, as king, is not subject to the oo* action m the law: that is true; for he who is a living law, as such, cannot punish himself, as the law saith.

Assert, 1. — The law hath a supremacy of constitution above the king: —

1. Because the king by nature is not king, as is proved ; therefore, he must be king by a pontic constitution and law; and so the law, in that consideration, is above the king, because it is from a civil law that there is a king rather than any other kind of governor. 2. It is by law, that amongst many hundred men, tnis man is king, not that man ; and because, by the which a thing is constituted, by the same thing it is, or may be dissolved; therefore, 3. As a community, finding such and such qualifications as the law requireth to be in a king, in this man, not in that man,-^therefore upon lawg*ound they make him a king, and, upon w-grounds and just demerit, they may unnmke him again ; for what men voluntary do upon condition, the condition being removed, they may undo again*

Assert. 2. — It is denied by none but the

king is under the directive power of the law,

though many liberate the kmg from the coactive power of a civil law. But I see not

what direction a civil law can give to the

king if he be above all obedience, or disobedience, to a law, seeing all law-direction is in

ordine ad ohedi&ntiam^ in order to obey, except thus far, that the light that is in the

civil law is a moral or natural guide to conduct a king in his walking ; but this is the

morality of the law which enlighteneth and

informeth, not any obligation that aweth the

king ; and so the king is under God's and

nature's law. This is nothing to the purpose.

Assert, 3. — The b'ng is under the law, in

re^d of some coercive limitation ; because,

1. There is no absolute power given to him

to do what he listeth, as a man. And because, 2. God, in making Saul a king, doth

not by any royal stamp give him a power to

sin, or to play the tyrant ; io€ which cause I

expone these of the law, omma sunt possi'

bilta regif imperator omnia potest, Baldus

prima constitut, C* col. 2. Chassanceus in

catalog, glories mundi. par. 5. considerat.

24. et tanta est ejus celsitudo, ut non posset

ei imponi lex in regno suo. Curt, in consol.

66. col. 6. ad. F. Petrus Rebuff. Notab. 3.

repet, I. unicce. C. de sentent. quas pro eo

quod n. ITjj'. 363. All these go no otha*wise but thus, The king can do s£ things which by a law he can do, and that holdeth him, id possumus quod jure possumus; and, therefore, the kmg cannot be above the covenant and kw made betwixt him and his people at his coronation-oath; for then the covenant and oath should bind him only by a natural obligation, as he is a man, not by a civil or

?olitic obligation, as he is a king. So then, . It were sufficient that the king should swear that oath in his cabinet-chamber, and it is but a mocking of an oath that he swear it to the people. 2. That oath given by the representative-kingdom should also oblige the subjects naturally, tnforo Dei, not politically, inforo humanOj upon the same reason. 3. He may be resisted as a man*

Assert. 4. — The fourth case is, if the king be under the obliging politic co-action of dvu laws, for that he, inforo Dei, be under the morality of civil laws, so as he cannot contravene any law in that notion but he must sin against God, is granted on all hands. (Deut. xvii. 20 ; Josh. i. 8 ; 1 Sam. xii. 15.) That the king bind himself to the same law that he doth bind others, is decent, and obligeth the king as he is a man; because, 1. (Matt, vii. 12,) It is said to be the law and the prophets, " All things whatsoever ye would men should do unto you, do ye even so to them." 2. It is the law, imperator I. 4. digna vox. C. de lege et tit. Quod quisque juris in alium statuit, eodem et ipse utatur. Julius Csesar commanded the youth who had deflowered the emperor's daughter to be scourged above that which the Lsiw allowed. The youth said to the emperor, Dixisti legem CcBsar, — " You appointed the law, Csesar." The emperor was so oiFended with himself that he had failed against the law, that for the whole day he refused to taste meat.^

Assert. 5.— The king cannot but be subject to the co-active power of fundamental laws. Because, 1. This is a fundamental law that the free estates lay upon the king, that all the power that they give to the king, as king, is for the good and safety of the people; and so what he doth to the hurt of his subjects, he doth it not as king. 2. The law saith. Qui habet potestatem coTistituendi etiam et jus ctdimendi, L nemo. 37. I. 21. de reg. jure. Those who have power to make have power to unmake kin^. 3. Whatever the king doth as king, tnat he

1 Plntarcb in Apotbf g. lib. 4.

THB LAW AND THE PRINCE.

doth by a power borrowed from (or bj a fiduciary power which is his by trust) the estates, who made him king. He must then be nothing but an eminent servant of the state, in the punishing of others. If, therefore, he be unpunishable, it is not so much because his royal power is above all law oo-action, as because one and the same man cannot be both the punisher and the punished; and this is a physical incongruity rather than a moral absurdity. So the law of Grod layeth a duty on the inferior magistrate to use the sword against the murderer, and that by virtue of liis office; but I much doubt, if for that he is to use the sword against himself in the case of murder, for this is a truth I purpose to make good. That suffering, as sufPering, according to the substance and essence of passion, is not commanded by any law of Grod or nature to the sufferer, but only the manner of suffering. I doubt if it be not, by the law of nature, lawfiil even to the ill-doer, who hath deserved death by God's law, to fly from the sword of the lawful magistrate; only the manner of suffering with patience is commanded of Grod. 1 know the law saith here, That the magistrate is both judge and the executor of the sentence against himself, in his own cause, for the excellency of his office.^ Therefore these are to be distinguished, whether the kin?, ratione dementi et jure^ by law be puni^ble, or if the king can actually be punished corporally by a law of man, he remaining king; and since he must be a punisher himself, and that by virtue of his office. In matters of goods, the king may be both judge and punisher of himself, as our law provideth that any subject may plead his own heritage from the king before tne inferior judges, and if the king be a violent possessor, and in mala fide for many years, by law he is obliged, upon a decree of the lords, to execute the sentence against himself, ex ofido, and to restore the lands, and repay the damage to the just owner; and this the king is to do against himself, ex ojlcio. I grant here the king, as king, punisheth himself as an unjust man, but because bodily suffering is mere violence to nature, I doubt if the king, ex oficio^ is to do or inflict any bodily punishment on himself. Nemo potest a scipso cogi. L ille a quOy sect, 13.

^ Ma|[i9tratii8 ipse est judex et execntor contra Bcipsam* in propria causa, propter excellentiam sni officii, 1. si pater familias, et 1. et hoc. Tiberius GaBsar, F. de Hered. hoc. just.

Assert, 6. — There be some laws made in favour of the king, as king, as to pay tribute. The king must be above this law as king. True, but if a nobleman of a great rent be elected king, I know not if he can be free from paying to himself, as king, tribute, seeing this is not allowed to the kmg by a divine law, (Rom. xiiL 6,) as a reward of his work; and Christ expressly maketh tribute a thing due to Caesar as a king. (Matt. xxii. 21.) There be some solenmities of the law from which the king may be free; Frickman (D. c. 3, n. 78) relateth what they are; they are not laws, but some circumstances belonging to laws, and he answereth to many places aUeged out of the lawyers, to prove the king to be above the law. Malderus (in under that law, which concemeth ail the commonwealth equallv in regard of the matter, and that by the law of nature; but he will not have him subject to these laws which concemeth the subjects as subjects, as to pay tribute. He citeth Francisc. a Vict. Covarruvias, and Turrecremata. He also will have the prince under positive laws, such as not to transport victuals; not because the law bindeth mm as a law, but because the making of the law bindeth him, tanquam conditio sine qua non, even " as he who teacheth another that he should not steal, he should not steal himself." (Kom. ii.) But the truth is, this is but a branch of tne law of nature, that I should not commit adultery, and theft, and sacrile^, and such sins as nature condemneth, ii I shall condemn them in others, and doth not prove that the king is under the co-active power of civil laws. Ulpianus (h 31. F. de regibus) saith, " The prince is loosed £rom laws." Bodine (de Bepub. 1. 7^ c. 8). — " Nemo tmperat sibiy^ no man commandeth himself. Tholosanus saith, (de Bep. 1. 7, c. 20,) " Ipsius est dare, non accipere leges,^^ the prince giveth laivs, but receiveth none. Donellus (Lib. 1, Comment, a 17) distinguisheth betwixt a law and a roycd law proper to the king. Trentlerus ^vol. i. 79, 80) saith, •* The prince is freed irom laws;" and that he obeyeth laws, de honestate, non de necessitate, upon honesty, not of necessity. Thomas P. f 1. q. 96, art. 6,) and with hSm Soto Chregonus de Valen" tia, and other schoolmen, subject the king to the directive power of the law, and liberate him of the co-active power of tJie law.

Assert, 7. — If a ting turn a parricide, a lion, and a waster and destroyer of the

people^ as a man he is subject to the <?o-actiye power of the laws of the hiad., Tf any law should hinder that a tyrant should not be punidied by law, it must be ]£)ecause he hath not a superior but God, for royalists build all upon this; but this ground is false: —

Arg, 1. — Because the estates of the kingdom, who gave him the crown, are above him, and they may take away what they gave him; as the law of nature and God saith. If they had known he would turn tyrant, they would never have given him the sword; and so, how much ignorance is in the contract they made with the king, as little of will is in it; and so it is not every way willing, but, being conditional, is supposed to h% against their will. They gave the power to nim onlv for their good, and that they may make the king, is dear. (2 Chron. xxiiL 11 } 1 Sam. x. 17, 24 ; Deut. xvU. 14 — 17 ; 2 Kings xi. 12 ; 1 Kings xvi. 21; .2 Kings x, 5; Judg. ix. 6.) Tourscore valiant men of the priests withstood Uzziah with corporal violence, and thrust him out, and cut him off from the house of the Lord, (2 Chron. xxvi. 18.)

Arg, 2. — If the prince's place do not put him above the laws of church disciplme, (Matt, xviii., for CSirist excepteth none, and how can men except?) and if the rod of Christ's " lips smite the earth, and slay the wicked,*' (Isa. xL 4,) and the prophets Elias, Nathan, Jeremiah, Isaiah, &c., and John Baptist, Jesus Christ, and his Apostles, have used this rod of censure and rebuke, as servants under God, against kings, this is a sort of gpiritual co-action of laws put in execution by men; and by due proportion corporal coaction being tne same ordinance of God, though of another nature, must have the like power over all, whom the law of God hath not excepted; but God's law excepteth none ^ all.

Arg^ 3. — It is presumed that God hath not provided better for the safety of the part than of the whole, especially when he maketh the part a mean for the safety of the whole. But if God have provided that the king, who is a part of the commonwealth, shall be free of all punishment, though he be a habitual destroyer of the whole kingdom, seeing God hath given him to be a father, tutor, saviour, defender thereof, and destined him as a mean for their safety, then must God have worse, not better, provided for the safety of the whole than of the part. The proposition is clear, in that God (Rom. xiii. 4 ; 1 Tim. ii.

2) hath ordained the ruler, and given tc( him the sword to defend the whole kxngdom"'and city; but we read nowhere that the' liord hath given the sword to the whole kingdoip, to defend one man, a king, though a ri^lejQ, going on in a tyrannical way of destroying all his subjects. The assumption is evi4en.t: for then tne king, turning tyrant, might set an army of Turks, Jews, or cruel !papi^.t,o destroy the church of God, without al^ifear of law or punishment. Yea, this '^ 6o|^- trary to the doctrine of royalists : yox, ytmzetus {adversus Buckananum, p. 275| saith of Nero, tlmt he, seeking to destroy the senate and people of Home, and seeking to make new laws for himself, eoadd^ jur^ regnif lost right to the kingdom. And Barclaius (Monarch. 1. 3, c. uTt. p. 213,j saith, a tyrant, such as Caliaula, spdUare se jure regniy spoileth himself of the right to the crown. And in that same place, regerii,' si regnum suum alienee ditioni manciparit, regno cadere^ if the king sell his kingdom, he loseth the title to the crown. Grotius, (de jure belli et pacts, I, i. c. 4, n. 7^) "Si rex kostili animo in totius populi ea^tium f&ratur, amittit regnum, if he turn enemy to the kingdom, for their destructibn, he loseth his kingdom, because (saith he) voluntas imperandi, et voluntas perdendi, simul consistere non possunt, a will or mind to govern and to destroy cannot consist together in one. Now, if this be true, that a iing, turning tyrant, loseth title to the crotm, this is either a falling from his royal title only in G^kI's court, or it is a losmg of it before men, and in the court of his stuDJects. If the former be said, 1. He is no Mng, having before God lost his royal title ; and yet the people is to obey him as " the minister of Ged," and a power from God, when as he is no such thing. 2. In vain do these authors provide remedies to save the people from a tyrannous waster of the peopW, if they speak of a tyrant who is no kmg ifi God's court only, and yet remaineth a king to the people in regard of the law : for "the places speak of remedies that God hath' jprovided against tyrants cum titulo, such as are lawful lings, but turn tyrants. Now by this they provide no remedy at all, if only in God's court, and not in man's court also, a tyrant lose his title. As for tyrants sine titulo, such as usurp the throne, and have no just claim to it, Barclaius (adver. Monarch, L iv. e, 10. j). 268) saith, " Any private man may kill him as a pubHc enemy

THB LAW AND TIDE PRINCE.

of the state:'' bat if he lose his title to the crown in the court of men, then is there a court on mtOi to judge the king, and so he is under the eo-actiTe power of a law; — then a king may be resisted, and jret those who resist liim do not incur damnation; the contrary whereof royalists endeavour to proy e from Bom. ziii. ;~^then the people may unking one who was a king. But I would know who taketh that!kt9 wi fiK>m him, whereby he is a king, that beam of divine majesty? Kot the people; because royalists say, they neither can gire nor take away royal dignity, and so they cannot unking him.

Arg, 4. — The more will be in the consent, (saith Ferd. Vasquez, 1. i. o. 41,) the obli^tion is the stricter. So doubled words (saiui the law, 1. 1, sect. 13, n. 13) oblige more strictly. And all laws of kings, who are rational fathers, and so lead us by laws, as b^ rational means to peace and external happiness, are contracts of king and people. Omms lex tponsio et contractus Beip, sect. 1, Intt, de ver, reUg. Now the king, at his coronation-corenant with the people, giveth a most intense consent, an oath, to be a keeper and preserver of all good laws: and so hardly he can be freed from the strictest obligation that law can impose. And if he keep laws by office, he is a mean to preserve laws; and no mean can be superior and above the end, but inferior thereunto.

Arg. 5. — Bodine proveth, (de Rep, I, 2, e. 5, p. 221, j that emperors at first were bat princes of the commonwealth, and that sovereignty remained still in the senate and peof^e. Marius SaLomonius, a learned B.0man divilian, wrote six books de prindpatUy to refute the supremacy of emperors above the state. Ferd. Vasq. (illust. qtiest. part, 1. 1. 1, n. 21) proveth, tnat the prince, by royal dignity, leaveth not off to be a citizen, a mem&r of the politic body, and not a king, but a keeper of laws.

Arg, 6. — Hence, the prince reroaineth, even being a prince, a social creature, a man as well as a kmg; one who must buy, seU, promise, contract, dispose: therefore, he is not reaula regulani, but under rule of law; for it IS impossible, if the king can, in a political way, live as a member of a society, and do and perform acts of policy, and so perform them, as he may, by his office, buy and not pay; promise, and vow, and swear to men, and not perform, nor be obliged to men to render a reckoning of his oatn, and kill and destroy,— *and yet in curia political

societatiSj in the court of human policy, be free: and that he may give inheritances, as just rewards of virtue and well-doing, and take them away again. Yea, seeing these sins, that are not punishable before men, are not sins before men, if all the shis and oppressions of a prince be so above the punishment that men can inflict, they are not sins before men; by which means the king is loosed from all ffuiltiness of the sins agauist the second tabk: for the ratio formalism the formal reason, why the judge, by warrant from Grod, oondeameth, in the court of men, the guilty man, is, that he hath sinned against human society through the scandal of blasphemy, or that through some other heinous sin he hath defiled the land. Now this is incident to the \mst as well as to some other sbfiil man.

To these, and the Uke, hear what the excommunicated Prelate hath to say, (c. 15, jp. 146, 147,) ** They sajr (he meaneth the Jesuits) every society of men is a perfect republic, and so must have withm itself a power to preserve itself from rum, and by that to punish a tjrrant.'' He answereth, '' A society without a head, is a disorderiy rout, not a politic body; and so cannot have this power.

Ang, 1, — The Pope giveth to every society politic power to make away a tyrant, or heretical xing, and to unking him, by his brethren, the Jesuits', way. And observe how papists (of which number I could easily prove tne P. Prelate to be, by the popiw doctrine that he delivered, while the iniquity of time, and dominion of prelates in Scotland, advanced him, against all worth of true learning and holiness, to be a preacher in Edinbur^) and Jesuits agree, as the builders of Babylon. It is the purpose of €rod to destroy Babylon.

2. This answer shall infer,, that the aristocratical governors of any free state, and that the Duke of Venice, and the senate there, is above all law, and cannot be resisted, because without their heads they are a disorderly rout.

3. A political society, as by nature's instinct they may appoint a head, or heads, to themselves, so also if their head, or heads, become ravenous wolves, the God of nature hath not left a perfect society remediless ; but they may both resist, and punish the head, or heads, to whom tiiey gave all the power that they have, for their good, not for their destruction.

4. Thqr are as orderly a bodj politic, to munalLe a tyrannous oomnumder, as they were to make a iust governor. The Prelate saithy *' It is alile to conceive a politic body without a governor, as to conceive the natural body without a head." He meaneth, none of them can be conceivable. I am not of his mind. When Saul was dead, Israel was a perfect politic bod^ ; and the Prelate, if he be not very obtuse m his head, (as this hungry piece, stolen from others, showeth him to be,) may conceive a visible political society performing a political action, (2 Sam. V. 1 — 3,) malung Pavid king at a visible and conceivable p&ce, at Hebron, and making a covenant with him. And that they wanted not all governors, is nothing to make them chimeras mconceivable. For when so many families, before Nimrod, were governed only bv fathers of families, and they agreed to maKo either a king, or other governors, a head, or heads, over themselves, though the several families had government, yet wese associated &milies had no government ; and vet so conceivable a politic body, as if Maxwell would have appeared amongst them, and called them a disorderly rout, or an unconceivable chimera, they should have made the Prelate know that chimeras can knock down prelates. Neither is a king the life of a politic body, as the soul is of the natural body. The body createth not the soul; but Israel created Saul king, and when he was dead, they made David king, and so, under God, many kings, as they succeeded, till the Messian came. No natural body can make souls to itself by succession; nor can sees create new prelates always.

P, Prelate. — Jesuits and nuritans differ infinitely: we are hopeful God shall cast down tms Babel. The Jesuits, for ought I know, seat the superintendent power m the community. Some sectaries follow them, and warrant any individual person to make away a king in case of defects, and the work is to be rewarded as when one killeth a ravenous wolf. Some will have it in a collective body; but how? Not met together by warrant, or writ of sovereign authority, but when fancy of reforming church and state calleth them. Some will have the power in the noUes and peers; some in the three estates assembled by the king's writ; some in the inferior judges. I luiow not where this power to curb sovereignty is, but in Almighty God.

Afu. 1. Jesuits and puritans differ infinitely; true. Jesuits deny the Pope to be antichrist, hold all Arminian doctrine, Christ's local descension to hell, — ail which the Prelate did preach. We deny all this.

2. We hope also the Lord shall destroy the Jesuits' Babel; the suburbs whereof, and more, are the popish prelates in Scotland and !^^land.

3. The Jesuits, for ought he knoweth, place all superintendent power in the community. The Prelate knoweth not^ all his brethren, the Jesuits', ways ; but it is ignorance, not want of good-wiU. Tot Bellarmine, Beucanus, Suarez, Gregor. de Yalentia, and others, his dear fellows, say, that aU superintendent power of policy, in ordine ad spiritualia is in the man, whose foot Maxwell would kiss for a cardinal's hat.

4. li these be all the differences, it is not much. The community is the remote and last subject, the representative body the nearest subject, the nobles a partial subject ; the judges, as judges sent by the king, are so in &e game, that when an arbitrary prince at his pleasure setteth th^m up, and at command that they judge for men, and not for the Lord, and accorcungly obey, they are by this power to be punished, and others put in their place.

6. A true cause of convening parliaments the Prelate maketh a fancy at this time : it is as if the thieves and robbers should say a justice-court were a fancy ; but if the Prelate might compear before the parliament of Scotland, (to which he is an outlaw like his father, 2 Thess. ii. 4,) sUch a fancy, I conceive, should hang him, and that deservedly.

P. Prelate (p. 147, 148).— The subject of this superintending power must be secured from error in judgment and practice, and the community and states then should be infallible.

Ana, — The consequence is nought. • No more than the king, the absolute independent, is infallible. It is sure the people are in less hazard of tyranny and self-destruction than the king is to subvert laws and make himself abeSute; and for that cause there must be a superintendent power above the king, and God Almighty also must be above all.

P. Prelate. — The parliament may err, then God hath left the state remediless, except the king remedy it.

An8 — There is no consequence here, except the king be impeccable. Posterior

parliaments may correct the former. A state IS not remediless, because God's remedies, in sinful men's hands, may miscarry. But the question is now, Whether God hath siren power to one man to destroy men, subyert d and raligion, without any power above him to coerce, restrain, or punish?

P. Prdate (c. 16, p. 148).— If, when the parliament erreth, the remedy is lefb to the wisdom of God, why not when the king erreth?

Ans. — Neither is antecedent true, nor the ccmsequence valid, for the sounder part may resist; and it is easier to one to destroy many, having a power absolute, which God never gave him, than for many to destroy themsmves. Then, if the kins Uzziah intrude himself and sacrifice, the priests do sin in remedying thereof.

P. Prelate. — Why might not the people of Israel, peers or sanhedrim, have convened before them, judged and punished David for his adultery and murder? Romanists and new statists acknowledge no case lawful, but heresy, apostacy, or tyranny; and tyranny, ihej say, must be universaly manifest as the sun, and with obstinacv, and invincible by prayers, as is recorded of Nero, whose wisn was rather a transported passion, than a fixed resolution. This cannot fidl in the attempts of any but a madman. Now this cannot be proved our king; but though we ^rant in the foresaid case, that the commumtv mav resume their power, and rectify what is amiss, which we cannot grant; but this will follow by their doctrine, in every case of male administration.^

Afu. — The Prelate draweth me to speak of the case of the king's unjust murder, confessed (Fsal. li.); to which I answer: He taketh it for confessed, that it had been treason in the sanhedrim or states of Israel to have taken on them to judge and punish Darid for his adultery and his murder; but he giveth no reason for this, nor any word of God; and truly, though I will not presume to go before others m this, God's law (Gren. ix. 6, compared with Num. xxxv. 30, 31) seemeth to say;ainst them.

6. Nor can I think that Grod's law, or his deputy the judges, are to accept the persons of the great, because they are great ; (Deut. i. 17 ; 2 Ghron. xix. 6, 7 ;) and we say, we

cannot distinguish where the law distinguisheth not. TheXord speaketh to under judges, (Lev. xix. 16,) *' Thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty," or of the prince, for we know

what these names Sl*IJ ^^^ {t!3*l ™®<^~ eth. I grant it is not God's meaning that the king should draw the sword against himself, but yet it followeth not, tJiat if we speak of the demerit of blood, that the law of Crod accepteth any judge, great or small; and if the estates be above me king, as I conceive they are, though it be a human politic constitution, that uie king be firee of all co-action of law, because it conduceth for the peace of the commonwealth; yet if we make a matter of conscience, for my part I see no exception that Grod maketh it; if men make, I crave leave to say, a facto (xd jus non sequitur; and I eaoly yield that in e?ery case the estates may coerce the kinff, if we make it a case of conscience. And for the place,

SPs. li. 4,) '* Against thee, thee only, have: sinned," ♦nNOfTn^S ^S flatterers allege it to be a place proving'that the king is above all earthly tribunals, and all laws, and that there was not on earth any who might punish king David; and so they cite Clemens Alexandnn. (Stnrni. 1. 4,) Amobi., PsaL 1., Dydimus, Hieronim. ; but Calvin on the place, giveth the meaning that most of the fathers give, — Domine, etMm si me totus mundus msoivat^ mihi tamen plusquam satis estf quod te solum judicem sentio. It is true, Beda, Euthymius, Ambrosius, (Apol. David, c. 4 and c. 10,) do all acknowledge from the place, de faeto^ there was none above Darid to judge him, and so doth Auffustine, Basilius Theodoret, say, and Chry- LtomiL, and GyriUus, a^d Hieronim^ (Epist. 22.) Ambrose (Sermon 16, in Fsal. cxviii.) Gregorius, and Augustine (Joan 8,) saith, he meaneth no man durst judge or punii^ him, but Grod only. Lorinus, the Jesuit, observeth eleven iaterpretations of the fathers all to this sense: " Since (Lyra saith) he sinned only against Grod, because Grod only could pardon him;" Hugo Cardinalis, '' Because Grod only could wash him," which he asketh in the text. And Lorinus, " Solo Deo consdo peccaviJ^ But the simple meaning is, 1. Against thee only have I sinned, as my eye-witness and immediate beholder; and, therefore, he addeth — and have done this evil in thy sight. 2. Against thee only, as my judge, that thou mayest be justified when thou judgest, as clear from ail unrighteousness^

wiidn< tfiDii dbalt send-tbe sMrordoiD mff hoqaa. 3; Agaitirt tiwe, O Loitdocdy^ who caiutt iMuiitiie,<iadpardottme(v^Jl,2)^ And if this ^^ tlMO OBtij'' exebde aikogetber IJriab) BMih8lieb% and tk kv of tbe judges, as if he had smoied against*Bone of tnese in their kind, then m the kin^, becaiiae a king, free, not only from a pnnisiiing hwr of man, but from &e dati of the seoond table shnply, and do a king cannot be under the best and largest half of the kw^ Thou abalt love thy nei^bour aa thyaelf He shaM nfA need to say, For^ve us our sbs, ami we fi^igiTe them that sm against us; for there is no reason, from the nature f sin, and the nature of the kw of God, why iveaaa aay mere the sttbjeots and sons* sin against' the king and father, than to say the father and kii^ sin against the eons and snl^ects. By thosj the' ki^ kilting hia &iher Jesse, should ma a^nst God, t^ not break the fifth cqirinand, it<^r sin afiaiast his father. God should in vabi^rbidi&thersto prenroka their cfaiidren to wrat}i

1. And kiiigs^ to do injustice to their sub^ jeete, becajuae by this tne supeiior caimot sb against the inferior, fbrasmnch as kii^ can sin asainst none but those who have power to judge and punish them ; but God only, and no inferiors, and no subjects, hftve power to punish the kings; thereifore kkgs can sin against none of th^r subjects; and where there is no sin, how can there be a law ? Neither maior or minor can be deided byroyalkts. ^

2* We acknowledge tyranny mui^ only unking a prince. l%e Prelate denieth it, but he is a green statist. Barcky, Grotius^ Winzetus, as I hare proved, granteth it.

S. He will excuse Neio^ as oi infirmity, wishing all Borne to have one nedc, that he may cut it oif. And is that charitable of kings, that they will not be so mad as to destroy their own kingdom? But when histories teach us there have been more tyrants than kings, the kings are more obliged to him for flattery than for state-wit, except we say that all kii^ who eat the peopk of God, as they do bread, owe him little £ar making them all mad and fiwntic.

4., But let them be Neroes, and mad, and worse, there is no coefoing of them, but all must give dkeir nedks to the sword, if the

Cr Prekte be heard; and yet kings cannot 30 mad as ta destroy their subjects. Mary of England was that mad. The Bomidbi princes who have given (Bev. xvii. 13}

their power and strength to the beast, and do nuAe war with the Lamb; and idnflsin- SfMred with the mrit of the beaAt^^aod maak with the wine or the cup of Babei\i Ibmicft^ tioBs, are so mad; and the temempeKoiaarp so mad, who wasted theb faifth&dettwibjdcts.

P. Prelate, — If there be swh a power, in the peers, resumahle in the exigsntiofnteBB^ sity, as the last necessary remodyiforjea&iy oi diarch and state, Grod and juitoiersot being deficient in things nweaaArj^it'^asa^ be proved out of the Senptoorevaiid net^ Udka oa trust, for a^Mrmawti tncumbit'probaiUK' •

^n^.— *Mr Bishop, whad; better lis i^wt c^mnanti ineumbit^ &e., Ihan ^fliiiieS &r you are the afi&rmer. L I caa jpvove a power in the king, limited oidy to mdy govern, and save the people; aad yoo- afimai that God hath given to the king^ not'ooly a power official and royal to savie^ but* ako te destroy and cut off, so as no man (may sa^^ Why doest ^on this? Shall we t(|ke tins upon the word of an excMnmuniciriaid ^.yre kte? Frofer ta6u2a#, John P. P^, I Maave you not, rojral power is, Deut mviL 18; Bkuu. iii. 14. I am sure there is thero< a power given to the king to do good, and that-firom God. Let John P. P. prove a power to do iU, given of God to the king. 2 We shall aui^y prove that the states may mprefli tnis power, and punish the tyrantr-^not die king, 'when he shall prov tlnli a tyraanous power is an ordinance ot' God, and so >niey not be resisted; &r the kw of natmre teash-^ ethy-^tf I give my sword to my feiiowitode^ fend me from me murderer, if: he shall fall to and murder me with mv own Mnrd^

I may (if I hare gtreiigth>a&. nqr wwd irom nun.

P. I^date. — 1. It id infiddit^ to-^think that God cannot help us, and* imJ>alsenoe that we wiU not wait on GML When siking op|ffesseth us, it is aieaibiat God's wisdom that he hath not provided azK^lusr mean for our safety than intrasicm on God^ vight. iL It is agunst God's power,*^. fiis faolineas — 4* GhiistiaB religion, that we iieoessitate God to so weak a mean as to make use of sin, and we oast the aspersum of treason on religion, and deter kin^ to profess ref<med caiholio reMgion;<^. We are not' to jostle God out of his ri^t.

Ans l.-^I see nothing but what Dr F^me, Gfotius, Barcky, fikekwood, have said before, with some colour of proving the conse<p]ence. The P. Prekte giveth us Qther men's arguments, but without bones. All

THE LAW ANB THE HRINCB.

were flood, if the state's ooercmff and carbinff a po4r which Ood ae^er ga4 to the king weie A sin and an act of impati^ioe and uih bdief; and if it were proper to God only, by in. iinUte hul, to ooeroe tyranny. % He eaiieth it not protestant relisiGD, either iiere or elsewherey but cunnmglj givB^rs naone that will agree to the Roman cathdic religionk For ^e Dominjcans, Fnmdwans^ and the Faiisian doctors and sidioohnent'&Uflwing^ Oocham, Gerson, Al** main, and o4hw papists, call themselves re* formed cathnlioB. He layeUi this for a gcoond, in liiree or four pages, — ^where these flane aigiunents are again and again repeated w tenmniw, as his second reason, fp. 149,^ was handled ad nctuseam (p. 148) ; his thira reason is repeated in his sixtn reason. (p.l51.) He kyeth down, I say, this groimd, which is the>^b^(ffed oondusion, and maketh the coflBlii8L(Hi inie assamption, in eight raw and aften^iepeated arguments, — ^to wit, That the pariiaaM&t's coercing and restraining of ap* bitBary j^wer is rebdlion, and resistmg the ordiaanee of €k)d. But he dare not lo& the

te^.Bom.xi]i.,onthefaoe. Other royalists done h with bad success. This I desire to be weighed, and I retort die Prelate's aigtmielit. But it is indeed the triyial arj^inrant of all royaysts, especially of Barclay, --^obvious tx his thurd book. If arbikary and tyrannical power, above any law that the lawfiil ntagistarate oommandeth under the pain of dsothj^^Thoa idialt not murder one man, Thou shalt not take away the vineyard ofone JSfaboth viokntly-^be lawful and warrantable by God's word, then an arbitrary power, above all divine laws, is given to the Keeping of the civil magistrate. And it is Ao laBs>law£ul 'arbitfary, or rather tyrannical pewerv-for David to kill all his sulnecte, and to> plunder all Jopusalem, (as I believe prelateftnd malignantsand papists would serve the three kiBi^nis, if the king should command them,) than to kill one Uriah, or for Ahabto spoil one Naboth. The essence of sin most agree alike to aU, thw^h the degrees

^ God's remedy a^st arbitrary poweo* hereafter, in the ^piestion of reaistanoe; but the confused engine of the Prelate bringeth it in here, where there is no> place for it. ^7. m. m,m^ i^tgBinent k:-Befare ^^ would authorise' rebellion, aiid give a bad precedent thereof Ibr 0fr, he would r^er w<k extraordinary and wonder&l iniracles; and therefore would not authorise

the people te deltvor tbemadtes from under^ Phsfaoh,' but made Mdsea^ a pnboe^ to bring' them out of Egypt with' a stnstebediinifc arm* Ifcr did ^e Lord^elitaD his' people by the wisdom i£ Moeo^ or strength ^ uA people, or any act that way of weirs,, but by his own immediate band and power*

Amj^^\ reduce the Prelate's oooiL&sed words to a few; for I speak not of his ponah term of St* Steven, and- r others: the. nke; because aH that hd ha^ sAid* in a book of 14& YW!maght liavebeen said in three sheets of paper. But, I pray yon, what- is^ this argument to the qnestion in haiad^ which is, whedi^r the king be so above ^aU' lawii, as people > and peers, in thO'Casoiof arbitrary power, may resume their power and punish a tyrant? The P. Prelaite draw*- eth m the question of resistance by th^ hair. Israel's not rising in attns agaiinsi kmg Pharaoh proveth nethtag against the power of a &ee xingdom against a tyrants

1* Mosesy who wr(Nj^ht miracles destruc* tive to Pharaoh, might pray for vengeance against Pharaoh,. God having revealed to Moses that Pharaoh was a reprobate ; but may ministers and nobles pray so against king CSiarles? God forbid.

2. Pharai^ had not his crown from Israel.

3. Pharaoh had not sworn to defend Israel^ nor became he their king upon condition he should maintain and profess the religion of the God of Israel; therefore Israel could not, as free estates, challenge him in their supreme court of pariiament of breach of oath ; and upon no terms conld they unking Pharaoh : he held not his crown of them. .

4. Pharaoh was never circumcised, nor within the oovenant of the God of Israel in profession.

5* Israel had their lands by the mere gift of the king. I hope the lung of Bxjtain standeth to Scotland and En^and in a fourfold contrary relation.

All divines know that Pharaoh, his prinos^ and the Egyptians, were his peers and people, and uiat Israel were not his native subjects, but a number of strangers, who, by the laws of the king and princes^ by the means of Joseph, had gotten the land of Goshen for their dwelhng, and liberty to serve the God of Abraham, to whom they prayed in their bondage, (Ex)Dd. ii^ 23, 24^ and they were not to serve the gods of •Egypt, nor were they of the king's religion. And therefinre, his argument is thus: A number of poor exiled strax^rs under king Pharaoh, who were not Pharaoh's princes and peers, could not restram. the tyranny of lung Pharaoh; therefore^ the three estates in a free kingdom may not restrain the arbitrary power of a kinff •

1. The Prelate must prove that God

save a royal and kinely power to kinir

Iharaoh, due to him by 4tue of his kingly

calling, (according as royalists explain 1

Sam. yiii. 9, 11,) to kill all the male children of Israel, to make slaves of themselves,

and compel them to work in brick and clay,

while their lives were a burden to them ;

and that if a Roman catholic, Mary of England, should kill all the male children of

protestants, by the hands of papists, at the

queen's commandment, and make bondslaves of all the peers, judges, and three

estates, who made her a iree princess ; yet,

notwithstanding that Mary had sworn to

maintain the protestant reugion, they were

to suffer and not to defend memselves. But

if Grod give Pharaoh a power to kill all

Israel, so as they could not control it, then

Grod giveth to a king a royal power by office

to sin, only the royalist saveth God from being

the author of sin in this, that God gave the

power to sin ; but yet with this limitation,

that the subjects should not resist this power.

