ANTHROPOLOGY.

MAN'S CREATION.

Augustine: City of God, XII. ; On the Soul and its Origin, Odo Tornacensis: De Peccato Originali. Biblioth. Max., XXI. 229 sq. Aquinas: Summa, II. cxviii. cxix. xci. xcii. Turrettin: Institutio, V. xiii. Maresius: Theologia Elenctica. Controversia X. Howe: Oracles, Part II. Lecture xxxvii. Edwards: Against Watts (Works, III. 533). Hopkins: Works, II. 289. Delitzscli: Biblical Psychology, 128-144. Nitzsch: Christian Doctrine, g 107. Evelyn: Glaubenslehre, III. 96. Domer: Christian Doctrine, ? 83. Gangauf: Psychologie des Augustinus, III. 1 1-4. Hagenbach: History Theology, II. 65 sq. Smith: Christian Theology, 166 sq. Shedd: Sin, and Gratuitous Imputation. Martenseu: Dogmatics, | 74.

relate to man as created and holy, and as apostate and sinful. It excludes those relating to man as regenerate and sanctified, because these belong to redemption, which is a special provision not contained in creation. Man's endowment by creation provided for his actual holiness, and his possible apostas}', but not for his recovery from apostasy. Anthropology comprises only what man is and becomes

4: ANTHROPOLOGY.

under the ordinary arrangements of tlie Creator: what he is by creation, and what he makes himself by self-determination. Man's creation, primitive state, probation, apos- tas}^ original sin and its transmission, are anthropological topics. Anthropology is principally concerned with the doctrine of sin; not because man is ideally and originally a sinner, but because he remained holy but a short time, and consequently his history, apart from redemption, is that of moral evil and its development.

Respecting man's creation, the Westminster Confession, IV, ii., teaches that " God created man male and female, with reasonable and immortal souls." The first part of this statement is supported by Gen, 1:27, " Male and female created he them." The second part is supported by Genesis 1:26, " God said. Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; " by Genesis 2:7, " God breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul;" by Ecclesiastes 12:7, " Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return to God who gave it; " and by Matthew 10:28, " Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell."

In this statement, two particulars are to be marked: 1. That man is bisexual. " God created man male and female." This implies that the idea of man is incomplete, if either the male or the female be considered by itself, in isolation from the other. The two together constitute the human species. A solitary male or female individual would not be the species man, nor include it, nor propagate it. In Milton's phrase, "Two great sexes animate the world."

The angels are sexless. Like man, they were created " with reasonable and immortal souls," but unlike him, they were not " created male and female." Matthew 22:30, " They neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God." Angels being sexless are Tiot a race or species of creatures. They were created one by one, as distinct and

separate individuals. This is proved bj tlie fact that they do not have a common character and history; some remain holy, and some lapse into sin.

2. That the body is of a different nature and substance from the soul. Genesis 2:7," God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul " (n^n rpj), a breath, or soul of life. According to this statement, man is composed of a material part, resulting from the vivification of the dust of the ground by creative energy, and of an immaterial part resulting from the spiration or imbreatliing of God. The Creator first enlivens inorganic matter into a body, and then creates a rational spirit which he infuses into it. The same difference between body and soul is taught in Ecclesiastes 12:7. The " dust " returns to the earth, and the " spirit " returns to God. Christ " commends his spirit into God's hands," and " and gave up the spirit," Luke 23:46. Stephen said, " Lord Jesus receive my spirit," Acts 7:59. " Jacob gathered up his feet into the bed, and yielded up the ghost,"' Genesis 49:33. Job exclaims, " O that I had given up the ghost," Job 10:18. " The hope of the wicked shall be as the giving up of the ghost," Job 11:20. "She hath given up the ghost," Jeremiah 15:9.

In Genesis 1:20, God says, " Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life;" literally, " Let the waters swarm a swarm of the soul of life " (r>yi rtip). And in Genesis 1:21 it is said, that " God created every living creature that moveth; " literally, " God created every living soul of life that creepeth." See also Genesis 1:24. The irrational animal is here denominated a " soul of life " as man is; but it is not added, as in the case of man, that God " breathed " the " soul of life " into him. On the contrary, the origin of animals is associated with the material world alone. When God cre- ates man, he addresses himself: " Let us make man in our image," Genesis 1:26. But when he creates animals, he addresses the inanimate world: " Let the waters bring fortli the moving creature," Genesis 1:20 ; " Let the earth bring forth the living creature," Genesis 1:24. The " sonl of life " in the instance of the animal is only the animal soul, whicli is physical and material in its nature, and perishes with the body of which it is the vital principle. The " sonl of life " in the instance of the man is a higher principle, the rational soul, which was imbreathed by the Creator, and made in his image. Hence it is said, in Ecclesiastes 3:21, that " the spirit (~^~) of man goeth upward," and " the spirit (nn"]) of the beast goeth downward to the earth."

Three theories have been formed of the mode of man's

Pre-existence teaches that all human souls were created in the beginning of creation, and before the creation of Adam. Each individual human soul existed in an antemundane state, and is united with a human body by ordi- nary generation. This theory found some snpport in Plato's pre-existent state of the soul. Some of the Jewish Rabbinical schools adopted it, and Origen endeavored, luisuccess- fully, to give it currency in the Christian church. Miiller, in his work on Sin, has revived it in a modified form. lie assumes, not an ante-temporal but a supra-temporal state, in which the soul existed and the origin of sin occurred. The fall of man was not in a time before time, but is timeless. This is virtually the same as Kant's conception of sin as a noumenon, or thing in itself, which is always timeless and spaceless, in distinction from a phenomenon, which always occurs in space and time. Philippi (Glaubenslehre, IIL 9G) contends that Miiller's view is virtually that of preexistence. The propagation of the body still leaves the ego pre-existent.

Pre-existence confines the idea of species to the body. As this is propagated, it is derived out of a common physical nature. The body, conseqnenth', cannot be older than that pliysical human nature which was created on the sixtli day. The spirit, on the other hand, was created prior to the sixth day. The human spirit is purely individual, like that of an angel.

Traducianism applies the idea of species to both body and soul. Upon the sixth day, God created two human individuals, one male and one female, and in them also created the specific psychico-physical nature from which all the subsequent individuals of the human family are procreated both psychically and physically. Hase (Hutterus adopted by Tertullian, Augustine, and the elder Protestant divines, in the interest of the stricter theory of original sin. Hagenbach (§ 55, 106) says that Tertullian was an earnest advocate of traducianism; that Augustine and Gregory the Great express themselves doubtfully and " with reserve respecting creationism; " and that " traducianism was professed not only by heterodox writers like Apollinaris, but The writer in the Middle ages who maintains traducianism with nnost decision is Odo, bishop of Cambray. His treatise upon Original Sin has received little attention even from the historians of doctrine, though it is marked by great profundity and acumen.

Neander (I. 615) describes the traducianism of Tertullian in the following terms: "It was his opinion, that our first parent bore within him the undeveloped germ of all mankind; that the soul of the first man was the fountain liead of all human souls, and that all varieties of individual human nature are but different modifications of that one spirit- ual substance. Hence the whole nature became corrupted in the original father of the race, and sinfulness is propagated at the same time with souls. Although this mode of apprehending the matter, in Tertullian, is connected with his sensuous habits of conception, yet this is by no means a

necessary connection." This last remark of Neander is important. Bellanuine claims Augustine as a creationist. Melanchtiion and Klee reckon him among traducianists. Gangauf says that he was undecided. Delitzsch (Biblical Psychology, § vii.) asserts that he was wrestling Math the subject all his life. Luther, according to Delitzsch, was at first inclined to traducianism, being urged by Bugenhagen, but afterwards distinguished the creation and infusion of the soul into the body as the second conception, from the first bodily conception. Smith (Tlieology, 168) asserts that " traducianism, on the whole, has been the most widely spread theory."

Turrettin (Institutio, IX. xii. G) remarks as follows respecting the traducian view. " Some are of opinion that the difiiculties pertaining to the propagation of original sin are best resolved by the doctrine of the propagation of the soul (animae traducem) ; a view held by not a few of the Fathers, and to which Augustine frequently seems to incline. And there is no doubt that by this theory all the difficulty seems to be removed; but since it does not accord with scripture or with sound reason, and is exposed to great difficulties, we do not think that recourse should be had

Maresius (De Marets), a Calvinistic theologian whose opinions had great weight, speaks as follows respecting traducianism. " Although Augustine seems sometimes to have been undecided (fluctuasse aliquando) respecting the origin of the soul; whether it is by immediate creation or by propagation; he is fixed in the opinion that original sin cannot be transmitted otherwise than by propagation. And he is far more inclined (longe pronior) to the last mentioned doctrine, nay, to speak truly, he constantly held it (constanter retinuit), in order to save the justice of God; because it is difficult to show the justice of infusing a soul newly created, and destitute of sin, and having no guilt of its own, into a vitiated body, by whose concupiscence and

lust it is stained and burdened, is exposed to many and great evils in this lite, and condemned to everlasting punishment liereafter. Augustine, Epist. 28, 137 ; De anima; and Jansenius, De statu naturae, I. 15. This was the opinion of Apollinaris, and of nearly all the western divines in Jerome's day; and is defended by Marnixins, Sohnius, and Combachius, truly great divines of our communion; to which, if this were the place to lay down the statements, I should not be much disinclined (valde alienus)." Maresius: Tlieologia Elenctica, Controversia XL

Charnocke (Discourse I.), after remarking that wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, and other accidents of the soul, are not propagated, adds: " I do not dispute whether the soul were generated or not. Suppose the substance of it was generated by the parents, yet those more excellent qualities were not the result of them," i.e., of the parents. Hooker (Eccl. Pol., II. vii.), also, speaks doubtfully. " Of some things, we may very well retain an opinion that they are probable, and not unlikely to be true, as when we hold that men have their souls rather by creation, than propagation."

Creation ism confines the idea of species to the body. In this respect, it agrees with the theory of pre-existence; the difference relating only to the time when the soul is created. Creationism and pre-existence both alike maintain that the human soul is individual only, and never had a race-existence in Adam. The creationist holds that God on the sixth day created two human individuals, one male and one female, and in them also created the specific physical nature from which the bodies of all the subsequent individuals were proci-eated; the soul in each instance being a new creation ex niliilo, and infused into the propagated body.

Hase (Ilutterus Redivivus, 79) represents this view as having been favored by Aristotle, and adopted by Ambrose^ Jerome, Pelagius, Bellarmine, and Calixtus. Hagenbach (§ 106) mentions as advocates of creationism, Lactantius,

Hilary, and Jerome, and remarks (§ 173) that this theory gained gradually upon traducianism in the middle ages, John of Damascus, Anselm, and Aquinas were creationists. Heppe (Reformirte Dogmatik, XII.) says that the Lutheran theologians almost without exception adopted traducianism, while the Reformed divines with very few exceptions maintained creationism. Creationism has been the most com- mon view during the last two centuries.

The choice must be made between traducianism and creationism, since the opinion that man as to his soul existed before Adam has no support from revelation. The Bible plainly teaches that Adam was the first man; and that all finite spirits existing before him were angels.

The question between the traducianist and the creationist is this: Wlien God created the first two human individuals, Adam and Eve, did he create in and with them the invisible substance of all the succeeding generations of men, both as to the soul and body, or only as to the body? Was the human nature that was created in Adam and Eve simple, or complex? Was it physical solely, or was it psychico- physical 1 Had the human nature in the first pair two sides, or only one? Was provision made for propagating out of the specific nature deposited in Adam, individuals who would be a union of body and soul, or only a mere body without a soul? '

The question, consequently, between the parties involves the quantity of being that was created on the sixth day, when God is said to have created '' man." The traducianist asserts that the entire invisible substance of all the gen- erations of mankind was originated ex nihilo, by that single act of God mentioned in Genesis 1:27, by which he created

> Augustine describes man as the union of spiritual and corporeal substance. "Persona hominis mixtura est animae et corporis, duarum rerum commixtio; tinius incorporeae, et alterius c orporeae; nam si aniraa in sua natura non fallatur, incorpoream se esse comprehendit." Ep. lo7, Ad Volusianum. "Quicquid enim corpus non est, et tamen aliquid est, jam recte spiritus dicitur." De Genesi ad literam, XII. vil 10. Compare Gangauf: Aug. Psychologie, 101.

" man male and female.'' The creationist asserts that only a part of the invisible substance of all the generations of mankind was created by that act: namely, that of their bodies; the invisible substance which constitutes their souls beingcreated subsequently, by as many distinct and separate creative acts as there are individual souls.

Traducianism and ci-eationism agree with each other in respect to the most difficult point in the problem: namelv, a kind of existence that is pi'ior to the individual existence. The creationist concedes that human history does not start with the birth of the individual man. He does not attempt to explain original sin with no reference to Adam. He maintains that the body and physical life of the iudividual is not a creation ex nihilo in each instance, but is derived from a common physical nature that was originated on the sixth day. In so doing, the creationist concedes existence in Adam, quoad hoc. But this race- mode of human existence, which is prior to the individual mode, is the priucipal difficulty in the problem, and in conceding its reality as to the body, the creationist carries a common burden with the traducianist. For it is as difficult to think of an invisible existence of the human body in Adam, as to think of an invisible existence of the human soul in him. In reality, it is even more difficult; because the body of an individual man, as we now know it, is visible and tangible, while his soul is not. And an invisible and intangible existence in Adam is more conceivable than a visible and tangible.

In discussing either traducianism or creationism, it is important to define the idea of " substance." The term, in this connection, does not imply either extension or figure. It is taken in its etymological and metaphysical sense, to denote that entity which stands tender phenomena, and is the base for them. As in theology, the Divine " substance '- or nature is unextended and formless, yet a real entity, so in anthropology, the human "substance" or nature is without extension and figure, jet is a certain amount of real being with definite and distinguishable properties. Shedd: Theological Essays, 135-137.

So far as the mental or psychical side of the human nature is concerned, when it is said that the " substance " of all individual souls was created in Adam, of course nothing extended and visible is implied. The substance in this case is a spiritual, rational, and immortal essence, similar to the nnextended essence of God, in whose image it M-as made ex nihilo. And so far as the physical and corporeal side of man is concerned, the notion of " substance" must be determined in the same manner. That which stands under, that which is the suhstans of the corporeal form and phenomena, is an invisible principle that has no one of the geometrical dimensions. Physical life, or the animal soul, though not spiritual and immortal like the rational soul, is nevertheless beyond the reach of the five senses. It occupies no space; it is not divisible by any material instruments; it cannot be examined by the microscope. In speaking therefore of the primary created " substance " of the liuman body, we must abstract from the notion everything that implies figure and extension of parts. "The things which are seen %vere not made of things which do appear," Ileb. 11:3. The visible body is constituted, and built up by an invisible vitality. Neither the cell, nor protoplasm, nor the "aether ".of Cams (Physiologic, I. 13), nor any visible whatever, can be regarded as the suhstans of the body; as the vital principle in its primordial mode. These are all of them extended, and objects of sensuous perception. They are the first form, in which the primarily formless physical life embodies itself. They each presuppose life as an invisible. In think- inir, therefore, of the " substance" of all individual bodies as having been created in Adam, M-e must not with Tertullian and others think of microscopic atoms, corpuscles, or protoplasm; but only of the unseen principle of life itself, of which these are the first visible organization. Modern

physiology (Haeckel: Creation, 1. 297) describes the human egg as y^y- part of an inch in diameter, so that in a sti-ong light it can just be perceived as a small speck, by the naked eye. This egg is a small globular bladder which contains all the constituent parts of a simple oi'ganic cell. These parts are: (a) The mucous cell-substance or protoplasm, called the ''yolk;" (5) The nucleus or cell-kernel, called the "germinal vesicle," which is surrounded by the yolk. This nucleus is a clear glassy globule of albumen about -^^-^ pai-t of an inch in dian)eter; (c) The nucleolus, the kernel speck or " germinal spot." This is enclosed and surrounded by the nucleus, and is the last phase of visible life under the present microscope. But this nucleolus is not the invisible life itself in its first phase, as immediately created ex nihilo. This " germinal spot " is only the first hardening, as it were, of the invisible into visibility. It is life in this form / whereas, in the beginning, as created in Adam, physical life was formless and invisible.

Before entering upon the discussion of the two theories of traducianism and creationism, we observe that there are several ways of handling the doctrine of original sin, or sin as related to Adam.

1. It may be held simply as a revealed fact, without any attempt at explanation. The theologian contents himself with affirming that Scripture teaches that all men were created holy in Adam, had an advantageous probation in Adam, sinned freely in Adam, aiid are justly exposed to physical and spiritual death upon these three grounds, and declines to construct any explanatory theory. In this case, he treats the doctrine of original sin as he does that of the creation of the universe. " Through faith he understands that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that the things which are seen were not made of things which do appear," Hebrews 11:3. Similarly, througli faith he understands that " death passed upon all men because all sinned," Eom, 5 : 12 ; that " by one offence, judgment came upon all men to condemna-

14: ANTHROPOLOGY.

tion," Rom. 5-18 ; and that "in Adam all die," 1 Corinthians 15:22 ; and formulates this in the statement that " all mankind descending from Adam by ordinary generation sinned in him, and fell with him, in the first transgression," L. C. 22. But as he does not undertake to explain creation ex nihilo, neither does he undertake to explain the fall in Adam. He accepts the fact of revelation, in each case. He has reason to believe that the docti-ine of the fall in Adam is truth, not error: first, because God would not reveal error; secondly, because God has made an infinite self-sacrifice in order to deliver man from the guilt and pollution of original sin: a thing he would not have done, if he knows that it is not really and truly sin.

2. The doctrine may be held as a revealed fact, and an explanation attempted by the theory of natural or substantial union with Adam. In this case, Adam and his poster- ity existed together, and sinned together, as a unity. The posterity were not vicariously represented in the first sin, because representation implies the absence of the party represented ; but they sinned the first sin being seminally ex- istent and present ; and this first sin is deservedly imputed to them, because in this generic manner it was committed by them. The guilt of the first sin, both as culpability (culpa) and obligation to the penalty of eternal death (reatus poenae), is chargeable upon Adam and his posterity upon the common principle that sin is chargeable upon the actor and author of it. The imputation of Adam's sin, upon this theory, differs from the imputation of Christ's righteousness, in being deserved, not undeserved or gratuitous.

3. The doctrine may be held as a fact of revelation, and an explanation of it attempted by the theory of representative OY forensic union with Adam. In this case, Adam as an individual, distinct from Eve, and distinct from his posterity whom in respect to the soul he did not seminally include, sinned representatively and vicariously for his non-existent and absent posterity. As their vicar and representative, he

disobeyed the Eden statute in their room and place, precisely as Christ obeyed the moral law, in respect to both precept and penalty, as the vicar and representative of his people. The sin of Adam, consequentlj-, is imputed to his posterity in the very same way that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to the believer — namely, undeservedly or gratuitously. The posterity are not guilty in the sense of being inherently and personally ill deserving on account of Adam's sin, just as the believer is not righteous in the sense of being inherently and personally deserving on account of Christ's obedience. As in the latter instance, only the consequences witliout the inherent merit of Christ's obedience: namely, freedom from the obligation to suffer the penalty of eternal death, and a title to eternal life, inure to the believer, so in the former instance, only the consequences of Adam's disobedience without the inherent demerit: namely, the obligation to suffer the penalty of eternal death, and forfeiture of a title to eternal life, inure to his posterity. On this theory, Adam's sin itself^ as a disobedient and rebellious act causative of the penalty of eternal deatli, is not imputed to the posterity, because it was not committed by them. Only its penal consequences are imputed. Adam's act is separated from its effect, namely, the penalty: the former not being chargeable to the posterity; the latter being imputed to and inflicted upon them. The posterity suffer the punitive evil produced by Adam's sin, but are not inherently and personally guilty of this sin itself.

4. The doctrine may be held as a fact of revelation, and an explanation of it attempted by a comhinatlon of natural with repi-esentative union. This is a middle theory between traducianism and creationism, combining elements of both. But like middle theories generally, it contains contradictory elements. If the posterity were present, as natural union implies, they could not be represented ; for this supposes absence. If they were absent, as representative union implies, they could not be present, as natural union supposes.

A consistent scheme can be constructed upon either view of the Adamic union by itself, but not upon both in combination.' This is evinced by the fact that the tendency on the part of the advocates of representation has been to minimize natural union, in the combination. The latest and one of the ablest of its defenders, the elder Hodge, founds imputation solely on representation. See p. 45. It is impor- tant to observe that the earlier advocates of the combination, such as Turrettin for example, asserted that Adam's sin is imputed both as culpa and reatus poenae. Some of the later advocates assert that it is imputed only as reatus poenae; only as obligation to suffer the penalty of eternal death.

These four ways of handling the doctrine of Adam's sin fall, generally, into the Augustino-Calvinistic anthropology, though some of them have a closer and moi-e self- consistent conformity to it than others. All four assert that penal evil befalls the posterity on account of Adam's transgression, and that this penal evil is phijslcal and spiritual death. This differentiates them from all theories which deny these two points. "Any man who holds that there is such an ascription of the sin of x\dam to his posterit}', as to be the ground of their bearing the punishment of that sin, holds the doctrine of imputation; whether lie undertakes to justify this imputation merely on the ground that we are the children of Adam, or on the principle of representation, or of scientia media; or whether he chooses to ])hilosophize

' Hodge notices the contrariety of the two views. "If we reconcile the condemnation of men on account of the sin of Adam, on the ground that he was our representative, or that he sustained the relation which all parents bear to their children, wc renounce the ground of a realistic union. If the latter theory be true, then Adam's sin was our act as truly as it was his. If we adopt the representative theory, his act was not our act in any other sense than that in which a representative acts for his constituents." Theology, II. 164. " A union of representation is not a union of identity. If Adam and his race were one and the same, he was not their representative, for a thing cannot represent itself. The two ideas are inconsistent. Where the one is asserted, the other is denied." Princeton Essays, I. 133.

on tlie nature of unity until lie confounds all notions of personal identity, as President Edwards appears to have done." Princeton Essays, I. 139.

5. A fifth method is that of the ancient Semi-Pelagian, and the modern Arminian. The doctrine of original sin is received as a truth of revelation, and an explanation is attempted by the theory of representatvve union. Adam acted as an individual for the individuals of his posterity. The latter are not guilty of his first sin, either in the sense of culpability or of obligation to punishment, but are exposed on account of it to certain non-jpenal evils ; principally physical suffering and death. They do not either deserve or incur spiritual and eternal deatli on account of it. This results only from actual transgression, not from Adam's sin.

The doctrine of the unity of Adam and his posterity, in the commission of the first sin and the fall from God, is of the utmost importance in anthropology. Without it, it is impossible to maintain the justice of God in tlie punishment of inherited sin. For it is evident, that an individual person cannot be morally different from the species to which he belongs. He cannot be holy, if his race is sinful. No individual can rise above his species, and exhibit a character and conduct radically different from theirs. Consequently, in order to establish the responsibility and guilt of the individual in respect to the origin of sin, a foothold must be- found for him in the being and agency of the race to which he belongs. He must exist in, and act with his species. This foothold is furnished in the Biblical doctrine of a primary existence, and a primary act of the common human nature in Adam, of which the secondary individual existence, and the secondary individual character and acts are the manifestation. Accordingly, all schools of evangelical anthropology have held on upon St. Paul's representation of the Adamic connection, however differently they may have explained it. ISTo one of them has adopted the Pelagian Vol. II.— 3

dogma of pure individualism, and absolute isolation from Adam. In contending that the human species was a complete whole, and an objective reality, in the first parents, traducianism obtains a foundation for that community of action whereby a common sinful character was originated by a single voluntary act of apostasy, the consequences of which appear in the historical series of individuals who are propagated parts of the species. The sinful disposition of an individual is the evil inclination of his will; this evil inclination comes along in and with his will; and his will comes from Adam by ordinary descent.

The perplexity into which a devout and thoughtful mind is thrown, which resolutely holds on upon the Augustinian position that inherited sin is damning and brings eternal death, while not holding on upon the co-ordinate Augustinian position of a primary existence and act of the species in Adam, is seen in the following extract from Pascal. "How astonishing is the fact, that the mystery, the most profound of all in the whole circle of our experience, namely, the transmission of original sin, is that of which from ourselves we can gain no knowledge. It is not to be doubted that there is nothing more revolting to our reason, than to maintain that the first man's sin has entailed guilt upon those whose remoteness from the original source seems to render them incapable of its participation. Such transmission appears to us not only impossible, but even unjust. For what can be more opposed to the laws of man's poor justice, than eternally to condemn an infant incapable of free wull, for a sin in which he had so little share that it was committed six thousand years before he came into existence. Nothing, assuredly, is more repugnant to us than this doctrine; yet, without this mystery, of all the most incom.prehensible, we are incomprehensible to ourselves. Through this abyss it is, that the whole tangled thread of our moral condition takes its mazy and devious way; and man is actually more inconceivable apart from this mystery, tlian the mystery itself is

inconceivable by man/' Thoughts: Greatness and Misery of Man.

There are difficulties attending either theory of the origin of man, but fewer connected with traducianism than witli creationism. If the mystery of a C07nplete existence in Adam on both the psychical and physical side is accepted, the difficulties connected with the imputation of the first sin and the propagation of corruption are relieved. As Turrettin says, " there is no doubt that by this theory all the difficulty seems to be removed." It is only the first step that costs. Adopting a revealed mystery in the start, the mystery in this instance, as in all the other instances of revealed mysteries, throws a flood of light, and makes all things plain.

There are three principal supports of Traducianism. 1. Scripture. 2. Systematic Theology. 3. Physiology.

1. The preponderance of the Biblical representations favors it. The Bible teaches that man is a species, and the idea of a species implies the propagation of the entire individual out of it. Individuals, generally, are not propagated in parts, but as wholes. In Genesis 1:26, 27, the man and the woman together are denominated " man." In these two verses, as in the remainder of the first chapter, the Hebi-ew t3~K is not a proper name. It does not denote the masculine individual Adam alone, but the two individuals, Adam and Eve, together. Adam, here, is the name of the human jpair^ or sjoecies. It is not until the second chapter of Genesis, that the word is used as a proper name, to denote the masculine, and to exclude the feminine. " God said. Let us make man (ti"T!) in our image, and let them have dominion. So God created man (ansirrm) in his own ima^e : in the image of God created he him ; male and female created same usage occurs. In employing the singular pronoun "him," the writer still has both individuals in his mind, as is evinced by the change of " him " to " them." Eve is ineluded, when it is said that God created "man" in his own image. In such connections Adam = Adam and Eve. The term is specific, not individuah Augustine (City of God, XY. xvii.) thus notices the specific use of the word " man." " Enos (ci3>5.") signifies ' man ' not as Adam does, whicli also signifies man, but is used in Hebrew indifferently for man and woman ; as it is written, ' male and female created he them, and blessed them, and called their name Adam/ (Genesis 5:2), leaving no room to doubt that though the woman was distinctively called Eve, yet the name Adam, meaning man, was common to both. But Enos means man in so restricted a sense, that Hebrew linguists tell us it cannot be applied to woman." '

The same usage is found in the New Testament. In Romans 7:1, St. Paul asks, " Know ye not, brethren, how long as he liveth? " The law spoken of is that of marriage, to whicli the wife equally with the husband is subject, both of whom are here denominated "the man." When, in verse 2, the apostle wishes to individualize, and distinguish the husband from the wife, he designates him not by 21) that " by man came death," he means both Adam and Eve, whom in the next clause he denominates to ''ASa/j,. Again, our Lord is denominated the Son of man {av^pajirov), although only the woman was concerned in his human origin, showing that woman is " man." When Christ (Matthew 12:12) asks: " How much then is a man better than a sheep? " he includes both sexes. When St. Paul addresses a letter to the " saints and faithful brethren which are at that " whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer; " they

' With this statement, Gesenius does not agree. He says (sub voce) that " '>^"ip^ is rarely put for the singular; is more commonly collective for the in poetic style."

mean both male and female alike and equally. And this original unity of species is referred to in St. Paul's statement respecting the marriage relation: " They two shall be one flesh," Ephesians 5:31. In accordance with this, Augustine denominates Adam and Eve, " primos illos homines in paradiso." De Civitate, XI. xii. The elder Protestant divines call them " protoplasti."