2. He must prove that Israel was to give

their male children to Pharaoh's butchers, —

for to hide them was to resist a royal power ;

and to disobey a royal Ppwer ^ven of Grod,

is to disobey God. 3. The subjects may not

resist the king's butchers coming to kill

them and their male children ; for to resist

the servant of the king in that wherein he is

a servant, is to resist we kin^. (1 Sam. viii.

Israel had been as strong as r haraoh and

his people ; that without God's special commandment, (they then wanting the written

word,) they should have fought with Pharaoh ; and that we now, for all wars, must

have a word from heaven, as if we had not

God's perfect will in his word, as at that

time Israel behoved to have in all wars,

because Grod gave not t^em an answer to

fi^t against Pharaoh, therefore we have no

warrant now to fight against a foreign nation

invading us; the consequence is null, and therefore this is a vain argument. The prophets never reprove the people for not performing the duty of defensive wan against tyrannous kings; therefore, there is no such duty enjoined by any law of Grod to us. For the prophetiB never rebuke the people for non-performing the duty of ofirensive wars. against their enemies, but where God gave a special command and response from his own oracle, that they should nght. And if Grod was pleased never to command the people to rise against a tyrannous king, they did not sin where they had no commandment of Grod; but I hope we have now a more sure word of prophecy to inform us. 5. The Prelate conjectureth Moses' miracles, and the deHveranoe of the people by dividing the Bed Sea, was to forbid and condemn defensive wars of people against their king; but he hath neither Scnpture nor reasons to do it The end of these miracles was to seal to Pharaoh the truth of Grod's calling of Moses and Aaron to deliver the people, as is. clear, £xod. iv. 1 — 4, compared with vii. 8 — 10. And that the Lord might get to himself a name on all the earth, Bom. ix. 17 ; Exod. ix. 16 ; xiii. 13, 14. But of the Prelate's conjectural end, the Scripture is silent, and we cannot take an excommunicated man's word. What I said of Pharaoh, who had not his crown from Israel, that I say of Nebuchadnezzar and the kin^ of Persia^ keeping the people of Grod captive.

P. Prelate (p. 153).— So m the book of Judges, when the people were delivered over to the hand of their enemies, because of their sins, he never warranted the ordinary judges or community to be their own deliverers; but when they repented, Grod raised up a judge. The people nad no hand in their own deliverance out of Babylim; Grod effected it by Cyrus, immediately and totally. Is not this a real proof Grod will not have inferior judges to rectify what is amiss; but we must wait in patience till Grod provide lawM me9ns, some sovereign power immediately sent by himself, in which course of his lOrdinary providei)cey he will not be defrdent.

Ans. 1. — All this is beside the question, and proveth nothing less than that peers and community may not resume their power to curb an arbitrary power. For, in the first case, their is neither arbitrary nor lawful supreme judge. 2. If the first prove any

thing, it proYeth that it was rebellion in the infenor judges and community of Israel to fight aeainst foreign icings, not set over them by Grcd; and tmtt onensive wars against any kings whatsoever, because they are kin^ though strangers, are unlawM. Let Socimans and anabaptists consider if the P. Prelate help not them in tiiis, and may proTO all wars to be unlawful. 3. He is so malignant to all inferior judges, as if they were not powers sant of Grod, and to all

fovemors that are not kings, and so up-> olders of prelates, and of lumself as ne conceiveth, that by his arguing he will have all delirerance of kings only, tne only lawful means in ordinary providence; and so aristocracy and democracy, except in Grod's extraordinary providence, and by some divine dispensation, must be extraordinarv and ordinarily unlawful. 1. The acts of a state, when a king is dead and they choose another, shall be an anticipating of Grod's providence. 2. K the king be a child, a captive, or distracted, and the kingdom oppressed with maliffnants, they are to wait, ^Me God munedi^ from Saven create a king to them, as he did Saul long ago. But have we now kings immediately sent as Saul was? How is we spirit of prophecy and government infused m them, as in king Saul? or are they by prophetical inspiration, anointed as David was? I conceive their calling to the throne on God's part differs as much from the calling of Saul and Dayid, in some respect, < tEe calling of ordinary pastors, who must be gifted by industry ana learning and called by the church, and tne calling of apostles. 3. God would deliver his people from Babylon by moving the heart of Cyrus immediately, the people having no hand in it, not so much as suppUcatmg Cyrus; therefore, the people and peers nmo made the king cannot curb his tvrannical power, if he make captives and slaves of them, as the kings of Chaldea made slaves of the people of Imel. What! Because Grod useth another mean, therefore, this mean is not lawAil. It foUoweth in no sort. If we must use no means but what the captive people did under Cyrus, we may not lawftiUy fly, nor supplicate, for the people did neither.

P. Prelate, — You read of no covenant in Scripture made without the king. (£xod. xxxiv.) Moses king of Jeshurun: neither tables nor parliament framed it. Joshua another, (Josh, xxiv.) and Asa, (2 Chron.

XV. ; 2 Chron. xxxiv. ; Ezra x.) The covenant of Jehoiada in the nonage of Joash, was the h^h priest's act, as the king's governor. There is a covenant with hell, n^e without the king, and a false covenant. (Hos. x. 3, 4.)

Ans, — ^We argue this negatively. 1. This is neither commanded, nor practised, nor warranted by promise; therefore, it is not lawful. But tnis is not practised in Scripture; therefore, it is not lawful. It foUoweth it. Show me in Scripture the killing of a coring ox who killed a man; the not ins3dng oatUements on a house; the putting to death of a man lying with a beast; the killing of seducing projpiets, who tempted the pe^le to go a whoring, and serve another God than Jehovah: I mean, a god made by the hand of the baker, such a one as the excommunicated Prelate is known to be, who hath preached this idolatry in three kingdoms. (Deut. xiii.) This is written, and all the former laws are divine precepts. Shall the precept make them all unlawnd, because they are not practised by some in Scripture? By this? I ask. Where read ye that the people entered in a covenant with Grod, not to worship the golden image, and the king; and those who pretended tney are the priests of Jehovah, the churchmen and relates, re&sed to enter in covenant with Grod? By this argument, the king and prelates, in non-practising with us, wantmg the precedent of a Ske practised in Scripture, are in the &rult. 2. This is nothing to prove the conclusion in question. 3. iQl these places prove it is the king's duty, when the people under him, and their fathers, have corrupted the worship of God, to renew a covenant with Grod, and to cause the people to do the like, as Moses, Asa, and Jehoshaphat did. 4. H the king refuse to do his duty, where is it written that the people ought also to omit their duty, and to love to have it so, because the rulers corrupt their ways? (Jer. v. 31.) To renew a covenant with Grod is a point of service due to God that the people are obliged unto, whether the king command it or no. What if Xh king command not his people to serve God; or, what if he forbid i^iel to pray to Grod? Shall the people in that case serve the King of kings, only at the nod and royal command of an earthly king? Clear this from Scripture. 5. Ezra (di. v.) had no commandment in pirticular from Artaxerxes, king of Persia, or from Darius, but a

general. (£zraTii.2d.) " Whatsoever is commanded bj the God of heaven, let it be diliffentlj done for the hooae of the God of heayen.*' Bat the tables in Scotland, and the two parliaments of England and Scotland, who renewed the oorenant, and entered in covenant not against the king, (as the P. P. saith,) bat to TMtore religion to its ancient puritj, lubve this express law both from kin? James and king Giuurles, in manj acts S parliament, that religion be kept pore. Now, as Artaxerxes knew nothing ot the covenant, and was unwilling to subembe it, and yet gave to Ezra ana the princes a warrant, in general, to do all that the God of heaven required to be done, for the religion and house of the Grod of heaven, and so a general warrant &r a covenant, without the king; and yet Ezra and the people, in swearing that covenant, failed in no dntv against their king, to whom, by the fifth comnuuidment, they were no less subject than we are to our lung: just so we are, and so have not failed. But they say, the king * h&th committed to no lieutexuoit and deputy under him, to do what they please in religion, without his roval consent in particular, and the direction of his clergy, seeing he is of that same religion with his people; whereas Artaxerxes was of another religion than were the Jews and their ^vemor. — Ans. Kor can our king take on himself to do what he pleaseth, and what the prelates (amongst whom those who ruled all are known, before the world and the sun, to be of another relif'on than we are^ pleaseth, in particular, ut see what religion and worship the Lord our God, and tiiie law of the lana (which is the king's revealed will) alloweth to us, that we may swear, though the king diould not swear it; otherwise, we are to be of no religion but of the king's, and to swear no covenant but the king's, which is to Wn with papists against protestants. 6. The strangers of Ephraim and Manasseh, and out of Simeon fell out of Israel in abundance to Asa, when they saw that the Lord his God was with him, (2 Chron. xv. 9, 10,) and sware that covenant without their own king's consent, their own king being against it. xf a people swear a religious covenant, without tiieir King, who is averse thereunto, fer more may the nobles, peers, and estates of parliament do it without their king; and here is an example of a practice, which the P. Prelate requuretib. 7. That Jehoiada wba governor and viceroy during the ncmage of

Joash, and that by this royal authority the covenant was sworn, is a draam, to the end he may make the Pope, and the ardtprelate, now vioercniv and kmgs, when the throne varieth. The nobles were authors of iha making c^ that covenant, no less tiian Jehoiada was; yea, and the people of the land, ndien the kin^ was bat a child, went unto the house oi Baal, and brake down hii images, &c. Here is a ref<Nnnation, made without the kine, by the people. 8. Grave expositors say, Uiat the covenant with death ana hell (Ink xxviii.) was the king's covenant with Egypt. 9. And the covenant (Hos. X.) is by none exponed of a covenant made without the king. I have heard said, this Prelate, preaching on this text belbre the king, exponed it so; but he ifpake words (as the text is) fiJsely. The P. rrelate, to the end of the chapter, giveth instance of the ill success of popular reformation, because the people caused Aanm to make a golden calf, and they revolted firam Behoboun to Jeroboam, and made two ffolden calves, and they conspired with Absuom against David.--* Ang, If the first example make good any thing, neither the high priest, as was Aarxm, nor the P. Prelate, who daimeth to be descended of Aaron's house, should have any hand in reformation at all; for Aaron erred in that And to argue firom the people's sins to deny their power, is no better than to prove Ahab, Jeroboam, and many kines in^^ and Jodah, oo^niitted iLi^, therefore they had no royal power at au. In the rest of the chapter, for a whole page, he singeth over again his matins in a cundie, and giveth us the same arguments we heard before; of which you have these three notes: — 1. They are stolen, and not his own. 2. ilepeated again and again to fill the field. 3. All hang on a fa&e suppositian, and a begging of the question. That the people, without the king, have no power at all.

QUESTION XXVII.

WHETHER OB NO THE KIXG BE THE SOLE, SUPREME AND FINAL INTERPBETEB OE THE LAW.

This question oonduceth not a little to the clearing of the doubts concerning the king's absobite power, and the suppoi^ sole no-

THE LAW AVA'TJBIB PRINCE.

iJIbthetM^ yowep in the king. And I thiiik it^not.tumk^ to the question, Whether the Bepe'imd'Soiniidi divrsh haye a aole and pecemploiy p6wer of exp(ing kws, nd the wosd f Qod? We are to connder that thiere is- a'tiro£oid enweiiion of laws; 1. . Ooe qMctdatiire tn a scnool way, so exquisite JQiistfer'faaye'a pover to expone laws. 2. Phbdiatth, in so far as the sense of the law &tteth oader oar piaotice; a&d this is twoiUdf^-^her piivate and oommon to all, or jadidal and proper to judges; and of this kit'is the* queiriion.

Fop t^) public, the law hath one fundamenial rule^ sulmg poouU, like the king of pfanetsy'the son, whicn lendeth star-light to all kvwtf, and bj which they are exponed: whatevei? interpretetion swerreth either from feodaibenital laws of policy, or from the law of nature, and tho law of nations, and espe* cnlfyi&oiri tiie nfety of the pubhc, is to be rcgected as a perrerting of the law; and tlraisfofey wtadentia humam generis, the natiuSakicoBieienoe of all men, to which the opprasriod people may appeal unto when the kasgicoBponcith a law unjustly, at his own imiare,>:i8 the last rule on earth for e^ponmg el lawsi Nar ought laws to be made so ohecam, aa 9n ordinary wit cannot see their oonnaexiDn with fundamental truths of poUcy, and the safety of the people; and therefore I see no tnconyeiiienoe, to say, that the law itself is MortMi et regtda jtuiuioandiy the rak^aitd directoiy to square the jud^e, and tiiat )the jvdge is the pubUc practical inter* pietfDofthelaiw.

Assert! l.r-Th6 king is not the sole and final Satoi^nreter of the law. • >1. Besuse then inferior judges should not beridtearprefteroof the kw; but inferior judges iar9 no less essentially judges than the km^, <Beat. i. 17; 2 Chron. xix. 6; 1 P^t. iLil4; Bom. xiii. 1, 2,) and so by fficB| must interpret the law, else they cannot give sentence according to their conscience and equity. Now, exponing of the law judicially is an act of judgmg, and so a personal and incommunicable act; so as I can no more judge and expone the law according to another man's conscience, than I can beneve with another man's soul, understand with another man'a understanding, or see with another man's eye. The king's pleasure, therefore, cannot be the rule of the inferior judge's oonscioioe, for he giveth aninmiediate account to Grod, the Juage of all, of a just or an unjust sent^ooe. Suppose

Ceesar fshaU- azptftie th^ law to FUate, that Christ deaetvcuv to die the dsath. yet Pilate is tftot^in ooii6ciHioeit expone the law sq. If therefore inferior judges jtKige for the king, Ahey * judge t only- by power borrowed from the king, not by the pleasure, will^ or command of the > king thus and thus exponii^ the law, therefore thekiagtoannot be the sok interpreter f the kiw

2. If tne Lord say not to the king only, but alsoto other inferior judges, ^' Be wise, understand, and the cause that you know not, search out," then tlie king is not the only interpreter of the law. Eut the Lord saith not to the king only, but to other judges also, Be wise, understand, and the cause that you know not,' search out ; thecrefore the king is 'not the- sole law-giver. The major is clear fi*om Psal. ii. 10, " Be wise now therefore, O ye kings, be instructed, ye judges of the earth." So am oommands and rebukes for unjust judgment given to others than to kings. (Fs. luxii. 1--^; lviii 1, 2; Isa. i. 17, 23, 25, 26; iii. 14; Job xxix; 12--15; xxxi. 21, 22.)

3. The kin^ is either ^e sole interpreter of law, in respect he is to f(^ow the law as his rule, and so he is a ministerial interpreter of the law, or he is an interpreter of the law aooording to that super-dominion of absdute power that he hath above the law. If the former be h(^en, then it is clear that the king is not the only interpreter, for all judges, as they are judges, have a ministerial power to expone the law by the law : but the second is the sense of royalists.

Assert. 2. — ^Hence our sec<id assertion is, That the king's power of exp(iing the law is a mere mimsterial power, and he hath no dominion of any absolute royal power to expone the law as he will, and to put such a sense and meaning of the law as he pleaseth.

1. Because Saul maketh a law, (1 Sam. xiv. 24,) ** Cursed be the man that tasteth any food tiU night, that the king may be avenged on his enemies," the law, according to the letter, was bloody ; but, according to the intent of the lawgiver and substance of the law, profitable, for tl end was that the enemies should be pursued with all ^eed. But king Saul's exponing the law a^r a tyranni(il way, against the intent of the law, which is the diamond and pearl of all laws — the safety of the innocent people, was justly resisted by the innocent people, who violentlv hindered innocent Jonathan to be killed. Whence it ia dear, that the people and

LEX, REX ; OR,

piinces put on the law its tnie sense and meaning; for Jonathan's tasting of a little hcmej, though as it was against that sinful and predpitote circumstance, a rash oath, yet it was not against the suhstance and true mtent of the &w, which was the people's speedy pursuit of the enemy. Whence it is Clear, that the people, including the princes, hath a ministerial power to expone the law aright, and according to its genuine intent, and that the king, as king, hath no ahsolute power to expone iixe law as he pleaseth.

2. The king's ahsolute pleasure can no more he the genuine sense of a just law than his ahsolute pleasure can he a law ; hecause the genuine sense of the law is the law itself, as l£e formal essence of a thing differeth not really, hut in respect of reason, from the thing itself. The Pope and Bomish church cannot put on the Scripture, ex plenitudine potestatis, whatever meaning they will, no more than they can, out of absolute power, make canonic a^pture. Now so it is, that the king, hy his ahsolute power, cannot make law no law. 1. Because ne is king hy, or according to, law, hut he is not king of law. Hex est rex seoimdum legem^ sed non est dominus et rex legis, 2.

. Because, although it have a good meaning, which XJlpian saith, *' Qibod pnncipi placet legis vigorem hahet,^^ — ^the wul of the prince is the law; yet the meaning is not that anything is a just law, hecause it is the prince's will, for its rule formally; for it must be good and just before the prince can will it, — and then, he finding it so, he putteth the stamp of a human law on it.

3. This is the difference between Grod's will and the will of the king, or any mortal creature. Things are just and good, because God willeth them,— -especially things positively good, (though I conceive it hoKi in all things^ and Grod doth not will things, because tney are good and just ; but the creature, be he king or any never so eminent, do ¥011 things, because they are good and just, and the king's willing of a thing maketh it not good and just ; for only Grod's will — not the creature's— can be the cause why things are good and just. If, therefore, it be so, it must undeniably hence follow, that the king's will maketh not a just law to have an unjust and bloody sense; and he cannot, as kmg, by any absolute super-dominion over the law, put a just sense on a bloody and unjust law

4. The advancing of any man to the

throne and royal dignity putteth not the man above the number ot rational men. No rational man can create, by any act of power never so transcendent or boundless, a sense to a law contrary to the law. Nay, give me leave to doubt if Omnipotence can make a just law to have an unjust and bloody sense, aut contra^ because it involveth a contradiction; — ^the true meaning of a law being the essential form of the law. Hence judge what brutish, swinish flatterers they are who say, " That it is the true meaning of the law which the king, the only supreme and independent expositor of the law, saith is the true sense of the law." There was once an animal — ^a fool of the first magnitude — ^who said he could demonstrate, by invincible reasons, that the king's dung was more nourishing food than bread of me flour of the finest wheat. For my part I could wish it were the demonstrators only food fi>r seven days, and that should be the best demonstration he could make for his proof.

5. It must follow that there can be no necessity of written laws to the subjects, against Scripture and natural reason, and the law of nations, in which all accord : that laws not promul^ted and published cannot oblige as law ; yea, Adam, m his innocency, was not obliged to obey a law not written in his heart by nature, except Crod had made known the law; as is clear, Gren. iii. 11, '' Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?" But if the king's absolute will may put on the law what sense he pleaseth, out of his independent and irresistible supremacy, the laws promulgated and written to the subjects can declfu:^ nothing what is to be done by the subjects as just, and what is to be avoided as unjust ; because the laws must signify to the subjects what is just and what is unjust, according to their genuine sense. Now, their genuine sense, according to royalists, is not only uncertain and impossible to be known, but also contradictory ; for the king obhgeth us, without gainsaying, to behove that the just law hath this unjust sense. Hence this of flattering royalists is more cruel to kings than ravens, (for these eat but dead men, while they devour living men,) When there is a controversy between the king and the estates of parliament, who shall expone the law and render its native meaning ? Boyalists say, Not the estates of parliament, for they are subjects, not judges, to the king, and only counsellors and advisers

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

of the king. The king, therefore, must be the only judicial and final expositor. "As for lawyers, (said Strafford,) the law is not endos^ in a lawyer's cap." But I remember this was one of the articles laid to the charge of Bichard II., that he said, " The law was in his head and breast."^ And, indeed, it must follow, if the king, by the plenitude of absolute power, be the only supreme uncontrollable expositor of the law, that is not law which is written in the acts of parliament, but that is the law which is in the king's breast and head, which Josephus (lib. 19, Antiq. c. 2.) objected to Caius. And all justice and injustice should be finally and peremptorily resolved on the king's will and absolute pleasure.

6. The king either is to expone the law by the law itself ; or by his absolute power, loosed from all law, he exponeth it ; or according to the advise of his great senate. If the first be said, he is nothing more than other judges. If the second be said, he must be ommpotent, and more. If the third be said, he is not absolute, if the senate be only advisers, and he yet the only judicial expositor. The king often professeth his ignorance of the laws ; and he must then bom be absolute above the law, and ignorant of the law, and the sole and final judicial exponer of the law. And by this, all parliaments, and their power of making laws, and of judging, are cned down.

06;. 1. — Prov. xvi. 10, " A divine sentence is in the lips of the king ; his mouth trangresseth not in judgment ;" therefore he only can expone the law.

Ans. — ^Lavater saith, (and I see no reason on the ccmtrary,) " By a king he meaneth all magistrates." Aben Ezra and Isidorus read the words imperatively. The Tiguiine version, — " They are oracles which proceed from his Hps; let not therefore his mouth transgress in judgment." Vatabulus, — ^** When he is in his prophecies, he Heth not." Jansenius, — ^^ Non facile errabit in judicando.^^ Mich. Jermine, — " If he pray." Calvin, — " If he read in the book of the law, as Grod commandeth him," Dent. xvii. But why stand we on the place? '' He speaketh of good kings, (saith Cornel, k Lapide,) otherwise Jeroboam, Ahab, and Manaaseh, erred in judgment." *' And except (as Mercerus exponeth it) we under-

1 Imperator se leges in scrinio condere dicit. I. omniiim, C. de testazn.

stand him to speak of kings according to their office, not their fiu^ and practice, we make them popes, and men who cannot give out erievous and uniust sentences on the thron^"-against boi the Word and expenence.

Ohj, 2. — Sometimes aU is cast upon one man's voice; why may not the king be this one man?

Ans, — The antecedent is false; the last voter in a senate is not the sole judge, else why should others give suffrages with him? This were to take away inferior judges, contrary to Grod's word, Deut. i. l7 ; 2 Qiron. xix. 6, 7 ; Rom. xiii. 1 — 3.

QUESTION XXVIII.

WHETHER OR NO WARS RAISED BY THE SUB- JECTS AND ESTATES, FOR THEIR OWN JUST

DEFENCE AGAINST THE EMISSARIES, BE LAWFUL.

KING S BLOODY

Amisseus perverteth the question; he saith, " The question is. Whether or no the subjects may, according to their power, judge the king and dethrone him; that is. Whether or no it is lawful for the subjects in any case to take arms against their lawful prince, if he degenerate, and shall wickedly use his lawful power."

1. The state of the question is much perverted, for these be different questions. Whether the kingdom may dethrone a wicked and tyrannous prince, and whether the kingdom may take up arms against the man who is the king, in their own innocent defence. For the former is an act offensive, and of punishing ; the latter is an act of defence.

2. The present question is not of subjects only, but of the estates, and parliamentary lords of a kingdom. I utterly deny these, as they are judges, to be subjects to the king ; for the question is, Whether is the king or the representative kingdom greatest, and which of^them be subject one to another ? I affirm, amongst judges, as judges, not one is the commander or superior, and the other the commanded or subject. Indeed, one higher judge may correct and punish a judge, not as a judge, but as an erring man.

3. The question is not so much concerning the autnoritative act of war, as concern-

LEX, REX ; OR,

ing the power of natural defence, upon supposition, that the kins be not now turned an habitual tyrant; but that upon some acts of misinformation, he come in arms agunst his subjects.

AmisGBus maketh two sort of kings, — ** Some kings integrcc majestatts^ of entire power and sovereignty; some kings by pactions, or voluntary agreement between king and people." But I judge this a vain distinction; for the limited prince, so he be limited to a power only oi doing just and right, by this is not a prince integrcs ma^ jestatis, of entire royal majesty, whereby he may both do good and also play tlie tyrant; but a power to do ill being no ways essential, yea, repugnant to the absolute majesty of the King of kings, cannot be an essential part of the majesty of a lawful king; and therefore the prince, Hmited by vomntary and positive paction only to rule according to law and equity, is the good, lawful, and entire prince, only if he have not power to do every thing just and good in that regard, he is not an entire and complete prince. So the man vdll have it lawful to resist the limited prince, not the absolute prince; by the contrary, it is more lawM to me to resist the absolute prince than the limited, inasmuch as we may with safer consciences resist the tyrant and the lion, than the just prince and lamb. Nor can I assent to Cunnerius (de oficio princip, Christia. c. 5 and 17,) wno holdetn, " that these voluntary pactions betwixt king and people, in which the power of the prince is diminished, cannot stand, because their power is given to them by God's word, whicn cannot be taken from them by any voluntary paction, lawfully;" and mm the same ground, Winzetus (in velit. eontr. Buchan. p. 3) " will have it unlawful to resist kings, because God hath made them irresistible." I answer, — If God, by a divine institution, make kings absolute, and above all laws, (which is a blasphemous supposition — ^the holy Lord can give to no man a power to sin, for God hath not himself any such power,) then tlie covenant betwixt the king and people cannot lawfully remove and take away what Grod by institution has siven; but because God (Deut. xvii.) hath mnited the first lavrful king, the mould of all the rest, the people ought also to limit him by a voluntaiy covenant; and because the laMrful power of a king.to do good is not by divine institution placed in an indivisible point. It is not a sin for the people

to take some power, even of doing good, from the king, that he solely, and by himself, shall not have power to paidon an involuntary homicide, without advice and the judicial suffrages of the council of the kingdom, least he, instead of this, give pardons to robbers, to abominable murderers; and in so doing, the people robbeth not the king of the power that God gave him as king, nor ought the king to contend for a sole power in nimself of ministering justice to all; for God layeth not upon kings burdens impossible; and God by institution hath denied to the king all power of doing all good; because it is his ¥dll that other judges be sharers with the king in that power, (Num. xiv. 16 ; Duet i. 14—17 ; 1 Pet. ii. 14 ; Rom. xiii. 1—4;) and therefore the duke of Venice, to me, cometh nearest to the king moulded by Crod, (Deut. xvii.) in respect of power, de jwre^ of any king I know in Europe. And in point of conscience, the inferior judge discerning a murderer and bloody man to die, may in foro conscienUcB despise the king's unjust pardon, and resist the King's force by his co-active power that Grod hath given him, and put to death the bloody murderer; and he sinneth if he do not this; for to me it is clear, that the king cannot judge so justly and understandingly of a murderer in Scotland, as a judge to whom God hath committed the sword in Scotland. Nor hath the Lord laid that impossible burden on a king to judge so of a murder four hundred mues removed from the king, as the judge nearer to him, as is clear hj Num. xiv. 16; 1 Sam. vii. 15 — 17. The king should go from place to place and judge; and whereas it is impossible to him to go through three kingdoms, he should appoint faithful judges, who may not be reasted, — no, not by the king.

1. The question is. If the king command A. B. to kill his father or his jmstor, — ^the man neither being cited nor convicted of any fault, he may mwfully be resisted.

2. Queritur, — If, in that case in which the king is captived, imprisoned, and not 8ui juris f and awed or overawed by bloody papists, and so is forced to command a barbarous and unjust war; and if, being distracted phvsicaily or morally through wicked counsel, he command that which no father in his sober wits would command, even against law and conscience, — that the sons should yield obedience and subjection to him in maintaining, with lives and goods.

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

a bloody religion and bloody papists: if in that case the king may not be resisted in his person, because the power lawful and the sinM person cannot be separated. We hold, that the king using, contrary to the oath of God and his royal office, violence in killing, against law and conscience, his subjects, by oloody emissaries, may be re^ sisted by defensive wars, at the commandment of the estates of the kingdom.

But before I produce arguments to prove the lawfulness of resistance, a little of the case of resistance. 1. Dr Feme (part 3, sect. 6, p. 39) granteth resistance by force to the kmg to be lawful, when the assault is sudden, without colour of a law or reason, and inevitable. But if Nero bum Eome, he hath a colour of law and reason; yea, though all Borne, and his mother, in whose womb he lay, were one neck. A man who will mih reason go mad, hath colour of reason, and so of law, to invade and kill the innocent. 2. AmissBus saith, (c. 2, n. 10,) " If the magistrate proceed extra-judidaliter^ without order of law by violence, the laws giveth every private man power to resist, if the danger be irrecoverable; yea, though it be recoverable." fX. prohibitum^ C. de jur, Jhsc. I. que madmodum^ sect. 39, tncbgistratus ad I, aquil, L nee, mctgistratihus^ (52, de injur.) Because, while the magistrate doth against his office, he is not a magistrate; for law and right, not injury, should come from the magistrate. (L. meminerint. 6, C. unde vi.) Yea, if the magistrate proceed judicially, and the loss be irrecoverable, jurists say that a private man hath the same law to resist. (Maran' iius, dis, 1, n, 35 j. And in a recoverable loss they say, every man is holden to resist, si evidenter constet de iniquitate^ if the iniquity be known to all. (J). D. Jason, n. 19, des. n. 26, ad I. ut vim dejust. etjur.) 3. I would think it not fit easily to resist the king's unjust exactors of custom or tribute. (1.) Because Christ paid tribute to Tiberius Caesar, an unjust usurper, though he was free from that, by Gfod's law, lest he should offend. (2.) Because we have a

greater dominion over goods than over our ves and bodies; and it is better to yield in a matter of goods than to come to arms, for of sinless evik we may choose the least. 4. A tyrant, without a title, may be resisted by any private man. Quia licet vim vi repellere, because we may repel violence by violence; yea, he may be filled, Ut I. et

vim. F. de in8tit etjure^ ubi plene per om^ nes. Vasquez, 1. 1, c. 3, n. 33 ; Barclaius, contra Monarch. 1. 4, c. 10, p. 268.

For the lawfulness of resistance in the matter of the king's unjust invasion of life and religion, we oner these arguments.

Arg. 1. — That power which is obliged to command and rule justly and religiously for the good of the subjects, and is only set over the people on these conditions, and not absolutely, cannot tie the people to subjection without resistance, when the power is abused to the destmction of laws, religion, and the subjects. But all power of the law is thus obliged, (Rom. xiii. 4 ; Deut. xvii. 18 — 20 ; 2 Chron. xix. 6 ; Ps. cxxxii. 11, 12 ; Ixxxix. 30, 31; 2 Sam. vii, 12; Jer. xvii. 24, 25,) and hath, and may be, abused by kings, to the destruction of laws, religion, and subjects. The proposition is clear. 1. For the powers that tie us to subjection only are of Grod. 2. Because to resist them, is to resist the ordinance of God. 3. Because they are not a terror to good works, but to evil. 4. Because they are God's ministers for our good, but abused powers are not of God, but of men, or not ordinances of Grod; they are a terror to good works, not to evil; they are not Grod's ministers for our good.

Arg. 2. — That power which is contrary to law, and is evil and tyrannical, can tie none to subjection, but is a mere tyrannical power and unlawful; and if it tie not to subjection, it may lawfully be resisted. But the power of the king, abused to the destruction of laws, religion, and subjects, is a power contrary to law, evil, and tyrannical, and tyeth no man to subjection: wickedness by no imaginable reason can oblige any man. Obligation to suffer of wicked men falleth under no commandment of God, except in our Saviour. A passion, as such, is not formally commanded, I mean a physical passion, such as to be killed. Grod hath not said to me in any moral law, Be thou killed, tortured, beheaded; but only. Be thou patient, if Grod deliver thee to wicked men's nands, to suffer these things.

Arg, 3. — There is not a stricter obligation moral betwixt king and people than betwixt parents and chil£:en, master and servant, patron and clients, husband and wife, the lord and the vassal, between the pilot of a ship and the passengers, the physician and the sick, the doctor and the scholars, but the law granteth, (I. Minime 36, de Melig. et sumpt. funer^) if these betray their tmst

committed to them, thej may be resisted: if the father turn distracted,' and arise to kill his sons, his sons may violently apprehend him, and bind his hands, and spoil him of his weapons; for in that he is not a father. Vasquez, (Lib, 1, lUtAStr, quest, c. 8, n. 18 J — Si dominiM subditum enarmiter et atrociter onerarety princeps superior vcwsallum posset ex toto eximere a sua juris-- dictione^ et etiam tacente subdit-o et nihil petente. Quid papa in suis decis. parliam, grot, dects. 62. Si quis Baro. abutentes dominio privari possunt. The servant may resist the master if he attempts unjustly to kill him, so may the wife do to the husband; if the pilot should wil&lly run the ship on a rock to destroy himself and his passengers, they midbit violently thrust him from the helm. Every tyrant is a furious man, and is morally distracted, as Althusius saith, Folit. c. 28, n. 30, and seq.

Arg. 4. — That which is given as a blessing, and a favour, and a screen, between the people's liberty and their bondage, cannot be given of God as a bondage and slavery to the people. But the power of a king is given as a blessing and favour of God to defend the poor and needy, to preserve both tables of the law, and to keep the people in their liberties from oppressing and treading one upon another. But so it is, that if such a power be given of God to a king, by which, actu pritnOy he is invested of God to do acts of tyranny, and so to do them, that to resist him in the most innocent way, which is self-defence, must be a resisting of God, and rebeUion against the king, his deputy; then hath &>d given a royal power as uncontrollable by mortal men, by any violence, as if God himself were immediately and personally resisted, when the king is resisted, and so this power shall be a power to waste and destroy irresistibly, and so in itself a plague and a curse; for it cannot be ordained both according to the intention and genuine formal effect and intrinsical operation of the power, to preserve the tables of the law, religion and Hberty, subjects and laws, and abo to destroy the same. But it is taught by royalists that this power is for tyranny, as weU as for peaceable government; because to resist this royal power put forth in acts either ways, either in acts of tyranny or just government, is to resist the ordinance of G^, as royalists say, from Biom. xiii. 1 — 3. And we know, to resist God's ordinances' and Gknl's d&patjj formaUter, as his deputy, is to resist God himself, (1 Sam. viii. 7 ; Matt x. 40,) as if Grod were doing personally these acts that the king is doing; and it importeth as much as the King of kings doth these acts in and through the tyrant. Now, it is blasphemy to tmnk or say, that when a king is drinlong the blood of innocents, and wasting the church of God, that Grod, if he were personally present, would commit these same acts of tyranny, (GUkL avert such blasphemy!) and that God in and through the ling, as his lawful deputy and vicegerent in mese acts of tyranny, is wasting the poor church of God. If it be said, in these sinful acts of tyranny, he is not God's formal vicegerent, but only in good and lawful acts of government, yet he IS not to be resisted in these acts, not because the acts are just and good, but because of the dignity of his royal person. Yet this must prove that those who resist the king in these acts of tyranny, must resist no ordinance of God, but only resist him who is the Lord's deputy, though not as the Lord's deputy. What absurdity is there in that more than to disobey him, reusing active obedience to him who is the Lord's deputy, not as the Lord's deputy, but as a man commanding besides his master's warrant?

Arg. 6. — That which is inconsistent with the care and providence of Grod in giving a king to his church is not to be tau^t. Now God's end in giving a king to his church, is the feeding, safety, preservation, and the peaceable and quiet life of his church. (1 Tim. ii. 2 ; Isa. xlix. 23 ; Psal. Ixxix. 71 )• But Grod should cross his own end in the same act of giving a king, if he should provide a king, wbo, oy office, were to suppress robbers, murderers, and all oppressors and wasters in his holy mount, and yet should give an irresistible power to one crowned lion, a king, who may kill ten hundred thousand protestants for their religion, in an ordinary providence; and they are by an ordinary law of God to give their throats to his emissaries and bloody executioners. If any say the king will not be so cruel, — I believe it; because, actu secundoy it is not possibly in his power to be so cruel. We owe thanks to his good ¥dll that he killeth not so many, but no thanks to the nature and genuine intrinsical end of a king, who hath power from God to kill all these, and that without resistance made b^ any

THE LAW AND THB PRINCB.

mortal man. Tea, no thanks (Grod avert blasphemy I) to God's ordinary proyidence, which (if royalists may he helieved) putteth no har upon the unlimited power oi a man inclined to sin, and ahuse his power to so much cruelty. Some may say, the same absurdity doth follow if the king should turn papist, and the parliament all were papists. In that case there might he so many martyrs for the truth put to death, and God should put no bar of providence upon this power, then more tnan now; and yet, in that case, the king and parliament should he iudges given of God, actu primOf and hy virtue of their office obliged to preserve the people in peace and godliness. But I answer. If God gave a mwful official power to king and parliament to work the same crueSy upon millions of martyrs, and it should he unlawM for them by arms to defend themselves, I should then think that king and parliaonent were both ex qfido^ hy virtue of their office, and actu prtmo, judges and fathers, and also by that same office, murderers and butchers, — which were a grievous aspersion to the unspotted providence of God.

Arg. 6. — If the estates of a kingdom give Ihe power to a king, it is their own power in the fountain; and if they give it for their own good, they have power to judge when it is used against themselves, and tor their evil, and so power to limit and resist the power that they gave. Now, that they may take away this power, is clear in Athaliah's case. It is true she was a tyrant without a title, and had not the right of heaven to the crown, yet she had, in men's court, a title. For supposing all the royal seed to be killed, and the people consent, we cannot say that, for these six years or thereabout, she was no magistrate: that there were none on the throne of David at this time: that she was not to he oheyed as Crod's deputy. But mnt that she was no magistrate; yet when Jehoash is brought forth to be crowned, it was a controversy to the states to whom the crown should belong. 1. Athaliah was in possession. 2. Jehoash himself being but seven years old, could not be judge. 3. It might be doubted if Joash was the true son of Ahaziah, and if he was not killed with the rest of llie blood royal.

Two great adversaries say with us; Hugo Grotius (dejur. belli et pdcis^ I. 1, c. 4, n, 7,) saith he dare not condemn this, if the lesser part of the people, and every one of

them indifferently, should defend themselves against a tyrant, ultimo necessitatis prcBsidio, The case of Scotland, when we were blocked up hy sea and land with armies: the case of England, when the king, induced by prelates, first attempted to bring an army to cut off the parliament, ana then gathered an army, and fortified York, and invaded Hull, to make the militia his own, sure is considerable. Barclay saith, the people hath jus se tuendi adversus tW manem scevitiem^ {advers. Monarch, I, 3, c. 8,) a power to defend themselves against prodigious cruelty. The case of England and Ireland, now invaded by the bloody rebels of Ireland, is also worthy of consideration. I could cite hosts more.

QUESTION XXIX.

WHETHBR, IN THE CASE OF DEFENSIYB WAR, THB DISTmCTION OF THE PERSON OF THE KING, AS A MAN, WHO CAN COMMIT ACTS OF HOSTILE TTRANNT AGAINST HIS SUB- JECTS, AND OF THE OFFICE AND ROTAL POWER THAT HB HATH FROM GOD AND THE PEOPLE, AS A KING, CAN HAVE PLACE.

Before I can proceed to other Scripture proofs for the lawfulness of resistance, this distinction, rejected by royalists, must be cleared. This is an evident and sensible distinction: — The king in conoreto, the man who is king, and the kingjtn abstracto, the royal office of the king. The ground of this distinction we desire to be considered &om Rom. xiii. We affirm with Buchanan, that Paul here speaketh of the office and duty of good magistrates, and that the text speaketh nothmg of an absolute king, nothing of a tyrant; and the rovalists distinguisn where the law distinguisheth not, against the law, (1. pret. 10, gl. Bart, de pub. in Bern.) ; and therefore we move the question here, Whether or no to resist the illegal and tyrannical will of the man who is kmg, be to resist the king and the ordinance of God; we say no. Nor do we deny the king, abusing his power in uniust acts, to remain king, and the minister of God, whose person for his royal office, and his royal office, are both to be honoured, reverenced, and obeyed. God forbid that we should do so as the sons of Belial, imputing to us the

doctrine of anabaptists, and the doctrine falsely imputed to Wicliffe, — ^that dominion is founded upon supernatural grace, and that a magistrate being in the state of mortal sin, cannot be a lawful magistrate, — ^we teach no such thing. The P. Prelate showeth us his sympathy with papists, and that he buildeth the monuments and sepulchres of the slain and murdered prophets, when he, revising to open his mouth m the gates for the righteous, professeth he will not purge the witnesses of Christ, the Waldenses, and Widiffe, and Huss, of these notes of disloyalty, but that these acts proceeding from this root of bitterness, the abused power of a king, should be acknowledged with obedience active or passive, in these unjust acts, we deny.

Assert, 1. — It is evident from Rom. xiii. that all subjection and obedience to higher powers commanded there, is subjection to the power and office of the magistrate in abstractor or, which is all one, to me person using the power lawMly, and that no subjection is due by that text, or any word of God, to the abused and tyrannical power of the king, which I evince from the text, and from o£er Scriotures.

1. Because tiie text saith, " Let every soul be subiect to the higher powers." But no powers commanding ^ngg unlawful, uid kilbng the innocent people of God, can be ixv^imi v^t^x^ea higher powers, but in that lower powers. He that commandeth not what Uod commandeth, and punisheth and killeth where God, if personally and immediately present, would neither command nor punish, is not in these acts to be subjected unto, and obeyed a a superior power, though in habit he may remain a superior power ; for all habitual, all actual superiority IS a formal participation of the power of the Most High. Arnis8Bus well saith, (c. 4, p. 96,) " That of Aristotle must be true. It is against nature, better and worthier men should be in subjection to unworthier and more wicked men ;" but when magistrates command wickedness, and kill the innocent, the non-obeyers, in so far, are worthier than the commanders (whatever they be in habit and in office) actually, or in these wicked acts are unworthier and inferior, and the non-obeyers are in that worthier, as being zealous adherents to God's command and not to man's will. I desire not to be mistaken ; if we speak of habitual excellency, godly and holj men, as the witnesses of

Christ in things lawfiil, are to obey wicked and infidel kings and emperors, but in that these wicked Bugs have an excellency in respect of office above them; but when they command things unlawfiil, and kill the innocent, they do it not by virtue of any office, and so in that they are not higher powers, but lower and weak ones. Laertius doth explain Aristotle well, who d^neth a tyrant by this, " That he commandeth his subjects by violence;" and Arnisseus condemneth Laertius for this, '' Because one tyrannical action doth no more constitute a tyrant, than one unjust action doth constitute an unjust man." But he may condemn, as he doth indeed, (Covarruvias pract. quest, c. 1, and Vaequez jQlustr. quest. 1. 1, c. 47, n. 1, 12,) for this is essential to a tyrant, to command and rule by violence. If a lawful prince do one or more acts of a tyrant, he is not a tyrant for that, yet his action in that is tyrannical, and he doth not that as a king, but in that act as a sinful man, having something of tyranny in him.

2. The powers (Bom. xiii. 1) that be, are ordained of God, as their author and efficient ; but kings commanding unjust things, and killing the innocent, in these acts, are but men, and sinful men; and the power by which they do these acts, a sinful and an usurped power, and so £ur they are not powers ordained of God, according to his revealed will, which must rule us. Now the authority and official power, in abstractor is ordained of God, as the text saith, and other Scriptures do evidence. And this pofiticians do clear, while they distinguish betwixt jus personoBy Hud jus coronary the power of the person, and the power of the crown and royal office. They must then be two different things.

3. He that resisteth the power, that is, the official power, and the lung, as king, and commanding in the Lord, resisteth the ordinance of God, and God's lawful constitution. But he who resisteth the man, who is the king, commanding that which is against God, and killing the innocent, resisteth no ordinance of God, but an ordinance of sin and Satan ; for a man commanding unjustly, and ruling tyrannically, hath, in that, no power from God.

4. They that resist the power and royal office of the king in things just and right, shall receive to themselves damnation, but they that resist, that is, refiise, for conscience, to obey the man who is the king.

Vand choose to obey God rather than man, as all the martyrs did, shall receive to themselves salvation. And the eighty valiant men, the priests, who used bodily violence a^nst king Uzziah*s person, '* and thrust him out or the house of the Lord," from offering incense to the Lord, which belonged to the priest only, received not damnation to themselves, but salvation in doing Grod's will, and in resisting the king's wicked will.

6. The lawful ruler, as a ruler, and in respect of his office, is not to be resisted, be<use he is not a terror to good works, but to evil ; and no man who doih. good is to be afraid of the office or the power, but to expect praise and a reward of^the same. But the man who is a kins may command an idolatrous and superstitious worshipsend an army of cut-throats a^nst them, because they refuse that worship, and may reward papists, prelates, and other corrupt men, and may advance them to places of state and honour because they kneel to a tree altar, — pray to the east, — adore the letters and souna of the word Jesus — ^teach and write Arminianism, and may imprison, deprive, confine, cut the ears, and slit the noses, and bum the faces of those who speak and preach and write the truth of God ; and may send armies of cut-throats, Irish rebels, and other papists and mali^ant atheists, to destroy and murder the judges of the land, and innocent defenders of the reformed re- Ugion, &c., — ^the man, I say, in these acts is a terror to good works, — ^an encouragement to evil ; and those that do good are to be afraid of the king, and to expect no praise, but punishment and vexation from oim; therefore, this reason in the text will prove that the man who is the king, in so far as he doth those things that are against his office, may be resisted ; and that in these we are not to be subject, but only we are to be subject to his power and royal authority, in abstraetOf in so far as, according to his office, he is not a terror to good works, but to evil.

6. The lawful ruler is the minister of God, or tiiie servant of God, for good to the commonwealth ; and to resist the servant in that wherein he is a servant, and unng the power that he hath from his master, is to resist the Lord his master. But the man who is the king, commanding unjust things, and killing the innocent, in mese acts is not the minister of Grod for the good of the I

commonwealth; — he serveth himself, and papists, and prelates, for the destruction of religion, laws, and commonwealth; therefore the man may be resisted, by this text, when the 4>ffice and power cannot be resisted.

7. The ruler, as the ruler, and the nature and intrinsical end of the office is, that he bear Grod's sword as an avenger to execute wrath on him that doth evil, — and so cannot be resisted without sin. But the man who is the ruler, and commandeth things unlawful, and killeth the innocent, carrieth the papist's and prelate's sword to execute, not the righteous judgment of the Lord upon the ill-doer, but nis own private revenge upon him that doth well; therefore, the man may be resisted, the office may not be resisted ; and they must be two different things.

8. We must needs be subject to the royal office for conscience, by reason of the fifth commandment ; but we must not needs be subject to the man who is king, if he command things unlawful ; for Dr Feme warranteth us to resist, if the ruler invade us suddenly, without colour of law or reason, and unavoidably; and Winzetus, Barclay, and Grotius, as before I cited, give us leave to resist a king turning a cruel tyrant ; but Paul (Bom. xui.) forbiddeth us to resist the power, in abstracto ; therefore, it must be the man, in concrete, that we must resist.

9. Those we may not resist to whom we owe tribute, as a reward of the onerous work on which they, as ministers of God, do attend continually. But we owe not tribute to the king as a man, — for then should we be indebted tribute to aU men, — but as a king, to whom the wages of tribute is due, as to a princely workman, — a king as a king; — ^therefore, the man and the king are different.

10. We owe fear and honour as due to be rendered to the man who is king, because he is a king, not because he is a man ; for it is the highest fear and honour due to any mortal man, which is due to the king, as king.

11. The man and the inferior judge are different; and we cannot, by this text, resist the inferior judge, as a judge, but we resist the ordinance of God, as llie text proveth. But cavaliers resist the inferior judges as men, and have kiUed divers members of both houses of parliament ; but they will not say that they killed then) as

judges, but as rebels. If, therefore, to be a rebel, as a wicked man, and to be a judge, are differenoed thus, then^ to be a man, and commit some acts of tTranny, and to be the supreme judge and king, are two different things.

12. The' congregation, in a letter to the nobility, ^Knox, Hist, of Scotland, 1. 2.) say, '* There is great difference betwixt the authority, which is God's ordinance, and the persons of those who are placed in authority. The authority and God's ordinance can never do wrong, for it commandeth that vice and vdcked men be punished, and virtue, with virtuous men and just, be maintained ; but the corrupt person placed in this authority may offend, and most commonly do contrary to this authority. And is then the corruption of man to be followed, by reason that it is clothed with the name of authority ?" And they give instance in Pharaoh and Saul, who were lawful kings and yet corrupt men. And certainly the La and the divine authority differ, as the subject and the accident, — ^as that which is under a law and can offend God, and that which is neither capable of law nor sin.

13. The king, as king, is a just creature, and by office a Uving and breathing law. His will, as he is king, is nothing but a just law; but the king, as a sinftd man, is not a just creature, but one who can sin and play the tyrant ; and his will, as a private sinful man, is a private will, and may be resisted. So the law saith, '* The king, as king, can do no wrong," but the king, as a man, may do a wrong. While as, then, the parliaments of both kingdoms resist the king's private will, as a man, and fight against nis illegal cutthroats, sent out by him to destroy his native subjects, they fight for him as a king, and obey his public legal will, which is his royal will, de jure ; and while he is absent from his parliaments as a man, he is legally and in his law-power present, and so the parliaments are as legsil as if he were personally present with them.

Let me answer royalists. — The P, Prelate saith it is Solomon's word, '' By me kings reign;" — ^kings, in concreto, with their sovereignty. He saith not, by me royalty or sovereignty reigneth. And elsewhere he saith that Barclay saith, *^ Paul, writing to the Bomans, keepeth the usual Boman diction in this, — who express by powers, in ahptractOy the persons authorised by power, — and it is the Scripture's dialect: by him

were created " thrones, dominions, principalities," that is, angels; to say angels, in abatractOy were created, (2 Pet. ii. 10,) They " speak evil of dignities," Jude viii., '' despise dominion," that is, they speak ill of Gajus, Caligula, Nero. Our Levites rail against the Lord's anointed, — ^the best of kmgs in the world. Nero, (Bom. xii. 4,) in concretOy beareth not the sword in vain. AmissBUS saith it better than the Prelate,^ (he is a witless thief,) Bom. xiii. 4, '' The royal power, in abstra>cto^ doth not bear the sword, but the person; not the power, but the prince himself beareth the sword." And the Prelate, poor man, following Dr Feme, saith, " It is absurd to pursue the king's person with a cannon bullet at Edgehill, and preserve his authority at London, or elsewhere." So saith Feme, (sect. 10, p. 64,) '' The concrete powers here are purposed as objects of our obedience, which cannot be directed but upon power in some person; for it is said, mi •htm iS^w0im The powers that be are of God." Now power cannot be •;r existent but in some person; and, saith Feme, *' Can power in the abstract have praise? Or is tribute paid to the power in the abstract? Yea, the power is the reason why we yield obedience to the person," &o. The Prelate hath as much learning as to copy out of Feme, Barclay, Arnisseus, and others, these words and the like, but hath not wit to add the sinews of these authors' reason; and with all this he can in his preface call it his own, and " provoke any to answer him if they dare;" wnereas, while I answer this excommunicated pamphleteer, I answer these learned authors, from which he stealeth' all he hath; and yet he must persuade the king he is the only man who can defend his Majesty's cause, and " the importunity (forsooth) of friends extorted this piece," as if it were a fault that this delpmc oracle (giving out railings and lies for responses) should be silent. 1. Not we only, but the Holy Ghost, in terminis^ hath this distinction. Acts iv. 19 ; v. 29, ^' We ought to obey God rather than men." Then rulers (for oi rulers sitting in judgment is that speech uttered) commanding and tyrannising over the apostles, are men contradistinguished from God; and as they command and punish unjustly, thev are but men, otherwise commanding for God, diey are gods, and more than men* 2. From

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

bovereiguty or royalty doth not properly reien or bear the gword, or receiye praise, and this accident doth not bear a sword; nor do we think (or Paul speak, Bom. xiii.) of the abstracted due of power and royalty, subsisting out of its subject; nor dream we that the naked accident of royal authority is to be feared and honoured as the Lord's anointed; the person or man who is the king, and beareth the crown on his head, and holdeth the sceptre in his hand, is to be obeyed. Accidents are not persons; but they speak nonsense, and are like brute beasts who deny that all the kingly honour due to the king must be due to him as a kinff, and because of the royal dignity that God hath given to him, and not because he 18 a man; for a pursuivant's son is a man; and if a pursuivant's son would usurp the throne, and take the crown on his head, and the sceptre in his hand, and command that all souls be subject to such a superior power, because he is a man, the laws of Scotland would hang a man for a less fault, we know; and the r. Prelate was wont to edify women, and converted souls to Christ, with such a distinction as objectum quod and objectum quo, in the pulpits of Edinburgh, and it hath good use here; we never took abstract royalty to.be the king. The kin^ of Scotland of old were not second notions, and we exclude not the person of the king; yet we distinguish, with leave of the P. Prelate, betwixt the person in linea fhysica (we must take physioa lai^ly here) and in linea morali, obedience, tetac, tribute, honour is due to the person of the king, and to the man who is King, not because of his person, or because he is a man, (the P. Prelate may know in what notion we take the name person,) but because Grod, by the people's election, hath exalted him to royal dignity; and for this cause ill-doers are to -subject their throats and necks to the sword of the Lord's anointed's executioner or hangman, with patience, and willingly; because, in takin? away the head of ilTdoers, for ill-doing, he is acting the office of the Lord, by whom he reigneth; but if he take away their heads, and send out the long-tusked vultures and boars of Babylon, the Irish rebels, to execute his wrath, as he is in that act a misinformed

man, and wanteth the authority of Grod's law and man's law, he may be resisted with arms. For, 1. If royalists say against this, ihea, if a king turn an habitual tyrant, and induce an hundred thousand Turks to destroy his subjects upon mere desire of revenge, they are not to resist, but to be subject, and suffer for cooscienoe. I am sure Grotius saith,^ " If a king sell his subjects, he loseth all title to the crown, and 80 may be resisted;" and Winzetus saith,^ " A tyrant may be resisted;" and Barday,' " It is lawful for the pe<^le, in case of tyranny, to defend themselves, adversus tmmanem scstfetiam, against extreme cruelty." And I desire the Prelate to answer how people are subject in suffering such cruelty of the higher power, because he is God's ordinance, and a power from God, except he say, as he selleth his people, and barba* rously destroyeth by the cut-ihroat Irishmen, his whole subjects refusing to worship idols, he is a man and a sinM man, eatenus, and an inferior power inspired by wicked counsel, not a king, eatenus, not a higher power; and that in resisting him thus, the subjects resist not the ordinance of Grod. Also suppose king David defend his kingdom and people against Jesse, his natural father, who we suppose cometh in against his son and prince, king David, with a huge army of the Philistines to destroy him and his kingdom, if he shall kill his own native father m that war, at some £dgehiU, how shall he preserve at Jerusalem mat honour and love that he oweth to his father, by virtue of the fifth commandment, *' Honour thy father and thy mother, &c.," let them an- Bwer this; except king David consider Jesse in one relation, in abstracto, as his &ther, whom he is to obey, and as he is a wicked man, and a perfidious subject, in another relation; and except king David say, he is to subject himself to his father, as a father, accwding to the fif^ commandment, and that in the act' of his father's violent invasion, he is not to subject himself to him, as he is a violent invader, and as a man. Let the royalist see how he can answer the argument, and how Levi is not to know his ikiher and mother, as they are sin&l men, (Deut. xxxiii. 9,) and yet to know and nonour them as parents; and how -an Is-

1 Grot, de jur. et pacis, 1. 1, c. 4, n. 7. ' Winzetus Velitat. adver. Buchanan, s Bard. adv. Monarchom. lib. 3/c. 8.

LEX, RBX ; OR,

raelite is not to pity the wife that lieth in his bosom, when she enticeth him " to go a whoring after strange gods," but is to kiU her, (Deut. xiii. 6 — 8,) and yet the husband is to '^ love the wife, as Christ loved his church," Eph. v. 25. If the husband take away lus wife's life in some mountain in the Holy Land, as Gfod's law commandeth, let the royalists answer us, where is then the marital love he owes to her, and that respect due to her as she is a wife and a helper? 2. But let not the royalist infer that I am from these examples pleading for the kiUing of kings; for lawful resistance is one thing, and kming of kings is another, — ^the one defensiye and lawAiI, the other offensive and unlawful, so long as he remaineth a king, and the Lord's anointed; but if he be a murderer of his father, who doth counsel his father to come to a place of danger where he may be killed, and where the kmg ought not to be; as Abner was worthy of death, who watched not carefully king Saul, but slept when David came to his bedside, and had opportunity to kill the king; they are traitors and murderers of the king, who either counselled his Majesty to come to Edgehill, where the danger was so great, or did not violently restrain him from coming thither, seeing kings' safety and lives are as much, yea, more, in the disposing of the people than in their own private will (2 Sam. xviii. 2, 3) ; for certainly the people might have violently restrained king Saul from killing himself; and the kin^ £ guilty of his own death, and sinneth against his office and subjects, who cometh out in person to any such battles where he may be Killed, and the contrary party free of his blood. And here our Prelate is blind, if he see not the clear difference between the king's person and his office as king, and between his private will and his public and royal will. 3. The angels may be named thrones and dominions in abstractOy and yet created in conereto, and we may say the angel and his power are both created at once; but Davia was not both bom the son of Jesse and a king at once; and the P. Pr^te by this may prove it is not lawAil to resist the devil, (for he is of the number of these created angels, Gol. i.,) as he is a deyfl; because in resisting the devil as a devil, we must resist an angel of God and a principality. 4. To speak evil of dignities, (2 Pet. ii. ; Jude viii.,) Piscator insinuateth, is, to speak evil of the very office of rulers,

as well as of their manners; and Theodat. saith, on 2 Pet. ii., that '' these railers speak evil of the place of governors and masters^ as unbeseeming beuevers." All our interpreters, as Beza, Calvin, Luther, Bucer, Marloratus, from the place, saith it is a special reproof of anabaptists and liber* tines, who in that time maintained that we are all free men in Christ, and that there should not be kings, masters, nor any mamtrates. However the abstract is put for me concrete, it is true, and it saith we are not to rail upon Nero; but to say Nero was a persecutor of Christians, and yet obey him commanding what is just, are very consistent. 5. '* The persons are proposed (Bom. xiii.) to be the object of our obedience," saith Dr Feme. Tnis is very true: but he is ignorant of our mind in exponing the wora perion. We never meant that fer, honour, royalty, tribute, must be due to the abstracted accident of kingly authority, and not to the man who is kmg; nor is it our meaning that royalty, in abstractor is crowned king, and is anointed, but that the person is crowned and anointed. But, i^ain, by a person, we mean nothing less than the man Nero wasting Kome, burning, crucifying Paul, and torturing Christians; and that we owe subjection to Nero^ and to his person in conereto, as to Grod's ordinance, uod's minister, Grod's swordbearer, in that notion of a person, is that only that we deny. Nay, in that Nero, in conereto, to us is no power ordained of God, no minister of God^ but a minister of the devil, and Satan's armour-bearer, and therefore we owe not fear, honour, subjection, or tribute to the person of Nero. But the person thus far is the object of our obedience, that fear, honour, subjection and tribute must be due to the man in conereto, to his person who is prince, but not because he is a man, or a person simply, or a swordbearer of papists, but for nis office, — ^for that eminent place of royal dignity that God hath conferred on his person. We know the light of the sun, the heat of fire, in dbstracto, do not properly give light and heat, but the sun and fire in conereto / yet the princwium qito, ratio qua^ the principles of these operations in sun and fire be light and heat; and we ascribe illuminating of dark bodies, heating of cold bodies, to sun and fire in conereto, yet not to the subjects simply, but to them as affected with such accidents; so here we honour and submit to

THE LAW AND THB PRINCE.

the man who is king, not because he is a man, that were treason; not because he useth his sword against the church, that were impiety; but because of his royal dignity, and because he useth it for the Lorn. It is true, AmissBus, Barclay, and Feme, say, '* That kings leave not off to be kings when they use their power and swoid against the church and religion. And also it is considerable, that when the worst of emperors, bloody Nero, did reign, the apostle presseth the duty of subjection to him, as to a power appointed of God, and condemneth tne resisting of NerO, as the resisting of an ordinance of Grod. And certainly, if the cause and reason, in point of duty moral, and of conscience before Grod remain in kings, to wit, that while they are enemies and persecutors, as Nero was, their royal dignity, given them of God remaineth, then subjection upon that ground is lawful, and resistance umawfid." — Ana, It is true, so long as kings remain kings, subjection is due to them because kings; but tluit is not the question. The question is, if subjection be due to them, wnen they use their power unlawfiiUy and tyrannicafly. Whatever David did, though he was a king, he did it not as king; he deflowered not Bathsheba as king, and Bathsheba might with bodily resistance and violence lawfully have resisted king David, though kingly power remained in nim, while he should thus attempt to commit adultery; else David might have said to Bathsheba, " Because I am the Lord's anointed, it is rebellion in thee, a subject, to oppose any bodily violence to my act of forcing of thee; it is unlawful to thee to cry for help, for if any shall offer violently to rescue thee from me, he resisteth the ordinance of God." Subjection is due to Nero as an emperor^ but not any subjection is due to him m the burning of Kome, and torturing of Christians, except you say that Nero's power abused in these acts of cruelty was, 1. A power from God. 2. An ordidance of God. 3. That in these he was the minister of God for the good of the commonwealth. Because some believed Christians were free from the yoke of magistracv, and that the dignity itself was unlawful; and because (c 12) he had set down the lawful church rulers, and in this and the following chapter, the duties of brotherly love of one toward another; so here (c. 13) he teacheth that all magistrates, suppose heathen, are to be obeyed and submitted unto

in all things, so fiur as they are ministers of Grod. AmissBus objecteth to Buchanan, " If we are by this place to subject ourselves to every power, in abstractor then also to a power contrary to the truth, and to a power of a king exceeding the limits of a lung; for such a power is a power, and we are not to distinguish where the law distinguisheth not."

Am^ 1. — The law clearly distinguisheth we are to obey parents in the Lord, and if Nero command idolatry, this is an excessive power. Are we obliged to obey, because the law distinguisheth not? 2. The text saith we are to obey every power from Grod that is Grod's ordinance, by which the man is a minister of Grod for good; but an unjust and excessive power is none of these three. 3. The text in words distinguisheth not obedience active in things wicked and lawful, yet we are to distinguish.

Svmmons. — Is authority subjected solely in the king's law, and no whit in his person, though put upon him both by God and man? Or, is authority only the subject, and the person exercising the authority, a bare accident to that, beins in it only more separably, as pride and fofly are in a man. Then, it one m authority command out of his own will, and not by law, — ^if I neither actively nor passively obey, I do not so much as resist abused authority; and then must the prince, by his disorderly will, have quite lost nis authority and become like another man; and yet his authority has not fled from him.

Ans. 1. — If we speak accurately, neither the man solely, nor his power only, is resisted; but the man clothed with lawful habitual power, is resisted in such and such acts flowing from an abused power. 2. It is an ignorant speech to ask. Is authority subjected solely m the king's law, and no whit in his person, for the authority hath all its power by law, not from the man's person? The authority hath nothing from the person but a naked inheritance in the person, as in the subject; and the person is to be honoured for the authority, not the authority for the person. 3. Authority is not so separable from the person, as that for every act of lawless will the king loseth his royal authority and ceaseth to be king. No, but every act of a king, in so far, can claim subjection of the interior, as the act of commanding and ruling hath law for it; and in so far as it is lawless, the person in

thftt act repugnant to law loseth all due daim of actiml subjection in that act, and in that act power actual is lost, as is clear, Acts iv. 19 ; v. 29. The apostles say to rulers. It is safer to obej God than man. What I Were not these rulers lawful magistrates armed with power from God? I answer, habituallj thej were rulers and more than men, and to obey them in things law- M is to obey God. But, actually, in these unlawM commandments, especially being commanded to speak no more in the name of Jesus, the apostles do acknowledge them to be no more but men; and so their actual authority is as separable from the person, as pride and foUy from men.

Symmfums, — The distinction holdeth good of inferior magistrates, that they may be considered as magistrates and as men, be- -cause their authority is only sacred, and addeth veneration to their persons, and is separable from the person. The man may live when his authority is extinguished, but it holdeth not in kings. King Saul's per^ on is venerable as ms authority, and his authority cometh by inheritance, and dieth, and hveth, inseparably with his person; and 4mthority and person add honour, each one to another.

Ans. 1. — If this be true, Manasseh, a king, did not shed innocent blood and use sorcery. He did not these great wickednesses as a man, but as a king. Solomon played the apostate as a king, not as a man, u BO, the man must make the king more infallible than the Pope; for the Pope, as a man, can err; — ^as a pope he cannot err, say ^pists. But prophets, in their persons, were anointed of G<xl as Satd and David were, then must we say, Nathan and Samuel erred not as men, because their persons were sacred and anointed, and sure they erred not as prophets, therefore they erred not aU. A king, as a king, is an holy ordinance of God, and so cannot do injustice, therefore they must do acts of justice as men. 1. The inferior judge is a power from God. 2. To resist him is to resist an ordinance of God. 3. He is not a terror to good works, but to evil. 4. He is a minister of Grod for good. 5. He is God's ^wrord-bearer. His ofiicial power to rule •may by as good right come by birth as the crown; and the king's person is sacred only for his office, and is anointed only for his office. For then the Chaldeans dishonoured not inferior judges (Lam. v. 12,) when they

^' hanged the prince, and honoured not the &ce8 of dders." It is in question, if the king's actual authority be not as separable from him, as the actual authority of the judffe.

Symmons (p. 24). — The king himself may use this distinction. As a Ghnstian he may forgive any that of&ndeth against his person, but as a judge, he must punish, in regard of his omce.

Ans. — ^Well, then, flatterers will grant the distinction, when the king doth good and pardoneth the blood of protestants, died by bloody rebels; but when the king doth acta of injustice, he is neither man nor king, hut some independent absolute god.

Symmona (p. 27). — God's word tyeth me to every one of his personal commandments, as well as his legal commandments. Nor do I obey the king's law, because it is esta- Uished, or because of its known penalty, nor yet the king himself, because he ruleth according to law, but I obey the king's law, because I obey the kins; and I obey the king, because I obey God; I obey. the king and his law, because I obey God and his law. Better obey the command for a reverent regard to the prince than for a penalty.

Atis. — It is hard to answer a sick man. It is blasphemy to seek this distinction of person and office in the King of kings, because by person in a mortal king, we understand a man that can sin. 1. I am not obliged to obey his personal commandment^ except I were his domestic; nor his unlaw- M personal commandments, because they are sinM. 2. It is false that you obey the king's law, because you obey the king; for then you say but this, I obey the king because I obey the king. The truth is, obedience is not fonxHilly terminated on the person of the king. Obedience is relative to a precept, and it is men-service to obey a law, not because it is good and just, but upon this formal motive, because it is the will of a mortal man to command it. And reverence, love, fear, being acts of the affection, are not terminated on a law, but.properly on the person of the judge; and they are modifications, <: laudable qualifieations of acts of obedience, not motives, not the formal reason why I obey, but the manner how I obey. And the apostle maketh expressly (Bom. xiii. 4). fear of punishment a motive of obedience, while he saith, " He beareth not the sword in vain," llierefore be subject to

THB LAW AND THB PRINCE.

the king; and this hindereth not personal resistance to unjust commandments.

Symmcms (p. 27—29).—" You say, * To obey the prince's, personal commandment against his legal will, is to obey himself against himself.' So say I, ' To obey his lesal will against his personal will, is to o^hineir.gainsth4elf.forIt;j.ehi. person to be himself.' "

Ans, — 1. To obey the king's personal will, when it is sinful, (as we now suppose,) against his legal will, is a sin, and a disobedience to God and the king also, seeing the law is the king's will as king; but to obey his legal will, against his sinful personal will, (as it must be sinful if contrary to a just law,) is obedience to the king as king, and so obedience to God. 2. You ti^e the king's person to be himself, but you take quid pro quo; for his person here you must not take physically, for his suppost of soul and body, but morally: it is the king, as a sinful man doing his worst will against the law, which is his just and best will, and the rule of the subjects. And the king's personal will is so far just, and to regulate the subjects, in so far as it agreeth with his legal will or his law, and this will can sin, and therefore may be crossed vrithout breach of the fifth commandment; but his legal will cannot be crossed without disobedience both to Grod and the king.

jSymmon (p. 28). — The king's personal will doth not always presuppose passion; and if it be attended with passion, yet we must bear it for conscience sake. — Ans, We are to obey the king's personal will, when the thing commanded is not sin; but his subjects, as subjects, have httle to do with his personal wul in that notion. It conoemeth his domestic servant, and is the king's will as he is the master of servants, not as he is king in relation to subjects; but we speak of the king's personal will as repugnant to law, and contrary to the king's will as king, and so contrary to the filth commandment; and this is attended often not only with passion, but also with prejudice; and we owe no subjection to prejudice and passions, or to acti<xis commanded by these disordered powers, because they are not from God, nor his ordinances, but from m^i and the flesh, and we owe no subjection to the flesh.

hr Feme (sect. 9, p. 58). — The distinction of personal and Ic^al will hath place in evil actions, biit not in resistance, where we

cannot sever the person and the dignity, or authority, because we cannot resist the power but we must resist the person who hath the power. Saul had lawfully the command of arms, but that power he useth unjustly, against innocent I)avid. I ask, When these emperors took away lives and goods at their pleasure, was that a power, ordained of God? No, but an illegal will, a tyranny — ^but they might not reast; nay, but they cannot resist; for that power and sovereignty employed to compass these illegal commandments was ordained and settled in them.. When Pilate condemned our Saviour, it was an illegal will, yet our Saviour acknowledgeth in it, that Pilate's power was given hmi from above.

Ans. — 1. Here we have the distinction denied by royalists, granted by Dr Feme. But if, when the king conunands us to do wickedness, we may resist that personal will, and when he commandeth us to suffer unjustly we cannot resist his will but we must resist also his royal person; what! is it not still the king, and his person sacred, as his power is sacred, when ne commandeth the subjects to do unjustly, as when he commandeth them to suner unjustly? It were fearfiil to say, when kings command any one act of idolatry, they are no longer kings. If, for conscience, I am to suffer unjusuy, when Nero commandeth unjust puniahment, because Nero commanding so, remaineth God's minister, why, but when Nero commandeth me to worship an heathen god, I am upon the same ground to obey that unjust will in doing ill; for Nero, in commanding idolatry, remaineth the Lord's minister, his person is sacred in the one commandment of doing ill, as in inflicting ill of punishment. And do I not resist his person in the one as in the other? His power and his person are as inseparably conj<Mned by God in the one as in the other. 2. In bodily thrusting out of Uzziah from the temple, these fourscore valiant men did resist the king's person by bodily violence, as well as his power. 3. If the power of killing the martyrs in Nero was no power ordained of God, then the resisting of Nero, in his taking away the lives of the martyrs, was but the resisting of tyranny; and certainly, if that power in Nero was rtrmyftivn a power ordained of God, and not to be resisted, as the place (B^n. xiii.) is alleged by royalists, then it must be a lawful power, and no tyranny; and if it cannot be ret-

LEX, REX ; OR,

sisted, because it was a power ordained and settled in him, it is either settled by Grod, and so not tyranny, (except God be the author of tyranny,) or then settled by the devil, and so may well be resisted. But the text speaketh of no power but of that which is of God. 4. We are not to be subject to all powers in cancreto, by the text; for we are not to be subject to powers law&l, yet commanding active obedience to things unlawful, ^w subjection includeth active obedience of honour, love, fear, paying tri* bute, and therefore of need force, some powers must be excepted. 6. Pilate's power is merely a power by divine permission, not a power ordained of God, as are the powers spoken of, Rom. xiii. Gregorius (mor. 1. 3, c. 11) expressly saith, — " This was Satan's power given to Pilate against Christ. Mambtts ScUanm pro nostra redemptione se tradidit^* Lyi^y '* ^ prin" dpibiuf Romanorum et ulteriiM permtssum a deo, qm eat potestas, superior,^' Calvin, Beza and Diodatus, saitn the same; and that he cannot mean of legal power from God's regulating will is evident, 1. Because Christ is answering Pilate, (John xix. 10,) " Knowest though not that I have power to crucify thee?" This was an untruth. Pilate had a command to worship him, and beUeve in him; and whereas Feme saith, (sect. 9, p. 59,) *' Pilate had power to judge any accused before him;" it is true; but he being obHged to believe in Christ, he was obliged to beheve in Christ's innocency, and so neither to judge nor receive accusation against him; and the power he saith he had to crucify, was a law-power in Pilate's meaning, but not in very deed any law power; because a law-power is from God's regulating will in the nf^h commandment, but no creature hath a lawful or a law-power to crucify Christ. 2. A lawpower is for good, (Bom. xiii. 4,) a power to crucify Chnst is for ill. 3. A law-power is a terror to ill works, and a praise to good: Pilate's power to crucify Chnst was the contrary. 4. A law-power is to execute wrath on ill-doing, a power to crucify Christ is no such. 6. A law-power conciliateth honour, fear, and veneration, to the person of the judge, a power to crucify Christ conciliateth no such thing, but a disgrace to Pilate. 6. The genuine acts of a lawM power are lawful a^ ; for such ad is the ^untain-power, such are the acts flowing therefrom. Grood acts flow not from bad powers, neither hath

Grod ^ven a power to sin, except by way of permission.