That man was created a species in two individuals appears, also, from the account of the creation of Eve. Ac- cording to Genesis 2:21-23, the female body was not made, as was the male, out of the dust of the ground, but out of a bone of the male. A fractional part of the male man was formed by creative power into the female man. Eve was derived out of Adam. " The man," says St. Paul (1 Corinthians 11:8), " is not made out of (e/c) the woman, but the woman out of (e^) the man." And the entire woman, soul and body, was produced in this way. For Moses does not say that the body of Eve was first made out of Adam's I'ib, and then that her soul w^as separately created and breathed into it — as was the method, when Adam's body was made out of the dust of the ground — but represents the total Eve, soul and body, as formed out of a part of Adam. " The rib which the Lord God had taken from man made he a woman, and brought her unto the man. And Adam said, This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man," Genesis 2:22, 23. The fact that the total female was supernaturally produced from the male, favors the traducian po- sition that the total man is propagated; that the soul like the body may be derived. The same creative act which produced the body of Eve out of a rib of Adam, produced her soul also. By a single Divine energy. Eve was derived from Adam, psychically as well as physically. This goes to show that when a child of Adam is propagated, the propagation includes the whole person, and is both psychical and physical. For the connection between a child and its

parents is nearer and closer than was the connection between Adam and Eve at creation. See Augustine: On the Soul, I. 29, where this argument is employed.

These two individuals, created ex nihilo in the manner thus described, are in Scripture sometimes both together called " man; " and sometimes separately are called " maleman," and " female-man " {p^, and nm), man and wo-man. entire human species: namely, the invisible substance, both psychical and physical, of all their posterity. This one substance, or " human nature," was to be transformed into millions of individuals by sexual propagation. The creation proper of " man " was finished and complete on the sixth day. After this, there is only the generation of "man."' The Biblical phraseology now changes. Eve is '• the mother of all living," Genesis 3:20. Adam " begat a son after his own image," Genesis 5:3. There is no longer any creation of n:ian ex nihilo by supernatural power; but only the derivation of individual men out of an existing human substance or nature, by means of natural law, under Divine providence and supervision.

The question now arises: Why is not this propagation only physical, as the creationist asserts? Why should not propagation be confined to the body 1

1. The first reply is, because it is contrary to Scripture. Certain texts forbid it. In John 3:6, Christ afiirms that " that which is born (begotten) of the fiesli is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit." The term " flesh," here, denotes man in his entirety of soul and body. The spiritual birth certainly includes both ; and the connection implies that the natural birth is equally comprehensive. Men, says our Lord, are born naturally of their parents, and spiritually of God ; and it is the same whole man in both instances. ISTow to the term " flesh " employed in this signification of the total person, Christ applies the participle jeyevvrjfxevov. The "" flesh," or man, consisting of soul and

bodj together, is " begotten '' and " born.'' That adp^ often comprehends the sonl as well as the body, is clear from both the psychical and physical nature of man. Christ employs it in the same signification in John 3:6, and teaches that it is a generation and birth.

(human seed), nor of the will of the flesh (sexual appetite), nor of the will of man (human decision)." This implies that the unregenerate are " begotten of blood, and of the will of the flesh, and of the will of man." But an unregenerate man is an entire man, consisting of soul and body. His soul and body, therefore, were " begotten and born of blood, and of the will of the flesh, and of the will of man." In this passage, the soul sustains the same relation to generation and birth that the body does ; both come under one and the same category.

In Romans 1:3, it is said that Christ " according to the flesh " flesh " here denotes the entire humanity of our Lord, Christ's soul and body together constituted his crap^ ; and this is represented as being " made of the seed of David." St. Paul employs the verb 'yivofiai, to denote that there was a generation, in distinction from a creation, in the origin of Christ's humanity. The connection forbids the confinement of this generation to the physical side of his human nature, so that his human body only, not his human soul, sprang

In Hebrews 12:9, it is said that " we have had fathers of shall we not much rather be in subjection to the Father of

the creationist, to prove that man is the father of the body only, God being the father of the soul. There are two objections to this explanation. 1. God is not called the '' Father of our spirits," which would be the required antithesis to " fathers of ow;' flesh." He is denominated " the Father of spirits" generally, not of human spirits in particular. The omission of rjixoiv with irvevfidrcov shows that the fatherhood is universal — relating to men and angels. God is the heavenly Father, in distinction from an earthly father. 2. Had the writer intended to set the human spirit in contrast with the human body, as the creationist interpretation supposes, he would have said: " the Father of spirits" {twv Trvevfidrcov). In this text, therefore, as in John 3:6, adp^ comprehends the whole man, soul and body. Chrysostom and Theophylact refer " spirits," in this text, to angels exclusively. Calvin and Bengel find creationism in it. Moll (Lange) and Ebrard find traducianism. ^^Xdp^ bezeichnet hier so wenig als irgendwo, den Leib (daher der Creationismus sicli fiir die Lehre, dasz der Leib allein von den Aeltern gezeugt werde, die Seele aber von Gott geschaffen werde, mit LInrecht auf diese Stelle beruf t) ; sondern adp^ bezeichnet hier, wie immer, das natiirliche durch creaturliche Ivrafte zu Stande kommende Leben." Ebrard in loco.

Traducianism is taught in Acts 17:26. God " hath made of one blood all nations." The natural interpretation of this text is, that men of all nationalities are made of one common human nature as to their whole constitution, memtal and physical. There is nothing to require the creation- ist qualification: " Every man, as to his body," but everything to exclude it. For the apostle was speaking particu- larly of man as rational, immortal, and having the image of God; and therefore in saying that " man is made of one blood," he certainly could not have intended to exclude his rational soul in this connection.

In Hebrews 7:10, it is said that " Levi," that is, the whole tribe of Levi (verse 9), " was yet in the loins of father, when Melchisedec met" Abraham. Here Abraham is called the father of Levi, thongh he was Levi's great-grandfather. Levi and his descendants are said to have had an existence that was real, not fictitious, in Abraham. But it contradicts the context, to confine this statement to the physical and irrational side of Levi and his descendants. The " paying of tithes " which led to the statement is a rational and moral act, and implies a rational and moral nature as the basis of it.

In Psalms 139:15, 16, there is a description of the mysterious generation of man. " My substance was not hid from thee when I was made in secret." Though the reference is to the embryonic and foetal life, yet it includes the mental and moral part of man with the physical. The clauses, " Zwas made," and " tiiy substance," certainly denote the speaker as an entire whole. The same is true of the passage Job 10:10, " Hast thou not poured me out as milk, and curdled me like cheese? " The " me " here, is the whole person. The total ego is described as begotten, in Jeremiah 1:5: Psalms 22:9, 10, David says, "Thou art he that took me fi'om the womb. I was cast upon thee from the womb; thou art my God from my mother's belly."

Genesis 2:1-3 teaches that the work of creation was complete on the sixth daj-. '•' God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it; because that in it he had rested from all his work which God had created and made." If the human soul has been a creation ex nihilo, daily and hourly, ever since Adam and Eve were created on the sixth day, it could not be said that " on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made." Compare Exodus 20:11, " In six days God made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested on the seventh day; " and Hebrews 4:4, God "rested from all his works."

'ASa/jb) all die." The article shows that Adam here, as in Genesis 1:17, denotes Adam and Eve inclusive of the species. To " die in Adam " implies existence in Adam. The nonexistent cannot die. Merely metaphorical existence in Adam is non-existence. Merely physical existence in Adam without psychical, would allow of physical death in Adam, but not of spiritual. To die in Adam, both spiritually and physically, supposes existence in Adam both as to soul and body.

The same remark is true respecting Ephesians 2:3: " We were by nature ((pvcrei) children of wrath." Here the term (j>va-i^ denotes a real nature derived from foregoing ancestors; as in Galatians 2:15, rj/M6i<i (J)V(7€l ^lovhaloi. And this nature is the whole nature of man, not a part of it. The apostle does not mean to teach that men are exposed to the divine displeasure, because of a sensuous and physical corruption which belongs to the body in distinction from the soul; but because of a corruption that is mental as well as physical.

The word Tj/xaprov in Romans 5:12 strongly supports the traducian view. The invariable usage in both the Old and Kew Testaments makes it an active verb. There is not a single instance of the alleged passive signification. Had the apostle meant to teach that all men were " regarded " as if all " sinned " in Adam in the active sense of rjfiaprov, all must have existed in him. Xonentity cannot sin; and merely physical substance cannot sin. Shedd: On Komans 5:12.

These Scripture texts support the traducian position, that the individual man is propagated as an entire whole consisting of soul and body, and contradict that of the creation- ist, that a part of him is propagated and a part is created. These Biblical data countenance the view, however difficult it may be to explain it, that man being a unity of body and

soul is heyotten and Ijorn as sucli a unity. " To be the son of a woman/' says Edwards (Against Watts's notion of the Pre-existence of Christ's liuinan Soulj, " is to receive being in both soul and body, in consequence of a conception in her womb. The soul is the principal part of the man; and sonship implies derivation of the soul as well as the body, by conception. Xot that the soul is a [material] part of the mother as the body is. Though the soul is no [material] part of the mother, and be immediately given by God, yet that hinders not its being derived by conception; it being consequent on it according to a law of nature. It is agreeable to a law of nature, that when a perfect human body is conceived in the womb of a woman, and properly nourished and increased, a human soul should come into being: and conception may as properly be the cause whence it is derived, as any other natural effects are derived from natural causes and antecedents. For it is the power of God which produces these effects, though it be according to an estahlishtd law. The soul being so much the principal part of man, a derivation of the soul by conception is the chief thing implied in a man's being the son of a woman." In saying that the soul is " no part of the mother as the body is; " that it is '• immediately given by God; " and yet that this "' does not hinder its derivation by conception," Edwards evidently means that the soul is not physical sub- stance like the body, and has a psychical in distinction from physical derivation or generation that is peculiar to itself.

Samuel Hopkins (Works, I. 289) follows Edwards, in saying that '• the mother, according to a law of nature, conceives both the soul and body of her son; she does as much towards the one as towards the other, and is equally the individual dispositions of the soul are propagated by generation, will scarcely be disputed.' Why not their generic

' Compare, As You Like It, I. i. '' I know you are my elder brother: the courtesy of nations allows you my better, in that you are the first born: but the

dispositions also? Hence, we cannot but maintain the doctrine of derivation, together witli creation." Christian Doc- trine, § 107. Weiss (Theology of the New Testament, § 67) explains St. Paul as teaching that " the soul is begotten."

The few texts that are quoted in favor of creationism are as easily applicable to tradncianisra. Isaiah 57:16, " The souls which I have made." The context does not imply a distinction of the soul from the body. On the contrary, " soul " here is put for the whole person. Tradncianism equally with creationism holds that God is the maker of the soul. The body, certainly, is propagated, yet God is its maker. Augustine (On the Soul, xvii.) remarks that God may as properly be said to " make " or " create " in the instance of the propagation of the soul, as in that of its indi- vidual creation. " Victor wishes the passage, ' Who giveth breath to the people,' to be taken to mean that God creates souls not by propagation, but by insufflation of new souls in every case. Let him, then, boldly maintain, on this principle, that God is not the creator of our body, on the ground that it is derived from our parents; and that because corn springs from corn, and grass from grass, thei'e- fore God is not the maker of each, and does not ' give each a body as it hath pleased him.'"

Zechariah 12:1, God " formeth the spirit of man in him.'' The verb ("1:^"^) in this place favors the traduction of the soul. See Lewis's Note, in Lange's Genesis, p. 16-1. Job 33:4, " The spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life." This is true also from the traducian position. Numbers 16:22, "The God of the spirits of all flesh." The context shows that " spirit," here, is put for the whole man: " Shall one man sin, and thou be wroth with the M-hole congregation." Hebrews 12:9, " Father of spirits." The antithesis is not between the body and soul of. man, but between man and

same tradition takes not away my blood, were there twenty brothers betwixt

spirits generally. If we are subject to our earthly fathers, ought we not to be subject to the universal Father? See page 24. John 5:17, "My father worketh hitherto." God works perpetually in preservation and providence. Another explanation, favored by the context, refers the statement to the exertion of miraculous power. Christ asserts that he works miracles, like his Fatlier.

2. Secondly, the theological argument strongly favors traducianisra. (a) The imputation of the first sin of Adam to all his posterity as a culpable act, is best explained and defended upon the traducian basis. The Augustinian and Calvinistic anthropologies affirm that the act by which sin came into the world of mankind was a self-determined and guilty act, and that it is justly chargeable upon every individual man equally and alike. But this requires that the posterity of Adam and Eve should, in some way or other, participate in it. Participation is the ground of raerited imputation ; though not of unmerited or gratuitous imputation. Shedd : On Romans 4:3, 8. The posterity could not participate in the first sin in the form of individuals, and hence they must have participated in it in the form of a race. This supposes that the race-form is prior to the individual form ; that man first exists as a race or species, and in this mode of existence commits a single and common sin. The individual, now a separate and distinct unit, was once a part of a greater whole. The Westminster Shorter Catechism, 16, asserts the commission of a connnon sin, in the following terms : " All mankind, descending from Adam by ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with iiim in his first transgression." The term " mankind " denotes here the human nature before it was individualized by propagation. This nature sinned. Human natu)'e existing primarily as a unity in Adam and Eve, and this same human nature as subsequently distributed and metamorphosed into the millions of individual men, are two modes of the same thing.

Again, tluat a participation of some kind or other in the first sin is postulated in the Westminster formula, is proved by the fact that the first sin is called "a transgression." " Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, doth bring guilt upon the sinner." Confession, YI. vi. This agrees with Horn. 5:15 ; where the first sin of Adam is denominated irapdirrwixa. But a transgression supposes a transgressor; and the transgressor in this instance must be the "all" who " sinned," spoken of in Romans 5:13 ; and who are the " moxikind descending bj ordinary generation " — that is to say, the hu- man nature existing in Adam and subsequently individualized by propagation. Anselm (De conceptu virginali, X.) reasons as follows: " Each and every child of Adam is man by propagation, and a person by that individuation whereby he is distinguished from others. He is not responsible for original sin because he is man, or because he is a person. For if this were so, it would follow that Adam would have been responsible for original sin before he sinned, because he was both man and a person prior to sin. It remains, therefore, that each and every child of Adam is responsible for original sin because he is Adam. Yet not merely and simply because he is Adam, but because he is, fallen Adam." Anselm, here, uses " Adam " to designate the " human nature " created in Adam and Eve.

The doctrine of the specific unity of Adam and his posterity removes the great difficulties connected with the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, that arise from the injustice of punishing a person for a sin in which he had no kind of participation. This is the Gordian knot in the dogma. Here the standing objections cluster. But if whatever is predicable of Adam as an individual is also predicable of his posterity, and in precisely the same way that it is of Adam, the knot is not cut but untied. ISTo one denies: 1. That the individual Adam committed the first sin prior to its imputation to him, and that it was righteonslj imputed to him as a culpable and damning act of disobedience. 2. That his first sin corrupted his nature simul- taneously with its commission, and that this corruption, like its cause the first sin, was prior to its imputation as culpable and damning corruption. There is certainly nothing unjust, in imputing the first sin, and the ensuing corruption, to the individual Adam, on the ground that he was the author of both.

Isow if the traducian postulate be true, namely, that Adam and his posterity were specifically one in the apostasy, all that is said of the individual Adam can be said of his posterity. The posterity committed the first sin prior to its imputation to them, and it was imputed to them as a culpable and damning act of disobedience. And the first sin corrupted the nature of the posterity simultaneously with its commission, and this corruption, like its cause the first sin, was prior to its imputation to them as culpable and damning corruption. There is certainly nothing unjust in imputing the first sin, and the ensuing corruption, to the posterity, on the ground that they were the author of both. There is indeed something inscrutably mysterious in the postulate of specific unity, but not more than there is in the postulate that God creates individual souls each by itself, and brings about corruption of nature in them negatively, by the withdrawment of grace, instead of positively by the first sin of Adam.

Edwards argues that a coexistence of the posterity with the first parents, if conceded, would relieve the difiiculties connected with the imputation of their sin. For this implies coagency, and this implies common responsibility. " I appeal," he says (Original Sin, Works, I. 491), " to such as are habituated to examine things strictly and closely, whether, on supposition that all mankind had coexisted in the manner mentioned before, any good reason can be given why their Creator might not, if he had pleased, have established such a union between Adam and the rest of

mankind as was in tlie case supposed. Particularly, if it had been the case that Adam's posterity had, actually, according to a law of nature, somehow grown out of him, and yet remained contiguous and literally united to him, as the branches to a tree, or the members of the body to the head; and had all, before the fall, existed together at the same time though in different ^;Z6'(?6', as the head and members are in different places: in this case, who can determine that the Author of nature might not have established such a union between the root and branches of this complex being, as that all should constitute one moral whole; so that there should be a communion in each moral alteration, and participate with the lieart of the root, be conformed to it, and concurring with it in all its affections and acts, and so jointly partaking in its state, as?^jpart of the same thingy This is defective, in that Edwards supposes a unity composed of individual persons aggregated together, instead of a single specific nature not yet individualized by propagation, as in Augnstinianism. Cut it shows that in his opinion, if a unity of action in the first sin can be obtained for all mankind, then the imputation of the first sin to them is just.

The following from Coleridge (Aids to lieflection. Harper's Ed., I. 289) also implies, that if oneness of nature and substance between Adam and his posterity could be proved, the justice of imputing the first sin would follow. " Should a professed believer ask you, whether that which is the ground of responsible action in your will could in any M'ay be responsihly 2>'^'(^sent in the will of Adam — answer him in these words: ' You, sir, can no more demonstrate the negative, than I can conceive the affirmative.' "

(5) The transmission of a sinful inclination is best explained by the ti-aducian theory. " Original sin," says the Westminster Larger Catechism, 26, " is conveyed from our first parents unto their posterity by natural generation, so that all that proceed from thenx in that way are con-

John 3:6; Epli. 2:3. This moral corruption, resulting from the first transgression, could not be transmitted and inherited unless there were a vehicle for its transmission; imless there were a common human nature, both as to soul and body, to convey it. Tertullian's maxim is logical: " Tradux peccati, tradiix animae." The transmission of sin requires the transmission of the sinning soul. Sin cannot be propagated, nnless that psychical substance in which sin inheres is also propagated. Sin cannot be transmitted along absolute non-entity. Neither can it be transmitted by a merely physical substance. If each individual soul never had any other than an individual existence, and were created ex nihilo in every instance, nothing mental could pass from Adam to his posterity. There could be the transmission of only bodily and physical traits. There would be a chasm of six thousand years between an individual soul of this generation and the individual soul of Adam, across which " original sin " or moral corruption could not go " by natural generation."

The difficulty of accounting for the transmission of sin upon the creationist theory, has led some creationists to assert the creation of all individual human souls sinmltane- ously with the creation of Adam, and their quiescent state until each is united with its body. Ashbel Green adopts this view, in his Lectures on the Catechism. Presbyterian Board's Ed. But this does not relieve the difficulty; because, as distinct and separate individuals, the souls of the posterity could not commit the one single sin, the " one offence " of Adam. They could only sin " after the simili- tude of Adam's transgression," Romans 5:14 ; that is, imitate and repeat Adam's sin; and there would be as many sins to be the cause of death as there were souls. These souls must therefore primarily have been a single specific psychical nature, in order to " sin in Adam, and fall with him in his first transgression." Vol. II.— 3

These difficulties in respect to participation in the sin that is imputed, and its transmission, are felt by those who hold to the imputation of original sin, and yet reject traducianism. Hence, the creationist partially adopts tradu- cianism. The theory of representative union is compelled to fall back upon the natural union of Adam and his posterity for support. Turrettin does this. " There can be," lie says (IX. ix. 11, 12), "no imputation of another's sin (peccati alieni) unless some conjunction with him is supposed. This union (cominunio) may be three-fold. 1. JS^atural, like that between parent and child; 2. Moral and political, like that between king and subject; 3. Voluntary, like that between friends, and between a debtor and his surety. Tliis latter kind of union we do not include here, since we acknowledge that it implies a previous consent of the parties; but only the first two kinds, in which it is not necessary that there should be an actual consent in order that the sin of one should be imputed to another. Adam was conjoined with us by this double bond: natural, so far as he is our father and we are his children; jpolitical and 2i[&o for^ensic, as far as he was the head (princeps), and representative head (caput representativum) of the whole human race. The foundation therefore of imputation is not only the natural union, but especially (praecipue) the moral and federal union, by means of which God made a covenant with Adam as our head." Turrettin mentions the " natural " union first in the order, but describes it as second in importance. In explaining what he means by de- nominating Adam a public and representative person, he quotes the statement of Augustine, that " all those were one man, who by derivation from that one man were to be so many distinct and separate individuals." But he then qualifies Augustine's phraseology'', by adding, that " they were not one man by a specific or numerical unity, but partly by a unity of origin, since all are of one blood, and partly by a unity of representation, since one represented all

by the ordinance of God." This qualification shows that Turrettin was not willing to adopt Augustine's statement in full, and that he departed in some degree from the Augustinian anthropology. He denies what Augustine affirms, namely, that all naen were in Adam by both a specific and a numerical unity, and introduces an idea foreign to Augustine, namely, that of unity by representation. Further- more, he implies that there is a difference between " specific unity " and " unity of origin." But they are the same thing. Specific unity is of course the unity of a species; and this means that all the individuals are propagated from a common nature or substance. This, certainly, is unity of origin. Secondly, he implies that numerical unity is identical with specific unity. But the two are distinct from each other. A numerical unity may, or may not be a specific unity. In the instance of the persons of the Trinity, there is a numerical unity of nature or substance, but not a specific unity. A specific unity implies the possibility of the division of the one numerical substance among the propagated individuals of the species. But there is no possibil* ity of a division of the Divine essence among the trinitarian persons. Consequently, they constitute a numerical but not a specific unity. But in the instance of man, the unity is both numerical and specific. The human nature while in Adam, is both numerically and specifically one. But when it is subdivided and individualized by propagation, it is no longer numerically one. The numerically one human nature becomes a multitude of individual persons, who are no longer the single numerical unity which they were at first. But they are still specifically one.

It is evident that while this eminent theologian lays more stress upon representative union than upon natural, he does not think that it can stand alone. He supports the representation by the unity of nature. He does not venture to rest the imputation of an act of Adam that brought eternal death upon all his posterity as a penal consequence,

solely upon a representation by Adam of an absent and non-existent posterity. A mere and simple representative acts vicariously for those whom he represents; and to make the eternal damnation of a human soul depend upon yicarious sin contradicts the profound convictions of the human conscience. To impute Adam's first sin to his posterity merely, and only, because Adam sinned as a represent- ative in their room and place, makes the imputation an arbitrary act of sovereignty, not a righteous judicial act which carries in it an intrinsic morality and justice. This, Turrettin seems to have been unwilling to maintain; and therefore, in connection with representative union, he also asserted to some extent the old Augustinian doctrine of a union of nature and substance. Yet, adopting creationism as he did, this substantial union, in his system, could be only physical (sensu physico et ratione seminali, IX. ix. 23), not psychical.

Turrettin marks the transition from the elder to the later Calvinism; from the theory of the Adamic union to that of the Adamic rejpresentation. Both theories are found in his system, and are found in conflict. He vibrates from one to the other, in his discussion of the subject of imputation. Sometimes he represents the union of Adam with his posterity as precisely like that of Christ with his people; namely, that of vicarious representation alone, without natural and seminal union. Adam's posterity, he says, " nondum erant in rerum natura," when Adam's sin was committed, and consequently " eadem ratione constituimur peccatores in Adamo, qua justi constituimur in Christo. At in Christo justi constituimur per justitiae imputationem; ergo et peccatores in Adamo per peccati ipsius imputationem." IX. ix. 16. Sometimes, on the other hand, he teaches that Adam's posterity were " in rerum natura," having seminal existence in Adam, and for this reason the exaction of penalty from them is a matter of justice. The following is an example of this style of reasoning. " In the imputation of

Adam's sin, the justice of God does not exact punishment from the undeserving, but the ill-deserving — ill-deserving, if not by proper and personal ill-desert, yet hj a, jja?'ticipated and common ill-desert founded in the natural and fed- eral union between Adam and ns. As Levi was tithed by Melchisedec in the person of Abraham, so far as he was potentially in his loins, so that he was regarded as justly tithed in and with Abraham, who then bore the person of his whole family (qui totius prosapiae suae personam tunc gerebat), so, much more, can the posterity of Adam be regarded as having sinned in him, seeing that they were in him as the branches in the root^ the Tuass in the first individuals, and the members in the head (ut rami in radice, massa in primitiis, et membra in capite)." IX. ix. 24, 25. This phraseology denotes more than vicarious representation. A representative, pure and simple, does not contain his constituents as the root contains the branches, as the first individuals contain the mass or species, as the head contains the members. Turrettin defines Adam as the " stem, root, and head of the human race " (stirps, radix, et caput generis humani. IX. ix. 23), but qualifies this, by saying that he was so " not only physically and seminally, but morally and representatively P But a representative proper could not be denominated the stem, root, and head of his constituents.

Comparing this latter passage with the first cited, it is evidenj; that Turrettin oscillates between natural and representative union, sometimes relying more upon the one, and sometimes more upon the other. "While unwilling, with Augustine and the older Reformed anthropology, to rest the imputation of Adam's sin wholly upon natural union, he feared to rest it wholly upon vicarious representation. He felt the pressure of the difiiculties attending a specific or race-existence in Adam, and sought to relieve them by combining with the doctrine of natural union that of represen- tative union. In so doing, he attempts to combine iron

with clay. For the two ideas of natural union and representation are incongruous, and exclude each other. The natural or substantial union of two things implies the presence of both. But vicarious representation implies the ab- sence of one of them. Says Heidegger (Heppe: Ref ormirte Dogmatik, 228), " representare est vi quadani juris exhibere praesentiara ejus, quod praesens non est." The natural union of the posterity with Adam implies their existence in him. Two things cannot be naturally or sub- stantially united, one of which is not present; and still less if one is non-existent. A soul created ex nihilo in a.d. 1880 could not have been naturally or substantially united with the soul of Adam in b.c. 4004. And, on the other hand, the vicarious representation of the posterity by Adam implies their absence from him, and is consistent with even their non-existence.

If, therefore, the posterity were existent and present in the progenitors by natural or substantial nnion, they did not need to be represented, and could not be, since representation supposes absence of substance. If, on the other hand, the posterity were absent as to substance when the representative acted, then it is contradictory to endeavor to have them present by means of a natural or substantial union. In other words, natural imion logically excludes representation, and representation logically excludes natural union. Either theory by itself is consistent; but the two in combination are incongruous.' Nevertheless, the two ideas since the time of Turrettin have been combined very extensively in Calvinistic schools; the combination being favored by the rise and progress of representative, in the place of monarchical government. De Moor-Marck (XY. xxxi.) employs both. Witsius (Covenants, I. i. 1, 3) unites the two, "Adam sustained a two-fold relation: 1. As man.

* There is a similar incongruity in the combination of creationism with traducianism, attempted by Martensen (Dogmatics, § 74), and Dorner (Doctrine,

2. As head, and root or representative of mankind." Here, the root is regarded as a representative of the tree, when in fact it is the tree itself in a certain mode or form of ita existence.

It may be said that political representation requires that the parties should be of the same nation, and that this implies a natural union as the foundation of the political. But in this case reference is had to expediency, or the fitness of the representative to conduct the business of his constituent, not to the justice of the proceeding. So far as justice is concerned, a constituent may be represented by anyone whom he pleases to select, and who pleases to act in the capacity of a representative. An American might be represented by an Englishman, provided all the parties con- cerned are willing. Representative union requires and supposes the consent of the individuals who are to be repre- sented, and properly falls under Turrettin's third division of " voluntary union," which he excludes in the explanation of imputation. But natural union does not require the consent of the individuals. The posterity, prior to their indi- vidual existence, are created a specific unity in Adam by the will of God, and while in this status they participate in the first sin. The human species created in this manner acted in and with Adam, and the act had all the characteristics for the species that it had for Adam. It was a moral, a self-determined, and a guilty act, for the progenitors and the posterity alike, because it was such for the one human nature itself, which was the first mode in which the posterity were created and existed.

Since the idea of representation by Adam is incompatible with that of specific existence in Adam, the choice must be made between representative union and natural union. A combination of the two views is illogical. But the doctrine of the covenant of works is consistent with either theory of the Adamic connection. The covenant of works was " made with Adam as a public person," L. C. 22. If a " public person " means tlie individual Adam solely, acting representa> tively and vicariously for his posterity, both in obeying and sinning, then the covenant of works was made between God and the individual Adam acting as a representative. If a " public person " means Adam and his posterity as a specific unity, acting directly and not by representation, both in obeying and sinning, then the covenant of works was made between God and the specific Adam. But in either case, it must be observed, that it was not the covenant of works that made the union of Adam and his posterity. The union of Adam and his posterity, be it representative or natural, was prior to the covenant, and is supposed in order to it. If Adam was a mere individual, and represented his nonexistent and absent posterity, this was provided for before the covenant of works was made with him. If Adam was specific, and included liis existent and present posterity, this also was provided for before the covenant of works was made with him. Hence, tlie so-called " federal union " does not mean a union constituted hy the foedus or covenant of works. It is rather a status, or relation, than a union proper. There is a covenant relation resting either upon a representative or a natural union. The union itself of Adam and his posterity, in either case, was not made by the covenant of works, but by a prior act of God — by a sovereign declarative act, if the nnion is representative; by a creative act, if the union is natural, and substantial.

According to the traducianist, the facts are as follows: Adam and his posterity were made a unity by the creative act of God. The human species was created in and with Adam and Eve, both psychically and physically. This is natural or substantial union. With this unity, nameh^, Adam and the human species in him, God then made the covenant of works; according to which, this unity was freely to stand or fall together. "Est unitas naturae, cui unitas f oederalis ei'at innixa." Leydecker, in Heppe: Reformirte Dogmatik, Loc. XY. Having reference to this

covenant, Adam and his posterity were " federally one: " that is, one in, not hy a foedus, league, or covenant. They were not constituted a unity by the covenant; for they were already and previously a unity by creation. And because they were so, God established the covenant with them. When therefore a " federal union " is spoken of, it must be remembered that it is a secondary union resting upon a primary union: namely, upon natural union, according to the traducianist; or upon representative union, according to the creationist.'

In the symbols and theological treatises, both Lutheran and Calvinistic, of the Reformation period, the unity of Adam and his posterity is described as natural, substantial, and specific. It is denoted by such terms as " massa," " natura," " essentia." And Adam means Adam and Eve in- clusive of their posterity, as in the first chapter of Genesis. " Etsi enim in Adamo et Heva, natura initio pura, bona, et sancta creata est; tamen per lapsum, peccatum ipsorum naturam invasit." Formula Concordiae, Solida Declaratio. Hase, 643. " Lapsus Adae vi pessima, humana tota massa, natura, et ipsa essentia corrupta est." Formula Concordiae, Epitome. Ilase, 574. Witsius (Covenants, II. iv. 11) quotes Cloppenberg as saying that " the apostle in Rom. 5, did not 60 understand one man Adam as to exclude Eve: which is here the leading error of some." De Moor-Marck (XY. x.) remarks respecting Paul's statement in 1 Timothy 2:1-4: " Nee negat ab altera parte apostolus mulieris peccatum, cum opponit, peccati propagati auctorem, in quo peccavimus et morimur omnes, esse docet, quem expresse quoque Adamuin Moor (Y. X.) cites Paraeus as making Adam to include Eve: {a) By a common nature, (b) By husband and wife

' Turrettin denominates the federal union the principal union (praecipue). But if it be true that Adam and his posterity were not constituted a unity by the covenant (foedus) of works, it cannot be the primary and principal one.

4:2 ANTHROPOLOGY,

being one flesh. Gen, 2 : 24, Augustine (Citj of God, XL xii.) denominates Adam and Eve " primes illos homines in paradiso," Odo (Bib. Patrum, XXI. 230) remarks: " Quaeritur quomodo peccatum iiabeamus ab origine nostra quae est Adam et Eva." All this agrees with St. Paul, who asserts that " the woman being deceived was in the [first] transgression," 2 Timothy 2:14. And the narrative in Genesis (3 : 16-19) shows that the punishment for the first sin fell upon Eve as well as upon Adam.

The elder Calvinistic theologians say nothing respecting representation. The term is foreign to their thought. The order with them is: 1. Specific existence in Adam; 2. Specific participation in the first sin; 3. Imputation of the peccaverunt, hoc est, culpa et reatu tenentur." All men are both culpable and punishable. He proves that they are so, by three particulars: 1. By participation in the first act of sin, " participatione culpae; " because the posterity existed seminally in Adam. " All men committed the first sin when Adam committed it, as Levi paid tithes in the loins of Abraham, when Abraham paid them." 2. By the imputation of the obligation to punishment resulting from partici- pation in the first sin, " imputatione reatus; " because " the first man so stood in grace, that if he should sin, not he alone but all his posterity should fall from grace and become liable with him to eternal death, according to the threatening, ' In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.' " 3. By the propagation of the inherent corruption of nature which results from the participation in, and imputation of the first sin.

According to the elder Calvinism, as represented by Paraeus and those of his class, original sin jprojpagated in every individual rests upon original sin inherent in every individual ; original sin inherent in every individual rests upon original sin imjputed to every individual ; and original

MAN'S CREATION. 4:>

sin imputed to every individual rests upon original sin committed by all men as a common nature in Adam. On this scheme, the justice and propriety of each particular, and of the whole are apparent. The first sin, which it must be remembered consisted of both an internal lust and an external act, of both an inclination and a volition, is justly imputed to the common nature because it was voluntarily committed by it; is justly inherent in the common nature, because justly imputed; and is justly propagated with the common nature because justly inherent. This scheme if taken entire is ethically consistent. But if mutilated by the omission of one or more particulars, its ethical consistency is gone. To impute the first sin without prior participation in it, is unjust. To make it inherent without prior imputation, is un- just. To propagate it without prior inherence is unjust. The derangement of the scheme by omission has occurred in the later Calvinism. The advocate of mediate imputation deranges it, by imputing original sin as inherent, but not as committed either substantially or representatively. The adv^ocate of representative imputation deranges it, by imputing original sin as inherent, but not as committed, except in the deluding sense of nominal and putative com- mission.

The elder Calvinism, like Augustinianism, starts with a unity, name!}-, Adam and his posterity in him as a common unindividualized nature. This unity commits the first sin: " all sinned," Romans 5:12. This sin is imputed to the unity that committed it, inheres in the unity, and is propagated out of the unity. Consequently, all the particulars regarding sin that apply to the unity or common nature apply equally and strictly to each individualized portion of it. The individual Socrates was a fractional part of the human nature that "sinned in, and fell with Adam in his first transgression," L. C. 22, Consequently, the commission, impu- tation, inherence, and propagation of original sin cleave indissolubly to the individualized part of the common nature,

as they did to the unindividualized whole of it. The distribution and propagation of the nature make no alteration in it, except in respect to form. Its natural properties and characteristics by creation, and its acquired properties and characteristics by apostasy, remain unchanged.

Calvin relies upon the natural union between Adam and his posterity, for the explanation of the imputation of original sin. "Two things," he says (Inst., II. i. 8), "should be distinctly noticed; first, that our nature being so totally vitiated and depraved, we are on account of this very corruption considered as deservedly condemned in the sight of God. And this liability (obligatio) arises not from the fault of another (alieni delicti). For when it is said that the sin of Adam renders us obnoxious to the Divine judgment, it is not to be understood as if we being innocent were undeservedly loaded with the guilt (culpam) of his sin. We derive from him not only the punishment, but also the pollution to which the punishment is justly due. Wherefore Augustine, though he frequently calls it the sin of another, in order to indicate its transmission to us by propagation, yet at the same time also asserts it to belong properly to every individual. Therefore infants themselves, as they bring their condemnation into the world with them, are rendered obnoxious to punishment by their own sinfulness, not by the sinfulness of another. For though they have not yet produced the fruits of their iniquity, yet they have the seed of it within them, nay, their whole nature is as it were a seed of sin, and therefore odious and abominable to God. Wlience it follows, that it is properly accounted sin in the sight of God, because there could not be liability to punishment without guilt (quia non esset reatus absque culpa).'"

1 The proof that participation in the first sin is an essential point in the early Calvinism has been carefully collected by Landis, in a volume entitled, " Original Sin, and Gratuitous Imputation." The author, hovi'ever, while asserting participation, and combating the later doctrine of mere representation by Adam,

The later Calvinism, in some of its representatives, takes the extreme ground of rejecting natural union altogether, as a support of the doctrine of imputation, and resting it wholly upon representation. The elder Hodge is one of the most positive and ablest of this class.' " Adam," he says 'Princeton Essays, I. 187), " was our representative; as a Dublic person, we sinned in him in virtue of a union resulting from a covenant or contract. Let it be noted, that this is the 07ily union here [Larger Catechism, 22] mentioned. The bond arising from our natural relation to him as our parent is not even referred to." The objections to this statement are the following: 1. The Catechism in this place denominates Adam a " public person," but does not denominate him a " representative." The term " representative " is not once employed in the Westminster stand- ards. It has been introduced from the outside, to define a " public person." 2, The Catechism, in this place, gives its own definition, and defines a " public person " as one "from whom all mankind descend hy ordinary generation^ Here, only our natural relation to Adam is mentioned; as it is also in Confession, YI. iii., where "our first parents," as public persons, are denominated " the root of all mankind." Natural, not representative union is the " only " union referred to, in this definition of a public person by the terms "root," "descent," and "ordinary generation." A representative is not the root of his constituents, nor do they

■with particular reference to the views of Hodge, yet rejects the realistic doctrine of race-existence as the true explanation (pp. 13, 20, 31). In so doing, he departs from both Augustine and the elder Calvinists, as much as do the advocates of the representative theory. For it is clear that there can be no par- ticipation in the first sin, unless the posterity are in existence to participate in it. And the only way in which they could exist and act in Adam, is as a single specific nature. They could not exist in Adam as an aggregate of millions of individuals.

* Breckenridge (Theology, 499), on the contrary, contends that " we must not attempt to eeparate Adam's federal from his natural headship, by which he ia the root of the human race ; since we have not a particle of reasou to believo that the former would ever have existed without the latter."

descend from him by ordinary generation. 3. The Catechism, in this place, states that the covenant was made " with Adam as a public person." Consequently, Adam could not have been made a public person hy the covenant; nor could the union between him and his posterity " result from the covenant or contract," as Hodge asserts. Adam and his posterity, frior to the covenant of works, had been made a natural unity by the creative act of God, as the traducianist contends, or else a representative unity by the sovereign act of God, as Ilodge contends; and with this unity, God established the covenant of works. The covenant presupposes the unity, in both cases.

I^atural union is excluded, and representative union made the sole ground of the imputation of Adam's sin, in the following statement of Hodge. " In the imputation of Adam's sin to us, and of our sins to Christ, and of Christ's righteousness to believers, the nature of the imputation is the same, so that the one case illustrates the others. By virtue of the union between Adam and his descendants, his sin is the judicial ground of the condemnation of his race, precisely as the righteousness of Christ is the judicial ground of the justification of his people." Theology, H. 194, 195. There is confessedly no natural union between Christ and his people, therefore, argues Ilodge, there is none between Adam and his posterity. Christ did not include his people by race-union with them, therefore Adam did not include his posterity by race-union with them. Christ's people did not participate in his obedience, therefore Adam's posterity did not participate in his disobedience. Natural union beino- thus excluded, nothing but representative union remains. Hence it follows, that as Christ vicariously represented his absent people when he obeyed, Adam also vicariously represented liis absent posterity when he disobeyed, and "his sin is the judicial ground of the condemnation of his v&ce, precisely as the righteousness of Christ is the judicial ground of the justification of his people." The correctness of this

reasoning depends upon that of the assumption, that there is an exact similarity between union in Adam and union in Clirist. Foi- proof that this is an erroneous assumption, see

An examination of the Westminster standards evinces, that in the judgment of tlieir authors natural or substantial union is the true ground of the imputation of Adam's sin, and that vicarious representation is inadequate. They never once use the verb "represent," or the noun " representative," in their Confession of Faith and Catechisms — a fact utterly inconsistent with the assertion that "representative union was the only one they maintained." The avoidance and total omission of these terms, when they were making careful definitions of Adam's sin, shows that they regarded them as unsuitable in this connection. The terms " represent" and "representative," it is true, occur in the the- ological treatises of this period, even in those of the Westminster divines themselves; but they are excluded from their dogmatic formulas, because while in a loose popular sense Adam may be called a representative of the posterity whom he seminally included, in the strict scientific sense he cannot be. A thing existing in one mode is sometimes said to represent itself as existing in another mode; as when the root is said to represent the tree. But the two are one and the same thing, in two forms.

The Westminster Assembly explained original sin and its imputation by " natural generation," " ordinary generation," the figure of a "root," and the phrase "public person." All the passages in the Westminster documents relating to Adam's sin are the following: Confession, YI. iii., " They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to

XIX. i., "God gave to Adam a law, by which he bound Kim and all h.\s jposterity to obedience." Larger Catechism, 26, " Original sin is conveyed from our first parents unto their posterity, by natural generation f " L. C. 22, " The covenant being made with Adam as a public person, not for himself only but for his jposterity^ all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation sinned in Idm and fell imth him, in that first transgression." L. C. 92, " The rule of beside a special command not to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, was the moral law."

In the first of these statements, it is said that " the guilt of the first sin was imputed, and death and corruption of nature is conveyed," because " our first parents were the root of all mankind." This teaches natural, not representative union. For the root does not vicariously re])resent the tree, as something other than and different from itself, and absent and apart from it, but it is the tree itself in the first mode of its existence. A root buried in the ground does not stand for an absent tree, and still less for a non-existent one. When a potato is planted, all the subsequent individuals are seminally present. The vital principle and substance that will produce them is all in the root. And the same is true, when the figure of " seed " is taken instead of that of a "root," as is so often the case in Scripture.

Again, when it is said that " original sin is conveyed from our first parents unto their posterity by natural generation^'' unity of substance and nature is taught. "Whatever descends by natural generation must be seminally and substantially present in the progenitors. And the same is taught in the explanation of the phrase " public person." A public person is described as one " from whom all mankind descend hy ordinary generation, in whom all manhind sinned, and with whom all manhind fell in the first transgression."

In all these Westminster statements, there is not a syllable that teaches that Adam was a non-specific individual

who vicariously represented a non-existent and absent posterity. And even if it be conceded that the posterity were existent and -pi^esent physically, their merely physical existence and presence would not justify the assertion that they " sinned with and fell in him." The verbs " sinned " and " fell," and the prepositions " with " and " in," are too strong to be applied to the theory of vicarious representation. Men say that a constituent acts " by " his representative,

(c) The temptation by Satan is best explained by traducianism. Upon the theory of creationism, it is impossible to account for the fall of the individual soul by means of a temptation of the devil. The individual soul viewed as newly created ex nihilo is holy. The Calvinistic creationist denies equally with the Calvinistic traducianist, that God creates a soul without character. This is the Pelagian view. God's creative work is always "good," and is so pronounced by him. The soul as a new creation must therefore first be positively holy, and then freely fall from this created holiness into sin. And it must be tempted to fall. But on the creationist theory, there is no possibility of a temptation by Satan, or from any other quarter. And no attempt is made by the representationist to explain the fall of the posterity by temptation. The only reason which he assigns is,, that God withdraws grace from the posterity. It is not so, in the traducian theory. In the instance of the fall of the entire species in the first human paii", the species was tempted to fall in and with Adam. Adam and Eve were mature and perfect in all their powers, physical, intellectual, and moral. The human nature acted in and with the two sinless individuals, in and with whom it was created. In them, it was tempted by Satan, and yielded to the temptation.

{d) The universality of sin is best accounted for by traducianism. The fall being that of the species in the first pair, is of course coextensive with the species. But upon Vol. IL— 4

the creationist theory, the fall is that of the individual onlj'. Each soul apostatizes from God by itself. Why should every soul without exception fall? Why not a fall of only a part, as in the case of the angels, who fell as individuals, not as a species? A soul as created and holy " has the law written upon the heart, and power to fulfil it." (L. C. 17.) Why should it invariabli/ apostatize?

If it be replied that God withdraws common supporting grace in the instant when he creates each individual soul, and therefore every soul apostatizes, this is of the nature of punishment, and punishment according to Scripture and reason snpposes previous fault (culpa). God did not withdraw the common supporting grace of his Spirit from Adam, until after transgression. But here, by tlie supposition of the creationist, is a pure and holy soul fresh from the hand of God, from whom previous to its apostasy God totally withdraws one of his own gifts by creation, in order to bring about apostasy. The withdrawing of grace occurs not because of apostasy, but in order to produce it.

If it be said that this is done because of the transgression of Adam, this is a good reason from the position of traducianism, because the withdrawal, in this case, is after the fall of t\\Q posterity in and with Adam. An act has now been performed by Adam and his posterity together, which makes the withdrawal of created gifts from the whole unity righteous and just. But from the creationist position, a newly created and innocent soul that never was substantially one with Adam, and did not participate with him in the first transgression, is deprived of certain created gifts by an act of sovereignty. There is no reason, npon this theorj', why by the same sovereignty men might not be deprived of Divine gifts on account of the transgression of Lucifer. Upon the theory of creationism, the withdrawal of the Holy Spirit from the newly created soul is an arbitrary, not a judicial act. The so-called "guilt" of obligation to penalty (reatus * poenae), on the ground of which the withdrawment of grace

rests, is putative and fictitious, not real. It is constructive guilt — the product of an act of sovereign will w^liicli decides that an innocent person shall be liable to penal suffering because of another's sin. As in the gospel scheme there is a " righteousness of God," that is, a constructive and unmerited righteousness, when the obedience of Christ is gratuitously imputed, so in this scheme there is an " ^^7^righteousness of God," that is, a constructive and unmerited unrighteousness, when the disobedience of Adam is gratuitously imputed. But this confounds all moral distinctions and destroys all ethics, by annulling the difference between righteousness and unrighteousness, and putting each in precisely the same relation to the Divine sovereignty and agency.

If it bo replied, as it is by those who combine representative with natural union, that between Adam and his pos- terity there is a natural union such as does not obtain between man and Lucifer, and that this relieves the imputation of the first sin and withdrawal of grace from the charge of arbitrariness, this iscreationism betaking itself to traducianism for support. Because, natural union when examined will be found to be race-union; and race-union must be total not partial, psychical as well as physical, in order to be of any use in justifying the imputation of Adam's sin. Sin is mental, and a merely bodily connection with Adam is not a sufficient ground for imputing his transgression.

The representative theory of imputation endeavors to parry the objection to an arbitrary punishment for another's culpability, by separating punishment (poena) from culpability (culpa) and asserting that Adam's posterity are pun- ishable for his sin, but are not culpable for it. They are compelled to endure penal suffering on Adam's account, though they are not chargeable with his fault or crime. To this separation between the punishment and the culpability of Adam's first sin, so frequently employed in the later Calvinism, but never in the earlier, there are the following ob- jections:

1. It conflicts with the intuitive conviction of the human mind that culpability and punishment stand in the relation of cause and effect, and hence, like these, are inseparable. A free agent is punished because he is culpable. Ko culpability, then no punishment. !No cause, then no effect. That there can be an involuntary obligation to endure the punishment of culpability, when there is no culpability, contra- venes the common-sense and judgment of mankind. " There could be no punishment without culpability ; non esset reatus absque culpa," says Calvin (Inst., II. i S). The posi- tion that there can be involuntary punishment without culpability nullifies ethics, as completely as the position that there can be an effect without a cause nullifies physics. Ko more demoralizing postulate could be introduced into the province of law and penalty. When the instance of Christ's suffering punishment without culpability is cited to justify this in the instance of Adam's posterity, it is forgotten that Christ consented and agreed to this uncommon arrangement, while Adam's posterity have no option in the matter. If an innocent person, having the proper qualifications and the right to do so, agrees to suffer judicial infliction for another's culpability, of course no injustice is done to him by the infliction ; 'but if he is compelled to do so, it is the height of injustice.

2. The separation of punishment from culpability is a characteristic of tlie Semi-Pelagian and Arminian anthropology, and when adopted introduces a Semi-Pelagian and Arminian tendency into Augustinianism and Calvinism. "sinned," but "regarded as a sinner;" not culpability (culpa), but liability to suffer what is due to culpability (poena). They denied that the posterity of Adam participated by natural union in the first sin, and are culpable and damnable for it. Adam, they contended, only represented his posterity in their non-existence and absence, and cousequently the statement of the Apostle that "death passed npon all men for that all have sinned " means, that all men are liable by the sovereign appointment of God to snffer guilty of it in his sight. This same interpretation reappears in the modern Arminianism. Grotius, Liraborch, to suffering and death ; " " to be regarded as sinners ; " "peccati poenam subire" (Grotius); "propeccati culpam sustines," Wahl : Clavis, in voce. And the reason for giving such an uncommon signification to an active verb which nowhere else in Scripture has such a sense, was the opinion that " all men sinned " representatively, not i-eally.

This is wholly foreign to Augustine. In his theory of imputation, " death passed upon all men because all men sinned; " not because " all men were reckoned to have sinned." He explained ijfiaprov, in Itom. 5:12, in its active sense, and as denoting the act of the species in Adam. According to him, Adam's sin is both culpable and punishable, in the posterity. The culpability (reatus culpae), as well as the obligation to suffer penalty (reatus poenae), passes by participation, not by representation — an idea unknown to Augustine. Julian, for example, crowds him with the common objection, that the posterity could not voluntarily sin in Adam " before they themselves were born, and before even their parents or grandparents were begotten." Augustine replies, first citing the high authority of Ambrose to the same eifect, by saying: "Per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt.'" Opus Imperfectum, TY. 104. The same reply is made in a multitude of instances. Compare, De Meritis, I. 10 ; III. 14; De Nuptiis, II. 5; Opus Imperfectum, II. 179; City of God, XXI. xii.

This Augustinian method of defending the imputation

of Adam's sin passed, as we have observed (p. 41 sq), to the Lutheran and Calvinistic creeds of the Reformation, and to the Calvinistic theologians generally, down to the 17th century. Turrettin, we have seen (p. 34 sq.), while laying the first stress upon representation, yet retains the doctrine of natural union in connection with it, though adopting creationism. With Augustine and the elder Keformed theologians, he regards culpability and punishability as inseparable; and the iniputation of Adam's sin, with him as with them, meant the imputation of hoth reatus culpae and reatus poenae. While holding, of course, to the separation of punishment from culpability in the instance of Christ's vicarious atonement for sin, he denies that such separation is possible when the personal j>iinishnient of Adam's posterity for original sin is the instance. The Tridentine theologians had misemployed this valid separation of the two obligations in the case of Christ's suffering, by transferring it to the ordinary ethical relations of man to the moral law, in order to establish their doctrine of ecclesiastical penance. They contended that although the sacrifice of Chi'ist had freed the believer from the culpability of original sin, it had not freed him altogether from its punishment, and therefore he was still bound, more or less, by the reatus poenae; and must therefore do penance. From the Tridentine divines, this separation passed subsequently, for a different dogmatic reason, to the Arminians, and to some of the later Calvinists. Turrettin combats this Papistic distinction. lie argues as follows to prove that when original sin is in question, there is no possible separation be- tween culpability and punishability, and that if the sacrifice of Christ frees a believer from the culpability of original sin, it frees him from all obligation to suffer the punishment of it. " The Papists erroneously distinguish judicial obligation (reatus), into obligation of culpability (reatus culpae), and obligation to punishment (reatus poenae). Obligation of cul- pability, they say, is that whereby the sinner is mideserving of the favor of God but deserving of his wratli and condemnation; but obligation to punishment is that whereby he is liable to condemnation and is bound to it. The former obligation, they say, was taken away by Christ; but the latter can remain, at least in respect to the obligation to temporal punishment. But the falsity (vanitas) of this distinction is evident from the nature of each. For since culpability (culpa) and punishment (poena) are correlated, and judicial obligation (reatus) is nothing else than obligation to a punishment that springs from culpability (reatus nihil aliud est quam obligatio ad poenam quam nascitur ex culj>a), they mutually establish or abolish each other (se mutuo ponunt et tollunt) ; so that if culpability and its obligation is tahen away, punishment, which cannot be inflicted excej)t on account of cidjxibility, ought necessarily to be taken away. Otherwise it cannot be said that culpability is remitted and its obligation taken away, if any- thing still remains to be expiated by the suffering of the sinner."

De Moor on Marck (XV. viii.) repudiates this separation of punishment from culpability, in similar terms. " Repudianda prorsus est Papistica distinctio inter reatum cul- pae et poenae." Ileppe (Reformirte Dogmatik, Locus XY.), by quotations, shows that this was the common view among the elder Calvinists. Amesius (XII. 2) founds the obligation to suffer punishment on culpability. " Reatus est obligatio peccatoris ad poenam justam sustinendam propter culpam." Riissen (IX. 57) distinguishes between reatus potentialis and actualis, but rejects the distinction between reatus culpae and poenae. " Reatus Q&i ^^otentialis^ qui notat meritum intrinsicum poenae, quod a peccato inseparabile est; vel actualis, qui per dei misericordiam ab eo separari potest, per remissionem scilicet, quae proprie est reatus actualis ablatio. Ille pertinet ad peccati demeritum.^ peccato adhaeret. Iste vero ad demeriti judicium, sen kupeccati facta est." (IX. 59.) " Perperaiu vero a Pontificiis distinguitur reatus in lapsnm culpae et ])oena6 : rcatns culpae illis dicitur, quo peccator ex se indignus est dei gratia, dignus autem est ipsius ira et damnatione; poenae vero, quo obnoxius est damnationi, et ad eani obligatur." Brann (I. iii. 3, 14) also distinguishes between potential and actual obligation, but denies that punishment can be separated from culpability. " Inepte distinguunt Pontificii inter reatuni poenae et reatum culpae, quasi a nobis possit tolli reatus culpae nianente tamen reatu poenae: quasi poenam, vel in purgatorio, vel alibi: quod est falsissimum. Ubi enini nulla est culpa, ibi nnllus prorsns reatus, nullaque jpoena concipi potest."