QUESTION XXX.

WHETHER OR KO PASSIVE OBEDIENCE BE A MEAK TO WHICH WE ARE SUBJECTED IN CONSCIENCE, BY VIRTUE OF A DIVINE COM- MANDMENT ; AND WHAT A MEAN RESIST- ANCE IS. THAT FLYING IS RESISTANCE.

Much is built, to commend patient suffering of ill, and to condemn all resistance of superiors, by royalists, on the place, 1 Pet. ii. 18, where we are commanded, being servants, to suffer buffets not only for ill-3oing of good masters, but also undeservedly; and when we do well, we are to suffer of those masters that are evil; and so much more are we patiently without resistance to suffer of kings. But it is clear, the place is nothing against resistance, as in these assertions I clear: —

Assert. 1. — Patient suffering of wicked men, and violent resisting are not incompatible, but they may weS stand together; so this consequence is the basis of the argument, and it is just nothing: to wit, servants are to suffer unjustfy wounds and buffeting of their wicked masters, and they are to bear it patiently; therefore, servants are in conscience obliged to non-resistance. Now, Scripture makeui this clear, — 1. The church of God is to bear with all patience the indignation of the Lord, because she hath sinned, and to suffer of wicked enemies which were to be trodden as mire in the streets (Micah vii. 9 — 12); but withal, they were not obliged to non-resistance and not to fight against these enemies, yea, they were obliged to fight against them alsa If these were Babylon, Judah might have resisted and fought if God had not given a special commandment of a positive law, that they should not fight; it these were the Assyrians and other enemies, or rather both, the people were to resist by fighting, and yet to endure patiently the indignation of the Lord. David did bear most* patiently the wrong that his own son Absalom, and Ahitophel, and the people inflicted on him, in pursuing him to take his life and the kingdom from him, as is clear by his gracious expressions (2 Sam. xv. 25, 26 ; xvi. 10 — 12; Psal. iiL 1 — 3); yea, he prayeth

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

fur a blessing on the people that conspired against him (Psal. iii. 8) ; yet did he lawfully resist Absalom and the conspirators, and sent out Joab and a huge army in open battle against them, (2 Sam< xviii. 1— -4, &c.,) and fought against them* And were not the people of God patient to endure the riolence done to them in the wilderness by Og, king of Bashan; Sihon, king of Heshbon; by the Amorites, Moabites, &c.? I think God's law tyeth all men, especiaUy his people, to as patient a suffering in wars. (Deut. viii. 16.) God then trying and humbling his people, as the servant is to endure patiently, unjurtly inflicted buffets (1 Pet. li. 18); and yet God's people at God's command did resist these longs and people, and did fight and kill them, and possess their land, as the history is dear. See the like Josh. xi. 18, 19. 2.r One act of grace and ▼irtue is not contrary to another; resistance is in the children of Grod an innocent act of self-pres^vartion, as is patient suffering, and therefore they may well subsist in one. And so saith Amasa by the Spirit of the Lord, 1 Chron. zii. 18, ** Peace, peace be unto thee, and peace to thy helpers, for Grodhelpeth thee." Now, in that, David and all nis helpers were resisters of king Saul. 3. The scope of the j^ace (1 Pet. ii.) is not to forbid all violent resisting, as is dear he speaketh nothing of violent resisting eith^ one way or other, but only he forbiddeth revengefiil roasting of repaying one wrong with another, &om the example of Christ, who, '^ when he was reviled, reviled Bot a^ain; when he suffered, he threatened not;''^ therefore, the argument is a felacy, ah o quod dodtur mmrk r), ad illtui qttod dkitar mirxSf Though therefore the master should attempt to kill an innocent servant, and invade him with a weapon of death suddenly, without all reason or cause, or unavoidaJbly, Dr Feme, (p. S, sect. 2, p. 10,) in that case, doi^ free a subject from

iltiness if ho violently resist his prince ;

Brefore, the servant who should violently resist his master in the aforesaid case should, and mi^t patiently suffer and violently resist, notwithstanding anything that royalists can oondude on the contrary. 4. No prince hath a masterly or lordly dominion over his subjects, but only a free, ingenuous, paternal* and tutoriy oversight for the good of the people. (Rom. xiii. 4.) The master, especially in the^apostle Peter's tin^e, had a domimoitofr servants as over their proper goods.

Assert, 2. — Neither suffering formally as suffering, and so neither can non-resisting passive fall under any moral law of Gkxi, except in two conditions: 1. In the point of Christ's passive obedience, he being the eternal God as well as man, and so lord of his own blood and life, by virtue of a special commandment imposed on him by his Father, was commanded to lay down his life, vea, and to be an agent as well as a patient m dying (Job. x. 18) ; yea, and actively he was to contribute something for his own death, and offer himself wimngty to death (Matt, xxviii. 20) ; and, knowing the hour that he was to depart out of this world unto the Father, (John xiii. 1,) would not only not fly — ^which is to ro3ralists lawiul, to us a special point of resistance (John xiv. 81 ; xviii. 4--7) — ^but upbraided Peter as the a^nt of SaUm, who would dissuade him to die, (Matt. xvi. 22, 23,) and would fight for him. And he doth not fetch any argument against Peter's dravdng of his swora firom the unlawfulness of self-defence and innocent resistance, (which he should have done if royalists plead with any colour of reason from his example, asainst the lawfulness of resistance and self-defence,) but from the absolute power of God. 2. From Grod's positive wiU, who commanded him to die.- (Matt. xxvi. 63, 64.) If therefore royalists prove anything against the lawMness of resisting kings, when they offer (most unjustly) violence to the life of God's servants, crom this one merely extraordinary and rare example of Christ, the like whereof was never in the world, they may, firom the same example, prove it unlawful to fly, for Christ would not fly. ^sal. xh 6, 7 ; Heb. X. 6 — 9; John xiv. 31; xviii. 4 — ^7.) 1. They may prove that people sought by a tyrant to be crucified for the cause of God, are to reveal and discover themselves to an army of men who come to seek them. (John xiii. 1,2; xviii. 4 — -7). 2. That martyrs are of purpose to go to the place where they know they shall he apprehended and put to death, for this Christ md, and are wiUmgly to offer themselves to the enemy's army, for so did Christ (John xiv. 3; Mark xiv. 41, 42; ^att. xxvi. 46, 47) ; and so by his example, all the parliament, all the innocents of the city of London, and assembly of divines, are obliged to lay down arms and to go to their own death to prince Rupert, and the bloody Irish rebels. 3. By this example it is unlawfiil to resist the cut-throats of a king, for

Csesar in his own royal person — ^the high priest in person, came not out against Christ; yea, it is not lawful for the parliament to resist a Judas, who hath fled as a traitorous apostate from the truth and the temple of Qirist. 4. It is not lawful for innocents to defend themselves by any violence against the invasion of superiors, in Dr Feme's three cases in which he alloweth resistance: (1.) When the invasion is sudden. (2.) Unavoidable. (3^ Without all colour of law and reason. In the two last cases, royalists defend the lawfulness of self-defence. 5. If the example be pressed, — Christ did not this and that, he resisted not with violence, to save his own life, therefore, we are to abstain from resistance and such and such means of self-preservation; then, because Christ appealed not from inferior judges to the emperor Ceesar; who, no doubt, would have shown him more favour than the scribes and Pharisees did, and because Christ conveyed not a humble supplication to his sovereign and father Caesar, — ^then because he proffered not a humble petition to prince f ilate for his life, he being an innocent man, and his cause just, — ^because he neither procured an orator to plead his own just cause, nor did he so plead for himself, and give in word and wnt, all lawful and possible defences for his own safety, but answered many things with silence, to the admiration of tne judge, (Mark xv. 3 — 5,) and was thrice pronounced by the judge to be innocent (Luke xxii. 23) ; because, I say, Christ did not all these for his own life, therefore it is unlawful for Scotland and England to appeal to the king, to suppHcate, to give in apolo^es, &;c. I think royalists dare not say so. But if they say he would not resist, and yet might histve done all these lawfully, because these be lawful means, and resistance with the sword unlawful, — ^because '^ He that taketh the sword, shall perish by the sword," — let me answer then, 1. They leave the argument from Christ's example, who was thus far subject to higher powers, that he would not resist, and plead worn the unlawfulness of resistance; this is petitio prindpiL 2. He that tskketh the sword without Grod's warrant, which Peter had not, but the contrary, he was himself a Satan to Christ, who would but counsel him not to die; but there is no shadow of a word to prove that violent resisting is unlawful, when the king and his Irish cut-throats pursue us unjustly; only Christ saith, when God may

deliver extraordinarily by his angels, except it be his absolute will that his Don should drink the cup of death, then to take the sword, when God hath declared his will on the contrary, is unlawful; and that is all; though I do not question but Christ's asking for swords, and his arresting all his enemies to the ground (John xviii. 6) backward, is a justifying of self-defence. But hitherto it is dear, by Christ's example, that he only was commanded to suffer. Now the second case in which suffering £sJleth under a commandment, is indirect^ and comparatively, when it cometh to uie election of the witness of Jesus, that it is referred to them, either to deny the truth of Christ and his name, or then to suffer death. The choice is apparently evident; and this choice that persecutors refer us unto, is to us a commandmtot of God, that we must choose suffering for Christ, and refuse sinning against Christ. But the supposition must stand, that this alternative is unavoidable, that is not in our power to decline either suffering for Christ, or denying of Christ before men; otherwise no man is to expect the reward of a witness of Jesus, who having a lawM possible means of eschewing suffering, doth yet cast himself into suffering needlessly. But I prove that suffering by men of ^is world ialleth not formally and directly under any divine positive law; for the law of nature, — whatever Arminians in their declaration, or this Arminian excommunicate think vrith them, (for they teach that Grod gave a commandment to Adam, to abstain from such and such fruit, with pain and trouble to sinless nature,}-— doth not command Buffering, or anything contrary to nature, as nature is smless; 1 prove it thus: —

1. Whatever falleth under a positive oommandment of God, I may say here, under any commandment of God, is not a thing under the free will and power of others, from whom we are not descended necessarily by natural generation, but that men of the world kill me, even ikese from whom I am not descended by natural generation (which I speak to exclude Adam, who killed all his posterity) is not in my free will, either as if they had my common nature in that act, or as if I were accessory by counsel, consent, or approbation to that act, for this is under the free will and power of others, not under my own free will; therefore, that I suffer by others is not under my &ee vdll, and -oaonot

fall under a oommandment of God; and certainly it is an irrational law (glorified be his name) that God should command Antipas either formally to suffer, or formally not to suffer death by these of the synagogue of Satan, (Bev. ii. 13,) because if they be pleased not to kill him, it is not in his free will to be killed by them; and if they shall have him in their power (except God extraordinarily deliver) it is not in nis power, in an ordinary providence, not to be killed.

2. All these places of God's word, that

recommendeth suffering to the followers of

Christ, do not command formally that we

suffer; therefore, suffering falleth not formally under any comman£nent of God. I

prove the antecedent, because if they be considered, they prove only that comparatively

we are to choose rather to suffer than to

deny Christ before men, (Mat. x. 28, 32 ;

or then they command not suffering according to the substance of the passion, but according to the manner that we suffer, willingly, cheerfully, and patiently. Hence

Christ's word to take up nis cross, which is

not a mere passion, but commendeth an act

of the virtue of patience. Now no Christian

virtue oonsisteth in a mere passion, but in

laudable habits, and good and gracious acts,

and the text we are now on (1 Pet. ii. 18,

19) doth not recommend suffering from the

example of Christ, but patient sniroring; and

but Iv wmrri rS ^Cm in all fear, (ver. 18,) and

the words Arf i^uv and ^^in7, to suffer with

xiii. 7y love ritmi ^t/aiw suffereth all

things; Heb. xii. 17, if you suffer correction; 1 Tim. v. 5, she continueth patientlv in prayers; Heb. xii. 2, Christ endurew the cross patiently/ (Bom. xv. 5 ;

viii. 25 ; Luke viii. 16 ; xxi. 29). The derivations hence agnify patience; so do all our interpreters, Beza, Calvin, Marloratus, and

popish expositors, as Lorinus, Estius, Carthusian, Lyra, Hugo Cardinalis, expound it of

patient suffering; and the text is clear, it is

suffering like Ouist, without rendering evil

for evil, and reviling for reviling.

3. Suffering simply, according to substance of the passion, (I cannot say action,) is common to good and ill, and to the wicked, yea to the damned in hell, who suffer against their will, and that cannot be Joined according to its substance as an act of formal obedience and subjection to higher powers, kings, fathers, masters, by force of tke fifth commandment, and of the place. Bom. xiii. 1, 2. Which, according to its substance, wicked men suffer, and the damned in hell also against their will.

4. Passive obedience to wicked emperors can but be enjoined (Bom. xiii.) but only in the manner, and upon supposition, that we must be subject to them, and must suffer, against our wills aU the ill of punishment that they can inflict; we must suffer patiently, and because it is God's permissive will that they punish us unjustly ; for it is not God's ruling and approving will (called voluntas signi) that they should, against the law of Grod and man, kill us, and persecute us ; and therefore neither Bom. xiii., nor 1 Pet. ii., nor any other place in God's word, any common divine, natural, national or any municipal law, commandeth formally obedience passive, or subjection passive, or non-resistance under the notion of passive obedience ; yea, to me, obedience passive (if we speak of obedience, properly called, as relative essentially to a law) is a chimera, a dream, and repugnantia in adjecto; and therefore I utterly deny that resistance passive, or subjection passive, doth formally fall under either commandment of God affirmative or negative ; only the unlawM manner of resistance by way of revenge, or for defence of popery and false religion, and out of impatient toleration of monarchy or any tyranny, is forbidden in God's word ; and certainly all the words used Bom. xiii., as they fidl under a formal commandment of God, are words of action, not of any chimerical passive obedience, as we are not to resist actively God's ordinance, as his ordinance, (ver, 1, 2,) that is, to resist God actively. We are to do good works, not evil, if we would have the ruler no terror to us (ver. 3). We must not do ill if we would be free of vengeance's sword (ver. 7) ; we are to pay tribute and to give fear and honour to the ruler, all which are evidently actions, not passive subjection ; and if any passive subjection be commanded, it is not here, nor in the first commandment, commanded, but in the first commandment under the hand of patience and submission under Grod's hand in sufferings, or in the third^ commandment under the hand of rather djring for Christ than denying his truth before men. Hence I argue here (Bom. xiii. ; 1 Pet. ii. ; Tit. mj is nothing else but an exposition of the fifth

commaiidment; but in the fifth coimnandment only active obedienoe is formallj c6mmanded, and the subordination of inferiors to superiors is ordained, and passiye obedience is nowhere commanded, but only modus reif the manner of suffering, and the occasion of* the commandment, here it is thought that the Jews converted under this pretext, that they were (Jod's people, believed that they should not be subject to the Romans. A certain Galilean made the Galileans believe that they should not pay tribute to strangers, ^nd that they should call none lord, but the God of heaven; as Josephus saith, (Antiq, Judaic. 1. 20, c. 2, and de bell. Judaic. 1 7> c 29,) yea and Hieron. (Com. in Tit.,) saith, At this time the sect of the Galileans were on foot. It is like the Jews were thought to be Galileans, and that their liberty, purchased in Cljirist, could not consist with the order of master and servant, king and subject. And to remove this, Paul estabhshed magistracy, and commandeth obedience in the Lord; and he is more to prove the office of the magistrate to be of Grod than any other thing, and to show what is his due, than to establish abso* luteness in Nero to be of God; yea, to me, every word in the text speaketh limitedness of princes, and crieth down absoluteness: — (1.) No power of God, (2.) no ordinance of God, who is a terror to evil, but a praise to good works, (3.) no minister of Grod for good, &c. can be a power to which we sub mit ourselves on eairth, as next unto Grod, without controlment. That passive obedience &lleth formally under no commandment of Grod, I prove thus: All obedience^ liable to a divine commandment, doth commend morally the performer of obedience, as having a will conformed to Qod's moral law, ana deformity betwixt the will of him who performeth not obedience, involveth the non-obedient in wrath and guiltiness. But non-passive subjection to the sword of the judge doth not morally commend him that sufiSreth not punishment; for no man is formally a sinner against a moral law because he suffereth not the ill of punishment, nor is he morally good, or to be commended, because he suffereth ill of punishment, but because he doth the ill of sin. And all evil of punishment unjustly inflicted hath Grod's voluntas beneplaciti, the instrumental and hidden decree of Grod, which ordereth both good and iU, (Ephes. i. 11,) for its rule and cause, and hath not God's will or approbation called, voluntfu signi^ for its rule, both is contrary to that wiU. I am sore Epiphanius, (1. 1, torn, 3, heres. 40,) BasiliuB (in Fsal. xxxiiA Naaiapzen Orat. {ad suhd. et imperat^)y Hilar. (U. ad Constant.)^ and Augustine, all citeth these words, and saith the same. K, then, passive subjection be not commanded, non-subjection passive oannot be forbidden, and this text, Kom. xiii., and 1 Pet. ii. cannot a whit help the bad cause of royalists. All then must be reduced to some action of resisting; arguments for passive subjection, though there were idiipmlisof them, they cannot help us.

Assert. 3. — By the place, 1 Pet, ii., the servant unjustly buffeted is not to buffet his master agam, but to bear patiently as Christ did, mo, when he was reviled, did not revile ugarn. Not because the place condemneth resistance for self-defence, bat because buffeting again is formally re-offending — ^not deien<unff: defendii^ is -properly a warding off a blow or stroke. If my ne^hbour come to kill me, and I can by no means save my life by flight, I may defend myself; and all divines say I may rather kill ere I be killed, because I am nearer, by the law of nature, and dearer to myself and my own life than to my brother; — but if I kill him, out of malice or hatred, the act of defending, by the unlawful manner of doing, becometh an act of offraiding and murder; whence the mind of the blood-shedder will vary the nature of the aetioa from whence this coroll/ucy dpth naturally issue^ that, the physical action of taking aMy the life maketh not murder nor homicide, and so the physical action of offending my neiffhbeur is not murder. 1.. Abi^dbaia may kill his son, _he for whom the cities of re&ge were ordained, and did kill lus brother, yet,, not hating him, be was not, by God's law, judgS 1^ murderer; and, 2. It necessarily hence Mloweth, that an act which ia physically an act of offending my Inrother, yea even to the taking away of his life, is (^en morally and leguly an act of lawM seUdefence: an offending of another, necessitated &om the sole invention of self-defence, is no more but an act of innocent sdf-defence. If David, with his men, had killed any of Saul's men in a set battile, David and his men only int^iding self-defence, the war on David's part was mere defensive; for physical actions of killing, indifferent of themselves, yet imperatea by a principle of natural self-defence, and clothed with this formal

THE LAW AND TH£ PRINCE.

end of self-defence, or aooordixiff to the substance of the action^ the act is of self-defence. If, therefore, one shall wound me deadly, and I know it is my death, after that, to kill the killer of myself, I beins only a private man, mu^ be no act of sel^efence, but of homicide; because it cannot be imperated by a sinless dictate of a natural conscience, for this end of self-defence, after I know I am killed. Any mean not used for preTentinff death must be an act of revenge, not of seu-defence, for it is physicallv unaiitable for the intended end d self-defence. And so, for a servant buffeted to buffet again, is oi the same nature, — ^ihe second Iraffet not being a condueibla mean to ward the first buffet, but a mean to procure he^ vier strdies, and, possibly, killing, it cannot be an act of self-defence; f<Nr an act of s^- defence must be an act dsstinated ex natura ret, only for deHmce; and if it be known to be an act of &Ae offending, without anr known necessary relation of a mean to s^- defenoe as the end, it cannot be {n^perly an act oi self-drfence.

AtserL 4. — When the matter is lis^ter, as in paying tribute, or suffering a buffet of a rough master, thouflh unjustly, we are not to use any act criT r-offending. For, though I be not absolute lord of my own goods, and so may not at my sole pleasure give tribute and expend monies to the hurting of my children, where I am not, by Grod^ law or man's law, obliged to pay tribute^ and though I be not aa absolute lord of my members, to expose &oe, and cheeks, and back, to stripes and whips at my own mere will, yet have we & comparative dominion myexL to us of God in matters of goods, and disposing of our members, ^I think I may except me case of mutilation, which is a little death,) for buffets, because Christ, no doubt to teach us the like, would rather give of his goods, and pay tribute where it was not due, than that this scandal be in the way of Christ, that Christ was no loyal su^ect to law&l emperors and kings. And (1 (jor. ix.) Paul would rather not ^e stipend, though it was due to him, than hinder the course of the gospel. And the like is 1 Cor. vL, where the C(3nthians were rather to suffer loss in their goods Ihazi to go to law bei^re infidel judges, and by the hke to prevent greater mconveniences, and mutilation, and death. The Christian servant hath that dominion over hiB members, rather to suffer buffets than to ward off buffets with violent resistance. But it is no consequence, that innocent subjects should suffer death of tyrants, and servants be killed by masters, and yet that they shall not be allowed, by the law of nature, to defend themselves, by re-offending, when only self-defence is intended, because we have not that dominion over life and death. And therefore, as a man is his brother's murderer, who, with froward Cain, wiU not be his brother's keeper, and may preserve his brother's life, without loss of his own life, when his brother is unjustly preserved; so, when he may preserve his own hfe, and doth not that wmdi nature's law alloweth him to do, (rather to kill ere he be killed,) he is guilty of self-murder, because he is deficient in the du^ of lawful self-defence. But I grant, to offend or kill is not of the nature of defensive war, but accidental thereunto; and yet killing of cutthroats, sent forth by the illegal commandment of the kinff, may be intended as a mean, and a lai/mil mean, of self-defence. Of two ills of punishment, we have a comparative dominion over ourselves, — a man may cast his goods into the sea to redeem his life; so, for to redeem peace, we may suffer buffets, but because death is the greatest ill of punishment, God hath not made it eligiblie to us when lawftil self-defence is at hand. But, in defending our own life against tyrannical power, though we do it hj offencUng and killing, we resist no ordinance of God, only I judge killing of the king in selP-defenee not lawful, because selfdefence must be national on just causes.

Let here the reader judge Barclay, H. 3, c 8, p. 159, con. Monar!) " If the King (saith Jbe) shall vex the commonwealth, or one port thereof, with great and intolerable cruelty, what shall the people do? They have (saith he) in that case a power to resist and defend themselves from injury; but only to defend themselves, nor to invade the prince, nor to resist the injury, or to recede from reverence due to the prince."^

I answer, 1. Let Barclay or the Prelate, (if he may carry Barclay's books) or any, aifference these two, — ^the people may resist & tyrant, but they may not resist the injuries inflicted by a tyrant's officers and cutthroats. I cannot inu^ne how to conciliate

^ Fopnlo qnidem hoc casn resitendi ac tnendi se ab injuria potestas competit. sod tuendi se tanttim, non autem principem inyadendi, et resistendi injuriSB illat8B, non recedendi a, debita reverentia — non vim prseteritam nldscendi jns habet.

LEX, REX ; OR,

these two; for to resist the cruelty of a king is but to hold off the injury by resistance. 2. If this Nero waste tke commonwealth insufferably with his cruelty, and remain a lawful king, to be honoured as a king, who may resist him, according to the royalists' way? But, from Bom. xiii., they resist the ordinance of Grod. Besisting is not a mere suffering, nor is it a moral resisting by alleging £ws to be broken by him. We had never a question with royalists about such resisting. Nor is this resisting non-obedience to unjust commandments; that resisting was never yet in question by any except the papists, who in good earnest, by consequent, say, It is better to obey men than God. 3 It is then resisting by bodily violence. But if the king have such an ab^ solute power given him by God, as royalists fancy, irom Bom. xiii. 1, 2; 1 Sam. viii. 9 — 11, 1 know not how subjects have any power given them of Grod to resist the power from God, and God's ordinance. And if this resii^g extend not itself to defensive wars, how Siall the people defend themselves from injuries, and the greatest injuries imagina* ble, — from an army of cut-throats and idolators, in war coming to destroy reHgion, set up idolatry, and root out the name of Grod's people, and lav waste the mountain of the Lora's house? And if they may defend themselves by defensive wars, how can wars be without offending? 4. The law of nature teacheth to repel violence with violence, when one man is oppressed, no less than when the commonwealth is oppressed. Barclay should have given either Scripture or the law of nature for his warrant here. 5. Let us suppose a king can be perjured, how are the estates of the kingdom, who are his subjects, by Barclay's way, not to challenge sucn a tyrant of his perjury? He did swear he should be meek and clement, and he is now become a furious lion. Shall the flock of Grod be committed to the keeping of a furious lion?

Dr Feme (p. 3, sect. 2, p. 9,) addeth, *^ Personal defence is lawful against sudden and illegal invasion, such as Elisha practised, even if it were against the prince, to ward blows, and to hold the prince's hand, but not to return blows; but general resistance by arms cannot be without many unjust violences, and doth immediately strike at the order, which is the life of the commonwealth.

Ans. — 1. If it be natural to one man to

defend himself against the personal invasion of a prince, then is it natural and warrantable to ten thousand, and to a whold kingdom; and what reason to defraud a kingdom of the benefit of self-defence more than one man? 2. Neither grace nor policy destroyeth nature; and how shall ten or twenty thousand be defended a^gainst cannons and muskets, tliat killeth af^ off, except they keep towns against the king, (which Jh Feme and others say had b^n treason in David, if he had kept Keilah against king Saul,) except they be armed to offend, with weapons of^the Uke nature to kill rather than be killed, as the law of nature teacheth. 3. To hold the hands of the prince is no leas resisting violence than to cut the skirt of his garment, which royalists think unlawful, and 18 an opposing of external force to the king's person. 4. It is true, wars merely defensive cannot be but they must be offensive; but they are offensive by accident, and intended for mere defence, and they cannot be with' out wars sinfrdly offensive, nor can any wan be in rerum natura now, (I except the wars commanded by God, who only must have been sinful in the manner of doing,) but some innocent must be killed; but wars cannot for that be condemned. 5. Neither are offensive wars against those who are no powers and no ordinances of Grod, such as are cut-throat Irish, condemned prelates and papists now in arms, more destructive to the order established by God than acts of lawful war are, or the punishing of robbers. And by all this, proteistants in Scotland and Ens* Itmd should remain in their houses unarmed, while the papists and Irish come on them armed, ana cut their throats, and spoil, and plunder at will.

Nor can we think that resistance to a king, in holding his hands, can be natural; if he be stronger, it is not a natural mean of self-preservation. Nature hath appointed innocent and offending violence, agiunst unjust violence, as a means of self-preservation. GoHath's sword is no natural means to hold Saul's hands, for a sword hath no fingers; and if king Saul suddenly, without colour of law or reason, or inevitably, should make personal invasion on David to kill him, Dr Feme saith he m&j resist; but resisting is essentially a re-action of violence. Show us Scripture or reason for violent holding a king's hands in an unjust personal invasion, without any other re-aetion of offence. Walter Torrils killed king W. Bufus as he ivas

sbootinff at a deer; the Earl of Suffolk killed Henry VIII. at tilting: there is no treasonable intention here, and so no homicide. Defensive wars are offensive, ex eventu et efectu^ not ex cauaa^ or ex intentione.

But it may be a^Lod, if no paflSLYe subjection at aU be commanded as due to superiors. — Ana. None properly so called, that is, purely passiye, only we are, for fear of the sword, to do our duty. We are to suffer ill of punishment of tyrants, ex hypo^ ihesi^ that tney inflict that ill on us some other way, and in some other notion than we are to suffer ill of equals; for we are to suffer of equals not for any paternal authority that they have over us, as certainhr we are to suffer ill inflicted by superiors. 1 demand of royalists, If tyrants inflicting evil of punishment upon subjects unjustly be powers ordained of God: if to resist a power in tyrannical acts be to resist Grod. Since we are not to yield active obedience to all the commandments of superiors, whether they be good or ill, by virtue of this place. Bom. xiii. how is it that we may not deny passive subjection to all the acts of violence exercised, whedier of injustice, whether in these acts of violence wherein the prince in actu exercito and formally, punisheth not in God's stead, or m these wherein he punisheth tyrannically, in no formal or actual subordination to G<xl, we owe passive subjection? I desire an answer to these.

Assert. 5. — Flying from the tyranny of abused authority, is a plain resisting of rulers in their unlawful oppression and perverting of judgment.

All royalists grant it lawful, and ground it upon the law of nature, that those that are persecuted b^ tyrannous princes may flee, and it is evident from Christ's commandment, **' If they persecute you in one city, flee to another," Matt. x. 23, and by Matt, xxiii. 34. Christ fled from the fliry of ihQ Jews till his hour was come; Elias, Uriah, (Jer. xxvL 20,) and Joseph and Mary fled; the martyrs did hide themselves in caves and dens of the earth (Heb. zi. 37> 38) ; Paul was let down through a window in a basket at Damascus. This certainly is resistance; for look, what legal power God hath given to a tyrannous ruler, remaining a power ordained of Grod, to summon legaiiy, and set before his tribunal the servants of God, that he may kill them, and murder them unjustly, that same le^ power he hath to murder them; for if it be a

legal power to kill the innocent, and such a power as they are obliged in conscience to submit unto, they are obliged in conscience to submit to the legal power of citing; for it is one and the same power. 1. Now, if resistance to the one power be unlawful, resistance to the other must be unlawM also; and if the law of self-defence, or command of Christ, warrant me to disobey a tyrannous power commanding me to compear to receive the sentence of death, that same law far more shall warrant me to resist and deny passive subjection in submitting to the unjust sentence of death. 2. When a murderer, selfconvicted, fleeth from the just power of a judge lawfully citing him, he resisteth the just power ordain^ of Grod (Bom. iii.); therefore, by the same reason, if we flee from a tyrannous power, we resist that tyrannous power, ana so, by royalists' ground, we resist the ordinance of God by flying. Now, to be disobedient to a just power summoning a malefactor, is to hinder that lawful power to be put forth in lawful acts; for the judge cannot purj^ the land of blood if the murderer flee. 3. When the king of Israel sendeth a captain and fifly lictors to fetch Elisha, these come instructed with legal power from the king; if I may lay fetters on their power by night, upon the ground of self-preservation, the same warrant shall allow me to oppose harmless violence for my own safety, i, Boyalists hold it unlawM to keep a stronghold against the king, though the fort be not the king's house, and though that David should not nave offended if he nad kept Keilah against Saul: Dr Feme and royalists say it had been unlawflil resistance. What more resistance is made to royal power by walls interposed than by seas and miles of earth interposed? Both are physical resistance, and violent in their kind.

QUESTION XXXI.

Self-preservation in all creatures in which is nature, is in the creatures suitable to their nature. The bull defendeth itself by its horns, the eagle by her claws and bill, it will not follow that a lamb will defend itself

LEX, REX ; ORy

against a wolf any other way than bj flying. & men, and Christian men, do naturalhr defend themselves; but the manner of self*- defence in a rational creature is rational, and not always merely natural; therefore, a ponaturesy as neither grace, &r less can policy, destroy nature, then must these many natures be allowed of Crod to use a natural self-de* fence. If the king bring in an army of foreigners, then a politic o(nmumty must defend itself in a rational way. Why? Self-defenoe is natural to man, and natural to a lamb, but not the same way. A lamb or a dove naturally defend themselves against beasts of another kind only by flight, not by re-action and re-offending; but it foUoweth not that a man defendeui himself from his enemy only by flight. If a robber invade me, to take aWaj my life and my parse, I may defend myself by re'<iction; for reason ana grace both may determine the way of self-preservation. Hence royalists say, a private man against his prince hath no way to defend himself but by flight; therefore^ a community hath no other way to defend themselves but by flight.

1. The antecedent is false. Dr Feme aUoweth to a private man supplications, and denying of subsidies and tribute to the prmce, when he employeth tribute to the destruction of the commonwealth ; which, by the way, n a dear resistance, and an active resislaiiee made against the long (Rom. xiii, 6, 7) and against a commandment of €rod, esc^ royuistsmnt tyrannous powers may be resisted. 2. TThe consequence ia naught, for a private man may defend himself against unjust violence, but not any way he pbaseth; the first way is by supplications and apolo^es, — ^he may not presently use vio lence to the kuiff's. servants before he suppli'- cate, nor may he use re-offending, if flight may save. David used a^- the three in order. He made his defence by words, by the mediation of Jonathan; when that prevailed not, he took himself to flight, as the next ; but because he knew flisht was net safe every way, and nature taught him self-preservation, and reason and light of moe taught him the means, and the religious order of these means for self-preservation, therefore he addeth a third, " He took Goliath's swQsd, and gathered six hundi^ed armed men,'^ and BXter that made use of an host. Now a sword and armour' are not horsing and shipping for flight, but contraey to

flight; so re-offending is policy's lai$ refuge. A godly mafflstrate taketh not away the hie of a subject if other means can compass the end of tne law, and so he is oompelled and necessitated to take away the lifo; so the private man, in his natiural self-defence, is not to use re-actum, or violent re-offending, in his self-defaice against any man, far less against the servants of a king, but in the exigence ci the last and most mexorable necessity. And it IS true that M. Symmons nith, (sect. 11, p. 35,) '* Self-defence is not to be used where it cannot be without sin." It is certam, necessity is but a hungry plea for sin, (Luke xiv. 18,) but it is abo true, re-offenoinff comparaUvely, that I kill rather than I be killed, in the sinless court of na^ tnre's spotless and harmless necessity, is lawful and necessary, except I be guil^ of selfmurder, in the culpable omission of self-defence. Now a private man may fly, and and that is his second necessity, and violent re-offending is the third mean of self-preservation; but, with leave, violent re-o£fending is necessary to a private man, when his second mean, to wit, flight, is not possible, and cannot attain the end, as in the case of David: if flight do not prevail, Groliath's sword and an host of armea men are lawful. So, to a church and a community of protes* tants, men, wcmen, aged, sucking childien, sick, and diseased, who ave presMd either to be killed or forsake reHgion and JesDS Christ, flight is not the second mean, nor a mean at aH, because not possible, and therefore not a natwal mean of preservatioii; for the aged, the sick, the suosing infents, and sounl religion in the posterity cannot flee; flight here is nhysicaUy, and by nature's necessity, impossible, and therefore no hntM mean. What is to natuie physically impossible is no lawfbl mean. If Christ have a promise that the ends of ^b earth (Pbal. ii. o] and the isles shaH. be his possession^ (Isa. xhx. 1,) I see not how natural defence can put us to flee, evem all> pvotestants and thdr seed, and the weak and sick, whom we are obliged to defend as ourselves, both by the law of nature and grace. I rcKEui that sev^ wicked nations and idolatrous were cast out of their land to> give place to tiie churdi d 6od to dwell there, but show me a warrant in nature's law and in Grod's word that three kingdoms of protestants, their seed, aged, sick, sucking children, should flee out of England, Scotiand, Ireland, and leave religion and the land< to a king and ta papists,

THB LAW AND THE PRINCE.

prelates, and bloody Irish, and atheists f Mid therefore to a church and community having Qod's r^ht and man's law to the land, vio-* lent re-offending is their second mean (next to supplications and declarations, &c.) and filght IS not required of them as of a private man; jea flight is not necessarily required of a private man, but where it is a possible mean of self-preservation; violent and unjust invaaon of a private man, which is unavoidable, mAj be obviated with violent re-K>ffending. ^ow the unjust invasion made on S^tlaad in 1640, for refusing the servicebook, or raider the idolatry of the mass, therein intended, was unavoidable; it was inmossiHe for the protestants, their old and ck, their women and sucking children to flee over sea, or to have shipping betwixt the king's brin^g an army on them at Bunse Law, and tne prelates' charging of the ministers to receive the mess book. Althufflus saith well, (Polit. c. 38, n. 78,) Though private men may flee, yet the estates, if they flee, they do not do their duty, to commit a country, religion and aU, to a lion. Let not any obiect, We may not devise a way to fulfil the prophecy, Psal. ii. 8, 9 ; Isa. xlix. 1 ; it is true, if the way be our own sinful way; nor let any object, a colony went to New £ngland and fled the persecution. Answer, True, but if fleeing be the only mean after supplication, there was no more reascm that one colony should go to New England than it is necessary, and by a divine law obli^tory, that the whole protestants in tibe* three lungdoms, according to royalists' doctrine, are to leave their native country and religion to one man, and to popish idolatOFS and atheists, willing to worship idols with them, and whither then shall the gospel be, which we are obliged to defend with our hves?