As late as the middle of the ISth century, we find the elder Edwards objecting to the separation of punishment from culpability, which is implied in the passive signification given to Tjfjuaprov by Taylor and the Arminian writers of that day. " Xo instance is produced wherein the verb ' sin ' which is used by the apostle, when he says ' all have sinned,' is any whei'e used in our author's sense for ' being brought into a state of suffering,' and that not as a punishment for sin. St. Paul very often speaks of ' condemna- tion,' but where does he express it ' by being made sinners? ' Especially how far is he from using such a phi-ase to signify being condemned without guilt, or any imputation or supposition of guilt. Vastly more still, is it remote from his language so to use the word ' sin,' and to say man ' sinneth ' or ' has sinned,' though hereby meaning nothing more nor less than that he by a judicial act is condemned. lie has much occasion to speak of ' death,' temporal and eternal; he has much occasion to speak of ' suffering ' of all kinds, in this world and the world to come; but where does he call these things ' sin,' and denominate innocent men

that tliey are brought into a state of suffering? " Original

The position that there may be punishment without culpability, in the instance of Adam's posterity, is sought to be supported, as we have before noticed, by the parallel between Adam and Christ. It is said that Christ confessedly suffered punishment " for the sins of the whole world " (1 John 2:2) without being culpable for them, and therefore Adam's posterity may suffer punishment for Adam's first sin without being culpable for it. If Christ may endure penal suffering for a sin in which he did not partici- pate, then Adam's posterity may also. This is the standing argument of the representationist, and is often accompanied with the assertion, that the two unities are so exactly alike, that it is impossible for the traducianist to hold that Adam's posterity are inherently and personally culpable through their union with Adam, and not also hold that believers are inherently and personally meritorious through their union with Christ; that participation in Adam's disobedience carries "with it participation in Christ's obedience. Bnt an examination will show that the two unities, thouirh alike in some particulars, are wholly unlike in othei-s; so that certain characteristics, particularly those of vicariousness and gratuitousness, that are connected with one cannot be with the other. St. Paul himself directs attention to some points of difference in the parallel. See Ilom. 5:15,

1. In the first place, Christ suffered freely and voluntarily for the sin of man, but Adam's posterity suffer neces- sarily and involuntarily for the sin of Adam. Christ was under no obligation to suffer penalty for man's sin, and had he so pleased need not have suffered for it. " I^o man taketh my life from me, but I lay it down of myself," John suffering on account of Adam's sin, and have no option in regard to its endurance. They do not, like Christ, volunteer and agree to suffer, but are compelled to suffer ; and their suffering, unlike that of Christ, is accompanied with the sense of ill-desert. Original sin as imputed, inherent, and propagated, is felt to be guilt, is confessed as such, and is forgiven as such. This implies that, unlike Christ, thej must in some way have committed the sin for which they feel personally guilty, and for which they are liable to suffer eternal death.

2. Secondly, Christ was undeservedly punished when he suffered for the sin of man ; but Adam's posterity are not undeservedly punished when they suffer for the sin of Adam. Christ ''suffered the just for the unjust;" but Adam's posterity do not suffer the just for the unjust. Christ was innocent of the sin for which he suffered ; but Adam's posterity are not innocent of the sin for which they suffer. Consequently inherent and personal guilt is separable from punishment in the instance of Christ's suffering, but not in that of Adam's posterity.

A.dam's posterity are the principals. They do not suffer in the place of sinners when they suffer for Adam's sin, but they suffer as sinners. They are not vicarious sufferers, as Christ was. They suffer for themselves, not for others. Consequently, the imputation of sin to Christ was constructive and putative; but the imputation of sin to Adam's posterity is real, like that in the case of an actual criminal.

4. Fourthly, the purpose of Christ's suffering is expiatory / that of the suffering of Adam's posterity is retribu- tive. Christ endured penalty in order to the remission and removal of sin ; but Adam's posterity endure penalty solely for the satisfaction of justice. Their suffering obtains neither the remission nor the removal of sin.

5. Fifthly, the guilt of Adam's sin did not rest upon Christ as it does upon Adam's posterity, and hence he could voluntarily consent and agree to endure its penalty, without beino- under oblis-ation to do so. Christ was free from the

guilt of Adam's sin, both in the sense of culpa and poena. But the posterity are obligated by both, Christ therefore suffers as an innocent person to expiate a sin in which he did not participate; but Adam's posterity suffer as guilty persons to satisfy the law for a sin in which they did participate/

This comparison of tiie union of Christ and his people with that of Adam and his posterity shows clearly, that Christ's relation to the penal suffering which he voluntarily endured was radically different in several particulars from that which Adam's posterity sustain to the penal suffering which they involuntarily endure, and that it is a great error to argue from one union to the other, so far as these particulars are concerned; and especially in regard to the particulars of vicariousness and gratuitousness.*

The obvious fallacy in this argument from the parallel vicarious sinning / and that because there may be gratui-

' It may be objected, that on the traducian theory the human nature of Christ did participate in Adam's sin, because it was a fractional part of the original human nature which committed this sin. This is true; and if Christ had been born by ordinary generation, and his human nature had not been supernaturally prepared for a union with the Divine, he would have shared the common guilt of Adam's sin. But the effect of the miraculous conception and incarnation upon Clirist's humanity was, to abolish both the guilt and the pollution derived through the Virgin mother from. Adam. Christ's human nature was botli justified and sanctified, before it was assumed into union with the Logos; justiSed proleptically, as were the Old Testament saints, on the ground of an atonement yet to be made, and sanctified completely by the power of tlie Holy Spirit. This justification and sanctification of Christ's human nature was tantamount to non-participation in Adam's sin. For it placed Christ's human nature in the same innocent a,nd. perfect state that the common human nature was in by creation, and before apostasy. See p. 83. For Owen's statement on this point, see Communion with the Trmity, I.

2 While dissenting from the views of Hodge upon the nature of the union between Adam and his posterity, and of the imputation t.f the first sin, the writer has the most profound respect for the opinions of this learned and logical theologian. With the exception of the elder Edwards, to no divme is American theology more indebted.

tons justification without any merit on the part o£ the justified, tliere may be gratuitous condemnation without any ill-desert on the part of the condemned. The former is conceivable, but the latter is not. One person may obey in the place of others in order to save them; but one person may not disobey in the place of others in order to ruin them. Christ could suffer by mere representa- tion for his absent people, for the purpose of their justification; but Adam could not sin by mere representation for his absent posterity, for the purpose of their condemnation.

Those who force the parallel between Adam and Christ so far as to make the imputation of Adam's sin precisely like that of Christ's righteousness, commit the great error of supposing that sin, like righteousness, may be imputed to man in two ways: namely, mcritoi'iously, and unmeritoriously or gratuitously. This is contrary both to Scripture and reason. St. Paul teaches that rigliteousness may be imputed either Kara oc^eikruia, or koto, yapiv = Bcopedv = that righteousness may be placed to a man's account either deservedly or undeservedlj' ; either when he has obeyed or when he has not obeyed. " To him that worketh, is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness," Romans 4:4, 5. But St. Paul nowhere teaches the same thing respecting 8171. lie never says that sin may be put to a man's account either deservedly or undeservedly; either when he has sinned or when he has not sinned. His doctrine is that of Scripture uniformly, that sin is always imputed to epyoiv, never undeservedly and gratuitously. The punishment of man's disobedience he denominates " wages," but the reward of his obedience he denominates a " gift." Romans 6:23. Christ's obedience, which is the same thing as " the

righteousness of God" (Romans 1:17 ; 0:8), can be a gift to Lis people; but Adam's disobedience cannot be a gift to his posterit}-. Heaven can be bestowed upon the sinner for nothing that he lias done; but hell cannot be. The characteristic of gratuitousness, or absence of inherent desert, can be associated with righteousness, but not with unrighteousness. Shedd: On Romans 4:3.

Turrettin directs attention to this radical difference between the imputation of Christ's righteousness, and that of Adam's sin. He shows that the nature of the imputation is not identical in both cases, but differs in respect to the ground and reason of the imputation. The ground and reason is, judioial Q.ndi forensic, when Christ's obedience is imputed, but inherent and ])ersonal when Adam's disobedience is imputed. His language is as follows: " Christ by his obedience is rightly said to constitute us righteous not by inherent righteousness, but by imputed: as Rom. 4: : 6 teaches, and verse 19 implies, where the contrast with the antecedent condemnation is mentioned. For those are constituted righteous before God who are absolved from merited punishment on account of the obedience of Christ imputed to them, not less than Adam's posterity are constituted unrighteous, that is liable to death and condemna- tion, on account of the disobedience of Adam. Kor does it follow, that because Adam constituted us unrighteous efficiently, through the 'projtagation of inherent depramty (effective, per propagationem vitiositatis inhaerentis), on account of %ohich we are liable to death before God, Christ in like manner constituted us forensically and judicially righteous before God by an inherent righteousness given to us by himself. Because the scope of the apostle, which alone is to be considered, does not tend to this, but only exhibits the ground of the condemnation on the one side, and of the justification on the other, in our union with the first and second Adam respectively, as to the fact (rem), though the mode of the union is different, owing to the diversity of

the subject.' Institutio, XVI. ii. 19. It is plain tliat Turrettin here founds tiie imputation of Adam's sin, upon some kind of participation in it. Adam, he says, constituted liis posterity unrighteous " effective, per propagationem vitiositatis inhaerentis." The propagation of inlierent holiness is not the way in which Christ makes his people righteous. The ground of the imputation of Adam's disobedience, according to this statement of Turrettin, is different from that of tlie imputation of Clirist's obedience, because " the mode of the union is different, owing to the diversity of the subject," or agent. The former imputation rests upon some- thing propagated, inherent, and subjective in the posterity; the latter rests upon something wholly objective — namely, the sovereign decision and judicial declaration of God.

The common distinction between legal and evangelical righteousness also shows that righteousness may be imputed in two ways, but sin in only one. " The foundation," says Turrettin (XVI. iii. 7), "of imputation, is either in the merit and worth of the person to whom something is imputed, or else it is outside of the person, in the mere grace and compassion of him who imputes. The first mode is legal im-

' " Nee si Adamus noa injustos constituit effective per propagationem vitiositatis inhaerentis, propter quam etiam rei samus mortis coram deo; sequitur pariter Christum nos justos constituere per justificationem forensem judicii dei per justitiam inhaerentem nobis ab ipso datam. Quia scopus Apostoli, qui unice respiciendus, non eo tendet, ssd tantum vult aperire fundamentum communionis reatus ad mortem, et juris ad vitam, ex nnione nostra cum Adamo primo et secundo, quoad rem, licet modus sit diversus propter diversitatem subjecti." This phraseology of Turrettin, taken by itself, would teach the mediate imputation of Adam's sin; which Turrettin combated. If Adam's posterity are constituted unrighteous merehj and ouhj "by the propagation of inherent depravity " (and this is all he says here), this was the view of Placa6us. But in other places, Turrettin abundantly teaches that there is a reason for this propagation of depravity — namely, tha immediate imputation of tho first sin. Th3 propagation of inherent depravity requires an explanatory and justifying reason; but the advocate of mediate imputation in denying the imputation of the first sin itself, gives none. So far as Turrettin held to natural union, the logical reason for tho propagation of depravity would be the impiitation of the first sin to the posterity bocause of their participation in it; so far as he held to representative union, the logical reason would be the imputation of the first sin to the posterity constructively, and without participation.

piitation, and the last evangelical impntation." It is clear that while both of these imputations apply to righteousness, only one of them is applicable to sin. Obedience may be imputed to man both legally and evangelically, but disobedience may be imputed to him only legally.

The inference that because God gratuitously imputes Christ's righteousness to Christ's people, he also gratuitously imputes Adam's sin to Adam's posterity, is the same kind of fallacy that lies in the inference that because God works in the human will " to will and to do " when it wills rightly, he also works in it " to will and to do " when it wills wrongly. And to argue that if gratuitous imputation is not true in the case of Adam's sin, it is not true in the case of Christ's righteousness, is like arguing that if God is not the author of sin by direct efficiency, he is not the author of holiness by direct efficiency. Both errors proceed upon the false assumption, that God sustains precisely the same relation to holiness and sin. But holiness and sin are absolute and irreconcilable contraries; so that some things that are true of the former are untrue of the latter. God may be the author of holiness, but not of sin. He can "give," that is gratuitously and undeservedl}^ impute, righteousness, but not unrighteousness. lie can pronounce a man innocent when lie is guilty, because Christ has obeyed for him; but he cannot pronounce a man guilty when he is innocent, because Adam disobeyed for him. These are self-evident propositions, and intuitive convictions; and they agree witli the Scripture representations respecting the difference between the imputation of righteousness, and the imputation of sin.

3. Thirdly, the physiological argument favors traducianism. Sex in man implies a species, and a species implies that the entire invisible rudimental substance of the posterity is created in the first pair of the species. In nature universally, the Creator does not create a species piecemeal. Tlie term " species " has a two-fold definition, according to the point of view taken. A species may be defined at its

64: ANTHROPOLOGY.

beginning, prior to its generation and propagation; or at its close, subsequent to its generation and propagation. In the first case, the species is a unity; in the second case, it is an aggregate, or multitude.

Defining in the first manner: (a) A species is a single invisible nature created in a primitive pair of individuals, which nature, by division of substance through genera- tion and propagation, becomes a multitude of individuals. Tliis defines the human species at the beginning of its history, or at the moment of its creation on the sixth day. He Avho saw Adam and Eve prior to the conception of Cain, saw the human species in its first mode. The species then Avas one and undistributed, in the first pair of individuals.

Defining in the second nlanner: (h) A species is a multitude of individuals, who are procreated portions of a single invisible nature that was created in a primitive pair, and have descended from them in a natural succession of families. This defines the human species at the close of its history, or at the end of tlie world. He who shall see all the individuals of the human species in the day of judgment, M'ill see the human species in its second mode. The species then will be a multitude, not a unity.

Naturalists generally define in the second manner: that is, as an aggregate of individuals. De Candolle defines a botanical species as " a collection of all the individuals which resemble each other more than they resemble anything else; which can by nnitual fecundation produce fer- tile individuals; and which reproduce themselve by generation, in such a manner that we may from analogy suppose them to have sprung from a single individual." Penny Cyclopaedia: Article, Species. Quatrefages defines an animal species as " a collection of individuals more or less re- sembling each other, which may be regarded as having descended from a single primitive pair, by an uninterrupted and natural succession of families." Human Species, I. iii.

A species, or a specific nature, is that primitive invisible

substance, or plastic principle, which God created from nonentity, as the rudiraental matter of which all the individuals of the species are to be composed. The first oak tree, for example, contained the seminal substance of all oak trees. The Creator has exerted no strictly creative power in the line of the oak, since he originated that vegetable species. He has exerted only a sustaining and providential agency, in the propagation of individual oak after individual oak, as this agency is seen in the law of vegetable growth. This doctrine of the creation of a species is taught in Genesis 2:5. God " made every plant of the field, hefore it was in the describes the origination ex nihilo of a species in the vegetable kingdom. A plant made by God "before it was in the earth, and before it grew," could not have been an evolution out of tlie earth. It is true that into the composition of the first oak there entered various material ele- ments that were already in existence, the earths and gases, but these did not constitute the oak proper. The oak itself, considered as a new and previously non-existent species, was that invisible jprinci/ple of vegetable life which the creator originated ex nihilo, in this particular instance, by which these earths and gases were built up into the visible oak. It belongs among those " things invisible " of which the eternal Son of God is said to be the creator, in Colossians 1:16. It is one of those " things not seen " (^^ ^aivoiikva) of which the " things seen " {ja pkeiroixeva) are made. Ileb. 11:1,3. Ilodge (Theology, II. 80-82) explains the original invisibility of a species by the following quotations. " The im- material [invisible] * principle," says Agassiz, " determines

• This is the rendering of the Septuagint and Vulgate. The Targams and Syriac render : " Now no plant of the field was yet in the earth, and no herb of the field had yet sprouted forth. " Speaker's Commentary, in loco.

2 " Invisible " is preferable to "immaterial" in this connection, because the "immaterial" strictly speaking is ihe mental and spiritual. Physical life is neither. It belongs to the material world. It is matter, not mind ; but in an invisible state or mode.

Vol. II.— 5

the constancy of the species from generation to generation, and is the source of all the varied exhibitions of instinct and intelligence which we see displayed. The constancy of species is a phenomenon dependent npon the immaterial [in- visible] nature. All animals may be traced back in the embryo to a mere point npon the yolk of an egg, bearing no resemblance whatever to the future animal. But even liere, an immaterial [invisible] principle which no external influence can prevent or modify is present, and determines its f utnre form; so that the egg of a hen can produce only a chicken, and the egg of a codfish only a cod." Similarly Dana says, that " the true notion of the species is not in the resulting group, but in the idea or pote7itial element which is at the basis of every individual of the group." " Here," says Ilodge, "we ]-each solid ground. Unity of species does not consist in unity or sameness of organic structure, in sameness as to size, color, or anything merely external; but in the sameness of the immaterial [invisible] pi'inciple or ' potential idea ' which constitutes and determines the sameness of nature."

This view of life as an invisible formative principle lies under all the historical physics, and has been adopted by the leading scientific minds. None but the materialists have reje(;ted it, and their speculations have been destructive of scientific progress whenever they have prevailed. Agassiz' "invisible principle," and Dana's "idea" or "potential element" is the same thing as the "visvitae" of Ilaller, the "nisus formativus " of Blumenbach, the "vis medicatrix naturae" of Stahl, the "living principle" of Hunter, the " individuating principle " of Coleridge, the "animating form " of Saumerez. "The animating form," says Sanmerez (Physiology, I. 16, 17), "of a physical body, is neither its external organization nor its figure, nor any of those inferior forms which make up the system of its visible qualities; but it is the power, which not being that organization nor those visible qualities, is yet able to pro-

(luce, to preserve, and to employ them. It is the presiding principle which constitutes the power of the system ; the bond of its elementary parts; the cement that connects assumes resides. It is the power by which the human species differs from the brute, the brute from the vegetable, the vegetable from inanimate matter ; it is the cause that inanimate matter is converted into organs living and active ; that the acorn is evolved into an oak ; that the brute embryo is evolved into an animal, and the human embryo into a man." Compare Ileinroth : Anthropologic, 54c.

The generation and propagation of individuals succeeds the creation of a species, in the Biblical account. God having originated an invisible specific nature or substance, then provides for its division and propagation into a multitude of distinct and separate individuals. This is tauglit in Genesis 1:12. " The earth brought forth grass and herb yieldi7ig seed after his kind, and the tree yielding frtdt, whose seed is in itself, after his kind." This is vegetable propagation. The generation of the animal is taught in Genesis 1:22. "Be fruitful and multiply." In the Mosaic cosmogony, the creation of a species is the base, and its evolution into individuals is the superstructure. Every true and real species begins by a creative fiat, back of which there is no species of this kind in existence. A true and real species cannot be accounted for by evolution, because this implies existing substance to be evolved. But when the invisible specific substance has been originated from non-entity, it then develops. "When God has made a vegetable species " before it was in the earth," it then " yields seed after its kind."

That the species contains all the individuals, is proved: {a) By non-sexual propagation. In the lowest range of vegetable and animal life, propagation is without sex. The moner (cell) simply divides itself into two (fission) ; and

these divide again, and so on indefinitely. Here the child is as old as the parent. Roget: Physiology, II. 583, Again in the instance of propagation by buds (gemmation), the cell protrudes a part of itself. It buds. And this protruded part may exist either partially or entirely separate from the stock. In both fission and gemmation, there is no impregnation of egg by sperm, of female by male.

Now in both of these instances, the creative act that originated ex nihilo the species or primitive type, inlaid in it all that evolves from it either by fission or by gemmation. The species is capable of producing all this series by innumerable splittings or dividings, without the intervention of a second creative act of God. This is all prepared and provided for, in the one act that originated the species from non-entity.

(J) Sexual propagation, which is the usual method in the higher plants and animals, also proves that the species contains all the individuals. The two sexes may exist in one individual, who is hermaphrodite, or double-sexed. In most of the higher plants, every blossom contains both the male organs (the stamen and anther), and the female organs (the pistil and germ). The garden snail produces eggs in one part of the sexual gland, and in another part sperm, but the conjunction of the two individuals is requisite to impregnation.

The majority of plants are hermaphrodites. Only a few, like the willow and poplar, and some aquatic plants, propagate themselves by sex in two individuals. But in the ani- mal world, the rule is the reverse. Propagation of a species, here, is by male and female individuals; and each successive pair is the offspring of a preceding pair, and so backward, until the very first primitive pair is reached. This primitive pair was a creation ex nihilo; and the creator of the first pair created in and with them the invisible but real substance of all their posterity.

A species, or specific nature, then, though an invisible

principle, is a real entity, not a mere idea. When God creates a primordial substance which is to be individualized bv propagation, that whicli is created is not a mental abstraction, or general term having no objective correspond- ent. A specific nature has a real existence, not a nominal.

The dispute between the realist and nominalist is easily settled, if the parties distinguish carefully between specific and non-specific substance; or, in otlier words, between organic and inorganic substance. When specific or vital sub- stance is in view, then realism is the truth; the species is a reality equally with the individuals that are produced out of it. Both species and individuals are entities. But when there is no species; when there is no vital specific substance out of which the individual is produced; then the only reality is the individual. " Species," in this case, is employed in a nominal and improper sense. It is only an ab- stract term, denoting a collection of individuals who are the only reality in the case.

Accordingly, the answer to the question between realism and nominalism: namely, whether a general conception has objective reality or not, depends upon the nature of the thing referred to. The dispute between the parties has overlooked this. In respect to certain things, the assertion of the nominalist is correct; in respect to certain others, the realist is correct. For example, the general conception of an ink-stand has no objective correspondent, because inkstands are not propagated from a specific substance or nat- ure. They are inorganic, non-vital substance. They are not a species. They are only individuals. The only reality is the particular single ink-stand. " Ink-stand," as a general term, is merely a name, not a thing. The assertion of the nominalist is correct here. The same is true of the crj'stal. There is no propagation of crj'stals from a common specific substance. The only reality here is the indi- vidual crystal. Again, there is no objective correspondent

to sucli general terras as biped, quadruped, animal, vegetable, etc., because these denote classes or orders, not species; neither is there an objective correspondent to the general term " state " or " nation." " Although we speak of communities as sentient beings; although we ascribe to them happiness and miserj^, desires, interests, and passions; nothing really exists or feels but individuals.^^ Paley: Moral Philosophy, YI. xi. The individuals of a nation are not propagated out of the nation, but out of the race. There is no English or French propagation. Propagation is human, not national. Englishmen and Frenchmen are primarily the sons of Adam, and only secondarily the sons of Alfred and Clovis.

But the general conception of an oak, an eagle, a lion, or a man, has objective reality, because each of these is a species. All of them belong to the organic world. The indi- vidual oak is a portion of a primitive invisible substance, which substance really exists, because God created it from nothing " in the day that he made every plant of the field before it was in the earth," Genesis 3:5, The oak has two modes of existence, while the crystal has only one. The oak first exists as a single specific nature, and then afterwards as a multitude of individuals. The crystal has no ex- istence but that of the single particular crystal. And the same is true of the eagle, the lion, and the man. In reference to these propagated things, realism is correct in asserting that the general conception has objective reality, and nominalism is incorrect in denying it.

that of non-sjpecijlc, inorganic, and un2?Topagated being. " Crystal," as a general conception, denotes only the collective aggregate of all the individual crystals that ever ex- ist. The individual, here, is the only actual and objective reality. But " man," as a general conception, denotes not only the collective aggregate of all the individual men that

ever exist, but also tliat primitive linman nature of wliicli they are fractional parts, and out of which tliey have been derived. The individual, in this instance, is not the only actual and objective reality. The species is real also. The one human nature in Adam was an entity, as truly as the multitude of individuals produced out of it. The primitive unity " man " was as objective and real, as the final aggregate " men."

There is a spurious realism arising from a wrong definition of the term " human nature." Human nature is sometimes like " rationality " or " immortality." As all individual men have rationality and immortality as a characteristic quality, so all men liave " humanity," or " human nature " as a characteristic quality. Human natui-e, as thus defined, is only an attribute, or adjunct of each individual; and the whole of " human nature," in this case, belongs equally and alike to each individual, as does the whole of the property or quality of rationality or immortality. Dr. Hodge, in his expla- nation of realism, and objections to it, so understands and defines " human nature." He regards it as an adjunct of the individual; as something united with it. He explains it as " the manifestation of the general pi'inciple of humanity in union roith. a given corporeal organization." Theology, H. 51. "An individual man is a given corporeal organization, in which humanity as a general life or force is present.''^ Theology, 11. 53. " That which constitutes the species, or genus, is a real objective existence, one and the same numerically as well as specifically. This one general sub- stance exists in every individual belonging to the species, and constitutes its essence." Theology, 11. 53. " Individual men are tlie manifestations of this substance, numeri- cally and specifically one and the same, in connection with their several corporeal organizations." Theology, H. 54. He illustrates his view, by magnetism, electricity, etc. "As magnetism is a force in nature existing antecedently.

independently, and outside of any and all individual magnets; and as electricity exists independently of the Leyden jars in which it may be collected, or through which it is manifested as present; so humanity exists antecedently to individual men, and independently of them." Theology,

This is an erroneous definition. Human nature is a stibstance^ not the property or quality of a substance. It is not the property or quality of an individual substance, but is itself a specific or general substance. Nor is it a specific or general substance added to, or united with an individual; because the latter is only an individualized j)a7't of the former. Nor is it a " general principle manifesting itself in a given corporeal organization." All of these definitions are incorrect.' Human nature is a specific or general substance created in and with the first individuals of a human species, which is not yet individualized, but which by ordinary generation is subdivided into parts, and these parts are formed into distinct and separate individuals of the species. The one specific substance, by propagation, is metamorphosed into millions of individual substances, or persons. An individual man is a fractional part of human nature separated from the common mass, and constituted a particular person having all the essential properties of human nature. The individual Socrates, for example, is not a previously existing " corporeal organization," to which " human nature," either in the sense of a property like rationality, or in the sense of a '*■ general substance," or " general principle," is added, but he is a dhiinci jmrt of the human nat- ure created in Adam, which part has been separated from the common mass and individualized by ordinary genera-

' Anselm complained of this same misapprehension of the notion of a species, on the part of Roscellin and the Nominalists. He contended that general conceptions were not mere flatus vocis, but denoted substances. "Nondum intelle- git," he says of Roscellin. "quomodo plures hommes in specie sint unus homo; non potest intelligere aliquid esse hominem, nisi individuum." Baur: Dreieinigkeitslehre, II. 411 sq.

tion, and which individualized part has the very same properties tliat tlie common mass has, but a different form. Suppose that a bit of clay is broken off from a larger mass, and then moulded into a cup. This cup now has an individual form that is peculiar to itself, such as it did not have before it was broken off and moulded. This cup still has all the specific properties of clay; such as extension, color, mineral and earthy elements, etc. But the clay that is in this individual cup, is not the clay that is left in the lump from which it was broken off. Kor is it the clay that is in other individual cups, that have been forujed from other pieces broken off from the lump. ISJ^either is this cup a piece of clay without properties, to which a certain set of properties belonging to the lump are added; but it is simply a piece of the lump itself, having all the essential properties of the clay, but with an individual shape peculiar to itself. Take another illustration of individuality. There is a definite and fixed amount of carbon in the universe. A certain part of it is individualized under the providential law of crystallization, and becomes a black diamond; and a certain other part of it is individualized by the same method, and becomes the Kohinoor. The substance of each of these in- dividual diamonds is a fraction of carbon, taken from the original sum total of carbon in the universe. But the foi-m, or individuality^ of the one is quite different from that of the other. And no atom of the carbon that enters into the black diamond enters into the Kohinoor. Similarly, no integrant of that portion of " human nature " which constitutes the individual Peter, is an integrant of the individ- ual John. But John is as truly human as Peter. The common properties of human nature belong to each alike,'

' The inquiry may arise whether carbon, here, is not a species, and the crystal an individual under it — contrary to what was said on p. 69, respecting the inorganic sphere. The reply is, that the crystal though having an individuality has not a specific individuality. This requires that the individual be produced by propagation, and have no other properties than those which are in the specitic substance. But a crystal is not produced by propagation, and even in th in-

Another illustration of individuality is furnished by the mao-netic stone. If it be broken into small fraij-ments, each piece will be a complete magnet by itself, having all the qualities of the original unity. Each fragment will have its magnetic poles, and its point of indifference, like the undivided mass. The only difference will be in the quantity and the form; that is, in the individuality of the piece.

The question respecting the priority of the universal (the species) and the individual (res) arises here. Whether individuals are meant. If the first two individuals of a species are in mind, then the universal, i.e. the species, is not prior, but simultaneous (universale in re). The instant God created the first pair of human individuals, he created the human nature or species in and with them. But if the individuals subsequent to the first pair are in mind, then the universal, i.e. the species, is prior to the individuals (universale ante rem), God created the human nature in Adam and Eve before their posterity were produced out of it.