There is tutela tfitce proooima, et remota, a mere and immediate defence of our life, and a remote or mediate defence; when there is no actual invasion made by a man seeking our life, we are not to use violent re-oflending. David might have killed Saul when he was sleeping, and when he cut off the lap of his garment, but it was unlawful for him to kill the Lord's anointed, because he is the iKMrd's anointed, as it is unlawful to kin a man, because he is the image of Grod, (Gen. ix. 6,) except in case of necessity. The ma^strate m case of necessity may kiU the malefactor, though his malefic cTis do not put him in that case, that he hath

not now the image of €rOd; how prudence and Kght of grace determineth, when n^e are to use violent re-offending for self-preservation, it is not left to our pleasure. Li a remote posture of self-defence, we are not to use violent re-offending: David having Saul in his hand was in a remote posture of defence, the unjust invanon then was not actual, not unavoidable, not a necessary mean in human prudence for self-preservation, for king Saul was then in a habitual, not in an actual pursuit of the whole princes, elders, and judges of Israel, or of a whole community and church; Saul did but seek the life 6f one man, David, and that not for religion, or a national pretended offence, and tberefbre he could not in conscience put hands on the Lord's anointed; but if Saul had actually ihvaded David for his Ufe, David might, in that case, make use of Goliath's sword, (for he took not that weapon with him as a cypher to boast Saul — it is no less unlawful to threaten a king than to put hands on him,) and rather kiU or be killed by Saul's emissaries; because then he should have been in an immediate and nearest posture of actual self-defence. Now the case is far otherwise between the king and the two parliaments of England and Scotland, for the king is not sleeping in his emissaries, for he hath armies in two kingdoms, and now in three kingdoms,, by sea and land, night and day, in aictual pursuit, not of one David, but of the estates, and a Christian community in England and Scotland, and that for religions, £ws, and liberties; for the question is now between papist and protectant, between arbitrary ot tyrannicai government,- and law government, and therefore by both the laws of the politic sofcieties of both kihdoms, and by the law of €rod and nature, we are to ude violent re-offending for self-preservation, and put to this necessity, when armiee are in actual pursuit of all the protestant churches of ^e three kingdoms, to actual killing, rather than we be killed, and suffer laws and religion to be undone.

But, saith the royalist, David's argument, '^ God forbid that I stretch out my hand against the Lord's anointed, my master the kmg," concludeth universally, that the king in his most tyrannous acts, still remaining the Lord's anointed, cannot be resisted.

Ans. — 1. David speaketh of stretching out his hand against the person of king Saul: no man in the three kingdoms did so much as

attempt to do violence to the king's person. But this argument is inconsequent, for a king invading, in his own royal person, the* innocent suc^ect, suddenly, without colour of law or reason, and unavoidably, may be personally resisted, and that ¥dth opposing a violence bodily, yet in that invasion lie remaineth the Lord's anointed. 2. By this argument the life of a murderer cannot be ta£en away by a judge, for he remaineth one indued ¥dth God's image, and keepeth still the nature of a man under all the murders that he doth, but it foUoweth nowise, that because Grod hath endowed his person with a sort of royalty, of a divine image, that his life cannot be taken; and certainly, if to be a man endued with God's image, (Gen. vi. 9, 10,) and to be an ill-doer worthy of evil punishment, are different, to be a king and,an ill -doer may be distinguished.

1. The grounds of sell-defence are these: — A woman or a young man may violently oppose a king, if he force the one to adultery and incest, and the other to sodomy, though couct flatterers should say, the king, in regard of his absoluteness, is lord of li^ and death ; yet no man ever said that the king is lord of chastity, i^th, and oath that the wife hath made to her husband.

2. Particular nature yields to the good of universal nature, for which cause heavy bodies ascend, airy and light bodies descend. If, then, a wild bull or a goring ox, may not be let loose in a great market-confluence of people, and if any man turn so distracted as he smite himself with stones and kiQ all that pass by him, or come at him, in that case the man is to be bound, and his hands fettered, and all whom he invadeth may resist him, were they his own sons, and may save their own lives with weapons, much more a king turning a Nero. King Saul, vexed with an evil spuit from the Lord, may be resisted ; and far more if a king endued with use of reason, shall put violent hands on all his subjects, kUl his son and heir; yea, and violently invaded, by nature's law, may defend themselves, and the violent restraining of such a one is but the hurting of one man, who cannot be virtually the commonwealth, but his destroying of the community of men sent out in wars, as his bloody emissaries, to the dissolution of the commonwealth.

8. The cutting off of a contagious member, that by a gangrene, would corrupt the whole body, is well warranted by nature, because the safety of the whole is to be preferred to the safety of a part Nor is it much that royalists say, The king being the head, destroy him, and the whole body of the commonwealth is dissolved ; as cut off a man's head, and the life of the whole man is taken awav. Because, 1. God cutteth off the spirits of tyrannous kings, and yet the commonwealth is not dissolved, no more than when a leopard or a wild boar, running through children, is killed, can be the destruction of all the children in the land. 2. A king indeflmtely is referred to the commonwealth as an adequate head to a monarchical kingdom; and remove all kings and the politic body, as monarchical, in its frame, is not monarchical, but it leaveth not off to be a politic body, seeing it hath other judges ; but the natural body without the nea^ cannot live. 3. This or that tyrannous king, being a transient mortal thing, cannot be referred to the immortal commonwealth, as it is adequate correlate. They say, " the king never dieth," yet this king can die ; an immortal poHtic body, such as the commonwealth, must have an immortal head, and that is a king as a king, not this or that man, possibly a tyrant, who is for the time (and eternal things abstract from time) only a king.

4. The reason of Fortunius Gardas, a skilflil lawyer in Spain, is considerable, (Comment, in I. ut vim vi ff* de jttsttL et jure,) Grod hath implanted in every creature natural inclinations and motions to preserve itself, and we are to love ourselves for God, and have a love to preserve ourselves rather than our neighbour; and nature's law teacheth every man to love God best of all, and next ourselves more than our neighbour ; for the law saith, " Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Then saith Malderius, (com. in 12, q. 26, torn. 2, c. 10, concl. 2,) " The love of ourselves is the measure of the love of our neighbour." But the rule and the measure is more perfect, simple, and more principal than the thing that is measured. It is true I am to love the salvation of the church, it cometh nearer to God's glory, more than my own salvation, as the wishes of Moses and Paul do prove; and I am to love the ssdvation of my brother more than my own temporal life; but I am to love my own temporal life more than the life of any other, and therefore, I am rather to kill than to be killed, the exigence of necessity so requiring. Nature without sin owneth this as a truth, in the case of loss of life, Proximus sum eao^ met mtAt, (Ephes. ▼. 28, 29,) "He that loveth his wife, loveth himself; for no man ever yet hated his own flesh, but nourisheth it, and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the church." As then nature tyeth the dam to defend the young birds, and the lion her whelps, and the husband the wife, and that by a comparative re-offending, rather than the wife or children should m killed ; yea, he that his wanting to his brother, (if a robber unjustly invade his brother,^ and helpeth him not, is a murderer of his brother, so &r Grod's spiritual law requiring both conservation of it in our person, and preservation in others. The forced damsel was commanded to cry for help, and not the magistrate only, but the nearest private man or woman was to come, by an obligation of a divine law of the seventh commandment, to rescue the damsel with violence, even as a man is to save his enemy's ox or his ass out of a pit. And if a private man may inflict bodily punishment of two degrees, to preserve the life and chastity of his neighbour, far rather than suffer his life and chastity to be taken away, then he may inflict violence of four degrees, even to killing, for his life, and much more for his 0¥m me. So when a robber, with deadly weapons, invadeth an innocent traveller to kill Mm for his goods, upon the supposition that if the robMr be not killed, tne innocent shall be killed. Now the question is, which of the two, by Grod's moral law and revealed will, in point of conscience, ought to be killed by his fellow ? For we spes^ not now of God's eternal decree of permitting evil, according to the which murderers may crucify the innocent Lord of glory. By no moral law of Grod should the unjust robber kill the innocent traveUer; therefore, in this exigence of providence, the traveller should rather kill the robber. If any say, by God's moral law not one should kul his fellow, and it is a sin against the moral law in either to kill the other, I answer, — If a third shall come in when the robber and the innocent are invading each other for his life, all acknowledge by Sie sixth commandment the third may cut off the robber's arm to save the innocent ; but by what law of God he may cut off his arm, he may take his life also to save the other ; for it is mur^ der to wound unjustly, and to dismember a man by private authority, as it is to take

I away his life; if, therefore, the third may take away the robber's member, then also his life, so he do it without malice or appetite of revenge, and if he may do it out of this principle, " Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself;" because a man is obliged more to love his own flesh than his neighbour's, ^Ephes. v. 28,) and so more to de€nd himself than to defend his neighbour, — ^then may he oppose violence to the robber. As two men drowning in a water, the one is not obliged by God s law to expose himself to drowning to save his neighbour; but by the contrary, he is obliged rather to save himself, though it were with the loss of his neighbour's life. As in war, if soldiers in a strait passage be pursued on their life, nature teacneth them to flee; if one fall, his fellow in that exigence is not only not obHged to lift him up, but he and the rest flying, though they trample on him and kill him, they are not guilty of murder, seeing they hated him not before, (Deut. xix. 4, 6 ;) so Chemnit. {loc. com. de vindic, q. 3) alloweth private aefence. 1. When die violence is sudden. 2. And the violence manifestly inevitable. 3. When the magistrate is absent and cannot help. 4. When moderation is kept as lawyers require. 1. That it be done incontinent; if it be done after the injury, it is revenge, not defence. 2. Not of desire of revenge. 3. With proportion of armour. If the violent invader mvade not with deadly weapons, you must not invade him with deadly weapons; and certainly the law (Exod. xxii.) of a man's defending his house is clear. 1. If he come in the night, it is presumed he is a robber. 2. If he be taken with a weapon breaking the house, he cometh to kill, a man may defend himself, wife, aiid children, 3. But he is but to wound him, and if he die of the wound, the defender is free; so the defender is not to intend his death, but to save himself.

6. It were a mighty defect in providence to man, if dogs by nature may Mend themselves against wolves, buUs against lions, doves against hawks, if man, in the absence of the &wM magistrate, should not defend himself against unjust violence ; but one man might raise armies of papists, sick for blood, to destroy innocent men. They object, " When the king is present in his person, and his invaders, he is not absent, and so though you may rather kill a private man than suffer yourself to be killed, yet,

USX, BSX ; OR,

because prudence determinetb the meaDS of self-defence, you are to expose jour life to hazard for justice of your Eng, and therefore not to do Tiolence to the life of your king; nor can the body, in any self-defence^ fight against the head, that must be the destructiop of the whde." — Ans, 1. Though the king be present as an unjust invader m wars against nis innocent subjects, he is absent s a king, and a father and defender, and present as an unjust conqueror, and therefore the innocent may defend themr selves whep the king neither can, nor will defend them. *^ Nature maketh a man, (saith th^ law, Gener, c, de decwr, h 10, I. 9% alius, sect, Bellissime ubique Gloss, in vers, ex magn, not, 'per, ilium, text, ff, quod vi aut clam, I, ait prcetor, sect, si debitorem meum, ff, de kxsqua in fraud, credito.f) even a private man, his oivn judge, magistrate, and defender, qvtando copiam

fuaxcts^ qui sibi jus reddat, non habet^ when he hath no judge to give him justice and law." The subjects are to give their lives for the king, as the king, because the safety of the king, as king, is the safety of the commonwealth. But the king, as offering unjust violence to his innocent subjects, is not king. Zoannet. (part 3, defens. i^. 44,) — Transgrediens notorie oMoium suum judeXy agit velut privatus cdiquis^ non ut ma^istratus (ff, de injur, est bonus in simili in, I. qut fundum, sect, si, tutor, ff, jyro emptore), 3. If the politic body fight against this head in particular, not as head, }mi as an oppressor of the people, there is no fear of^ dissolution; if the body rise against all magistracy, as magistracy and laws, dissolution of all must follow. Parliaments and inferior judges are heads (Num. i. 16 ; X. 4 ; Deut i. 15 ; Josh, xxii, 21 ; Mic. iii. 1, 9, 11; 1 Kings viii. 1 ; 1 Chron^ y. 25; 2 Chron. v. 2,) no less than the king; and it is unlawful to offer violence to them, though I shall rather think a private man is to suffer the king to kill him rather than he kill the king, because he i^ to prefer the life of a private man to the Ijfe of a public man.

6. By the law of nature a ruler is appointed to defend the innocent. Now, bv nature, an infant in the womb defendeth itself first, before the parents can defend it, then when parents and magistrates are not, (and violent invading magistrates are not in that magistrates,] nature hath commended every man to self-defence.

7. The law of nature excepteth no violence, whether inflicted by a magistrate or any other. Unjust violence from a ruler is double injustice. 1, He doth unjustly as a man. 2. As a member of the commonwealth. 3. He committeth a special kind of sin of injustice against his office, but it is absurd to say we may lawfully defend ourselves from smaller injuries, by the law of nature, and not from the greater. " If the Pope, saith Fer. Vasquez (illust.[ quest. L 1, c. 24, n. 24, 25) command to take away benefices from the just owner, those who are to. execute his commandment are not to obey, but to write back that that mandate came not firom his holiness, but from the avarice of his officers ; but if the Pope still continue and press the same unjust mandate, and though there be none above the Pope, yet there is natural self-defence pate^t for all." '^ Defensio vitce necessaria est^ et a jure naturali projluit" (L, ut vim, ff. de just, et jure 16,J *' Nam quod quisque ob tutelam corporis sui fecerit^ jwre fecisse vi-* devietvi armata^ I, injuria/ru/m^ ff. de injuria : C. significasti. 2, de horn, I, scientiam^ sect, qui non alitor ff. ad leg, Aquil; C, si veto 1, de sent, excom, e^ X sed etsi ff. ad leg. Aquil,) " Etiam sequatur ho* middium.^* Vasquez. (I. 1, c. 17, n. 5.)^^ '^ Etiam ocddere licet ob de/ensionem rerum. Vim vi repelhre on^nia jura per^ jur, n. 3,) — ** De/endere se est juris nor turos et gentium. A jure dvilijmt addi' turn m>oderamen inculpatee tutelcej- Novel (defens. n. 101,^ — " Ocddens primi" pern vel alium tyranniidem exercentem^ a poena homicidii excusatur." Qrotius (de corpus impetatur vi presente^ cum pencuh vitce non aliter vitabtli^ tunc bellum est lidtu/m etiam cum interfectione periculum inferentisy ratio, natttra quemque sibi com^

But what ground (saith the royalist) is there to take arms against the king? Jealousies and suspicions are not enou^.

Ans, — 1. llie king s^nt first a^i army to Scotland, and blocked us u^f by sea, before we took arms. 2. Papists were armed in ^ns" land. They have professed themselves in

their religion of Trent to be so much the holier, that they root out protestants. 3. The king declared we had broken loyalty to him since the last parliament. 4. He declared both kingdoms rebels. 5. Attempted in his emissaries to destroy the parliament; 6. And to bring in a foreign enemy. And the law saith, ** An imminent danger, which is a sufEcient warrant to take up a^ is not strokes, but either the terr(r of arming or threatening." Glossator. {ind I, 1, C!)— *' Unde vi. ait non esse verbera expectant da, sed vel terrorem armorum suficere, vel minasy et hoc esse imminens perioulum,^* X. sed et si quemcunqtie in prine, ff* ad leg, Aquil I, 3, quod qui armati jf. devi et vi armata is qui aggressorem C ad legem ComeU,

In most heinous sins, conatuSf the wdeavoor and aim, etiamsi effectus non sequa* tur, puniri debetf is punishable. BartoL in L " Si quis non dicam rapere,*^

The king hath aimed at the destruction of his subjects, through the power of wicked counsellors, and we are to consider not tba intention of the workers, but the nature and intention of the work. Papists are in arms, —their religion, the oonspiracy of Trent, thehr conscience, (if they nave any,) their malice against the covenant of Scotland, which abjureth their religion to the AiU, their ceremonies, their prelates, — ^lead and necessitate them to root out the name of protestant religion, yea, and to stab a king who is a protestant. Nor is our king, remaining a protestant, and adhering to his oath made at the coronation in bom kingdoms, lord of his own person, master of himself, nor able, as king, to be a king over protestant subjects, if the papists, now in arms under his standard, shall proTail.

The king hath been compelled to go against his own oath, and the laws which he did swear to maintain; the Po^ sendeth to his popish armies both dispensations, bulls, mandates, and encouragements; the king hath made a cessation with the bloody Irish, and hath put arms in the hands of papists. Now, he being under the oath of God, tyed to maintain the protestant religion, he luith a metaphysically subtle, piercing fidth of muracles, who believeth armed papists and prelates shall defend the reli^on of protestants; and those who have aj^ured prelates as the lawful sons of the Pope, that § mfrix^t^r^i and as the law saith, QuiUbet in dubio prce-^ sumitur bonus, Z. merito prossumi, L,

non omneSy sect, a Barbaris de re milit. Charity belieyeth not ill; so charity is not a fool to believe all things. So saith the law, Semel malus, semper proBsumkur molus, in eodem genere, C sem^l malus de jure gentium in 6. Once wicked, is always wicked in that kind. Marius Salamonius, l. C, in L, ut vimatque injuriamff. dejust etjure. We are not to wait on strokes, the terror of armour, onmium consensu, by consent of all is sufiicient (n. 3). ^* If I see (saith he) the enemy take an arrow out of the quiver, before he bend the bow, it is lawful to prevent him with a blow — cunctor tio est periculosaJ* The king's coming with aimed men into the House of Commons to demand the five members, is very symboheal, and war was printed on that &ct, ** he that runneth may read." His coming to Hull with an army, saith not he had no errand there, but to ask what it was in the dock. Novellus, that learned Venetian lawyer, in a treatise for defence, maketh continuatam rixam, a continued upbraiding, a sufficient ground of violent defence. He citeth Dr Uomniter. in X. ut vim, ff, de just et jure. Yea, he saith, drunkenness, (defens. n. 44,) error, (n. 46,) madness, (n. 40, 50,) ignorance, (n. 51, 52y) impudence, (n. 54,) necessity, (n. 56,) lactviousnesB, (n 58,) continual reproaches, (n. 59,) die fervour of anger, (n. 64,) threatening, (n. 66,) fear of imminent danger, (n, 67,) and just ffrief, do excuse a man m>m homicide, and mat in these he ought to be more mildly punished, quia obniMatum et m^ncum est consilium, reason in these being lame and clogged. (Ambros. 1. 1. offic.) Qui non repetlit injuriam a sodo, cum potest, tarn est in vitio, quam ille quifaeit. And as nature, so ^e law saith, " When the losses are such as can never be repaired, as death, mutilation, loss of chastity, quoniam facta infecta fieri nequeunt, things of that kind once done, can never be undone, we are to prevent the enemy" {L 21kmat, tract, defens. par, 3, Z. in belh sect, faetas de car pit, notat. Gloss, in I, si quis provocatione). If the kinff send an Irish rebel to east me over a bridge, and drown me in a water, I am to do nothing, while the king's emissary first cast me over, and then m the next room I am to defend myself; but nature and the law of self-defence warranteth me (if I know certainly his aim,) to horse him first over the bridge, and then consult how to defend myself at my own leisure.

LEX, REX ; OR,

Boyalists object that Dayid, in his defence, never invaded and persecuted Saul; jea, when he came upon Saul and his men sleep* ing, he would not kill any; but the Scottish and parliament's forces not only defend, but inyade, offend, kill, and plunder; and this is clearly an offensiye, not a defensive war.

Ans, 1. — There is no defensiye war different in specie and nature from an offensive war; if we speak physically, they differ only in the event and intention of the heart; and it is most dear that the affection and intention doth make one and the same action of taking away the life, either homicide, or no homicide. 1. If a man, out of hatred, deliberately take away his brother's life, he is a murderer eatenus, but if that same man had taken away that same brother's life, by the flying off of an axe-head off the staff, while he was hewing timber, he neither hating him before, nor intending to hurt his brother, he is no murderer, by Grod's express law, f Deut. iv. 42 ; xix. 4 ; Joshua XX. 5.) 2. Tne cause between the kin? and the two parliaments, and between Saul and David, are so different in this, as it is much for us. Boyalists say, David might, if he had seen offending to conduce for self-preservation, have invaded Saul's men, and, say they, the case was extraordinary, and bindeth not us to self-defence; and thus they must say — ^for offensive weapons, such as GroUath's sword, and an host of armed men, cannot by any rational man be assumed (and David had the wisdom of God) but to offend, if providence should so dispose; and so what was lawful to David, is law^l to us in self-defence; he might offend lawfully, and so may we.

2. If Saul and the Philistines, aiming (as under an oath) to set up dagon in the land of Israel, should invade David, and the princes and elders of Israel who made him king ; and if David, with an host of armed men, he and the princes of Israel, should come in that case upon Saul and the Philistines sleening, if in that case David might not lawfully have cut off the Philistines, and as he defended in that case Grod's church and true religion, if he might not then have lawfully killed, I say, the Philistines, I re* mit to the conscience of the reader. Now to us, papists and prelates under the king's banner, are Philistines, introducing the ido-^ latry of bread-worship and popery, as hateful to Grod as dagon-worship.

3. Saul intended no arbitrary government, nor to make Israel a conquered people, nor yet to cut off all that professed the true worship of Grod ; nor came Saul against these princes, elders and people, who made him King, only David's head would have made Saul lay down arms ; but prelates, and papists, and malignants, under the king, intend to make the king's sole will a law, to destroy the court of parliament, which putteth laws in execution against their idolatry ; and their aim is, that protestants be a conquered people; and their attempt hath been hitherto to blow up king and parliament, to cut off all protestants; and they are in arms, in divers parts of the kingdom, against the princes of the land, who are no less judges and deputies of the Lord than the king himself; and would kill, and do kill, plunder, and spoil us, if we kill not them. And the case is every way now between armies and armies, as between a single man unjustly invaded for his life, and an unjust invader. Neither in a natursd action, such as is self-defence, is that of policy to be urged, — ^none can be judge in his own cause, when oppression is manifest : one may be both agent and patient, as the fire and water conflicting; there is no need of a judge, a community casts not off nature; when the judge is wanting, nature is judge, actor, accused, 'and all.

Lastly, no man is lord of the members of his own body, (w. I, liher homo ff, ad leg, Aqui.) nor lord of his own life, but is to be accountable to God for it.

QUESTION XXXII.

WHETHER OR NOT THE LAWFULNESS OP DE- PENSITE WARS HATH ITS WARRANT IN GOD's WORD, FROM THE EXAMPLE OF DAVID, ELI- SHA, THE EIGHTY PRIESTS WHO RESISTED UZZIAH, &C.

David defended himself against king Saul,

1. By taking Goliath's sword with him. 2.

By being captain to six hundred men ; yea,

it is more than clear, (1 Chron. xii. 22---34,)

that there came to David a host like the host

of God, to help against Saul, exceeding four

thousand. Now, that this host came warrantably to help him against Saul, I prove,

1. Because it is said, " Now these are they

that came to David to Ziklag, while he

kept himself close, because of Saul the son

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

of Kiah; and they were among^ the mighty men, helpers of the war;" and then so many mighty captains are reckoned out. *' There came of the children of Benjamin and Judah to the hold of David." And there fell some of Manasseh to David, — " As he went to Ziklag there fell to him of Manasseh, Kenah and Jozahad, Jediel and Michael, and Jozahad and Elihu, and Zilthai, captains of the thousands that were of Manasseh. ' ''And they helped David against the hand of the rovers." " At that time, day by day, there came to David, until it was a great hoKst, like the host of Grod." Now the same expression that is in the first verse, where it is said they came to help David against Saul, is repeated in ver. 16, 19^23. 2. That they warrantably came, is evident; because,

SI.) The Spirit of God oommendeth them or their valour and skill in war, (ver. 2 &c.), which the Spirit of Grod doth not in unlawful wars. (2A Because Amassai, (ver. 18), the Spirit ot tne Lord coming on him, saith, '' Tnine are we, David, and on thy side, thou son of Jesse; peace, peace unto thee, and peace to thy helpers, for thy God helpeth thee." The Spirit of God inspireth no man to pray peace to those who are in an unla?irful war. 3. That they came to David's side only to be sufferers, and to flee with David, and not to pursue and offend, is ridiculous. 1. It is said, (ver. 1,) " They came to David to Ziklag, while he kept himself close, because of Saul the son of Ejsh. And they were amongst the mighty men, helpers of the war." It is a scorn to say, that their might, and their helping in war, consisted in being mere patients with David, and such as ned from Saul, for they had been on Saul's side before; and to come with armour to flee, is a mocking of the word of God. 2. It is clear, the scope of the Spirit of God is to show how God helped his innocent servant David against his persecuting prince and master, king Saul, in moving so many mighty men of war to come in such multitudes, all in arms, to help him in war. Now to what end would the Lord commend them as fit for war, '' men of might, fit to handle shield and buckler, whose mces are as the faces of lions, as swift as the roes on the mountains," (ver. 8,^ and commend them as helpers of David, if it were unlawful for David, and all those mighty men, to carry arms to pursue Saul and his followers, and to do nothing with their armour but flee? Judge if the Spirit of Grod, in reason,

could say, ** All these men came armed with bows," (ver. 2,) and could " handle both the right hand and the lefl in flinging stones, and shooting of arrows," and that ^er. 22) all these '' came to David, being mighty men of valour, and they came as captains over hundreds, and thousands, and they put to flight all them of the valleysj botn toward the east and toward the west," (ver. 13, 15,) and that ** David received them, and made them captains of the band," if they did not come in a posture of war, and for hostile invasion, if need were? For if they came only to suffer and to flee, not to

CBue, bowmen, captains, and captains of ds made by David, and David's helpers in the war, came not to help David by flying, that was a hurt to David, not a help. It is true, Mr Symmons saith, (l Sam. xxii. 2,) " Those that came out to David strengthened him, but he strengthened not them; and David might easily have revenged himself on the Ziphites, who did good will to betray him to the hands of Saul, if his conscience had served him.

Ana, 1. — This would infer thai these armed men came to help David against his conscience, and that David was a patient in the business. The contrary is in the text, (1 Sam. xxvi. 2,) *^ David became a captain over them;" and (1 Chron. xii. 17, 18,) " If ye come peaceably to helpme, my heart shall be knit to you. Then David received them, and made them captains of the band." 2. David might have revenged himself upon the Ziphites, true; but that conscience hindered him cannot be proved. To pursue an enemy is an act of a council of war; and he saw it would create more enemies, not help his cause. 3. To David to kill Saul sleeping, and the people who, out of a mis-informed conscience came out, many of them to help their lawfiil prince against a traitor (as was supposed) seeJdng to sill their king, and to usurp the throne, had not been wisdom nor justice; because to kill the enemy in a just self-defence, must be, when the enemy actually doth invade, and the life of the defendant cannot be otherwise saved. A sleeping enemy is not in the act of unjust pursuit of the innocent; but if an army of papists, Philistines, were in the fields sleeping, pursuing not one single David only for a supposed personal wrong to the king, but lying in the fields and camp against the whole kingdom and religion, and labouring to introduce arbitrary government, poper}%

LBX, RXX ; OR,

idolatry, and to destroy laws, and Kberties, and parliaments, then David were obliged to kill these murderers in their sleep.

If any say, The case is all one in a nataral self-defence, whatever be the cause, and whoever be the enemy, beeaose the selMefender is not to offend, except the unjust invader be in actual pursuit, — ^now armies in their sleep are not in actual pursuit.

Ans, 1. — When one man with a multitude invadeth one man, that one man may pursue, as he seeth most condudble for selfdefence. Now the law saith, ^* Threatenings and terror of armour maketh imminent dimger," and the case of pursuit in self-defence lawiul; if therefore an army of Iruh rebels and Spaniards were sleeping in their' camp, and our king in a de^ sleep in the midst of them, ana these rebels actually in the camp besieging the parliament, and the city of London, most unjustly to iake away parliament, laws,> and hberties of religion, it should follow that General Essex ought not to kill the king's majesty in his sleep, for he is the Lord's anointed; but will it follow that General Essex may not kill the Irish rebels sleeping about the king; and that he may not rescue the king's person out of the hands of the papists and rebels, ensnaring the king, and leading him on to popery, and to employ his authority to defend popery, and trample mnm protestant parliam^te and h^f cJSj fiom i^example this cannot be concluded. For armies in actual pursuit of a whole parliament, kingdom, kws, and religion, (though sleeping in the camp,) because in actual pursuit, may be invaded, and killed, though steeping. And David useth no argument, from conscience, why he might not kill Saul's army, (I conceive he had not arms to do that,) and i^ould have created more enemies to himself, and hazard his own hfe, and the life of all his men, if he had of purpose killed so many sleeping men; yea-, the mexpedience of that, for a private wrong to kill God's misled peo- ^e, i^ould have imde all Israel enemies to David. But David useth an argument, from conscience only, to prove it was not lawM for him to stretch forth his hand against the king; and for my part, so long as ne remaineth king, and is not dethroned by those who made him king at Hebron, to put hands on his person, I ju<^e utterly unlawM. One man sleeping cannot be in actual pursuit of another man; so that the self-defender may lawfully kill him in his sleep; but the case

is far otherwise in lawful wars; the Isra^- ites might lawMly kill the Philistines encamping about Jerusalem to destroy it, and religion, and the church of God, though they were aU sleeping; even though we suppose king Saul had brought them in by his authority, and though he were sleeping in the midst of the undrcumcised armies; and it is evident, that an host of armed enemies, though sleeping, by the law of selfdefence, may be killed, lest they awake and kill us; whereas one smgle man, and that a king, cannot be killed. 2. 1 think, eertainlj, David had done unwisely, and hazarded his own life and all his men's, if he, and Abimelech, and Abishai, should have killed an host of their enemies sleeping: that had been a work as impossible to three, as hazardous to all his men.

Dr Feme, as Amisseus did before him, saith, '^ The example of David was extraordinary, because he was anointed and designed by God as successor to Saul, and so he must use an extraordinary way of guarding himself." Amisseus (c. 2, n. 15) citeth ^beric. G^ntilffi, that David was now exempted from amongst the number of subjects.

Ans. — 1. There were not two kings in Israel now, both David and Saul. 1. David acknowledgeth his subjection in naming Saul the Lord's anointed, and his master, lord and king; and, therefore, David was yet a subject. 2. If David would have proved his title to the crown by extraordinary ways, he who killed Goliath extraordinarily might have killed Saul by a miracle; but David goeth a most ordinary way to work for sell-defence, and his coming to the kingdom was through persecution, want, eatmg shew-bread in case of necessity, defending himself with Groliath's sword. 3. How was anything extraordinary and above a law, seeing David might have killed his enemy Saul, and, according to God's law, he spared him? and he argueth firom a moral duty, He is the Lord's anointed, therefore I will not kill him. Was this extraordinary above a law? then, according to God's law, he might have killed him. Koyalists cannot say so. What ground to say one of David's acts in his deportment towards Saul was extraordinary, and not all? Was it extraordinary that David fled? No; or that David consulted the oracle of God what to do when Saul was coining against him? 4. In an ordinary fact something may be extraordinary, — as the dead deep

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

from the Lord upon Saul and his men, (1 Sam. xxvi.) and jet the &ct, according to its substance, ordinary. 6. Nor is this extraordinary, — ^that a distressed man, being an excellent warrior, as David was, may use the help of six hundred men, who, by the law of charity, are to help to deliver the mnocent from death; yea, all Israel were obliged to defend him wno killed Groliath. 6. Royalists make David's act of not putting hands on the Lord's anointed an ordinary moral reason against resistance, but his putting on of armour they will have extraordinary; and this is, I confess, a short way to an adversary to cull out something that is for his cause and make it ordinary, and something that is a^nst his cause must be extraordinary. 7. These men, by the law of nature, were obliged to join in arms with David; therefore, the non-helping of an oppressed man must be Grod's ordinary law, — a blasphemous tenet. 8. If David, by an extraordinary spirit, killed not king Saul, then the Jesuits' way of killing must be God's ordinary law.

2. David certainly intended to keep Keilah against king Saul, for the Lord would not have answered David in an unlawM fact ; for that were all one as if (jfod should teach David how to play the traitor to his king ; for if G-od had answered, They will not deliver thee up, but they shall save thee from the hand of Saul, — as David believed he might say this, as well as its oontradicent, then David behoved to keep the city ; for certainly David's question pre-supposeth he was to keep the city.

The example of Elisha the prophet is considerable, (2 Kings vL 32,) " But Elisha sat in his nouse, and the elders with him; and the king sent a man before him; but, ere the messengers came to him, he said to the elders, See now, the son of a murderer hath sent to take away mine head." 1. Here is unjust violence offered by king Joram to an innocent man. Elisha keepem the house violently against the king's messenger, as we I did keep castles against king Charles' un- I kwfiil messengers. '* Look (saith he) when I the messenger cometh, — shut the door." 2. ' There is violence also commanded, and re- ^stance to be made, " Hold him &st at the door." In the Hebrew it is, nSlD

Montan. : Claudite ostium^ et oppremetis eumin ogtio, " Violently press him at the door." And so the Chaldee paraphrase, Ne

nnatis eum introire, Jerome. The JiXX. Interpreters, U^ii4^n aMt U r? ^^a illi" dvte eum in ostio, '' Press him betwixt the door and the wall." It is a word of bodily violence, according to Vatablus; yea, Theodoret will have king Joram himself holden at the door. And, 3. It is no answer that Dr Feme and other royalists give, that Elisha made no personal resistance to the king himself, but only to the king's cutthroat, sent to take away his head; yea, they say, it is lawM to resist the king's cutthroats. But the text is clear, that the violent resistance is made to the king himself also, for he addeth, '* Is not the sound of his master's feet behind him?" And by this answer, it is lawful to keep towns with iron gates and bars, and violently to oppose the king's cut-throats coming to take away the heads of the parliaments of both kingdoms, and of protestants in the three kingdoms.