Accordingly, the doctrine of " universale ante rem " is the true realism, in case "res" denotes the individuals of \\\Q posterity. The species as a single nature is created and exists prior to its distribution by propagation. The universal as a species exists before the individuals (res) formed out of it. And the doctrine of " universale in re " is the true realism, in case '' res " denotes only the first pair of individuals. The specific nature as created and existing in these two primitive individuals (res) is not prior to them, but simultaneous with them.'

stance of the diamond, which is the purest form of carbon, it is not absolutely, free from other properties than those of carbon; while anthracite, charcoal, and graphite, and other individual forms of carbon are highly impure. Carbon, however, is one of those general terms which denote an objective reality within the sphere of inorganic being, and so far goes to prove the truth of realism. The original sum total of carbon is as objectively real, as any one of its individualized parts.

' On realism and nominalism, see Hasse: Anselm, II. 77 ; Neander: History, IV. 356 ; Dorner: Person of Christ, II. 377 ; Ueberweg: History of Philoso-

Tradncianism, or propagation, on the side of the body presents less difficulty, and is adopted by creationism. It should not be confined to the body but extended to the soul, for the following physiological reasons:

1. Man at every point in his history, embryonic as well as foetal, is a tmion of soul and body, of mind and matter. lie is both psychical and physical. There is no instant, when he is a mere brute. An embryo without a rational principle in it would be brutal, not human. The human embryo is only potentially a human body ; and it is also potentially a human soul. The development of tlie psychical part keeps pace with that of the physical. The body of a new-born infant is as distant from the body of manhood, as the mind of a new-born infant is from the mind of manhood. That the human egg-cell under the microscope cannot be distinguished from the canine egg-cell, does not prove that the two are identical in species. If they were, the evolution of one into a man and the other into a dog is unaccountable. There must be a psychical principle in one that is not in the other, which makes the difference in the growth and development of each. The fact that there is no manifestation of mind, does not prove that there is no mental principle in the human embryo. The newborn child reveals moral and mental traits as little as does the unborn child. Foeticide is nnirder in the eye of God, and of a pure human conscience ; but it could not be, unless there is rational as well as animal life in that which is killed. Were there merely and only a physical entity without a psychical, the extinguishment of this life would no more be criminal than the crushing of a caterpillar. Creationists themselves suppose a very early creation of the in- dividual soul, and its infusion into the body. Some make the date, the fortieth day after conception.

In the foetal state, the soul sleeps as it does in the inphy, I. 365 sq. ; Baur: Dreieinigkeifc, TI. 406 sq. ; Baumgarten-Crusius: De vero scholasticorum realium et nominaliura discrimine.

fant, or the adult; only it is a continual sleep. But the soul is as really existent in its sleeping state, as in its waking state. " Sleep," says Saunierez (Physiology, I. 231), " is that condition of the system when the sentient and rational principles have a total suspension of action, when external impressions are of none effect, and the mind itself is in a dormant state. Such is the natural condition of the foetal state, that the various substances are absent upon which tiie organs of sense and of sensation are destined to act; and the organs themselves are not properly evolved. Sleep, therefore, must be its natural condition."

2. The creation of the soul subsequently to the conception of the body, and its infusion into it, is contrary to all the analogies in nature. Under the common providence of God, as seen in nature, one portion of a living organism is not first propagated, and then a second part created and added to it. Composition and juxtaposition of parts is not the method in propagation ; but generation and growth of the whole individual creature at once, and altogether. " Nature," says Bolingbroke, borrowing from Bacon, " does not proceed as a statuary proceeds in forming a statue, who works, sometimes on the face, sometimes on one part, and sometimes on another ; but ' rudimenta partium omnium simul parit et producit : ' she throws out altogether, and at once, the whole system of every being, and the rudiments of all the parts. The vegetable or the animal grows in bulk, and increases in strength ; but it is the same from the first." (Patriot King.) So, too, the soul and the body hfive a parallel, and equal growth.

" Nature, crescent, does not grow alone In tliews and bulk; but as this temple waxes, The inward service of the mind and soul Grows wide withal." — Hamxet, I. iii.

3. If the body is propagated and the soul created, the body is six thousand years older tlian the soul, in the instance o£ an individnal of this generation. Personal identity is jeoparded by sucli an hypothesis.

Tlie doctrine of the creation of a specific nature that is psychical as well as physical, and its individualization by propagation, is a mystery like that of all creation ex nihilo, and is a matter of faith. The creation of all mankind in Adam cannot be explained. All that can be done, is to keep the doctrine clear of self-contradiction. " By faith we rationally understand [voovjiev) that the worlds were framed by the word of God," Hebrews 11:3. By the exercise of the same kind of reasonable faith, we understand that all men existed and apostatized in the first human pair. The fall in Adam is a doctrine of revealed religion, not of natural i-eligion. Human consciousness and observation teach the doctrine of sin, but not of the sin in Adam. If the Scriptures teach this, and the symmetry of doctrine requires it, and all the analogies of nature favor it, and it ex- plains other doctrines that are inexplicable without it, then it is rational to hold it as a constituent part of the Christian system. And in son)e form or other, the sin in Adam is affirmed in all evangelical anthropologies.

But like all the mysteries of the Christian religion, there is an element of reason and intelligence in this mystery, and it is possible to say something in its defence. The following particulars are to be noted, in this reference:

1. The distinction between "nature" and "person" required in Traducianism, is acknowledged to be valid in both Trinitarianism and Christology. God is one nature in three persons. Christ is one person in two natures. In these spheres, the general term "nature" denotes an objective entity or substance, as much as the general term "person." Realism, not nominalism, is the philosophy adopted by the church, when constructing the doctrines of the Trinity and the God-man. Traducianism carries this same distinction into anthropology. Man was originally one single human nature, which by propagation became millions of persons.

This human nature was as much an objective reality as the Divine nature. And a human person is of course a reality.

2. The individualization, or personalizing, of a connnon nature in and by its issuing persons, is w- holly different in anthropology from what it is in theology. Human generation is infinitely diverse from eternal generation and pro- cession. Each trinitarian person is the whole Divine nature in a particular mode or " form of God," Philippians 2:6; but each human person is only o. portion of the human natin-e in a particular mode or form of man. In trinitariauism, there is no division and distribution of essence ; but in anthropology there is. Tlie persons of the trinity are, each one of them, the same numerical essence, identical, and entire, AVhen it is said, that the Son is " of " the essence of the Father, the preposition eK is not used partitively, as it is when it is said that an individual man is " of " the substance of mankind. The trinitarian persons are also said to be " in " the essence — a preposition never used respecting a human person. God the Father is not a portion of the Divine essence, but is the whole essence in that hypostasis. The same is true of the Son, and the Spirit. But a human person is only a pai't of the specific human nature. If we should suppose God to create a human species that was intended to be propagated into a million of human persons or individuals, and that the distribution of substance was to be mathematically equal in every instance, then each individual of such a species would be one-millionth part of it.

Adam and Eve were two human persons created by God, on the sixth day. In and with them, God also created the entire invisible nature of the human species; the masculine side of it in Adam, the feminine in Eve. This nature was complex: being both psychical and physical, spiritual and material.' Adam and Eve procreated Cain "in their own image and likeness," Genesis 5:3. As they were each of

1 Creationism asserts that it was incomplex and simple. It waa only physical and material.

tliein a sjntliesis and union of body and soul, so was their son. This son was an individualized part of the psjchicophvsical nature that was created and included in the par- ents. Abel was another individualized part. Four individuals now constituted, and also included the human species, instead of two as at lirst. "Human nature" was now comprised in four persons, instead of two. By ordinary' gen- eration, the specific nature was still farther subdivided and individualized into millions of persons. There is no creation ex niliilo in this process, but procreation out of an exist- ing substance. He who looked upon Adam and Eve in Eden, the moment after their creation, saw the whole human race in its first form. And he who shall look on the millions of individuals in the day of judgment, will see the same human race in its last form. The difference between the two visions is formal, not material.

3. The conception of a " nature " or " specific substance " must be kept metaphysical in Anthropology, as it is in Theology and Christology. All visible and pondei-able elements must be banished, and we must think of a substance that is unextended, invisible, and formless. It M-as at this point, that Tertullian and other traducianists erred. Tliey attempted to explain the mystery by " atoms," " corpuscles," and " animalcules."

In conceiving of the one human nature of M-hich all individual men are portions, we are to think of an invisible, in accordance with Ileb. 11:3. " The things which ai-e seen were not made of things that do appear." Visibilities were made out of invisibilities. This way of conceiving is possible, so far as the psychical or mental side of the human nature is concerned. The mind of man is substance; yet spiritual substance, occupying no space and having no form. It is also possible, so far as the physical or bodily side of the human nature is concerned. For scientific physiology cannot stop with the microscopic cell. It goes back of this, to the invisible life which no microscope can exhibit, as the

ultimate or metaphysical mode of the human body. The vital principle is as invisible as the human spirit itself, though it is animal, not rational entity or substance. We can think of the invisible substance or formative principle of a human body as still in existence, although the body as a visible organization and an extended form has been dissolved to dust for centuries. The body of Alexander the Great, as an invisible, is still a part of the physical universe. It has not been annihilated. And yet it is as difficult to explain its present existence, as to explain its existence in Adam. " The life," says our Lord, "is more than the meat." The invisible principle that animates the body is " more," that is, more real and jyermanent., than the food that nourishes it, or even the material elements which it builds up into a visible form.

The elder Edwards was unquestionably tending towards the Augnstinian doctrine of a specific human nature, in his scheme of a unity of Adam and his posterity constituted by Divine omnipotence working after the manner of a continual creation, in unifying the acts and affections of the pos- terity. The defect in this, is the absence of an underlying substance^ to be the ground and support of the phenom- enal acts and exercises. Adam's posterity lack substantial being in him, on this theory. Had Edwards definitely employed the old category of " substance," instead of " a communion and coexistence in acts and affections " (Original Sin, Works, II. 483), he would have simply reaffirmed the doctrine of Augustine, of the more oi'thodox of the schoolmen, and of the theologians of the Reformation — ■ namely, that the posterity were one in Adam as " natura," " massa," " substantia." A mere " unity of acts and affections" brought about by a Divine constitution, would not be a unity of nature and substantial being. Neither is this conceivable. For acts and affections require a subject; and this subject must be either an individual substance, or a specific substance; either an individual soul, as the creationist postulates, or a specific one, as the traduciaiiist contends.

In some places Edwards, however, suggests that there may be unity of substance between Adam and his posterity. " From these things," he says (Original Sin, Works, 11. 487), " it -will clearly follow that identity of consciousness depends wholly on a law of nature, and so on the sovereign will and agency of God; and therefore, that personal identity, and so the derivation of the pollution and guilt of past sins in the same person, depends on an arbitrary divine constitution y and this, even though we should allow the same consciousness not to be the only thing wdiich constitutes oneness of person, but should, beside that, suppose sameness of sxibstance requisite. For even this oneness of created substance, existing at different times, is merely dependent identity — dependent on the pleasure and sovereign constitution of him who worketh all in all."

The following are the principal objections urged against the theory of Traducianism :

1. It is said that it conflicts with the doctrine of Christ'ssinlessness. It does not, if the doctrine of the miraculous conception is held. The Scriptures teach that the human nature of our Lord was perfectly sanctified, in and by his conception by the Holy Ghost. Sanctification implies that the nature needed sanctification. Had Christ been born of Mary's substance in the ordinary manner, he would have been a sinful man. His humanity prior to conception was an undividualized part of the common human nature. He was the "seed of the woman," the "seed of David." As such simply, his human nature was like that of Mary and of David, fallen and sinful. It is denominated " sinful flesh," in Romans 8:3. It required perfect sanctification before it could be assumed into union with the second trinitarian person, and it obtained it through the miraculous conception. Says Pearson (Creed, Art. HI.), " the original and total sanctification of the human nature was first Vol. II.— 6

necessary, to fit it for the personal union witli the Word, ■who out of his infinite love humbled himself to become flesh, and at the same time out of his infinite purity could not defile himself by becoming sinful flesh. The human nature was formed by the Spirit, and in its formation sanctified, and in its sanctification united to the Word." See

Theologians have confined their attention mainly to the sanctification of Christ's human nature, saying little about lis justification. But a complete Christology must include the latter as well as the former. Any nature that requires sanctification requires justification / because sin is guilt as well as pollution. The Logos could not unite with a human nature taken from the Yirgin Mary, and transmitted from Adam, unless it had previously been delivered from both the condemnation and the corruption of sin. The idea of redemption, also, includes both justification and sanctification; and it is conceded that that portion of human nature which the Logos assumed into union with himself was redeemed. Ilisown humanity was the "first fruits" of his redemptive work, "Christ the first fruits, afterwards they that are Christ's," 1 Corinthians 15:23. Consequently, the doctrine is not fully constructed, unless this side of it is presented.

So far, then, as the guilt of Adam's sin rested upon that unindividualized portion of the common fallen nature of Adam assumed by the Logos, it was expiated by the one sacrifice on Calvary. The human nature of Christ was pre- pared for the personal union with the Logos, by being justified, as well as sanctified. " God was manifested in the flesh, Here, the " flesh " denotes the entire humanity, psychical and physical, audit was "justified." The justification in this instance, like that of the Old Testament believers, was proleptical, in view of the future atoning death of Christ.'

The gracious redemption of the humanity which the Logos assumed into union with himself, is a familiar point in the patristic Christologj. Augustine (Enchiridion, xxxvi.) teaches it as follows: " Wherefore was this unheard-of glory of being united with deity conferred on human nature — a glory which, as there was no antecedent merit, was of course wholly of grace — except that here those who have looked at the matter soberly and honestly might behold a clear manifestation of the power of God's free grace, and might understand that they are justified from their sins hy the same grace which made the man Christ Jesus free from the possibility of sin? " To the same eifect, Athanasius (Contra Arianos, 11. Ixi.) says that Christ's human nature so became the means of our salvation and redemption."

2. It is objected that traducianism implies division of substance, and that all division implies extended material substance. Not necessarily. When it is said that that which is divisible is material, divisibility by man is meant. It is the separation of something that is visible, extended, and ponderable, by means of material instruments. But there is another kind of divisibility that is effected by the Creator, by means of a law of propagation established for this purpose. God can divide and distribute a primary substance that is not visible, extended, and ponderable, and yet is real, by a method wholly different from that by which a man divides a piece of clay into two portions. There is an example of this even in the propagation of the body. Here, individual physical life is derived from specific physical life. But this is division of life. Imponderable physi-

Christ's person, is plain from the context. If this be so, the dative is instrumental in both instances; denoting the agency by which the action of the verb is brought about. " God was manifested by the humanity, and justified by the Divinity." The " justification " of the human nature was through the atonement made by the Divine nature incarnate. This view of the antithesis between adp^ and irvevfia, was taken generally by the older commentators. Of modem exegetes, it is adopted by Wiesinger.

84: ANTHROPOLOGY.

cal substance is separated from imponderable physical substance. An individual body is not animated by the total physical life of the species, but by a derived part of it. That invisible principle which constitutes the reality and identity of the individual human body (p. 65 sq.) is abscided, invisibly, and mvsteriously, from the specific physical nature of man.' But this process is wholly different from the division of extended and visible substance by human modes. Animal life in its last analysis is as invisible as psychical life, and is as little capable of human divisibility.

Accordingly, the advocates of traducianism distinguish between physical and psychical propagation. Maresius, a Keformed theologian of high authority, refers to this distinction in the following terms: " Whatever be the origin of the soul, these three things are to be held as fixed and certain: First, that the soul is immortal; second, that God is not the author of sin; thii'd, that we are born from Adam corrupt and depraved. It would not be more difficult to harmonize the propagation of the soul with its immateriality and immortality, than to harmonize the creation of each individual soul with the propagation of orig- inal sin. Only it must be remembered that the propagation in this instance is not a coarse (crassam) material propagation from animal substance, but a subtile spiritual deriv^a- tion from a mental essence similar to that of the light of one candle propagating itself to another." Theologia Elenctica, Controversia XI. Heppe (Reformirte Dogmatik, XI.) quotes the testimony of Hiissen; "Communior est sententia eorum, qui volunt animara esse ex traduce; i.e., animam traduci ex anima, non per decisionem aut partitionem animae paternae, sed modo quodam spirituali, ut lumen accenditur de luraine. ISTos autem statuimus, animas omnes immediate a deo creari, et creando infundi."

But if there may be division and derivation of invisible

^ A species or specific nature is divisible, but an individual is not — as the etymology (in-dividuu8) implies.

substance, in the case of the body, there may be in the case of tlie soul. It is the invisibility and imponderability that constitutes the difficulty, and if this is no bar to propagation in respect to the physical part of man, it is not in re- spect to the psychical part. When God by means of his own law of propagation derives an individual soul from a specific psychical nature, he does not sever and separate substance in any material manner. The words of our Lord may be used by way of accommodation here: " That which is born of the spirit is spirit." Psychical propagation yields a psychical product. When God causes an individual soul to be conceived and born simultaneously with the conception and birth of an individual body, that entity which he thus derives out of the psychical side of the specific human nature is really and truly mind, not matter. " Deus est qui nos personat," says Augustine. God is the author of our personality. If he can create an entity which at the very first instant of its existence is a spiritual and self-determined substance, then certainly he C2kn j)roj)agate an en- tity that is a spiritual and self-determined substance. The propagation of the soul involves no greater difficulty than its creation. If creation may be associated with both spirit and matter, without materializing the former, so may propagation. We do not argue that if spirit is created, it must be material because matter is created. And neither should we argue that if spirit is propagated, it must be material because matter is propagated. God creates matter as matter, and mind as mind. And he propagates matter as matter, and mind as mind. We continually speak of the " growth of the soul," " the development of the mind." These are primarily physical terms, but we apply them literally to a spiritual substance, not supposing that we thereby materialize it. Why may we not, then, speak of the " propaga- tion " or " derivation " of a soul without thereby materializing it?

If the distinction between creation and propagation is

carefully observed, there is no danger of materialism in the doctrine of the soul's propagation. For propagation cannot change the qualities of that which is being propagated. Propagation is only transmission of something that has already been created, and which is already in existence. The quality is fixed by the original creative act. Propagation consequently can only yield what is given in creation. If we grant, therefore, that God did create the human species in its totality^ as a complex of matter and mind, body and soul, physical substance and mental substance, it is plain that the mere individualizing of this species by propagation must leave matter and mind, body and soul, just as it finds them. Matter cannot be converted into mind by being conceived and born, and neither can mind be converted into matter by propagation. Propagation makes no alteration of qualities, because propagation is transmission only. Both sides of man, the physical and the psychical, will therefore retain their original created qualities and characteristics in this process of procreation, which, it must be re- membered, is the Creator's work, carried on by means of laws which he has established for this very purpose of propagating a species, and which is conducted under his immediate and continual providence. That which is body, or physical, will be propagated as body; and that which is soul, or psychical, will be propagated as sonl; and this because propagation is merely transmission, and makes no changes in the created qualities of that which is propagated or transmitted.'

Propagation implies continuity of substance, and immutability of properties. In the propagation of the body, there is continuity of substance and sameness of properties, between the producing and the produced individuals; be- tween the parents and the child. There is no creation ex nihilo, of new substance and properties. In every instance

' Shedd: Theological Essays, 253. Delitzsch: Biblical Psychology, VIL p.

of bodily conception, a certain amount of cellular substance which has been secreted and prepared by the invisible physical life issues, and is transformed into a child's embryo. The child, physically considered, is a part of the specific human nature transmitted through the parents, and by their instrumentality formed into a separate individual body. It is an q^spring from them. Xow suppose this continuity of substance and uncliangeableness of properties in the instance of psychical or spiritual substance, and we have the propagation of the soul. Spiritual substance is transmitted under the same providential law by which physical substance is. The soul of the child, simultaneously with his body, is derived psychically out of the com- mon human nature, which is both psychical and physical, upon the traducian theory.

Traducianism would be liable to the charge of materialism, if it maintained either of the two following positions: 1. That the soul is or'iginated by propagation. 2. That the soul is propagated hj physical propagation. Keither of these positions belong to the theory. In the first place, traducianism contends as strenuously as creationism that the human soul is the product of creative power; only, this power was exerted once on the sixth day, not millions of times subsequently. The origin of the soul is supernatural, on this theory as well as on the other. The human soul as specific was not an evolution from physical substance, but a creation ex nihilo of spiritual substance. Propagation merely transmits and individualizes what was given in creation. In the second place, the transmission is not by a physical but a psychical propagation. There is nothing in the term "propagate" that necessarily implies materialism. Before this can be charged, it must be asked: What kind of substance is it that is propagated; and by what land of propa- gation? To assert that there is only one kind and mode of propagation, and that propagation can only mean the propagation of matter, is to beg the question.

3. It is objected, that upon the tradiician theory all the sinful acts of Adam and Eve ought to be imputed to their posterity, as well as the first sin. The reply is, that the sinful acts of Adam and Eve after the fall differed from the act of eating of the forbidden fruit in two i*espects : (a). They were transgressions of the moral law, not of the probationary statute. (J). They were not committed by the entire race in and with Adam.

In the first place, by the Divine arrangement in the covenant of works, it w^as only that particular act of disobedi- ence that related to the positive statute given in Eden that was to be probationary. This statute and this transgression alone were to test the obedience of the race. God never gave this commandment a second time. The command not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil would be superfluous after the fall. Fallen man had got the knowledge. Consequently, all sins subsequent to this one pecul- iar transgression of a peculiar statute belonged to a different class from the first sin, because they were transgressions of the moral law, and the moral law was not the statute chosen by God to decide man's probation. According to Romans 5:15-19, Adam and his posterity were to stand or fall according as they did not, or did commit this one sin, and this only. Postlapsarian sins were violations of the moral law, not of the probationary law. Romans 5:13, 14 teaches that infants sinned in Adam against the probationary statute only. They did not sin " after the similitude of Adam's transgression," but sinned Adam's transgression Adam's first transgression, by sinning against either the law of conscience or the written law, but they sinned Adam's identical transgression. The fact that " death passes " upon them, as upon all of Adam's posterity, proves this.

Secondly, only the first act of sin is imputed, because the entire posterity were in Adam and Eve when it was committed, but ceased to be in theih afterwards. Unity

of natni-e and participation are the ground of the imputation of the first sin. Wlien this unity is broken even in tlie least, the ground is taken from under imputation, and imputation ceases. The conception of the first individual of the species destroj's the original unity. When Cain was begotten, his separate individual existence began. He was no longer " in Adam; " and no longer an unindividualized part of the species. He was now the o^spring of Adam and Eve; an individualized part of the human nature that was created on the sixth day. He received and inherited the corruption that was now in human nature, and subsequently acted it out in individual transgressions. His natural and substantial union with his progenitors being at an end, whatever transgressions they might commit were no sins of his, and whatever sins he might commit were no sins of theirs. With reference to the first sin committed by Adam and Eve before the conception of any in- dividual man, St. Paul (Romans 5:18, 19) says: '* By one offence, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; by one man's disobedience many were made sinners." With reference to the subsequent individual sins committed after the conception of the first individual man, Ezekiel (18 : 20) says: " The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son."

When the advocate of representative union is asked why the sins of Adam after the first sin are not imputed to the posterity, his answer is, that Adam ceased to represent; ceased to be a public person. In like manner, the advocate of natui-al union replies to the same inquiry, that Adam ceased to be the race- unity postulated in order to the imputation of the first sin. The moment the individualiza- tion of the nature begins by propagation, the unity is at an end. If it be objected, that at least the individual transgressions of Adam and Eve during the interval between the first sin and the conception of Cain must be imputed to

the posterity, because the entire posterity are still in Adam and Eve during this interval, the reply is, that the imputation, even in this case, would not lie upon any individual the non-individualized nature. These personal transgressions of Adam, if charged at all, could be charged only upon the species. But the fact, already mentioned, namely, that it was the transgression of the Eden statute, and not of the moral law, that was made the probationary sin by the Divine arrangement, shows that the personal transgressions of Adam after his first sin would not be imputable even to the non-individualized nature in him.

The first two individuals included the species, but considered simply as individuals were not the species. Adam and Eve viewed as individuals were not the entire human race, but contained it. So Milton, Paradise Lost, IX, 414 :

" Where likeliest lie might find The only two of mankind, hut in them Tlie whole included race, his destined j^rey."

" In Adam, as a common receptacle, the whole nature of man was reposited, from him to flow down in a channel to his posterity; for all mankind ' is made of one blood,' Acts 17:26, so that according as this nature proves through his standing or falling, before he puts it out of his hands, accordingly it is propagated from him. Adam, therefore, falling and sinning, the nature became guilty and corrupted, and is so derived. Thus in him ' all have sinned.' " Matthew Henry: On Romans 5:13. The specific nature was a deposited invisible substance in the first human pair. The prepositions " in " and " with," in the clause, " sinned in and fell with," imply this. As thus deposited by creation in Adam and Eve, it was to be transmitted. In like manner, every individual man along with his individuality receives, not as Adam did, the tohole human nature but a fraction of it, to transmit and individualize. Every individual is to assist ill perpetuating his species. Genesis 1:28." Every man, consequently, includes a portion of non-individualized human nature transmitted to him from his ancestors immedi- ately, and from Adam primarily. When, and so long as, Adam and Eve were the only two individuals, the entire species was in two individuals. When, and so long as, Adam, Eve, and Cain were the only three individuals, the whole species was in three. At this present moment of time, the Avhole species consists of millions of individuals; namely, of the millions now living in this world together with the nonindividualized human nature in them, and the disembodied millions in the other world who include no non-individualized substance, because they " are as the angels of God," Matthew 22:30. Thus it appears that the human nature was single, entire, and undivided, only in those first two individuals in whom it was created. All individuals except- ing tlie first two include each but a fractional part of human nature. A sin committed by a fraction is not a sin committed by tlie whole unity. Individual transgression is not the original transgression, or Adam's first sin.

Hence it follows, that what is strictly and purely individual in a human person must not be confounded with Mdiat is specific in him. As an individual, he sins individually; but what he does in this individual manner does not affect that portion of fallen human nature which he receives to transmit. This fractional part of the nature does not " sin in and with " the individual containing- and transmitting it. He may be regenerated as an individual, but this does not regenerate that part of the human species which he includes, and which he is to individualize by generation. His children are born unregenerate. Regeneration is individual

' It is certainly an error, when Baird (Elohim, p. 356), asserts that " the blood of Cain and Abel does not now flow in any human veins; that human nature is not any longer transmitted from them; but that Seth is the father of the present popidation of the earth." The line of Seth was that of the church, and that of Cain, of the world as the opposite of the church. Both individuals were concerned in the propagation of the species.

only, not specific. It Is f on tided upon an election out of an aggregate of separate individuals. Consequently, it does not sanctify that fraction of human nature which is deposited in each individual to be propagated. Neither do the individual transgressions of a natural man make the corrupt nature of his children any more corrupt. The non-individualized nature in his person remains just as it came from Adam, ^ov are his individual transgressions imputable to his children; because the portion of human nature which he has i-eceived, and which he transmits, does not act with him and sin with him in his individual transgressions. It is a latent nature or principle which remains in a quiescent state, in reference to his individuality. It is inactive, as existing in him. It does not add to, or subtract from his individual power. It constitutes no part of his individuality. Not until it is individualized, and being separated from the progenitor becomes a distinct person by itself, does it begin to act out the sinful disposition originated in it when Adam fell.