Some royalists are so impudent as to say that there was no violence here, and that Elisha was an extraordinary man, and that it is not lawM for us to call a king the son of a murderer, as the prophet Ehsha did; but Feme, (sect. 2, p. 9,) forgetting himself, saith from hence, " It is lawRil to resist the prince himself, thus far, as to ward his blows, and hold his hands." But let Feme answer, if the violent binding of the prince's hand, that he shall not be able to HIl, be a greater violence done to his royal person tnan David's cutting off the skirt of Saul's garment; for certainly the royal body of a prince is of more worth than his clothes. Now it was a sin, I judge, that smote David's conscience, that he being a suliect, and not in the act of natural selfdei^nce, did cut the garment of the Lord's anointed. Let Feme see, then, how he will save his own principles; for certainly he yieldeth the cause for me. I judge that the person of the king, or any judge who is the Lord's deputy, as is the king, is sacred; and that remaining in that honourable case, no subject can, without guiltiness before Grod, put hands on his person, the case of natural self-defence being excepted; for, because the royal dignity doth not advance a king above the common condition of men, and me throne maketh him not leave off to be a man, and a man that can do wrong; and therefore as one that doth manifest violence to the life of a man, though his subject, he may be resisted with bodily resistance, in the case of unjust and violent invadiHi. It is a vain thing to m;, " Who shall be judge betwieen the£iiieand his sabjects? The sobiect cannot jiu^ the king, becanse aone can be judge in his own catue, and an inferior or eqoal cannot judm a ■nperior or equal." But I ansrer, 1. This is the king's own cause alw, and he doth unjust violence as a man, and not as a Ung, and BO he cannot be judge more than toe subject. 2. Every one that doth unjust violence, as he is such, is inferior to the innocent, and BO ought to be judged W eome. 3. There is no need of the iormahty of a judge in things evident to nature's eye, such as are manifestly unjust violences. Nature, in acta natural of self-defence, is judge, party, accuser, witnesB, and all; for it is supposed the judge is absent when tlie judge doth wrong. And for the plea of "^i^'s extraordinary q>irit, it is nothing extraordinary to the prophet to call the long the son of a murderer, when he oomplameth to the elders for justice of his oppreKon, no more than it is for a plaintiff to hbel a true crime against a wicked person, and if Elisfaa's resistance came from an extraordinary spirit, then it is not natural for an oppressed man to close the door upon a murderer, Uten the taking away of the innocent prophet's head must l>e extraordinary, for this was but an ordinary and most natural remedy against this oppression; and though to name the king the son of a murderer be extraordinary, (and I should grant it without any hurt to ting cause,) it foiloweth nowise that the self-defence was extraordinary. 4. (2 Chron. xxvi. 17.) four score en prieste, with Azariah, are commended as valiant men. LXX. iui tn^uM Heb. ^n-*Ji Ariufl Montan. FUU virtuti, Men of courage and valour, for that they resisted Vztm the king, who would take on him to bum incense b> the Lord, against the law. Mr Bymmons, (p. 34, sect. 10,) They vritbstood him not vrith swords and weapons, but only by nieaking, and otto but spake. I answer, 1. It was a bodily reastance; for beode that, Jerane tum^ it, Virifortistimi, most violent men. And it is a speech in the Scnptures taken for men valorous for war; as 1 Sam. xvi. 26 ; 2 Sam. xviL 10 ; 1 Chron. v. 18 ; and so doth the phrase tj^n 'jn3J Potent in valour; andTthe phrase, 7in't!^')K ^ ^*'"- xxiv. 9 ; xi. 16 ; 1 Sam. xxxi. 12 ; and therefore all the e^ty, not only by words, but violently, expeUed the king out of the

tempte. 2. imTV-'^y HDyn Ar. Mmt £t te(rHnt contra Huzn-tfoAu; the LXX say. Mil fTfrnxM they resisted the king. So Inn. xi. 17, The armies of the south shall not stand, Dan. viii. 26, it is a word of violence. 3. The text saith, (ver. 20,) and they thrust him out. InlyTlD'l Arias Mont. Et/ecerwa etttn fegUnare; Hieron. FettincUo &ipule-unt eum. The LXX. say, The priest urinwit aM. i; as Vatablus,^ They cast him out. 4. It is said, (ver. 21,) " He was cut oflf from the house of the Lord." Dr Feme saith, (sect. 4, p. 60,) " They are valiant men who dare withstand a king in an evil way, by a home reproof, and by withdrawing the holy things from him, especially sboe, by the law, the leper was to be put out of the congregation."

An. \. — He contradicteth ^e text. It vras not a resistance 1^ words, for the text Biuth, " They withstood him, and they thrust him out videntlv." 2, He yieldeth the cause, for to withdraw the holy things of God by corporeal violence, and violenUy to pull the censer out of his hand, ^t be should not provoke God's wrath by offering incense to the Lord, is resistance; and the like violence may, by this example, be used when the king useth the sword and the militia to bring in an enemy to destroy tiie kingdom. It is no lees injustice against the second table, that the king useth the sword to destroy the innocent wan to usurp the censer agiunst the fimt table. But Dr Ferae yieldeth, that the censer may be pulled out of his hand, let he provoke God to wrath; therefore, by the same very reason, aforlioTe, the sword, the castles, the sea-ports, the mihtia, may be violently pulled out of his hand; for if there was an express law that the leper should be pnt out of the congregation, and therefore the king also ehoula be subject to his church-censor, then he subjecteth the king to a punishment to be inflicted by the subjects upon the king. 1. Therefore the king is omosiooa to ue co-active power of the hw. 2. Tlierefore subjects may judge him and punish him. 3. Therefore he is to be subject to all church-censors no less than the people. 4. There is an express law that Uie leper should be put out of the congregation. What then? Flattering court divines ny,

THS LAW AND THE PRINCE.

'< The king is above all these laws;" for there is an ezprefis law of God as express as that ceremonial law on touching lepers, and a more landing law, that t£e murderer should die the death. Will royalists put no exception upon a ceremonial bw of expelling the lej^, and vet put an exception upon a divme moral law, concerning the punishing of murderers given before the law <m Mount SinaL (Gen, vi. 9.) Thej 80 declare that thej accept the persons of men. 5. If a leper king could not actuallv fflt upon the throne, but must be cut off from the house of the Lord, because of an express law of God, these being inconsistent, that a kinff remaining amongst God's people, ruling and reigning, should keep company with the church of God, and jet be a leper, who was to be cut off, by a divine law, from the church. Now, I persuade myself, that far less can he actually reign in the fidl use of the power of the swora, if he use the sword to cut off thousands of innocent people; because, murdering the innocent ^ th^ &therle^ and roy^ goyeming in righteousness and sodliness, are more inconsi^nt by Grod's taw, being morally opposite, than remaining a governor of tne people, and the disease- of leprosy, are incompatible. 6. 1 think not much ^at Barclay saith, (cent. Monar. 1. 5, c. 11,) *^ Uzziah remained king, after he was removed from the congregation for leprocfy." 1. Because that toucheth the question of dethroning kbgg, this is an hmnmt brought d yk&nt resisting of ungs, and that the people did resume all power fr>om Uzziah, and put it in the '* hand of Jotham his son, who was over the king's house, judging the people of the land " fver 21). And by this same reason the parliaments of both kingdoms may resume the power once given to the king, when he hath proved more unfit to govern morally than Uzziah was ceremonially, that he ought not to judge the people of the land in this case. 2. If the priests did execute a ceremonial law upon king Uzziah, far more may the three estates of Scotland, and the two houses of parliament of ^England, execute the moral law of God on their king.

If the people may covenant by oath to rescue the innocent and unjustly-condemned from the sentence of death, notoriously known to be tyrannous and cruel, then may the people resist the king in his unlawful practices; but this the people did in the

matter of Jonathan. Mr Symmons (p. 32) and Dr Feme (sect 9^ 49) say, *' That with no violence, but by prayers and tears, the peoj^e saved Jonathan; as Peter was rescued out of prison by the prayers of the church, king Saul might easily be entreated to break a rash vow to save the life of his eldest son." — Ans 1. I say not the common people did it, but the people, including proceres ryniy the princes of the land, and captains of thousands. 2. The text hath not one word or syllable of either prayers, supplications or tears; but by the contrary, they bound themselves by an oath, contrary to the oath of Saul, (1 Sam. xiv. 44, 46,) and swore, ** Grod forbid: as the Lordliveth, there shall not one hair ofhis head fall to the ground. So the people rescued Jonathan."^ The church prayed not to God for Peter's deliverance witn an oath, that Hiey must have Peter saved, whether Grod will or no. Though we read of no vidience used by the people, yet an oath upon so reasonable a ground, — 1. Without the king's consent. 2. Contrary to astanding law that they had agreed unto. (ver. 24.) 3. Contradictory to the king's sentence and umust oath. 4. Spoken to the king in his race, — all these prove that the people meant, and that the oath ex eonditione operisy tended to a violet resisting of the king in a manifestly unjust sentence. Chrysostom, hom. 14, ad Pop., Antiodi accuseth Saul as a murderer in this sentence, and praiseth the people: so Junius, Peter Martyr* (whom royalists impudently cite); so Cornelius k Lapide, Zanchius, Lyra, and Hugo Cardinalis say, *' It was tyranny in Saul, and laudable that the people resisted Saul;" and the same is asserted by Josephus (1. 6, antiquit. c. 7 ; so Althusius, Polit. c. 38, n. 109).

We see also, (2 Chron. xxi. 10,) that Libnah revolted from under Jehoram, because he had forsaken the Lord God of his fathers. It hath no ground in the text that royalists say, that the defection of Libnah is not justified in the text, but the cause is from me demerit of wicked Jeboram, because he made defection from God. Libnah made defection from him, as the ten tribes revolted from Behoboam for Solomon's

> P. Mart, saith with a doubt. Si ista seditiose feceront — ^nnllo modo ezcnsari possant. Yea, he saith they might snffragiis, with their suffrages free him.

LEX, USX ; OB,

idolatry, which, before the Lord, procured this defection, yet the ten tribes make defection for oppression. I answer. Where the literal meaning is simple and obvious, we are not to go from it. The text showeth what cause moved Libnah to revolt:^ it was a town of the Levites, and we biow they were longer found in the truth than the ten tribes (2 Chron. xiii. 8 — 10; Hosea xi. 12). Lavater saith, Jehoram hath pressed them to idolatry, and therefore they revolted. Zanchius and Cornelius aLapide say. This was the cause that moved them to revolt, and it is clear, (ver. 13,) he caused Judah and the inhabitants of Jerusalem to go a whoring from God, and no doubt tempted Libnah to the like."^

Yea, the city of Abel (2 Sam. xx.) did well to resist Joab, David's general, for he came to destroy a whole city for a traitor's sake, for Sheba; they resisted and defended themselves. The wise woman calleth the city a mother in Israel, and the inheritance of the Lord; (ver. 19 ;) and Joab professeth, (ver. 20,) far be it from him to swallow up and destroy Abel. The woman saith, (ver. 18,) " They Said of old, thev shall surely ask counsel at Abel; and so they ended the matter;" that is, the city of Abel was a place of prophets and oracles of old, where they asked responses of their doubts, and therefore peace should be first offered to the city before Joab should destroy it, as the law saith, Deut. xx. 10. From all which it is evident, that the city, in defending itself, did nothing against peace, so they should deliver Sheba, the traitor, to Joab's hand, which they accordingly did; and Joab pursued them not as traitors for keeping the city against the king, but professeth in that they did no wrong.

QUESTION XXXIII.

WHETHER OR NO THB PLACE, ROM. XIII. 1, PROVE THAT IN NO CASE IT IS LAWFUL TO RESIST THE KING.

The special ground of royalists from Bom. xiii., against the lawfulness of defensive wars,

1 P. Mar. Com. in 2 Reg. c. 8, saith Libnah revolted. Quia Bubditos nitebatur cogere ad idololatriam, quod ipsi libneiises pati noluemnt et merito : prineipibns enim parendum est, yerum usque ad aras.

> Yatab. in not. — Impulit Judseos ad idololatriam, alioqui jam pronos ad cultum idololorum. .

is to make Paul (Bom. xiii.) speak only of kings. Hugo GroHxiB {de jtMre belli et pac. L 1, c. 4, n. 6), and Barclay {cont Monar, L 3, c. 9) say, " Though Ambrose expound the place. Bom. xiii., de solis regihus^ of kings only, (this is false of kings <mLyy he dotE not, but of kings prindpaUi/y) yet it fblloweth not that afl magistrates, by this place, are freed from all laws, because (saith he) there is no judge above a king on earth, and therefore he cannot be punished; but there is a judge above all inferior judges, and therefore uiey must be subject to laws." So Dr Feme followeth him, (sect. 2, p. 10,) and our poor Prelate must be an accident to them, (Saer. San. Maj. c. 2, p. 29,) for his learning cannot subsist per se.

Assert, 1. In a free monarchy (such as Scotland is known to be) by ^e higher power (Bom. xiii.) is the kmg principal^ in respect of digni^ understood, but not solely and only, as ii inferior judges were not higher powers. 1. I say in a free monarchy; for no man can say, that where there is not a king,, but only aristocracy, and government by states, as in Holland, that there the people are obliged to obey the king; and yet this text, I hope, can reach the consciences of all * Holland, that there every soul must be subject to the higher powers, and yet not a subject in Holland is to be subject to any king: for non eniis nulla sunt accidentia, 2. I said the king, in a free monarchy, is here principally understood in regard of dignity, but not in regard of the essence of a magistrate, because the essence of a magistrate doth equally belong to all inferior magistrates, as to the king, as is already proved; (let the Prelate answer if he can;) for though some judges be sent by the kmg, and have from him authority to judge, yet this doth no more prove that inferior judges are improperly judges, and only such by analogy, and not essentially, than it will prove a citizen is not essentially a citizen, nor a church-officer essentially a church-officer, nor a son not essentially a living creature, because the former have authority from the incorporation of citizens, and of church-officers, and the latter hath his life by generation from his father, as Grod's instrument. For though the citizen and the church-officers may be judged by their several incorporations that made them, yet are they also essentially citizens and church-officers, as those who made them such.

Assert, 2. — There is no reason to restrain the higher powers to monarchs only, or jet prindpallj, as if they only were essentially powers ordained of God, 1. Because he calleth them V^y^im iw^t^wnu higher powers. Now this will include ail hiffher powers, as Piscator obser^eth on the place; and certainly Borne had never two or three kings to which every soul should be subject. If Paul had intended that they should have given obedience to one Nero, as the only essential judge, he would have designed him by the noun m the singular number. 2. All the reasons that the apostle bringeth to prove that subjection is due, agreeth to inferior judges as well as to emperors, for they are powers ordained of Grod, and they bear the sword, and we must obey them for conscience sake, and they are Grod's deputies, and their judgment is not the judgment of men, but of uie Lord (2 Ghron. xix. 6, 7 ; Deut. i. 16 ; Numb. xi. 16, 17). Tribute and wages be no less due to them, as ministers and servants, for their work, than to the king, &c. 3. The apostle could not omit obedience to the good civil laws enacted by the senate, nor could he omit to command subjection to rulers, if the Bomans should chuige the government, and abolish monarchy, and erect their ancient ibrm of government before they had kings. 4. Tnis is canonical Scripture, and a dear exposition of the fifth commandment, and so must reach the consciences of all Christian republics, where there is no monarchy. 5. Parallel places of Scripture prove this. Paul (1 Tim. ii. 1, 2) will have prayers made to God for kings, and for all that are in authority, and the intrinsical end of all is a godl^, honest, and peaceable life. And (1 Fet. li. 13) '* Submit to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake;" aJso, (Tit. iii. 1,) it is true, subjection to Nero, or whom Tertullian said, (Apol. 5,) Nihil nisi grande honwn a N^one damnaturny is commanded here, but to Nero as such a one as he is obliged, de jure, to be, (whether you speak of the office in ahstractOy or of the emperor in concretOy in this notion, to me it is all one,) but that Paul commandeth subjection to Nero, and that principally and solely, as he was such a man, de facto, I shall then believe, when antichristian prelates turn Paul's bishops, (1 Tim. ii.,) which is a miracle.- 6. Inferior judges are not necessarily sent by the king, by any divine law, but chosen by the people, as the king is; and, de facto, is the practice

of creating all magistrates of cities in both kingdoms. 7. Augustine, (expos, prop. 72 on epist. Bom.,) IrensBus, (1. 6, c. 24;) Chrysostom, (in Psal. cxlviii., and on the place,) and Hieron. (epist. 63, advers, i;tgilant.) expomid it of masters, magistrates; so do Calvin, Beza, Parous, Piscator, Bollocus, Marloratus; so do popish writers, Aquinas, Lyra, Hugo Cardinalis, Carihusius, Pirerius, Toletus, UomeHus k Lapide, Salmeron, Estius, expound the place; and therefore there is no argument that royalists hence draw against resisting of the king by the parliaments, but they do strongly conclude against the cavaliers' unlawful wars against the parliaments and estates of two kmgdoms. Here what the P. Prelate saith to tne contrary. 1. They are called eminent powers; therefore, kings only. — Ans, It followeth not, for these can be no other than itdpTis it h tntt^xS hr%$, (1 Tim. ii. 2). But these are not kings, but in the text contradivided from /SM-iXuf kings, and they can be no other than i^^** ^ ^•t^tea principalities and powers. 2. The reason of the apostle proveth clearly that V^v^Uu cannot mean king's only, for Paul addeth of that same Vi^wim " For there is no power but of God." It must be there is no supereminent royal power, but it is of God, and the powers only (so he must mean) that be, are ordained of God. Now the latter is manifestly false, for inferior powers are of God. The powers of the Boman senate, of a master, of a &>ther, are of God.

P. Prelate. — " Peter must expound Paul, and Paul's higher powers must be (1 Pet. ii.) fia^iXus tnei^x**^i More reason that Paul expound Paul. Now (1 Tim. ii. 2) itims h v*t^x^ tyrir. All in authority are not kings. P. Prelate.—" Are of God," or " ordained of God," cannot so properly be understood of subordinate powers, for that is not by immediate derivation from God, but immediately from the higher power the king, and mediately from G<^.

Ans. 1. — It is most fidse that king David is so immediately a king from Grod, as that he is not also by the m^iation of the people, who made him king at Hebron. 2. The inferior magistrates are also immediate vi-

1 Yatab.— Homiues intelligit pnblica authoritate pneditna.

> P. Martyr. — ^Varia sunt potestatnm genera — regna, aristocratica, politica, tyrannica, oligarcliica — Dens etiam illomm author. Willet saith the same, and so Beza, Tolet., Hammond, &c.

ears and mioisteni of God as the king, for their throne and judgment is not the king's, but the Lord's (IWt. i. 16 ; 2 Ghron. xxi. 6). 3. Though thej were mediatelj from man, it foUoweth not that thej are not so properly from God, for wisdom (Prov. viii.) saith as properly, (ver. 16,) ** By me princes rule, and nobles, even all the judges of the earth;" as, (ver. 16,) " By me kings reign;" and promotion is as properly firom Grod, and not from the east and tne west, (PsJ. Ixxv, 6, 7)) though God promote Joseph by the thankful mimificence of Pharaoh, and Mordecai by Ahasuerus, Daniel by Darius, as if he gaye them power and honour immediately from heaven.

P. Prelate. — Learned interpreters expound it so. — Am, It is an untruth, for none ej^und it only and principally of kings, rroduce one Literpreter for that conceit. P. Prelate, — Paul wrote this when Nero was monardi. — Ans. 1. Then must the text be expounded of Nero only. 2. He wrote this when Nero played the tyrant and persecuted Christians, therefore we are not to obey Neroes now, 3. He wrote it when the senate of Bome had power to de-^ clare Nero an enemy, not a father, as they did. P. PreUxte, — mi must be referred to the antecedent VS/u^U ^m^nffm and this, " There is no power •; ^ but of God," must undeniably inror there is no supreme power but of Grod; and so, sovereignty relates to God as his immediate author, so sectaries reason, Gral. ii. 16, " Not justL&ed by works, (Uy fik) but by faith only." Thm <; ^ miri Tvt ^uS must be a perfect exclusive, else their stronghold for justification is overthrown. — Ans. aS hatn a nearer antecedent, which is i^'u^ it is alone without

utri^x*^^' '^^ this mmmar is not so good as Beza's, which lie rejected. 2. hn ^ will refer to God alone as &e only cause, t genere causa primoB. God alone

fiveth rain, but not for that inmiediately, ut by the mediation of vapours and clou<U. ** Grod alone kilieth and maketh alive," Deut. xxxii. 39, that is, excluding all strange gods, but not immediately; for, bv his people's fighting, he slew Og, king of Baahan, and cast out seven nations, yet they used bow and sword, as it is used in the book of Joshua; and, therefore, God killed not Og inunediately. Grod hath an infinite, eminent, transcendent way of wcrking, so that in his kind he only worketh his alone; Deus solus oper<x6ur solitudine primce eausaSf

fiveth learning and wisdom, yet not imioeiately always—often he do^ it by teaching and industry, God only maketh ridb, yet the prelates make themselves rich idso witii the fat of the flock; and God only maketh poor, yet the P. Prelate's courts, mediately also under God, made many men poor. 3. btf fik IB not such an exclusive particle when we ascribe it to God, as when we ascribe it to two created causes, works and faith; and the protestants' form of arguing (Gal. n,\ to prove " we are justified by faith," he calleth our stronghol j^ therefore it is not his stronghold. In this point, then, he must be a papist, and so he refiiises to own

Erotestant strongholds for justification by kith alone.

Dr Feme (sect. 2, p. 10). — ^As many as have souls must be subject to the hi^er powers spoken of here; but all inferior judges have souls.

Ans, — 1. If the word souls be thus pressed, none shall be understood by hi^er

Eowers, but the king only. 2. Gertunly e that commandeth as he eommandeth must be excepted, except, because the kiag hath a soul, you must isubject the king to himself and to his own commandments royal, and so to penal laws. 3. Inferior judges, as judges, by this text, must either be subject to themselves as judges, (and, by the same reason, the king must be subject to himself, as he is a jud^,) or judges, as men, or as erring men are to be subject; which I would grant, but they are not subject as judges, no more than one, as he commandeth, can also obey as he oommandetb. These are c(mtradietory. I am not put off that opinion since I was at school, species suljusibUis qua subjicibiUs non est proBdir cahilis, 4. If Nero make fathers rulers over their mothers and children, and command them, by this public sw(d of justice, to kill their own children and mothers, — ^if a senate of such &thers disobey, and if, with the sword, they defend their own children and mothers, which some other Doegs, as judges, are to kill, in the name and commandment of Nero, then they, resisting Nero's bastard commandment by this doctrine, resist the ordinance of God, and resist the minister of God. I have not a £uth stretched out so &r to the Prelate's courtdivinity. Yet Feme saith, "There was never more cause to resist higher powers, for their widced Nero was emperor, whw

THE LAW AND THS PRINCE.

he now forbiddeth resistance, (Bom. xiii.) under the pain of damnation." I desire to be informed, whether to resist the king's servants, be to resist the king? Dr Feme (p. 3, sect. 2, p. 10, and part 3, sect. 9, p. 59) allows us, m unayoidable assaults where death is imminent, personal defence without offending, as law^, whether the king or his emissaries invade, without law or reason. Well, then, the resisting of the king's cutthroats, thoueh thej have a persontu. command of the King to kill the innocent, yet if thej want a legal, is no resisting of the king, as king, for the servant hath no more than the master giveth; but the king, in lawless commandments, gave nothing royal to his cat-throats, and so nothing legaL

QUESTION XXXIV.

WHETHER ROYALISTS BT COGENT REASONS BO PROVE THE X7NLAWEULNESS OF DEFEN- SIVE WARS.

What reasons have already been discussed, I touch not.

Obj. 1. — AmissBUs {de authority prindp, c. 2, n. 2). " K we are to obey our parents, not if they be good, but simply whether they be good or ill, (so Justin, saith of the kin^j Quamvis legwn contemptOTy qwxnvvis.tmpius, tamenpatery sect, si vera %nff, VM. 12,) then must we submit to wicked kings/'

Am, — Valeat totum^ we are to submit to wicked kings and wicked parents, because kings and parents; but when it cometh to actual submission, we are to submit to neither but in the Lord. The question is not touching subjection to a prince, let him be Nero, but if in acts of tyranny we may not deny subjection. There be great odds betwixt wicked rulers and rulers commanding or punishing unjustly*

06;. 2— Amiseeus (c. 3, n. 9). We may resist an inferior magistrate, therefore we may resist the supreme. It followeth not; for an inferior judge hath a majesty in fiction only, not properly : treason is, or can only be committed against the king; the obligation to inferior judges is only tor the prince, the person of none is sacred and inviolable but the king's.

Ans, — ^We obey parents, masters, kings, upon this formal ground, because they are

God's deputies, and set over us not by man, but by Uod; so that not only are we to obey them because what they command is good and just, (such a sort of obedience an equal owes to the counsel of either equal or inferior,) but also by virtue of the fifth commandment, because of their place of dignity. Now this majesty, which is the formal reason of subjection, is one and the same in specie and nature in king and constable, and only different gradually in the king and in other judges; and it is denied that there is any incommunicable sanctity in the king's person which is not in some degree in me inferior judge. All proceedeth from this false ground, that the king and inferior judges differ in nature, which is denied; and treason inferior may be committed against an inferior judge, and it is a fiction that the inferior judge doth not resemble God as the king doth; yea, there is a sacred majesty in all inferior judges, in the aged, in every superior, wherefore they deserve honour, fear, and reverence. Suppose there were no king on earth, as is clear in Scripture, (£xod. XX. 12 ; Levit. xix. 32 ; Esther, i. 20; Psal. cxlix.:9; Prov. iii. 16; Matt, xiii. 57; Heb. v. 4; Isa. iii. 3; Lam. v. 12 ; Mai. i. 6 ; Fsal. viii. 5,) and this honour is but united in a special manner in the king, because of his hign place.

Obj. 3. — A king elected upon conditions may be resisted.

Aris. — ^He is as essentially a king as a hereditary, yea, as an absolute prince, and no less the Lord's anointed than another prince; if then one, also another may be resisted.

Obj. 4.— The oath of God bindeth the subjects; therefore, they must obey, not resist.

Ans, — Obedience and resistance are very consistent. No doubt the people gave their oath to Athaliah, but to ner as the only heir of the crown, they not knowing that Joash, the lawfiil heir, was living; so may conditional oaths (all of this kind are conditional) in which tnere is interpretative and virtual ignorance, be broken; as the people swear loyalty to such a man conceivea to be a father, he, after that, tumeth tyrant, may they not resist his tyranny? They may. Also, no doubt, Israel gave their oath of loyalty to Jabin, (for when Nebuchadnezzar subdued Judah, he took an oath of loyalty of their king,) yet many of Zebulun, Naphtali, and Issachar, Barak leading them, conspired against Jabin.

LEX, rex; or,

06?*. 6. — ^There is no law to take a king's | life if he turn a Nero, — we never read t£it subjects did it.

Ans, — The treatise of unlimited prerogative saith, (p. 7,) " We read not that a father, killing his children, was killed by them, the fact being abominable." The law (Gen. vi. 9 ; Levit. xxiv. 16) excepteth none. See Deut. xiii. 6, the dearest that nature knoweth are not excepted.

Obj. 6. — Vengeance pursued Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, who resisted Moses.

Obj. 7. — Exod. xxii. 28, " Thou shalt not revile the gods, nor curse the Ruler of the people." Exod. x. 20, " Curse not the king, no not in thy thought, nor the rich in thy bed-chamber."

An$, — The word elohim signifieth all judges, and K*tJ^3> wcwt signifieth one. lifted up above the people, saith Rivetus, {in loc) whether a monarch, or many rulers. All cursing of any is unlawful, even of a private man, (Rom. xii. 14,) therefore we may not resist a private man by this; the other text readeth, contemn not the king, ^j;*lQ3 in scientia tua. Aria Mon., or in thy conscience or thought; and it may prove resisting any rich man to be unlaw^I. Nothing in word or deed tending to the dishonour of the king may be done; now to resist him in self-defence, being a commandment of God in the law of nature, cannot fight with another commandment to honour the king, no more than the fifth commandment can fight with the sixth; for all resistance is against the judge, as a man exceeding the limits of his omce, in that wherein he is resisted, not as a judge.

Obj. 8.-.Eccles. viii. 3, 4, " Where the word of a king is, there is power; and who may say to him, What dost thou?" therefore, the king cannot be resisted.

Ans. — Tremelius saith well, That " the scope is that a man go not from the king's lawiul command in passion and rebeUion;" Vatab.— " If thou go from the king in disgrace, strive to be reconciled to him quickly;" Cajetanus — " Use not kings too familiarly, by coming too quickly to them, or going too hastily from them;" Plutarch, — " Cum rege agendum ut cum rogOy neither too near tms fire nor too far oft." Those have smarted who have been too great in their

favour, — Ahasuerus slew Haman, Alexander so served Glitus and Tiberius Sejaunus, and Nero Seneca. But the sense is clear, rebellion is forbidden, not resistance, so the Hebrew y^ ^DID IDyfl-^^f stand not in an evil matter, or in a rebellion, and he dehorteth from rebellion against the king by an argument taken from his

Eower, for he dom whatsoever pleaseth im. Where the word of a king is, there is power, and who may say unto nim, what doest thou? The meaning is, in way of justice, he is armed with power that cannot be resisted; otherwise Samuel said to king Saul, (1 Sam. xiii. 13,) '^ Thou hast done foolishly." Elijah said more to Ahab then What hast thou done.? And the prophets were to rebuke sin in kings (2 Kings iii. 14 ; Jer. i. 28 ; xxii. 3 ; Hosea v. 1, 2) ; and though Solomon here give them a power, he speaketh of kings as they are de facto; but, de jure^ they are under a law (Deut. xvii. 18). If the meaning be, as royjuists dream, he doth whatsoever he will or desireth, as a prince, by his royal, that is, his legal ¥dll, by which he is lex animata, a breathing law, we shall own that as truth, and it is nothing against us; but if the meaning be, that de jure, as king, he doth whatsoever he will, by the absolute supremacy of royal will, above all law and reason, then Joram should, by law, as king, take Elisha's head away; and Elisha resisted Grod in saying. What doth the king? and he sinned in commanding to deal roughly with the king's messenger, and hold him at the door; then the fourscore valiant priests, who said to king Uzziah, What dost thou? and resisted him, in burning incense, which he desired to do; sinned, then Pharaoh, who said,

iEzek. xxix. 3,) " The river Nilus is mine, '. have made it for myself; and the king of Tyrus, (Ezek. xxvii. 2,) " I am God, I sit in the seat of Grod," should not be controlled by the prophets; and no man should say to them. What sayest thou? Did Cyrus, as a king, with a royal power from God, and jure regio, be angry at the river Ganges, because it drowned one of his horses, and punish it by dividing it in one hundred and thirty diannels? (Sen. Z. 3, de ira, c, 21.) And did Xerxes, jure regio, by a royal

Eower given of God, when Hellespontus ad cast down his bridges, command that three hundred whips should be inflicted on that little sea, and that it should be cast in fetters? And our royalists will have these

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

mad fools, doing these acts of blasphemous insolence against heaven, to be honoured as kings, and to act those acts by a regal power. But hear flatterers, — a royal power is the good gift of Grod, a lawful and just power. A Eing acting and speaking as a ting, speaketh and acteth law and justice. A power to blaspheme is not a lawful power; they did and spake these things with a human and a sinml will; if, therefore, this be the royalists' meaning, — ^as kings, 1. They are absolute, and so the limited and elected king is no king. 2. The king, as king, is above (Jod's law put on him by Grod, Venit. xvii. 3. His will is the measure of good and ill. 4. It were unlawful to say to the king of Gyrus, What sayest thou? thou art not God, according to tnis vain sense of royalists.

Oij. 9.— EUhu saith, (Job. xxxiv. 18,) " Is it fit to say to a king, Jhou art wicked, and to. princes, Ye are ungodly?" Therefore, you maynot resist kings.

Ans. 1. — ^This text no more proveth that kings should not be resisted thim it proveth that rich men, or liberal men, or other judges inferior, should not be resisted, for DOn3 sigxiifleth all that, and it signiiieth liberal, Isa. xxxii. 6 ; and the same word is in ver. 8. 2. Deodatus and Calvin say, the meaning is, " Learn from the respect that is due to earthly princes the reverence due to the sovereign Lord," Mai. i. 8 ; for it is not convenient to reproach earthly kings, and to say to a prince, Sy*Si *eliel, a word of reproach, signifying extreme wickedness. And you may not say to a man of place, ytSfT an extremely wicked man; so are the words taken, as signifying most vile and wicked men, 1 Sam. ii. 12; x. 27; 2 Sam. XXV. 6 ; Psal. i. 1, 6 ; xi. 5 ; xii. 8 ; Prov. xiv. 4 ; Psal. cxlvi. 9, and in infinite

places. For ^y*Si ^fl ^^^ ^^ extreme reproach, coming from ry^ smCy vum^ and Syt profuit, ( Jud. xix. 22,).a most naughty and a lewd man, or from ^ty 7'w<^wi, a lawless man, who hath cast off all yokes of Ood's or man's laws. So then the meaning is. It is unlawful to reproach earthlv princes and men of place, far more is it unlawful to reproach the Judge of the whole earth with injustice. And what then? We maynot reproach the king, as Shimei cursed king IJavid; therefore it is unlawful to resist the Kng in any tyrannous acts. I shall deny the cotisequence; nay, as Pineda observeth, if the royalist press the words literally, it shall not be lawful for prophets to reprove

kings of their sins. Christ called Herod a fox, Elias Ahab, one that troubled Israel. '

Obj. 10. — Acts xxiii. Paul excuseth himself that he called Ananias, the high-priest, a whited wall.

Ans. — Rivetus (Exod. xxii.) learnedly discussing the place, thinketh Paul, professing he knew him not to be the high-priest, speaketh ironically, that he could not acluiowledge such a man for a judge. Piscator answereth. He could not then cite Scripture, " It is written," &c. — Ans, But they may well insist, in diat act of smiting Paid unjustly, he might be reproached, otherwise it IS not lawful to reproach him; and surely it is not like that Paul was ignorant that he was a judge; yea, it is certam ho knew him to be a judge. 1. He appeared before him as a juc[ge, to answer for himself. 2. Paul saith expressly he was a judge, fver. 3,) " Sittest thou to judge me after tne law," &c. And therefore the place is for us, for even according to the mind of all, the fault was (if there were any) in calling him a whited wall; and he resisted him m judgment, when he said, '' Gommandestthou me to be smitten against the law?" 3. Though royalists rather put a fault <m the aposUe Paul, (now in the act of prophesying judgment against Ananias, which after fell out,) than upon their god, the king, yet the consequence amounteth but to this. We may not revile the high-priest, therefore we may not resist the xing in his illegal commandments. It followeth not; yea, it should prove, if a prelate come in open war to kill the innocent apostle Paul, the apostle might fly or hold his hands, but might not reoffend. Now the prelate iff the nigh-priest's successor, and so his base person is as sacred 9S the person of the Lord's anointed, the king. Hence the cavaliers had ih one of their colours, which was taken by the Scots at the battle of Marston, July 2, 1644, the crown and the Prelate's mitre, painted vrith these words, " Nolite tangere Christos meos," as if the antichristian mitre were as sacred as the lawful crown of the kins of Britain. ^

Obj. 11.— Feme, (sect. 9, 56,) " If the senate and people of Bome, who a little before had the supreme government over the then emperors, that of subjects had made them lords, might not resist their emperors, much less can the people of England have power of resistance a^dnst the succession of this crown, descending from the conqueror, who by force of anos, but in justice, conquered the kingdom.

Ans. 1. — Though the Boman emperors were absolute, (of which I much doubt,) and though the senate had made them absolute, I denj that, therefore, they cannot be resisted. The unlawM resistance condemned by Paul (Rom. xiii.) is not upon the ground of absoluteness, which is in the court of God nothing, being never ordained of God, but upon reasons of conscience, because the

S)wers are of Grod, and ordained of Grod. ut some may say, Volenti nonfit injwriay If a people totally resign their power, and swear non-resistance to a conqueror, by com-

Sact, they cannot resist. I answer, neither oth this follow, because it is an unlaw^ compact, and none is obliged to what is unlawnd. For, (1.) It is no more lawful for me to resign to another my power of natural self-defence than I can resign my Sower to defend the innocent drawn to eath, and the wives, children, and posterity that God had tyed me unto. (2.^ The people can no more resign power oi selfdefence, which nature hath given them, than they can be guilty of self-murder, and be wanting in the lawful defence of kingdom and religion. (3.) Though you make one their king with absoluteness of power, yet when he use that transcendent power, not for the safety but for the destruction of the state, it is l^own they could not resign to another that power which neither God nor nature gave them, to wit, a power to destroy themselves. 2. I much doubt if the Soman emperor was absolute when Paul wrote this. Justinian saith so, (Digest. I, 2, tit, 2,) but he is partial in tiiis cause. Bodine {de repuh. L 2, c 5, p. 221,) proveth that the Boman 'emperors were but princes of the commonwealth, and that the sovereignty remained still in the senate and people. Marius Salamon. writeth six books (De PrindpatM) on the contrary. How coula they make their emperors absolute? Livy saith, ^' The name of a king w<u9 contrai^ to a senate liberty." Florus^ Nomen Regis invidioswny They instituted a yearly feast, Feb. 23, called Regifu^iwrn. CMsero, as Augustine observeth, Begem Bomce posthcec nee Diiy nee homines esse patiantibr. The emperors might do something defacto, but Lex Megia was not before Vespasian's tune. Augustus took on him to be tribune of the people from ten years to ten. Suetonius and Tacitus say, " The succeeding kings encroached by

degrees upon the people's liberty." For speedier execution of law, the kings in time of war were forced to do many thmgs without the senate, and after the reign m emperors, though there were no Plebisdta, yet there were Senatus-consultOy and one great one is, that the senate declared Nero to be an enemy to the state. It is thought Julius Gcesar, in the war against Fompey, subdued the Bomans and the senate, and they were subdued again in the battle of Octavius against Gassius and Brutus. But Tacitus saith that was defactOy not de jwre, {Anal, L 1, ^. 2,) Ilom>CB ruere in servitium, Cortr sulesy PatreSy Eques, Caligula intended to assume diadema^ the ensign of a king, but his friends dissuaded him. 3. England is obliged to Dr Feme, who maketh them a subdued nation; the contrary of which is known to the world.

Si/mmons (sect. 6, p. 19). — God is not honoured by being resisted, no more is the king.

Ans. — 1. I deny the consequence. Those who resist the king's personal ¥dll, and will not suffer him to ruin his crown and posterity in following papists, against his oath at the coronation, do honour him, and his throne and race, as a king, though for the time they displease him. 2. Uzziah was not dishonoured in that he was resisted. 3. Nor do we honour the king when we flee from him and his law; yet that resistance is lawM, according to the way of royalists, and in truth also.

Obj. 12. — Supreme power is not to be resisted by subordinate powers, because they are inferior to the supreme.

Ans, — 1. The bloody Irish rebels, then, being inferior to the parliament, cannot resist me parliament. 2. Inferior judges, as judges, are immediately subot'dinate to God as me king, and must be guilty of blood before God if they use not the sword against bloody cavaUers and Irish cut-throats, except you say inferior judges are not obliged to execute judgment but at the king's commandment.

Obj, — As the Irish rebels are armed with the king's power, they are superior to the parliament.

Ans, — So an army of Turks and Spaniards, armed with the king's power, and coming against the two kingdoms at the king's commandment, though thej be but lictors in a lawless cause, are superior to the highest courts of parliament in the two

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

kingdoms. But the king and the law gave power to tibe parliament first to resist rebels, now he givetn power to rebels to resist the parliament. Here must be contradictory wills and contradictory powers in the king. Which of them is the king's will and his power? the former is legal and parliamentary; then, because law is not contrary to law, the latter cannot be legal also, nor can it be from God, and to resist it, then, is not to resist God.

Obj. 13. — If resistance be restrained to legal commandments, what shall we say to these arguments, — that Paul forbiddeth resistance under these tyrannous govemors, and that from the end of their goyemment, which is for good, and which their subjects did in some sort enjoy under them?

Ans, — This proveth nothing, but that we are to co-operate with these governors, though tyrannous, by subjecting to their laws, so mr as they come up to this end, the moral good and peace of their government; but Paul nowhere commandeth absolute subjection to tyrannous governors in tyrannous acts, which is still the question.

Obj, 14. — ^He that hath the supreme trust next to God, should have the greatest security to his person and power; but if resistance be lawfol, he hath a poor security.

Ana. — 1. He that hath the greatest trust should have the greatest security to his person and power in the keeping his power, and usins it according to his trust wr its own natifeend-forj^ee, peace, and godliness. God alloweth security to no man, nor that hils angels c^all guard them, but only when they are in their ways and the service of Grod; else, " there is no peace to the wicked." 2. It is denied that one man, having the greatest trust, should have the greatesit security; the church and people of God, for whose safety he hath the trust, as a means for the end, should have a greater security; the city ought to have greater security than the watchers, the army than the leaders, — *' The good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep." 3. A power to do ill, without resistance, is not security.

Obj. 15. — If Grod appoint ministers to preadi, then the sheep cannot seek safety elsewhere.

Ans. — The wife is obliged to bed and board with her husband, but not if she fear he will kill her in the bed. The obedience of positive duties that subjects owe to princes cannot loose them from nature's law of selfpreservation,nor from God's law of defending religion ajgainst papists in arms, nor are the sheep obhged to entrust themselves but to li saving shepherd.

Olj. 16. — K self-defence, and that by taking up arms against the king, be an unlawfiu duty, how is it that you have no practice, no precept, no TOromiii& for it, in all the word of Grod? 1. You have no practice: Ahab sold himself to do evil, — he was an idolater, — and killed the prophets; and his queen, a bloody idolatress, stirred him up to great wickedness. Elias had as great power with the people as you have, yet he never stirred up the people to take arms against the king. Why did God at this time rather use extraordinary means of saving his church? Amisaeus, {de auiho. princ. c. 8,) — " Elias only fled. Nebuchadnezzar, Ahab, Manasseh, and Julian, were tyrants and idolaters, yet the people never raised an army aj^inst them." Bishop Williams of Ossory, (JDeut. xiv.,) " K brother, son, daughter, wife, or friend, entice thee to follow strange gods, kill them; not a word of the father. Children are to love their fathers, not to kill them." " Christ (saith John P. P.), in the cradle, taudit by practice to flee from Herod; and all Christ's acts and sufferings are full of mysteries and our instructions. He might have had legions of angels to defend him, but would rather work a miracle, in curing Malchus' ear, as use the sword against Ceesar. If sectaries give us a new creed, it will concern them never with expunging Christ's descent into hell, and the communion of saints, to raze out this. He suffered under Pontius Pilate. My resolution is (for this sin of yours) to dissolve in tears and prayers, and, with my master, say, daily and hourly. Father, forrive them, &c. Christ thought it an uncoum spirit to call for fire from heaven to bum the Samaritans, because they refused him lodging. The prophets cried out against idolatry, blasphemy, murder, adultery, &c., and all sins; never against the sin of neglect, and murderous omission to defend church and religion against a tyrannous king. No. promise is made to such a rebellious insurrection in God's word."

Ans. It is a great non-consequence: this duty is not practised by any examples in God's word, therefore it is no duty. Practice in Scripture is a narrow rule of faith. Show a practice when a husband stoned his wife, because she enticed him to follow strange gods; yet it is commanded, (Deut. xiii. 0,)

whdn a mm lyinff with a beast is put to ^eath; yet it is a law (£xod. xxii. 19). Ingnite more laws are, the practice of which we find not in Scripture. 2. Jehu and the elders of Israel rooted out Ahab's posterity for their idolatry; and if Jehu, out of sin*^ oerity, and for the zeal of Grod, had done what God commanded, he should have been rewarded; for, say that it was extraordinary to Jehu that he should kill Ahab, yet there was an express law for it, that he that stirreth up others to idolatry should die the death (Deut. xiiL 6) ; and there is no exception of king or iailier in the law; and to except father or mother in Grod's matter, is expressly against the zeal of God (Deut. xxxii. 9). And many grave divines think the people to be commended in making Jehu king, and in killing kingNabab, and smiting all the house of Jeroboam for his idolatry; they did that which was a part of their ordinary duty, according to God's express law (Deut. xiii. 6 — 9), though the facts of these men be extraorainary. 3. Ahab and Jezebel raised not an army of idolaters and malignantB, such as are papists, prelates, and cavaliers, against the three estates, to destroy parliaments, laws, and religion — ^and the people conspired with Ahab m the persecution and idolatry, to forsake the covenant, throw down the altars of God, and s]a,y his prophets — so as in the estimation of Elias, (1 King xix. 9 — 11,^ there was not one man, but they were malignant cavaliers; and hath any Elias now power with the cavaliers, to exhort them to rise in arms a^mst themselves, and to show them it is weir duty to make war against the king and themselves, in the defence of religion? When the prophets had much ado to convince the people that they sinned in joining with the king, what place was there to mow them theur sin, in not using their own lawM defence? And in reason, any may judge it unreasonable for Elias to exhort, of thousands of thousands in Israel, poor seven thousand (of which many no doubt were women, aged, weak, and young,) to rise in arms against Ahab and all Israel, except God had given a positive and extraordinary commandment, and with all miraculous courage and strexigth in war against the whole land. Axfd God worketh not always by miracles to save his church, and therefore the natural mandate of self-preservation in that case doth no more oblige a few weak ones to lawful resistance than it obliged one martyr to rise

i^ainst a persecuting Nero and all his fi>roe8. Amiseeus should remember we are not to tie our Lord to miracles.

1. Elias did not only flee, but denounced

wrath against the king and cavaliers who

joined with them in idolatry; and when

Grod gave opportunity, he showed himself,

and stirred the people up to kill Baal's Jesuits and seducing idolaters, when the idolatrous king refiised to do it; and Elias with

his own hand took them not, but all Israel

being pothered together, (1 Kings xviii. 19,)

the prmces and judges did apprehend them,

(ver. 40,) which is a warrant, when the king

refuseth to draw the ewotd of justice against

armed papists, that other jw^es are to do

it. 2. For Jeremiah, from the Loo'd, expressly forbade to fight against Nebuchadnezzar, show us the like for not defending ourselves against bloody papists and Irish

cut-throats ; for that example may as well

prove, (if it be a binding law to us,) that our

xing should not raise his subjeots to fight

ag)£t a Spanish armada and a for^gn

prince ; for before ever .Nebuchadnezzar

subdued the kingdom of Judah, (Jer. xxvii.

1,) in the beginning of the reign of Jehoialbm, (Jer. xxxvi. and xxxvii.,) the king of

Judah is from the Lord commanded not to

draw a sword against the king of Babylon.

not to fight a^unst foreign princes, or against

the great Tunc, if they shall unjustly invade

us and our king ; and this example is a|^dnst

the king's resisting of a foreign prince unjustly invading him, as much as against us,

for Nebuchadnezzar was a tyrannous invader,

and the king of Judah the Lord's anomted.

3. The people also conspired with Manasseh,

as with Ahab. (Jer. xv. 4). 4. Of emperors persecuting Christians we shall hear

anon. 6. Deut. xiii., None are ex<3epted,

by a synecdoche, the dearest are expressed,

'' son, daughter, brother, the friend that is

as thine own soul ;" therefore fathers also;

^'and husbands are to love their wives"

(Ephes. V. 26); yet to execute judgment

on them ¥dthout pity (Deut. xiii. o, 9);

the father is to love the son, yet if the son

prophecy falsely in the name of the Lord, to

kill hinfi. (Zech. xiii. 3.) Hence love, fear,

reverence toward the king, may be commanded, and defensive wars also. 6. Christ

fled from Herod, and all his acticms and

sufferings are mysteries and instructions,

saith the poor Prelate. Christ kissed the

man that, to his knowledge, came to betray

THE LAW AND TUB PRINCE.

him; Christ fled not but knowing where sad when his enemy should apprehend him, came willingly to the place; therefore we should not nee. His actions are so mysterious that John P. P., in imitation of Christ's forty days' fast, will &8t from flesh in Lent^ and the Prelate must walk on the sea and work miracles, if all Christ's actions be our instructions. 7. He might, with more than twelve legions of angels, defend himself, but he would not, not because resistance was unlawful — ^no shadow for that in the text — but because it was Grod's will that he should drink the cup his Father ^ve him, and because to take the sword without Grod's warrant, subjecteth the usurper of Gk)d's place to perish with the sword. Peter had God's revealed will that Christ behoved to suffer, (Matt. xxvi. 62, 63; xvi. 21—23,) and God's positive command, that Christ should die for sinners, (John x. 24,) may well restrain an act of lawful self-preservation, hie et nttnc, and such an act as Christ lawfully used at another time, (Luke iv. 29, 30 ; John xi. 7, 8.) We rive no new creed; but this apostate hath forsaken his old creed, and the religion of the Church of Scotland, in which he was baptized. Nor do we expunge out of the creed Christ's descension into hell and the communion of saints, as the apostate saith; but the popish local descensum of Christ, and the popish advancing of the church's power above the Scriptures, and the intercession and prayers to the saints, or of the saiats for us, we deny; and this Prelate, though he did swear the doctrine of the Church of Scotland, preached expressly all these, and many other points of popery, in the pulpits of Edinburgh. 10. We believe that Christ suffered xmS&t Pontius Pilate, but that Pilate had any legal power to condemn Christ — but only a power by a permissive decree, (Acts iv. 27, 28,) such as devils had by God's permission, (Luke xxii. 63,) — we utterly deny. 11. The Prelate saith it is his resolution, for our sin of natural self-defence, to dissolve in tears; because his bishopric, I conceive, by which he was wont to dissolve in cups, (being drunk on the Lord's day, after he, with other prelates, had been at the Loid's supper, while the chamber, wherein they were, was dissolved in vomiting,) was taken from him. 12. The prophets cry against all sms, but never agamst the sin of non-resistance; and yet they had very tyrannous and idolatrous kings. This is but a weak argument. 1.

The prophets cry not.out against all sins — they cry not out against men-stealers, and killers of father and mother, in express terms, yet do they, by consequence, condemn all these sins; and so do they condemn non-resistance in wars, by consequence, when they cry out, (Jer. v. 31,) " The prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means, and my people love to have it so." And when they oomplam (Ezek. xxii. 26-^28), '' That the prophets and priests violate the law, her prmces are like wolves ravening the prey, to shed blood, and the people use oppression, and exercise robbery, and vex the poor;" and when tiiiey say, (Jer. xxii* 2,) not to the king 'Only, but also to his servants, and the people that enter in by the gates, *' Execute judgment and righteousness, and deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor," — 1 pray you, who are the oppressors? I answer. The murderine judges. (Isa. i. 21.) '* As for my people, children are their oppressors, and women rule over them," (L. iii 12,) and, (ver. 14, 16,) " the ancients of the people grind the faces of the poor;" and when they are not valiant for the truth upon the earth; and (Prov. xxiv. 11) the Lord shall render to these men according to their works, which forbear to help men that are drawn to death, and those that be ready to be slain; if they shift the business, and say. Behold, we know not, doth not he that pondereth the heart consider it? When, therefore, the Lord's prophets complain that the people execute not judgment, relieve not the oppressed, help not and rescue not those that are drawn to death unjustly by the king, or his murdering judges, they expressly cry out against the sin of non-resistance. 2. The prophets cannot expressly and formally cry out against the judges for non-resisting the king, when they join, as ravening wolves, with tne king in tiiese same acts of oppression, even as the judge cannot formally impannel twenty-four men, sent out to guard the travellers from an arch-robber, if these men join with the robber, and rob the travellers, and become cut-throats, as the arch-robber is, he cannot accuse them for their omission in not guarding the innocent travellers, but for a more heinous crime, that not only they omitted what was their duty, in that they did not rescue the oppressed out of the hands of the wicked, but because they did rob and murder; and so the lesser sin is swallowed up

LEX, RSX : OR

in the greater. The under-jtidges are watchmen, and a guard to the cnnrdi of God; if the king turn a bosom robber, their part is, (Jer. xxiL 3,) " To deUver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor," to watch against domestic and foreign enemies, and to defend the flock from wolves; "To let the oppressed go free, and to break every yoke, (Isa. Iviu. 6,) " To break the jaws of the wicted, and pluck the spoil out of his teeth." fJob. xxix. 17.) Now if these judges turn lions and ravening wolves, to prey upon the flock, and join wiuL the kmg, as always they did when the king was an oppressor, " his princes made him g&d with tneir Hes," and joined with him, and the people with both, (Jer. i. 18 ; V. 1 ; ix. 1 ; Mic. vii. 1 ; £zek. xxii. 24--31 ; Jer. xv. 1 — 3,) it is no wonder if the prophets condemn and cry out against the hugest and most bloody crime of positive oppression, formally and expressly, and in that their negative murders, m not relieving the oppressed, must also be cried out against. 13. The whole land cannot formally be accused for non-resistance when the whole land are oppressors, for then they should be accused for not resisting themselves. 14. The king ought to resist the inferior judges in their oppression of the people, by the confession of royalists, then this argument cometh with the like force of strength on themselves. Let them show us practice, precept, or promise in the Word, where the king raised an army for defence of religion, agamst princes and people who were subverting reHgion, and we shall make use of that same place of Scripture to prove that the estates and people, who are above the king, (as I have proved,) and made the king, may, and ought to resist the king, with the like force of scriptural truth in the like case. 15. Koyalists desire the like precedent of practice and precept for defensive wars; but, I answer, let them show us a practice where any king of Israel or Judah raised an army of malignants, of Philistines, Sidonians, or Ammonites, against the princes of Israel and Judah, convened in an assembly to take course for bringing home the captived ark of Grod, and vindicating the laws of the land, and raised an army contrary to the knowledge of the elders, princes, and judges, to set u^ Dagon, or tolerate the worship of Ihe Sidomangods; and yet princes, elders, judges, and the whole eople, were obliged all to flee out of God's nd, or then onfy to weep and request. that

the king would not destroy souls and bodies of them and their innocent posterities, because they could not, in conscience, embrace the worship of Dagon and the Sidonian gods. When the royalists can parallel this with a precedent, we can answer. There was as small apparency of precedency in Scripture, (except you flee to the law of nature,) that eighty priests, the subjects of king TJzziah, should put in execution a penal law against the Lord's anointed, and that the inferiors and subjects should resist the superior, and that 'these priests, with the princes of the land, should remove the kin&r fr^m actual goreUent, aU his days, -adiown hk son. at least make the &ther, their prince and superior, (as royalist say,^ as good as a cypher? Is not this a pumsnment inflicted by keriors upon a superior, according to the way of royalists? Now it is clear, a worshippins of bread and the mass commanded, ana against law obtruded upon Scotland, by influence of the counsel of Known papists, is to us, and in itself, as abominable as the worshipping of Dagon or the Sidonian gods; and when me kingdom of Scotland did but convene, supplicate, and protest against that obtruded idolatry, they were first declared rebels by the king, and then an army raised against them by prelates and malignants, inspired with the spirit of antichrist, to destroy the airhole land, if they should not submit, soul and conscience, to that wicked service.

£

QUESTION XXXV.

WHETHER OR NO THE SUFFERINGS OF THE MARTYRS IN THE PRIMITIYE CHTJRCH MI- LITATE AGAINST THE LAWFULNESS OF DE- FENSIVE WARS.

' Ohj. 1. — ^Royalists think they burden our cause much with hatred, when they bring the fathers and ancient martyrs against us; so the P. Prelate (p. 74 — 76,) extracted out of other authors testimonies for this, and from 1. Armagh, in a sermon on Bom. xiii. (p. 20, 21 ); so the doctors of Aberdeen. The Prelate proveth from Oem. Alexand. (1. 7, c. if) that the king is constituted by the Lord; so Ignatius.

Ans, 1. — Except he prove from these fathers that the king is from. God only and immediately, he proveth nothing.

THE LAW AND THB PRINCB,

Obj. 2. — Iren. (l. 5, adv. hasr. c. 20). — proveth that Grod siveth kingdoms, and that the devil lied, Luke iv. ; and we make the people to make kings, and so to be the children of the deril.

Ans, — If we denied Grod to dispose of kingdoms, this man might allege the church of God in England and Scotl^d to be the sons of Satan; but Grod's word, in Deut. xvii. 18, and many other places, makes the people to make kings, and yet not devils. But to say that prelates should crown kings, and with their loul fingers anoint him, and that as the Pope's substitute, is to make him that is the son of perdition a donor of kingdoms; also to make a man, with his bloody sword, to ascend to a throne, is to deny Grod to be the disposer of kingdoms; and prelates teach both these.

Obj. 3.— TertuL (Apol e. SO).—Inde est imperator, unde et homOf antequam tmperator, inde potestcu t72t, unde et spirittis, God is no less uie creator of sovereignty than of the soul of man.

Ans. — Grod only maketh kings by his absolute sovereignty, as he only maketh high and low, and so only he maketh mayors, provosts, bailiffs, for tnere is no power but of him, (Bom xiii.,) therefore provosts and bailiffs are not from men. The reader shall not be troubled with the rest of the testimonies of this poor plagiary, for they prove what never man domed but prelates and royalists, to wit, that kings are not from God's approving and regulating will, which iJiey oppose, when they say, So& conquest is a just title to the crown.

But they deserve rather an answer which Grotius, Barclay, Amisseus, and Spalato, allege, as, —

06;. 1 — CJyprian (epist. 1). — Non est fas Christianis, armisj ac vi tueri se adversus impetum persecutorumy Christians cannot, by violence, defend themselves against persecutors.

Ans, — If these words be pressed literally. It were not law&l to defend ourselves against murderers; but Cyprian is expressly condemning in that place the seditious tumults ofpeop&agwustthekwMinagistaite.

Obj, 2. — The ancients say he was justly punished who did rend and tear the edict of Dioclesian and Maximinus {Euseb, L 7^ Hist. Eccles. c. 5).

Ans. — To rend an edict is no act of natural self-defence, but a breach of a positive commandment of the emperor's, and could

not be lawfully done, especially by a private man;

Obj. 3. — CJyprian (epist. 56) Incumbamus gemitibiu assiduis et deprecationibus ere" briSf hcBc enim sunt munimenta spiritualia et tela divina quce protegunt; and Buffinus,'(l. 2, c. 6,\ Ambrosius adversus regince {JustincB Artnoe) fwrorevn non se manu defensabat aut teloy sed jejunUs contintM" tisque vigilUs sub altari positus.

Ans. — It is true, Cyprian reputed prayers his armour, but not his only armour. Though Ambrose, de fa/sto^ used no other against Jusdna, the places say nothing against the lawfulness of self-defence. Ambrose speaketh of that armour and these means of defence that are proper to pastors, and these are prayers and tears, not the sword; because pastors carry the ark, that is their charge, not the sword, that is the magistrate's place.

Obj. 4. — TertuUian (apolog. c. 37) saith expressly, that the Christians might, for strength and number, have defended themselves against their persecutors, but thought it unlawful. Q,uando vel una nox pauculis facuUs largitatem ultionis pass et operariy si malum malo dispungi penes nos liceretj sed cibsit ut igni humano vindieetur divina secta^ aut doleat pati^ in quo probetur. Si enim hostes eostraneosy non tantum vindices occultos agere vellemus^ deesset nobis vis numerorum et eopiarum?

Atis. — I will not go about to say that Tertullian thought it lawM to raise arms against the emperor: I ingenuously confess Tertullian was in that error. But, 1. something of the man; 2. Of the Christians. 1. Of tne man — TertuUian after this turned a Montanist. 2. Famelius saith of him, in vit, Tertul. inter Apocrypha numercOur — ex~ eommunicatus. 3. It was Tertullian's error in a fact, not in a question, that he believed Christians were so numerous as that they might have fought with the emperors. 4. M. Pryn doth judiciously observe, (part 3, Sovereign Power of Pari. p. 139, 140,) he not only thought it unlawml to resist, but also to flee, and therefore wrote a book de fuga; and therefore as some men are excessive in doing for Christ, so also in suffering for Christ. Hence I infer, that TertuUum is neither ours nor theirs in this point; and we can cite Tertullian against them also. Jam sumus ergo pares; yea, Fox, in his Monum., saith, " Christians ran to the stakes to be burnt, when they were nei-

LEX, EEX ; OR,

ther condemned nor cited." 5. What if we cite Theodoret, (fol. 98. De provid.) " Who, about that time, saj that eril men reign k^XH^^*^ Af)^Mi, through the cowardliness oi the subjects;" as the Prelate saith of Tertullian, I turn it, If Theodoret were now living he would go for a rebel. 1. About that time Christians sought help from Constantino the Great against Ljcinius their emperor, and overthrew him in battle; and the Christians, being oppressed by the king of Persia their own king, sent to TheodosiuB to help them against hun. 2. For the man, Terti^ian, in tne place cited, saith, '^ The Christians were strangers under the emperor," extemi sumus^ and therefore they had no laws of their own, but were under the civil laws of heathen till Constantino's time; and they had sworn to Julian, as his soldiers, and therefore might have, and no doubt had, scruples of conscience to resist the emperor. 3. It is known Julian had huge numbers of heathen in his army, and to resist had been great danger. 4. Wanting leaders and commitnders, (many prime men doubting of the lawfulness thereof,) though they had been equal in number, yet number is not all in war, skill in valorous commanders is required. 5. What if all Christians were not of TertuUian's mind. 6. If I would go to human testimonies, which I judge not satisi^ictory to the conscience, I might cite many: the practice of France, of Hdili^d, the divines in Luther's time, (Sleidan. 8, c. 8, 22,) resolved resistance to be lawful; Calvin, JBeza, Parous, the German divines, Buchanan, and an host might be produced.

QUESTION XXXVI.

WHBTHER THE POWER OF WAB BE ONLY IN

THE KING.

It is not hard to determine this question. The sword in a constitute commonwealth is

f^iven to the judge supreme or subordinate; Rom. xiii. 4;) *^He beareth not the sword in vain" in the empire. The use of armour is restricted to the emperor by a positive law; so the law saith^ ^rmorum oMda nisijussu frvMXfis iumt inierdictaj {Ub, de Cod. de Lege. 1.) Imperat Valentinian niiZZt, nobis ineonsuUis^ usus armorum tribwxtw, {ad 1. Jul. Mai. I. 3.) War k a species and a particular, the sword is a general.

Assert. — 1. The powei: of the sword, by God's law, is not proper and peculiar to the • king only, but given T[)y God to the inferior judges. 1. Because the inferior judge is essentially a judge no less than tne king, as is proved, therefore he must bear the sword, (Bom. xiii. 4.) 2. Not Moses only, but the congregation of Israel, had power of life and deaSi, and so of the sword; Num. xxxv. 12, the man-slayer shall not die, " until he stand before the congregation in Judgment;" ver. 24, " Then the congregation shall judge between the slayer and the avenger of blood;" Dent. xxu. 18, The elders of the city shall take that man and chastise him;" ver. 21, ** The men of the city shall stone her with stones;" Deut. xvii. 5 ; xix. 12, 13, v. 18—21 ; xxi. 19, " Then shall his father and his mother bring him to the elders of his city;" ver. 21, " And the men of the city shall stone him with stones;" 1 Kings xxi.

11, The elders and nobles that were inhabitants in his city stoned Naboth. 3. Inferior judges are condemned as murderers, who have shed innocent blood, (Isa. i. 12 ; Psal. xciv. 5, 6 ; Jer. xxii. 3 ; £zek. xxii.

12, 27; Hosea vi. 8; Zeph. iii. 1—3,) therefore, they must have the power of the sword, hence, upon the same grounds.

Assert. 2. — ^That the king oidy hath the power of war, and raising armies must be but a positive civil law. J^or, 1. By divine right, if the inferior judges have the sword given to them of God, uien have th^ also powerof war, and raising armies. 2. All power of war that the king h^ is cumulative, not privative, and not destructive, but given for the safety of the kingdom; as therefore the king cannot take from one particular man the power of the sword for natural self-preservation, because it is the birthright of life, neither can the king take from a commnmt^ and kingdom a power of rising in arms for their own defence. If an army of Turks shall suddenly invade the land, and the king's express consent cannot be had, (for it is essentially involved in the office of the king, as king, that all the power of the sword £at he hath be for their safety,) or if the king should, as a man, revise nis con^ sent, and interdict and dischai^e the land to rise in arms, yet they have his royal ccndsent, though they want his personal consent, in respect that his office obligeth him to command than to rise in arms. 3. Because no king, no civil power can take away nature's burthrigbt m s^-defence fr<mi any

man, or a oommunitj of men. 4. Because if a king should sell his kingdom, and invite a bloody conqueror to come in with an army of men to destroy his people, impose upon their conscience an idolatrous religion, they may lawfully rise against that army without the king's consent; for, though royalists say, they n^ not come in asmine patience, and oifer their throats to cut-throats, but may flee, yet several things hindereth a flight. 1. They are obliged by virtue of the nfth commandment to remain, and, with their sword, defend the cities of the Lord and the king (2 Sam. x. 12 ; 1 Chron. xix. 13) ; for if to defend our country and diildren, and the church of God, from unjust invaders and cut-throats, by the sword, be an act of charity that God and the law of v nature requireth of a people, as is evident, rProv. XXIV. 11,) and if the fifth oommaaapaent obligee the land to defend their need parents and youpg children from those in^ek, and if the sixth commandment lay on us the Uke bond, all the land are to act works of mercy and charity, though the king unjustly command the contrary, except, royalists say, that we are not to perform tne duties of the second table commanded by Gixl, if an earthly king forbid us; and if we exercise not acts 01 mercy towards our brethren, when their life is in hazard, to save them, we are murderers; and so men may murder their neighbour if the king oxnmand them so to do; this is like the otwrt-fiedth. 2. The king's power of wars is for the safety of his people; if he deny his consent to their raism^ of arms till they be destroyed, he playeui the tyrant, not the king,, and Uie law -of nature will necessitate them either to defend themselves, (seeing flight of all in that case is harder than deau,) else they must be guilty of self-murder. Now, the king's commandment of not rising in arms, at best, is positive and against the nature of his office, and it floweth then from him as from a men, and so must be far inferior to ihe natural commandment of God, which commandeth self-weservation, if we would not be guilty of self-murder, and of obeying men raw^ tlian God; so Althusius (Polit. c, 25, n. 9), Ehlicamas. (L 4, Antiq. Bom.V, Aristot. (FoUt. 1. 3, c. 3). 3. David took Goliath'B sword and became a captain, a captain to ^n host of armed men in the battle, and Ibught the battles of the L<d, (1 Sam. XXV. 28,) and this Abigail by the spirit of prophecy, as I take it, saith, (ver.

29—31; 1 Sam. xxii. 2; 1 Chron. xii. 1—3 ; xvii. 18, 21, 22,) not only without Saul's consent, but against king Saul, as he was a man, but not against him as he was king of Israel. 4. If there be no king, or the Idng be minor, or an usurper, as Athaliah , be on the throne, the kingdom may lawfully make war vdthout the king, as (Judg. XX.) the children of Israel, — rour hundr^ thousand footmen that drew sword, went out to war against the children of Benjamin. Judah hfi^ the power of the Bword when Josiah was but eight years old, in the beginning of his reign, (2 Kings xxii. 1, 2,^ and before Jehoash was crowned king, ana while he was minor, (2 Kings xi.,) there were captains of hundreds in arms raised by. Jehoiada, and the people of Judah, to defend the young king. It cannot be said that this is more extraordinary than that it is extraordinary for kings to die, and in the interregnum^ wars, in an ordinary providence, may fall out in these kingdoms, where kings go by election; and for kings to faU to be minors, cai>tives, tyrannous. And I Aall be of that opinion that Mr Symmons, who holdeth that royid birth is equivalent to divine unction, must also hold, that election is , not equivalent to divine unction ; for both eloction and birth cannot be of the same validity, the one being natural, the other a matter of free dioice, which shall infer that kings by election are less properly, and analogically only, kings; and so Saul was not properly a kmg, for he was king by election; but I conceive t^at rather kings by birth must be less properly kings, because the first king by God's institution, being the mould of all the rest, was by election (Deut. xvii. 18—20).

5. If the estates create the king, and make this man king, not that man, (as is clear from Deut. xviL 18, and 2 Chron. v. 1 — 4,) they give to him the power of the sw<M*d, and the power of war, and the militia ; and I shali judge it strange and reasonless, that the power given to the king, by the parliam^t or estat^ of a free kingdom, (such as Scotland is acknowledged by all to be,) should create, regulate, limit, abridge, yea, and annul that power that created itself. Hath God ordained a parliamentary power to create a royal power of the sword and war, to be placed in liie king, the parliament's creature, for the safety of parliament and kingdom, which yet is destructive of itself? Dr Feme saith that '* l^e king sum-

LEX, BXX ; OR,

moneth a parliament, and giveth them power to be a parliament, and to advise and counsel him;" and, in the meantime, Scripture saith (Deut. xvii. 18—20 ; 1 Sam. x. 20— 25 ; 2 Sam. v. 1 — 4) that the parliament createth the king. Here is admirable reciprocation of creation in policy I Shall God make the mother to destroy the daughter? The parliamentary power that giveth orovm, militia, sword, and all to the king, must give power to the king to use sword and war for the destruction of the kingdom, and to annul aU the power of parlmments, to make, unmake paruaments, and all parliamentary power. What more absurd?

Ohj, 1. — (Syijanons, p. 57). These phrases, (1 Sam. ix. 1,) *^ When kings go forth to war," and (Luke xiv. 31) " WJiat king going forth to war,*' speak to my conscience, that both offensive and defensive war are in the king's hand.

Ana. — It is not much to other men what is spoken to any man's conscience by phrase and customs; for by this no states, where there be no kings, but government by the best, or the peop&, as in Holland, or in other nations, can have power of war; for what time of year shall kmgs go to war who are not kings? and because Christ saith, *' A certain householder delivered talents to his servants," will this infer to any conscience, that none but a householder may take usury? And when he saith, '' If the good man of the house knew at what hour the thief would come, he would watch;" shall it follow the son or servant may not watch the house, but only the good man?

Obj. 2.— (Feme, p. 95.) The natural body cannot move but upon natural principles; and so neither can the politic body move in war, but upon politic reasons from the prince, which must direct by law.

Ans. 1. — This may well be retorted, the politic head cannot then move but upon poHtic reasons; and so the king cannot move to wars but by the law, and that is by consent of Parliament; and no law can principle the head to destroy the members. 2. If an army of cut-throats rise to destroy the kingdom, because the king is behind in his place in doing his duty, how can the other judges, the states and parliament, be accessory to murder committed by them in not raising armies to suppress such robbers? Shall the inferior judges be guilty of innocent blood because me king will not do his duty? 3. The politic body ceaseth no

more to renounce the principles of sinless nature in self-defence, because it is a politic body, and subject to a king, than it can leave off to sleep, eat, and dnnk; and there is more need of politic principles to the one than the other. 4. The parliaments and estates of both kingdoms move in these wars by the king's laws, and are a formal politic body in themselves.

Olj, 2. — The ground of the present ware against the king, saith Dr Feme, (sect. 4, p. 13,) is false, to wit, that the parliament 18 co-ordinate with the king; but so the king shall not be supreme, the parliament's consent is required to an act of supremacy, but not to a denial of that act. And there can no more (saith Amisseus, de jure majes* tatUy c. 3 / in quo eonsistat essen. majest, c. 3, n. 1 ; and a/a jur, majest, separ,^ 8^e c, 2, n. 2) be two equal and co-ordinate supreme powers than there can be two supreme Grods; and multitudo deorum est nulUtcu deorum^ many gods infer no gods. Ans, 1. — If we consider the fountainpower, the king is subordinate to the parliament, and not co-ordinate; for the constituent is above that which is constituted. If we regard the derived and executive power in parliamentary acts, they make but a total and complete sovereign power; yet so as the sovereign power of the parliament, being habitually and underived a Erime and fountain-power, (for I do not ere separate people and parliament,) is perfect without the king, for all parliamentary acts, as is clear, in that the parliament make kings, make laws, and raise armies, when either the king is minor, captived, tyrannous, or dead; but royal power parliamentary without the parliament, is null, because it is essentially but a part of the parliament, and can work nothing separated from the parliament, no more uian a hand cut off m>m the body can write; and so here we see two supremos co-ordinate. Amongst infinite things there cannot be two, because it involveth a contradiction, that an infinite thing can be created, for then it should it be finite; but a royal power is essentially a derived and created power and supreme, secundum quid^ only m relation to single men, but not in relation to the community; it is always a creature of the community, with leave of the royalist. 2. It is fidse, that to an act of parliamentary supremacy the consent of the king is required, for it is repugnant that

there can be any parliain^tary judicial act without the parUamenty but there may be without the kmg. 8. More fidse it is, that the king hath a negative voice in parliament; then he shall be sole judge, and the parliamenty the king's creator and constituent, shall be a cjnpher.