It is no valid objection to the doctrine of existence in Adam, and in foregoing ancestors, that it is impossible to explain the mode. The question: " How can these things be? " as in the instance of Xicodemus, must be answered by the affirmation that it is a fact, and a mystery. It is no refutation of the doctrine, to ask how the nature exists before it is individualized or procreated, any more than it is a refutation of the doctrine of the resurrection, to ask how the invisible substance of a human body still continues to exist after death. We know the fact from Scripture; and science also confirms it by its maxim that there is no anniliilation of rudimental substance in the created universe. The body of Julius Caesar is still in being, as to its fundamental invisible substance, whatever that substance may be. Resurrection, though miraculous, is not the creation of a body ex nihilo. In like manner, the elementary invisible substance of the individual Julius Caesar, both as to soul

and body, was in existence between the time of the creation of the whole human species on the sixth day, and the time of the conception of Julius Caesar. The Westminster Shorter Catechism (Q. 37) states that the bodies of believers, "being still united to Christ, do rest in their graves till the resurrection." This implies that the believer's body, as to its invisible substance, continues to exist for hundreds or thousands^ of years between its death and its resurrection. But this kind of existence is no more mysterious than the existence of the human nature in Adam, and its continued existence between Adam and the year 1875. In one sense, the posterity of Adam are as old as Adam; the children as old as the parents. The human nature out of which all individuals are derived was created on the sixth day, and all sustain the same relation to it so far as the time of its creation is concerned. The Seyn of all was then, though the Daseyn was not; the noumenon, though not the phenomenon, was in existence.

It is important to distinguish traits that are derived and inherited from secondary ancestors, either immediate or remote, and traits that are derived and inherited from the first ancestors. To inherit the gout from one's father, is very different from inheriting the carnal mind from Adam. Such inherited idiosyncrasies are not sinful, though they tempt to sin. A hankering for alcohol or opium may be inherited from a grandfather or father, without culpability for it; but pride, and enmity towards God are inherited from Adam, and are accompanied with a sense of guilt. To inherit a temperament, is to inherit a secondary trait. A choleric temper is not guilt. But envy and hatred are. The testimony of conscience in each case is different. These qualities inherited from secondary ancestors may run themselves out in a few generations. But original sin never runs itself out. The former are conquerable without grace; some persons overcome their hankering for alcohol and opium without regeneration. But original sin is un> conquerable without regeneration.

Derivation and inheritance of sinful character is compatible with responsibility for sinful character, provided that while it is derived and inherited at a secondary point, it is self-originated at 2i. primary one. If sinful character be derived at both the primary and the secondary points, then re- sponsibility is impossible. The individual man derives and inherits his sinful disposition from his immediate ancestors, but originated it in his first ancestors. He is born sinful from his father and mother, but was created holy in Adam and Eve. But if he had derived his sinfulness at Ijoth points; if sin in Adam had been derived from God; then its transmission from Adam to the posterity would not have involved any responsibility or fault. In Psalms 51:5, David mentions the fact that he was born sinful, as an aggravation of his particular act of adultery, not as an excuse for it. It evinced the depth and intensity of his wickedness. This could not be, if to be born sinful is the same thing as to be created sinful.

ancestor, is really no greater than the difficulty in regard to existence in the immediate ancestors. The mystery is only farther off.

CHAPTER 11.

Augustine: City of God, XII. i.-ix. xxiii. Anselm: De Casu Diaboli, XII. Aquinas: Sumnia, II. xciii.-xcvii. Calvin: Institutes, I. XV. Ursinus: Christian Eeligion, Qu. 6. Tuvrettin: Institutio, V. ix.-xii. Howe: Oraqles, Lectures XVI. -XX. Miiller: Sin, IV. iv. Edwards: Original Sin, II i; Efficacious Grace, ^ 43-51. Hodge: Theology, II. 92-15. Strong: Theology, 262-268. Shedd: History of Doctrine, II. 5^65. Smith: Theology, 252-259.

Holiness, in the order, is prior to sin. Man must be holy, before he can be sinful. " The good," sajs Plato (Protagoras, 3M), "maj become bad; but the bad does not become bad; he is always bad." Similarly, Aristotle poets is the echo and corruption of the Biblical account of man's original state. Tacitus describes the earliest generation of men as follows: " Yetustissimi mortalium, nulla adhuc mala libidine, sine probro, scelere, eoque sine poena ant coercitationibus, agebant: neque praemiis opus erat, cum honesta suopte ingenio peterentur: et ubi nihil contra morem cuperent, nihil per metum vetabantur." An- nalium, IH. 26.

The Westminster statement is the common one in the Augustino-Calvinistic creeds: " God created man after his own image, in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness," S. C, 10. " God said, Let us make man in our own image. So God created man in his own image," Genesis 1:26, 27. "God hath made man upright; but they have sought out

many inventions," Eccl. T: 29. "The new man is renewed in knowledge after the image of bim that created liim/'

Holiness is more than innocence. It is not sufficient to say that man was created in a state of innocence. This would be true, if he had been destitute of a moral disposition either right or wrong. Man was made not only negatively innocent, but positively holy. Man's regenerate condition is a restoration of his primitive state; and his righteousness as regenerate is described as Kara ^eov, Eph. character, not mere innocency.

Con-created holiness is one of the distingiiishing tenets of Auorustinianism. Pelamanism denies that holiness is con-created. It asserts that the will of man by creation, and in its first condition, is characterless. Its first act is to originate either holiness or sin. "Kon pleni nascimur; " we are not boi-n full of character, Adam's pos- terity are born, as he was created, without holiness and without sin. Pelagius, quoted by Augustine: De peccato originis, XIII. Semi-Pelagianism holds the same opinion; excepting that it concedes a transmission of a vitiated physical nature, which Pelagianism denies. So far as the rational and voluntary nature of man is concerned, the Semi-Pelagian asserts that lioliness like sin must be selforiginated by each individual. The Tridentine anthropol- ogy is a mixture of Pelagianism and Augustinianism. God created man " in puris naturalibus," without either holiness or sin. This creative act, which left man characterless, God followed with another act by which he endowed man with holiness. Holiness was something supernatural, and not contained in the first creative act. Creation is, thus, imperfect, and is improved by an after-thought. In tlie Modern church, the Calvinists and early Lutherans adopted the Auffustinian view. Tbe Arminians and some of the later Lutherans reject the doctrine of con-created holiness.

Holiness has two sides or phases: 1. It is percej?t ion and hnoicledge. As such, it relates to the understanding, God and divine things must be apprehended, in order to holiness. 2. It is inclination and feeling. As such, it relates to the will and affections. God and divine things must be desired and delighted in, in order to holiness.

1. The knowledge in which man was created, was the knowledge of God. It was conscious and spiritual, in distinction from speculative. It was that immediate and prac- tical apprehension spoken of in 1 Corinthians 2:14, " The things of the Spirit are spiritually discerned." This is proved : {a) By the fact that regeneration " is a renewal in knowledge," after the Divine image, Coloss. 3:10 ; but regeneration restores what man had by creation. (J) By the fact that being associated with love and reverence, it must have been experimental.

The knowledge possessed by Adam and Eve before the fall was different from what it was after. This is proved by Genesis 2:25, " They were naked and were not ashamed." They were conscious of holiness, and had no consciousness of sin. But apostasy brought with it the conscious knowledge of evil. Genesis 3:7, " The eyes of both of them were opened, and they knew that they were naked." Genesis 3:22, " God said, Behold the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil." God knows good consciously, and evil, not consciously but, intuitively by his omniscience. Thus his knowledge of both good and evil is perfect; although his knowledge of the former is by a different method from that by which he knows the latter.' Unfallen man knew good consciously, and evil only speculatively and

> The narrative in Genesis speaks of a knowledge like that of " God " (Genesis 3:22), and like that of "the gods," or Satan and his angels (Genesis 3:5). The knowledge is described from two points of view. Adam, by apostasy, came to have a knowledge of evil similar to that of God, in that it was a thorough knowledge; and a knowledge ideyitieal with that of Satan, because it was a conscious knowledge. Respecting the knowledge of unfallen Adam, see Augustine: City of God, XXII. xxx. ; StillLngfleet: Origines Sacrae, I. ii. iii Vol. II.— 7

theoretically. Hence his knowledge of sin was imperfect. On the other hand, fallen man knew evil consciously, and ^ood only speculatively and theoretically. '' The eyes of both of them were opened, and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord, amongst the trees of the garden," Genesis 3:7, 8. " The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him," 1 Cor, 2:14.

There are two ways of knowing sin: () As the sinner knows it; and, {h) As the saint knows it. A sinful man knows vice by the immediate consciousness of it; a holy angel perceives it as the contrast of his own virtue and purity. The latter knowledge of sin is far inferior in thor- oughness to the former. Thus it appears, that in Adam the conscious experimental knowledge of holiness implied only a speculative and inadeqnate knowledge of sin; and the conscious experimental knowledge of sin implied only a speculative and inadequate knowledge of holiness. Holy man was ignorant of sin; and sinful man was ignorant of holiness. Consciously to know good, is a good; consciously to know evil, is an evil.

2. The inclination and moral disposition with which man was created, consisted in the perfect harmony of his will with the Divine law. The agreement was so perfect and entire, that there was no distinction between the two in holy Adam's consciousness. Inclination was duty, and duty was inclination. Unfallen Adam, like the holy angels, did not feel the law to be over him as a taskmaster, but in him like a living actuating principle. In a perfect moral condition, law and will are one ; as in the sphere of physical nature, the laws of nature and the forces of nature are identical. It is in this reference that St. Paid (1 Timothy 1:9) affirms that " the law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and for sinners." Law coupled with the threat of punishment, is law in a form suited only to a will at enmity with it. Law when

proclaimed at Sinai to rebellious man is accompanied with thunders and lightnings; but not when proclaimed in heaven to the holy and obedient. Shedd: Sermons to the Spiritual Man, 212-224.

The positive holiness, then, with which man was endowed by creation, consisted in an understanding enlightened in the spiritual knowledge of God and divine things, and a will vi'holly inclined to them. The following are.some of the rational proofs that man was so created.

1. The maturity and perfection of man suppose it. Adam was not created an infant, but an adult. To suppose him to be vacant of the knowledge of God, and of moral character, in this advanced stage of existence, contradicts the idea of complete and mature manhood. A perfect man who has neither the knowledge nor the love of God, is a contradiction.

2. The idea of the will, as a mental facult}-, implies a con-created holiness. Inclination enters into the definition of the will, as necessarily as triangularity does into that of a triansule : as intellio-ence does into that of an understanding ; as properties do into that of a substance. To create a will, therefore, is to create an inclination also. If we should suppose God to create a certain faculty which at the instant of its creation was uninclined, and undetermined either to good or evil, it would not be a voluntary faculty. For a voluntary faculty is one that is marked by voluntariness. It is determined and inclined, and evinces thereby that it is a will. If it is destitute of inclination, it is involuntary ; and an involuntary will is a solecism. To say that it will become voluntary by becoming inclined, does not relieve the difficulty. This is to concede that at present it is not voluntary.

The human will is by creation voluntary, as the human understanding is by creation cognitive. When God creates the understanding, he endows it with innate ideas, and laws of thought, by virtue of which it is an intelligent faculty.

These are the content of the understanding. And when lie creates tlie human will, he endows it with an inclination, or a disposition, or a self-determination, whatever be the term employed, by virtue of which it is a voluntary faculty. This is the content of the will. As the understanding without this created intelligence in its constitution would not be an understanding at all, so the will without this created voluntariness in its constitution would not be a will at all.

3. The creation of a finite mind or spirit implies the creation of holiness. Spiritual substance is distinguished from matter, by the characteristic of self-motion, or motion ab intra. Matter must be moved from without, by another material substance impinging upon it. But mind moves from W'ithin. Its motion is not from external impact, but is self-motion. Adam was created a sjpirit. The instant, therefore, that he was created, he had all the characteristics that distinguish spirit from matter. One of these, and one of the most important, is self-motion. But self-motion is self-determination, and self-determination is inclination.' The Scripture asserts that Adam was created a "living soul." Life implies motion ; and the motion in this case was not mechanical or material, but the motion of mind. Thus in creating a rational spirit, God creates a self -moving essence, and this is a self-determining will.

4. If holiness is not created, the creature improves the Creator's work. Augustine (City of God, XII. ix.) thus argues : " Was the good inclination of the good angels created along with them, or did they exist for a time without it ? If along with themselves, then doubtless it was created by him who created them; and as soon as ever they were created, they attached themselves to him who created them with that love which he created in them. But if the

1 Throughout this discussion, self-determination is synonymous with spontaneity or inclination.

good angels existed for a time without a good inclination, and produced it in themselves without God's interference, then it follows that they made themselves better than he made them. We must therefore acknowledge that not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels, it can be said, that ' the love of God is shed abroad in their hearts, by the Holy Ghost which is given unto them.' "

5. The dependent nature of finite holiness implies that it is created. Uncreated, independent holiness is possible on]}' in a self-existent and self-sustaining Being. Holiness in the ci-eature is ultimately suspended upon the action of the Creator. It is derived from him. In its first beginning, it must be given both to angels and men. " The nature of virtue," says Edwards (Efficacious Grace, §§ 43-51), " being a positive thing, can proceed from nothing but God's immediate influence, and must take its rise from creation, or infusion from God. There can be no one virtuous choice unless God immediately gives it. Reason shows that the first existence of a principle of virtue cannot be given from man himself, nor in any created being whatsoever ; but must be inmiediately given from God. God is said, in Scripture, to give true virtue and purity to the heart of man ; to work it in him, to create it, to form it ; and with regard to it, we are said to be his workmanship. Lev. 26, 27, ' There shall come out of Zion the deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob.' "

Anselm (De casu diaboli, xii.) argues similarly for the derivation of holiness in the finite will. He contends that if the will of man or angel be supposed to be created in a state of indifference, without any inclination whatever, it could not begin any self-motion at all. It would remain indifferent forever, and never have any inclination. A creat- ure with no character will never originate a character. Consequently, the first inclination of the will must be given to the will when the will is made ex uihilo: and since the

holy Creator cannot give to his own work a bad inclination, lie must give a good one.

6. That holiness is creatable in man, is proved by the facts of regeneration and sanctification. The regeneration of tlie soul is the origination of holiness a second time, within it. This is described, in Scripture, as " giving a heart of flesh," " i-enewing a i-ight spirit within," " working in you to will." This pliraseology teaches that God produces a holy inclination. Again, such terms as "• creating anew," "begetting," "quickening" imply the creation of holiness.

Sanctification likewise proves that holiness is creatable. Sanctification is the increase of holiness; and the increase is by derivation, not by original production. ISTo Christian augments his own holiness by his own isolated decision. The law of sanctification is stated in John 15:4. "Abide in me and I in you: as the branch cannot bear fruit of itself except it abide in the vine, no more can ye except ye abide in me." The vine branch bears fruit spontaneously in case it is in the vine. Similarly, sanctification is spontaneous and free, yet only as it is derived from Christ the source of holiness. Another passage in point is 2 Corinthians 9:8, "God is able to make all grace abound toward you, so that having all sufficiency {avrapiceiav) in all things, ye may abound to every good work." This " sufiiciency " is that genuine and spontaneous inclination to holiness which impels to good acts; but this inclination is " made to abound " in the Christian by the grace of God. These facts prove that the spontaneous motion of the will may be a product of God, as well as a characteristic of man; in other words, that a good inclination, while it is the personal quality of a man, may be likewise a created qualit}^ in him.

The arguments that have been presented for the creatability of holiness assume the correctness of the Augustiuian

definition of voluntariness, or free agency: namely, that it is tke spontaneous self-determination of the will. This can be created along with the will, if the will itself can be created. Consequently, it is necessary to establish the correctness of this definition. The freedom of the will is its self-motion. That which is self-moved is not forced to move; and that which is not forced to move is free. Simple self-motion or self-determination, therefore, is the freedom of the will. " God hath indued the will of man with that natural liberty that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined, to good or evil." Westminster Confession, IX. i. " Yoluntarie moveri est ex se moveri, et non ab alio." Aquinas: Summa, I. cv. 4.

It is indispensable to voluntary freedom, that the motion shall proceed from an ego, or true self. The falling of water, and the rising of sap, is only seeming self-motion. One globule pushes another by mechanical law, or by vital force. Xo globule is self-moved. Could a man demonstrate that his action, either internal or external, is not the energy of his own personal essence, but that of another personal essence, or is caused by some physical law or force, he would demonstrate that his action is neither voluntary nor free. But if this indispensable characteristic exists, the substance of moral freedom is secured. Many things may still be out of the power of the will, for omnipotence is not necessary in oi-der to freedom, yet if the will be i-eally self-'m- clined and self-determined in its activity, internal and external, it is a free will. It is important, here, to notice that the central as well as the superficial activity of the will must be self-activity, in order to freedom and responsibility. The central action of the will is its steady inclination; and the superficial action is its m.omentary volition in a particular instance. The murderer's hate is the central activitj'- of his will; the murderer's act is the superficial. Both must be self-moved, in order to responsibility and guilt. And both are self-moved. The murderer is not foi'ced to hate.

He is willing in his hatred, and in all his moral desiies and feelings; willing in anger, envy, malice, pride, and all forms of sinful inclination. While, however, the central and the superficial activity of the will are alike in regard to free selfmotion, they differ in regard to the power to the contrary. The superficial activity, or the volition, is accompanied with this power; the central, or the inclination, is not. The murderer can refrain from the outward act of murder, hy a volition; but he cannot refrain from his inward hatred, by a volition. A volition can stop another volition; but a volition cannot stop an inclination. A man can reverse bis sinful volition, but not his sinful inclination. This is an indisputable fact of consciousness.

1. It follows from this, that thepower to the contrary, or of antagonistic action, is not necessary in order to the freedom of the will. Simple self-determination, without the additional power to antagonize the existing self-determination, is enough to constitute voluntariness. If the will move in the direction of holiness by its own self-motion, this fact alone demonstrates the freeness of its action. It is not necessary to add a power to act in opposition to the existing self-motion, in order that the existing self-motion may be self-xs\Q\AOi\ ; any more than it is necessary to add the power to fly, in order that the power to walk may be a power to walk.' When holy Adam was self-determining in holiness, it was not necessary to give him the power to self -determine to sin, in order that he might be self-determining in holiness. The possibilitas peccandi was associated with Adam's primitive state, not in order to his freedom, but in order to his lyrohatioii. If God, bj^ the operation of his Spirit, had preserved Adam from the exercise of an antagonistic and contrary self-determination, Adam would still have been self-determined and spontaneously inclined to

essentiale facere; cum per lubentiam et spontaneitatem definieada sit." Turrettin: Institutio, VI. v. 11,

lioliiiess. And the same is true upon the side of sin. If the will of Satan, or of fallen Adam, is spontaneously selfinclined to sin, this fact alone demonstrates the unforced nature of its sinful action. It is not necessary to add the power to the contrary, i.e., the power to self-incline to holiness, in order that the existing sinful self-inclination may he 5tj//'-inclination. It is not necessary in order to responsibility for a sinful inclination, that the sinner be able to reverse his sinful inclination. It is only necessary, that he was able to originate it, and that he did originate it.

That self-determining or inclining is compatible with inability to the contrary, is proved by the following examples. A man wills to be happy. lie is free in thus will- ing, because the action of his will is self-action. It is his own spontaneous inclination. Yet he cannot will the contrary. No man is able to will to be miserable. If the power to the contrary necessarily enters into the definition of freedom along with the power of inclining or self-determining, then this man who wills to be happy is not free in so willing. But if self-determination alone, and simply, is the ])roper definition of freedom, then this man is free in his will or inclination to be liappy, because it is his i-eal and genuine spontaneity.

Another instance of moral freedom with inability to the contrary, is that of the unregenerate sinner. His sin is voluntary self-determination. It issues out of the self, and it is the working of the self. It is not another man who sins, but this very man and no othei-. This fact establishes his free agency in this sin. He is inclined to sin, and inclination is free agency. Yet he is unable to overcome and eradicate this sinful inclination. This is a Avell-established fact of consciousness. It is also the teaching of revelation. " No man can come unto me except the Father which hath sent me draw him," John 6:44. " Whosoever committeth sin is the slave of sin," John 8:34. " Without me ye can do nothing," John 15:5. Here are two facts: {a) That the

will wills its own sin; this is self-determination; {h) That having so willed, it cannot unwill its own sin; this is inability.

It is false to infer that the will does not will its own sin, if it cannot nnwill it; that a person does not act freeh', if has been established by conclusive proofs, the fact must stand. A man throws himself off a precipice. This is an act of the self, lie was not flung off by another self, or by a physical force in nature. It was his own spontaneous act. This makes it a free act. Yet he cannot undo his act. He has no power to the contrary, at any point of his fall. Nevertheless, his fall from top to bottom is chargeable to him as his own responsible act. At no point in his fall, is he innocent of suicide. He is guilty of self murder, at every inch in the descent. An inability that results from an act of the self, is as absolute as that which results from the act of another. A man who kills himself is as dead as a man killed by another. In like manner, an inclination to sin that is originated by the self is as insuperable by the self that originated it, and which now has it, as it would be if it were originated by a third party and forced upon him. Moral inability is as real inability as natm-al inability; but the former is guilty inability, because it is the product of the will itself, while the latter is innocent inability, because it is the product of God in creation and providence. In every act of transgressing the law of God, there is a reflex action of the will upon itself, whereby it becomes unable perfectly to keep that law A man is not forced to sin, but if he does, he cannot of himself get back where he was before sinning. He cannot get back to innocency, nor can he get back to holiness of heart.

Another instance of self-determination without ])ower to the contrary, is that of God. The Supreme Being is selfmoved. But he is unable to sin. This is taught in James 1:13: '' God cannot be tempted." A being who is intemptable is impeccable. Yet in the Supreme Being is to be found the highest form of moral freedom. The more intense the self-determination in any being, the more intense the freedom. Consequently, a Avill self-determined to holiness in an infinite degree is marked by a higher grade of freedom, than one self-determined in only a finite degree. But in proportion as self-determination increases, the power to the contrary diminishes. In God, the infinitude of self-determination excludes the possibility of a change in the self-determination; that is, excludes a power to the contrary. Freedom and moral necessity are one and the same thing, in the Supreme Being.

Freedom in the Infinite Being is inimutable self-determination; in a finite being, it is in.-ittcthle self-determination. God is free in his holiness, because he is self -moved in the rishteous action of his will. That this motion is eternal and nnchangeable in one and the same direction, does not destroy the self-motivity, and convert it into compulsion. Man also was free in his holiness, yet could sin. lie was free, because self-moved in the right action of his will. That this self-motion was mutable, and could take another direction, did not destroy the self-motivity, and convert it into compulsion. Thus it appears, that the power to the contrary, or the power to reverse the existing self-determination of the will, is not the snbstance of freedom, but only the accident. The freedom of both the Infinite and the finite will is in the self-motion of mind or spirit, as diverse from matter. That God cannot alter his self-deter- mination to good, does not diminish his self-determination. Tliat man conld alter his self-determination to good, did not increase his self-determination. The freedom, in both instances, is in the existmg action of the will, not in a conceivable or possible action. The present inclining is willing unforced agency.

2. Inclination, or self-determination, excludes indifference. A will that is determined or inclined towards God,

is not indifferent towards God. Indifference is tlie exact contrary of inclination or self-determination.

It is here that the two principal theories of moral freedom find their starting-point. The Augustinian asserts, that the essence of voluntariness is self-determination vierely and only. The Pelagian asserts that indetermination, or indifference, with power to will in either direction, is the essence of voluntariness. Unless this power of alternative choice continually exist, there is no freedom. Ilence it perpetually accompanies the will, Loth here and hereafter. The Augustinian affirms that if a will be really self-mo\edi in a particular activity, such as hatred of a fellow-man for example, it is free, even thongh it be not able to start another activity of a contrary nature, such as love of that fel- low-man, A man who is M'alking is really and truly walking, though he is not able to fly. His inability to fly does not affect the nature of the act of walking. And similarly man's inability to love, does not destroy the spontaneity and self-motion of his hate.

Tlie Pelagian contends that such self-motion is insufficient. There must be an indefectible, inalienable power of alternative choice, in order to freedom of the will. But in order that there may be tliis constant power, the will must have no inclination in either direction. Consequently indifference or indetermination, not positive self-determina- tion, is the sine qua non of moral freedom for the Pelagian. The text Dent. 30:19, is quoted to prove indifference, and the power of alternative choice. " I have set before you life and death: therefore choose life." But no alternative between these two final ends, and no indifference, is allowed. Only one final end is permitted. Men are not bidden to choose either life or death, but to clioose life. Death is set before them that it may be rejected, not that it may be elected. Life is set before them that it may be elected, not that it may be rejected. Simple self-determination to good is required. Indifference is forbidden. " Choose

lifey Tlie election of good is ipso facto the rejection of evil, and vice versa. The holiness of Immanuel is described in a similar manner, in Isaiah 7:16 : " Before the child shall know to refuse the evil, and choose the good," etc. lie is not indifferent, choosing either evil or good, "but positively inclined to good, and ipso facto disinclined to evil. In brief, tlie difference between tlie Angustinian and the Pelagian doctrine of freedom is this: The Pelagum asserts that the will as nninclined and indifferent chooses, lie postulates a volition antecedent to any inclination. The Angustinian asserts that the will is never nnin- clined or indifferent. There is no volition pi'ior to inclination. The former places freedom in an act of the will prior to inclining; the latter places it in the very act itself of inclining.

The objections to the theory that freedom is indetermination, or indifference, are the followino; :

1. The free will, in this case, has no contents. The power of choosing either one of two contrary ways implies that as yet there is no action of the will at all. The will is undetermined. But we have seen that an undetermined will is a contradiction in terms. " Libertas indiffer- entiae est impossibilis,'' says Leibnitz. De Libertate. Ed. Erdmann, 669.'

' Sometimes "• indifference " is employed to denote the possibilitas peccandi connected with Adam's mutable holiness. Maresius (Systema, VI. 23) so uses it. " Libertatem tribuimus homini primo, non solum spontmicitatis, quod nempe ultro et absque coactione ruerit in pecsatum, sed etiam indifferentiae, juxta quam potuisset abstinere a pecsato, et in illo statu permanere." But this is not the ordinary use of the term. Nor is it a proper use of it. Holy Adam, holiness.

Howe also asserts that the human will " was created without any determination to good; it was made in such a state of liberty as to be in a certain sort of equipoise, according as things should be truly or falsely represented by the leading faculty, the mind or understanding." Oracles, II. xxii. Howe supposes this, in order to explain the possibility of the fall. The understanding of Adam was capable of being deceived, because it was finite. And the will was capable of yielding to the deception. This capability he calls an "equipoise"

2. The freedom of indifference is never found in actual existence. There is no example of it. The so-called " formal freedom" is indifference. It is defined by Midler (Sin, II. 28) as " the ability, from an undetermined state, to this position of equilibrium and indifference, it starts a decision in one direction, or the other. Such a condition, and such an act of the human will, never occurred within the domain of human consciousness. Consciousness always i-eports an inclined will, never an indifferent one. Hence Miiller places the first act of self-determination to evil fi-om an undetermined state of the will, back of consciousness and beyond time. Miiller, however, differs from the Pelagian, in holding that formal freedom is confined to a par- ticular instant. It is not a perpetual accompaniment of the will. Having out of the indifferent state of formal freedom taken a determination, the will afterwards is inclined and the indifference ceases. Starting with the Pela- gian view of freedom, Miiller ends with the Auwustinian view of sin.

The freedom of the will is primarily a self-determination to a single end, not a choice between two yet unchosen contrary ends. The central and deepest activity of the will is to incline or tend, not to select or choose. It moves forward by self-motion, and self-decision, to one point. Two contrary objects or ends are not requisite in order to selfdetermination. It is not necessary that there should be a

of the will. But a will not in eqmpoise, but inclined to holiness, is capable of yielding to deception, or any other temptation, provided it be a finite and mutable will. It is not necessary to assume absolute indifference to holiness and sin, in order to account for the apostasy of Adam's will. While, however, asserting this indifference, Howe does not regard it as a necessary element in freedom. It was necessary only iu order to probation. It is " not a perfection belonging immutably to the nature of man," he says. After the fall, it disappears. The sinful will is not in equipoise. Nor is the holy will, in its perfect state in heaven.

comparison of one object with a contrarj' one, and a choice of the one rather than of the other, in order to the self-determination of the will. If the will shonld know of but one object, saj, its Creator, it might tend or incline to that object, and the tendency or inclination would be the free voluntariness of the will. It is true that the M'ill, in this case, would not \)Q forced to incline to the one object before it. It would have an option to incline, or to disincline, to the one object. But this is already said, in saying that the inclining is self-motion. This liberty to incline or to disincline to one object is very different, however, from the liberty to choose either of two contrary objects. In the latter case, there is a comparison of one object with anothei" ; in the former, there is no such comparison. But what is far moi-e important, in the latter case there is indifference towards both objects; but in the former, thei'e is no indifference towards the single object. For if thei-e is not inclination to it, there is aversion to it; if there is not desire for it, there is liatred of it; if the will does not incline to God, it disinclines and is at enmity with him; if there is not the spiritual mind, there is the carnal mind; if there is not holy self-determination, thei'e is sinfid self-determination. The will, in this instance, is not indifferent, as in the other, but is committed to an ultimate end; if not to its Creator, then to itself.