Ohf, 3.--*(Amis8Bn8, de jur. maj. de poteat, armorumy c. 5, n. 4.) The people are mad and fiirious, therefore supreme majes^ cannot be secured, and rebels suppressed, snd public peace kept, if the power of armour be not in tlie long's hand only.

Ana, 1. — To denude 3ie people of armour, because thej may abuse the prince, is to expose them to violence and oppression, unjustly; for one king may more easily abuse armour than aU the people; one man may more easily fail than a community. 2. The safety of the people is far to b& preferred before the safety of one man, though he were two emperors, one in the east, another in the west, because the emperor is ordained of God for the good and wety of the people* (1 Tim. ii. 2.) 3. There can be no mferior judges to bear the sword, as Grod requir^, (Rom. ziii. 4 ; Dent. i. 15, 16 ; Chron. six. 6, 7) and the king must be sole judge, if he only have the sword, and all armour mcmopoLised to himself,

Olj. 4.— The causes of war, saith Mr Symmons, (sect. 4, p. 9,) should not be made known to the subjects, who are to look more to the lawM call to war from the prince than to the cause of the war.

Ana, 1. — ^The parliament and aU the fudges and nobles are subjects to royalists, if wey should make war and shed blood upon blind obedience to the king, not inquiring either in causes of law or &ct, they must resign their consciences to the king. 2. The kmg cannot make unlawM war to be lawful by any authority royal, except he oould rase out the sixth commandment; therefore subjects must look more to the causes of war than to the authority of the king; and this were a fair way to make

ruaments of both kingdoms set up popery the swoid, and root out the reformed relision upon the. king's authority, as the lawful call to war, not looking to the causes of war.

QUESTION XXXVII.

WHBTHBR OE KO IT BB LAWFUL THAT THB ESTATES OF SCOTLAND HBLP THBIR OP^ FBBS8ED BBSmBEN, THE PABLIAMENT AND PBOTBSTANTS IN ENGLAND, AGAINST PA- FISTS AND PBELATBS NOW IN ABM8 AGAINST THEM, AND KILLING THEM, AND ENDEAyomUNG THB ESTABLISHMENT OF POPERY, THOUGH THE KING OF SCOTLAND SHOULD INHIBIT THEM.

1. Marianus saith, one is obliged to help his brother, non vinculo ^icaci, not with any efficacious band ; because in these, (saith he,) non eat actio aut poena, one may not have action of law against his brother, who revised to help him; yet, (saith he) as man he is obliged to man, neam dvilia aodetatia^ by the bond of human society.

2. Others say, one nation mav indirectly defend a neighbour nation agamst a common enemy, because it is a selNlefence ; and it is presumed that a foreign enemy, having overcome the neighbour nation, shall invade that nation itself who denieth help and succour to the neighbour nation. This is a self-opinion, and to me it looketh not like the spuntual law of God.

3. Some say it is lawful, but not always expedient, in which opinion there is this much truth, that if the neighbour nation have an evil cause, neque licet, neque ex^ pedk, it is neither lawAil nor expedient. But what is lawful in the case of necessity so extreme, as is the loss of a brother's life, or <^ a nation, must be expedient ; because necessity of non-sinning maketh any lawful thing expedient. As to help my brother in fire or water, requiring my present and speedy help, though to the loss of my goods, must be as expedient as a negative commandment, Thou shalt not murder.

4. Others think it lawfiil in the c&^e that mv brother seek mv help only, otherwise I have no calling thereunto; to which opinion I cannot universally subscribe, it is held, both by reason and the soundest divines, that to rebuke my brother of sin is actua miaericordics et charitcuia, an act of mercy and charity to his soul ; yet I hold I am obliged to rebuke him by Grod's law

LEX, REX ; OR,

Nor can I think in reason, that my duty of love to my brother doth not oblige me but upon dependency on his ftee consent; but as I am to help my neighbour's ox out of a ditoh^ though my neighbour know not, and so I have only his implioit and virtual 0onsait, so is the case here. I go not £Eirther in this case of conscience, — if a neighbour nation be iealous of our help, and in an hostile way should oppose us in h^pina, (whieh, blessed be the Lord, the honourable houses of the parliament of £ngland hath not done, though malignant spirits tempted them to 8U(£ a course,) what, in that case, we should Owe to the afflicted memberd of Christ's body, is a case may be determined easily.

5. The fiflh and last opini(i is <^ those who think, if the king command papists and prelates to rise against the parhament and our brethr^i in En^and in wars, that we are oUiged in conscience, and by our oath and covenant, to help our native prince against them, — ^to whi^ opinion, with nands and feet I should accord, if our kind's cause were just and lawful ; but from this it followeth, that we must thus far judge of the cause, as concemeth our consdences, in the matter of our necessary duty, leaving the

C'*)ial cognizance to the honourable par* ent of £ng;land. But because I cannot return to all these opinions particularly, I see no reason but the civil law of a kingdom doth oblige any citizen to help an innocent man against a murdering robbw, and that he may be judicially accused as a murderer, who faileth in his duty^ and that Solon said well, Beatam remp. esse illcnn^ in qua quisque injurictfm alterius sucmh ^Hmet^ It is a blessed society in whidi every man is to repute an- injury done against a brother, as an injury done against himself. As the Egyptians had a eood law, by which he was accused upon his head who helped not one that suffered wrong; and if he was not able to help, he was held to accuse the injurer, if not, his punishment was whips or three days' hunger; it may be upon this ground it was that Moses slew the Egyptian. Ambrose ocxnmended him for so doing.

Assert. — ^We c6 obliged, by many bands, to expose our lives, goods, children, &c., in this cause of religion and of the unjust op'- pression of enemies, for the safety and defence of our dear brethren and true religion in England; 1 Prov. xxiv. 11, 12, " If thou

forbear to deliver them that are drawn to death, H^DS D^HpS (taken as captives to be killed,J and those tluit are ready to be slain. Ii thou sayest. Behold we knew it not, doih not he that pondereth the heart consider it? and he that keepeth thy soul, doth he not know it? and shall he not render to every man according to his work?" Mr Jermine is too nanow, who^ commenting on the place, resiricteth all to these two, that the priest diould deliver by interceding for the innocent, and the king by pardoning only. But to deliver is a work of violence, as (1 Sam. xxx. 18) David by the sword rescued his wives; Hos. v. 14, " I will take away, and none Aa^ rescue;" 1 Sanu xvii. 35, '^ I rescued the lambs out of his mouth," out of the lion's mouth, which behoved to be done with great violence; 2 Kings xviii. 34, They have not delivered ^^^%i7} O Samaria out of my hand." So ComeL k Lapide, Chcmtas madety nt vi et armis eruamus injuste dudos ad martemk Ambrose {Ub, 1, ojki c 36) citeth this same text, and commendeth Moses wlio killed the Egyptian in defending a Hebrew man. To deliver is an act of charity, and so to be done, though the judge forbnid it, when the innocent is unjustly put to death.

Olj. — But in so doing, private men may offer violence to the lawnil magistrate when he unjustly putteth an innocent man to death, and rescue him out of the hands of the magistrate; and this were to bring in anarchy and confusion; for if it be an act of charity to deliver the innocent out of the hands of the magistrate, it is homicide to a private man not to do it; for our obedienoe to the law of nature tyeth os absolutely, though the magistrate forbid these ax^; for it is known that I must obey Crod rather than men.

Ans. — 1, The law of nature tyeih us to obedience in acts of charity, yet not to perform these acts after any way and manner in a m&ce natural way, impetu nostwrcR; but I am to perform acts of natural charity in a rational and prudent way, and in lookmg to God's law, else, if my brother or ftther were justly condemned to. did, I might violently deliver him out of the magistrate's hand, but, by the contrary, my hand should be first on him, without natural compassion. As, ii my brother or my wife have been a blasphemer of God, (Deut. xiii. 6—^,) therefore, I am to do acts natural, as a wise man observing (as Solomon saith, Ecdes. viii. 5)

THE LAW AND THB PRINCE.

" both time and judgment." Now, it were no wisdom for one private man to hazard his own life hj attempting to rescue an innocent brother, because he hath not strength to do it, and the law of nature obligeth me not to acts of charity when I, in all reason, see them impossible; but a multitude who had strength did well to rescue innocent Jonathan oat oi the hands of the king, that he should not be put to death; yet one man was not tyed by the law of nature to rescue Jonathan if the king and prince had condemned him, though unjustly.

2. The host of men that helped David against kins Saul (1 Sam. xzii. 2) entered in a lawM war, and (1 Chron. xii. 18) Amasa, by the Spirit of the Lord, blesseth his helpers,^ — *' reaoe, peace be unto thee, and peace be to thy helpers, for thy God helpeth thee.^' Therefore, peace must be to the parliament of Endand, and to their helpers, thdr brethren of Scotland.

S. Numb, xxjpi. 1 — 3, dec. ; Josh. i. 12 — 14, the children of Gad, and of Keuben, and the Indf tribe of Manasseh, though their inheritance fell to be on this side of Jordan, yet they were to go over the rivw armed, to fight for their brethren, while they had f^o possession of the knd, at the commandment of Moses and Joshua.

4. So Saul and Israel helped the men of Jabesh-Gilead c(ijomed in blood with them, against Nahadli the Ammonite, and hn unjust conditions in plucking out their right eyes, 1 Sam. xi.

5. Jephtha (Judg. xii. 2) justly rebuketh the men of Ephraim because they would •not help him and his peo^e against the Anomonites.

6. If the communion of saints be any bond, — that England and we have ** one Ikord, one &ith, one baptism, one head and ^viour, Jesus Christ," then are we obliged to help our bleeding sisterK^hurch against these same common enemies, papists and prelates ; but the former is undeniably tcae^ tor we send help to the Hochelle, if there had not been a secret betraying of our brethren, we send help to the recovery of the palatinate, and the aid of the confederate princes agauist BabePs strenj^h and power, and that lawiuUy, but we did it at great leisure and coldly. Queen Elizabeth helped Holland agamst the king of Spain ; and, hordes the union in religion, we sail in one iship together, being in one island, under one ■king; and now, by the mercy of God, have

sworn one covenant, and so must stand or fall together.

7. We are obliged, by the union betwixt the kingdoms, concluded to be by the Convention of the Estates of Scotland^ anno 1585, at the desire of the General Assembly, 1583, to join forces together at home, and enter in league with protestant princes and estates abrcmd, to mamtain the protesh tant rdigion against the bloody confederacy of Trent ; and, accordingly, this league between the two crowns was subscribed at Berwick, 1586, and the same renewed, 1567^8, as also the Confession of Faith subscribed, when the Spanish armada was on our coasts.

8. The law of God, commanding that we love our neighbour as ourselves, and therefore to defend one another against unjust violence, {L ut vim, /; de ju9t. et jur.,) obligeth us to the same, except we think Gk>d can be pleased with lip-love in word only, which the Spirit of God condemneth (1 John ii. 9, 10 ; iii. 16). And the sum of law and prophets is, that as we would not men should reRise to help us when we are unjustly oppressed, so neither would we so serve our afflicted brethren, (I. in facto ff, de cand, et demonstr, sect, St uxor. Jtutk, de ntp^.)

9. £vry man is a keeper of his brother's life. There is a voluntary homidde when a man rofbseth food or physic necessary for his own life, and refuseth food to his dying brother; and men are not bom for themsmves; and when the king defendeth not subjects against their enemies, all fellow-subiects, by t£e law of nature, of nations, the krU and <jm,on law, have a natural privilege to defend one another, and are mutual magistrates to one another when there be no omer magistrates. If an army of Turics or pagans would come upon Britain, if the kii^ were dead, as he is civilly dead in this juncture of time, when he reluseth to help his subjects, one part of Britain would help another ; as Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, did right in helping Ahab and Israel, so the Lord had approved of the war. If the left hand be wounded, and the left eye put out, nature teacheth that the whole burden of natural acts is devolved on the other hand and eye, and so are they obliged to help one another.

10. As we are to bear one another's burdens, and to help our enemies to compassionate strangers, so far more those who make one body of Christ with us.

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THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

justice and equity of commanding; hence from this last I shall set down the first thesis.

Assert, 1. — An absolute and unlimited monarchj is not only not the best form of government, but it is the worst, and this is against our petty Prelate and all royalists. My reasons are tiiese: — 1. Because it is an unlawful ordinance, and God never ordained it; and I cannot ascribe the superlative degree to anything of which I aeny the positive. Absolute government in a sinful Ind peaceable man is a wicked goyemment, and not a power from God, for God never gave a power to sin. Plenitudo potestatis ad mcUum et injunam non eaotendkur, Sozenus Junior (cans, 66) in catAsa occur^ renti (Z. 2). Ferdinand. Loazes in stio sans, pro March, de Velez. (p, 54, n, 66) ,

and so that learned senator, Ferd. Vasquez (p. 1, 1. 1, c. 5, n. 17). 2. It was better tor ^e state tfaAt Epiminondas could not sleep than that he oould sleep, when the people were dancing, because, said he, *^ I wake that you may have leave to sleep and be secure;" for he was upon deep cogitations how to do good to the commonwealui when the people were upon their pleasures; because all kings, since the Tall of the father, king Adam, are inclined to sin and injustice, and so had need to be guided by a law, even because they are kings, so they remain men. Omnipotency in one that can sin is a cursed power. With reason all our divines say, the state of saving grace in the second Adam, where there is non passe dejficerey they caxmot fall away from God, is better than the state of the first Adam, where there was passe non deficere^ a power not to fall away; and that our fr^e will is better in our countnr in heaven, where we cannot sin, than in the way to our country, on earth, where we have a power to sin; and so Grod's peo^e is in a better case, (Hosea, ii. 6, 7) *' Where her power to overtake her lovers is closed up with an hedge of thorns that she cannot find her paths;" then the condition of Ephraim, of whom God saith, (Hosea, iv. 17>) ^^ Ephraim is joined to idols, let him alone." So cannot that be a good government when the supreme power is in a sinful man, as inclinable to injustice by nature as any man, and more inclinable to injustice by the condition of his place than any; and yet by office he is one that can do no injustice against his subjects; he is a king, and so may destroy Uriah, kill his subjects.

but cannot sin; and this is, to flattering royalists, the best government in the world. As if an unchamed lion were the best governor, because unchained, to all the beasts, sheep, and lambs, and all others, which with his teeth and paws he may reach, and that by virtue otan ordinance of God. 3. What is one man under no restraint, but made a eod on earth, and so drunk with the grandeur of a sinning-god, here under the moon and clouds? who may hear good counsel from men of his own choosing, yet is under no restraint of law to follow it, being the supreme power absolute, high, mighty, and an impeccable god on earth. Certainly this man may more easily err, and break out in violent acts of injustice, than a number of rulers, grave, wise, under a law. One being a sinful man, shall sooner sin and turn a Nero (when he may

fo to hell, and lead thousands to hell witJb im gratis^ than a multitude of sinful men, who nave less power to do against law, and a tyrannous killing of innocents, and a subversion of laws, hberties, and religion, by one who may, by office, and without resistance of mortal men, do all ill, is more dangerous and hurtful than division and faction incident to aristocracy. 4. Geesar is great, but law and reason are greater; by an absolute monarchy all things are ruled by wiU and pleasure above law; then this government connot be so good as law and reason in a government by the best, or by many. 5. Under absolute monarchy, a free people is, €Ktu 2>rima, and in themselves enslaved, because though the monarch, so absolute, should kill ^, he cannot be controlled; there is no more but flight, prayers, and tears remaining; and wluit greater power hath a tyrant? None at aU, so may we say. An absolute monarch is, actu primoy a sleeping Hon, and a tyrant is a waking and a devouring Hon, and they differ in accidents only. 6. This is the papists' way. Bellarmine (de pontif,, I, 1, c. 1), and Sanderus (de vistbili Monorchia, I, 3, c, 3), Turrere (m sum de Ecdes. I. 2, c. 2l prove that the government of the church is by an absolute monarch and pope, because that is the best government imch yet is in question. So royalists prove commonwealths must be best governed by absolute monarchs, because that is the best government; but the law saith, it is contrary to nature, even though people should paction to make a king absolute: Canventio praear-

LEX, rex; OB,

atoria ctd dilapidandum et disavpandwn Juri naturali contraria nulla esty L fiXiiu 15, decond. Just. L Nepoa. procul 125, de verb, signif. L 188, u6t. de jwre Regni I. 85, d tit.

Assert. 2. — ^Monarchy in its latitude-^ as heaven, and earth, and all the host therein, are citizens — is the best government absolutely, because God's immediate government must be best; but that other governments are good or best so far as thej come near to this, must prove that there is a monarchy in angels ii there be a government and a monarchy amongst fishes, leasts, birds, &c. ; and that, if Adam had never sinned, there should be one monarchy amongst all mankind. I profess I have no eye to see what government could be in that state, but paternal, or marital; and, by this reason, there should be one catholic emperor over all the kings of the earth; a position held by some papists and interpreters of the cannon law, which maketh all the princes of the earth to be usurpers, except those who ao^ knowledge a catholic dominion of the whole earth in the emperor, to whom they submit themselves as vassals. If kings were gods and could not sin, and just, as Solomon in the the beginning of his. reign, and as David, I could say, monarchy so Umited must be better than anstocracgr or democracy, 1. Because it is farthest irom injui^ice, nearest to peace and godliness. {M. I, 3, sect, aparet, ff. de advM.imtrat. tutor. I. 2, sect, novis- Ame^f. de orig. jw. Aristot. pel. I. ByC. 10, Sodin. de Rep. I, 6, c. 4.) 2. Because God oidained this government in his people. 3. By experience it is known to be less obnoxious to chai^, except that some think the Venetian c(MnmonweaIth best; but, with rever^Qce, I see small difference betweai a king and the Duke ef Venice.

Assert. 3. — Every government hath something wherein it k bet; monaidby is honourable and glorious-like before men; aristocracy, for counsel, is surest; democracy for liberty, and possibly for riches and gain, is best. Monarchy obtaineth its end with more conveniency, because the hip is easier brought to land wh^i gob sitteth at the helm, than when tai move the helm. We more easily fear, love, obey, and serve one than many. He can more easily execute the laws.

Assert. 4. — A limited and mixed monarchy, such as is in Scotland and England, seems to me the best governmeoxt, when par^

liamentfi, with the king, have the good of all the three. This government hath glory, order, unity, from a monarch; from the government of the most and wisest, it hath safety of oounsel, stability, strength; from the influence of the commons, it hath liberty, privileges, promptitude of obedience.

Uhj. 1. — There is more power, terror, and love, in one than in many.

Ans. — ^Not more power; terror oometh from sin, and so to nature fallen in sin, in circumstances a monarchy is best.

Ohj. 2. — It is more convenient to nature that one should be lord than many.

Ans. — To sinless nature, true, as in a father to many diildren.

Ohj. 3. — ^Monarchy, for invention of counsels, execution, concealing of secrets, is above any other government.

Ans.-^hsii is in some particulars, because sin hath brought darlmess on us; so are we all dull of invention, slow in execution, and by reason of the falseness of men, silence is needM; bat this is the aeddentary state of nature, and otherwise there is safety in a multitude of counsellors; one commanding all, without following counsel, trusteth in his own heart, and is a fool.

Ohj. 4. — A monarch is above envy, because he hath no equal.

^ntf.-'-Granted; in many things a monardiy is more excellent, but that is nothing to an abscdute monarchy, for which roya£sts contend.

Ans^^^-yL&ce multitude cannot govern in eitlier democracy of aristocracy, for then all diould be mlers, and none ruled, but many eyes see more than one, — by accident one may see more than hundreds, but accidents are not rules.

06;, 6. — ^Monardiy is most perfect, because most oj^osite to anarchy and most agreeable to nature, as is evident in plants, bu*ds, bees.

. Ans. — Government of sinless nature vwd of reason, as in birds and bees, is weak to oondude politic civil government amongst men in ain, and especially absolute government. A king-bee is not absolute, nor & king-eagle, if either destroy its fellows, by nature all rise and destroy thdr king. A king-bee doth not act by counsel b<Mn*owed from felk)w4)ees, as a king must do, and joommunioation of counsels lesseneth absoluteness of a man. I see not how a monarchy is more opposite to anarchy and confusion than other governments. A monarch, as one, is more opposite to a multitude, as many, but there is no less order in aristocracy than in monarchy; for a government essentially includeth order of commanding and subjection. Now, one is not, for absoluteness, more contrary to anarchy than many; for that one now who can easily slip from a king to a tyrant, cannot have a negative voice in acts of justice, for then should he have a legal power to oppose justice, and so, for his absoluteness, he should be most contrary to order of justice; and a monarch, because absolute, should be a doorneighbour to disorder and confusion.

06;. — But the parliament hath no power to deny their voices to things just, or to cross the law of God, more than the king.

Ans, — It is true neither of them hatn a negative voice against law and reason, but if the monarch, by his exorbitant power, may deny justice, he may, by that same legal power, do all injustice; and so there is no absoluteness in either.

Ohj, — ^Who should then punish and coerce the parliament in the case of exorbitance?

Ans, — Posterior parliaments.

Ohj. — Posterior parliaments and people may both err.

Am, — All is true; God must remedy that only.

QUESTION XXXIX.

WHETHER OR NO ANY PREROGATIVE AT ALL ABOVE THE LAW BE DUE TO THE KING, OR IF " JURA MAJESTATIS" BE ANY SUCH PRE- ROGATIVE ROYAL.

I conceive kings are conceived to have a threefold supreme power. 1. Strictly absolute to do what they please, their will being simply a law. This is tyrannical. Some kings have it, de facto ^ ex consuetudine, but by a divine law none have it. I doubt if any have it by a human positive law, except the great Turk and the king of Spain, over his conquest without the borders of Europe, and some few other conquerors. 2. There is another power limited to God's law, the due proper right of kings. (Deut. xvii. 18 — 20.) 3. There is, a poteitas intermedia^ a

middle power, not so vast as that which is absolute and tyrannical, which yet is some way human. This I take what jurists call jus regium, lex regia, jura regalia regis; Cicero, jura majestatis; Livius, jura tmperiiy and these royal privileges are such common and high dignities as no one particular magistrate can have, seeing they are common to all the kingdom, as that Ceesar only should coin money in his own name. Hence the penny given to Christ, because it had Caesar's image and superscription, (Matt. xxii. 20, 21,) infers by way of argumentation, i^^arl 9V9, &c., give therefore tribute to Caesar as his due; so the magazine and armoury for the safety of the kinffdora is in the king's hand. The king hath the like of these privileges, because he is the common, supreme, public officer and minister of God for the good of all the kingdom; and, amongst these royal pnTUeges, I reckon that power that is given to the king, when he is made king, to do many things without warrant of the letter of the law, without the express consent of his council, which he cannot always carry about with him, as the law saith. The kin^ shall not raise armies without consent oi the parliament; but if an army of Irish, or Danes, or Spaniards, should suddenly land in Scotland, he hath a power, without a formally-convened parliament, to command them all to rise in arms against these invaders and defend themselves, — ^this power no inferior magistrate hath as he is, but such a magistrate. And in many such exigencies, when the necessity of justice or grace requireth an extemporal exposition of laws, pro re nata, for present necessary execution, some say only the emperor, — others, all kings have these pleasures. I am of the mind of Arnisaeus,^ that these privileges are not rewards given to princes for their great pains; for the king is not obHged to govern the commonwealth because he receiveth these royal privileges as his reward, but because by office he is obliged to govern the commonwealth; thereiore these privileges are given to him, and without them he could not so easily govern. But I am utterly against Amiseeus, who saith, "These are not essential to a king, because (saith he) he createth marquises, dukes, nobles, &c., and constituteth magistrates, not because of his royal dignity, but by reason of his aboslute

LEX, RKX ; OR,

power; for many princes have supreme power and cannot make nobles, and therefore to him they are jura majestatis^ non jura potestatis.

Ans, 1. — The king, sappose a limited king, may and ought to make nobles, for he may confer honours as a reward of virtue; none can say Pharaoh, by his absolute authority, and not as a kins, advanced Joseph to be a noble ruler. We cannot say that, for there was merit and worth in mm deserving that honour; and Darius, not by absolute authoritv, but on the ground of well-deservinff, (the rule by which kings are obliged, m justice, to confer honours,) promoted Daniel to be the first president of all his kingdoms, because, (Daii. vi. 3,) " an excellent spirit was in him;" and in justice the king could ennoble none rather than Daniel, except he should fail against the rule of conferring honours. It is acknowledged by all, that honos est prcemium virtuUSf honour is founded upon virtue; and therefore Darius did not this out of his absolute majesty, but as king.

2. All kings as kings, and by a divine law of God, and so by no absoluteness of majesty, are to make men of ¥risdom, fearing Grod, hating covetousness, judges under them, Deut, i. 13; 2 Chron. xix. 6, 7; Psal. ci. 6—8.

3. J£ we suppose a king to be limited, as Grod's king is, (Deut. xvii. 18 — 20,) yet is it his part to confer honours upon the worthiest. Now, if he have no absoluteness of majesty, he cannot confer honours out of a prmdple that is none at all, unum quodque sicut est, ita operatur ; and if the people confer honours, then must royalists mnt that there is an absolute majesty in the people, why then mav they not derive majesty to a king ? and why then do royalists taUk to us of Grod's immediate creating of kings, without any intervening action of the people ?

4. By this absoluteness of majesty, kings may play the tyrant, as Samuel (1 Sam. viii. 9 — 14) foretelleth Saul would clo. But I cannot believe that kings have the same very official absolute power, from whence they do both acts of grace, goodness, and justice, such as are to expone laws extem-

E orally in extraordinary cases, — ^to confer onours upon good and excellent men of grace, — to pardon offenders upon good grounds, and also do acts of extreme tyranny I for out of the same fountain doth

not proceed both sweet water and bitter. Then by this absoluteness kings cannot do acts of goodness, justice, and grace, and so they must do good as kings, and they must do acts of tyranny as men, not &om absoluteness of majesty.

5. Inferior magistrates, in whom Hiere is no absoluteness of majesty, according to royalists, may expound laws also extemporally, and do acts of justice, without formalities of civil or municipal laws, so they keep the genuine intent of the law, as they may pardon one that goeth up to the wall of a city, and discovereth the approach of the enemy, when the watchmen are sleeping, though the law be, that any ascending to the wall of the cily shall die. Also, the inferior judge may make judges and deputies under himself.

6. This distinction is neither grounded upon reason or laws, nor on any word of (rod. Not the former, as is proved before, for there is no absolute power in a king to do above or against law; all the o&cial

Sower that a king hath, is a royal power to good, for the safety and good othis subjects, and that according to law and reason, and there is no other power given to a king as a king; and for Scripture, Amisfeus allegeth, 1 Sam. viii. tne manner or law of the king, ver. 9, 11, and he saith. It cannot be tlie custom and manner of the king, but must be the law of absolute majesty, 1. Because it was the manner of inferior judges, as Tiberius said of his judges, to flay the people, when they were commanded to snearthem only. 2. Samuel's sons, who wrested judgment and perverted the law, had this manner and custom to oppress the people, as did the sons of Eli; and, therefore, without reason it is called the law of kings, jus reaumy if it was the law of the judges; for it all this law be tyrannical, and but an abuse of kingly power, the same law may agree to all other magistrates, who, by the same unjust power, may abuse their power; but Samuel (as Brentius observeth, homi. 27, in 1 Sam. tnprtnc.) doth mean here a greater license than kings can challenge, if at any time they would make use of their plentitude of absolute power; and therefore, nomine juris, by the word law here, he understandeth a power granted by law, jwe, or right to the King, but pernicious to the people, which Gregory calleth jus regium tyrannorum, the royal law of tyrants. — So Seneca, 1 de

THE LAW AND THE PRINCE.

clem, c. 11, hoc interest inter regem et tV" rannumy species ipsa fortunce ac Hcentice par estj ntsi quod tyranni ex voluntate scBviunty reges non nisi ex causa et neceS' sitate f quid ergo? non reges quoque occtdere solent? sed quoties fieri pvJblica uttlitas persuadet, tyrannis scevitia cordi est. A tyrant in this differeth from a king, Qui ne ea quidem vult^ qtux sibi licent^ that a king wul not do these things which are lawful; a tyrant doth quae libet, what he pleaseth to do.

Ans. 1. Amisseas betray eth his ignorance in the Scriptures, for me word tSBti^D signifieth a custom, and a wicked custom, as by many Scriptures I have proved already: his reasons are poor. It is the manner of inferior judges, as we see in the sons df Eli and Samuel, to pervert judgment, as well as king Saul did; but ti^e king may more oppress, and his tyranny hath more colour, and is more catholic than the oppression of inferior judges. It is not Samuel's purpose thus to dutinguish the judges of Israel and the kings, in that the judges had no power granted them of Grod to oppress, because the people might judge theur judges and resist them; and there was power given of God to the king, so far to play the tyrant, that no man could resist him, or say. What dost thou? The text will not bear any such difference; for it was as unlawM to resist Moses, Joshua, Samuel, (as royalists prove from the judgment of Grod that came upon Korah, jDaman, and Abiram,) as to resist king Saul and king David: royalists doubt not to make Moses a king. It was also no less sin to resist Samuel's sons, or to do violence to their persons, as judging for the Lord, and sent by the supreme judge, their &ther Samuel, than it was sin to resist many inferior judges that were lions and even wolves under the kings of Israel and Judah, so they judged for the Lord, and as sent by the supreme magistrate. But the difference was in this, that judges were extraordinarily raised up of God out of any tribe he pleased, and were believers, (Heb. xi. 32,) saved by faith, and so used not their power to oppress the people, though inferior judges, as the sons of Eli and Samuel, perverted judgment; and therefore in the time of the judges, God, who gave them saviours and judges, was their king; but kings were tyed to a certain tribe, especially the line of David, to the kingdom of Judah.

2. They were hereditary, but judges are not so.

3. They were made and chosen by the people, (Deut. xvii. 14, 16 ; 1 Sam. x. 17 — 20 ; 2 Sam. v. 1 — 3,) as were the kings of the nations ; and the first king, (though a king be the lawful ordinance of God,) was sought from God in a sinful imitation of the nations, (1 Sam. viii. 19, 20,) and therefore were not of Grod's peculiar election, as the judges, and so they were wicked men, and many of them, yea, all for the most part, did evil in the sight of the Lord, and their law, tO&tS^D) their manner and custom, was to oppress the people, and so were their inferior judges little tyrants, and lesser lions, leoparos, evening wolves. (Ezek. xxii. 27 ; Mic. iii. 1 — 3 ; Isa. iii. 14, 16.) And the kings and inferior judges are only distinguiuied, de facto f that the king was a more catholic oppressor, and the old lion, and so had more art and power to catch Uie prey than the inferior judges, who were but whelps, and had less power, but all were oppressors, (some few excepted, and Samuel speaketh of that which Saul was to be, de facto, not de jure, and the most part of the Idngs after him,) and this tyranny is well called jtis regis, the manner of uie king, and not the maimer of the judges, because it had not been the practice, custom, and tOBB^O, of the believing judges^ before Saul's reign, and while God was nis people's king, (1 Sam, viii. 7,) to oppress. We grant that all other inferior judges, after the people cast off God's government, and, in imitation of the nations, would have a king, were also lesser tyrants, as the king was a greater tyrant, and that was a punishment of their rejecting God and Samuel to be their King and judge. How shall Amis- 8BUS prove that this manner or tODU^D of the king was, potestas concessa, a power granted, I hope, granted of God, and not an abuse of kingly power ; for then he and royalists must say, that all the acts of tyranny ascribed to king Saul, (1 Sam. viii. 11 — 14,^ by reason of which they did cry out, ana complain to Grod because of their oppression, was no abuse of power given to Saul ; therefore it was an use, and a lawful use of power given of Grod to their king, for there IS no medium betwixt a lawftd power used in moral acts, and a lawftd power abused ; and, indeed, Amiseeus so distinguisheth a king and a tyrant, that he maketh them all one in nature and specie. He saith, a tyil

LEX, REX ; OR,

rant doth, quod Ucet, that which hj law he may do, and a king doth not these things, quce Ucenty which bj law he maj do; but, so to me it is clear, a tyrant, acting as a tyrant, must act according to this DDt^D ^^ of the king, and that which is lawtiil, and a king, acting as a king, and not doing these things that are lawful, must sin against his office, and the power that God hath given to him, which were to commend and praise the tyrant, and to condemn and dispraise the kmg. If this law of the king be a permissive law of Grod, which the King may, out of his absoluteness, put in execution to oppress the people, such as a law of a bill of divorcement, as Arnisseus, Barclay, and other royalists say, then must God have given a law to every king to play the tyrant, because of the hardness of the king's heart; but we would gladly see some word of God for this. The law of a bill of divorcement is a mere positive law, permitted in a particular exigent, when a nusband, out of levity of heart and affection, cannot love his wife; therefore God by a law permitted him out of indulgence to put her away, that both might have a seed, (the want whereof, because of the blessed Seed to be bom of woman, was a reproach in Israel,) and though this was an affliction to some particular women, yet the intent of the law, and the soul thereof, was a public benefit to the commonwealth of Israel, of which sort of laws I judge the hard usage permitted by God to his people — in the master toward the servant — and the people of Grod toward the stranger, of whom they might exact usury — though not toward their brethren. But that Grod should make a permissive law, that Jeroboam might press all Israel to sin and worship the golden calves; and that a king by law may kill, as a bloody Nero, all the people of God, by a divine permissive law, hath no warrant in Grod's word. Judge^ reader, if royalists make God to confer a benefit on a land, when he giveth them a king, if by a law of Grod, such as the law for a bill of divorcement, the king may kill and devour, as a lawful absolute lion, six kingdoms of nations that profess Christ and bilieve in his name. For if the king have a divine law to kill an innocent Jonathan, so as it be unlawful to resist him, he may, by that same law, turn bloodier than either Nero, Julian, or any that ever sucked the paps of a lioness, or of whom it may be said, Qoaoqae dedit nntrix ubera, tigris erat,

and he shall be given as a plague of Grod, ew conditione doni^ to the people, and the people, inasmuch as they are gifted of God with a king, to feed them in a peaceable and godly life, must be made slaves; now, it wanteth reason, that God will have a permissive law of murdering the church of Christ, a law so contrary to the public good and intrinsical intention of a kmg, and to the immutable and eternal law ot nature, that one man, because of his power, may, by God's permissive law, murder millions of innocents. Some may say, " It is against the duty of love, that by nature and God's law the husband owes to the wife, (£phes. v. 25,) that the husband should put away his wife; for God hateth putting away, and yet God made a law, that a husband might give his wife a bill of divorce, and so put her away; and by the same reason, Goa may make a law, though against nature, that a king should kill and murder, without all resistance."

Ans. — 1. The question is not, if God may make permissive laws to oppress the in* nocent; I grant he may do it, as he may command Abraham to kill his son Isaac; and Abraham by law is obHged to kill him, except Grod retract his commandment, and whether God retract it or not, he may intend to kill his son, which is an act of love and obedience to God; but this were more than a permissive law. 2. We have a clear Scripture for a permissive law of divorce, and it was not a law tending to the universal destruction of a whole kingdom, or many kingdoms, but only to the grievance of some particular wives; but the law of divorce gave not power to all husbands to put away meir wives, but only to the husband who could not command his affection to love his wife. But this law of the king is a catholic law to all kings, (for royalists will have all kings so absolute, as it is sin and disobedience to God to resist any,) that all kings have a divine law to kill aU their subjects; surely, then, it were better for the diurch to want such nurse-fathers, as have absolute power to suck their blood; and for such a perpetual permissive law continuing to the end of the world, there is no word of God. Nor can we think that the hardness of one prince's heart can be a ground for God to make a law, so destructive to his church and all mankind; such a permissive law, being a positive law of God, must have a word of Christ for it, else we are not to receive it. Arnisffius, (cap, 4. distru, T^rcm. et pnnc.