That self -determining, or inclining is the ultimate fact in the freedom of the will, is evident from considering the relation of motives to the will. The will, it is said, is determined by motives. This is often understood to mean, that the will is efficiently and idtimaiely detei-mined by a motive out of itself, and other than itself. This is an error. The will is only proximately and occasionally deter- mined by external motives. Take a case. A man's will is determined by wealth, as a motive. But only because his will is already so se^-determined or inclined, that wealth is a motive for him; that is, is desirable to him. Were his

will self-determined or inclined to ambition instead of avarice, wealth would not be a motive for him, but power would be. Again, were his will inclined or self-determined to sensual pleasure, this would be the motive that would move or determine it, and neither wealth nor power would be. Thus it is evident tliat the motivitv of a motive, tliat is, its power to move or influence the will, depends primarily and ultimately upon the will's prior inclination, or self-determination. The inclination makes the motive, instead of the motive making the inclination. But the inclination itself is self-made, in the sense of being self-motion. If the will is inclined to the Creator as an ultimate end, then the only motives that influence and move it are spiritual and heavenly. If the will is inclined to the creature as an ultimate end, then the only motives that influence and move it are carnal and earthly. The motives in each instance are determinants, only because of tlie prior bias or self-determination of the will; they influence the person, only because of his existing inclination. They are only the proximate and occasional, not the ultimate and efiicient cause of the will's action.

The first activity, therefore, of the will, considered as a faculty, is inclination, not volition. Man is always disposed or biassed in his will, before he exerts choices. The will does not incline, because it first chooses from out of a state of indifference; but it chooses, because it has already inclined. Inclining or self-determining is the primary and central action of the will, and volition or choice is the secondary and superficial. The will, therefore, in its idea and nature, is causative and origwative, rather than elective. Hence guilt is denoted in Greek by acria. It implies causation. " The notion of pure will," says Kant (Practical Eeason, 205, Abbott's Tr.), "contains that of a causality accompanied with freedom, that is, one which is not determinable by physical laws."

The truth of this view of voluntary freedom is evident

from considering the case of Adam, first as holy, and secondly as sinful. 1. First, the will of holy Adam was by the creative act inclined to God as the chief good, before it exerted any volitions and made any choices. Adam as a created spirit was self-determined to God and goodness the instant he was created, and in consequence of this internal bias and disposition chose the various means of grati- fying it. Holy Adam at the instant of his creation did not find himself set to choose either the Creator or the creature as an ultimate end, being indifferent to both, but he found himself inclined to the Creator, and choosing means accordingly. He was committed to one and only one supreme end of existence, God and goodness, and selected means corresponding. That Adam's self-determination to God was created with his will itself, is not inconsistent with its being s€^-determination. His will if created at all must have been created as voluntary; since it could not be created as involuntary or uninclined. This inclination was selfmotion. It was the spontaneity of a spiritual essence, not an activity forced ab extra. God necessarily creates a selfdetermining, self-moving faculty, in creating a will. Con- sequently, holy inclination is both a creation and a selfdetermination, according as it is viewed. Viewed with reference to God, it is created: inclinatio originata. Viewed with reference to the voluntary faculty, it is spontaneous and self-moving: inclinatio originans. Holy inclination is at once the Creator's product, and the creature's activity.

2. Secondly, the will of sinful Adam by his oicn act had been inclined to the creature as the chief good, before it exerted sinful volitions and made sinful choices. Adam as fallen was 56^-determined to evil, and in consequence of this inward bias of his will chose the various means of gratifying it. The first of these choices was plucking and eating of the tree of knowledge. But there is this important difference ; namely, that the evil inclination was not created by God, but was originated by Adam. Sinful inclina-

114: ANTHROPOLOGY.

tion is both the creature's product, and the creature's activity. It is referable to the creature, both as inclinatio originans, and origin ata.

Thus the term "self-determination" has two significations. It may mean that the self-motion is in the self, but •not from the self as the ultimate author. This is created self-determination, which is always holy. Or it may mean that the self-motion is both in the self, and from the self as the ultimate author. This is sinful self-determination. Holiness is self-determined, but not self-originated. Sin is both self-determined and self-originated.

Created self-determination, or holy inclination, is only relatively meritorious or deserving, because man is not the efficient in its oi'igination. Being either con-created in creation, or i-e-created in regeneration, the reward due to a holy inclination of the will is gracious. " Eternal life is the gift of God," Tlom. 6:23. Self-originated self-determination, or sinful inclination, on the contrary, is absolutely demeritorious or ill-deserving. Man is the sole efficient in its origination, and therefore the retribution due to it is a strict debt. "Eternal death is ih.e wages of sin." Justice owes retribution to the sinner. Man is absolutely re- wardable for trangression, but only relatively rewardable for obedience.

CHAPTER III.

THE HUMAN WILL.

Augiistine: City of God, XTV. vi. Gangauf: Psychologie des Augustinus, VI. i.-v. Anselm: De Libertate Arbitrii. Aquinas: Summa, I. cv. 4. Calvin: Institutes, II. ii. 4-12 ; iii. 5-11. Witsius: Covenants, III. vii. 4-5. Howe: Oracles, I. xxiv. ; II. xxv. V. Owen: Indwelling Sin, III. Hooker: Polity, I. xi. Burgess: Original Sin, III. iv. J. Taylor: Efficient Causes of Human Actions. Edwards: Religious Affections (in initio) ; Will, III. iv. ; Reality of Spiritual Light. Hopkins: Works, I. 83. Locke: Understanding, II. xxi. Butler: Nature of Virtue (in initio). Reid: On the Intellectual and Active Powers. Shedd: Theological Essays, 230- 243 ; Literary Essays, 324-328. Kant: Practical Reason (Abbott's 154, 263, 271-274. Marsh: Remains, 368-390. Delitzsch: Biblical Psychology, IV. v. xii. Beck: Biblical Psychology. Miiller: Sin, III. i. 1-3. Baur: Gegensatz, 118-173. Smith: Theology, 236-252. Green: Prolegomena to Ethics. Hamilton: On the Conative Power. Hopkins: Outline Study of Man, 225-257. Hickok: Empirical Psychology, 382-292.

In discussing the subject of original sin, ranch depends •upon the definition of the "Will; whether it be taken in a wide, or in a narrow sense. The elder psychology divides the powers of the soul into Understanding and Will; the later ps^^chology divides them into Intellect, Sensibility, and Will. The former includes the moral affections and desires in the Will; the latter excludes them from it. For the former, inclination is the principal characteristic of voluntariness; for the latter, volition is the principal charac- teristic. In classifying the powers of the soul under two

modes, it is not meant that there is a division of the soul into two parts. The wliole soul as cognizing, is the understanding; and the whole soul as inclining, is the will.

Locke laid the foundation for the later view of the will, by excluding moral desire and affection from the faculty. " I iiud," he says (Essay II. xxi.), " the will often confomidbd with several of the affections, especially desire, and one put for the other. This, I imagine, has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter, and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that shall turn his thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind when he wills, shall see that the lolll, or power of volition, is conversant about nothing but t\ia,t pa rtlcida?' determination of the mind whereby, barely by a thought, the mind endeavors to give rise, continuation, or stop to any action which it takes to be in its power. This, well considered, plainly shows that the vnll is perfectly distinguished from desire, which may have quite a contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon. A man whom I cannot deny may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail with him. In this case, it is plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrarj-." Here, " will" denotes a _2^arilc2dar act of the faculty, namely, a volition, and excludes a general act of it, namely, desire or inclination. A man's desire, according to Locke's use of terms, is involuntary. If " will " means on\y volition, then a man's inclination is not "will," because inclination is the same as desire.

Edwards (Will, I. i.) combats Locke, and contends that " a man never wills anything contrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his will. In the instance cited, it is not carefully observed what is the thing willed, and what is the thing desired: if it were, it would be found that will and desire do not clash in the least. The thing

willed, on some consideration, is to utter such words; and certainly, the same consideration so influences him that he does not desire tlie contrary: all things considered, he chooses to utter such words, and does not desire not to utter them. x\nd so, as to the thing which Mr. Locke speaks of as desired; namely, that the words, though tliey tend to persuade, should not he effectual to that end; his w^ill is not contrary to this; he does not will that they should be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as he desires. In order to prove that will and desire never run counter, it should be shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the same thing; but here tlje objects are two; and in each, taken by themselves, the will and desire agree." '

Kant, on the other hand, defines the will as the faculty of desire: Begehrungsvermogen. " The notion of the chief good determines the faculty of desire." " The will may be defined as the faculty of ultimate ends (das Yermogen der Zwecke), since these are always determinants of the desires." Kant also denominates the will the practical reason, "because the objects of the practical reason are good and evil. By good, is meant an object necessarily desired according to a principle of reason; by evil, one necessarily shunned according to a principle of reason." Practical Reason, 210, Abbott's Translation. Green (Prolegomena to Ethics, 152) contends that will is desire towards a moral end. " The man as desiring, or putting himself forth in desire for the realization of some object present to him in idea, is the same thing as willing. Will is desire having

'In this reasoning, however, Edwards, as is frequently the case, does cot mark off choice, or volition, from desire. He calls a volition, a desire. "All things considered," he says, " the man chooses to utter such words, and does not desire not to utter them." Here, the volition by which the v/ords are spoken is called a " desire." But this is not desire as spoken of by Locke, when he says that the man does not desire that the words shall be effectual to persuade. The desire and the volition, in Locke's use of the terms, which is also the correct use, are two different acts of the will; and one may not agree with the other. But the desire and the volition, in Edwards's use, in this place, are one and the same act, and of course cannot disagree with each other.

the action of a self-determining self npon and within

We regard the elder psjcholog}' as correct, in including the moral desires and affections in the total action of the will, and in making two faculties of the soul: namely, understanding and will.'

The Understanding is the cognitive faculty or mode of the soul. It comprises the intellect and the conscience. These are percipient and preceptive powers. They are destitute of desire and inclination; and they are not self-deter- mining and executive powers. The intellect perceives what ought to be done, and the conscience commands what ought to be done, but they never do anything themselves. They do not incline to an end. They have no love and desire for what is commanded; and no hatred and aversion towards what is forbidden. The intellect neither loves nor hates; neither desires nor is averse. The conscience approves and disapproves; but approbation is not love and desire, nor is disapprobation hatred and abhorrence. Shedd: Sermons to the Natural Man (XY.).

The understanding is the fixed and stationary faculty or mode of the soul. It can be vitiated and injured, but not radically changed. The operation of the human intellect cannot be totally reversed and revolutionized, as that of the human will may be. After the apostasy, the understanding of man obeys the same rules of logic as before, and possesses the same mathematical and ethical ideas and intui- tions. And the same is true of the human conscience, as involving the perception of right and wrong. Its structure and laws are unaltered by apostasy. After the fall, man does not have moral perceptions that are exactly contrary to those he had before it. He does not perceive that the

' A full classification on this basis would be, understanding, will, and instinct: using the latter term in a wide sense. The old psychology, however, did not formally appropriate the term instinct, to designate the involuntary side of man's nature, but left it undesignated.

love of God is evil, and the love of sin is good. He does not approve of disobedience of law, and disapprove of obedience. The enei'gy with which both intellect and conscience operate after apostasy is, indeed, greatly diminished; but the same general mode of operation continues. The effect of sin upon the cognitive side of the human soul is to darken, dim, and stupefy, but not radically to change. This fixedness of the understanding is in striking contrast, as we shall see, with the mobility and mutability of the will.

The Will is that faculty or mode of the soul which selfdetermines, inclines, desires, and chooses in reference to moral and religious objects and ends. These objects and ends are all centred and summed up in God. We say moral and religious objects and ends, because there is a class of propensities and desires that refer to non-moral and nonreligious objects. They are the natural or instmctive desires, which are involuntary. Speaking generally, the voluntary and moral desires relate to God. They are either inclined or averse to him; they are either love or hatred. The natural and instinctive desires, on the other hand, relate to the creature. Of these latter, there are four kinds, () Physical appetites, (b) Family affections, (c) Social affections, {d) ^Esthetic feeling. These all relate to some form or phase of the Finite, and therefore are not in themselves of the nature of virtue or religion, because religion relates to the Infinite. They may be sanctified by the moral and relio-ious desires, and are so sanctified when the relisrious desires coexist with them; but they are in themselves neither sinful nor holy. They are constitutional, non-moral propensities, flowing necessarily from man's physical and mental structure. Unregenerate men have them, as well as regenerate. They are none of them the object of a divine command or prohibition, like the moral and religious desires. AVhen husbands are commanded to "love their wives " (Colossians 3:19), and wives to " love their husbands and

children '' (Titns 2:4), they are commanded to love " in the Zo/y/." The mere instinctive love itself is not commanded. This is provided for in the created relation of linsband and wife; of parent and child. The instinctive affection as sanctified by a connection and union with the religions affection of supreme love of God, is what is enjoined. The same is true of the love and obedience of chil- dren towards their parents (Colossians 3:20), of the love and care of parents towards their children (Colossians 3:21), of the 13, 14), of the relation between master and servant (Col. merely as natural instinctive desires and affections, but as sanctified instinctive desires and affections.

The instinctive or natural desires and affections are transient. They relate to the temporal, not the eternal. The famil}', and the state, are institutions that are confined to earth and time. This fact shows that they are non-moral in their nature. The moral and religious is eternal. Kone of the natural and instinctive desires were lost by the fall, though all of them were vitiated and corrupted by it. None of them were converted into their contraries, by the apostasy of Adam. Compare Edwards: Nature of Virtue, Y.-YIir. Calvin: Inst. II. ii. 13.'

The elder theolo2;ians include the moral and religious desires and affections in the Will. Edwards (Affections, in initio) states the view in the following terms: " The will and the affections of the soul are not two faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination

' The classification of the instinctive desires is various. Hopkins (Outlines, Lect. IX.), besides the physical appetites, enumerates the desire of existence, of good (happiness), of power, of knowledge, of property, of esteem, of libert,y, of society, of beauty. These can all be brought under the category of the Finite. No one of them is desire for God, and spiritual good.

of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of exercise." Again he says (Will, III. iv.), "The affections are only certain iiiodes of the exercise of the will." " The inclination of the will h?^ leading act of the will." In this sense of the term " will," the religious affections are voluntary affections. Edwards identifies the will with the heart, and contradistinguishes it from the understanding. "In the former case, is exercised merely the speculative faculty, or the understanding strictly so called, in distinction from the will or disposition of the soul. In the latter, the will, or hiclination, or heart, is mainly concerned." Spiritual Light. Works, lY. 442. Augustine's psychology is the same: " Amor seu dilectio valentior est voluntas." Trhiity, XV. xxi. 41. " What are desire and joy, but a will inclined towards the things we desire and rejoice in. And what are fear and hatred, but a will disinclined towards the things we fear and hate? " City of God, XIV. vi. Clement of Alexandria (Miscellanies, II. xv.) says that " what is voluntary is either what is by desire, or what is by choice." It is the common view among the elder theologians. " Affectus in deo nihil aliena sunt quam actus vo- luntatis divinae." Van Mastricht, II. xv. 19. " The will of God, according to its divers objects, hath different names, to wit: of holiness, goodness, love, mercy, and such like." Koss's Wollebius, p. 17. The elder Calvinists often defined the wnll as rational appetency: " Voluntas, quae est appetitus rationalis, semper est conjuncta cum appetitu sensitivo, ita quidem, ut ipse appetitus sensitivus in homine proportionaliter respondeat voluntati." Keckermann: in Heppe's Reformirte Dogmatik, Locus XV. Consequently, they regarded the inward motions of this rational appetency as sinful and punishable, and refnsed to call them involuntary. "Non omnino invohmtarii sunt isti motus, quia nostra voluntate eos attraximus. Nihil obstat, quominus ad peccatum actuale eos etiam motus referamas: quia nirnirum concupiscent la actuale peccatum est: motus

autem isti aut partes, aut prima puiicta, concnpiscentiae." Keckerman: in Ileppe, ut supra. "As tlie will doth now work upon that object [viz., God] by desire, which is as it were a motion towards the end as yet unobtained, so likewise upon the same hereafter received, it shall work also by love." Hooker: Polity, I. xi. '' The knowledge of man is of two kinds: the one respecting his understanding and reason, and the other respecting his will, appetite, and affections; whereof the former produceth position or decree, the latter action or execution." Bacon: Advancement of Learning, II. " The difference of men is very great; you would scarce think thetn to be of the same species; and yet it consists more in affection than in intellect." Selden: Table Talk, p. 71, Ed. Auber.

The terms inclination, desire, and affection, are interchangeable. The " desire " of the Psalmist's heart is one and the same thing with the " inclination " of his will. He often asks God to " incline " his heart. The inclination of the will is its constant self-determination. The affections or desires are the various phases or aspects of the inclination. Love of God is an affection of the heart; but it is also one variety of the disposition or inclination of the Christian. Hatred of sin is the aversion of a good man's will, its disinclination to evil. " Yelle, nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedani in objectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale." Aquinas: Summa, I. cv. 4.

In the Authorized version, " willing " sometimes means '"desiring," and sometimes "purposing," according as it 27 : 43, " The centurion willing {/3ou\ofxevo<?, purposing) to

the same as sinful inclination, when he sajs, " Ye lust {tirc- ^viielre) and have not, ye desire to have [i^rfkoiire) and cannot obtain." When Christ (John, 5 : 0) asks, "Wilt thou be made whole? " " will " means desire.

The will, unlike the understanding, is mutable. It is capable of a radical and total change, or revolution. It has met with such a change in the apostasy of Adam. Man now is inclined exactly contrary to what he was by creation. In respect to moral and religions ends and objects, he inclines, desires, loves, and acts directly contrary to what he did when he came from the Creator's hand. This great chanire is denominated a "fall." It is an overthrow, a catastrophe. It is not a mere difference in the degree or intensity with which the will operates, but it is an entire alteration of the direction of its activity. The fall of the will was a revolution, not an evolution.

The elder psychology, by regarding the moral desires and affections as modes of the inclination of the will brings them within the sphere of responsibility; and distinguishes in kind between the moral or voluntary, and the natural or involuntary desires. In this way, it precludes necessitating theories of human nature and agency. Spinoza, for example, breaks down the distinction between the natural and the moral, the instinctive and the voluntary, by rejecting Des Cartes' view of the moral affections as voluntary inclination, and contending that " the affections of hatred, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and force (virtus) of nature as other things." Ethics, III., Pi-eface. The physical appetites, together with the family, social, and aesthetic desires and affections, are clearly different from such affections as envy, pride, hatred, and malice, in their origin and nature. The report and verdict of conscience concerning them is wholly different. They are instinct, not will. That a man craves food is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. That he feels love and desire towards his kindred, his country, and artistic

124: ANTHROPOLOGY.

beaut}-, is neitlier praiseworthy nor blameworthy. But to feel love and desire when God is presented as the supreme object and end, is holiness; and to feel hatred and aversion, is sin. These latter are not instinctive and constitutional affections, but modes of the man's moral inclination, for which he is approved or condemned.

Moral desires and affections are the self-activity of the M'ill; its inclination and tendency showing itself in the phases of love or hatred of God; of desire or aversion towards goodness. They are commanded or prohibited by the moral law; M-hicli proves that they are voluntary. The feelings of supreme love towards God, and of equal love towards a fellow-creature, are not instinctive, but voluntary. Such love and inclination is not, like the storge of the parental relation, or the involuntary affection of the citizen for his country, a merely natural and necessary efflux from the human constitution, deserving neither praise nor blame; but it is the tree determination of the human will. To have it, is meritorious. Kot to have it, or to have its contrary, is guilt requiring atonement and remission. Again, the feeling of aversion towards God, or of hatred towards a fellow-man, is not like tlie shrinking of animal life from death, say, the recoil of a child from a viper, an involuntaiy activity of the soul which stands in no relation to law and justice, and is deserving of no punishment. This aversion towards God is called " enmity " (Romans 8:7), the posi- tive hostility of the inclination, the disinclination of the will in its deepest recesses. This hatred of a fellow-creature is the repugnance of the will, and is murderous in its quality; for "he that hatetli his brother is a murderer," 1 John 3:15. Accordingly, in Scripture, hol}^ desire is holy inclination. Psalms 63:1, "My soul tliirsteth for thee, my Hesli longetli for thee." Psalms 42:1, " So panteth my soul after thee." Such desire is the object of command. Psalms 37:4, " Delight thyself in the Lord." The sum of the moral law is a command to love. " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God

with all thy heart." And evil desire is evil inclination. Psalms 112:10, " The desire of the wicked shall perish." Psalms 140:8, " Grant not, O Lord, the desires of the wicked." Proverbs 10:28, " The expectation of the wicked shall perish." Job 21:14, " Depart from ns; for we desire not the knowledge of thy ways."

The recent psychology distribntes thefacnlties of the sonl into three divisions: Intellect, Sensibility, and Will. The objections to this classification are the following:

1. The moral desires and religions affections must, if anywhere, be included under the Sensibility, by this arrange- ment. But this is too narrow and shallow a term, to denote those profound feelings, desires, and inclinations that relate to religion. " Sensibility," by its etymology, refers us to the five senses. Properly speaking, it comprises only sensuous feelings and desires. Hence it is wholly inadequate to denote feelings and desires that have no connection at all with the five senses : such as the holy affections of reverence, faith, hope, humility, joy, peace, love ; or the sinful affections of pride, envy, malice, hatred, and the like. Both holy and sinful affections, in their deeper forms, are mental, and disconnected with a physical organism. They. have no connection with the sensuous sensibility. The seraph who adores and burns does not inhei'it flesh and blood. His religious desires and feelings are purely mental. The fiend, also, is intellectual in his depravity. Lucifer, the ethereal son of the morning, was not tempted to apostasy by any sensuous appetite ; and his existing moral con- dition is mainly intellectual. The wickedness of the fallen angels is denominated by St. Paul, " spiritual wickedness," Ephesians 6:12. " Sensibility," thei-efore, is an inadequate term to cover that wide domain which includes the moral desires of the heart, and the inclination of the will, and which is entirely distinct from the physical and fleshly side of man.

2. The explanation of the moral desires, and religious affections, is inadequate, by this classification. According to

this division, the will excludes inclination and desii-e, and is only the power of exerting volitions; and the sensibility includes onlj^ the physical appetites, together with certain in- stinctive, involuntary, and innocent desires. The love of approbation, and the love of happiness, are mentioned as the principal of these latter. When these physical appetites and involuntary desires are " adopted " and " strengthened" by a volition, or are weakened and rejected by it, then sinful or holy affections arise. Virtue and vice thus differ only in degree, not in kind. The love of approbation intensified by volition, becomes pride; diminished by volition, becomes humility. The love of happiness strengthened by volition, becomes selfishness; weakened by volition, becomes benevolence. The rudimental base of virtue and vice is neither virtuous nor vicious. Thus there is no positive intrinsic morality upon this theory. Those sinful affections mentioned in Galatians 5:19, 20, " hatred, variance, emulations wi-ath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders," instead of being regarded as the simple and innnediate inclination of the will, and therefore culpable in their own intrinsic nature, are regarded as complex and compounded. They are made out of innocent and involuntary material derived from the " sensibility," which when intensified by volitions or particular choices becomes guilt.

Furthermore, when a list of involuntary and innocent sensibilities sufficiently large to account for all the virtuous and vicious moral affections is asked for, it is not forthcoming. It is impossible to find innocent bases for " malice, env}^, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, murders, and such like." Neither can " the fruits of the Spirit, love, joy, peace, long-suffering gentleness, goodness, meekness, temperance " (Galatians 5:22), be explained out of involuntary and characterless materials.

The theory, moreover, breaks down when the so-called innocent sensibility, the "love of approbation," is examined. This is really nothing but the love of human applause; the

he speaks of those wlio " receive lionor one of another, and seek not the honor that cometh from God only," and who "love the praise of men more than the praise of God;" and by St, Paul, in 1 Corinthians 4:3, affirming that " it is a very small thing to be judged of man's judgment." This desire for popular approbation is not the same thing as the desire for self -^:^\)l•oha,tlon, or the approval of conscience. The latter is virtuous and proper; but the former is the base of all egotism, pride, and ambition. It is exactly contrary to the meekness and lowliness of Christ, and utterly opposed to that poverty of spirit, and humbleness of mind which every sinful man ought to have, and upon which Christ pronounces a blessing. Such a " sensibility " as this cannot be the elementary base of holy affections. And the other "sensibility," also, the "love of happiness," is essentially selfish. It underlies the selfish theory of morals, which is ethically nnsound. Ko mere modification of the love of happiness can possibly produce the love of God, or the love of holiness, or the love of man. This scheme, in reality, derives and explains virtue out of vice. Pope describes the method, with his usual condensation and brilliancy.

" As fruits ungrateful to the planter's care, On savage stocks inserted, learn to bear; The surest virtues thus from passions shoot, Wild nature's vigor working at the root. What crops of wit and honesty appear From spleen, from obstinacy, hate, or fear I See anger, zeal and fortitude supply; E'en avarice, prudence, sloth, philosophy; Lust, through certain strainers well refined, Is gentle love, and charms all womankind; Envy, to which th' ignoble mind 's a slave, Is emulation in the leam'd or brave; Nor virtue male or female can we name, But what will grow on pride, or grow on shame."

Essay on Man, II.

Spinoza represents all affections, good and bad, as alike springing out of " the endeavor of a thing to persevere in its being." From this one source, he derives the affections of anger, revenge, jealousj, ambition, sensuality, covetousness, love, benevolence, humility, compassion, hatred, joy, grief, envy, contempt, hope, fear, self-distress, pride, repentance, etc. Ethics, Part III.

The elder psychology agrees with Scripture, in its definition of the will. In the Biblical ps^^cholog}^, the will in- are terms for the voluntary side of the soul; and in the Old Testament, nb denotes the same. Tlie cognitive side of the soul is designated in the New Testament by irvevfjia, 1/0D9, and <^pr]v; and in the Old Testament, by dd_3 and n^i. Girdlestone: Synonyms of the Old Testament.

antithetic to understanding. It includes the inclination, together with the moral desires, and affections. Romans 1:24, "Lusts of the heart." Romans 2:5, "Impenitent heart." 2 Corinthians 9:7, " Purposed in the heart." Rom. " Turn the hearts." Deuteronomy 4:29, " If thou seek with all thy heart." Deuteronomy 6:5," Love with all thy heart." Psalms 119:112, "I have inclined my heart." Proverbs 31:11, " The heart of her husband doth trust her." Lament. heart ").

These passages evince that in the Biblical psychology, the will comprehends the heart. It comprises all that moral activity of the soul which is manifested in loving, liating, inclining, desiring, purposing, seeking, repenting, turning, delighting, trusting, hoping, believing. Each and all of these aifections are phases of the will. They are modes of a man's inclination and self-determination. If they are conformed to the moral law, they are right affections, and the will is a liolj' will. If they are contrai-y to the moral law, they are evil affections, and the will is a sinful will. This species of psychical activity is not intellect- ual and percipient, but affectionate and executive. " The actual compliance of the will and affections with the mind and understanding, with respect to the objects proposed by them."

@e\r}/jia denotes inclination and desire, in distinction from volition. Matthew 6:10, " Thy will be done." Matt. not the will of your Father." John 4:34, " The will of him that sent me." Rom. 2 : IS, " Ivnowest his will." these passages, the " will " is the will of desire and delight. See Bruder, in voce.

inclination and desire. Luke 23:51, " The same had not consented to the counsel [decision] of them." Acts 18:15, " I will be [decide to be] no judge of such matters." Acts 19:30, " When Paul would have [purposed to] entered." Acts 25:22, " I would [decide] also hear the man, myself." 2 Corinthians 1:15, " I was minded [purposed] to come unto you." Acts 2:23, " The determinate counsel [purpose] of God." Hebrews 6:17, " God willing [purposing] to show more abundantly unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his council." See Bruder, in vocibus. In these pas- particular instance. This decision may agree, or disagree with the inclination. When Christ was crucified by God's will of purpose (Acts 2:23), it was contrary to his will of desire and delight. Vol. II.— 9

The primary and dominant meaning of irvevfia, and its will. It comprises all the perceptive agencies of the soul. Mark 2:8," Knowing in his spirit." 1 Corinthians 2:11, " What man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man right well." Proverbs 19:2, " That the soul be without knowledge is not good." Deuteronomy 4:9," Keep thy soul diligently, lest thou forget." Job 20:3, " The spirit (n^"i) of my understanding." Isaiah 29:24, " They that erred in spirit shall come to understanding." Exodus 28:3, " The spirit of wisdom."

As the understanding and will are one soul or person, the Romans 2:15, " The law [of conscience] written in their hearts." 2 Corinthians 4:6, " Shined in the heart, to give the light of the knowledge of God." 1 John 3:20, " God is greater than our heart [conscience] and knoweth all spake with him all that was in her heart," i.e. all she knew. Gesenius in loco. Hodge on Eph. p. 249.

Similarly, Trvevfxa is put for Kaphia, in Matthew 5:3, " Poor 7:6," Newness of spirit," Romans 8:6," Mind {(f)p6vr}fxa) of the spirit." Romans 8:27, " He who searcheth the heart 42:1, "In whom my soul (idcd) delighteth." Psalms 42:2, " My soul thirsteth for God." Genesis 23:8, " If it be your

willing mind (uicp)." In the Old Testament, cc?. is very often used to denote the heart and will.

The distinction between the will's inclination, and its volition, is of the highest importance in both psychology and theology. The key to the distinction is found in the following discrimination by Des Cartes (Les Passions, Partie I. Article xviii.). " Onr acts of will are of two kinds. One are the actions of the soul wliicli terminate on the soul itself; as when we will to love God. The other kind are the actions of the soul that terminate on the body; as when from the mere will to take a walk, there follows the movement of our limbs, and we go forward.'' The first of these acts of will is inclining; the last is the exertion of a volition. The same distinction is referred to by Constant: " Je puis faire de bonnes et fortes actions; je ne puis avoir de bons procedes."

When I say, " I will pick up that stone," this is volition. The action of the will terminates on the body. I am conscions of ability to do it, or not. In this instance, there is a power of alternative choice. I can do one as easily as the other. But when I say, " I will love Grod supremely," this is inclination. The action of the will terminates on the win. I am not conscious of ability to do it, or not. In this instance, there is not a power of alternative choice. I cannot do one as easily as the other. And the reason is, that I am already loving myself supremely. I am already inclined or self-determined. I am already doing the contrary of loving God supremely. And the existing inclina- tion precludes the other. I can do the one which I am doing, but not the other which I am not doing. But when I said, " I will pick up that stone," I was not already inclined to the contrary act — -namely, not to pick it up. In this instance, I was indifferent and undetermined in regard to the act of picking up the stone. Consequently, I could do one thing as easily as the other. In the instance of a proposed change of self-determination or inclination, there is a contrarj self-determination or inclination already existing and opposing. In the instance of a change of volition, there is indifference, or the absence of inclination or self-determination.

The difference between inclination and volition is seen by considering the moral desires and affections. The desire of human applause, or ambition, does not rise by a volition. In this sense, it is involuntary, and those who resolve all the action of the will into volition so denominate it. Yet it is free and unforced activity. It rises by spontaneous inclination. In this sense, it is voluntary. The man is willingly proud and ambitious, and is punishable for it. His desire for fame is the determination of the self. If some cause other than self. But in this case, the sense of guilt which accompanies it is inexplicable. The same reasoning applies to envy, hatred, malice, and.all other sinful desires. They are not volitionary, but they are voluntary; they are the inclination of the will, not its volition.

The following particulars mark the difference between inclination and volition :

1. Inclination is the central action of the will ; volition is the superficial action. The inclination is the source of volitions. " It is," says Edwards (Original Sin, 11. i. 1), " the general notion, not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed." By " principles" Edwards means, as he teaches in the context, the dis- position or inclination; and by "actions" he means particular choices or volitions. That the inclination is more profound action than a volition, is proved by the fact that a man cannot incline himself by a volition, or resolution. When he is already inclined, no exertion of that volitionary power by which he lifts a hand, or applies his mind to a given subject, like geometry for example, can originate a contrary inclination. lie may, by volitionary eft'ort, fix his

thoughts upon God as the Being towards wliom he ought to incline, but this is as far as he can go, if lie is not already inclined. No conceivable amount of resolution, even though it rise to spasm, can start that profound and central action of the will which is its inclination, and is identical with its moral affection and disposition. The central action of the will in inclining is better denominated " voluntary'," and the superficial action in choosing, " volitionary." The voluntary is the spontaneous. Milton speaks of " thoughts that voluntary (i.e. spontaneously) move harmonious numbers." If the term " voluntary " is made to do double duty, and designate both the central and the superficial action of the will, both inclination and volition, it leads to confusion. Some things are predicable of a volition that are not of an inclination. Volitions can be originated at any instant, and in any number;' an inclination cannot be. If, however, the term "choice" be used to denote the inclination, it should be qualified as the choice of an ultimate end, in distinction from the means to it; and also, as not proceeding from an indifferent state of the will.'

2. The volition has the same moral quality with the inclination. This is taught by Christ, in Matthew 7:17 : " Every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit." Hence the volition has been denominated " executive volition," and the inclination " im- manent volition," by those who do not discriminate technically between inclination and volition.

All the volitionary acts of particular choice are performed in order to gratify the prevailing inclination, or de- termination of the will. A man is inclined to ambition; and he endeavors to attain the ambitious end to which he is self-determined, by thousands and tens of thousands of voli-

^ Preference is inclination, not choice, though Locke (Understanding, IV. xxi. ) considers them to be identical. Preference is bias. A man can choose what he does not prefer. He can choose pain in a particular instance, though he prefers pleasure. He can control his choice by a volition, but not his preference.

tions. These are all of them of the same moral quality with the inclination. Thej are vicious, not virtuous. Selfseeking or selfishness is the generic character of human in- clination; pride, envy, malice, covetousness, etc., are varieties of this. These are modes of man's inclination, all of which have the creature not the Creator for the ultimate end. Yolitious are exercised in choosing and using means, in order to gratify these varieties of inclination. In their moral quality, they are the sanje as the inclination. A volition exerted to attain an ambitious end, and gratify an ambitious inclination, is ambitious. A volition exerted to attain a malignant end, is malignant. And so through the entire list. Yolitions cannot be morally different from the inclination which prompts them. This also is taught by our Lord, in Matt. 7 : IS. " A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit."

The volition sometimes seems to run counter to the inclination, but really it does not. A drunkard, from fear or shame, may by a volition reject the cup that is offered to him. He acts contrary, in this particular instance, to his physical appetite for alcohol, but not contrary to the central inclination of his will to self. By the supposition, he is still determined to the creature as the ultimate end, not to the Creator, lie still loves himself supremely. The motive, consequently, from which he rejects the intoxicant in the instance supposed, is a selfish one: shame, pride, fear of man, or some other merely prudential consideration. He is still controlled by his inclination to self. The volition by which he rejected the cup agrees in its moral quality with the state of his heart. It is not holy, because not prompted by the desire and determination to please and obey God. Had he rejected the intoxicant from regard to the Divine command against drunkenness, this would prove him to have obtained a new inclination of the will. But in the case supposed, his volition, though counter to his physieal appetite, yet agrees with his moral character and disposition of win. He has carried out his selfish inclination bj jiis volition; only in a different manner from common. His volition in this instance ministered to his pride, instead of to his physical appetite.'

3. The inclination of the will is the result of self-determination, not of a volition, because the inclination is the self-determination viewed objectively. Consider the facts. Adam as created was inclined to holiness. This inclination, although created with his will, was at the same time the self-motion of his will. Viewed with reference to its first author and origin, it was the product of his Maker ; but viewed with reference to his own will, it was the activity of his will, and in this secondary sense the product of his will. This holy inclination was both con-created, and self-determined ; the former, because it was a created voluntariness ; the latter, because of the intrinsic nature of voluntariness.

Kow it is evident that this lioly inclination was not the product of a volition exerted prior to the inclination, and when there was no inclination, but it was the simple selfmotion of the will. The will of Adam moved spontane- ously to God as a supreme end, and this spontaneity of the will was identical with the will's inclination. The will as uninclined did not choose to incline, and by this choice made an inclination, but it simply inclined, and this inclining M'as its inclination.

And the same is true of Adam's evil inclination. This, also, was the result of self-determination, not of a volition. Adam, in the act of apostasy, did not make a choice between two contraries, God and the creature, to neither of which was he yet inclined; but he passed or " lapsed " from

1 Sometimes a volition may be exerted without any inclination prompting it. Out of thirty silver dollars, all newly minted and all alike, a man may take one arbitrarily. He has no motive or inclination to take the one he does take, rather than another. Stat jiro ratione voluntas. This is raprirc. Such a volition is uncommon, and has no morality. It is only a sporadic spasmodic act of the will that moves the muscles convulsively.

one inclination to another; from one self-determination to another. This instant, he is wholly inclined to good; the next instant, he is wholly inclined to evil. Such a, fall of the will, cannot be accounted for by an antecedent choice from an indifferent state of the will. It is explained by the possibilitas peccandi. This is the power of self-determining to evil, implied in the mutable holiness of a creature who is not self-sustaining and onmipotent. When God created Adam's will with a holy inclination, this inclination, be- cause ji.nite^ was not immutable. Mutable Adam, unlike his immutable Maker, could lose holiness. lie was able to persevere in his holy self-determination, and he was able to start a sinful self-determination. God left it to Adam himself to decide whether he would continue in his first created inclination, or would begin a second evil inclination. This was his probation. The first sin was the self-determining of the will to evil, which expelled the existing self-determination to good, and not a volition in a state of indiffer- ence. It was self-determination to an ultimate end, not a choice of means to an ultimate end. Sinful inclination began in Adam immediately by self-determination, and not mediately by a foregoing volition. He did not choose to incline to evil, but he inclined.

In the instance of regeneration, also, a new inclination is begun immediately by the Holy Spirit, not mediately by the exertion of a human volition. The Holy Spirit regenerates the fallen will instantaneously, and the effect is a new inclining or self-determining of the faculty. The will is " powerfully determined," as the Westminster Confession phrases it. The sinner does not choose or resolve to incline to God, but God the Spirit immediately inclines him. The inclination or self-determination of regeneration differs from that of apostasy, in that it is the effect of God the apostasy, Adam determined himself to evil without any

immediate operation of God. Yet there is no compulsion of the will in regeneration, because the Holj Spirit operates as spirit upon spirit; that is, in accordance with the nature of a mental and self-moving substance, and not as matter operates upon matter. The new inclination of the will is real and true spontaneity, or self-determination. But, there are two beings concerned in it: namely, the Holy Spirit the efficient, and the human spirit the recipient. In the case of the sinful self-determination in the apostasy, there was only a single being concerned, namely, man.

Consequently, inclination or self-determination may be viewed either subjectively or objectively; either as an activity, or as a result; as an act, or as a fact. Holy inclina- tion, viewed subjectively, is the activity of the will, its voluntary spontaneity: justitia originans. Viewed objectively, it is this spontaneity as originally created, or subse- quently re-created by God: justitia originata. Sinful inclination, viewed subjectively, is tlie activity of the will, its voluntary spontaneity: peccatum originans. Yiewed objectively, it is this spontaneity considered as an abiding state of the will originated by the will itself, in Adam's fall: peccatum originatum.^

4. Inclination differs from volition, as the end differs from

1 This designation of fche subjective and objective aspect of an active principle by the active and passive participle, is employed by the philosopher as well as the theologian. A force of nature contemplated subjectively, as energizing and producing effects, is called natura natural ; contemplated objectively, as having energized and produced an effect, it is called natura naiurata. Gravitation viewed subjectively, as cause, is the invisible force. This is natura naturans. Gravitation viewed objectively, as effect, is the visible phenomenon or fact : e.g., the falling apple. This is natura naturata. The old English poet Hawes (Pastime of Pleasure, Capit. 2.5, 39) employs the terms :

" The right hye power Nature, naturying Naturate, made the bodyes above, In sundry wise, to take their workyng That aboute the wo ride naturallye do move.''

AU thinges to growe."

the means. Inclination is self-determination to an ultimate end, God or the world. When Adam apostatized, his will inclined to self and the creature, as the supreme end. This was a self-originated self-determination. "When this new inclination to self and sin had begun, then began a series of choices or volitions by means of which he might attain the new end of existence which he had set up. And the first of these choices, the first volition that succeeded the origination of the inclination, Avas the reaching forth of the hand and taking the forbidden fruit. This volitionarj act was the means of attaining the selfish end he had now assumed, lie gratified his new inclination bj a choice. For Adam had fallen in his heart and will, before he ate the fruit of the tree of knowledge. lie was already inclined to self, prior to this outward act; and the volition by which he reached forth the hand and took the fruit was executive of his new inclination. It did not originate his inclination, but expressed and exhibited it.

The term " choice,'' as has been observed, is applied indiscriminately to the election of the end as well as of the means, by those wdio do not distinguish between voluntary and volitionary action. Adam, thej' say, chose self as the ultimate end, instead of choosing God. But this indiscriminate use of the term is confusing. It is preferable to appropriate each term to its proper act. The will " inclines " to an end, and " chooses " a means. Edwards sometimes appropriates the term " choice " to voli- tions, and uses the term " disposition," or " affection," to denote inclination. " It is agreeable," he says (Original Sin, II. i. 1), " to the sense of the minds of men in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but the good choice itself from which that effect proceeds; yea, and not only so, but also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or aifection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice is virtuous." In this passage, three elements are mentioned: (a) The outward act: " the fruit or effect of a good choice." (h) The choice, or volition that caused the outward act. (c) The " disposition, temper, or affection " which produced the volition. Edwards's position in regard to each of them is: (a) That the outward act is preceded and produced by the volition, {h) That the volition is preceded and produced by the disposition, or inclination, {c) That the disposition or inclination, if holy, is either con-created with the will, or else re-originated in regeneration; if sinful, is originated in Adam's apostasy. But inasmuch as Edwards does not formally and technically appropriate the term " choice " to volitions, but employs it oftentimes to designate the inclination; and still more, because he uses the term " volun- tary," as his Arminian opponents did, to denote alike what is volitionary or " caused by antecedent choice " (Works, II. 122), and what is bias or inclination, he has exposed himself to the misinterpretation which his views have some- times met with.'

Julius Muller (Sin, I. 31) remarks that " the true conception of the will does not lie in the element of self-deter- mination alone. This Ave must attribute in a certain sense to creatures without rational intelligence. Self-determination becomes will, only when it is conscious of itself." But it is incorrect to call the volitions of animals, " self-determination;" and to make the only difference between hu- man and animal will, to lie in an act of hwvjledge. There is a difference in the khul of activity. Will in man is rational, nnnecessitated self-activity towards a moral end.

1 The following are examples of the indiscriminate use of inclination and choice, by Edwards : " If the will, all things now considered, indiues or chooses to go that way, then it cannot choose, all things now considered, to go the other way, and so cannot choose to be made to go the other way." Will, III. iv. Edwards, here, is speaking of inclination, not of volition. Again, he says, " The thing which has led men into this inconsistent notion of action when applied to volition, as though it were essential to this wternal action" etc. Will, IV. ii. Here, Edwards designates the internal action, or inclination of the will, by the term volition.

Will in animals is irrational, necessitated activity in choosing means to a physical end necessitated by physical in- stinct. The former is real self-determination; the latter is not. The animal \^ forced by the law of his physical nature to the end aimed at in his volitions; the man is not. The may not. Instinct in the animal is involuntary; inclination in man is voluntary.'

5. Volition is common to man and the animal creation ; inclination or self-determination belongs only to man, and other rational beings. The movements of the lingers of a pianist are each caused by an act of choice, in distinction from an act of self-determination to an ultimate end. There are thousands of volitions exerted in a few moments. Volition is also seen in insects, and is inconceivably rapid in them. Volition here is innervation. Excitement of the nerve results in excitement of the muscle. If the molecular theory of vitality were true, volition in insects would be rightly defined as Haeckel defines will : namely, " the habit of molecular motion." It would be the molecular process in the nervous-muscular system. A gnat, according to a French naturalist, vibrates its wings five hundred times in a second. The vibrations of the wings of the common fly, according to an English naturalist, are as many as six hundred in a second. Pouchet : Universe, p. 112. These are each and every one of them volitionary, not voluntary acts ; choice, not self-determination ; and ai'e the same in kind with those by which the pianist plays a tune, or a drummer beats a tattoo. For if the vibrations of the gnat's wing were not caused by volitions, it could not stop flying. The motion would be mechanical, and animals

' Hartmann, in his Philosophy of the Unconscious, makes will synonymous with vitality. Animal growth, animal instinct, animal lust, equally with human inclination and volition, are alike modes of will, according to this theorist. The distinction between nature and spirit, matter and mind, is denied, and the whole universe is converted into a blind pantheistic movement of physical appetite and bestial desire, called "will."

would be machines as Descartes asserted in his curious theory. Naturalists are now distinguishing between vegetable or passive life, and active or wilful life. The veg- etable puts forth no volitions; the animal does.

But volition in the animal or the insect has soniethhig behind it as its ground and cause, as volition in man has. This back-ground and originating source in the animal is instinct. This takes the place of self-determination or inclination, in man. All the volitions of an animal or an in- sect are exerted for the purpose of attaining the end prescribed by animal instinct, just as the volitions of a man are exerted for the purpose of reaching the end prescribed by his moral inclination. Yolitionary action in man is responsible, because the disposition or inclination prompting it is self-moved. But in the animal, volitionary action is irresponsible, because instinct is not self-moved. Instinct is the necessitated motion of physical substance, in accordance with physical properties and laws. Inclination is the free motion of mental and spiritual substance, which is not controlled by physical law.

6. Inclination or self-determination is inherited ; volitions or choices are not. The bias of the will is born with the individual. His choices or volitions are not born with him, and do not begin until self-consciousness begins. The sinful self-determination began in Adam, prior to birth ; sinful volitions begin in the individual, after birth.

7. Inclination is free, because it is self-determined ; volition is necessitated, because it is determined in its moral- ity by the inclination of which it is the executive. The selfishly inclined drunkard may drink or not drink in a particular instance, and thus seems to be free in regard to volition, but in either case, his volition is selfish like his inclination. Apparently and formally it is free, but really, it is necessitated. 'No volition can be holy, if it is the executive of a sinful inclination ; or sinful, if it is the execu- tive of a holy inclination. Hence man's freedom must be

sought for in his ijidmatio?i, not in liis volitions. Moral necessity can be predicated of volitions, but not of inclination. There is a necessary connection between volitions and the foregoing inclination of which they are the index and executive; but no such necessary connection exists between an inclination and a foregoing inclination, or between an inclination and a foregoing volition. It is improper to say, that a person must incline in a certain manner, but proper to say that he fnicst choose in a certain manner. If he has an evil inclination, his choices are necessarily evil; but his inclination itself is not necessarily evil. Inclination has no antecedent, but constitutes an absolute beginning ex nihilo; but a volition does not.

This is what Kant means, when he asserts that the will as noumenon, or " thing in itself," is free, but as phenomenon is necessitated. Practical Reason. Abbott's Trans., 2G9-2S9. The law of cause and effect, or of the antecedent causiug the consequent, operates in regard to the phe- nomenal series of volitions in time, but not in regard to the abiding inclination which underlies them, and which is referable to no particular moment of time. The inclination is not a series, but a unit. There is only one inclination (noumenon), but myriads of volitions (phenomena). The inclination is not caused either by an antecedent inclination, or by a volition, but is self-caused. And the inclination is the real will of the man: the Ding an sich. Ritschl (History of Justification, YII.) states Kant's doctrine as fol- low^s: " Freedom denotes the will as unconditioned causality out of time, in distinction from the phenomena of will that run on in time, and are subject to natural necessity. The reason why every recollection of an act committed lono- ao-o calls forth sorrow is, that reason in all that pertains to our moral existence recognizes no distinctions of time, but asks only if the action was really mine." Edwards teaches the same truth in his doctrine of moral necessityaccording to which, the volition in its moral quality necessarilj follows the inclination. M. Hopkins, also, says that "choice" is free, but "volition" is necessary. Study of

8. Self-determination is causative, and originative of character. It starts a bias or disposition in the will. Volition is unproductive of character and disposition. A voli- tion leaves the man's inclination exactly as it found it. It makes no alteration in the bias of the will. This is seen in the futile attempt of the moralist to change liis inclination by volitionary resolutions. Inclination is a positive determination of the will in one direction, and towards one final end. Volition or choice is the selection of one out of two or more things, not from any interest in one rather than another, but because it is best adapted to the end in view. A volitionary choice is indifferent towards the thing chosen. If the drunkard could gratify his selfish inclination to physical pleasure better by water than by alcohol, he would choose water.

9. Inclination is spontaneous ; volition is nervous and often spasmodic. Inclination is easy and genial ; volition is more or less an effort, whether exerted against the inclination, or in accordance with it. When the drunkard by a volition refuses the cup because of his selfish inclination in the form of shame or fear, this volition costs him a great effort. When the drunkard by a volition takes the cup because of his selfish inclination in tlie form of desire of sensual pleasure, the volition is still an effort, though not a great one. He is, at least, compelled to exert his will sufficiently to move his muscles and limbs. Volition moves the body ; and this requires a distinct and separate resolution of the will back of the bodily movement. Inclination moves the will itself ; but this does not require a distinct and separate resolution of the will back of the mental and voluntary movement. The inclining is itself the mental activity ; the cause and the effect are one and the same thing. But the volition is not itself the muscular bodily

action: the cause and the effect are two different things. When a person loves or hates, he does not need to resolve to do it. Cut when he picks up a pin, or applies his mind to a geometrical proposition, he must resolve to do so. Love and hatred are easy because spontaneous; volitions are more or less an effort.

To recapitulate, then, we say that the total action of the Will is to be distinguished into voluntary and volitionary action, according as we speak of the central abiding inclination, or the superficial momentary choice. " Voluntary " action both originates, and is inclination, according as the action is viewed as subjective or objective; as originans or originata. It has only three points at which it may begin. 1. The instant of creation, when a holy inclination commenced by being con-created in the will of the specific Adam. 2. The instant of apostasy, when a sinful inclination commenced in the will of the specific Adam, by solitary self-determination without Divine co-operation. 3. The instant of regeneration, when a holy inclination is re-originated in the sinful will of the individual man, by the Holy Ghost. The beginning of a self-determined inclination is consequently an epoch in the history of the human will, and epochs are infrequent and rare from the nature of the case. Creation, apostasy, and regeneration are the great epochal points in man's existence.' But volitions are beginning continually, and are numberless. " Yolitionary " action has innumerable points of beginning, and in every instance supposes a prior inclination to an ultimate end.''

1 " The subject of the Paradise Lost is the origin of evil — an era in existence ; an event more than all others dividing past from future time ; an isthmus in the ocean of eternity. " Campbell: Essay on English Poetry.

2 Of American writers, Hopkins, in his Outline Study of Man, distinguishes between "choice" and " volition" in a manner that approximates to the distinction between inclination and volition. "Rational choice is the funda- mental, the voluntary, the moral part of the will ; volition is the executive part of the will," p. 224. "The point of freedom is in choice, and in that only. Choice being made, volition follows of course. The one is the essential element of freedom manifesting itself in the spiritual realm, and is the immediate ob'

Tliis distinction, between "voluntary" and " volitionary " action, or between inclination and choice, is marked in German, by Wille and Wilkiihr; in Latin, by voluntas and ar- Cicero: Tusc. Quaest., IV. 6. The neglect of the distinction results in confusion and misunderstanding. If he who makes this distinction asserts that " original sin is voluntary, but not volitionary," he is understood to say that orig- inal sin is the inclination of a man, and not a successive series of single choices; that it is the constant and central determination of the will to self and sin, and not the innumerable outward transgressions that proceed from this. But if one who does not make this distinction between voluntary and volitionary action asserts that " original sin is voluntary," he may be understood to mean that there is no sin but that of volitions; that original sin is the product of a volition, and can be removed by a volition.

Theologians who in fact agree with each other, appear to disagree in case the distinction is not recognized. Owen, for example, remarks (Indwelling Sin, XII.,) that " the will is the principle, the next seat and cause of obedience and disobedience. Moral actions are unto us, or in us, so far good or evil as they partake of the consent of the will. He spake truth of old who said: ' Every sin is so voluntary, that if it be not voluntarj' it is not sin.' " In this statement, " will " is employed in the comprehensive sense as antithetic to the understanding, and " voluntary " does not mean "volitionary." Owen would not say that "every sin is so volitionary, that if it be not volitionary it is not sin." Hodge

ject of the divine government; the other simply instrumental and executive, and is that of which human governments chiefly take cognizance," p. 225. Compare pp. 212, 231, 257. Hickok also tends towards the distinction between inclination and volition, in his threefold discrimination of '' immanent preference," "governing purpose," and " desultory volition." and in his definition of " spiritual susceptibility " and " spiritual disposition." Empirical Psychology, pp. 283-292. But both Hopkins and Hickok adopt the classification of intellect, sensibility, and will.

Vol. II.— 10

(Theology, I. 403), on the other hand, asserts that " freedom is more than spontaneity," and that " the affections are spontaneous, but not free. Loving and hating, delighting and abhorring do not depend upon the will." This agrees with the modern psychology, not with the elder. For by " will," Hodge here means the volitionary power, and by " freedom " the power to the contrary in the exercise of single choices.' If this is the true psychology, and freedom means the power of contrary choice, then it is correct to say that " the affections are not free ; " because they are most certainly not the product of volitions. Yet Hodge holds that evil affections are guilty and punishable. But this requires that they be free in the sense of inclination or dis- position ; that they are not the product of compulsion and necessity. And in saying that " the affections are spontaneous," he implies tliat they are from the will (ex sponte). For spontaneity in a rational being is free will. Spontaneity in an animal, is mere physical instinct ; but in man, it is rational self-determination. Leibnitz (De Libertate, Ed. Erdmann, 669) says, " libertas est spontaneitas intelligentis, itaque, quod spontaneum est in bruto vel alia substantia intellectus experte, id in homine vel in alia substantia intelli- gente, altius assurgit et liberum appellatur." ° Instinct in a brute is necessitated, because it is grounded wholly in sense and animal nature ; inclination in man is free, because it is grounded in reason and a spiritual essence. Inclination is the subject of command, and prohibition. Man is bidden to have a good inclination, and forbidden to have an evil

1 Hodge (Theology, II. 807) defines a self-determined will, as " acting independently of reason, conscience, inclinations, and feelings." This is the Ar- minian volitionary self-determination, which is accompanied with the power to the contrary.

^ Owen (Arminianism, XII.) defines freedom, with Prosper, as " a spontaneous appetite of what suemeth good unto it: liberum arbitrium est rei sibi placitae spontaneus ajjpetitus."

The great question in anthropology, and in reference to sin and holiness, relates to inclination rather than volition. How does an inclination begin — either a holy or a sinful inclination— is the true subject of inquiry. Had unfallen man power to change his holy inclination? Has fallen man power to change his sinful inclination e That man has power over his volitions is undisputed.

CHAPTER IV.